

Operational Art and the Dual Status Commander

A Monograph

by

MAJ John Goulart
US Army



School of Advanced Military Studies
US Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS

2018

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is unlimited

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

*Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188*

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 24-05-2018	2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis	3. DATES COVERED (From - To) JUN 2017 - MAY 2018
--	--	--

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Operational Art and the Dual Status Commander	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ John Goulart	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
--	---

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Advanced Military Studies Program	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for Public Release, Distribution is Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
A dual status commander is authorized to command both Title 10 and Title 32 forces in support of civil authorities. Though successfully employed for planned national security events, the requirement for a dual status commander during unplanned, limited notice, or no notice events became apparent during the military response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. After the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, the dual status commander construct was implemented in 2012 during Hurricane Sandy with both success and challenges. The dual status commander construct is one of legal authorities and emphasizes command and control. The intentional use of operational art under the dual status commander construct during natural disasters is not readily apparent due to the short planning timeline, current defense support of civil authorities doctrine, and the legal constraints of the dual status commander. The purpose of this study is to encourage the consideration of operational art as the dual status commander concept matures and as defense support of civil authorities doctrine develops.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Dual Status Commander, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, Operational Art

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			MAJ John Goulart
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	41	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: MAJ John Goulart

Monograph Title: Operational Art and the Dual Status Commander

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Ricardo A. Herrera, PhD

_____, Seminar Leader
Richard A. Martin, COL

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
James C. Markert, COL

Accepted this 24th day of May 2018 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, PhD

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into this manuscript. A work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright, however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

Abstract

Operational Art and the Dual Status Commander, by MAJ John Goulart, US Army, 41 Pages.

A dual status commander is authorized to command both Title 10 and Title 32 forces in support of civil authorities. Though successfully employed for planned national security events, the requirement for a dual status commander during unplanned, limited notice, or no notice events became apparent during the military response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. After the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, the dual status commander construct was implemented in 2012 during Hurricane Sandy with both success and challenges.

The dual status commander construct is one of legal authorities and emphasizes command and control. The intentional use of operational art under the dual status commander construct during natural disasters is not readily apparent due to the short planning timeline, current defense support of civil authorities doctrine, and the legal constraints of the dual status commander. The purpose of this study is to encourage the consideration of operational art as the dual status commander concept matures and as defense support of civil authorities doctrine develops.

Contents

Abstract	iii
Acknowledgements	v
Acronyms	vi
Illustrations	viii
Introduction	1
The National Guard	5
Policy	8
Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).....	14
Dual Status Commander.....	19
Operational Art.....	22
Hurricane Katrina	25
Hurricane Sandy	32
Conclusion.....	37
Bibliography	39

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Ricardo Herrera for his patience, effort, and humor over the past year. I would also like to thank COL Richard Martin and my seminar peers for their encouragement and the privilege of being their teammate. Lastly, I want to convey my deepest gratitude to my wife for her never-ending patience and support.

Acronyms

AAR	After Action Report
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ANG	Air National Guard
ARNG	Army National Guard
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosives
CCMD	Combatant Command
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CNGB	Chief, National Guard Bureau
DOD	Department of Defense
DSCA	Defense Support to Civil Authorities
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
EPLO	Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
ESF	Emergency Support Functions
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FORSCOM	US Forces Command
FSRT	Fatality & Services Response Teams
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
JFLCC	Joint Forces Land Component Commander
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JPP	Joint Planning Process

JTF-Katrina	Joint Task Force Katrina
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
LNO	Liaison Officer
MREs	Meals Ready to Eat
NAS	Naval Air Station
NDAA	The National Defense Authorization Act
NHC	National Hurricane Center
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NORAD	North American Aerospace and Defense Command
NRF	National Response Framework
NSS	National Security Strategy
OJS	Operation Jump Start
OPCON	Operational Control
PME	Professional Military Education
PPD	Presidential Policy Directive
RFA	Requests For Assistance
SAD	State Active Duty
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SRAAG	Senior Army Advisors, Army National Guard
TACON	Tactical Control
TAG	The Adjutant General
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USC	United States Code
USCBP	United States Customs and Border Patrol
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USNORTHCOM	US Northern Command

Illustrations

Figure 1. Typical Dual Status Command Model.....	22
--	----

Introduction

Our national preparedness is the shared responsibility of all levels of government and nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens. Everyone can contribute to safeguarding the Nation from harm. As such, while this directive is intended to galvanize action by the Federal Government, it is also aimed at facilitating an integrated, all-of-national, capabilities-based approach to preparedness.

President Barack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive 8

Since before the American Revolution, military forces have supported civil authorities in what eventually became the United States of America. First established in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636, the colonial and states' militias, later re-designated the Army National Guard (ARNG), fought in North America and abroad in every American war from the Pequot war of 1637 to the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹ The 1792 Militia Act established the place of state militias in the nation's defense and defined the militias' relationship to the federal government. Although this act was a victory for the anti-federalists and ensured the militias remained under state control, it provided the mechanism for the exercise of federal authority in times of invasion or insurrection. At the turn of the twentieth century, the US Military Academy was the commissioning source for the vast majority of regular army officers. The regular army's officer corps was tightly knit and considered the National Guard's leadership to be amateurs due to their truncated and uneven commissioning processes and training. Additionally, the regular army officers were distrustful of the National Guard's state ties, thus the army hatched a plan to remove the National Guard from state affiliations.

The states, however, prevailed through the Dick Act of 1903, which confirmed the National Guard as the army's main ready reserve. The Dick Act represented a compromise that increased federal control and gave states' guard forces access to federal funds but subjected them to inspection by regular army officers. Additionally, the Dick Act set the requirement for twenty-

¹ Army National Guard, *National Guard Fact Sheet*, accessed 30 October 2017, <http://www.arng.army.mil>.

four annual drills and annual training.² Today, the National Guard is comprised of fifty-four separate entities; the fifty states and the territories of Guam, US Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.³

The National Guard is the only US military force that operates in support of a state's and the federal government's response to crises.⁴ The active duty military mobilizes purely in support of federal civilian authorities. Together, the National Guard and the active duty military have secured the southwest border against Pancho Villa and other raiders, quelled the civil disturbances of the mid-twentieth century, responded to natural disasters, and responded to the attacks of 11 September 2001.⁵ Both state and federal forces have a long history mobilizing resources to protect the United States homeland.

Climate change represents one critical homeland security risk.⁶ Whatever the cause, climate change is linked to rising global temperatures, increased storm intensity and frequency, rising sea levels, increased drought, and fire risks.⁷ The catastrophic effects of weather events have proven to be an ever-increasing challenge of the last decade and a half. The frequency and severity of these low probability but high-impact events are expected to increase.⁸ Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf Coast of the United States on 29 August 2005 and soon became

² Renee Hylton-Green and Robert K. Wright, *A Brief History of The Militia and the National Guard* (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 1986), 26-29.

³ Army National Guard, *National Guard Fact Sheet*.

⁴ National Guard Association of the United States, *Fact Sheet*, accessed 28 December 2017, <https://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/Guard%20Statues.pdf>.

⁵ Paul J. Scheips, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945-1992* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2005), vii-ix.

⁶ US Department of Homeland Security, *The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* (Washington, DC: 2014), 14.

⁷ Federal Emergency Management Agency, Strategic Foresight Initiative, *Critical Infrastructure: Long-term Trends and Drivers and Their Implications for Emergency Management* (June 2011), 1.

⁸ DHS, *The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*, 14.

the most catastrophic natural disaster in American history. Katrina caused over one thousand three hundred deaths, destroyed three hundred thousand homes, and caused over ninety-six billion dollars in damage also making the storm the costliest disaster in American history.⁹ Hurricane Sandy, the second largest Atlantic storm ever recorded killed approximately one hundred seventeen people and led to tremendous flooding. Sandy left nearly nine million people without power and caused tens of billions of dollars in damage.¹⁰ In 2011, to bring state and federal military resources closer together during disaster response, congress mandated the Dual Status Commander (DSC) concept.¹¹ Though previously used during planned events, large national security functions, and long discussed for no notice disasters, the DSC mandate was largely a reaction to the disjointed response to Hurricane Katrina.¹² A DSC commands State Activity Duty (SAD), Title 10 federal forces, and Title 32 national guard forces during catastrophic disasters and incidents.¹³

The future of the nation's military support to large disasters includes both state and federal forces and is under the DSC construct. The activation of DSCs during Hurricane Sandy in 2012 and the 2017 hurricane season demonstrated the concept's value as a command and control mechanism to achieve unity of effort and continued to set precedence. There has been significant research and academic writing on both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy from the civil perspective within the federal, state, and local government. Since its inception fourteen years ago

⁹ The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, February 2006*, accessed 12 October 2017, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/>.

