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**SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND INTERGROUP
CONFLICT IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE**

by

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March 2019

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**SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND INTERGROUP CONFLICT IN
ISRAEL/PALESTINE**

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ABSTRACT

Intergroup dynamics have been a central vector in long-lasting identity conflicts around the globe. In Israel-Palestine, the conflict has not been reduced to the same level of sustained peace as it has in other countries. The conflicting groups often get involved in increasingly destructive forms of reciprocating violence, which fuels narratives that lead to further cycles of violence. This thesis examines whether social identity theory is a useful framework for understanding this conflict. The thesis finds that both Israeli and Palestinian group behaviors can be better understood using the framework of social identity theory. It finds that both sides view each other through a lens of in- and out-group dynamics that rationalizes moves by the in-group and demonizes actions by the out-group. Israelis see things through the lens of a Westphalian nation-state, and Palestinian groups see themselves as liberation movements. Both sides of this conflict have extensive patronage lines to other nations, react to provocations to restore a sense of lost honor, respond to challenges with escalating levels of violence, and contest the same set of limited goods. The fact that the United States has a history of providing Israel with aid has had negative consequences for the former state with much of the Arab and Muslim communities. Terrorists use this assistance as part of their narratives against the United States. Consequently, the United States may have to rebalance its aid to the region.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

FRC	Fatah Revolutionary Council
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
PFLP	People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
SIT	social identity theory
UN	United Nations

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Intergroup dynamics have been a central vector in lasting identity conflicts around the globe.¹ In Israel/Palestine, the conflict has not been reduced to the same level of sustained peace as it has in other countries. The conflicting groups often participate in increasingly destructive forms of reciprocating violence, which fuels narratives that lead to further cycles of violence. This particular conflict poses a challenge to homeland security in the United States in balancing the interests of its ally with potential backlash from Arabs and Muslims from across the Middle East.² This thesis examines whether social identity theory (SIT) is a useful framework for understanding this conflict. SIT examines the hermeneutics of group members and local populations involved in a conflict and considers the differing perspectives of groups and individuals. Understanding these perspectives may help analysts, policymakers, and security practitioners understand the basis of inter-group conflicts and allow them to tailor approaches for mitigating them.³

In critically analyzing the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict leading up to the 1982 invasion, it is important to remember that the analytical markers overlap and intertwine like an interconnected web. For example, honor challenges involve limited goods and affect both patrons and clients as part of the challenge-response cycle. Moreover, going back into history as far as they want, both sides point to the other as the one that

¹ Marie Sirgun Moss and Johana Ray Vollhardt, “You Can’t Give a Syringe with Unity: Rwandan Response to the Government’s Single Recategorization Policies,” *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy* 16, no. 1 (2016): 325–359, <https://doi.org/10.1111/asap.12097>; Shana Levin and Jim Sidanius, “Social Dominance and Social Identity in the United States and Israel: Ingroup Favoritism or Outgroup Derogation?,” *Political Psychology* 20, no. 1 (March 1999): 99, <https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00138>; and Wayne Colin Leach and Wendy Williams, “Group Identity and Conflicting Expectations of the Future in Northern Ireland,” *Political Psychology* 20, no. 4 (December 1999): 875, <https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00171>.

² Andrew Glazzard, “Losing the Plot: Narrative, Counter-Narrative and Violent Extremism” (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, May 2017), 3, <https://doi.org/10.19165/2017.1.08>; and Shmuel Bar, “The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism,” Hoover Institution, June 1, 2004, <https://www.hoover.org/research/religious-sources-islamic-terrorism>.

³ Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn, *Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2011), 64–65.

started the conflict. Because the timelines could be boundless, this thesis bounds them to just before the creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

This study primarily uses qualitative research to examine various Israeli and Palestinian accounts through the framework of social identity theory to highlight honor-shame paradigms, challenge-response cycles, limited goods, and Patron-client relationships that define the conflict. It analyzes the political and historical climate in Israel/Palestine and the identity politics that have contributed to the ongoing conflict. This thesis finds that both sides view each other through a lens of in- and out-group dynamics, which rationalize moves by the in-group and demonize actions by the out-group. Israelis see things through the lens of a Westphalian nation-state—their formally recognized country is plagued by violence from terrorists and political movements that want to eradicate their state.⁴ Meanwhile, Palestinian groups see themselves as liberation movements fighting a colonialist occupier state.⁵ Both sides of this conflict have extensive patronage lines to other nations, react to provocations to restore a sense of lost honor, respond to challenges with escalating levels of violence, and contest the same set of limited goods (i.e., land, honor, resources, and international recognition).⁶

From the Israeli perspective, Operation Peace for Galilee was the culmination of a challenge-response cycle related to the limited-good issue of land control that was decades in the making. The group honor of both sides was bound up in that cycle. From its creation in 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) existed as a challenge to the Israeli state. The PLO formed in part due to the failure of the Palestinians to respond to Haganah and Irgun, Zionist paramilitary and terrorist organizations that targeted the British and Arabs with the aim of creating an Israeli state. The PLO even modeled its tactics after

⁴ Keith Williams, “Moral Support, Strategic Reasoning, or Domestic Politics: America’s Continual Support to Israel” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 7–9, <https://www.hSDL.org/?view&did=483095>; and Benjamin Netanyahu, *Terrorism: How the West Can Win* (New York: Avon Books, 1987), 83.

⁵ Keith W. Ludwick, “Closing the Gap: Measuring the Social Identity of Terrorists” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 43, <https://www.hSDL.org/?view&did=234866>.

⁶ “After Embassy Move, Trump Weighs Jerusalem Consulate Changes,” Al Jazeera, June 1, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/embassy-move-trump-weighs-jerusalem-consulate-180601180158323.html>.

Irgun, which used bombs full of nails to target Arab markets and large bombs to force Zionist policy on the British Mandate for Palestine.⁷

The PLO had been facilitating kinetic attacks against the Israeli state and its populace since 1965.⁸ Initially, it operated out of Jordan, striking Israeli targets and gaining increasing notoriety with Arab patrons over time. By 1966, it had provoked Israel enough to initiate a major strike into Jordan, which pushed the PLO into Lebanon. From Lebanon, the PLO began to wedge itself into the escalating fault lines that brought the country into civil war, fueling an escalating challenge-response cycle between Israeli and Palestinian clients.⁹ The death of every Israeli or Christian client militia-member was a challenge to the Israeli state. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon was designed as an overwhelming response to stop the threat of the PLO.¹⁰ Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Sharon wanted to destroy the PLO's military infrastructure in Lebanon and undermine its political capacity, establish a new political order with the Christian Maronites and Bashir Gemayel at the center, attain favorable patronage-based peace with Lebanon, and expel the Syrian military forces. They hoped that successfully meeting these goals would take the wind out of the Palestinian nationalists' sails and facilitate the formal annexation of occupied Palestinian territories into the Israeli state. Begin and Sharon anticipated that the ensuing flood of Palestinians from Lebanon and the West Bank would topple the Jordanian Hashemite monarchy, allowing the territory to form into a new Palestinian state—outside the borders of Zionist Israel.¹¹

There are many sub-hermeneutics within Palestinian society, but this research focuses on general and readily identifiable issues centered on the PLO during Operation Peace for Galilee. Palestinian members or sympathizers of the PLO do not see themselves

⁷ Andrew Glazzard, "Anonymous Soldiers: The Struggle for Israel, 1917–194," *RUSI Journal* 161, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 97–98, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1152128>.

⁸ Gilad Sharon, *Sharon: The Life of a Leader* (New York: HarperCollins, 2011); and Charles Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2012), 270.

⁹ William W. Harris, *The New Face of Lebanon: History's Revenge* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2006), 162.

¹⁰ Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: Norton, 1999), 395.

