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THESIS

REFUGEES AND TERRORISM IN THE WEST

by

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March 2019

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REFUGEES AND TERRORISM IN THE WEST

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ABSTRACT

A key concern of the United States and Europe for accepting refugees is the perceived threat of increased vulnerability to terrorist attacks, especially concerning refugees from origin countries with a known presence of terrorist organizations. While studies have focused on refugee flows to specific countries, research is needed to identify and compare any correlation between refugees and an increased number of terrorist attacks in the receiving country. This thesis aims to analyze any correlation to determine if there is a positive relationship between receiving refugees and an increase in terrorist attacks, and evaluate conditions that may exacerbate or mitigate the likelihood of attacks as a result of accepting refugees.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMIF	Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund
CSP	Center for Systemic Peace
EIF	European Integration Fund
ERF	European Refugee Fund
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNI	Gross national income
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
INSCR	Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research
ISF	Internal Security Fund
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ITERATE	International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events
MENA	Mediterranean and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIM	Nationalist, anti-Immigration, anti-Minority
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
START	Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
USRAP	United States Refugee Admissions Program
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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This is dedicated to the countless refugees who have been forced from their homes, ways of life, and everything they've known—yet make the most of the situation and honestly strive to integrate into their new societies—as well as the governments, non-governmental organizations, and citizen volunteers who do everything they can to help those in dire need. Moreover, this is dedicated to the servicemembers who volunteer to put themselves in harm's way and risk their lives to fight for and free the oppressed, so that those they seek to help need not become refugees.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of displaced persons around the world is at its highest on record. Approximately 68.5 million people have been forced from their homes.¹ Of this figure, 25.4 million are refugees and 3.1 are asylum seekers.² The world is more connected than ever, and fortunately many of these people are able to seek refuge in safe havens that were once out of reach—if others will let them in. Unfortunately, the increased connectivity and ability to migrate also brings an opportunity for malevolent actors to exploit both those fleeing and their potential protectors in pursuit of their own objectives. The fear and threat of terrorism taking place on one's own soil has caused many states to reevaluate their hospitality policies while seeking to ensure the protection of their own populations.

Nation-states have different policies toward accepting refugees as leaders struggle with balancing those policies and assuring their constituents.³ In recent years we have seen world leaders such as the United States strictly limit the amount of refugees it is willing to accept,⁴ while others such as Germany have opened their doors to accommodate vast amounts of refugees.⁵ A common concern highlighted in political rhetoric is that increasing the amount of refugees accepted increases the threat to security. For example, the 2018 *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* argues that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

¹ “Figures at a Glance,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed March 18, 2018, <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html>.

² United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

³ Paul Hokenos, “Nothing Can Take Down Angela Merkel—Except 800,000 Refugees,” *Foreign Policy*, October 22, 2015, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/22/nothing-can-take-down-angela-merkel-except-800000-refugees-germany-cdu-pegida/>.

⁴ Mica Rosenberg, “Exclusive: Dozens of Refugee Resettlement Offices to Close as Trump Downsizes Program,” Reuters, February 14, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-refugees-exclusive/exclusive-dozens-of-refugee-resettlement-offices-to-close-as-trump-downsizes-program-idUSKCN1FY1EJ>.

⁵ Erik Kirschbaum, “Merkel Has No Regrets Over Refugee Policy Despite Political Cost,” Reuters, August 27, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-election/merkel-has-no-regrets-over-refugee-policy-despite-political-cost-idUSKCN1B70F2>.

(ISIS, also known as Daesh) “has exploited weaknesses in European border security to great effect by capitalizing on the migrant crisis to seed attack operatives into the region,” stating that “two of the perpetrators of the 2015 ISIS attacks in Paris, France, infiltrated the country by posing as migrants.”⁶ Others argue that more open-door or humanitarian policies, such as that shown by Germany’s Angela Merkel, actually “reduces the risk of her citizens being targeted by Middle East terror groups,”⁷ whether it be by fostering a sense of inclusiveness or a result of direct actions taken by legitimate refugees against terrorists, as was done by Syrian refugees in Germany in 2016.⁸ The question, however, remains: does accepting an increased volume of refugees result in an increased number of terrorist attacks in the host country? If so, what are the conditions that may result in an increased amount of attacks or mitigate the incidence of attacks? This study strives to answer these questions.

This subject is important for several reasons. Refugees will continue to arise out of conflicts, creating potential humanitarian crisis situations. Policy toward accepting refugees and immigration is hotly debated in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. Fear toward accepting people from a war-torn area may be natural for many people, but may not be factually grounded. Policy based on unfounded fear can be detrimental, whereas evidence-based positions can be more helpful when shaping policies and determining the best approaches to difficult situations.

From a defense analysis perspective, the value of the research lies in empirically shaping our understanding of an ill-shaped, ambiguous, perceived threat and attempting to determine if certain conditions exist that either exacerbate or mitigate that threat. If there is indeed a relationship between an increase in refugees and terrorist attacks in a given country, what factors might contribute to that relationship? Acknowledging that correlation

⁶ White House, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 2018), 8, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NSCT.pdf>.

⁷ Robert Verkaik, “How Germany’s Open-Door Refugee Policy Helps Fight Terrorism,” CNN, January 16, 2017, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/16/opinions/germany-open-door-policy-verkaik/index.html>.

⁸ Shehab Khan, “Mayor of Leipzig Thanks Syrian Men Who Helped Catch Bomb Suspect,” *Independent*, October 11, 2016, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-bomb-threat-three-syrians-suspected-isis-links-latest-jaber-al-bakr-allegations-a7356051.html>.

does not equal causation, it may still be possible to analyze what conditions either positively or negatively impact any interconnectedness. There are many different approaches to accepting refugees, and this research strives to identify major factors that may explain any association between an increase in volume of refugees accepted and homeland terrorist attacks (or lack thereof).

This paper begins with a brief overview of various studies on the subject, followed by a description of the methodology applied, common term definitions, and data sources. Any correlation between refugee acceptance and terrorism in Western countries is analyzed first, repeated for a focus set of refugee origin countries with a founded or feared presence of anti-Western terrorist organizations. From this, two host countries are identified for further comparative analysis based upon disparate levels of terrorism events relative to volume of refugees admitted. Sweden, which admitted a high volume of refugees per capita yet sustained relatively few terrorism events is compared with the United Kingdom, which admitted a lower volume of refugees per capita yet sustained much more terrorism events, in an effort to determine what conditions may be associated with a higher or lower number of terrorism events. The paper concludes with a discussion of the results and any conclusions that may be inferred.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

The debate over refugee acceptance exists among various professionals, whether policy-makers, security professionals, academics, or humanitarians. But it lacks consensus as to whether a Western country that accepts a greater number of refugees results in an increased vulnerability to homeland terrorist attacks, and what conditions may increase or mitigate any such vulnerability. This section highlights these perspectives and identifies how this research contributes to the discussion.

Many officials and concerned citizens proclaim the need for stricter refugee acceptance standards, fearing an increase of attacks as a result of accepting refugees, especially from conflict areas where established terrorist organizations have been known to exist such as Iraq and Syria. This was largely the impetus behind the United States' so-called "travel ban" that began with Executive Order 13769 on January 27, 2017, which

limited immigrant and non-immigrant travel into the United States from several countries and temporarily suspended the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) in order to assess and improve procedures “to ensure that those approved for refugee admission do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the United States.”⁹ Improvements were made and the USRAP was reactivated with enhanced vetting capabilities on October 24, 2017.¹⁰ The initial order was updated by Executive Order 13780 on March 6, 2017,¹¹ and after a year-and-a-half of legal challenges the Supreme Court upheld certain travel limitations of the final version.¹² The political, legal, and social debate around the controversial “travel ban” demonstrates the importance of the issue and challenge facing the current administration, but it is not new.

During the Obama administration, a House Homeland Security Committee Review of the security risks and counterterrorism challenges pertaining to Syrian refugee flows, published in November 2015, illustrates concerns about terrorists posing as refugees.¹³ The report states ten preliminary findings, the first of which is the claim that “Islamist terrorists are determined to infiltrate refugee flows to enter the West—and appear to have already done so in Europe.”¹⁴ This is followed by stating “the United States lacks the information needed to confidently screen refugees from the Syria conflict zone to identify possible terrorism connections,” and that U.S. senior officials, such as [then] National Intelligence Director James Clapper, “remain concerned about the risks and acknowledge

⁹ Exec. Order No. 13769, 3 C.F.R. 8977 (2017), <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-02-01/pdf/2017-02281.pdf>.

¹⁰ Exec. Order No. 13815, 3 C.F.R. 50055 (2017), <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-10-27/pdf/2017-23630.pdf>.

¹¹ Exec. Order No. 13780, 3 C.F.R. 13209 (2017), <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-03-09/pdf/2017-04837.pdf>.

¹² Alicia Parlapiano, “The Travel Ban Has Been Upheld. Here Are Some of Its Effects So Far,” *New York Times*, June 27, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/27/us/politics/trump-travel-ban-effects.html>.

¹³ Homeland Security Committee, *Syrian Refugee Flow: Security Risks and Counterterrorism Challenges* (Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 2015), <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Homeland-Security-Committee-Syrian-Refugee-Report.pdf>.

¹⁴ Homeland Security Committee, 2.

the possibility of ISIS infiltration into U.S.-bound Syrian refugee populations.”¹⁵ The report’s authors were also concerned about “an increase in federal law enforcement’s counterterrorism caseload” as a result of a large influx of Syrian refugees.¹⁶ The report’s fifth and sixth findings state that Europe is partly responsible for the uncontrolled refugee crisis due to weak border security, no internal border checks within the Schengen Area, and information-sharing challenges that hinder terrorist suspect tracking. Stating that immigrant pathways are “highly susceptible to terrorist exploitation,” the committee argued that this “poor information-sharing and weak vetting systems,” coupled with transit countries that were complicit and sought to alleviate pressure by expediting refugee flow through and out of their country, risked turning Mediterranean and Balkan countries into a new “terrorist turnpike.”¹⁷ The report contends that certain refugee communities are “likely to become ‘fertile soil’ for violent radicalization” and that Syrian populations “have already been directly targeted by extremists for recruitment.”¹⁸ Finally, the authors claim that Europe’s shortcomings in vetting refugees and managing radicalization challenges puts America’s security at risk.¹⁹

The Homeland Security Committee’s review made several recommendations, including temporarily suspending “the admission of Syrian refugees into the United States until the nation’s leading intelligence and law enforcement agencies can certify the refugee screening process is adequate to detect individuals with terrorist ties.”²⁰ The Committee’s bipartisan review highlights pertinent and valid concerns regarding admitting refugees from conflict zones with terrorist organizations (as well as a possible course of action). It makes a call to action and superficial recommendations for the United States and Western European countries to decrease the risk of terrorist infiltration into refugee streams by improving information sharing and vetting systems of refugees. In doing so it also

¹⁵ Homeland Security Committee, 4.

¹⁶ Homeland Security Committee, 5.

¹⁷ Homeland Security Committee, 7–8.

¹⁸ Homeland Security Committee, 8.

¹⁹ Homeland Security Committee, 9.

²⁰ Homeland Security Committee, 9.

indirectly calls for further, specific research to identify ways in which countries are able to successfully host legitimate refugees while preventing terrorist infiltrators from either entering the country or conducting a successful attack.

Initial studies have taken steps toward analyzing links between refugees and terrorism through a quantitative lens. For example, Leiken and Brooke conducted an analysis of “373 charged, convicted, and/or killed terrorists in Western Europe and North America”²¹ in an attempt to illuminate terrorist networks and foster quantitative approaches to data analysis of terrorism. Focusing on Global Salafi Jihad attacks from 1993 to 15 December 2004, and further filtering their data to “those individuals who have resided in or crossed national borders in Europe and/or North America,”²² they used their data set to analyze the nationalities of the selected terrorists and immigration vehicle used. Of their sample, they concluded that 87% of their terrorists were immigrants, but 41% were Western nationals (1/4 European), 36% were from North Africa and only 17% were “Core Arabs” born in the Middle East.²³ Only finding entry status data for 206 of the 373 subjects, they determined that of those 206, 23% entered their host countries through asylum chains, and 6% entered illegally.²⁴ Leiken and Brooke’s work, although not all-inclusive, is a step in the right direction as, in their words, “a part of a preliminary effort to develop a quantitative approach to counterterrorism.”²⁵ Leiken and Brooke’s approach can be further refined to focus on one type of immigrant and garner a perspective of which Western countries are successfully accommodating refugees while reducing attacks.

Other studies have focused more in-depth on the relationship between immigrants and terrorism, but often focus on one country or case study. Alex Nowrasteh studied the risk in the United States of attacks from foreign-born terrorists and how they entered the

²¹ Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Quantitative Analysis of Terrorism and Immigration: An Initial Exploration,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 4 (2006): 503, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550600880294>.

²² Leiken and Brooke, 506.

²³ Leiken and Brooke, 503–4, 507–8.

²⁴ Leiken and Brooke, 510.

²⁵ Leiken and Brooke, 516.

country. He states that 154 foreign-born terrorists “were responsible for 88 percent (or 3,024) of the 3,432 murders caused by terrorists on U.S. soil from 1975 through the end of 2015,” and that of these 154, only 20 were refugees.²⁶ He goes on to argue that during that time period, the chance “of an American being killed in a terrorist attack was 1 in 3,609,709 a year.”²⁷ Nowrasteh’s analysis is useful for analyzing which visa programs terrorists may seek to exploit to enter the U.S. and commit an attack and demonstrates that attackers in the U.S. under refugee status are fewer than attackers in the United States under Legal Permanent Resident and Tourist status.²⁸ Adding to this line of work and assessing various host country factors may help illuminate conditions that mitigate or facilitate exploitation of refugee programs by terrorist organizations.

The literature has yet to reveal any succinct comparison between the volume of refugees admitted by the United States and Western European countries and the number of terrorist attacks within those host countries. Of particular importance is analyzing the ratio of refugees admitted to incidence of attacks. Assuming trends are dissimilar, i.e., five of the 100 refugees from origin country “X” that are hosted by host country “A” committed attacks, whereas only one of the 100 refugees from origin country “X” that are hosted by host country “B” committed an attack, a comparison of factors between host country “A” and “B” may reveal successful accommodation conditions or programs to be emulated.

While the literature is scant on increased attacks as a direct result of increased refugees, there have been numerous studies conducted on xenophobic violence in European countries as a result of increased refugee admittance, and various models developed to explain and attempt to predict this violence. Adding to the current fog surrounding the topic, models can be contradictory or represent different trends, sometimes even by the same author. For example, in an article published in 2010, Robert Braun argues that his coauthored theoretical framework for explaining geographical and temporal spread of

²⁶ Alex Nowrasteh, *Terrorism and Immigration: A Risk Analysis*, Policy Analysis Number 798 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2016), 1–2, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa798_2.pdf.

²⁷ Nowrasteh, 2.

²⁸ Nowrasteh, 9.

extreme right violence in Germany from 1990–1995 demonstrated “that political opportunities, ethnic competition and social disorganization, media coverage, and the severity or previous violence are significant factors in the evolution of xenophobic violence.”²⁹ In this article Braun and his coauthor Koopmans also argued that social similarity rather than geographical proximity better explains the spread of ethnic violence, even stating that “geographical distance does not affect the diffusion of ethnic violence when controlling for social similarity.”³⁰ Braun later analyzed the diffusion of racist violence in the Netherlands from 2001–2003, and argued in 2011 that “ethnic competition, deprivation and political opportunity structures are not significantly related to the outbreak of violence, but that only population size adequately predicts where violence starts.”³¹ He contended that xenophobia starts in large cities and spreads to distant counties after it is visible in the mass media.³² Braun’s work, although focused on host-country citizens’ responses to immigrants and not specifically violence from refugees themselves, demonstrates that findings can vary widely between different countries and the overall subject area warrants further research.