¹⁰ DHS, *The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*, 21.

¹¹ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 112-81, 112th Cong. (31 December 2011), 99.

¹² Ryan Burke and Sue McNeil, *Toward a Unified Military Response: Hurricane Sandy and the Dual Status Commander* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press), 10-11.

¹³ John T. Gereski, Jr and Christopher R. Brown, "Two Hats Are Better than One: The Dual Status Commander in Domestic Operations," *The Army Lawyer* (June 2010), 73.

as a command and control concept for a planned event, the DSC has accrued significant professional study through department of defense (DOD) after-action reports (AAR) and documented lessons learned. Much of the research emphasis is on Title 10, Title 32, and civilian emergency management integration and synchronization. When it comes to the no notice and unplanned crisis, the DSC construct has some significant challenges with the implementation of operational art and developmental opportunities. The unique nature of a DSC's authorities and the low priority of teaching Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations in professional military education compared with the emphasis placed on offensive, defensive, and stability operations has led to a lack of understanding by active duty officers. Hurricane Sandy exposed this lack of understanding.¹⁴

To examine DSCA operations is to have an appreciation of how civilian authorities and the nation provide homeland security and disaster relief. Disasters are typically seen local events that can quickly overwhelm local authorities who require assistance from higher levels of government. The DOD's DSCA doctrine and planning demonstrates DOD has a detailed strategic understanding of the nation's civilian disaster relief response systems and structure. The DOD's appreciation in conjunction with the states' governors led to the development of the DSC to remedy command and control issues and ensure unity of effort between civilian and military disaster relief efforts. However, the DSC construct and military disaster response has failed to demonstrate the deliberate use of operational art. Operational art is the Army's contemporary campaign planning tool used by army planners and commanders to organize operations and employ military forces. Operational art is not readily apparent in the execution of DSCA operations under the DSC. Though the use of a DSC is provided for through DSCA doctrine and concepts, the ad hoc nature, and the accelerated timeline of a DSC's staff organization during a no notice event inhibits the use of operational art.

¹⁴ Burke and McNeil, *Toward a Unified Military Response: Hurricane Sandy and the Dual Status Commander*, 14-15.

The National Guard

The National Guard's role must be examined to understand the guard's unique place in national defense, national security, and disaster response. National Guardsmen potentially have two commanders, the governor of the state where they serve and the president of the United States. To understand the National Guard is to understand the three authorities guardsmen may serve under: State Active Duty (SAD), Title 32, and Title 10. The state governor can order national guard personnel to a SAD status in response to disasters or homeland defense missions as authorized by the state's constitution and state laws. Command and control belongs to the governor delegated to the state's Adjutant General (TAG). A state's TAG is a cabinet official who commands, trains, and ensures the readiness of a state's military forces on behalf of the governor when they are not on active duty.¹⁵ During a SAD response the guard can use federally assigned aircraft, equipment, and supplies for state purposes as long as the federal government is reimbursed for the costs associated with these resources.¹⁶

The National guard is authorized by the Militia Clause of the US Constitution under Article 1, Section 8. The Militia Clause leaves the militia under state control but available to the federal government in the event of insurrections or invasions.¹⁷ The relationship between the states' national guard and the Federal government is further expanded in Title 32 United States Code (USC). Title 32 empowers the governor of a state to order national guard troops to duty for homeland defense activities. The President and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) approves activation under Title 32 for homeland defense, though command and control remain with the state. The two key aspects to Title 32 status are the funding and exception to the Posse Comitatus

¹⁵ Michael D. Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard 1636-2000*, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2003), 70.

¹⁶ Timothy J. Lowenberg, *The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security* (Washington, DC: National Guard Association of the United States, 2005), 2.

¹⁷ US Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8.

Act. The federal government funds the pay, allowances, and training of Title 32 troops while they remain under the command and control of the governor. It is this funding that justifies Presidential and SECDEF approval. The National Guard's activation for airport and transportation hub security after the 11 September 2001 attacks in Title 32 status was under the control of the individual states, but at the directive of the President and SECDEF.¹⁸ Conversely, The Posse Comitatus Act's origin dates back to the postbellum era and represents a backlash against the use of the army in reconstruction enforcement in the south.¹⁹ With few exceptions, the act prohibits the use of federal troops to enforce laws. An important exception is national guard forces under a state's authority may enforce laws and assist law enforcement.²⁰

Title 10 USC pertains to Army, Navy, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps forces under federal control to include each service's reserve components. Additionally, Title 10 provides the authority to the federal government to remove the National Guard from state control then mobilize and deploy these units and personnel for combat worldwide. Under Title 10, command and control lays with the President. Once this takes place, national guard troops are no longer accessible to their home states or governors. Under Title 10, national guard units become indistinguishable from federal forces and the exception to the Posse Comitatus Act no longer applies.²¹

Events during the 1990s greatly increased the National Guard's domestic role and capacity in support of civil authorities with a number of domestic emergencies and the growing intensity of natural disasters. The first major challenge for the National Guard's domestic

¹⁸ Lowenberg, *The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security*, 2.

¹⁹ Matt Matthews, *The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical Perspective* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 32.

²⁰ Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support to Civil Authorities After Certain Incident to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members, Committees on Armed Services, US Senate and US House of Representatives, *Before Disaster Strikes: Imperatives for Enhancing Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: 2010), 18.

²¹ Lowenberg, *The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security*, 3.

response capabilities was the Los Angeles Riots in April of 1992 which cost the lives of fifty-three people and caused nearly a billion dollars in property loss. The size and violence mirrored race riots, the likes of which the country had not seen since the 1960s. During the Los Angeles Riots, the Governor of California, Pete Wilson, activated over ten-thousand members of the California National Guard to protect residents and their interests.²² The vast size of natural disasters like Hurricane Andrew and the flood season of 1992-93 required regional national guard responses by multiple states. These disasters led to a nationwide structure of interstate compacts between governors and state emergency service offices authorizing the request and the employment of national guard troops across state lines. The National Guard received legal authority to provide regional responses.²³ In addition to natural disasters, the proliferation of terrorist attacks beginning with the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York by Islamic fundamentalists positioned the National Guard as a key player in domestic defense.²⁴

Today, national guard domestic operations and support to civil authorities extend well beyond the acute crisis. All states and territories' national guard Title 32 forces provide long term support to the nation's law enforcement through niche programs and capabilities that utilize the processes of the army warfighting functions, unique service skills, and the National Guard's traditional ties to the local community and state leadership. For example, the National Guard Counterdrug Program has provided military support and skills to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies with specific constraints since 1991. Counterdrug support includes criminal intelligence analysis and fusion with a focus on illicit finance; aviation support such as aerial observation, imagery, and communications; specialized training for law enforcement and interagency partners; federal operations incorporating mobile radar platforms and linguistics; civil

²² Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard 1636-2000*, 358.

²³ *Ibid.*, 358.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 359.

operations which coach antidrug coalitions on collaborative efforts and effect strategies to encourage a healthy citizenry.²⁵ National guard counterdrug support is provided under Title 32, funded by the federal government to each state and territory with national guard forces, along with a national guard Title 10 counterdrug management function at the National Guard Bureau (NGB).

Another creative use of the National Guard to support civil authorities was sanctioned by President George W. Bush from 2006-2008, when he authorized Operation Jump Start (OJS) along the Southwest Border of the United States. During the two-year period, over thirty thousand national guardsmen provided support to the United States Border Patrol (USCBP). Operating in Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas, their mission was not one of law enforcement but application of military technical skills. These service members provided crucial engineering, aviation, entry identification teams, technical, logistical, and administrative support to improve tactical infrastructure along the border and allow more USBP agents to conduct enforcement activities.²⁶

Policy

National preparedness doctrine begins at the highest level of government with the office of the president. The President of the United States is responsible for the safety, security, and resilience of the United States.²⁷ President Barack Obama implemented Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8) on 30 March 2011 aimed at “strengthening the security and the resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the

²⁵ National Guard Bureau, National Guard Regulation (NGR) 500-2, *National Guard Counterdrug Support* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008); Army National Guard, *National Guard Fact Sheet*.

²⁶ Doubler, *Operation Jump Start: The National Guard on the Southwest Border, 2006-2008*, 5.