¹¹ Shlaim, 395–396.

as part of a terrorist organization but rather a liberation movement.¹² Palestinians see the use of Israeli firebombs and the shelling of schools in Beirut as terrorism. They define themselves as victims and freedom fighters, trying to throw off the yoke of colonialists.¹³ When Israel and the United States discuss Palestinian hostage-taking and hijackings, Palestinians argue that Israel hijacked the first plane in the Middle East when it forced a Syrian Airways flight to land and detained its passengers in 1954.¹⁴ They point to multiple massacres of Palestinians perpetrated by Israel and its Christian clients in Lebanon using weapons from the U.S. patron.¹⁵ They conclude that Western discourse on terrorism is framed in a racist perspective that focuses only on Arabs and Muslims while ignoring the acts of Jews. Palestinians and their Arab-Muslim sympathizers believe that the Western hermeneutic is a construct of colonialism: the oppressed are delegalized, dehumanized as terrorists, and deemed backward, evil, cowardly, and inferior.¹⁶

The PLO rose to prominence as the Arab Nationalist Movement fell apart after the 1967 Six-Day War.¹⁷ Arafat and the PLO appealed to many Palestinian nationalists to continue the fight against the Israelis after the neighboring Arab states stood down.¹⁸ In 1968, Arafat attempted to establish bases of operations in the West Bank, resulting in Israeli forces decimating his group and forcing Fatah to flee across the river into Jordan.¹⁹ The PLO continued to make attacks, and when the Israelis chose to respond by attacking its base of operations in Karameh, the PLO was compelled to respond in kind. Even though

¹² Halim Barakat, "Liberation or Terrorism: Refuting the Language of the Oppressor," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 2 (April 1987): 133.

¹³ Barakat, 133.

¹⁴ Barakat, 135.

¹⁵ Barakat, 135.

¹⁶ Barakat, 136.

¹⁷ Yazīd Şāyigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 87.

¹⁸ Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 423, 425; and Andrew W. Terrill, "The Political Mythology of the Battle of Karameh," *Middle East Journal* 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 95, ProQuest.

¹⁹ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 425.

the Palestinians lost the battle and were forced into Lebanon, they saw the battle as a victory.²⁰

The PLO continued to carry out attacks and hijackings against Israel for quite some time. As the PLO gained recruits, capability, and respect, it elicited increasing ire from Israel.²¹ Israeli leaders like Sharon and Begin sought ways to remove the PLO from Lebanon and away from their power base in the refugee camps.²² The resulting invasion forced the PLO to retreat from Lebanon under a U.S. guarantee of protection for civilians, a move that failed when Christian militias entered the Palestinian villages of Sabra and Shatila and massacred civilians.²³ The invasion of Lebanon had lasting consequences for Arafat's patronage line that ultimately led to his joining the peace process and cooperating with the United States, a move that effectively divided the Palestinian cause at the Oslo Accords.²⁴

Because the United States has a history of providing economic resources, weapons, and information to Israel, America has experienced negative consequences in its relationships with Arab and Muslim communities.²⁵ Terrorist groups use this assistance as part of their narrative of a colonialist, Zionist, crusader out-group attempting to dominate their respective in-groups.²⁶ Recent moves by the United States to support the Israeli state further have made things more challenging.²⁷ To overcome these challenges and mitigate the violence caused by this conflict, the United States may have to re-balance its aid

²⁰ Tessler, 425–426.

²¹ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 395.

²² Shlaim, 395.

²³ Anders Strindberg, "From the River to the Sea: Honor, Identity, and Politics in Historical and Contemporary Palestinian Rejectionism" (PhD diss., University of St. Andrews, 2001), 142.

²⁴ Strindberg, 147.

²⁵ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 355.

²⁶ Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, "Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11," *Middle East Policy* 10, no. 2 (2003): 83.

²⁷ Williams, "Moral Support, Strategic Reasoning, or Democratic Politics," 7–9; Wiktorowicz and Kaltner, "Killing in the Name of Islam," 77; and Arwa Ibrahim and Maram Humaid, "U.S. Aid Cut to Palestinians Hits NGOs Hard," *Al Jazeera*, August 25, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/aid-cut-palestinians-hits-ngo-hard-180825102944853.html>.

cooperation with both Israeli and Palestinian interests. A two-state solution may need to be considered as part of an overall peace process both to reduce violence in Israel/Palestine and to protect the security of the United States.²⁸

²⁸ Gordon Neve and Yinon Cohen, “Western Interests, Israeli Unilateralism, and the Two State Solution,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 41, no. 3 (2012): 8, <https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1041009095?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:primo&accountid=12702>.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Intergroup dynamics have been a driving factor behind violence in intractable intra-state conflicts around the globe. Rwanda, Israel/Palestine, and Northern Ireland are primary examples of the inter-group dynamics that drive conflict and peace.¹ For Israel/Palestine, the conflict has not come to the same level of sustained peace that some other countries have achieved. The conflicting groups at play often initiate or respond to aggression with reciprocating extremism, fueling narratives that lead to further cycles of violence. This particular interaction puts a continuous strain on the United States to balance the support of its ally with potential backlash from Arabs and Muslims in the region. Islamist communities and groups across the Middle East have created a narrative of Israeli aggression—backed by the United States—as a primary cause of Muslim shame, humiliation, and suffering.²

This thesis examines whether social identity theory (SIT) is a useful tool in understanding and mitigating this conflict. SIT considers the hermeneutics of group members and local populations. It is versatile enough to consider the different perspectives of a conflict based on experiences, history, and culture. Understanding these perspectives may help analysts, policymakers, and security practitioners comprehend the roots of intergroup conflict and target approaches for mitigating conflicts.³

¹ Marie Sirgun Moss and Johana Ray Vollhardt, “You Can’t Give a Syringe with Unity: Rwandan Response to the Government’s Single Recategorization Policies,” *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy* 16, no. 1 (2016): 325–359, <https://doi.org/10.1111/asap.12097>; Shana Levin and Jim Sidanius, “Social Dominance and Social Identity in the United States and Israel: Ingroup Favoritism or Outgroup Derogation?,” *Political Psychology* 20, no. 1 (March 1999): 99, <https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00138>; and Wayne Colin Leach and Wendy Williams, “Group Identity and Conflicting Expectations of the Future in Northern Ireland,” *Political Psychology* 20, no. 4 (December 1999): 875, <https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00171>.

² Andrew Glazzard, “Losing the Plot: Narrative, Counter-Narrative and Violent Extremism,” (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, May 2017), 3, <https://doi.org/10.19165/2017.1.08>; and Shmuel Bar, “The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism,” Hoover Institution, June 1, 2004, <https://www.hoover.org/research/religious-sources-islamic-terrorism>.

³ Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn, *Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2011), 64–65.

A. HYPOTHESIS

Social identity theory is a tool for analyzing the perspective of individuals in the context of the socially constructed groups to which they belong. The hypothesis is that SIT can be used to analyze Israeli and Palestinian perspectives of their enduring conflict to better understand the impact of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the region.

B. FOCUS AND GOAL

This research focuses primarily on qualitative research into the identity-based conflict in Israel/Palestine. This study analyzes various Israeli and Palestinian accounts through the lens of social identity theory to highlight honor-shame paradigms, challenge-response cycles, limited goods, and patron-client relationships that define the conflict. It analyzes the historical and political climate in the Israel/Palestine region and the identity politics that have contributed to the ongoing conflict. After analyzing the Israeli and Palestinian hermeneutics, this thesis analyzes what these findings mean for U.S. policy in the region.

C. RESEARCH QUESTION

Identity-based conflicts have more diverse causes and solutions than inter-state conflicts based on national strategic interests or conflicts based on ideology. Identity-based conflicts are rooted in the socially constructed identity of individuals and the groups to which they belong. Identity conflicts are contests of power and dominance, honor and humiliation, and reciprocating challenges and responses. Understanding these conflicts may require an understanding of the concept of social identity and the underlying assumptions that perpetuate in-group/out-group dynamics. Reducing conflicts based on identity involves solutions designed with socially constructed identity in mind.

This thesis examines the following questions: How can social identity theory be used to understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and how does a new understanding affect U.S. policy?

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

This thesis applies SIT to analyze the conflict in Israel/Palestine to better understand the perspectives of Palestinians and Israelis as well as their impact on U.S. counterterrorism policy in the region.

1. Social Identity Theory As a Tool for Analysis

Research by Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg argues that the study of terrorism has been reduced to understanding the lowest common denominator of terrorist groups, which politically challenge nation-states' monopoly on the use of armed violence. Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg state that terrorism has been viewed through a "hermeneutic of crisis," whereby law enforcement and homeland security scholars research their subjects using an antagonistic viewpoint that seeks to defeat terrorism. This hermeneutic effectively colors the lens through which scholars understand terrorists, networks, and motivations. Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg argue that the study of terrorism as a discipline has become a pseudo-adjunct to counterterrorist organizations. Terrorists are thereby seen as enemies rather than individuals or groups to be fully understood.⁴

Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg articulate the need to move beyond the hermeneutic of crisis to understand terrorism and its roots in societies more fully. They argue that among heuristic models, SIT best identifies how individual identity grows in groups and considers cultural and social environments. They find that SIT reveals the emic—or local viewpoint—to the etic—the educated outsider's viewpoint. Unlike much of the available research on terrorism, SIT does not force the subject of study into a framework constructed outside its immediate environment. Instead, SIT harnesses the emic as the critical launching point for research. The theory integrates insight from multiple analytical models within the framework of the cultures being studied. It also allows the scholar to consider one's hermeneutics and biases in addition to those of the subjects.⁵ Brannan, Esler, and

⁴ David W. Brannan, Philip F. Esler, and N. T. Anders Strindberg, "Talking to 'Terrorists': Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24, no. 1 (January 2001): 5, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100118602>.