Finally, growing concern about refugees and uncontrolled migration is impacting the political landscape in the West. A Bloomberg analysis of 22 European countries states that “support for populist radical-right parties is higher than it’s been at any time over the past 30 years.”³³ Voter support for these parties, which appeal to issues of uncontrolled immigration, national sovereignty, globalization, declining manufacturing jobs, corruption, and income equality, increased from an average of 5% in 1997 to 11% ten years ago to 16% in each country’s most recent election, as well as winning 15% of seats in the

²⁹ Robert Braun and Ruud Koopmans, “The Diffusion of Ethnic Violence in Germany: The Role of Social Similarity,” *European Sociological Review* 26, no. 1 (February 2010): 111, <https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcp056>.

³⁰ Braun and Koopmans, 111.

³¹ Robert Braun, “The Diffusion of Racist Violence in the Netherlands: Discourse and Distance,” *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 6 (2011): 753, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343311419238>.

³² Braun.

³³ Andre Tartar, “How the Populist Right is Redrawing the Map of Europe,” Bloomberg, December 11, 2017, <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-europe-populist-right/>.

European Parliament.³⁴ The study notes that, on a regional level, neither the percentage of the population that is foreign-born nor unemployment rates have a consistent relationship with voter support for these parties.³⁵ It is likely that is also the case for any relationship between refugees and terrorism, and attempting to discern what conditions may actually support or negate any nexus between refugees and terrorism will be beneficial for all political parties and voters alike to be well informed.

In summary, much of the existing literature regarding correlation between refugees and terrorism either highlights the perceived threat, is overly broad, is overly narrow and focuses on one host country, or focuses on host country citizen responses to refugees. A comparison between Western countries' acceptance of refugees, any correlation to homeland acts of terrorism, and the conditions that may correlate to any increase in attacks may provide insight to best practices in refugee accommodation.

³⁴ Tartar.

³⁵ Tartar.

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II. METHODOLOGY, DEFINITIONS, AND DATA

A. METHODOLOGY

1. Purpose and Approach

This study seeks to identify whether a Western state's fear of increased terrorism at home from increased acceptance of refugees and asylum seekers is quantitatively substantiated, as well as determine conditions that may mitigate or facilitate risk of attacks. A sample of 46 Western countries is first analyzed with a simple, single variable regression model to determine if a correlation exists between the number of total refugees (term includes asylum seekers) admitted and number of terrorist events within their borders. The number of terrorism events is the dependent variable. A single event, regardless of outcome, is weighted the same as every other single event. The process is repeated, this time limiting the refugee population to include only refugees from 10 focus origin countries, which are explained in the next section. To account for changing geopolitical landscape, the relationship is assessed for the entire timeframe of 1970–2017 as well as separately for the Cold War, post-Cold War, and post-9/11 periods. A strong positive correlation is revealed between refugees and terrorism, and shown to decrease over time. Fundamental control variables are then introduced and the unit of analysis refined to further evaluate the relationship using ordinary least squares and Poisson regressions.

Host countries' refugee acceptance and terrorism levels are assessed, then normalized for refugees per capita in order to account for host countries admitting varying numbers of refugees. All other aspects being equal, if indeed there is a correlation between the number of refugees admitted and terrorism events, then it is not necessarily the host country that admits the most refugees that is assuming a greater risk, but rather the host country that admits the most refugees per capita. More citizens in a host country that admits greater refugees per capita are more likely to be victims or directly affected by terrorism events, meaning that they assume a greater risk.

Each country's relative performance with regard to refugees admitted per capita and terrorism levels is then plotted for comparison. From this, two countries with the lowest and highest number of events relative to the number of refugees admitted are revealed to be Sweden and the United Kingdom. These two host countries are further analyzed for the post-9/11 time period with a focus on 10 different conditions that may impact the level of terrorism in order to better understand why each country experienced such different results. Conditions assessed include the economic situation, health and safety, education level, ethnic, religious, and native-born homogeneity, freedom and democracy, European Union (EU) migrant program funding, military involvement in the middle east, public attitudes toward immigrants, dimensions of national culture, and support for right-wing populist political parties. Each condition, including data sources and rationale for evaluating it, is further explained in chapter IV. The goal in comparing these aspects between Sweden and the UK is to identify what conditions may mitigate the probability of an attack and determine if there exist "best practice" trends or conditions regarding refugee acceptance. Findings from the research may have policy implications for best practices in refugee acceptance while protecting the homeland.

2. Data Sample Groups

a. Hosts

A total of 46 countries are included in the host country group, which consists of European nations, Canada, and the United States in an attempt to select hosts that are as similar as possible in many ways relative to major refugee populations. Europe, as referred to in this paper, includes all current states with the exception of Russia. Host countries are developed Western/European nations that are signatories to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (with the exception of Andorra and San Marino),³⁶ share developed standards of living, have democratic political structures, and protect religious freedoms. A complete list of included countries is included in the appendix.

³⁶ "Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Chapter V, Section 2: Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees," United Nations, accessed November 15, 2018, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtmsg_no=V-2&chapter=5&Temp=mtmsg2&clang=_en.

Turkey was intentionally omitted from this study due to its borders with Iraq and Syria. Large refugee camps in close proximity to conflict zones present a unique situation with great numbers that is outside the scope of this research and could skew the results. The intent of this study is to assess any terrorist threat from refugees that are genuinely interested in resettling and integrating in a foreign land, and that undergo a host country's acceptance process in good faith. While data on these intentions is not readily available, the assumption is made that a refugee that is willing and able to travel great distances, endure risks and hardship along the way, and progress through proper refugee acceptance channels is more committed to resettling and integrating in its host country (even if it is only temporary). Refugees that escape immediate danger and are content with temporary lodging in camps across the first border until it is safe to return home are assumed to be less desiring of completely breaking ties with their former country and less willing to integrate in a new society. Regardless if these assumptions are correct, the sheer number of refugees residing in camps across the proximate land border would eschew any findings.

The primary data source used for terrorism events in this study, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), lists events according to the name of the country in existence at the time the event occurred,³⁷ so to account for changing geopolitical boundaries event data from former states has been coded to be included under the name of the current state, disaggregated by the first administrative boundary or city/town in which the event occurred. For example, an event that occurred in Yugoslavia is further analyzed to determine which province or city it occurred, and if that location is within present-day Montenegro then the event falls within Montenegro for the purposes of this study. This methodology was applied to the breakups of the Soviet Union,

³⁷ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables," University of Maryland, July 2018, 18, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf>.

Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Likewise, events that occurred in East and West Germany were aggregated under present-day Germany.³⁸

b. Origins

Where applicable, this study analyzes two refugee populations: total refugees and only refugees from focus origin countries. Focus origin countries include Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. These countries were chosen based upon relevancy in today's debate over refugees, historical or current presence of anti-Western terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, proximity to Europe in the Mediterranean/North Africa (MENA) region, internal conflict, and/or Western military involvement.³⁹ The refugee "crisis" of 2015 in Europe is largely attributed to the conflict with Daesh in Iraq and Syria, although other focus origin countries

³⁸ Additional notes regarding country and event data coding: due to geographical proximity, United Kingdom includes Gibraltar and Norway includes Svalbard and Jan Mayen. All other territories or departments listed separately by the UNHCR (i.e., French Guiana, Guam, British Virgin Islands, etc.) are not included in the host country figures.

The UNHCR data for "The Holy See" is referred to as Vatican City in this study.

The GTD lists 10 events occurring in Czechoslovakia from 1972–1992. Of these, eight occurred in present-day Czech Republic, one in present-day Slovak Republic, and one event location was unknown. The one event with an unknown location has been omitted.

Similarly, the GTD lists 78 events occurring in the Soviet Union from 1978–1991. Of these, four occurred in present-day Estonia, seven in present-day Latvia, six in present-day Lithuania, 58 elsewhere/ outside of this study's focus host countries, and three events with unknown locations. The three events with unknown locations have been omitted.

The GTD team acknowledges missing event-specific data for 1993 from the complete database, but has provided an appendix that provides 1993 country-level statistics for the total number of incidents, as well as total number of persons killed and injured. This data has been incorporated in this study with the exception of five events that occurred in Yugoslavia due to their locations being unknown and therefore not discernable to present-day countries.

Finally, the GTD lists no record of events occurring in Liechtenstein, Monaco, or San Marino. It is assumed that this is because no events occurred in those countries. The UNHCR lists Andorra, San Marino, and Vatican City as not accepting any refugees from 1970–2017, and Monaco as not accepting any refugees from any of the focus origin countries during the same timeframe. Where appropriate, these countries are omitted from the study.

³⁹ Samuel Osborne, "Terrorism 'Heat Map' Shows ISIS Network Spreading Across the World," *Independent*, August 3, 2016, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-terrorism-terror-groups-al-qaeda-al-shabaab-security-attacks-counterterrorism-a7169516.html>; "Terrorist Groups: Al-Qa'ida," National Counterterrorism Center, accessed May 10, 2018, <https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups.html>; Tim Lister et al., "ISIS Goes Global: 143 Attacks in 29 Countries Have Killed 2043," CNN, February 12, 2018, <https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/index.html>; Tim Meko, "Now that the Islamic State Has Fallen in Iraq and Syria, where are All its Fighters Going?" *Washington Post*, February 22, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/world/isis-returning-fighters/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6910edc19d63.

have also experienced large-scale violence that forced people to flee, often as a result of conflict involving terrorist organizations such as Daesh, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, and/or affiliates. Anti-West terrorist organizations infiltrating legitimate refugee populations in order to commit terrorist attacks on Western soil is largely the concern of Western host countries. Numerous attacks have been attributed to persons from these countries, with varying degrees of impact. For example, the Madrid train bombings in 2004 were attributed in part to operatives with ties to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group⁴⁰ and followed by Spain's withdrawal of troops from Iraq, whereas Daesh attacks in Paris of November 2015 in response to French airstrikes⁴¹ hardened France's resolve.

B. DEFINITIONS

This research was conducted using open source data that is accessible by the public. While many of the variables used need no explanation, it is necessary to define key terms as applied in this study.

1. Terrorism Event

There are many definitions of terrorism with varying aspects of what does and does not constitute a terrorism event. To be as consistent as possible, this study defines terrorism in accordance with the dataset used to measure events: the Global Terrorism Database. It defines a terrorist event as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”⁴² For an event to be included in the GTD it must be intentional, entail “some level of violence or immediate threat of violence,” and be conducted by sub-national actors.⁴³ This eliminates acts by states or competitors that may be along the lines

⁴⁰ William Rose and Rysia Murphy, “Does Terrorism Ever Work? The 2004 Madrid Train Bombings,” *International Security* 32, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 186, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2007.32.1.185>.

⁴¹ “Paris Attacks: Day After Atrocity – As it Happened,” *The Guardian*, March 13, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2015/nov/14/paris-terror-attacks-attackers-dead-mass-killing-live-updates#block-56471333e4b0ced428cb289a>.

⁴² National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database Codebook,” 10.

⁴³ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism,

of state-to-state conflict or civil war, but not necessarily acts by state-sponsored terrorists. Additionally, at least two of the following three criteria must be present to meet this standardized definition: (1) “the act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal,” (2) “there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims,” and (3) “the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.”⁴⁴

2. Refugees and Asylum Seekers

For the purpose of this study, the term refugee encompasses both refugees and asylum seekers. The UNHCR defines refugees as

individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; its 1967 Protocol; the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; individuals granted complementary forms of protection; or those enjoying temporary protection. Since 2007, the refugee population also includes people in a refugee-like situation.⁴⁵

More specifically, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol define a refugee as a person “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”⁴⁶ The 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention expands the definition to include persons fleeing their country as a result of “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order,” and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration adds threats to security or freedom from “generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed

⁴⁴ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 10.

⁴⁵ “Population Statistics,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed March 18, 2018, <http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview>.

⁴⁶ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Communications and Public Information Service, 2010), 14, <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.pdf>.

public order.”⁴⁷ People in a refugee-like situation includes those outside their country of origin that face similar risks as refugees, “but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.”⁴⁸

Asylum-seekers are defined as “individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined, irrespective of when they may have been lodged.”⁴⁹ Traditionally, asylum-seekers are persons that have fled their country and arrived at a safe country, whereupon they petition for formal refugee status, temporary protected status, or resettlement.

Fundamental to the protection of refugees is the principle of non-refoulement. Specified in the 1951 Convention and considered a rule of customary international law, non-refoulement prohibits a state from sending a refugee or asylum seeker back to where his or her life or freedom is threatened.⁵⁰

Although individual states have signed the 1951 Convention and agree to support it, implementation policies are less clear and non-uniform. Each state still retains its sovereignty and determines who may or may not enter as well as who may be granted asylum, even when a group of persons are deemed refugees by the collective vote or the UNHCR. Every person is entitled to seek refugee status and protection, but every state is not required to open their doors. A plethora of dynamics factor into each states’ policy about whom and how many refugees and asylum seekers they provide refuge for.

⁴⁷ Richard Perruchoud and Jillyanne Redpath-Cross, *Glossary on Migration*, 2nd ed. (Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, 2011), 80.

⁴⁸ “UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database: Sources, Methods and Data Considerations,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, January 1, 2013, <https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/45c06c662.html#refugees>.

⁴⁹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Population Statistics.”

⁵⁰ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 30.

C. DATA SOURCES

1. Global Terrorism Database

All data is sourced from open and publicly available sources. Terrorist event data is compiled from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD), managed by the University of Maryland. The GTD catalogues domestic and international terrorist events around the world from 1970–2017.⁵¹ All information in the database is obtained from open-source materials, and the complete version is a compilation of several services and institutions’ collection efforts over different time periods, all synthesized by the GTD staff at the University of Maryland to ensure “that the definitions and methodology are as consistent as possible” for all events.⁵²

The GTD was chosen as the source of terrorist events both for its accessibility and inclusivity. First, it is open and free to the public. Second, the GTD covers domestic and international events for its entire timeframe. Although the current concern at the forefront is predominantly focused on foreign fighters seeking to infiltrate the ranks of legitimate refugees, it is very plausible that terrorist networks also seek to recruit and inspire others who are already in host countries to join their cause. Indeed, telemetrically radicalizing potential extremists, also known as “homegrown violent extremists”⁵³ has been one of the main efforts of several terrorist organizations such as Daesh (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS, or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL). It is no secret that recruitment efforts are likely aimed at the most susceptible pool of populations that may share the same or similar thoughts and ideologies as terrorist networks, or at the least similar familiar identities, whether they be religious, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, etc. Additionally, these populations may feel marginalized and disenfranchised within their

⁵¹ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database.”

⁵² National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database Codebook,” 4. For more information on the GTD collection methodology, see the GTD codebook or website at <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>.

⁵³ White House, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, 7.

host country societies, making them more susceptible to recruitment. If successful, a terrorist network will then be able to recruit individuals in these population pools and spurn them to action in the form of attacking their host country in some manner. This may include acts conducted by legitimate refugees residing in host countries, or by permanent residents and citizens of the host countries that have been influenced and manipulated by a terrorist organization.

In addition to including the range of terrorism events conducted or directed by established terrorist organizations or radicalized homegrown violent extremists sympathetic to their cause, the GTD encompasses domestic events that may occur in response to a state's refugee practices or an increase in irregular immigration. Attacks committed by domestic terrorists may be directed against refugees or other citizens and institutions of a state in response to an influx of foreigners or policy. Therefore, to assess as broadly as possible the impact of refugees on terrorism, all perpetrators and motivations are included.