²⁷ US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), I-3.

security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.”²⁸ As this directive cascades through the federal government, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with coordinating all executive departments while including and collaborating with state, local, tribal, and all other levels of government to include the private sector and the general public.²⁹ In essence, this is the joint service concept of unified action which intends to orchestrate all government activities through synchronization, coordination, and integration to achieve unity of effort. The resulting unity of effort is the cooperation and drive of multiple organizations toward common objectives when they are not part of the same chain of command.³⁰

The distinction between homeland defense and homeland security in preparedness doctrine is important. Though often used interchangeably they are two separate distinct mission categories in the federal government and to the DOD. Yet, homeland defense and homeland security are clearly related with some mission overlap between responsible entities. However, federal civilian and military doctrine is clear, the fundamental responsibility of each organization is unique and the lead agencies for homeland defense and homeland security differs. Homeland defense, as it sounds, is defense of the US homeland from an external threat such as international terrorism or an enemy state. The DOD is the lead agency in homeland defense. Nonetheless, measures to protect the homeland is not solely a DOD endeavor as all instruments of national power are employed to defeat threats to the homeland.³¹ The DOD is responsible for “detecting,

²⁸ Barack Obama, Presidential Policy Directive 8, "National Preparedness," (30 March 2011), 1; US Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1.

²⁹ Obama, Presidential Policy Directive 8, “National Preparedness,” 4.

³⁰ US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013) V-1, GL-13.

³¹ US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* 2013, viii.

detering, preventing, and defeating against threats from actors of concern as far forward from the US as possible.”³² All DOD Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) share in the responsibility of eliminating global threats to the US homeland whether near or far.³³

Homeland security on the other hand, is defense of the homeland from internal threats that originate from within the borders of the United States. These include threats to American citizens and national infrastructure such as homegrown terrorism, nature disasters, and cyber-attacks.³⁴ Homeland security realizes this protection through five key missions: 1. prevent terrorism and enhance security; 2. secure and manage borders; 3. enforce and administer immigration laws; 4. safeguard and secure cyber space; 5. strengthen national preparedness and resilience.³⁵ These five missions support the four enduring US national interests that have remained constant in the National Security Strategy (NSS) over the past decade. These national interests focus on the security of the United States, citizen, economic structures, preservation of universal values, and US leadership on the international stage.³⁶ DHS is the lead agency for homeland security, though the fundamental tenet to the American homeland security ethos is its collaborative nature where responsibility is shared among all levels of government and the public sector to create a “networked community.” The sharing of responsibility ensures the vast range of threats to the nation are addressed through an integrated mutually supporting structure. The public and private nature of the network concept strives to achieve flexible, adaptive, and efficient

³² US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-27, *Homeland Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), I-1.

³³ US Joint Staff, JP 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* 2013, I-16.

³⁴ James Jay Carafano, “Homeland Defense and Homeland Security: Distinctions and Difference,” in *Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA): The U.S. Military’s Role to Support and Defend*, ed. Robert McCreight and Robert B. Tussing, (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2015), 1-7.

³⁵ DHS, *The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review* 14.

³⁶ Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2010), 29; Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2015), 2.

response.³⁷ Again, this concept aligns with the joint service concept of unity of effort which emphasizes American “national objectives and common solutions to national security challenges.”³⁸

Within the DHS, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the organization whose chief responsibility “is to support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a nation the United States works together to build, sustain, and improve national capacity to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from and mitigate all hazards.”³⁹ Through this responsibility, FEMA maintains the civilian doctrine for national incident management. The fundamental principle in US disaster support reflects the idea that all disasters are local events. Support from higher levels of government is managed locally.⁴⁰ This is management and awareness from the bottom up, as local and municipal authorities are overwhelmed their requests for support flow to the county and onto the state if county resources are inadequate or overwhelmed. The state’s emergency management office has significantly more resources to include governor approved access to the state’s national guard along with the ability to exercise Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC) with other states and federal government agencies. Once a state is overwhelmed by the resource requirements of a disaster, federal assistance can be requested. This federal assistance can include Title 10 federal military forces. By civilian doctrine, FEMA becomes responsible for management of all federal assistance through the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.⁴¹ To the military

³⁷ DHS, *The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*, 31.

³⁸ US Joint Staff, JP 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* 2013, I-1-I-2.

³⁹ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *About*, accessed 30 October 2017, <https://fema.gov/about-agency>.

⁴⁰ US Department of Defense, “History of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs: Superstorm Sandy Response Narrative” (Draft, 2013) 2.

⁴¹ Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-288 as Amended (Washington, DC: 2013).

professional, these are tactical situations that widen to operational and strategic as a crisis expands and or local resources become depleted. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, this request process colloquially referred to in disaster management as a “pull system” for federal resources. Once overwhelmed, the state and local authorities “pull” support and resources from the federal government.⁴²

The Robert T. Stafford Act is the legal link between state and federal disaster relief assistance. The Act is a powerful tool that governs the federal government’s delivery of federal assistance. This reinforces the nation’s doctrine that during a disaster local resources are exhausted first, then state resources, and then federal resources are brought to bear if needed. The Stafford Act gives the federal government the legal authority to provide assistance to state and local governments if a disaster causes local and state governments to exhaust their resources. The law allows a governor to formally request the President declare a state of emergency after the governor has activated the state’s emergency response plan, which often includes national guard activations. FEMA provides the federal assistance approved by the President through the Stafford Act.⁴³

Though the Stafford Act provides the legal authority for federal assistance, it is the National Response Framework (NRF) that serves as the playbook for synchronizing the nation’s capabilities when responding to disasters. The NRF is national level policy for emergency management and describes the doctrine for national response.⁴⁴ The NRF uses the concept of Emergency Support Functions (ESF) to categorize response capabilities to achieve shared understanding among the civilian, military, and private sector response. The nation’s Incident

⁴² The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned*, February 2006, 18.

⁴³ Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 2013.

⁴⁴ US Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, *National Incident Management System* (Washington, DC, 2008), 1.

Management System (NIMS) provides the approach for managing the ESF. NIMS is the templated doctrine, concepts, and vocabulary of incident management.⁴⁵ NIMS is designed to be scalable, flexible, and adaptable to span and support all levels of government. When a locality requests additional resources, these requests typically go to county level emergency management and onto a state's office of emergency services. National guard forces are among the many disaster resources at a state's disposal and additional resources from outside of state can be acquired through Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC). When an incident outstrips a state's resources the state requests federal assistance through FEMA.⁴⁶

FEMA's primary relationship and link to DOD is through the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). FEMA requests DOD assistance such as manpower, specific capabilities, or assets through the DCO. The DCO is a senior Title 10 Army officer and often a former brigade commander who serves as FEMA's link to the DOD's resources. The relationship is designed so the DCO serves as the single point of contact between military forces and FEMA. The DCO validates requests for assistance (RFA) from federal civil authorities and forwards the RFAs to DOD for approval and sourcing. Each of the ten FEMA geographic regions have a permanent DCO provided by US Army North (USARNORTH). The DCO is supported by military administrative and support staff known as the defense coordinating element (DCE). During a crisis, FEMA activates a Joint Field Office (JFO) which is a temporary multi-agency coordination center designed as a central location of coordination for all levels of government. During a DSCA event that requires a DOD response, additional DCOs support the JFOs as they are established and become operational. Additionally, each FEMA region and state are authorized Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLO) who are under the operational control (OPCON) of the

⁴⁵ US Army, ADP 3-28, (2012), 2-3.

⁴⁶ US Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, *National Response Framework Third Edition June 2016* (Washington, DC, 2016), 1-14.

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). They operate under the tactical control (TACON) of the DCO when performing homeland defense and DSCA missions. EPLOs are senior Title 10 reserve forces imbedded in the DCEs who liaise on behalf of DOD to facilitate planning, coordination, and training for DSCA and national preparedness. The EPLO also advises civilian partners beyond FEMA regarding DOD capabilities and resources. EPLOs are available to surge during large DSCA events to support FEMA and additional JFOs.⁴⁷

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) is the DOD's support provided by all service component Title 10 assets, DOD civilians, contractors, and Title 32 national guard. DSCA is provided in response to requests for support from civilian authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, along with other domestic activities.⁴⁸ Understanding the distinct relationships, interplay, and legal authorities of federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal governments is a significant challenge. These factors need to be considered during the planning, resource sharing, and when executing DSCA operations. However, the layered relationships provide an allotment of resources to state and local officials that are reinforced by higher echelons of government through the US constitution, common laws, and traditional relationships.⁴⁹

The fundamental principle in US disaster support is that all disasters are local events. This principle reverberates in DOD DSCA doctrine. Disaster support from higher levels of government are managed locally. Incident leadership and decisions are tactical in nature. The

⁴⁷ US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* 2013, II-12-II-13.