⁵ Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, 4.

Strindberg argue the importance of remaining unbiased because the over-reliance of scholars on secondary sources creates inaccurate analyses that contribute to political, social, and law enforcement policy. If analysts and policymakers do not fully understand groups labeled as terrorists, as Brannan asks, “from where do we expect peaceful initiatives?”⁶

Henri Tajfel, credited with founding SIT as a framework, finds three main components in socially constructed identities: cognitive, evaluative, and emotional. These components combine to create a sense of identity and self-worth from being part of a group. Tajfel theorizes that an individual’s identity is derived from the position he or she occupies in society, and one’s identity affects one’s behavior.⁷ He further argues that groups, group interactions, and group conflict define societies and cultures.⁸ Empirical evidence supports these claims. Tajfel’s lab experiments showed individuals more strongly identify with group traits than individual ones. Moreover, once an individual is designated a member of a group, he or she is defined by its designations and seeks homogeneity with its members.⁹

Strindberg and Wörn support this theory as a framework, asserting it works well for analyzing group identities because it is broad enough for varying cultural contexts, local histories, and group experiences. In contrast, other theories are inflexible and rely on strict state-actor rationality.¹⁰ International political theorists have pointed out that the emotional—rather than rational—messages used by conflicting groups are powerful tools to influence the perception and reaction of group audiences.¹¹

Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg have further refined Tajfel’s research by articulating four analytical markers to examine the actions of terrorist groups. These tools

⁶ Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, 14.

⁷ Strindberg and Wörn, *Islamism*, 64–65.

⁸ Henri Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 91–100.

⁹ Tajfel, 89.

¹⁰ Strindberg and Wörn, *Islamism*, 64–65.

¹¹ Greg Simons, “Rethinking Communication within the Global War on Terror,” *Small Wars Journal*, July 6, 2016, 1–2, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=794429>.

are challenge-response cycles, honor-shame paradigms, Patron-client relationships, and concepts of limited good. These markers are applied as a matrix for understanding the actions of groups in response to their environment and other groups.¹²

Mabry extends the context of socially constructed identities to the concept of language, arguing that language is an identity marker. He argues that language is a requirement for membership in or exclusion from broader nationalistic communities. Furthermore, communities with different languages can effectively represent different nations. Kaufman supports this assertion, arguing that language represents social and political identity as well as lends a critical piece of mythological narratives.¹³ Mabry provides a host of nation-state examples in which language is a marker of inter-group conflict: French in Algeria, Spanish in the United States, Afrikaans in South Africa, Tibetan in China, and Tamil in India.¹⁴ Contrary to Mabry's stance, Anderson and Paskeviciute have worked to dissuade scholars from using language as a proxy for ethnicity in understanding inter-group conflict. They have found that linguistic differences are not reliable as a predictor of ethnic conflict.¹⁵ Rogers Smith reinforces these criticisms, arguing that Laitin places too much weight on rational choice, which contributes very little to the formation of identity.¹⁶ Mabry concludes that while studying language in ethnic conflict is valuable for understanding comparative politics, it is not something that can be easily quantified to predict ethnic conflict. Mabry argues that the most important factor of interacting language communities is their relative status, both politically and socially.¹⁷

¹² David Brannan, Kristin Darken, and Anders Strindberg, *A Practitioners Way Forward: Terrorism Analysis* (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014), 67.

¹³ Stuart J. Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), 204.

¹⁴ Tristan James Mabry, "Language and Conflict," *International Political Science Review* 32, no. 2 (2011): 191–192, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512110379489>.

¹⁵ Christopher J. Anderson and Aida Paskeviciute, "How Ethnic and Linguistic Heterogeneity Influence the Prospects for Civil Society: and Comparative Study of Citizenship Behavior," *Journal of Politics* 68, no. 4 (2006): 788.

¹⁶ Rogers Smith, "Identities, Interests, and the Future of Political Science," *Perspectives on Politics* 2, no. 2 (2004): 305–306.

¹⁷ Mabry, "Language and Conflict," 203.

There are several schools of thought regarding SIT and the reduction of conflict. Gaertner et al. cite a foundational work in reducing identity-based conflict, a 1954 study conducted by Muzafer Sherif, which created social identities, introduced conflict, and advanced three methods to de-escalate the conflict all over a three-week period. The three strategies included re-categorization, de-categorization, and mutual differentiation with a superordinate goal.¹⁸ The 1954 research has served as a building block on which many more recent studies—by Turner and Crisp as well as Gomez et al.—have been conducted. Turner and Crisp note that while the original research heavily emphasizes the introduction of a superordinate goal to reduce conflict as a part of a mutual differentiation strategy, both de- and re-categorization are also used. Gaertner et al. conclude that these three strategies together successfully de-escalate conflicts.¹⁹

Leach and Williams examine the overall challenges in reducing intergroup conflicts. The researchers discovered that when analyzing a set of goals, individuals in Northern Ireland tended to favor the policies they believed would give them and their in-group a social and economic competitive advantage. They argue the path to reducing overall conflict and enhancing inter-group peace thus leads through a range of options that promotes cross-categorization and mutual differentiation. Essentially, individuals need to find appeal and envision a future wherein both sides benefit in order to reduce conflict. This finding supports research by Berndt et al. by showing the need for equality between groups as an essential piece of getting buy-in for superordinate goals.²⁰

Levin and Sidanius build on Leach and Williams's research by highlighting several challenges to reducing intergroup conflict using categorization strategies. Studies of American and Israeli students have shown a political bias against Arab Palestinians. Levin

¹⁸ Samuel L. Gaertner et al., "Reducing Intergroup Conflict: From Superordinate Goals to Decategorization, Recategorization, and Mutual Differentiation," *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice* 4, no. 1 (March 2000): 112, <https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2699.4.1.98>.

¹⁹ Rhiannon Turner and Richard J. Crisp, "Explaining the Relationship between Ingroup Identification and Intergroup Bias following Recategorization: A Self-Regulation Theory Analysis," *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* 13, no. 2 (2010): 251–261, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430209351702>.

²⁰ Leach and Williams, "Group Identity and Conflicting Expectations," 876–877.

and Sidanius have found that when individuals have high in-group identification, there are strong biases toward groups with which they associate.²¹

2. Israeli Perspectives

In his comprehensive history of Israel and its Arab neighbors, Avi Shlaim maintains that the Israeli state and the West's defense of it are largely defined by the Holocaust. As a democratic and a predominantly defensive state that has had to protect itself from infancy, Israel sees itself as fighting in an ongoing struggle "between a Jewish David and an Arab Goliath."²² According to Shlaim, the Israel Defense Forces act aggressively because the perception of power can mean life or death for Israel. Pre-emptive strikes are seen as necessary to ensure survival and freedom of commerce. A poignant example in Shlaim's work is the Six-Day War and Israel's stated need to restore deterrence and re-open Israeli access to the Straights of Tiran. Another example of strength and deterrence as a tactic against non-state actors is the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Gilad Sharon provides the perspectives of his father, Ariel Sharon, over the course of his military and political career. The former states that his father and then-Prime Minister Rabin orchestrated the invasion of Lebanon to end the increasing presence of terrorism and create a regime change in Beirut that would depose the presence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and establish a Christian Phalangist regime friendly to the state of Israel. Sharon states that this aggressive stance was necessary to prevent the annihilation of friendly Christians in the North and the escalation of the threat to the Israeli state. He argues that this line of reasoning reflects the same pre-emptive attitudes that Israeli policymakers have upheld throughout the nation's history. For Israeli leaders, the Palestinian targeting of civilians and the presence of Arab forces near the Israeli border are a justifiable *casus belli*. Sharon and his father have seen violent Palestinians as terrorists not deserving of mercy.²³

²¹ Levin and Sidanius, "Social Dominance and Social Identity," 99.

²² Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: Norton, 1999), 23–24.

²³ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 33–89; and Gilad Sharon, *Sharon: The Life of a Leader* (New York: HarperCollins, 2011), 391–401.