Another well-known database, International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), requires fees and "is confined to international or transnational events."⁵⁴ This may therefore exclude terrorist events that are perpetrated by a resident or citizen "lone-wolf" that has been radicalized by a terrorist organization, whether from afar or in person, as well as citizen terrorist attacks against their own state or the refugee population.

2. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Data on refugees and asylum seekers in this study is attained from the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees.⁵⁵ The UNHCR collects its data from three main sources: governmental agencies, UNHCR field offices, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), with the host government generally being the "sole data provider"

⁵⁴ Ivan Sascha Sheehan, "Assessing and Comparing Data Sources for Terrorism Research," in *Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy*, ed. Cynthia Lum and Leslie W. Kennedy (New York: Springer, 2012), 36.

⁵⁵ "Data," United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, accessed March 20, 2018, <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/data.html>.

in “most industrialized countries.”⁵⁶ Data comes mainly from registers, surveys, registration processes, or censuses.⁵⁷ The UNHCR uses this data to compile estimates “based on the arrival of refugees through resettlement programs and the individual recognition of refugees over a 10-year...or 5-year period.”⁵⁸ Since 2007, resettled refugees are excluded from the refugee estimates.⁵⁹ In addition to reporting figures, signatory states to the 1951 Convention must report on the conditions of refugees as well as laws and regulations relating to refugees.⁶⁰

3. Additional Sources

Additional data used in this research for the in-depth analysis of conditions in Sweden and the UK is sourced from several sources. Data regarding population levels, gross national income, poverty headcount, Gini Index, total unemployment, government expenditure on health and education, the number of physicians, and intentional homicides is from The World Bank.⁶¹ General government gross debt data and education attainment levels are from Eurostat.⁶² Data regarding foreign-born unemployment rates comes from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).⁶³ The percentage of foreign-born residents in the UK and ethnicity comes from the United Kingdom Office

⁵⁶ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database: Sources, Methods and Data Considerations.”

⁵⁷ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

⁵⁸ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

⁵⁹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

⁶⁰ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 31.

⁶¹ “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank, accessed October 18, 2018, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/source/world-development-indicators>.

⁶² Eurostat Database (General government gross debt sdg_17_40; accessed November 9, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=sdg_17_40.; Eurostat Database (Population by education attainment level, sex and age (%) – main indicators edat_lfse_03; accessed November 9, 2018), http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=edat_lfse_03&lang=en.

⁶³ OECD International Migration Statistics Database (Foreign-born unemployment; accessed November 11, 2018), <https://doi.org/10.1787/data-00722-en>.

for National Statistics.⁶⁴ Election data in the UK is compiled from reports sanctioned by the UK Parliament.⁶⁵ Statistics Sweden provided data on the percentage of foreign-born residents and Swedish election results.⁶⁶ Information regarding religious demographics, perceptions about immigrant influence, domestic way of life, and nationalistic, anti-immigrant, anti-minority sentiment is from the Pew Research Center.⁶⁷ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)⁶⁸ and Global Coalition against Daesh⁶⁹ provided additional information on military involvement in the Middle East. Eurobarometer was used for

⁶⁴ Office for National Statistics Population of the UK by Country of Birth and Nationality Dataset (accessed November 13, 2018), <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationality>.; “KS006 – Ethnic Group,” Office for National Statistics, accessed November 20, 2018, <http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2001/KS006/view/2092957703?cols=measures>.; “Ethnic Group,” Office for National Statistics, June 13, 2014, <http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/ks201uk>.

⁶⁵ Adam Mellows-Facer, *General Election 2005*, Research Paper 05/33 (London: House of Commons Library, 2006), 92, <http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP05-33/RP05-33.pdf>.; Richard Cracknell, Feargal McGuinness, and Chris Rhodes, *General Election 2010*, Research Paper 10/36 (London: House of Commons Library, 2011), 80, <http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP10-36/RP10-36.pdf>.; Oliver Hawkins, Richard Keen, and Nambassa Nakatudde, *General Election 2015*, Briefing Paper Number CBP7186 (London: House of Commons Library, 2015), 11, <http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7186/CBP-7186.pdf>.; “General Elections Online: 2017 Party Election Results,” United Kingdom Parliament, accessed November 12, 2018, <http://electionresults.parliament.uk/election/2017-06-08/Results/PartyIndex>.

⁶⁶ “Summary of Population Statistics 1960–2017,” Statistics Sweden, March 21, 2018, <https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/population/population-composition/population-statistics/pong/tables-and-graphs/yearly-statistics--the-whole-country/summary-of-population-statistics/>.; “Election to the Riksdag – Results by Region and Party etc. Number and Percent. Year of Election 1973–2018,” Statistics Sweden, November 21, 2018, http://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/en/ssd/START_ME_ME0104_ME0104C/ME0104T3/?rxid=be84edcd-3023-4e63-a46e-36b959e17ba6.

⁶⁷ Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database (accessed November 10, 2018), <http://www.pewglobal.org/question-search/>.; Neha Sahgal et al., *Being Christian in Western Europe*, (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2018), <http://www.pewforum.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2018/05/Being-Christian-in-Western-Europe-FOR-WEB1.pdf>.; Conrad Hackett et al., *The Global Religious Landscape: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Major Religious Groups as of 2010*, Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2012), <http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2014/01/global-religion-full.pdf>.

⁶⁸ “Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 2018, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_11/20181112_2018-11-RSM-Placemat.pdf.

⁶⁹ “Sweden,” Global Coalition, May 8, 2018, <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/partners/sweden/>.; “Sweden’s Contribution to the Global Coalition,” Global Coalition, May 8, 2018, <http://theglobalcoalition.org/en/swedens-contribution-to-the-global-coalition/>.

public opinion data on issues of top concern and feelings toward immigrants.⁷⁰ World Values Survey data gauged resident opinions regarding employers and immigrants.⁷¹ Comparisons of national culture dimensions are made using information from Geert Hofstede and his research team.⁷² The Center for Systemic Peace Polity IV dataset was used to measure democracy levels.⁷³ Freedom House data was used to measure freedom levels.⁷⁴ Finally, figures regarding European Union migrant program funding are from the European Commission.⁷⁵

4. Limitations

The GTD data is retroactive to 1970. It should also be noted that the GTD's criteria for a terrorist event may be met even if there are no casualties or damage but the attempt is made and deemed an attempted act of terrorism. Alternatively, the GTD database is unclassified and does not include foiled or thwarted attacks prior to this threshold, meaning that there may have been many more planned attacks or attackers than are reflected in the data.

Tracking the precise number of refugees is an inherently difficult task and accuracy may be limited for a number of reasons. There may be differences between the UNHCR,

⁷⁰ "Eurobarometer Interactive," European Commission Public Opinion, accessed November 11, 2018, <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index>.

⁷¹ "Online Data Analysis," World Values Survey, accessed November 13, 2018, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>.

⁷² Geert Hofstede, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*, 3rd ed. (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2010).; "National Culture," Hofstede Insights, accessed November 14, 2018, <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/models/national-culture/>.; "Compare Countries," Hofstede Insights, accessed November 14, 2018, <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/>.

⁷³ Center for Systemic Peace, "Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research Database" (Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800–2017; accessed November 11, 2018), <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>.

⁷⁴ Freedom House, "Freedom in the World Data and Resources," (Country and Territory Ratings and Statuses, 1973–2018 and Aggregate Category and Subcategory Scores, 2003–2018); accessed November 11, 2018), <https://freedomhouse.org/content/freedom-world-data-and-resources>.

⁷⁵ "Sweden," European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, accessed November 9, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/mapping-funds/countries/sweden_en.; "United Kingdom," European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, accessed November 9, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/mapping-funds/countries/united-kingdom_en.

NGOs, and host country governments about who is a refugee, resulting in some countries recognizing certain populations as refugees while others do not.⁷⁶ This nuance is assumed to be negligible between Western host countries in this study. Naturally, refugees living outside established camps or residences and have not registered or sought protected status are not accounted for.

The UNHCR data lists figures only according to present-day country names, and includes Serbia and Kosovo as one entity. Therefore, Serbia and Kosovo must be treated as one for this study. Events that occurred in present-day Serbia or Kosovo are aggregated within “Serbia and Kosovo.”

Finally, more refined and nuanced data, especially for conditional variables assessed in the comparative analysis between Sweden and the UK, varies in its yearly availability. Despite this and the previously mentioned limitations, this study can still provide useful insights considering refugees and terrorism. A broad assessment of the entire host population’s experience with refugees and terrorism over the last 47 years will demonstrate quantitatively if general fears of terrorism from refugees are founded or not, and a more qualitative view comparing key conditions between two countries with very different results of terrorism events relative to refugee admittance may illuminate factors that mitigate or exacerbate the risk and propensity of attacks.

⁷⁶ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database: Sources, Methods and Data Considerations.”

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III. BROAD ASSESSMENT OF REFUGEES AND TERRORISM EVENTS IN THE WEST

A. CORRELATION BETWEEN REFUGEES AND TERRORISM

This research begins with a broad assessment of the relation between refugees admitted and terrorism events in host countries in order to ascertain if a correlation exists between the two, and if so, which host countries experience a greater number of events. All years for which data is available from both the GTD and UNHCR are included: 1970–2017. This is to maximize the number of observations, as well as to include major world events and shifts in the analysis such as the Afghanistan/USSR war, collapse of the Soviet Union and independence of several European states, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond. For a macro perspective, the unit of analysis is each host country. The relationship between the number of refugees admitted and the number of terrorism events is graphically illustrated using a simple linear model in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Correlation between refugees and terrorism, 1970–2017.⁷⁷

Not yet accounting for any other variables, Figure 1 reveals a strong positive correlation between refugees admitted and terrorism events in host countries. There is an

⁷⁷ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Population Statistics.”

overall stronger correlation for all refugees (0.7784) than focus origin refugees alone (0.7355), which may indicate that a perceived higher threat of terrorism conducted by refugees from focus origin countries is unfounded. To assess any impact of changing world dynamics on this relationship, the same ordinary least squares regression is conducted for three key time periods: the Cold War, post-Cold War, and post-9/11. Results are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Correlation of refugees to terrorism.⁷⁸

	Refugee population	Coefficient	Coefficient of correlation (R)	Coefficient of determination (R ²)	P-value
1970-2017	All	0.4412***	0.7784	0.6059	1.92x10 ⁻¹⁰
	Focus origin	0.4325***	0.7355	0.5410	5.79x10 ⁻⁹
1970-1991	All	0.3105***	0.7628	0.5818	7.22x10 ⁻¹⁰
	Focus origin	0.3828***	0.5720	0.3272	3.28x10 ⁻⁵
1992-2001	All	0.2951***	0.7014	0.4920	5.63x10 ⁻⁸
	Focus origin	0.2660***	0.5896	0.3476	1.62x10 ⁻⁵
2002-2017	All	0.3743***	0.6751	0.4558	2.65x10 ⁻⁷
	Focus origin	0.3568***	0.6429	0.4133	1.45x10 ⁻⁶

Refugee volumes are lagged one year and all variables logged, except for event or refugee values of 0. N=46; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.

A moderate to strong positive correlation exists between all refugees and terrorism, indicated by the coefficients of correlation, but that correlation has decreased over time. As Table 1 shows, the relationship was strongest during the Cold War years, and lowest during the post-9/11 period. This may be due to less immediately proximate conflict as the overall European area has been relatively calmer and more stable since 2001, or due to increased and/or improved screening of refugees and domestic security efforts. The correlation of refugees from focus origin countries and terrorism, however, has increased over time and is currently the highest it has been of the three time periods. This is likely due to the large increase in volume of refugees from those areas as a result of the wars in

⁷⁸ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Population Statistics.”

Afghanistan and Iraq, the war against Daesh, and the Syrian civil war, as well as revolts following the Arab Spring and persistent conflict in Yemen and Somalia.

Numerous other factors, however, undoubtedly affect the level of terrorism. To evaluate the impact of other conditions, various regression models can be used. Where data is available, general economic conditions can be accounted for by incorporating gross national income (GNI) per capita and unemployment rates with the pretense that wealthier and employed people are less likely to commit terrorism. Assessing government expenditure on health per capita and intentional homicides can measure the general health and security environment of a country, assuming that people who have basic health needs met and live in relative safety are less prone to conduct terrorism. Finally, a society's incorporation of outsiders may potentially be affected by the amount of outsiders that constitute it, measured by the percentage of its population that is foreign-born. A society that is made up of larger amounts of people from diverse national backgrounds may be more welcoming of outsiders than one that is more homogenous. These variables and others are discussed in more depth in the next chapter, but are applied here as controls to assist in quantitatively evaluating the relationship of refugees to terrorism.

To refine the assessment, the unit of analysis is changed to country-year. All variables are logarithmically transformed except for the number of terrorism events and refugees when they are zero. Due to differences in data coverage, the number of observations changes considerably depending upon the combination of independent variables. Both an ordinary least squares and Poisson regression are used for comparative purposes because the dependent variable is a count variable. Results of three models, completed for both types of regression and for both total refugees and focus origin refugees, are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Various regression models showing significance of refugees to terrorism.⁷⁹

Model #	Linear Regression (ordinary least squares)						Poisson Regression					
	All Refugees			Focus Origin Refugees			All Refugees			Focus Origin Refugees		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
	Coefficient (standard error)	Coefficient (standard error)	Coefficient (standard error)	Coefficient (standard error)	Coefficient (standard error)	Coefficient (standard error)	Coefficient (standard error)	Coefficient (standard error)	Coefficient (standard error)	Coefficient (standard error)	Coefficient (standard error)	Coefficient (standard error)
Refugees	0.260*** (0.031)	0.227*** (0.026)	0.228*** (0.018)	0.145*** (0.026)	0.096*** (0.019)	0.135*** (0.017)	0.561*** (0.020)	0.422*** (0.013)	0.470*** (0.009)	0.367*** (0.017)	0.131*** (0.007)	0.573*** (0.011)
GNI per capita	0.926 (0.639)	0.073 (0.141)	0.295* (0.169)	0.097 (0.670)	0.437*** (0.139)	0.111 (0.183)	3.942*** (0.269)	0.059 (0.052)	0.780*** (0.036)	2.234*** (0.267)	0.690*** (0.048)	1.335*** (0.043)
Government expenditure on health per capita	-0.914 (0.557)		-0.141 (0.140)	0.063 (0.569)		0.065 (0.149)	-3.463*** (0.222)		-0.873*** (0.028)	-1.848*** (0.218)		-1.390*** (0.035)
Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people)	0.286** (0.120)	0.411*** (0.103)	0.312*** (0.074)	0.393*** (0.126)	0.469*** (0.109)	0.212*** (0.079)	-0.045 (0.044)	0.319*** (0.032)	0.597*** (0.025)	0.307*** (0.041)	0.513*** (0.029)	0.666*** (0.027)
Unemployment	0.718*** (0.174)	0.857*** (0.136)	0.324*** (0.067)	0.809*** (0.185)	0.969*** (0.144)	0.504*** (0.074)	1.299*** (0.073)	1.343*** (0.050)	0.075** (0.033)	1.416*** (0.075)	1.479*** (0.049)	1.025*** (0.041)
Foreign-born population (% of total population)	0.337** (0.138)	0.266** (0.113)		0.467*** (0.158)	0.246** (0.122)		0.165** (0.077)	-0.189*** (0.046)		0.564*** (0.062)	0.155*** (0.035)	
1970-1991 (dummy variable)												
1992-2001 (dummy variable)	0.402 (0.284)	0.459*** (0.135)	0.364** (0.164)	0.901*** (0.294)	0.807*** (0.142)	0.654*** (0.175)	0.337*** (0.082)	0.670*** (0.043)	-0.864*** (0.071)	0.888*** (0.082)	1.300*** (0.043)	-0.336*** (0.060)
2002-2017 (dummy variable)												
Constant	-6.599** (2.819)	-4.639*** (1.373)	-4.108*** (0.851)	-4.670 (3.010)	-7.152*** (1.407)	-2.953*** (0.915)	-21.628*** (1.466)	-5.815*** (0.530)	-4.858*** (0.244)	-14.821*** (1.381)	-10.170*** (0.539)	-8.780*** (0.294)
Observations	253	392	556	253	392	556	253	392	556	253	392	556
R ²	0.343	0.321	0.299	0.253	0.234	0.187						
Adjusted R ²	0.325	0.310	0.291	0.232	0.223	0.178						
	1.050	1.116	1.005	1.120	1.184	1.083						
Residual Standard Error	(df = 245)	(df = 385)	(df = 549)	(df = 245)	(df = 385)	(df = 549)						
	18.304***	30.297***	38.982***	11.857***	19.653***	21.032***						
F Statistics	(df = 7; 245)	(df = 6; 385)	(df = 6; 549)	(df = 7; 245)	(df = 6; 385)	(df = 6; 549)						
Log Likelihood							-1,715.06	-3,331.72	-6,704.11	-1,930.39	-3,790.29	-6,347.88
Akaike Inf. Crit.							3,446.12	6,677.45	13,422.23	3,876.78	7,594.57	12,709.76

Refugee volumes are lagged one year and all variables logged, except for event or refugee values of 0. Number of terrorism events is not logged for Poisson models. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.