⁴⁸ US Joint Staff, JP 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* 2013, vii, I-16.

⁴⁹ US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* 2013, vii.

Title 10 active component military along with the SAD and Title 32 national guard have resources that can be crucial to the support of civil authorities during disasters. The DOD has the operational capabilities to turn strategic decisions into timely tactical actions on the ground.⁵⁰ Both have significant manpower, with national guard forces regionally dispersed.⁵¹ The National Guard has specialized teams such as Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high-yield Explosives (CBRNE) and Fatality and Services Response Teams (FSRT).⁵² Joint doctrine and the NRF recognize the National Guard is fundamentally a state resource. When the National Guard deploys domestically it organizes under an internal structure, but the local incident command philosophy is preserved with tactical guidance provided by the civilian incident commander.⁵³

All federal active component forces operate under Title 10, USC. Title 10 provides legal authorization for the operations of federal armed forces and the division into individual service components of the army, navy, air force, and marine corps. Under Title 10, military support to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) is not authorized. National guard forces can mobilize under Title 10 by the President or the SECDEF and the Posse Comitatus act applies to national guard forces while on Title 10 status. Under Title 10, national guard forces are commanded by a GCC and all personal, training, and operations costs are paid by the DOD.

Title 32, USC provides for federal oversight of national guard forces while under state control for training and duty usually linked to the National Guard's service specific warfighting mission. Additionally, Title 32 allows the governor of a state to order national guard service

⁵⁰ The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned*, February 2006, 54.

⁵¹ DOD, "History of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs: Superstorm Sandy Response Narrative," 2.

⁵² National Guard Bureau, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, National Guard Regulations (NGR) 500-1, *National Guard Domestic Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 8-9.

⁵³ US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* 2013, II-4.

members to duty for operational homeland defense duties, with the approval of the president or the SECDEF. Federal funds finance Title 32 national guard, but these forces remain under the command and control of the TAG on behalf of the governor and the state. A state's TAG is the senior military commander who usually holds the rank of major general and is normally a cabinet official appointed by the governor, in several states the public elects TAG. TAG is responsible for the constitutionally recognized national guard and any other militia created by the governor in accordance with state and federal law.⁵⁴ As long as the command and control remains with the state, a statutory exception to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 enables the guard to serve in a law enforcement capacity.

SAD is another status linked to the states' rights to field a militia and authorized by a state's governor to resource forces during disasters and homeland defense missions. SAD forces are governed exclusively by individual state policy and financed through state funds. The state pure nature of SAD forces means the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to SAD forces.⁵⁵ Technically and by military doctrine, SAD support sits outside of DSCA because of its state sovereign and state centric nature.⁵⁶ But, this differentiation is irrelevant to affected citizens, governors, and DSCs. Since most disasters and civil emergencies do not require federal military support, when military support is necessary, states use their national guard forces first. Historically, and when the DSC is not implemented during large events and disasters federal forces were called upon under the direction of the supported GCC while the National guard maintained their chain of command. This resulted in a parallel command and control structure.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Lowenberg, *The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security*, 8.

⁵⁵ National Guard Association of the United States, *Fact Sheet*.

⁵⁶ US Army, ADP 3-28, (2012), ii.

⁵⁷ DOD, "History of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs: Superstorm Sandy Response Narrative," 4.

An important player in the Title 10 and Title 32 interface for both DSCA and traditional warfighting preparation are the Senior Army Advisors, Army National Guard (SRAAG). Each state and territory with an ARNG receives an assigned SRAAG who is senior Title 10 active duty officer. The SRAAG serves as TAG's liaison to the regular army and advises ARNG commanders on organization, operations, training, and readiness. The SRAAG also serves to as an expert on Title 32 integration into the active component during mobilizations. The SRAAGs are part of the First Army, which is the field army who assists army reserve and national guard formations reach Department of the Army mandated training and readiness levels on behalf of US Forces Command (FORSCOM). FORSCOM provides trained and ready army forces to the GCCs.⁵⁸ The SRAAG can also serve as an additional link to US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and Title 10 forces during disasters as was the case during Hurricane Katrina.⁵⁹

The DOD's primary DSCA organization is USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM is the GCC created after the attacks on 11 September 2001 "to provide command and control of [DOD's] homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities."⁶⁰ USNORTHCOM's charter is to conduct homeland defense in the air, land, and sea domain (out to five hundred nautical miles) within the continental US, Alaska, Canada, and Mexico.⁶¹ USPACOM shares similar homeland defense responsibilities from the maritime domain of the West Coast of the US to Hawaii and the US Territory of Guam.⁶²

⁵⁸ "ATFP and Senior Army Advisor, Army National Guard (SRAAG) Duties and Certification," *STAND-TO! The Official Focus of the U.S. Army*, last modified 3 December 2014, accessed 01 March 2018, https://www.army.mil/standto/archive_2014-12-03.

⁵⁹ Gary Cecchine, et al, *Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 16.

⁶⁰ "ABOUT USNORTHCOM," US Northern Command, accessed 1 November 2017, <http://www.northcom.mil/About-USNORTHCOM/>.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* 2013, C-1.

Fortunately, USNORTHCOM has yet to respond to a large-scale threat with military intervention. However, the command is often called upon to provide assistance during natural disasters. DOD doctrine for the handling of natural disasters and DSCA predates the establishment of USNORTHCOM. National guard forces operating under state authorities have primacy when military assistance is provided and use DOD DSCA doctrine. But, USNORTHCOM owns DSCA doctrine and continues to improve the way DOD interacts with civil authorities. Though the majority of USNORTHCOM's support to civil authorities has been for natural disasters, three notable exceptions are the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia disaster, the 2007 collapse of an Interstate 35 bridge in Minnesota, and the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Platform oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.⁶³

The unique nature of DSCA compared to other military activities within the range of military operations (ROMO) is made apparent in joint doctrine through a modification of planning phases. Like other operations, DSCA relies on a six-phase planning model. The six DSCA phases are: shape, anticipate, respond, operate, stabilize, and transition. The phases have a sequence but lines of effort and activities often overlap and span several phases. A DSCA

⁶³ "A Short History of United States Northern Command," US Northern Command, accessed 28 January 2018, <http://www.northcom.mil>.

operation may include several of the phases concurrently in a large Joint Area of Operations (JOA).⁶⁴

Dual Status Commander

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2004 granted the ability of a national guard officer to hold a state and federal commission at the same time. This new concept implemented during at the June 2004 G-8 Summit on Sea Island, Georgia. Previously, national guard forces operated at the direction of the state while federal forces operated that the direction of the GCCs when in support of civil authorities. Since the 2004 NDAA, a DSC has been authorized by national authority over two dozen times in planned events of national security significance to include presidential inaugurations and political conventions. In each of these cases the DSC concept is successful when events allowed for significant planning and preparation. However, in limited or no notice natural disasters and incidents coordination between national guard and federal forces is much more difficult.⁶⁵

In 2010, the Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort further inspired the appointment of a DSC during no notice or imminent events. A collective effort between the Council of Governors, the DOD, the DHS, and FEMA developed the Joint Action Plan in late 2010. In 2011, the plan received approval and the signatures of the Council of Governors, the SECDEF, and the Secretary of DHS. The plan identified five areas for expeditious cooperation between the participant agencies. The Joint Action Plan highlighted the governor's role as the primary civilian authority within their state or territory when federal government provides support during an emergency and the governor's responsibility for managing the response. The plan identified a state's TAG as the primary military authority within a state supported by the DSC and all Title 10 forces as supporting forces subject to state laws. What the Joint Action Plan reiterated was the need for a command and control link that brought unity of effort among state and federal forces while it ensures a separation of the state and federal resources. The plan identified the DSC

as that link.⁶⁶ The Joint Action Plan identifies DOD as capable of providing the mission assignment function identified in the NRF during federal operations when a local or state government is overwhelmed and cannot provide mission assignment at their level.⁶⁷

The Joint Action Plan, developed in a climate of perceived government failures during Hurricane Katrina was formalized and legally authorized through fiscal year 2012 NDAA. The 2012 NDAA codified the DSC as the “usual and customary command and control arrangement” when Title 10 and Title 32 forces are employed in support of civil authorities. The act also formally identified a state’s TAG as the primary military authority support by the DSC’s state role during no notice or unplanned events. Additionally, the 2012 NDAA included a provision for the activation of Title 10 reserve forces from all of the services in support of civil authorities during disaster response.⁶⁸

The different statuses of Title 10, Title 32, and SAD create confusion and by design there is not a clear chain of command between the president and the states’ governors.⁶⁹ A DSC holds a commission in either the active duty Army or Air Force, but normally is an ARNG or Air National Guard (ANG) officer with a federal commission. The SECDEF authorizes a DSC to receive federal orders and command federal Title 10 forces. Concurrently, the governor of the effected state or territory empowers the DSC to command and receive orders on behalf of Title 32 forces. The DSC is legally authorized to serve in two statuses simultaneously and represents a unique link in these two separate chains of command and ensures the federal orders and state orders are kept mutually exclusive. The DSC is the link between the two statuses and does not

⁶⁶ Council of Governors, *Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort* (Washington, DC: Council of Governors and the Department of Defense, 2011), 1-2.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

⁶⁸ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 112-81, 112th Cong., (31 December 2011), 119.