Williams argues through the Western and Westphalian lenses when he states that Israel is morally superior to its opponents because it is a recognized state that works to keep sub-state actors and terrorists at bay. Williams also argues that all of Israel's actions are strategically aimed at projecting strength—that Israelis believe it is better to take strong action against their Arab neighbors than to allow subnational groups to destabilize Israeli hegemony in the region. This is the same line of reasoning that Israeli leaders, such as Benjamin Netanyahu, have followed. Netanyahu argues that the root of terrorism in the Middle East lies in the disposition of Arabs and Muslims toward violence. He contends this violence is deeply tied to Arab and Muslim culture and history.²⁴

Thomas Friedman's *From Beirut to Jerusalem* offers a Western and journalistic perspective of Palestinian organizations throughout the years of conflict with Israel. He reveals an attributional bias against Palestinians when he points out the wealth and decadence of the leaders at the top of these groups. Friedman points out how Westerners have discredited the leaders of Palestinian organizations for how they use their funds. Barakat underscores the apparent hypocrisy of the Western hermeneutic as it looks at things through the biased lens of its own in-group. He argues that calling the PLO a terrorist organization for its support of Hussein among other aggressors is hypocritical because the United States supported him before and during the Iran–Iraq war.²⁵

3. Palestinian Perspectives

Primary sources, such as articles by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and statements by Palestinian leaders including George Habash and Yasser Arafat,

²⁴ Keith Williams, "Moral Support, Strategic Reasoning, or Domestic Politics: America's Continual Support to Israel" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 7–9, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=483095>; and Benjamin Netanyahu, *Terrorism: How the West Can Win* (New York: Avon Books, 1987), 83.

²⁵ Thomas Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (New York: Anchor Books, 1995), 123–124; and Halim Barakat, "Liberation or Terrorism: Refuting the Language of the Oppressor," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 9, no. 2 (April 1987): 133, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1300211217/>.

reflect directly on the Palestinian hermeneutic.²⁶ Historical works by Robert Fisk and Avi Schlaim introduce Westerners to the Palestinian hermeneutic by offering a perspective into the refugee crisis and poverty related to aggressive Zionism. They build on their research by showing in-group/out-group dynamics between Israelis and Palestinians and reveal how the deliberate provocation of the Six-Day War by Israel affects the perception of the Palestinian diaspora in the region.²⁷

A survey of subnational Palestinian resistance group members completed in 2007 indicates that most members strongly agree they are proud of their decision to join the group and to serve until retirement. Through this sort of primary sourcing, Keith Ludwick shows Western readers that being labeled terrorists or discredited as Marxists by Western powers does not deter Palestinians from adopting the narratives of movements such as the PLO and the PFLP. Ludwick's research shows that local group narratives strongly define Palestinian social identity. Palestinians whose identities are tied to these sub-state "terrorist" groups consider themselves not part of a terror movement but part of a revolutionary battle against the neo-colonialism of Israel and its Western allies.²⁸

Franz Fanon introduces readers to the perspectives of "colonized" and culturally repressed groups. He describes the psyche of individuals who have experienced being part of out-groups and who are pushed to the point of believing that only force can achieve liberation from their perceived oppressors.²⁹ Kinnvall adds empirical evidence to Fanon's claims, showing a correlation between "structurally marginalized" peoples and

²⁶ Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, "Editorial," *PFLP Bulletin: Strategic Alliance for Aggression*, no. 55 (October 1981): 3–4, <http://pflp-documents.org/documents/PFLPBulletin-55-Oct1981.pdf>; "Dr George Habash Speaks on 'Terrorism' and Resistance," Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, video, 0:59, July 7, 2013, <http://pflp.ps/english/2013/07/07/video-dr-george-habash-speaks-on-terrorism-and-resistance/>; and "UN Arafat - 1974," YouTube video, 5:58, posted by AP Archive, July 21, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7L1oVlbCL8Q>.

²⁷ Robert Fisk, *The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East* (Washington, DC: Random House, 2005), 377; and Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 241–242.

²⁸ Keith W. Ludwick, "Closing the Gap: Measuring the Social Identity of Terrorists" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 43, <https://www.hSDL.org/?view&did=234866>.

²⁹ Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), iv.

participation in resistance operations based on identity and faith.³⁰ The concept of honor and shame in the Arab world is thoroughly discussed by Pely who, using local studies to avoid orientalist bias, analyzes the pull of honor challenges and shame in the Middle East. His research underscores the cultural origins of revenge based on patron-client relationships among individuals in the Israel/Palestine region. His findings indicate that the cultures in Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Syria are all vulnerable to the sort of behavior that drives individuals to place their honor above more immediate needs like sustenance, freedom from imprisonment, and safety from retaliatory responses.³¹

In 1986, the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University and the Association of Arab-American University Graduates hosted a seminar discussing the context and interpretations of terrorism in the Middle East. Students reflected the in-group attitudes of Palestinians and Arabs fighting against Israel and sympathized with the main points made by Fanon. They argued that Palestinians who had been displaced by successive wars, Israeli land grabs, and the invasion of Lebanon were victims, not instigators, of terrorism.³² Barakat explains that many Arabs see Palestinian groups as liberation movements, and they see labels of terrorism as part of a broader colonialist effort by the West. Barakat has built on outputs of this conference to show—Palestinians and their sympathizers—how the Western hermeneutics of Arabs in the Middle East are racist and repressive.³³ He shows that many Arabs believe Western intolerance of the Palestinian viewpoint originates from the “Israelization” of American public opinion.³⁴ Israelis can convey their messages in a manner that garners Western sympathy while the Palestinians are dehumanized. He argues that the West labels the PLO a terrorist organization to

³⁰ Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security,” *Political Psychology* 25, no. 5 (Oct. 2004): 747, [https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00396.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00396.x).

³¹ Doron Pely, “When Honor Trumps Basic Needs: The Role of Honor in Deadly Disputes within Israel’s Arab Community,” *Negotiation Journal* 27, no. 2 (April 2011): 205–225, [https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.2011.00303.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.2011.00303.x).

³² Barakat, “Liberation or Terrorism,” 133–134.

³³ Barakat, 136.

³⁴ Barakat, 136.

delegitimize the group while erasing the history of Jewish terrorism against the British before the Israeli state and against its neighbors after statehood was gained.³⁵

There is considerable research on terrorism and insurgency. The two are considered separate disciplines with very different objectives. The former is a sensationalist tactic and may not necessarily be part of a broader political strategy. It may not have a territorial motivation. Insurgency, on the other hand, is a political movement used to overthrow a government or occupying force. Insurgency is usually grounded in some dispute over territory and sovereignty. Palestinians view themselves as insurgents fighting for their homeland and Israelis as terrorists taking actions based on Zionist ideology.³⁶

4. Conclusion

There is a broad range of approaches in using social identity to understand what drives and mitigates intergroup conflict. Social identity theory is flexible enough to consider multiple perspectives. A number of books, articles, and firsthand accounts outline the perspectives of Israelis and Palestinians. This thesis examines an array of sources to determine the underlying causes of ongoing conflict in the Israel/Palestine region and examine what impact these findings have on U.S. policy in the region.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

The object of this study was the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This continuing conflict was analyzed through the lens of social identity theory to better understand the motivations and actions taken by Israeli and Palestinian groups. This study examined multiple sources including editorials, newspapers, and websites of Israeli and Palestinian groups engaged in politics and terrorism; books and scholarly journals written about the history of the region; and statements from Israeli and Palestinian leaders as primary sources for analysis. The selection criteria for the analysis centered on actions that shaped global politics and emphasized viewpoints of the groups they represented. This

³⁵ Barakat, 136–137.

³⁶ Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker, “The Terror Fringe,” Hoover Institution, December 1, 2009, <https://www.hoover.org/research/terror-fringe>.

research focused on Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization leading up to and during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Actions and narratives of these groups were analyzed using the SIT framework social identity analysis method, as described by Brannan and Strindberg, to better understand the hermeneutics of these groups.

The method involves four primary markers to understand the local emic hermeneutic: challenge-response cycles, honor-shame paradigms, Patron-client relationships, and concepts of limited good. Using these markers, this thesis depicts historical events to examine Israeli and Palestinian perspectives. After both sides of the conflict are analyzed, this thesis considers what hermeneutics mean for U.S. policy in the region (see Figure 1). The intended output of this research is a better understanding of how social identity theory can be used to analyze the driving forces of this conflict as well as understand limitations or opportunities for U.S. policy in the region.