⁷⁹ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Population; The World Bank, “World Development Indicators”; OECD International Migration Statistics Database.

All models show that the amount of refugees admitted is statistically significant. The model that includes all variables, model 1, has the strongest coefficient of correlation (0.5857) and describes approximately 34.3% of the variation in terrorism levels when linear regression is applied, as shown by the coefficient of determination. This model shows that unemployment accounts for the largest change in terrorism, as indicated by its coefficient of 0.718 being the greatest of all variables. When a Poisson regression is used, unemployment remains a strong factor, and the effect of wealth becomes significant in contributing to terrorism (coefficient of 3.942) while the effect of government spending on healthcare becomes significant in reducing terrorism (coefficient of -3.463). Additional nuanced differences exist between variables' coefficients depending upon the type of model (combination of independent variables) and type of regression used, but the main point is not to develop a predictive model, but rather to demonstrate that the relationship between refugees and terrorism still exists and is significant when accounting for additional factors.

In order to determine what those additional factors may be and assess their impact on terrorism, more in-depth analysis is needed. However, each host country is unique in nearly an infinite number of ways, and attempting to quantitatively model all the conditions for all countries is futile, especially given constraints in data availability. Instead, an approach is to evaluate each country's relative performance in terms of its relation between refugees admitted and terrorism events. Doing so will illuminate which countries are more successful at hosting refugees while mitigating terrorism. Countries with disparate results can then be identified and their additional factors compared and contrasted to determine conditions that may explain their success or failure.

B. HOST COUNTRY PERFORMANCE

To identify countries for a more in-depth analysis, a comparison of refugees admitted and terrorism events in each host country is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Refugees and terrorism events by country, 1970–2017.⁸⁰

Clearly, different hosts have admitted vastly different amounts of refugees. This highlights that although hosts are signatories to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, each retains its sovereignty and independent right to set its own refugee acceptance policies. Naturally, providing refuge for vast amounts of refugees can be extremely taxing on the resources of a host, especially considering the minimal securities and welfare a host is obligated to provide for both humanitarian reasons and as outlined in the 1951 Convention. Examples include employment opportunity, housing, public education, public relief, and administrative assistance.⁸¹ Individual states have varying resources available to accommodate these needs, undoubtedly factoring into their policies.


Less tangible considerations regarding admitting large amounts of refugees may include a state's concerns over the second and third-order effects of admitting and caring

⁸⁰ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database"; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Population Statistics."

⁸¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*, 22–27.

for large numbers of people. These could include the need for an increased labor force, fear of increased competition over limited employment opportunities, perceived dilution of a population's identity, cultural conflicts, associated political backlash or public sentiment, etc. While each state's situation is unique, an effective way to generalize and compare the burden of hosting refugees placed upon a state is to normalize the volume by amount of refugees admitted per capita of the host country population. Another reason for assessing refugees admitted per capita, other than as a measure of the resource burden placed upon a host, is that this normalization helps assess the risk assumed by a host population if terrorist organizations are indeed attempting to exploit refugee streams for malevolent reasons. A host population that admits more refugees per capita risks having a greater percentage of its citizens directly affected by any terrorism events exploiting refugee flows due to increased exposure. Finally, greater refugees per capita increases the likelihood of interaction between refugees and host residents, which may also increase friction or tension amongst the host population and increase the likelihood of residents committing terrorist acts, either against the refugees or their own government.

Normalizing refugee volumes as refugees admitted per capita of the host population dramatically changes the perspective, as shown in Figure 3.



Refugees per capita is calculated using a state's average annual population over the given timeframe.

Figure 3. Refugees admitted per capita and terrorism events, 1970–2017.⁸²

This perspective shows that the previous leaders, Germany and the United States, pale in comparison to Sweden in terms of refugees admitted per capita.⁸³ Also of note is the high level of terrorism witnessed by the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and the United States. A scatter plot of each country's total refugees per capita and number of terrorism events, Figure 4, is used to better assess countries' performance relative to one another.

⁸² Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database"; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Population Statistics"; The World Bank, "World Development Indicators."

⁸³ The Serbia and Kosovo outlier is likely due to the frequent conflict and redrawing of state lines in areas that constitute those countries today. For these reasons, it will be excluded as a candidate for further analysis for the purposes of this study.




Figure 4. Relation of events to refugees per capita, 1970–2017.⁸⁴

The United Kingdom has experienced the highest volume of terrorism events by a large margin, despite admitting roughly the same volume of refugees per capita as the United States and France. Spain has admitted fewer refugees per capita and sustained a large volume of terrorism events, but still much less than the UK. Sweden appears to be the most successful country in terms of accepting the most refugees while experiencing minimal terrorism events. Figure 3 also demonstrated that nearly half of Sweden’s refugee population has been from focus origin countries, further undermining any fear that jihadi terrorist organizations operating in those countries infiltrate these refugee populations to attack the West.

C. CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

The relation of refugees to terrorism has already been shown for each major time period, and although it is currently lower than during the Cold War and pre-9/11, the

⁸⁴ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Population Statistics”; The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

remainder of this research focuses on the post-9/11 world to better address current concerns regarding any link between refugees and terrorism, particularly concerns over anti-West jihadi terrorism. Additionally, more nuanced data regarding various conditions is readily available for recent years, enabling the comparison in the next chapter to be more comprehensive. Figure 5 graphically illustrates the relationship of refugees to terrorism during the more current time period.




Figure 5. Correlation between refugees and terrorism, 2002–2017.⁸⁵

The relation between focus origin refugees and terrorism (coefficient of correlation 0.6429) is stronger than previous time periods as shown in Table 1, yet still less than the relation between all refugees and terrorism (0.6751). Figure 6 plots the relation of refugees per capita to number of terrorism events for each country in order to better assess each country’s performances relative to one another.

⁸⁵ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Population Statistics.”




Figure 6. Relation of events to refugees per capita, 2002–2017.⁸⁶

During this time period Ukraine is an outlier in the number of terrorism events, likely due to events surrounding Russia’s annexation of Crimea (indeed, 91% of the 1682 terrorism events occurring in Ukraine during this time period occurred in 2014 and 2015).⁸⁷ Both Sweden and the UK again stand out with regard to the number of terrorism events and refugees admitted per capita. In the current environment, Sweden has demonstrated its ability to host a proportionately large number of refugees while minimizing terrorism, whereas the UK has admitted proportionately fewer refugees yet sustained much higher amounts of terrorism.

⁸⁶ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Population Statistics”; The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

⁸⁷ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database.”

D. SUMMARY

This broad assessment has shown that a moderate to strong positive correlation exists between refugees and terrorism in the West, and that the correlation is weaker for 2002–2017 than it was for 1992–2001 or 1970–1991 (coefficients of correlation of 0.6751, 0.7014, and 0.7628, respectively). Any relation between focus origin refugees and terrorism alone is weaker than that of all refugees and terrorism, but this sub-population's correlation has increased in recent years as the number of refugees from those countries has risen. The impact of refugees on terrorism variance remains significant when accounting for select control variables, regardless of the type of regression used or combination of various independent variables.

Despite an overall declining correlation, there continues to be strong debate about refugees and their perceived link to terrorism. Countries like Germany and the United States have admitted the most refugees over the aggregate timeframe, but in reality Sweden has been the most challenged in terms of relative responsibility and risk to terrorism from refugees by admitting the most per capita. But while Sweden has admitted the most refugees per capita, it has also maintained some of the lowest levels of terrorism. The United Kingdom, in contrast, has consistently admitted much fewer refugees per capita yet sustained much higher levels of terrorism. Both countries are West European, industrialized, wealthy nations removed from the mainland and geographically further from potential refugee origin countries, amongst other similarities. So why the disparity between the two in terms of refugees admitted and terrorism events? Answering this question is the objective of the next chapter.

IV. COUNTRY COMPARISON—SWEDEN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

Sweden admitted increasingly more refugees per capita than the United Kingdom, yet the United Kingdom witnessed many more terrorism events. Comparing both countries' refugee admittance to number of terrorism events in Figure 7 shows a stark contrast.




Figure 7. Refugees admitted per capita and terrorism in Sweden (left) and the UK (right).⁸⁸

Using an ordinary least squares regression and not accounting for any other variables, the coefficient of correlation between total refugees admitted and terrorism from 2002–2017 is 0.876 for Sweden and 0.912 for the UK, with variable coefficients of 984.26 and -3,2931.60 respectively. For focus origin refugees only, the coefficient of correlation is 0.925 for Sweden and 0.910 for the UK, with variable coefficients of 1,234.73 and - 119,447.00. There is a strong relationship between refugees and terrorism in both countries, yet opposite effects.

Much further analysis is needed to determine what other factors may be involved and to explain these disparate results. Applying John Stuart Mill's Method of Difference analysis to evaluate other conditions in each country will support or discredit any

⁸⁸ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database"; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Population Statistics."

connection between refugees and terrorism. Applying his Method of Concomitant Variations for each condition will also illuminate the impact these conditions may have on terrorism.⁸⁹ Then, comparing the results between the two countries and identifying commonalities will reveal any conditions that may mitigate or exacerbate the level of terrorism in a Western country. This chapter assesses 10 conditions in an effort to explore nuances between the two countries and elucidate their disparate results: (1) the economic situation, (2) health and safety, (3) education level, (4) ethnic, religious, and native-born homogeneity, (5) freedom and democracy, (6) EU migrant program funding, (7) military involvement in the middle east, (8) public attitudes toward immigrants, (9) dimensions of national culture, and (10) support for right-wing populist political parties. This analysis will focus on the more recent time period of 2002–2017 for sake of currency and data availability.

A. ECONOMIC FACTORS

If the economic situation in a country is poor and competition over fundamental resources extreme, then people may become desperate, more prone to lashing out at others or the government if they feel their needs aren't met, or disenfranchised and more susceptible to recruitment and manipulation by nefarious actors. Several variables are analyzed to assess the economic condition. In lieu of gross domestic product, gross national income (GNI) per capita is measured using the World Bank Atlas method⁹⁰ in order to best

⁸⁹ Christopher Macleod, "John Stuart Mill," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/mill>.

⁹⁰ The World Bank, "World Development Indicators." According to the World Bank, the "GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) is the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method, divided by the midyear population. GNI is the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI, calculated in national currency, is usually converted to U.S. dollars at official exchange rates for comparisons across economies, although an alternative rate is used when the official exchange rate is judged to diverge by an exceptionally large margin from the rate actually applied in international transactions. To smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange rates, a special Atlas method of conversion is used by the World Bank. This applies a conversion factor that averages the exchange rate for a given year and the two preceding years, adjusted for differences in rates of inflation between the country, and through 2000, the G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States). From 2001, these countries include the Euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States."

gauge the overall economic situation of the residents. General government gross debt⁹¹ is another indicator of the overall economic situation. Additionally, unemployment rates are used to assess an economy's health.⁹² In this study both overall unemployment rates and foreign-born unemployment rates are utilized, with foreign-born unemployment rates being reported as a percentage of the foreign-born labor force.⁹³ An indicator of economic strife is the poverty rate, of which there are many ways to measure and may be subjective for each country, but is measured in this study by the percentage of the population living on less than \$5.50 a day calculated at 2011 international prices.⁹⁴ Finally, the Gini index estimate from the World Bank attempts to demonstrate how equitably income is distributed within a country.⁹⁵ A nation with greater disparity in income distribution may experience greater civil unrest if its lower-income populace feels exploited by a wealthy elite, especially in a nation that subscribes to more socialist systems. Figures 8–13 illustrate these variables in relation to the volume of terrorism events for Sweden and the UK.

⁹¹ Eurostat Database (General government gross debt). Eurostat defines general government gross debt “as the ratio of government debt outstanding at the end of the year to gross domestic product at current market prices. For this calculation, government debt is defined as the total consolidated gross debt at nominal value in the following categories of government liabilities (as defined in ESA 2010): currency and deposits (AF.2), debt securities (AF.3) and loans (AF.4). The general government sector comprises the subsectors of central government, state government, local government and social security funds.”

⁹² The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.” Total unemployment rates are defined by the World Bank as “the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment.” The figure is a percent of the total labor force according to a modeled International Labor Organization estimate.

⁹³ OECD International Migration Statistics Database. The OECD states that “The foreign-born unemployment rate is calculated as the share of unemployed foreign-born persons aged 15–64 in the foreign-born labour force (the sum of employed and unemployed foreign-born) of that same age. Unemployed people consist of those persons who report that they are without work during the reference week, are available for work and have taken active steps to find work during the four weeks preceding the interview. Immigrant workers are affected to a greater extent by unemployment than native-born workers in European countries that have traditionally received migrants. This indicator is measured as a percentage of foreign-born labour force.”

⁹⁴ The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

⁹⁵ The World Bank. The World Bank says that the “Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus, a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.”




Figure 8. GNI per capita, Sweden (left) and UK (right).⁹⁶




Figure 9. General government gross debt, Sweden (left) and UK (right).⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

⁹⁷ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; Eurostat Database (General government gross debt).




Figure 10. Unemployment rates, Sweden (left) and UK (right).⁹⁸




Figure 11. Foreign-born unemployment rates, Sweden (left) and UK (right).⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

⁹⁹ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; OECD International Migration Statistics Database.




Figure 12. Poverty levels, Sweden (left) and UK (right).¹⁰⁰




Figure 13. Gini index, Sweden (left) and UK (right).¹⁰¹

For Sweden, none of the economic variables appear to have a significant correlation with the number of terrorism events. Over time, Sweden's GNI per capita has generally increased, general government debt has remained relatively stable, the population living at \$5.50 or less per day has hovered around 1%, and there is a slight decrease in the equitable distribution of income according to the Gini index, although it has not been drastic at less than five points on a 100-point scale over 12 years. The unemployment rate did increase slightly in the years following the economic crisis of 2008, but began showing signs of

¹⁰⁰ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database"; The World Bank, "World Development Indicators."