⁶⁹ US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* 2013, III-8.

merge state and federal resources or directives. A DSC cannot direct federal forces on orders from the state chain of command or state forces on orders received from the federal government. For example, the governor cannot give orders to Title 10 forces through the DSC and the president cannot instruct state militia. The DSC is where the two chains of command meet to create unity of effort, but orders and resources are to never cross.⁷⁰ Preservation of the Posse Comitatus Act arguably carries the most weight in preserving the mutually exclusive Title 10 and Title 32 chains of command.⁷¹ Separation and preservation of authorities is at the crux of the DSC responsibilities and requires a senior, experienced, and educated officer. The appointment of a DSC requires a state or territory with a national guard. This includes USNORTHCOM's domestic area of responsibility, the State of Hawaii, and Territory of Guam in the USPACOM AOR.⁷²

The appointment of a DSC requires consensus between a state's governor and the president or SECDEF, under the advisement of the supported Combatant Commander (CCDR) (USNORTHCOM or USPACOM) that the DSC is necessary and proper. When a disaster is regional or when a state is faced with multiple incidents, appointment of multiple DSCs may be appropriate.⁷³ A DSC is required to conduct all operations in accordance with Titles 10, 32, state, and federal laws. This makes state and federal judge advocates a critical part of a DSC's staff.

The DSC construct is one of deliberate preparation of agreements that cover: legal authorities, training, fiscal, operational, and administrative responsibilities. What is not evident in the arrangement is intentional consideration of operational art.⁷⁴ The important mutually

⁷⁰ US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* 2013, C-1; National Guard Bureau, *Dual Status Commander Fact Sheet*, accessed 30 August 2017, <http://www.nationalguard.mil>.

⁷¹ Gereski and Brown, "Two Hats Are Better than One: The Dual Status Commander in Domestic Operations," 77.

⁷² US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* 2013, C-1.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, C-1-C-2.

⁷⁴ Gereski and Brown, "Two Hats Are Better than One: The Dual Status Commander in Domestic Operations," 75.

officer education.⁷⁵ Both US joint doctrine and Army doctrine share a definition of operational art. The Army uses operational art to advance “strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose.”⁷⁶ US joint doctrine categorizes warfare into three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. The levels of warfare intentionally do not have distinct or defined boundaries to resemble the fluid ambiguity of war or a crisis, and neither does the implementation of operational art.

The strategic level is the use of the instruments of national power in a conceptually broad fashion to achieve national objectives. The operational level, is the link between the strategic and tactical and achieves objectives through the sequencing of tactical actions. The operational level is where commanders, staff, doctrine, and history find much of the value of operational art. The tactical level is the employment of combat units in relation to one another through maneuver and fires. It is the level of battles and engagements.⁷⁷ The DSC is an operational and tactically focused command. Key to the application of operational art is the empirical experience, skill, and education of commanders and their staff. Operational art offers an approach to understand vague, uncertain, and complex operational environments and problems. The purpose of operational art is to provide shared understanding of how commanders visualize the operation approach. This operational approach links the ends, ways, and means in time, space, and purpose to achieve the end state.

Operational art is not to be mistaken as the exclusive critical link between the strategic and tactical levels, as the tenets and tools of operational art apply at all three levels of warfare.

⁷⁵ Michael D. Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard 1636-2000*, 358; Harold W. Nelson, “The Maturation of Operational Art: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” in *Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art*, ed. Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Philips (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2007), 440-475.

⁷⁶ US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 4-1.

⁷⁷ US Joint Staff, JP 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* 2013, I-8.

For the Army, operational art incorporates ten elements, modified from the joint elements of operational design, which serve as tools and a common language for commanders and staffs to visualize and describe the operational environment. All ten elements of operational art have the potential to be a powerful tools to assist a DSC and staff while planning for and during times of crisis. The most applicable of the ten elements to DSCA and the DSC are lines of effort, operational reach, culmination, basing, tempo, phasing and transitions, and risk. Lines of efforts help commanders link tasks based on purpose and help the commander visualize the sequence or concurrence of actions during support of civil authorities.⁷⁸

Operational reach is the distance and duration a commander can conduct operations and employ capabilities. Culmination during DSCA occurs when response requirements overwhelm forces because there are more events than can be managed simultaneously. Basing represents the location from which operations receive sustainment, command and control support, and the place from which a force is projected. Tempo pertains to the rate a military operation takes place and during DSCA tempo can represent the speed at which a sense of normalcy returns to a community. Phasing and transitions, a phase divides an operation by time or activity, while a transition in DSCA represents a point where DOD support is no longer required.⁷⁹ Risk represent the uncertainty inherent in military operations and is magnified by inadequate planning and preparation. The shortened planning timeline of a DSC during a limited or no notice event magnifies risk. The other elements of operational art are designed to mitigate risk.⁸⁰

As unified action attempts to reduce operational risk and furthers military and civilian organizations' efforts towards common objectives, so does operational art. Operational art can

⁷⁸ US Army, ADRP 3-0, (2012), 4-1-4-5.

⁷⁹ US Army, ADRP 3-0, (2012), 4-7; US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* 2013, II-16.

⁸⁰ US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* 2013, 4-9.

organize and integrate resources to create as complete of a picture as possible during the disaster relief efforts. Operational art offers value to civilian disaster response planning by synchronizing resources and efforts from multiple agencies because of the shared understanding operational art creates and the continuous collaboration between all echelons. Without operational art the local nature of disaster response maintains a disjointed application at the cost of regional and national efficiency.⁸¹

Hurricane Katrina

By any measure, Hurricane Katrina was a national catastrophe. Similar to the images of grief and destruction on September 11, 2001, the images of suffering and despair from Hurricane Katrina are forever seared into the hearts and memories of all Americans. Those painful images must be the catalyst for change.

The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, February 2006

The nation had advanced warning of Hurricane Katrina. On 23 August 2005 Hurricane Katrina was a tropical depression near the Bahamas. Over the next week, the tropical depression grew to a tropical storm and ultimately in to a destructive Category 5 hurricane. Katrina first made landfall just north of Miami, Florida, as a Category 1 hurricane. Once across Florida and in the Gulf of Mexico, Katrina turned from an east-west path to the northwest and directly towards the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. The warm waters of the Gulf fueled the hurricane's growth into a Category 5 and on 29 August 2007, Katrina made land fall on the Gulf Coast.⁸²

Large storms are not uncommon in the US or to the Gulf Coast. What set Hurricane Katrina apart was the sheer size of the hurricane. Katrina's hurricane force winds radiated one hundred thirty miles from the center, while tropical storm force winds extend two hundred thirty

⁸¹ US Joint Staff, JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* 2013, 4-1.

⁸² The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, February 2006*, 23; "Hurricane Katrina," Federal Emergency Management Administration, last modified January 12, 2016, accessed 27 December 2017, <https://www.fema.gov/hurricane-katrina>.

miles. The ocean storm surges reached twenty-seven feet high from Mobile, Alabama to New Orleans, Louisiana. Hurricane Katrina affected an area of nearly ninety-three thousand square miles, close to the size of Great Britain. Hurricane Katrina's final tally was over one thousand three hundred lives lost, more than three hundred thousand homes destroyed, and seven hundred seventy thousand people displaced. Property damage estimates reached ninety-six billion dollars and the hurricane created one hundred eighteen million cubic yards of debris. Though many small cities were damaged or destroyed, their immediate relief required smaller efforts. New Orleans was a much different story. The largest city in Hurricane Katrina's path, New Orleans' three hundred fifty-mile levee system was no match for the Katrina. Once breached, eighty percent of the city flooded in between six feet and twenty feet of water in about eighteen hours.⁸³

On 23 August 2005, USNORTHCOM issued a warning order to the SRAAGs in the Gulf states.⁸⁴ Actual military movement began on 26 August 2005, with a focus on basing. Louisiana National Guard's Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) activated its Joint Operations Center (JOC) and two thousand national guardsmen. The JOC was located at Jackson Barracks in New Orleans and was responsible for coordination the Louisiana National Guards response to Hurricane Katrina. Simultaneously, the Governor of Mississippi issued an executive order to the state's national guard to prepare for disaster relief operations. Seven hundred fifty military police were activated along with the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Jackson, Mississippi. The Mississippi National Guard based emergency rescue assets in the three coastal counties, while Alabama staged Guardsmen in two of the four coastal counties, Mobile and Baldwin.⁸⁵ Additionally, the Mississippi prepared Camp Shelby in central Mississippi to receive an influx of

⁸³ The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned*, February 2006, 23.