Figure 1. Social Identity Analysis Map

F. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Chapter II defines social identity theory, and then Chapters III and IV apply the theory to analyze Israelis and Palestinians, respectively. Chapter V analyzes the implications for U.S. policy in the region and concludes by comparing current U.S. strategies with the hermeneutical findings.

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II. OVERVIEW OF SIT

Social identity theory (SIT) was chosen as the analytical tool for this research because it focuses on understanding the societal constructs behind individual actors and the groups to which they belong. Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg argue that this framework is useful in explaining terrorism and its roots in societies more fully—rather than viewing it as something to be defeated.³⁷ Understanding conflicts involving groups labeled terrorists requires looking beyond the hermeneutic of crisis and studying the conflicts from multiple perspectives.³⁸ Unlike much of the available research on terrorism, SIT does not force the subject of study into a framework constructed outside the subject's immediate environment. Instead, SIT harnesses the emic as the critical launching point for research. The theory integrates insight from multiple analytical models within the framework of the cultures being studied. It also allows the scholar to consider one's hermeneutics and biases in addition to those of the subject.³⁹

Social identity theory, as founded by Henri Tajfel, is a heuristic model that describes how an individual's identity grows within and among groups through communication and interactions. Strindberg and Wörn argue that SIT “emphasizes the significance of the subjects’ hermeneutic situation and groups members’ internally constructed social identity.” SIT is valuable as an analytical framework because it is flexible enough to account for different cultural contexts while analyzing group identity. This analytical framework has three components. The cognitive component involves the members’ knowledge that they belong to a group. The evaluative component is the significance that membership in a group brings to its members. The emotional component consists of the feelings individuals derive from the evaluative and cognitive aspects of group membership. People internalize their group membership as a piece of their self-

³⁷ Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, “Talking to ‘Terrorists,’” 3–4.

³⁸ Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, 4.

³⁹ Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, “Talking to ‘Terrorists,’” 4–5; and Anders Strindberg, “From the River to the Sea: Honor, Identity, and Politics in Historical and Contemporary Palestinian Rejectionism” (PhD diss., University of St. Andrews, 2001), 27.

understanding. The assumptions of this framework hold for cultures all around the world because the theory accounts for different cultures and norms. This thesis applies the group identity framework to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, looking specifically at the Israeli state and the PLO leading up to and during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.⁴⁰

In his foundational work, *Social Identity Theory and Intergroup Relations*, Tajfel argues that individual behaviors derive from identity, and identities derive from the position one occupies in broader society.⁴¹ Empirical evidence suggests that individuals identify more with social and group traits than they do with individual ones, especially in cases where the individual is part of a minority group.⁴² Tajfel demonstrates that once individuals are marked as members of an out-group or a minority group, they define themselves by that designation and seek homogeneous association with members of this socially constructed identity.⁴³ Given Tajfel's findings, within the scope of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, individuals identify more as Palestinian, Israeli, Lebanese, Jewish, Muslim, or Christian than with their individual characteristics such as being a man or a bank clerk.⁴⁴

According to Tajfel, group membership, group interaction, and competition between groups define the socially constructed reality in which people live.⁴⁵ Group identity plays a role in social perception and the ways individuals view their surrounding environments. Empirical testing of intergroup conflict has shown evidence of perceptual bias toward the in-group. In a 1970 experiment by Duncan, test subjects from the University of California, Irvine, were shown videos of violent actions. When subjects saw violence involving members of their in-group, they attributed the behavior to the individuals' circumstances. When these same subjects saw violence involving members of

⁴⁰ Strindberg and Wörn, *Islamism*, 64–65.

⁴¹ Henri Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 91.

⁴² Tajfel, 91.

⁴³ Tajfel, 90.

⁴⁴ Tajfel, 89–91.

⁴⁵ Tajfel, 100.

an out-group, they credited the violence to attributes of the actor's identity.⁴⁶ According to Tajfel, such a dynamic manifests in perceptions of racial bias between white and black citizens in the United States.⁴⁷ Members of the African-American community perceive negative actions by blacks as a product of white people's racial bias against their in-group and the black citizen's circumstances. Members of the white community blame violence from black citizens on attributional qualities but violence from white individuals on environmental circumstances.⁴⁸ Similar studies in India with members of Hindu and Muslim groups have shown bias toward their in-groups.⁴⁹ This thesis examines how these social perceptions and biases have played out in the groups affected by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Evaluating the hermeneutics of Israeli actors and the various PLO elements involves differentiating between the local Palestinians communities—both in Israel and refugee camps abroad—and Western society. Strindberg and Wörn argue the largely individualistic culture of Western Europe and North America are anathema to most of the world's cultures, which have more collectivist attitudes.⁵⁰ According to Buss, Western individualism is different from the rest of the world because of its evolution from ancient Greek philosophy, Judeo-Christian beliefs, the reformation that led to the Peace of Westphalia, and the separation of church and state. This evolution culminated in the individual freedoms that came from the egalitarian revolutions that arose in the 18th and 19th centuries.⁵¹ The collectivist communities of the Middle East exhibit a powerful drive for continuity of culture and identity when there is a perceived threat of domination by

⁴⁶ Birt L. Duncan, "Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 34, no. 4 (October 1976): 590, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.34.4.590>.

⁴⁷ Jennifer Crocker et al., "Social Stigma: The Affective Consequences of Attributional Ambiguity," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 60, no. 2 (1991): 218, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/614298697?accountid=12702>.

⁴⁸ Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 104.

⁴⁹ Tajfel, 105.

⁵⁰ Strindberg and Wörn, *Islamism*, 65.

⁵¹ Andreas Buss, "The Evolution of Western Individualism," *Religion* 30, no. 1 (January 2000): 1–25.

outsiders.⁵² These communities tend to rally around others whom they see as part of their in-group under the threat of domination by an out-group. This phenomenon explains the broader support for the PLO and the Palestinian people by many Middle Eastern powers throughout much of the conflict's history. Grasping the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of this dynamic helps to frame the psychological reaction to perceived domination by Zionists and Western colonialists.⁵³ These differences are important as the Arab and Islamic world is not a monolithic force, unified in its opposition to Israel and the West. Strindberg points out that many in the West have a crude perception of Palestinians as wholly united behind the PLO and part of a broader coalition of fanatics and terrorists whose extremism resulted in their exile.⁵⁴

Mabry builds on the importance of this distinction when he states that Islamic culture and the Westphalian derivative of the nation-state nearly contradict one another. In Islam, the idea of *ummah* is a collection of believers in the one true god and Muhammad as his one true prophet. Therefore, in Islamic culture, regime legitimacy derives from a community of believers, not one of nationalists. Moreover, Mabry notes that Western and Arabic notions of language can even be antithetical to one another in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁵⁵ Hebrew is a superordinate language spoken by the millions of residents of the Israeli state while Arabic is spoken in variations of over 35 different dialects.⁵⁶ These dialects are different from the religious, scholarly form of Arabic called Modern Standard Arabic, which is more ceremonial and archaic, equivalent in use to Latin in the Roman-Catholic sphere of influence.⁵⁷ Arabic dialects are so diverse that they are often intelligible to each other. In Jordan, where millions of Palestinians live as refugees, indigenous Bedouin and the more genteel Madani-speaking Jordanians rank higher

⁵² Anders Strindberg, "The Damascus-Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces: A Primer," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 3 (Spring 2000): 60, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2676456>.

⁵³ Kinnvall, "Globalization and Religious Nationalism," 747.

⁵⁴ Strindberg, "From the River to the Sea," 5–19.

⁵⁵ Tristan Mabry, "Arab Di-Nationalism," *Levantine Review* 2, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 31, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/57123>.

⁵⁶ Mabry, 35.

⁵⁷ Mabry, 39.

politically and socially than speakers of the Fellahi dialect, which is spoken by Palestinian refugees. Jordanians do not view Palestinians as their peers, and though they may empathize with them against perceived Israeli aggression, they do not view them as equals.⁵⁸

Even legally, the Israelis and Palestinians view the conflict differently. Israelis view the ongoing conflict through the lens of a nation-state fighting terrorists and their state sponsors abroad. Israelis see the 1982 invasion of Lebanon as part of a broader conflict that can be defined and governed by international rules and norms regarding war and peace. Meanwhile, the PLO and its constituents see the conflict as a challenge-response cycle involving freedom fighters and oppressive expansionists.⁵⁹

A. SOCIAL IDENTITY ANALYTICAL MARKERS

Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg contend that four analytical markers are effective in analyzing group actions. These markers include relationships between patrons and clients, the challenge-response cycle, the honor-shame paradigm, and limited goods. These markers do not directly correlate with all possible actions such that $x = y$, but they do offer a matrix for exploring the actions of groups in response to other groups in their immediate environment.⁶⁰

1. Patron-Client Relationships

Patron-client relationships are the emblematic relationships among individuals or groups in which a client depends on a patron for reciprocal support, status, or protection.⁶¹

2. Challenge-Response Cycle

The cycle of challenge and response is the interaction among different groups in environments where resources are scarce. Challenges and responses can be positive or

⁵⁸ Mabry, "Arab Di-Nationalism," 341; and Mabry, "Language and Conflict," 189–207.