¹⁰¹ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database"; The World Bank, "World Development Indicators."

decline in 2013 and 2014. Overall, it appears the Swedish economic situation has had minimal impact on the number of terrorism events.

In the UK, the most significant economic variable correlating with the number of terrorism events is government debt. Although total unemployment increased in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis, poverty levels dropped slightly and income became slightly more equally distributed according to the World Bank's Gini index. The government accruing more debt after the economic crisis appears to have been used effectively to combat unemployment and poverty, but at the cost of continued high debt levels even after unemployment decreased to rates below pre-crisis years. There was an increase in terrorism when unemployment was elevated, but this association is reduced by sustained higher levels of terrorism despite decreasing unemployment beginning in 2013. Overall, the trend is that terrorism in the UK increased with government debt, and remains elevated with high levels of debt.

Economically, the largest discriminator between Sweden and the UK is general government debt as a percentage of GDP. The UK's debt increased steadily, more than doubling during this timeframe, as did a corresponding level of terrorism. As debt increased, government resources likely became more scarce, potentially reducing funding for integration programs or other assistance and increasing competition over limited resources for general welfare programs, which may have heightened tensions between natives and immigrants.

The Swedish population was wealthier as measured by GNI per capita, which may have contributed to the overall low amount of terrorism. Both states had comparable poverty and total unemployment rates, but Sweden maintained a much higher foreign-born unemployment rate, averaging approximately 16% from 2009–2017 whereas the UK's never once reached 10%.¹⁰² Sweden's higher foreign-born unemployment rate, yet consistently low poverty levels and high GNI per capita, coupled with a lower Gini index (indicating more equitably distributed income) and low levels of terrorism, may indicate

¹⁰² OECD International Migration Statistics Database.

that refugees and other immigrants are well-provided for and secure in their new host country, which would reduce susceptibility to radicalization by extremists.

B. HEALTH AND SAFETY

Similar to the economic situation, a population that faces grave challenges to its health or general safety may indicate it is more vulnerable to exploitation by radical violent extremists that use violence and terrorism to affect change in a society. A population that values basic levels of health and general security expects to be reasonably provided for in these areas. To gauge healthcare security three variables are considered: the general government health expenditure per capita,¹⁰³ the general government health expenditure as a percentage of GDP,¹⁰⁴ and physicians per 1000 people.¹⁰⁵ To gauge general security from violent crime the number of intentional homicides per 100,000 people is considered.¹⁰⁶ These variables are represented in Figures 14–17.

¹⁰³ The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.” The World Bank defines this as “public expenditure on health from domestic sources per capita expressed in current U.S. dollars.”

¹⁰⁴ The World Bank. The World Bank defines this as “public expenditure on health from domestic sources as a share of the economy as measured by GDP.”

¹⁰⁵ The World Bank.

¹⁰⁶ The World Bank. The World Bank states that “intentional homicides are estimates of unlawful homicides purposely inflicted as a result of domestic disputes, interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources, intergang violence over turf or control, and predatory violence and killing by armed groups. Intentional homicide does not include all intentional killing; the difference is usually in the organization of the killing. Individuals or small groups usually commit homicide, whereas killing in armed conflict is usually committed by fairly cohesive groups of up to several hundred members and is thus usually excluded.”




Figure 14. Government health expenditure per capita, Sweden (left) and UK (right).¹⁰⁷




Figure 15. Government health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Sweden (left) and UK (right).¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

¹⁰⁸ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”




Figure 16. Physicians, Sweden (left) and UK (right).¹⁰⁹




Figure 17. Intentional homicides, Sweden (left) and UK (right).¹¹⁰

Swedish domestic government spending on healthcare increased two points as a measure of GDP in 2011, resulting in an overall increase in spending per capita. The number of physicians per 1,000 people increased slightly, while the number of intentional homicides has remained around one per 100,000 people. No discernable relation between these variables and terrorism is readily apparent. This indicates that neither a poor healthcare environment nor violent crime environment are contributing factors to the increase in terrorism events in the country.

¹⁰⁹ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

¹¹⁰ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

UK government spending on healthcare as a percentage of its GDP increased gradually with a slight uptick in 2009; however, in the same year there was a slight decrease in government health spending per capita. There was no sudden surge in population that could explain this (population levels from 2007–2009 were 61.35, 61.84, and 62.31 million, respectively¹¹¹), so it is likely the disparity between the two expenditure figures is due to a corresponding decrease in GDP (indeed, the GNI per capita dropped from 2008 to 2009). Data available for the number of physicians indicates consistent levels of providers, and the number of intentional homicides declined. Overall, the data indicates that the increase in terrorism is not a byproduct of deteriorating health or safety conditions.

Differences between the UK and Sweden in this category are minimal in terms of trends, but do indicate a higher priority for health spending and physicians in Sweden. The Swedish government averaged spending nearly 7% of its GDP on domestic healthcare until increasing this figure to 9% in 2011, while the UK did not reach 7% until 2009 and close to 8% in 2013.¹¹² The number of physicians per 1000 people in Sweden was above three in 2002, three and a half in 2008, and steadily increased until above four in 2012 and later. In the UK this figure never breached three.¹¹³

C. EDUCATION

The education level of a population can impact numerous aspects of a society. More-educated people may think independently about issues, not be swayed easily by single sources of information or dynamic personalities that appeal to emotions, not be as threatened by new ideas, be more open to considering alternate views, be more pragmatic in decision making, and be less likely to turn to violence in order to achieve their objectives, especially in an open and democratic society. Education and the emphasis that a society places upon it can be measured numerous ways and at different levels, whether by duration, graduation rates, teacher to student ratios, number of institutions, etc.

¹¹¹ The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

¹¹² The World Bank.

¹¹³ The World Bank.

To assess education, the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011 system is used to ensure equal comparison between countries.¹¹⁴ Two sub-populations are measured as a percentage of the total population. The first consists of people whose highest level of education attainment was ISCED11 levels three to four (upper and post-secondary, but not tertiary), and the second encompasses ISCED11 levels five to eight (tertiary). Additionally, general government expenditure on education (all levels) as a percentage of GDP is assessed.¹¹⁵ Education variables are shown in Figures 18 and 19.




Figure 18. Education attainment levels, Sweden (left) and UK (right).¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Eurostat, “International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).” ISCED11 levels 3 and 4 are upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary, respectively. ISCED11 levels 5, 6, 7, and 8 are short-cycle tertiary, bachelor’s or equivalent, master’s or equivalent, and doctoral or equivalent, respectively.

¹¹⁵ The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.” The World Bank states that “general government expenditure on education (current, capital, and transfers) is expressed as a percentage of GDP. It includes expenditure funded by transfers from international sources to government. General government usually refers to local, regional and central governments.”

¹¹⁶ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; Eurostat Database (Population by education attainment level).




Figure 19. Government education expenditure, Sweden (left) and UK (right).¹¹⁷

The data shows that the vast majority of the population of Sweden has achieved at least a secondary level of education, and that over time more of the population is seeking and attaining tertiary levels of education. Additionally, although there was a slight increase in government spending on education in 2012, the overall expenditure has remained around seven percent of GDP since 2002.¹¹⁸ In Sweden there has been no drastic change in education attainment (or decline) that would contribute to a change in the number of terrorism events.

The percentage of the population attaining higher education levels in the UK increased steadily by over 10% in the last 16 years,¹¹⁹ even with no significant change in government investment (it's feasible that the increase in education expenditure as a percentage of GDP in 2010 is a result of constant spending combined with a lower overall GDP). Increasing education levels appear to have a slight positive relation with increasing instances of terrorism, but this appears minimal.

There are no major differences between the UK and Sweden with regard to education, with the exception of the Swedish government spending slightly more of its GDP on education than the UK government (between 6–7% by Sweden with increases to

¹¹⁷ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

¹¹⁸ The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

¹¹⁹ Eurostat Database (Population by education attainment level).

above 7% beginning in 2012 and an average of 5% by the UK with increases in 2010 moving it closer to 6%¹²⁰). Both states consist of populations with over 70% completing at least secondary school,¹²¹ and experience general trends toward a larger percentage of citizens completing some level of tertiary education.

D. ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND NATIVE-BORN HOMOGENEITY

A valid consideration when assessing the sudden influx and incorporation of large numbers of minorities into a population is the host population's pre-existing ethnic and religious demographics, as well as percentage of foreign-born population. While not guaranteed, a society that is more homogenous may expect outsiders joining it to conform to the in-group identity, or they may feel that their current identities and values are threatened by large influxes of groups with alternate identities and values. A society's identity and values are often difficult to empirically measure, so various demographics such as ethnicity and religion are often used. Unfortunately for the purposes of demographic conflict studies, Sweden does not assess these demographics during a census. Categorizing people based upon ethnic or religious lines is so strongly frowned upon that these factors are not recorded even when gathering data to assess public security trends, such as criminal data.¹²² In fact, Swedish institutions have such a strong desire to be anti-racist that the police cannot even use racial or ethnic characteristics when describing crime suspects.¹²³

Unlike Sweden, the UK solicits broad categorical ethnicity data during censuses, with the most recent conducted in 2011 for all of the UK and 2001 for England and Wales. In 2011, 87.1% of the population was white, 7% Asian, 3% black, 2% mixed or multiethnic,

¹²⁰ The World Bank, "World Development Indicators."

¹²¹ Eurostat Database (Population by education attainment level).

¹²² Lee Roden, "Why Sweden Doesn't Keep Stats on Ethnicity and Crime," *The Local*, May 8, 2018, <https://www.thelocal.se/20180508/why-sweden-doesnt-keep-stats-on-ethnic-background-and-crime>.

¹²³ Emma Henderson, "Swedish Police Banned from Describing Criminals Anymore in Case They Sound Racist," *Independent*, January 14, 2016, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/swedish-police-are-not-allowed-to-give-descriptions-of-alleged-criminals-so-as-not-to-sound-racist-a6810311.html>.

and 0.9 % other.¹²⁴ Previously, in 2001, the composition was 91.3% white, 12.4% Asian, 4.7% black, and 0.49% mixed.¹²⁵ Although general trends can be inferred from these figures, the data is not refined enough to determine accurately any relation of ethnicity with terrorism from 2002–2017.

Despite no official statistics on Sweden’s ethnic and religious demographics, estimates of religious homogeneity are possible via secondary sources. Overall, Sweden and the UK are very similar religiously, although a larger portion of Sweden’s population is not religiously affiliated. A Pew Research Center report, *The Global Religious Landscape*, compiled religious demographic data for the world as of 2010, and listed figures for Sweden based upon multiple surveys from a third party that were then adjusted to “account for underrepresented religious groups and migrant populations.”¹²⁶ According to the report, Sweden in 2010 was 67.2% Christian, 4.6% Muslim, 0.2% Hindu, 0.4% Buddhist, 0.2% Folk, 0.1% Jewish, 0.2% other, and 27% unaffiliated.¹²⁷ The same report listed the UK population as 71.1% Christian, 4.4% Muslim, 1.3% Hindu, 0.4% Buddhist, 0.3% Folk, 0.5% Jewish, 0.8% other, and 21.3% unaffiliated.¹²⁸ Again, the lack of annual data prevents temporal changes in religious composition to be accurately compared to the rise in number of terrorism events. But due to the strong religious similarities yet differing number of terrorism events between the two countries, it can be inferred that religious homogeneity alone does not affect terrorism.

Annual data is available for both countries, however, for the percentage of the population that is foreign-born. This variable may offer additional insights about the host population and its willingness to accommodate foreigners. A society comprised of only residents born within its borders may be more nationalistic, view in-country birth as a

¹²⁴ “Ethnic Group,” Office for National Statistics, June 13, 2014, <http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/ks201uk>.

¹²⁵ “KS006 – Ethnic Group,” Office for National Statistics, accessed November 20, 2018, <http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2001/KS006/view/2092957703?cols=measures>.

¹²⁶ Hackett et al., *The Global Religious Landscape*, 79.

¹²⁷ Hackett et al., 49.

¹²⁸ Hackett et al., 50.

prerequisite to inclusion or being a true citizen, and be more fearful of outsiders with different ways of life that may not conform to the society's self-image. On the contrary, a society comprised of people from various places of birth and backgrounds may be more tolerant of outsiders as they were once outsiders themselves. Figure 20 displays foreign-born population and terrorism events.




Figure 20. Foreign-born population, Sweden (left) and UK (right).¹²⁹

In Sweden the percentage of the population that is foreign-born increased by more than 50% from 2002–2017.¹³⁰ A large part of this is likely due to the high volume of refugee admittance, but it should be recalled that refugee admittance was fairly steady from 2004–2012, then surged from 2012 onward. The same trend is not reflected in the foreign-born population rates, indicating that Sweden has been successful in managing a steady increase of its foreign-born population while simultaneously managing large increases in refugee admittance. This may point to successful and efficient refugee programs, which include timely determination of refugee status, followed by resettlement in Sweden, resettlement in a third country, voluntary repatriation to the origin country, or forced return to the origin country. Although terrorism increased during this time period as well, it appears unlikely that the steady increase in foreign-born population is largely to blame.

¹²⁹ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; Statistics Sweden, “Summary of Population Statistics 1960–2017”; Office for National Statistics Population of the UK by Country of Birth and Nationality Dataset.

¹³⁰ Statistics Sweden, “Summary of Population Statistics 1960–2017.”

The UK has seen a steady increase in the percentage of its population that is foreign-born, despite a dramatic decrease in refugees admitted from 2007–2013. This indicates that the predominant change in foreign-born population is not a result of refugee admittance, but rather a result of regular migration. The foreign-born population level steadily increases, as do the number of terrorism events, suggesting that this increase may fuel tensions or conditions that are conducive to terrorism in the UK.

E. FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY

Western democratic societies set the standard for freedom, and both Sweden and the UK are no exceptions. The Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) evaluates a nation's governmental structure on a scale from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Since 1917, Sweden has scored a +10 on this scale every year, as has the UK since 1922.¹³¹ The Freedom House evaluates the level of freedom in a country based upon civil liberties and political rights in nations since 1972. Methodologies have changed over time, but Sweden consistently earned a "Free" rating, achieving the maximum aggregate score of 100 on a scale of 0–100 for all but three years from 2002–2017 (and a score of 99 for the other three years).¹³² The UK also rated high, achieving at least an aggregate 95 freedom rating annually from 2002–2017.¹³³ Needless to say, Sweden and the UK are some of the freest and most democratic countries in the world. No correlation to changing levels of terrorism during the timeframe analyzed can be made due to these variables' consistency, although an argument could be made that they play a role in keeping terrorism events low.

F. INTEGRATION PROGRAMS

1. Core European Union Funding

Assessing the complete breadth, depth, and effectiveness of immigrant integration programs is beyond the scope of this study due to the vast numbers of offices and

¹³¹ Center for Systemic Peace, "Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research Database."

¹³² Freedom House, "Freedom in the World Data and Resources."

¹³³ Freedom House.

institutions that can be directly or indirectly involved, be they official government offices, non-governmental organizations, charity groups, or local volunteers, just to name a few. Additionally, the quantity and quality of such programs varies greatly amongst countries, making it difficult to effectively make any comparison. However, an attempt is still made to analyze this factor by assessing the level of four European Commission funds pertaining to migration that both Sweden and the UK received.