⁸⁴ Cecchine, et al, *Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations*, 16.

⁸⁵ The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned*, February 2006, 26.

Title 10 and Title 32 forces.⁸⁶ USNORTHCOM provided Naval Air Station (NAS) Meridian, Mississippi as an operational staging base for FEMA for the staging of relief provisions two days before landfall. The vast space required outside of the hurricane's path to store the influx of supplies, trailers, and personnel to support the relief efforts along with evacuees necessitated additional military basing areas. Barksdale Air Force Base near Shreveport, Louisiana became the location of the federal logistics mobilization center.⁸⁷ Use of these basing locations, both permanent and temporary, extended and enabled the operational reach, served as transportation nodes to move forces in and out of the anticipated operational area, and as distribution locations.⁸⁸

On 28 August 2005, the Governor of Louisiana and the Mayor of New Orleans identified and opened the "shelter of last resort," the unprepared Louisiana Superdome. Until this time the Superdome was used exclusively for special needs residents numbering no more than five hundred evacuees. The mayor anticipated the Superdome's shelter accommodation capacity to be up to seventy thousand people and encouraged anyone heading to the Superdome for shelter to bring their own food and comfort items. Incidental lines of effort emerged as the Louisiana National Guard provided provisions, security, and medical care at the Superdome. The National Guard pre-positioned Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) and water in the Superdome for the special needs residents. Once the Superdome was open to all, a Title 32 specific line of effort of authorized support to law enforcement began to ensure the safety of those sheltered within. The Louisiana National Guard deployed the highly trained Special Reaction Team to conduct law enforcement and area security missions within the Superdome. Title 10 forces could not have

⁸⁶ The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned*, February 2006, 43.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 27, 31.

⁸⁸ US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 4-0, Sustainment (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 3-9-3-10.

performed these duties because of Posse Comitatus constraints on federal troops. Soon, several hundred Louisiana Army National Guard engineers along with over one hundred security forces from the state's ANG reported to establish the wider security of the facility. Additionally, seventy-one medical personnel to include five physicians and a contingent of nurses and medics reported to the Superdome before the end of 28 August 2005.⁸⁹

After Hurricane Katrina made land fall, state and local officials were soon overwhelmed. Civil authorities' local incident command locations were unable to be establish or to maintain their functions. The incident command first responder communication infrastructure was destroyed. Local officials to include the mayor of New Orleans could not guide local, state, or federal support. This prevented not only emergency medical services and search and rescue, but also law enforcement, firefighting, and support to the swelling evaluation shelters. Both Mississippi and Louisiana had a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) deployed to Iraq significantly reducing the number of Army National Guardsmen available.⁹⁰ The governors of Mississippi and Louisiana exercised EMACs with other states and national guard forces and assets from these states began to flow into the region.⁹¹

Both national guard and active duty personnel played key roles in the nation's response to Hurricane Katrina. The initial military response of SAD and Title 32 national guardsmen remained under the command of the states of Mississippi and Louisiana. Active duty personnel under Title 10 authority remained under the federal chain of command with limitations on the support provided to civil authorities. 30 August 2005, DOD under Title 10 authority directed USNORTHCOM to establish Joint Task Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina). JTF-Katrina grew with

⁸⁹ The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, February 2006*, 29-30.

⁹⁰ Cecchine, et al, *Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations*, 20.

⁹¹ The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, February 2006*, 37.

exceptional speed. Active duty personnel climbed to over fourteen thousand within four days. The DOD provided much of the response's muscle through manpower, resources, and ability to plan which gave immediate benefit to disaster efforts. Title 10 missions included search and rescue, logistics, security, firefighting, mosquito abatement, salvage, air traffic control, and fuel distribution.⁹² However, these lines of effort and missions were not assigned through a single entity with visibility and understanding of all DSCA efforts.

The initial response, though a credit to the collaborative effort of the State TAGs could not be sustained because of the growing scale and duration of the required response. This demonstrated the National Guard's justifiable inability to control the tempo and culmination during the hurricane response. The National Guard (and its partners) understandably lost tempo because of the inability to establish normalcy during the humanitarian crisis and expended a large amount of energy and resources due to the high rate of operations. The National Guard achieved culmination in the context of DSCA when the requirements of the hurricane response outstripped what could manage simultaneously.⁹³ The CNGB addressed culmination and unanswered support request from the Gulf States through a hasty conference call with the fifty-four TAGs to identify the states with forces and equipment available to continue support to hurricane Katrina relief efforts. Additionally, the CNGB waived all required request paper work to speed the response to the Gulf.⁹⁴ The National Guard performed the same missions as federal forces with the addition of greater law enforcement support.

The flow of national guard forces into the Gulf was disjointed. The separate commands between the states and the active duty forces was to the detriment of communications and

⁹² The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, February 2006*, 43.

⁹³ US Army, ADRP 3-0, (2012), 4-7-4-9.

⁹⁴ Cecchine et al, *Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations*, 24.

synchronization. The different commands divided the JOA geographically and conducted separate operations. Each military organization had the same lines of effort within their area of operations, but these executed in a discrete and separate fashion violating the joint service and homeland security unity of effort fundamental. The lessons learned report commissioned by The White House highlighted the need for integration between the National Guard and active duty during homeland security planning and operations.⁹⁵

The need for a formal command and control structure during limited notice disaster response became apparent. “In the overall response to Hurricane Katrina, separate command structures for the active duty military and national guard hindered their unity of effort.” USNORTHCOM’s JTF-Katrina and states’ TAGs used an informal coordinating relationship leading to turmoil over roles and responsibilities. JTF-Katrina did not know what national guard forces were in the JOA and where they were located. JTF-Katrina could not operate effectively with a lack of situational awareness on over half of the military response forces. Likewise, the Louisiana National Guard was not fully aware of JTF-Katrina’s force locations and operations. This led to a delay in the assignment of JTF-Katrina missions and a duplication of effort with both national guard and active duty forces assigned the same tasks at the same locations. The military response was not coordinated and served two different commanders, the states’ governors and the president.⁹⁶

This was an overt call for the authorization of the command structure the DSC construct provides and unity of effort amongst Title 10 and Title 32 DOD forces. The tiered response of first national guard forces based on state mission and proximity, then the establishment of a robust JTF with active duty force demonstrates the need for a DSC empowered to plan for

⁹⁵ The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, February 2006*, 43.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 54-55.

phasing and transitions between the initial Title 32 response and Title 10 follow on forces during disaster response. The DSC construct should provide the organization required to plan and orchestrate such a transition.