⁵⁹ Asher Maoz, "War and Peace: An Israeli Perspective," *Constitutional Forum* 14, no. 2 (2005), 40, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=871650>.

⁶⁰ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioners Way Forward*, 67.

⁶¹ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, 67.

negative. If one group moves into another group's territory or kills a member of another faction, the challenge-response cycle requires revenge if the insulted group wishes to avoid further loss of honor. This concept of cyclical feedback also extends to a group's patronage line, as is demonstrated in detail in the following chapters on Israeli and Palestinian perspectives.⁶²

3. Honor-Shame Paradigm

The honor-shame paradigm is a balancing by the community involving status to groups and individuals relative to their peers and enemies.⁶³ Pely highlights the importance placed on honor and shame above safety and health—contrary to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, which states individuals focus on their immediate survival first—as shown in the blood feuds and honor killings between Israelis, Arabs, Muslims, Christians, and Druze.⁶⁴ Individuals involved in identity-based conflicts often choose to satisfy honor challenges before other concerns. This has important ramifications for policymakers and scholars working in the Israel/Palestine region. Honor and shame in the Middle East are closely tied to the concept of limited good. The honor of both the Israelis and the PLO are rooted deeply in the soils of the region, making it a central aspect of the challenge-response cycle at play between the two groups.⁶⁵

4. Limited Goods

The paradigm of limited goods involves resources such as land, wealth or water, and intangibles such as status, honor, and shame.⁶⁶ Examples of limited goods in the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict include land, water, international recognition, and sovereignty. These limited goods are seen as finite and attainable only at the expense of

⁶² Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioners Way Forward*, 67; and Pely, "When Honor Trumps Basic Needs," 211.

⁶³ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioners Way Forward*, 67.

⁶⁴ Pely, "When Honor Trumps Basic Needs," 205–225.

⁶⁵ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioners Way Forward*, 67; and Pely, "When Honor Trumps Basic Needs," 205–225.

⁶⁶ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioners Way Forward*, 67.

someone else.⁶⁷ The land has long been one of the most symbolic and religious examples of limited good in the region. Israelis view the land as a birthright from which they were torn 2,000 years ago. Palestinians see it as the land they inhabited for centuries before being driven away by Jewish settlers and later Israeli occupiers.⁶⁸

B. SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION OF SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

SIT has been used to further understand conflict and peace in several regions—Northern Ireland, Rwanda, and Israel among others—where ethnicity and religion have divided people into separate identities. In Northern Ireland, SIT was used as a framework to understand policies that inflamed and reduced tensions between the Protestant citizens of Northern Ireland and the Roman Catholic citizens of the Republic of Ireland.⁶⁹ In Rwanda, it was used to analyze the effectiveness of national, community, and business-sector strategies to reduce ethnic conflict. In Israel, SIT was applied in the Oslo Accords and to the motivations that led to the Rejectionist Front.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, “Talking to ‘Terrorists,’” 3–5.

⁶⁸ Barak A. Salmoni, “The Roadmap: A Phased Vision for Israel and Palestine,” *Strategic Insights* 2, no. 8 (August 2003): 3; *Encyclopedia Britannica*, s.v. “Zionism,” accessed October 29, 2017, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Zionism>; and “Dr George Habash Speaks on ‘Terrorism’ and Resistance.”

⁶⁹ Leach and Williams, “Group Identity and Conflicting Expectations,” 875.

⁷⁰ Moss and Vollhardt, “You Can’t Give a Syringe with Unity,” 325–359; and Strindberg, “From the River to the Sea,” 5–19.

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III. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE

In critically analyzing the history of this conflict leading up to the 1982 invasion, this chapter highlights the ways in which the analytical markers overlap and intertwine. For example, honor challenges involve limited goods and affect both patrons and clients as part of the challenge-response cycle. Notably, either party could pinpoint any time in the past and still blame the other for the source of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Because the timelines could be boundless, this thesis bounds them to just before the creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

A. CHALLENGE-RESPONSE CYCLE

This chapter begins with an examination of the Israeli perspective by looking at the challenge-response cycle leading up to the invasion of Lebanon. Operation Peace for Galilee was the culmination of a challenge-response cycle related to the limited good issue of land control that was decades in the making. The group honor of both sides was bound up in that cycle. From its creation in 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organization existed as a challenge to the Israeli state. The PLO formed in part due to the failure of the Palestinians to respond to Haganah and Irgun, Zionist paramilitary and terrorist organizations that targeted the British and Arabs with the aim of creating an Israeli state. The PLO even modeled their tactics after Irgun, which used bombs full of nails to target Arab markets and large bombs to force Zionist policy on the British Mandate for Palestine.⁷¹ Creating policy in response to the PLO, Israeli policymakers focused on Article 2 of the PLO's originating charter, which states that the borders of Palestine contain all the territories that existed under the British Mandate as an "indivisible unit." They also cite Article 4, which states that the Palestinians' destiny is to liberate their homeland. Israelis point out the charter was written before the Israeli occupation of Arab-controlled

⁷¹ Andrew Glazzard, "Anonymous Soldiers: The Struggle for Israel, 1917–1947," *RUSI Journal* 161, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 97–98, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2016.1152128>.

parts of Palestine, so it could only mean the destruction of the Israeli state.⁷² Israeli policymakers note that although Article 15 states the realm of the holy land guarantees the freedom of religion and protects holy sites, Arab-Muslims in Palestine had denied Jews freedom of movement to holy sites and restricted the practice of Judaism for hundreds of years before the creation of the modern Israeli state. The Temple Mount and the Wailing Wall were off limits to Jews before the Six-Day War, and only after Israel's occupation was freedom of religion allowed in the holy city of Jerusalem.⁷³ Much of the PLO's charter challenges the existence of the Israeli state, claiming it is illegitimate and occupied by a people whose identity is a religion, not a race.⁷⁴

Beyond the opening salvos of its charter, the PLO's first kinetic attacks against the Israeli state were launched against Israel's critical infrastructure and civilians in 1965. Members of Palestinian Fatah, a militant subgroup of the PLO, attacked from neighboring Arab territories held by Jordan. These continual challenges created the environment for an Israeli response in 1966, a major raid into the Jordanian-held West Bank. This further inflamed tensions in the region, eventually culminating in the 1967 Six-Day War in which Israel seized the Suez Canal, Gaza, and the West Bank.⁷⁵

After the PLO was forced out of Jordan and into Lebanon, Israel observed Arafat and his followers wedging themselves into the escalating fault lines that divided the country. As the Christian Phalangists and Muslim opposition leaders clashed, Palestinians were caught in the crossfire. The murder of their in-group necessitated a response. As this challenge-response cycle escalated, Phalangist militants killed more than 1,000 Palestinians in the Karantina massacre. The PLO responded by initiating the Damour massacre and killing more than 500 Christians.⁷⁶ This directly contributed to further

⁷² Sharon, *Life of a Leader*, 354.

⁷³ Yitzhak Reiter, *Jerusalem and Its Role in Islamic Solidarity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 130.

⁷⁴ Sharon, *Life of a Leader*, 356–357.

⁷⁵ Sharon, *Life of a Leader*, 359–360; and Charles Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2012), 270–271.