The European Refugee Fund (ERF) from 2007–2013 supported improvements in asylum procedures, reception accommodation infrastructure, resettlement or relocation operations, legal and social assistance, and programs for language training and acquisition of skills by asylum seekers and refugees.¹³⁴ The European Integration Fund (EIF) complemented the ERF from 2007–2013, with a focus on integrating non-EU third-country nationals into their host societies to “promote European cooperation, with the objective of granting comparable rights, responsibilities and opportunities for all.”¹³⁵ In addition to assisting new immigrants directly, this fund was designed to promote interoperability of EU member state efforts, information sharing of best practices, and activities regarding introduction to the host society in both the EU country and immigrants’ countries of origin.¹³⁶ The European Return Fund augmented the refugee and integration funds from 2008–2013 to assist in returning refugees to their country of origin. Focusing on voluntary returnees, this fund sought to enhance quality of information and management of voluntary return and reintegration programs, provide specific assistance to “vulnerable” returnees (ill, disabled, unaccompanied minors, elderly, etc.), and improve information sharing between EU nations. It also helped finance the forced return of those who received an unfavorable refugee determination decision and refused to return voluntarily.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ “Refugee Fund,” European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, accessed November 9, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/refugee-fund_en.

¹³⁵ “Integration Fund,” European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, accessed November 9, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/integration-fund_en.

¹³⁶ European Commission Migration and Home Affairs.

¹³⁷ “Return Fund,” European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, accessed November 9, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/return-fund_en.

Following the ERF, EIF, and Return Fund, the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (AMIF) for 2014–2020 seeks to assist member states applying EU legislation to strengthen and develop the Common European Asylum System, support legal migration and integration of non-EU nationals, enhance “fair and effective return strategies,” and ensure that “EU States which are most affected by migration and asylum flows can count on solidarity from other EU states.”¹³⁸ This fund can assist host countries integrate immigrants in a number of ways such as improving “accommodation and reception services for asylum seekers, information measures and campaigns in non-EU countries on legal migration channels, education and language training for non-EU nationals,” and staff training.¹³⁹ Sweden’s basic allocation of this fund is €118,536,877, and the UK’s allocation is €370,525,577.¹⁴⁰ Without data on yearly breakdown, this figure has been distributed equally per annum 2014–2020. Figure 21 shows the funding allotments for core EU migration programs.

¹³⁸ “Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF),” European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, accessed November 9, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/migration-asylum-borders/asylum-migration-integration-fund_en.

¹³⁹ European Commission Migration and Home Affairs.

¹⁴⁰ “European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, “Sweden”; European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, “United Kingdom.”




Figure 21. Core EU migration program funding, Sweden (left) and UK (right).¹⁴¹

Both countries' funding followed similar trends by increasing steadily until a peak in 2013, then dropping abruptly and levelling off in 2014 and beyond.¹⁴² The AMIF is intended to perform many functions of the preceding Refugee, Integration, and Return Funds, but with a lower budget than the summation of the three may not have been as effective.

A reduction in EU funding for these various immigrant programs is concurrent with an uptick in the number of terrorism events in Sweden from 2014–2017. If the events were caused as a direct or indirect result of refugees, then this may indicate that Sweden's use of the funding was successful in integrating refugees and mitigating conditions conducive to terrorism. When resources for those programs declined, so did the integration success rate. This is especially true when recalling that Sweden's major increase in refugee acceptance occurred from 2013–2015. Accepting more refugees in conjunction with decreased external financial support may have set conditions for greater marginalization of a vulnerable population and increased terrorism. At the same time, this combination of events may indicate just how efficient and successful Sweden's refugee and integration programs were when given adequate resourcing for the volume of refugees.

¹⁴¹ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database"; European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, "Sweden"; European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, "United Kingdom."

¹⁴² European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, "Sweden"; European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, "United Kingdom."

In contrast, there appears to be a strong relationship between the amount of EU program funding and the number of terrorism events in the UK, with both generally increasing to an apex in 2013 followed by a sharp decrease and relatively high stability afterwards. A possible initial explanation for this could be that the funding was used for more heavy-handed programs perceived to reduce conditions conducive to terrorism, but actually had the unintended consequence of alienating immigrants from their host society and driving them to become more susceptible to radicalization by extremists.

2. Additional European Union Funding

Sweden, unlike the UK, is part of the Schengen area of countries¹⁴³ and was therefore also a beneficiary of additional EU funding intended to assist with securing external borders. The External Borders Fund from 2007–2013 was designed to help EU states experiencing increased flows of migrants by improving implementation of border control standards, building a common EU visa policy, and reducing visa fraud. Border infrastructure, surveillance, operating equipment and systems, transportation means for controlling external borders, and information sharing were all improved upon under this fund, which strived to increase security and shorten passenger verification times.¹⁴⁴

In addition to the External Borders Fund, the Internal Security Fund (ISF) was established for 2014–2020 to promote the implementation of a comprehensive EU “Internal Security Strategy, law enforcement cooperation, and the management of the Union’s external borders.”¹⁴⁵ It is divided into two components: ISF Borders and Visa and ISF Police. The ISF Borders and Visa component focuses on supporting a common visa policy for the Schengen area to streamline service for legitimate travelers, share information among EU members, and achieve “a uniform and high level of control of the external

¹⁴³ “Schengen: Controversial EU Free Movement Deal Explained,” *BBC*, April 24, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13194723>.

¹⁴⁴ “External Borders Fund,” European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, accessed November 9, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/external-borders-fund_en.

¹⁴⁵ “Internal Security Fund – Borders and Visa,” European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, accessed November 9, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/internal-security-fund-borders_en.

borders... in order to halt irregular migration and ensure the smooth crossing of the external borders.”¹⁴⁶ One of the two key objectives of the ISF Police fund is to reduce cross-border crime (including terrorism) via improved coordination and cooperation with law enforcement, national authorities, and international organizations. The second objective is to manage security risks and crises by “preparing for protecting people and critical infrastructure against terrorist attacks and other security related incidents.”¹⁴⁷ Specific ways of doing this could include establishing information technology systems, acquiring operational equipment, and developing training programs to enhance coordination and cooperation.¹⁴⁸ Both the ISF Borders and Visa and ISF Police funds can be directed to state and federal authorities, local public bodies, non-governmental organizations, and private or public law companies.¹⁴⁹ The ISF Borders and Visa funds may also be granted to humanitarian, education, and research organizations.¹⁵⁰

Sweden’s total allocations from the External Borders Fund and two Internal Security Funds were a fraction of the core EU migration program funds that the UK was also a beneficiary of. Despite being augmented by the ISF programs to achieve parity with total 2010–2011 funding, the relationship between funding and terrorism was unchanged; the drop in total EU funding occurred with an increase in terrorism events in Sweden, as shown in Figure 22.

¹⁴⁶ European Commission Migration and Home Affairs.

¹⁴⁷ “Internal Security Fund – Police,” European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, accessed November 9, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/internal-security-fund-police_en.

¹⁴⁸ European Commission Migration and Home Affairs.

¹⁴⁹ European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, “Internal Security Fund – Borders and Visa”; European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, “Internal Security Fund – Police.”

¹⁵⁰ European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, “Internal Security Fund – Borders and Visa.”




Figure 22. Combined EU funding, Sweden (left) and UK (right).¹⁵¹

G. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Terrorist organizations may direct efforts at specific populations in an attempt to alter their government’s foreign policy objectives. When a state takes offensive action against a terrorist organization or joins a threatening coalition, it may become a target, especially if the threatened organization perceives it will attain at least some degree of success in altering the targeted state’s objectives. The Madrid train bombings of 2004 represent such an example. Spain was involved with the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, and withdrew shortly after the attacks killed more than 190 people, wounded another 1500,¹⁵² and helped propel the opposition political party to power during the subsequent election.¹⁵³ To assess whether or not military involvement in the middle east may be a factor impacting terrorism at home in Sweden and the UK, a dichotomous assessment of each nation’s involvement in the region is considered. Figure 23 shows Sweden and UK involvement in major military campaigns in the Middle East since 2002.

¹⁵¹ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, “Sweden”; European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, “United Kingdom.”

¹⁵² Raj Chari, “The 2004 Spanish Election: Terrorism as a Catalyst for Change?” *West European Politics* 27, no. 5 (September 2010): 944, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0140238042000283247>.

¹⁵³ Rose and Murphy, “Does Terrorism Ever Work?” 185.




Figure 23. Military involvement in the Middle East and South Central Asia, Sweden (left) and UK (right).¹⁵⁴

Sweden has been a part of NATO involvement in Afghanistan since the end of 2001,¹⁵⁵ which does not appear to have any effect on terrorism events at home. Additionally, Sweden has contributed more than \$350 million in humanitarian aid to Iraq and Syria since 2011, joined the Global Coalition against Daesh, and sent military forces to help train partners in Iraq since 2015.¹⁵⁶ During this same timeframe, there was a noticeable uptick in the number of terrorism events at home.

The UK has been a staunch military supporter of U.S.-led operations in the Middle East, extensively supporting the wars in Afghanistan,¹⁵⁷ Iraq,¹⁵⁸ and the Global Coalition against Daesh.¹⁵⁹ The greatest increase in terrorism in the UK was during the gap between the withdrawal of troops in 2011 at the conclusion of the Iraq war and the formation of the Global Coalition against Daesh in 2014. This suggests that, in light of the withdrawal of

¹⁵⁴ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; Swedish Armed Forces, “Afghanistan (Resolute Support Mission)”; Global Coalition, “Sweden’s Contribution”; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM)”; Ministry of Defence, “Medals”; The National Archives, “Operations in Afghanistan: Chronology of Events, September 2001 – December 2002”; Ministry of Defence, “UK Action to Combat Daesh.”

¹⁵⁵ Swedish Armed Forces, “Afghanistan (Resolute Support Mission)”; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM).”

¹⁵⁶ Global Coalition, “Sweden’s Contribution”; Global Coalition, “Sweden.”

¹⁵⁷ The National Archives, “Operations in Afghanistan: Chronology of Events, September 2001 – December 2002.”

¹⁵⁸ Ministry of Defence, “Medals.”

¹⁵⁹ Ministry of Defence, “UK Action to Combat Daesh.”

coalition troops in Iraq in 2011, Daesh and its affiliates grew in strength and organization and were able to not only seize large swaths of land in Iraq and Syria, but also orchestrate expeditionary attacks against the United States' staunchest partner and/or effectively radicalize susceptible UK citizens.

Both the UK and Sweden have been continuously involved in Afghanistan since the beginning of the war, and more recently in Iraq as part of the Global Coalition against Daesh. Sweden, however, was not a participant in Iraq prior to this, whereas the UK was. Additionally, this dichotomous assessment of military involvement in the Middle East does not account for the scale of involvement, which may be one of many factors assessed by a terrorist organization when targeting western nations and prioritizing expeditionary operations.

H. PUBLIC ATTITUDE TOWARD IMMIGRANTS

More difficult to assess—yet potentially more important—is a population's attitude toward immigrants. This condition is difficult to assess because individual opinions may vary widely on a broad spectrum of subjects directly or indirectly related to immigration. For example, a person may have positive attitudes toward foreigners, be highly tolerant of different cultures, religions, and ways of life, and even feel an obligation to care for those in need, but at the same time be very protective of domestic labor markets. If competition for employment increases as a result of a population boom, then that person may assume anti-immigrant sentiment for that reason alone. Conversely, a person may be intolerant of foreign cultures but appreciative of an increased (and perhaps cheaper) labor force, and consequently take a pro-immigrant stance. Thus, a myriad of factors can contribute to a population's overall attitudes toward immigrants. Challenges in assessing this sentiment over time are compounded by infrequent surveys and/or inconsistency of questions. Still, attempting to evaluate public opinion toward immigrants is a worthwhile endeavor due to the implications that a hostile or welcoming societal environment may have on terrorism.

Arguably the best assessment of this factor is Pew Research Center's Nationalist, anti-Immigration, and anti-Minority (NIM) score. Pew Research states that "attitudes on nationalism, immigration and religious minorities are closely connected with one

another... those who say Islam is incompatible with their country's values and culture are also more likely to favor restricting immigration."¹⁶⁰ A combination of 22 questions pertaining to its namesake's respective categories, the NIM weighs the categories so each is represented evenly on the final scale of 1–10. Three questions pertain to nationalism (each worth 1.11 points), seven questions pertain to immigration (each worth 0.48 points), and 12 questions pertain to religious minorities (each worth 0.28 points).¹⁶¹ For 15 Western European countries surveyed in 2017, Sweden scored the lowest median score of 1.2 and had the lowest percentage of respondents (8%) scoring between 5.01 and 10.¹⁶² For the UK, 22% of the population scored between 5.01 and 10, which is the eighth highest percentage of the 15 West European countries surveyed, and is also the median percentage.¹⁶³ The UK's median score was 3.0, which ranks as the seventh highest.¹⁶⁴ This indicates that, relative to the rest of Western Europe, Sweden is the most non-nationalist and tolerant of both immigrants and religious minorities. This public attitude likely is a contributing factor to its low number of terrorism events. Unfortunately, the survey and NIM scores were conducted only once in 2017, making it unfeasible to use as a tool to assess changes in public attitude over time.

However, other survey questions, although not as comprehensive as Pew Research Center's NIM score, may illuminate trends in public sentiment toward immigrants. In addition to Pew Research's Global Attitudes and Trends, the World Values Survey and Eurobarometer have surveyed European citizens on many topics pertaining to immigration. The questions from those sources selected in this study were chosen for their relevancy and/or frequency in an attempt to identify any trends that correlate with terrorism events.

First, in 2007, a Pew Research Center survey found that 64% of Swedes believed immigrant influence on the country was good while 29% believed it was bad.¹⁶⁵ Opinions

¹⁶⁰ Sahgal et al., *Being Christian in Western Europe*, 50.

¹⁶¹ Sahgal et al., 156–160.

¹⁶² Sahgal et al., 75.

¹⁶³ Sahgal et al., 75.

¹⁶⁴ Sahgal et al., 75.

¹⁶⁵ Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database.

in the UK were more negative, as only 44% of people believed that immigrant influence was good for the country while 48% believed it was bad.¹⁶⁶ That same year, 29% of Swedes believed their way of life needed protection against foreign influence while 67% did not, which contrasts with 54% and 43% in the UK, respectively.¹⁶⁷ World Values Surveys are generally conducted at four to six year intervals, and determined that from 2000–2014 less than one fifth of the Swedish population agreed that employers should give priority to citizens over immigrants, while approximately three fourths disagreed.¹⁶⁸ In the UK, the World Values Survey that spanned 2007 showed that 59% of people agreed that employers should give priority to citizens over immigrants, but only 28% disagreed.¹⁶⁹ Finally, Eurobarometer provided interviewees a list of 22 issues (with the additional options to reply ‘other, none, or don’t know’) and asked respondents to state the two most important issues facing their country at the time from 2005–2017 (with the exception of 2011), as well as whether people had positive or negative feelings toward immigrants from outside the EU during the timeframe 2014–2017.¹⁷⁰ Figure 24 shows how much of the population viewed immigration, terrorism, or unemployment as a “top two” issue of concern, as well as overall feelings about immigrants from outside the EU.

¹⁶⁶ Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database.

¹⁶⁷ Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database.

¹⁶⁸ World Values Survey, “Online Data Analysis.”

¹⁶⁹ World Values Survey.

¹⁷⁰ European Commission Public Opinion, “Eurobarometer Interactive.” The list of 22 issues suggested included “Crime, Defence Foreign Affairs, Economic situation, The education system, Energy, Energy related issues, The environment, The environment/climate and energy issues, Government debt, Health and social security, Healthcare system, Housing, Immigration, Our country’s external influence, Pensions, Protecting the environment, Public transport, Rising prices inflation cost of living, The state of Member states public finances, Taxation, Terrorism, Unemployment,” plus “Other (spontaneous), None (spontaneous), DK - Don’t know, and Other (specify).”