Hurricane Katrina studies and After Action Reports (AARs) are replete with justification for a DSC. During the initial Hurricane Katrina response search and rescue, evacuation of failing shelters, and relief operations to include infrastructure repair were essentially the three primary types of operations. A single command authorized to choreograph search and rescue operations would have allowed for an earlier start to operations and ensured a unified effort.⁹⁷ A DSC command would have enabled these types of operations to be developed into synchronized lines of effort with prioritized objectives that evolve as resources arrive in the JOA and operational reach is extended. Units were not selected for any specific capabilities. DOD lacked a process to match requirement against DOD capability. DOD personnel used their professional judgement when determining the types of units and equipment to send.⁹⁸ A DSC and staff would have had the tactical knowledge and situational awareness on civilian incident command requirements and short comings. This would have enabled a DSC staff to conduct a requirement analysis and request the appropriate DOD capabilities when exercising EMACs and requesting additional support Title 10 or Title 32.⁹⁹

The response of local, state, and the federal government to Hurricane Katrina has been the subject of much criticism. The DOD has not escaped harsh evaluation. Lack of timeliness, coordination failures, inefficiencies, mission redundancy, mission inadequacy, administrative and legal constraints include some of the critiques leveled at the military response. As the DOD, state national guard forces, governors, and the executive branch assessed Hurricane Katrina the need

⁹⁷ Cecchine, et al, *Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations*, 28-44.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 36.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 8, 25, 27.

for policy changes and improved coordination between the National Guard and federal forces became apparent. The original necessity and legal precedent previously set by the 2004 NDAA and U.S. Code 32 Sections 315 and 325 which allows a federally recognized officer to temporarily receive a state commission and for a national guard officer to be ordered to active duty and relieved of national guard duty for a preplanned event would serve as the basis for the Joint Action Plan and ultimately the 2012 NDAA.¹⁰⁰

Considering the criticism, the military response to Hurricane Katrina was remarkable. Within four hours of Hurricane Katrina's land fall the ARNG was conducting search and rescue operations with air and ground assets.¹⁰¹ The National Guard set a precedent with the speed and size of response with forty-one thousand personnel in Louisiana and Mississippi by 09 September 2005, far surpassed the near seventeen thousand national guardsmen mobilized in 1989 for the San Francisco, California earthquake. All Title 10 services provided active duty organizations leading to sixty-five thousand service members contributing the Hurricane Katrina response.¹⁰²

Hurricane Sandy

Like Hurricane Katrina, the nation had advanced warning of Hurricane Sandy. On 22 October 2012, Sandy was the eighteenth tropical depression of the season and in the southwestern Caribbean Sea. The National Hurricane Center (NHC) accurately predicted the storm would head towards the northeast. Three hundred ninety-five miles southwest of Jamaica, the Tropical Depression grew into Tropical Storm Sandy. On 24 October 2012, the NHC upgraded Sandy to a hurricane and the storm continued a north-northeast path with sustained winds of eighty miles per

¹⁰⁰ US Code 32 § 315, § 325; Burke and McNeil, *Toward a Unified Military Response: Hurricane Sandy and the Dual Status Commander*, 14-15.

¹⁰¹ The White House, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, February 2006*, 38.

¹⁰² Cecchine, et al, *Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations*, 22.

hour. As Sandy advanced up the Atlantic coast of the US, the hurricane consolidated with an arctic cold front and shifted to the northwest. The cold air from the arctic cold front created a blizzard in the Appalachian Mountains delivering over two feet of snow in parts of Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, and North Carolina. Before landfall, Hurricane Sandy produced severe flooding in the Great Lakes and along the Atlantic Coast. On the evening of 29 October 2012, Hurricane Sandy made landfall in southern New Jersey near Atlantic City.¹⁰³

Hurricane Sandy's winds reached up to eighty miles per hour and affected a massive area with tropical force winds extending five hundred eighty miles from the hurricane's center creating the largest diameter of an Atlantic storm ever recorded. The hurricane affected all of the American Eastern Seaboard and as far inland as Indiana. Hurricane Sandy headed north into Canada, lost strength and eventually dissipated. The worst hit was the coastal areas of New York and New Jersey. The heavy rain, and wind created record storm surges of fourteen feet. The impact of Hurricane Sandy was exacerbated because it struck a population center and crucial US economic region. New York slowed to a standstill without power and the subway tunnels flooded. Well over one hundred lives were lost and millions were left without power during the winter. Three hundred thousand homes were destroyed in New York alone and ninety percent of homes in Seaside Heights, New Jersey were destroyed or severely damaged. Final damages are estimated at close to one hundred billion dollars.¹⁰⁴

FEMA prepared extensively prior to landfall in conjunction with local governments and states in Hurricane Sandy's projected path. Primarily establishing basing locations for supplies and transportation assets along with dispersion of Liaison Officers (LNOs) to partner agencies.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ US Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Hurricane Sandy FEMA After-Action Report*, iii-4; DOD, "History of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs: Superstorm Sandy Response Narrative," 1.

¹⁰⁴ DHS, FEMA, *Hurricane Sandy FEMA After-Action Report*, Piii-4; DOD, "History of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs: Superstorm Sandy Response Narrative," 1-2; DHS, *The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*, 21.

¹⁰⁵ DHS, FEMA, *Hurricane Sandy FEMA After-Action Report*, iii-4.

These preparations were an outcome of the White House commission lesson learned report after Hurricane Katrina. The White House report determined that lower echelons of government might not have the depth to assess and identify requirements prior to a no notice disaster and federal resources take days to mobilize. Post Hurricane Katrina, FEMA and federal partners to include DOD transitioned from a “pull” mentality to a “push” system where federal resources are deployed and based to ensure operational reach into an affected area. The White House, FEMA, and DOD all pushed resources to the region prior to the formal requests of states’ to ensure a speedy response.¹⁰⁶

On 25 October 2012, USNORTHCOM issued a warning order to prepare DSCA forces for deployment. The next day, the SECDEF authorized and identified DSCs in five states; Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, and Maryland. On 27 October 2012, FEMA requested the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) assumed their role in support of FEMA Emergency Response Function (ESF) #3, public works and engineering.¹⁰⁷ The Deputy Chief of Engineers ARNG served in a capacity inspired by the DSC and synchronized engineering lines of efforts between USACE and national guard engineer units, identified capability gaps, and made recommendations to both USACE and NGB. This officer simultaneously reported directly to the Chief of USACE and CNGB. Deputy Chief Engineer ARNG is a Hurricane Katrina inspired position created just before Hurricane Sandy in October 2012.¹⁰⁸ FEMA requested activation of the DCO and DCE for FEMA regions I (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont) II (New Jersey, New York,

¹⁰⁶ DOD, “History of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs: Superstorm Sandy Response Narrative,” 4-5.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁰⁸ National Guard Bureau, *National Guard Bureau After Action Report: Hurricane Sandy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 11.

Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands), and III (District of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia).¹⁰⁹

Most of the states in Hurricane Sandy's path activated their national guard as the weather predictions gained clarity and size of the storm became clear to civil authorities. Prior to Hurricane Sandy making land fall, DOD and FEMA did not receive any RFA for disaster support. The states embedded national guard personnel with each state's emergency management office to assist in hurricane planning, identify capabilities gaps, and provide national guard capabilities.¹¹⁰

The fact the State National Guards of New York and New Jersey provided DSCs to command active duty forces in addition to state forces in a major regional disaster encompassing many states, is considered one of the most significant DSCA elements of Hurricane Sandy. The DSC helped to vet and synchronize requests for support and approve mission priorities for active duty forces and national guardsmen. Hurricane Sandy served as validation for the growing effectiveness and continued potential of DSC construct's value in the synchronization of military activities, improving command and control, and the promotion of unified effort.¹¹¹

However, there is room for improvement in the DSC implementation and concept. Many active duty commanders were unfamiliar with the DSC concept and this lack of understanding cause confusion during mission assignment. The DSCs lacked knowledge of the locations of many of the active duty forces during the response.¹¹² The Title 10 force's first responsibility is to support federal partners whose operational areas span several states and state boundaries are not the primary consideration when USNORTHCOM developed the JOA. The DSCs responsibilities

¹⁰⁹ NGB, *National Guard Bureau After Action Report: Hurricane Sandy*, 13.

¹¹⁰ DOD, "History of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs: Superstorm Sandy Response Narrative," 4-5.

¹¹¹ Burke and McNeil, *Toward a Unified Military Response: Hurricane Sandy and the Dual Status Commander*, 1-2.

¹¹² NGB, *National Guard Bureau After Action Report: Hurricane Sandy*, 4.

and command authority were confined to within state borders. This led to confusion as the Title 10 JOA spanned several states and the Joint Forces Land Component Commander's (JFLCC) relationship to the DSC was not was not solidified. The confusion was probably limited due the unfortunate fact only two DSC were assigned Title 10 forces though over one thousand were in the JOA. Additionally, the Title 10 deputies were not aware of USACE and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) activities limiting the deputies' ability to advise the DSCs and provide situational awareness on the USACE and DLA lines of effort.¹¹³

“The Process to approve DSC went well but it is unclear how effective actual operations were.”¹¹⁴ The SECDEF provided DSC approval more than seventy-two hours prior to Hurricane Sandy coming ashore. However, NGB failed to provide orders for the New York and New Jersey DSCs until almost twenty-four hours after landfall, which is unfortunate because though six DSCs were authorized, only New York and New Jersey activated theirs. This represented a ninety-six hour delay in the assembling of staff and the establishment of liaison and relationships with other DOD and civilian entities.¹¹⁵ This truncated timeline and relationship ambiguity inhibited the DSCs abilities to use operational art which assists commanders in analyzing future operations.¹¹⁶ Without the command and control advantages the DSC construct is designed to provide fully realized, the planning tool to the develop campaigns and operations are not at the DSCs disposal.