⁷⁶ William W. Harris, *The New Face of Lebanon: History's Revenge* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2006), 162.

division in Lebanon, which ignited the civil war that pre-empted Operation Peace for Galilee. The continued clashes between the Maronite clients of Israel and the Arab-Muslim forces led to Israel extending its law to effectively annex the Golan Heights. Israel hoped to extend its influence and eradicate what it believed to be the driving force behind Palestinian resistance, the PLO.⁷⁷

The *casus belli* for the Israeli invasion was the June 3, 1982, assassination of the Israeli ambassador to Lebanon in London, England.⁷⁸ The assassination was conducted by an organization that was a chief opponent of the PLO, the Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC); however, Israel had been planning the invasion to dislodge the PLO from Lebanon for quite some time.⁷⁹ In a meeting the next day, when several Israeli government ministers presented evidence linking the assassination to the FRC and its leader, Abu Nidal, Begin cut them off, saying, “they are all PLO.”⁸⁰ He went on to say, “Abu Nidal, Abu Schmida, we have to strike at the PLO.”⁸¹ Rafael Eytan, the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), proposed massive air strikes against the PLO, having obtained intelligence that the PLO would respond with artillery strikes against Israeli targets.⁸² He and other hawks wanted to initiate a series of escalating honor challenges that would result in mass support for an Israeli invasion.⁸³ Israel responded by bombing refugee camps and other targets from Southern Lebanon to Beirut.⁸⁴ The PLO responded with artillery strikes against multiple villages in Galilee, which in turn was followed by an Israeli invasion of more than 75,000 soldiers.⁸⁵

⁷⁷ Yazīd Ṣāyigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 326.

⁷⁸ Strindberg, “From the River to the Sea,” 139.

⁷⁹ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 397.

⁸⁰ Shlaim, 397.

⁸¹ Shlaim, 397–398.

⁸² Shlaim, 398.

⁸³ Shlaim, 398.

⁸⁴ Shlaim, 398.

⁸⁵ Strindberg, “From the River to the Sea,” 139; and Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 398.

While the Palestinians viewed their actions as part of a liberation movement, the Israelis saw them as cowardly terrorism.⁸⁶ Statistics compiled by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveal the toll that these terrorist attacks had taken on Israel leading up to the 1982 invasion (see Figure 2).⁸⁷ This information puts into perspective the way Israeli leaders viewed the Palestinian movement. Every death was a challenge to the Israeli state that had to be addressed. The 1982 invasion was designed as an overwhelming response to stop the threat of the PLO.⁸⁸




Figure 2. Israeli Fatalities in Terror Attacks, 1964–1982⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 425.

⁸⁷ “Terrorism Deaths in Israel, 1920–1999,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 1, 2000, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/2000/Pages/Terrorism%20deaths%20in%20Israel%20-%201920-1999.aspx>.

⁸⁸ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁹ Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

B. HONOR-SHAME PARADIGM

In analyzing the honor-shame paradigm, it is important to note that these concepts played a significant role for Israeli leaders in the lead up to 1982. In 1978, U.S. President Jimmy Carter was able to bring Israel and Egypt to the negotiating table for the Camp David Accords. The Begin coalition was pressured to adhere United Nations (UN) Resolution 242 and withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and Gaza. Begin could not do this without an honor loss among his constituents. He eventually found a way to save face by agreeing to do what the Israeli Knesset voted on for the Sinai, a phased withdrawal. He was also permitted to remove any references in the peace plan to Israeli withdrawal of the occupied territories in Israel/Palestine. These compromises allowed Begin to negotiate without incurring shame, which could have upset his ruling coalition and cost him his government.⁹⁰ A peace agreement between Israel and Egypt that had eluded them since Israel's birth had finally come but at the cost of the Palestinian national movement. The removal of clauses referencing an Israeli withdrawal meant that Palestinians were left to live in territories occupied by Israel or in refugee camps abroad. Palestinians became a people without a homeland. This further weakened the view of the United States in the Arab world, advancing the image of America as a patron of Israel.⁹¹

Researchers note the bias of the Western belief that revenge taken outside the legal system is irrational and bad for society. Westerners view extralegal revenge as something for primitive individuals with weak character.⁹² With this emphasis on jurisprudence, the entire concept of honor and shame is viewed differently by the Israeli state than by the PLO. Rather than seeking justice and revenge through informal networks, Israel has taken the Westphalian approach of using the overt power of a nation-state. Its courts have determined that wars started by the Israeli state in response to Palestinian and Islamic violence were engagements between sovereign states; whether the opposing Arab states were willing to recognize the actions of actors within their borders was irrelevant. Israel

⁹⁰ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 355.

⁹¹ Smith, 355.

⁹² Pely, "When Honor Trumps Basic Needs," 212.

justifies its occupation of Palestinian territories with legal decisions citing it has the right to seize Palestinian lands in self-defense because the neighboring Arab states would not agree to a formal peace with the Israeli state.⁹³ Where the Palestinians and their patrons see this occupation as a violation of Palestinian sovereignty and a challenge to their honor that must be avenged, the Israelis see it as a legitimate mechanism of state power acting against states that sponsor terrorism. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, its Supreme Court legitimized its actions as a response to PLO challenges, arguing that Israel and Lebanon were in a perpetual state of war ever since the Arab-Israeli war began. The court argued that since Lebanon agreed to nothing more than an armistice, the state of war had never ended. In short, while Arabs in the region have viewed honor, shame, and revenge as things to pursue outside the realm of state law, Israelis act within a more Western hermeneutic, justifying their honor–shame responses through the legal system and official state powers.⁹⁴

Operation Peace for Galilee was so overwhelming in its approach that it even changed how Israeli Jews and members of the international Jewish community viewed Israel’s role in defending itself.⁹⁵ The war was opposed by many and brought a sense of shame on many Israelis who viewed the war as an act of aggression.⁹⁶ Patrons from North America joined local Israeli protestors in opposing the war. Many stated they wanted a strong Israel, but extending Israeli power into other nations to stamp out the PLO went too far. They believed that the tactics were too extreme, resulting in too many dead civilians including children.⁹⁷

C. PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS

Shifting the focus to Patron-client relationships, the discussion moves to the Israeli patronage line leading up to the invasion of Lebanon. During Operation Peace for Galilee,

⁹³ Maoz, “War and Peace,” 35–38.

⁹⁴ Pely, “When Honor Trumps Basic Needs,” 212; and Maoz, “War and Peace,” 35–38.

⁹⁵ Susan Riley, “Anguish in the Diaspora,” *Maclean’s*, July 19, 1982, 34.

⁹⁶ Riley, 34.

⁹⁷ Riley, 34.

Israel existed as a patron to Lebanese Christian militias and as a client to the United States.⁹⁸ Before the launch of their forces in 1982, the Israelis considered becoming a patron to the Christian Maronites in Lebanon. The Maronites were a minority faction with historical roots in Lebanon who had pitted themselves against various Islamic and Arabic nationalist forces in the country.⁹⁹ By 1982, the group was suffering setbacks from Syrian and Palestinian factions. Even before the Sharon government came to power, the government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had been aiding the Christians in Lebanon.¹⁰⁰ Rabin saw the Christians as members of the nominal in-group. In his memoirs, he states that his government helped the Christians in Lebanon because they were “a religious minority fighting for their lives” against fanatical Muslim forces, and he felt it was Israel’s duty to help them.¹⁰¹ In addition to in-group sentiment, the popular belief in Israel was that if the group fell, it would mean domination of Lebanon by pro-Palestinian and Syrian forces and a concentration of anti-Israeli terrorists on its border.¹⁰²

The Christian Maronites’ patronage system dated back to the French mandate after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. These Maronites, united under the Phalangist movement, directly opposed the PLO, which had aligned itself with the patronage line of the Muslim-based national movement during the Lebanese Civil War.¹⁰³ The war started when unknown attackers fired on the leader of the Christian Phalangists, Pierre Gemayyel.¹⁰⁴ The Phalangists responded to this challenge by gunning down a bus full of Palestinians in Beirut. This tit-for-tat cycle continued to escalate into 1976 when the PLO massacred over

⁹⁸ Sharon, *Life of a Leader*, 392–393; and Williams, “Moral Support, Strategic Reasoning, or Democratic Politics,” 7–9.

⁹⁹ Sharon, *Life of a Leader*, 392.

¹⁰⁰ Laurie Eisenberg, “History Revisited or Revamped? The Maronite Factor in Israel’s 1982 Invasion of Lebanon,” *Israel Affairs* 15, no. 4 (October 2009): 373, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13537120903198654>.

¹⁰¹ Sharon, *Life of a Leader*, 393.

¹⁰² Sharon, 392–393.

¹⁰³ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 348–349.

¹⁰⁴ Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 66.