Figure 24. Population views on top issues of concern and feelings about non-EU immigrants, Sweden (left) and UK (right).¹⁷¹

In Sweden, unemployment was consistently viewed as a top two issue by a majority of the population until 2014, at which time it began to steadily decline as the issue of immigration increased.¹⁷² Feelings about immigrants from outside the EU remained relatively stable from 2014 to 2017, although there was a slight decrease of those who held positive feelings about immigrants (and corresponding increase of those who harbored negative feelings).¹⁷³ Overall, while the population generally viewed immigration as an increasingly important issue, this did not change their feelings toward immigrants, even with an increase in terrorism events.

It is difficult to discern if the UK's sentiment as indicated by the NIM score had any impact on the amount of terrorism (or vice versa). More clearly shown is the consistent debate over immigration, shown by at least 20% of the population ranking it as a top two issue during the entire timeframe.¹⁷⁴ Unemployment was not a matter of great public concern until after the economic crisis of 2008.¹⁷⁵ Terrorism as a public concern decreased significantly since 2006 despite a slight increase in the number of terrorism events, then

¹⁷¹ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database"; European Commission Public Opinion, "Eurobarometer Interactive."

¹⁷² European Commission Public Opinion, "Eurobarometer Interactive."

¹⁷³ European Commission Public Opinion.

¹⁷⁴ European Commission Public Opinion.

¹⁷⁵ European Commission Public Opinion.

increased strongly after 2014 as the volume of events remained elevated following a peak in 2013.¹⁷⁶ From 2014 onward, although terrorism remained elevated and increased in public opinion as a top issue, immigration as an issue increased as well, and so did the percentage of the population holding positive feelings about immigrants from outside the EU until finally passing 50% in 2017.¹⁷⁷ Awareness of immigration issues and sympathetic or positive feelings toward immigrants may have increased in response to events involving Daesh and the Syrian civil war. In 2017 immigration concern dropped abruptly,¹⁷⁸ which is interesting concerning immigration was a top concern during the debate and vote for Brexit in 2016 and continues to be hotly debated today. Perhaps with the referendum decided and implementation of Brexit looming the public no longer viewed it as a top concern. In May 2017, only 20.18% of the population listed immigration as one of the top two issues of concern, falling behind Health and Social Security at 36.6% and Terrorism at 30.8%.¹⁷⁹

Overall, immigration was an issue of consistent concern for people in the UK, generally increasing or decreasing in tandem with the volume of terrorism events (particularly from 2007–2015), with indicators of a slight majority viewing immigration as more negative than positive. It is inconclusive if this sentiment contributed to or mitigated incidents of terrorism. Although it is too early to tell definitively, it appears the referendum to leave the EU has resulted in less concern about immigration (relative to other issues) and more positive feelings toward immigrants.

In contrast to the UK, Swedes had more positive feelings toward immigrants and rarely believed immigration was a top issue until 2015. Prior to that, immigration ranked below 15% of the population's top two concerns (and only broached 10% three times), swamped by concerns about unemployment that regularly captured more than 50% of the vote as a top two issue.¹⁸⁰ Another key difference between the two countries is that an

¹⁷⁶ European Commission Public Opinion.

¹⁷⁷ European Commission Public Opinion.

¹⁷⁸ European Commission Public Opinion.

¹⁷⁹ European Commission Public Opinion.

¹⁸⁰ European Commission Public Opinion.

overwhelming majority of Swedes had positive feelings toward immigrants from outside the EU from 2014–2017, whereas it was not until 2017 when more than 50% of UK citizens felt the same way.¹⁸¹ Finally, Swedes were never too concerned about terrorism, with an average of only 2.26% of the population listing it as a top two issue from 2005–2017, compared to the UK average of 15.07%.¹⁸²

I. DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL CULTURE

Cultural conflict may be a factor that contributes to terrorism, but is difficult to quantify. Geert Hofstede, however, helped pioneer cultural comparison efforts while analyzing survey data of IBM employees in various countries in an attempt to improve business across cultures. Through decades of continuous refinement and additional research from numerous types of surveys and researchers in the field, he and his team have identified six dimensions of national culture and quantified them for comparison purposes.¹⁸³ While the dimensions and their scores are not direct empirical measures of a culture that can be used for statistical purposes, they do provide intriguing insights that may highlight compatibility (or lack thereof) between different cultures. It is important to note his team’s emphasis that “culture is defined as the collective mental programming of the human mind which distinguishes one group of people from another,” that not every individual from a given society shares the same values, and that “statements about just one culture on the level of ‘values’ do not describe ‘reality’; such statements are generalizations and they ought to be relative.”¹⁸⁴

The six dimensions the Hofstede team discerned are power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence.¹⁸⁵ Power distance measures the “degree to which less powerful members of a society accept and

¹⁸¹ European Commission Public Opinion.

¹⁸² European Commission Public Opinion.

¹⁸³ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*, 3rd ed., 27–49.

¹⁸⁴ Hofstede Insights, “Compare Countries.”

¹⁸⁵ Hofstede Insights, “National Culture.”

expect that power is distributed unequally.”¹⁸⁶ Greater power distance indicates a society that accepts a hierarchical order, while societies with lower power distance attempt to “equalize the distribution of power”¹⁸⁷ or demand justification for inequalities. Individualism measures the degree to which “individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families” vice collectivism, where “individuals can expect their relatives or members of a particular ingroup to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.”¹⁸⁸ Masculinity represents competitive societies and “a preference in society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material rewards for success,” whereas femininity represents a “more consensus-oriented” society with “a preference for cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak and quality of life.”¹⁸⁹ The uncertainty avoidance index strives to demonstrate how a society feels with uncertainty and ambiguity and the fact that “the future can never be known.”¹⁹⁰ A society scoring high on this measure tends to “maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior” and be more “intolerant of unorthodox behavior and ideas.”¹⁹¹ Long-term orientation indicates how much a society prefers pragmatic approaches to changing conditions, encouraging “thrift and efforts in modern education as a way to prepare for the future” rather than a short-term orientation that “prefer to maintain time-honored traditions and norms while viewing society change with suspicion.”¹⁹² Finally, indulgence “stands for a society that allows relatively free gratification of basic and natural human drives related to enjoying life and having fun,” whereas lower-scoring, more restrained societies suppress “gratification of needs and regulates it[self] by means of strict social norms.”¹⁹³ Data is compiled from Hofstede’s

¹⁸⁶ Hofstede Insights.

¹⁸⁷ Hofstede Insights.

¹⁸⁸ Hofstede Insights.

¹⁸⁹ Hofstede Insights.

¹⁹⁰ Hofstede Insights.

¹⁹¹ Hofstede Insights.

¹⁹² Hofstede Insights.

¹⁹³ Hofstede Insights.

third edition of *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind*.¹⁹⁴ Of the focus countries, data was only available for Iran, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, and Syria (minus the degree of indulgence for Syria). Figure 25 graphically depicts the relation of national culture dimension for Sweden and the UK to these five countries and their average value for each dimension.




Figure 25. Dimensions of national culture, Sweden, UK, and five focus origin countries.¹⁹⁵

The comparison of national culture dimensions represented here from Hofstede's work must be interpreted with great skepticism when alluding to any correlation between cultural disparities and conflict, especially because data is only available for a fraction of the focus origin countries, which are only a fraction of the total amount of refugees admitted. But exploring the idea is nonetheless interesting. Several Swedish and UK cultural dimensions appear to be quite different than the five focus origin countries for which data was available. Both European countries believe strongly in a fair and equal

¹⁹⁴ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 57–59, 95–97, 141–143, 192–194, 255–258, 282–285.

¹⁹⁵ Adapted from Hofstede Insights, "Compare Countries"; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 57–59, 95–97, 141–143, 192–194, 255–258, 282–285.

distribution of power (likely due to democratic and freedom values) as indicated by the low power distance index, are open to new ideas and behaviors as shown by the lower uncertainty avoidance index, prefer pragmatic approaches and views to shaping the future with a greater long-term orientation, and favor indulgence over restraint. Both countries are also more individualistic, with the UK a fair amount more so than Sweden.¹⁹⁶

The starkest difference between Sweden and the UK, however, is the index of masculinity. In this dimension the UK rates much higher than Sweden,¹⁹⁷ and quite close to the sample focus origin country average. This may indicate that during integration of two “competitive” cultures there is a greater chance of conflict, resulting in higher terrorism rates in the UK than there were in Sweden. Or, when coupled with the relatively higher individualistic index, this may indicate that UK society as a whole feels less obligated to forego personal gains or potential resources in order to provide for others, feeling that others should be able to compete individually just as well.

Sweden, on the other hand, ranks as slightly less individualistic and much less masculine and competitive than the UK.¹⁹⁸ Swedish society is still much more individualistic than the sample focus origin countries, however, despite strong Swedish social systems and graciousness in admitting and assisting so many refugees, which one might assume to be aligned with a collectivistic society. This, combined with the other dimensions, may demonstrate Sweden’s unique ability to emphasize individualism while at the same time be strongly united and committed to collective social systems in an unselfish manner. Such a society may be conducive to integrating immigrants from a different culture while mitigating conditions conducive to terrorism.

J. SUPPORT FOR RIGHT-WING POPULIST POLITICAL PARTIES

Support for right-wing populist political parties in Europe has increased in recent years, with theories ranging from globalization, security and terrorism, social issues, and

¹⁹⁶ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 57–59, 95–97, 192–194, 255–258, 282–285.

¹⁹⁷ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 141–143.

¹⁹⁸ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 95, 141–143.

everything in between.¹⁹⁹ Many of these parties are labelled as nationalist or anti-immigrant. While these parties may have the interests of their country and citizens in mind and view their insular positions as defending those interests—not necessarily attacking foreign countries, cultures, or societies and their way of life—their appeal to the public for support may mobilize anti-immigrant sentiment that manifests against already-present immigrants by increasing tensions, hostility, or even violence and terrorism. Additionally, rising sentiment of this nature may increase the sense of not belonging or being welcome by immigrants already in the country, making them more susceptible to radicalization efforts by extremists. While it is indeterminate if an increase in terrorism would cause an increase in support for these parties or vice versa, any relationship is worth exploring. In Sweden, a political party considered to be right-wing and anti-immigrant is the Sweden Democrats. It is a “social conservative party based on nationalism...first and foremost associated with the issue of migration” that believes “Sweden’s immigration policy has been too generous, that the many migrants coming to Sweden have put huge social and economic strains on the country.”²⁰⁰ This party has seen a strong increase in influence in the Riksdag (parliament) as a result of increasing voter support, shown in Figure 26.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ Tartar, “How the Populist Right is Redrawing the Map of Europe.”

²⁰⁰ “Political Parties in Sweden,” Swedish Institute, September 21, 2018, <https://sweden.se/society/political-parties-in-sweden/>.

²⁰¹ Statistics Sweden, “Election to the Riksdag.”




Figure 26. Right-wing populist political party support, Sweden.²⁰²

There appears to be a strong relationship between support for the Sweden Democrats and the number of refugees admitted, and milder connection with terrorism events taking place in the country. Whether support for this party fueled conditions conducive to terrorism is indeterminable (or vice versa), but the party's growing influence may have contributed to Sweden's abrupt halting of a steep upward trend in refugee acceptance from 2012–2015.

The UK's most prominent right-wing populist political party is the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which saw dramatic growth in popular support from 2002–2015,²⁰³ shown in Figure 27. The UKIP argues that “mass uncontrolled immigration has been extremely damaging to Britain,” and under their plan “migrants will not be able to claim public housing or benefits until they have been a tax paying resident in UK for a continuous five years.”²⁰⁴ It is unclear if this would pertain to refugees as well, but that may be assumed to be the case because they are migrants, even if forced from their home country.

²⁰² Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Population Statistics”; Statistics Sweden, “Election to the Riksdag.”

²⁰³ Mellows-Facer, *General Election 2005*, 92; Cracknell et al., *General Election 2010*, 80; Hawkins et al., *General Election 2015*, 11; United Kingdom Parliament, “General Elections Online.”

²⁰⁴ “UKIP Manifesto, Immigration,” United Kingdom Independence Party, accessed November 12, 2018, https://www.ukip.org/ukip-manifesto-item.php?cat_id=5.




Figure 27. Right-wing populist political party support, UK.²⁰⁵

Voter support for the UKIP increased as did the level of terrorism in the UK (until 2017), but interestingly this trend was opposite to the amount of refugees admitted, indicating a negative relationship. The rising support prior to the Brexit referendum in 2016 contrasts sharply with low support for UKIP in the 2017 elections, despite sustained high levels of terrorism and lower levels of refugee admittance. This may indicate that voters no longer saw utility in supporting UKIP after the referendum passed²⁰⁶ despite relatively stable terrorism and refugee admittance levels. It is possible that voters did not support UKIP for any of its rhetoric regarding terrorism or refugees specifically, but rather for other reasons (such as withdrawal from the EU).

The largest differences between the Sweden Democrats and the UKIP are the relation of support to refugees admitted and sustainability of that support. Sweden Democrat support increased with an increasing level of refugees, whereas UKIP's support increased as refugee admittance decreased. Sweden Democrat popularity continued to rise despite a decline in terrorism events from 2015–2017, whereas UKIP support declined despite a high volume of terrorist events.

²⁰⁵ Adapted from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database"; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Population Statistics"; Mellows-Facer, *General Election 2005*, 92.; Cracknell et al., *General Election 2010*, 80.; Hawkins et al., *General Election 2015*, 11; United Kingdom Parliament, "General Elections Online."

²⁰⁶ Tartar, "How the Populist Right is Redrawing the Map of Europe."

K. SUMMARY—SWEDEN

Although the number of terrorism events increased as the number of refugees increased from 2002–2017,²⁰⁷ it is difficult to determine if other factors had a tampering or amplifying effect on terrorism. Economic conditions, health and safety factors, education levels, freedom and democracy ratings, and sentiment toward immigrants remained relatively stable²⁰⁸ and did not appear to be significantly correlated to the changing number of terrorism events in Sweden. This is not to say that strengths in these areas did not contribute to the overall low number of events—that remains possible. With no data over time regarding Sweden’s ethnic and religious composition it is impossible to determine what role, if any, those factors had on terrorism. Although an increasing number of Swedes listed immigration as one of the top two issues facing the country beginning in 2014,²⁰⁹ there was generally no change in the perception of terrorism as a top issue or positive and negative feelings about immigrants.

Integration programs, gauged by various EU funds, may have assisted efforts that diffused any conditions leading to terrorism, shown by a decrease in overall funding and corresponding increase in terrorism beginning in 2014.²¹⁰ Military involvement in Afghanistan seems to have no effect on homeland terrorism, although there was an increase in incidents after Sweden sent military personnel to Iraq to assist the Global Coalition against Daesh.²¹¹ Sweden does have a distinctly different culture than many of its Middle

²⁰⁷ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Population Statistics.”

²⁰⁸ The World Bank, “World Development Indicators”; Eurostat Database (General government gross debt); OECD International Migrations Statistics Database; Eurostat Database (Population by education attainment level); Center for Systemic Peace, “Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research Database”; Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Data and Resources,”; European Commission Public Opinion, “Eurobarometer Interactive.

²⁰⁹ European Commission Public Opinion, “Eurobarometer Interactive.”

²¹⁰ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, “Sweden.”

²¹¹ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; Swedish Armed Forces, “Afghanistan (Resolute Support Mission)”; Global Coalition, “Sweden’s Contribution.”