Hurricane Sandy sits second to Hurricane Katrina as the most damaging Atlantic Hurricane in American History. Much like Katrina, the DOD response was massive. For a two-month time span, four thousand service members to include Title 32 and all Title 10 services

¹¹³ DOD, “History of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs: Superstorm Sandy Response Narrative,” 38-40.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 39.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 39-43.

¹¹⁶ US Army, ADRP 3-0, (2012), 4-1.

provided support of civil authorities in the northeast. The DSC construct was implemented as a command and control construct for the first time during a limited notice disaster. Though the execution was not perfect, it served as proof of the concept. The DSC and lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina did contribute to a reduced loss of life and human suffering.¹¹⁷

Conclusion

With a colonial militia heritage and demonstrated value as a strategic reserve in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries the National Guard is positioned as the first military option for DSCA. The use of national guard Title 32 preserves state sovereignty and options with a force that shares the common standards of training, readiness, and doctrine of the Title 10 active component. SAD forces add another layer of response and increase state options. Title 10 brings to bear options and resources for the federal government to support state leadership and local communities. Together they share a history of homeland security.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 and the appearance of increasingly ferocious weather events during the past two decades has necessitated the maturation of civilian homeland security concepts, doctrine, responsibilities, and relationships at all levels of government. The doctrine of military response in support of these civilian authorities developed in conjunction with civilian efforts to efficiently capitalize on military manpower, training, and resources. To achieve these efficiencies and unity of effort, military disaster response needs to not only be planned for, but integrated. A timely response and elimination of redundancies not only increases capabilities, but during a crisis saves lives. DSC concept was created to improve command and control and achieve complimentary and agile integration between state and federal forces, while preserving state sovereignty and the law. The required separation of state and local military resources under the DSC construct has not made the deliberate use of operational art readily apparent.

¹¹⁷ Burke and McNeil, *Toward a Unified Military Response: Hurricane Sandy and the Dual Status Commander*, 1-2.

Operational art applies to all operations and requires deliberate planning and preparation. The DSCA and the DSC concept needs greater emphasis in the Professional Military Education (PME) of Title 10 and Title 32 officers. It cannot be assumed that the Title 32 force understands DSCA or the DSC any better than Title 10. The greatest value of operational art lies in the education of military professionals.¹¹⁸ DSCA doctrine need to be revised to include operational art as a tenet and continue to evolve operations under a DSC.

The DSC design is one of legal considerations that enable command and control. Command is a human endeavor and requires established rapport and relationships. To further both Title 10 and Title 32 understanding a concerted effort needs to be made to establish these relationships with continued DSCA specific planning conferences, exercises, and especially staff training events. The staff training events need to incorporate an analysis of how operational art can be deliberately incorporated into DSCA operations under a DSC while still maintaining the separation of state and federal resources. More importantly, this analysis needs to identify what parts of the DSC construct prevent the implementation of operation art. Whether the constraints are legal or procedural, the future development of the DSC and DSCA doctrine requires a commitment to the use of operational art.

¹¹⁸ US Army, ADRP 3-0, (2012), 4-1.

Bibliography

- Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support to Civil Authorities After Certain Incidents to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members Committees on Armed Services, US Senate and US House of Representatives. *Before Disaster Strikes: Imperatives for Enhancing Defense Support of Civil Authorities*. Washington, DC: 2010.
- Army.mil. "ATFP and Senior Army Advisor, Army National Guard (SRAAG) Duties and Certification." *STAND-TO! The Official Focus of the U.S. Army*. Last modified 03 December 2014. Accessed 1 March 2018. https://www.army.mil/standto/archive_2014-12-03.
- Army National Guard. *National Guard Fact Sheet*. Accessed 23 October 2017, http://www.arng.army.mil/SiteCollectionDocuments/Publications/News%20Media%20Factsheets/ARNG_Factsheet_May_06%20ARNG%20fact%20Sheet.pdf.
- Benthall, Jonathan. *Disasters, Relief and the Media*. New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993.
- Burke, Ryan, and Sue McNeil. *Toward a Unified Military Response: Hurricane Sandy and the Dual Status Commander*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2015.
- Carafano, James Jay. "Homeland Defense and Homeland Security: Distinctions and Difference." in *Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA): The U.S. Military's Role to Support and Defend*, edited by Robert McCreight and Robert B. Tussing. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2015.
- Council of Governors. *Joint Action Plan for Developing Unity of Effort*. Washington, DC: Council of Governors and the Department of Defense, 2011.
- Cecchine, Gary, et al. *Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001.
- Doubler, Michael D. *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636 -2000*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003.
- . *Operation Jump Start: The National Guard on the Southwest Border, 2006-2008*. Washington, DC: Doubler, 2008.
- Federal Emergency Management Agency. *About*. Accessed October 30, 2017. <https://fema.gov/about-agency>.
- . Strategic Foresight Initiative. *Critical Infrastructure: Long-term Trends and Drivers and Their Implications for Emergency Management*. June 2011.
- . "Hurricane Katrina." Last modified 12 January 2016. Accessed 27 December 2017. <https://www.fema.gov/hurricane-katrina>.
- George Alexander L., and Andrew Bennet. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.

- Gereski, John T., Jr and Christopher R. Brown. "Two Hats Are Better than One: The Dual Status Commander in Domestic Operations." *The Army Lawyer*. June 2010.
- Honore, Russel L., *Survival*. New York: Atria Books, 2009.
- Hylton-Green, Renee, and Robert K. Wright. *A Brief History of The Militia and the National Guard*. Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 1986.
- Larson, Eric V., and John E. Peters. *Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security Concepts, Issues, and Options*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001.
- Lowenberg, Timothy J. *The Role of the National Guard in National Defense and Homeland Security*. Washington, DC: National Guard Association of the United States, 2005.
- Mahon, John K., *History of the Militia and the National Guard*. New York: Macmillian, 1983.
- Matthews, Matt. *The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical Perspective*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006.
- National Guard Association of the United States. *Fact Sheet*. Accessed 28 December 2017. <https://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/Guard%20Statues.pdf>.
- National Guard Bureau. Departments of the Army and the Air Force. National Guard Regulations (NGR) 500-1, National Guard Domestic Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008.
- . Departments of the Army and the Air Force. National Guard Regulation (NGR) 500-2, National Guard Counterdrug Support. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008.
- . *Dual Status Commander Fact Sheet*. Accessed 30 August 2017. [http://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Resources/Fact%20Sheets/Dual%20Status%20Commander%20Fact%20Sheet%20\(Dec.%202017\).pdf](http://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Resources/Fact%20Sheets/Dual%20Status%20Commander%20Fact%20Sheet%20(Dec.%202017).pdf).
- Nelson, Harold W. "The Maturation of Operational Art: Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm." in *Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art*, edited by Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Philips, 440-475 Washington DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 2007.
- Obama, Barack. *National Security Strategy*. Washington, DC: The White House, 2010.
- . *National Security Strategy*. Washington, DC: The White House, 2015.
- Ross, Ashley D. *Local Disaster Resilience: Administrative an Political Perspectives*. New York: Routledge, 2014.
- Scheips, Paul J. *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945-1992*. Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 2005.

The White House. *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, February 2006*. Accessed 12 October 2017. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/>.

US Department of the Army. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012.

———. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012.

———. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 4-0, *Sustainment*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012.

US Department of Defense. “History of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security Affairs: Superstorm Sandy Response Narrative.” Draft, 2013.

———. Joint Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013.

———. Joint Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017.

———. Joint Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-27, *Homeland Defense*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013.

———. Joint Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013.

US Department of Homeland Security. Federal Emergency Management Agency. *Hurricane Sandy FEMA After-Action Report*. Washington, DC, 2013.

———. Federal Emergency Management Agency. *National Incident. Management System*. Washington, DC, 2008.

———. Federal Emergency Management Agency. *National Response Framework Third Edition June 2016*. Washington, DC, 2016.

———. *The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*. Washington, DC, 2014.

US Northern Command. “ABOUT USNORTHCOM.” Accessed 1 November 2017. <http://www.northcom.mil/About-USNORTHCOM/>.

———. “A Short History of Unites States Northern Command.” Accessed 28 January 2018. <http://www.northcom.mil/Portals/28/Documents/Supporting%20documents/Historical/NORTHCOM%20History.pdf>

US President. Presidential Policy Directive 8. “National Preparedness.” (30 March 2011)