Russian Operational Concept: Factors that Influence a Slowly Emerging "Novelty"
Abstract
The Russian Federation has changed its operational concept. Russian Armed Forces fight differently today from how they did after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This monograph answers the question: what factors influenced the changes in the Russian operational concept after the collapse of the Soviet Union? The monograph argues that the following factors influenced the change: Russia's assertive foreign policy, the perceived threat from the West, asymmetries with Western armies and their capabilities, untenable casualties, the generational change within Russian society and its armed forces, and the lessons that Russians learned from conflicts. Although most of these factors appear to be "commonsense knowledge" for Western countries, some of them represent, nevertheless, a "renewed thinking" for Russia. The monograph first provides evidence that the current Russian operational concept is different from the operational concept inherited from the Soviet Union, and that there are seven major differences between the two "ways of war." Subsequently, the monograph analyzes two case studies the Chechen wars and the 2008 Russo-Georgian war in order to identify what changes occurred during and after these wars. The monograph claims that the factors identified above did change the Russian operational concept, but this change was an adaptation rather than a paradigm shift. It was a "novelty" within the old paradigm, a continuity rather than a contingency. The monograph then analyzes what these factors mean to other countries. The monograph asserts that these factors represent strengths and vulnerabilities, which if properly exploited, may help counter the operational concept that they themselves created.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 01, 2017
- Accession Number
- AD1072638
Entities
People
- Sergiu Cirimpei
Organizations
- School of Advanced Military Studies