Eastern immigrants as measured by Hofstede's dimensions,²¹² the makeup of which may contribute to a low number of terrorism events, but this is inconclusive. Finally, a relationship appears to exist between popular support for the Sweden Democrats party and both increased refugees and terrorism events, but it is indeterminate if support increased as a result of terrorism or terrorism increased as a result of party support.

L. SUMMARY—UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom witnessed a negative correlation between the amount of refugees admitted and terrorism events from 2002–2017, shown by simultaneous increases in terrorism and decreases in refugees admitted.²¹³ Government debt was the economic variable most closely aligned with terrorism, increasing in tandem with terrorism levels.²¹⁴ Health and violent crime conditions improved (as measured by government expenditure on health, physicians, and intentional homicides),²¹⁵ which one would logically surmise reduce potential conditions of terrorism, but despite this terrorism events increased. Similarly, as the population became more educated there was a corresponding increase of terrorism,²¹⁶ suggesting that a more highly educated populace does not necessarily lower terrorism levels. Ethnic and religious homogeneity data over time is not refined enough to offer correlation insights with regard to terrorism, and consistently high freedom and democracy ratings²¹⁷ indicate little to no impact on the variation of terrorism events. Active military involvement in the Middle East and Afghanistan appears to have a tamping effect, shown by the sharpest increase in homeland terrorism occurring during the “inter-

²¹² Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 57–59, 95–97, 141–143, 192–194, 255–258, 282–285.

²¹³ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Population Statistics.”

²¹⁴ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; Eurostat Database (General government gross debt).

²¹⁵ The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

²¹⁶ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; Eurostat Database (Population by education attainment level).

²¹⁷ Center for Systemic Peace, “Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research Database”; Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Data and Resources.”

war” years after the Iraq war and prior to the Global Coalition against Daesh,²¹⁸ augmenting hawkish arguments for bringing the fight to the enemy in order to prevent him from being able to organize, recruit, and orchestrate attacks (assuming the preponderance of those attacks were the result of Daesh actions, either directly or indirectly). Alarming, EU integration program funding associated positively with terrorism as both increased to a peak in 2013, and when funding was reduced so did the number of events.²¹⁹ This may indicate that either the programs used were ineffective, or they unintentionally fueled hostilities that led to an increase in events. The public appears to be divided in their attitudes toward immigrants, with a slight majority viewing immigrants in a negative manner until 2017.²²⁰ The concern about immigrants relative to other issues remained persistent,²²¹ but variances in this are inconclusive as to their impact on terrorism. The UK’s culture is quite different than that of several Middle Eastern countries in a majority of areas, but similar in terms of competitiveness and masculinity according to Hofstede’s dimensions,²²² which may indicate a clash of “masculine” cultures fosters conditions more prone to terrorism. Finally, initial concurrence between UKIP support and terrorism are shattered with the party’s abysmal performance in 2017 despite elevated levels of terrorism,²²³ degrading any argument about people supporting it solely for any rhetoric about terrorism.

²¹⁸ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; Ministry of Defence, “Medals”; Ministry of Defence, “UK Action to Combat Daesh.”

²¹⁹ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, “United Kingdom.”

²²⁰ European Commission Public Opinion, “Eurobarometer Interactive.

²²¹ European Commission Public Opinion.

²²² Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 57–59, 95–97, 141–143, 192–194, 255–258, 282–285.

²²³ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; Mellows-Facer, *General Election 2005*, 92.; Cracknell et al., *General Election 2010*, 80.; Hawkins et al., *General Election 2015*, 11; United Kingdom Parliament, “General Elections Online.”

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V. CONCLUSION

As this research has shown, there is indeed a correlation between refugee admittance and terrorism in Western host countries, but that correlation for all refugees is less than it was prior to September 11, 2001. More importantly, that correlation may be positive as is the case for Sweden or negative as is the case for the United Kingdom; the results are dependent on many other factors. Ten conditions were evaluated in this study to better understand why Sweden and the UK experienced such different outcomes: the economic situation, health and safety, education level, ethnic, religious, and native-born homogeneity, freedom and democracy, EU migrant program funding, military involvement in the middle east, public attitudes toward immigrants, dimensions of national culture, and support for right-wing populist political parties.

A. NO EFFECT

Several conditions were similar enough in both Sweden and the UK and appeared to have no explanatory effect on changing levels of terrorism. Economically, the two countries' poverty levels were both very low and their Gini indices comparable, and very slight variances either were not concurrent with rises in terrorism or antithetical to its trend (for example, poverty in the UK declined as terrorism increased).²²⁴ The general security situation in both states remained stable at approximately 1 intentional homicide per 100,000 people,²²⁵ and even with declining homicide rates the UK witnessed inclining terrorism, suggesting that a lack of internal security is not to blame for increasing terrorism. The population of both Sweden and the UK steadily became more educated,²²⁶ and although there was a relatively steady increase in terrorism in the UK, the lack of a similar trend in Sweden disputes any alignment between the two variables. An assessment of ethnic homogeneity is indeterminate due to no data on Sweden's composition, and limited

²²⁴ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database"; The World Bank, "World Development Indicators."

²²⁵ The World Bank, "World Development Indicators."

²²⁶ Eurostat Database (Population by education attainment level).

religious data shows similar makeup of both countries²²⁷ and does not explain their differing levels of terrorism. Both countries have been continuously involved militarily in Afghanistan,²²⁸ and both share similar cultural aspects of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence.²²⁹ Finally, Sweden and the UK are both highly democratic and free countries,²³⁰ and while this may reduce the overall levels of terrorism as people have outlets to voice their concerns and mechanisms to institute non-violent change, it does not describe why the UK experienced more attacks. All these similarities were likely nonfactors affecting levels of terrorism.

Other conditions were dissimilar between Sweden and the UK but also unlikely to account for increases in terrorism, namely unemployment rates. Sweden's total unemployment was relatively stable²³¹ and did not explain increases in terrorism in 2014 and beyond. It was also higher than the UK, yet the UK witnessed higher overall terrorism levels, which remained elevated even when unemployment rates declined.²³² The same is true when focusing on foreign-born unemployment: Sweden's foreign-born unemployment rate was twice that of the UK, and when the UK's foreign-born unemployment rate decreased its level of terrorism increased.²³³

B. POTENTIAL OR INDETERMINATE EFFECT

Multiple conditions were identified to be divergent between Sweden and the UK and may have an implicit effect in reducing total terrorism, but their trends deviate from changing levels of terrorism, making any association indeterminate. For example,

²²⁷ Hackett et al., *The Global Religious Landscape*, 49–50.

²²⁸ Swedish Armed Forces, “Afghanistan (Resolute Support Mission)”; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Resolute Support Mission (RSM)”; The National Archives, “Operations in Afghanistan: Chronology of Events, September 2001 – December 2002.”

²²⁹ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, *Cultures and Organizations*, 59, 194, 256, 282.

²³⁰ Center for Systemic Peace, “Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research Database”; Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Data and Resources.”

²³¹ The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

²³² National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”

²³³ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; OECD International Migration Statistics Database.

Sweden's GNI per capita was remarkably higher than that of the UK,²³⁴ and while this greater wealth may reduce terrorism overall it does not explain Sweden's increase in attacks in 2014 and beyond. Likewise, Sweden spent more than the UK on health and education, and had more physicians per 1,000 people,²³⁵ which may indicate the health and/or education needs of its population were better provided for and contributed to Sweden's overall lower amounts of terrorism, but no change in these conditions for either country is associated with changes in terrorism.

Less clear is the impact of each country's military involvement in Iraq, which yields different outcomes. Sweden did not participate in the Iraq war, but witnessed an increase in terrorism concurrent with committing military forces to the Global Coalition against Daesh in 2015.²³⁶ This year, however, was also the apex of refugee admittance.²³⁷ The UK experienced steady incline in terrorism during its involvement in the Iraq war, which accelerated sharply upon its conclusion and the withdrawal of forces in 2011, then was tamped during UK reengagement in the area with the Global Coalition,²³⁸ indicating initially a positive, then negative relation between military involvement and terrorism. Another condition with indeterminate effect is support for right-wing populist political parties, which had inverse outcomes for Sweden and the UK. Sweden's support for the Sweden Democrats increased steadily prior to hikes in terrorism and remained high when terrorism declined after its peak in 2015.²³⁹ In the UK, support for the UKIP increased in conjunction with terrorism, but then vanished while terrorism remained elevated.²⁴⁰

²³⁴ The World Bank, "World Development Indicators."

²³⁵ The World Bank.

²³⁶ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database"; Swedish Armed Forces, "Afghanistan (Resolute Support Mission)"; Global Coalition, "Sweden."

²³⁷ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Population Statistics."

²³⁸ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database"; Ministry of Defence, "Medals"; Ministry of Defence, "UK Action to Combat Daesh."

²³⁹ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database"; Statistics Sweden, "Election to the Riksdag."

²⁴⁰ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database"; Mellows-Facer, *General Election 2005*, 92.; Cracknell et al., *General Election 2010*, 80.; Hawkins et al., *General Election 2015*, 11; United Kingdom Parliament, "General Elections Online."

Culturally, Sweden and the UK differed strongest in terms of “masculinity” and competitiveness, in addition to the UK being deemed more individualistic.²⁴¹ While these dimensions may indicate Swedish society is more cooperative in nature and consensus-oriented, which may reduce overall cultural conflict with foreign immigrants, they do not empirically account for the increases in terrorism in both countries.

C. LIKELY EFFECT

The relation of EU migrant program funding to terrorism, in addition to a comparison of total allocations, indicates that Sweden’s use of the funds and programs may have been more efficient and effective at integrating immigrants and mitigating terrorism than those of the UK. Swedish allocation of overall EU funding for these programs from 2007–2017 was much less than the UK at a grand total of €228,534,382.20 compared to €499,997,478.20.²⁴² When normalized for the volume of refugees admitted during the same timeframe, this amounts to an average of €120.33 per refugee in Sweden and €214.74 per refugee in the UK. Granted, not all of the funding is earmarked specifically for refugees, but the overall intent of it is to foster successful programs relating to the asylum process and integration of all migrants—regular and irregular—from outside the EU. When funding declined in 2014, Sweden witnessed an increase in attacks that had previously been kept to a minimum, which also coincided with an increase in refugee volume.²⁴³ The UK, in contrast, witnessed an increase in attacks despite increasing funding and *decreasing* refugee volume from 2007–2013, and when funding decreased in 2014 so did the amount of attacks.²⁴⁴ If the level of terrorism is used as a measure of success when evaluating EU

²⁴¹ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 95, 141–143.

²⁴² European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, “Sweden”; European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, “United Kingdom.”

²⁴³ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Population Statistics”; European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, “Sweden.”

²⁴⁴ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database”; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Population Statistics”; European Commission Migration and Home Affairs, “United Kingdom.”

funding for integration efforts, this infers that Sweden's use of the funds and integration programs were much more successful than those of the UK.

An important factor that may have contributed to this difference in performance was the level and rate of change of foreign-born population in each country. A much larger percentage of Sweden's population was foreign-born (11.8% in 2002 and 18.5% in 2017 compared to 8.3% in 2002 and 14.4% in 2017 within the UK²⁴⁵), which may have contributed to the population's overall tolerance, acceptance of outsiders, and reduced animosity toward refugees and other immigrants. Additionally, the foreign-born population in Sweden increased steadily 57% from 2002–2017, whereas that of the UK surged 73% during the same time period.²⁴⁶ Given that the UK's refugee levels decreased, it can be assumed that the preponderance of this influx was from regular immigration. This higher rate of increase, coupled with greater EU funding than Sweden yet more terrorism, indicates that the UK's open immigration policy may have been too aggressive or uncontrolled and integration efforts inadequate to mitigate conditions conducive to terrorism.

Another compounding factor that likely contributed to more terrorism in the UK was its skyrocketing levels of government debt. Although Sweden's consistently low government debt may have mitigated conditions conducive to terrorism by freeing up resources for various welfare or integration efforts, its consistency did not coincide with increases in terrorism. The UK's debt, in contrast, was much higher than Sweden's and grew in concurrence with terrorism levels.²⁴⁷ This indicates that while low debt is not a guarantee to prevent spikes in attacks, high government debt may be a condition that facilitates terrorism, especially when occurring in combination with high rates of immigration.

²⁴⁵ Statistics Sweden, "Summary of Population Statistics 1960–2017"; Office for National Statistics Population of the UK by Country of Birth and Nationality Dataset.

²⁴⁶ Statistics Sweden, "Summary of Population Statistics 1960–2017"; Office for National Statistics Population of the UK by Country of Birth and Nationality Dataset.

²⁴⁷ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database"; Eurostat Database (General government gross debt).

A final, important condition that is likely to affect levels of terrorism is the public sentiment toward refugees and immigrants. Sweden's population demonstrated much more immigrant-friendly attitudes shown by a low NIM score, positive feelings about immigrants, belief that immigrant influence was good on the country, that their way of life did not need protected against foreign influence, and that employers should not give priority to natives when hiring.²⁴⁸ A majority of the UK population had a higher NIM score, more divided feelings about immigrants, believed immigrant influence was bad on the country, that their way of life needed protected against foreign influence, and that employers should give priority to natives when hiring.²⁴⁹ Additionally, the relevant importance of the issue of immigration was more prevalent for UK citizens, indicating that it was consistently perceived as a problem.²⁵⁰ If the issue was not adequately addressed, then the public may have been more likely to express discontent either toward their government or the immigrants themselves, fueling tensions and increasing the likelihood of terrorism. Hostile conditions between natives and immigrants in the UK may have been amplified by the high rate of increase of foreigners and high government debt, as competition over increasingly limited resources increased and people direct frustrations at those they deem responsible.

D. PROVIDING REFUGE WHILE MITIGATING TERRORISM

The association between refugees and terrorism in Western nations is country-dependent, but Sweden has exemplarily demonstrated that even when there is a positive relationship between the two, key conditions can help mitigate the risk of terrorism while providing refuge for those in need. Efficient and effective refugee and integration programs, coupled with well-managed regular immigration, a society that is more inclusive of foreigners, and low government debt may be fundamental to diffusing integration

²⁴⁸ Sahgal et al., *Being Christian in Western Europe*, 75.; Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database.; World Values Survey, "Online Data Analysis"; European Commission Public Opinion, "Eurobarometer Interactive."

²⁴⁹ Sahgal et al., *Being Christian in Western Europe*, 75.; Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database.; World Values Survey, "Online Data Analysis"; European Commission Public Opinion, "Eurobarometer Interactive."

²⁵⁰ European Commission Public Opinion, "Eurobarometer Interactive."

tensions between refugees and their host society. This reduces both native and foreign populations' vulnerability to radicalization or extremism, and ultimately mitigates terrorism. In contrast, the effectiveness of the UK's refugee and integration programs were questionable, its rate of regular immigration potentially too high for its society to manage well, popular sentiment toward outsiders too negative, and government debt too high. The compounding effect of these conditions may have resulted in greater propensity for terrorism within its borders. Of particular importance is that while these conditions may have contributed to increasing levels of terrorism, the UK admitted decreasing amounts of refugees, indicating a negative relationship between the two and furthering the case that any connection between refugees and terrorism is country-dependent. Western nations seeking to provide refuge for those most in need while mitigating terrorism will benefit from seeking to foster an inclusive society, managing regular immigration effectively, maintaining lower debt levels, and emulating Sweden's refugee and integration programs. Sweden may be setting the example of best practices for admitting refugees while simultaneously mitigating terrorism. Other countries could benefit from following its lead.

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APPENDIX. LIST OF HOST AND FOCUS ORIGIN COUNTRIES

Host Country Population

Albania, Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Kosovo, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Vatican City

Focus Origin Country Population

Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen

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