500 Christians in the town of Damour.¹⁰⁵ These identity-based murders effectively divided the country along the lines of religion and ethnicity, each side further identifying with its respective in-group as a reaction to every killing. This dynamic helped drive the country into civil war and set the stage for the Israeli invasion in 1982.¹⁰⁶

As Lebanon descended into chaos, Syria moved into the northern and central part of the country, pushing elements of the PLO to the south. Israel exerted its influence in the region by supplying and funneling Lebanese Christians across the border, hoping the Maronites would destroy PLO refugee camps.¹⁰⁷

A formal alliance with the Christian militias in Lebanon and the desire to eliminate the PLO were primary motivators leading to the Israeli invasion.¹⁰⁸ Begin and Sharon argued that becoming a patron to non-Muslim, non-Arab forces that also saw danger from Arab Muslim out-groups would allow Israel to establish hegemonic status in the area. Sharon was the central architect of this vision, and from his first weeks as defense minister, he planned the invasion.¹⁰⁹ He had three main goals: destroy the military infrastructure of the PLO in Lebanon and undermine its political capacity, establish a new Lebanese political order with the Christian Maronites under Bashir Gemayel and attain a favorable patronage-based peace with Lebanon, and push Syrian military forces out of Lebanon. Sharon hoped that successfully meeting these goals would take the wind out of the Palestinian nationalists' sails and facilitate the formal annexation of occupied Palestinian territories. Begin and Sharon anticipated that the ensuing flood of Palestinians from Lebanon and the West Bank would topple the Jordanian Hashemite monarchy, allowing the territory to form into a new Palestinian state outside the borders of Zionist Israel.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ Cobban, 66.

¹⁰⁶ Robert Fisk, *Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2001), 99–100.

¹⁰⁷ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 348–349.

¹⁰⁸ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 395.

¹⁰⁹ Shlaim, 395.

¹¹⁰ Shlaim, 395–396.

Five months before the Israeli invasion, Sharon flew to visit the Lebanese Christian factions led by Gemayel to assess the plight of the Christians and determine what their contributions would be in his proposed paradigm shift.¹¹¹ After the assassination of the Israeli statesmen—which served as the *casus belli*—Israel invaded Lebanon, formalized its alliance with the Christian factions under Gemayel, and worked to establish its planned regime change.¹¹² After Israel completed its siege of Beirut and collaborated with Christian militias to occupy the city, Israel received much international scrutiny when one of its client militias massacred an estimated 3,000 Palestinian and Lebanese women and children in the villages of Shatila and Sabra. Making matters worse, the villages had been surrounded by Israeli tanks and the massacres conducted with the explicit knowledge of Israeli commanders. Sharon and Eitan were even found personally responsible for the massacre in an Israeli fact-finding audit. The Maronite Christians alleged this was partly an honor-based response to the massacre at Damour six years earlier.¹¹³ In a biography of his father, Gilad Sharon articulates the Israeli perspective on this massacre. He explains that massacres are part of the fabric of Lebanese history. He explains that the Lebanese civil war involved an escalating series of challenges and responses involving massacres between Christians and Palestinians and that the massacres at Sabra and Shatila were just another notch on the stick of violent actions in the country.¹¹⁴

Israel and the United States have had a special relationship since President Harry S. Truman announced U.S. recognition of the newly formed Israeli state in 1946.¹¹⁵ Political support in the United States has much to do with the Western perception of Israel as a lone, Western-styled democratic state, standing as a stalwart against the monolithic forces of radical Islam and Arabic Nationalism, certainly an example of the sort of in-group

¹¹¹ Sharon, *Life of a Leader*, 397–398.

¹¹² Fisk, *Pity the Nation*, 382–383.

¹¹³ Fisk, *Pity the Nation*, 141; and Eisenberg, “History Revisited or Revamped,” 387.

¹¹⁴ Sharon, *Life of a Leader*, 393.

¹¹⁵ Michael T. Benson, *Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel* (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Publishing, 1997), 167.

bias that Tajfel predicts when discussing social identity and group conflict.¹¹⁶ In the United States, there is particularly strong support among evangelical Christians and Jews who actively lobby in favor of a pro-Israeli foreign policy.¹¹⁷ The patronage line between the United States and Israel is so strong, in fact, that other democratic states receive only a fraction of the military and economic support the United States gives to Israel every year.¹¹⁸ Israel is the top recipient of aid from the United States, receiving roughly \$3 billion per year despite being a high-income country.¹¹⁹

Leading up to the 1982 war in Lebanon, the United States had been working closely with Israel and the regional Arab states to reduce the violence that would further destabilize the region.¹²⁰ When the PLO and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine became too bold in their attacks, hijackings, and revolutionary behavior, the United States worked with King Hussein and Israel to prop up the Jordanian monarchy and expel the Palestinian leadership from the country.¹²¹ U.S. patronage for Israel was not just morality- or alliance-based; it was also directed against increasing Soviet influence in the region. U.S. support for Israel increased in tandem with Soviet support for neighboring Arab states.¹²² The United States provided many of the weapons and materiel used during Operation Peace for Galilee, and some were even used in ways that ran counter to U.S. intentions.¹²³ During the operation, U.S. President Reagan and Ambassador Philip Habib expressed in phone calls to Begin and Sharon that the time frame for IDF operations in

¹¹⁶ Williams, “Moral Support, Strategic Reasoning, or Democratic Politics,” 7–9; and Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 104–105.

¹¹⁷ John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Middle East Policy* 13, no. 3 (2006): 41, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2006.00260.x>. Examples include the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations and AIPAC; former majority leaders in the U.S. House of Representatives, Tom DeLay and Dick Armey; and evangelicals, such as Pat Robertson, Ralph Reed, and Jerry Falwell. These evangelicals believe that supporting Zionist expansion is God’s will.

¹¹⁸ Williams, “Moral Support, Strategic Reasoning, or Democratic Politics,” 7–9.

¹¹⁹ “U.S. Foreign Aid by Country: Israel,” United States Agency for International Development, accessed September 5, 2018, <https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/ISR>.

¹²⁰ Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, 49.

¹²¹ Cobban, 50.

¹²² Williams, “Moral Support, Strategic Reasoning, or Democratic Politics,” 7–9.

¹²³ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 607.

Lebanon was limited and that they expected certain concessions from their client state in any peace agreement. The United States hoped that Lebanon could be an avenue for broader peace in the region. Israel, as a client, was forced to compromise and walk a line somewhere between its desires and those of the United States.¹²⁴ Many U.S. allies in the Arab world were upset that the United States had allegedly given Israel approval for operations in Lebanon. They were angry that the United States had not stopped Israel from using American-made cluster munitions¹²⁵

At the conclusion of hostilities, the Reagan administration agreed with the Begin cabinet that the PLO was not a desirable organization and that the Palestinians should not have an independent state.¹²⁶ However, the administration did tailor its proposed peace plan to be amenable to neighboring Arab states to blunt criticism of U.S. support for the invasion. The United States consulted directly with Jordan about a peace plan that put Palestinians in the West Bank under the Hashemite Kingdom to gain favor with King Hussein. The strategy of considering Palestinian perspectives in the Reagan peace plan succeeded in garnering a positive response from Arab states. The plan, however, left out an explicit role for the PLO in the peace process.¹²⁷

The role of the Cold War was crucial in shaping the patronage links between the United States and Israel. During the Cold War, Egypt had been a key ally of Moscow in the Middle Eastern theater.¹²⁸ The U.S.S.R. was a major player in many of Nasser's industrialization projects and the primary source of military training and equipment for the Egyptian army.¹²⁹ The Soviet Union had been cultivating relations with Cairo and

¹²⁴ Williams, "Moral Support, Strategic Reasoning, or Democratic Politics," 7–9; and Sharon, *Life of a Leader*, 402–421.

¹²⁵ Michael Scheuer, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006), 4.

¹²⁶ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 603.

¹²⁷ Tessler, 607.

¹²⁸ Hassan Elbahtimy, "Allies at Arm's Length: Redefining Egyptian-Soviet Relations in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (February 2018): 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2018.1438893>.

¹²⁹ Elbahtimy, 1.

Damascus as part of a broader global balance with the United States. The strategic importance of the region and a desire for warm-water naval bases in the Mediterranean were part of the overall Soviet strategy against the United States.¹³⁰ The United States also saw the Middle East as a strategic interest in balancing against the U.S.S.R. Bringing Arab states into the West's defense network would give NATO valuable staging grounds against Soviet threats. However, U.S. interests in Israel prevented better relations with the Arab regimes in the region.¹³¹

As the Egyptian–Soviet alliance evolved, the two nations used the U.S.–Israeli relationship to bring other Arab states into their fold.¹³² Due in part to its support for Israel, the United States could not bring certain Arab nations into its security arrangement. The development of inter-continental ballistic missiles made the Middle East less crucial as a staging ground and allowed America to focus more on Israel as a strategic partner.¹³³ An escalation in the support for Israel began with the Kennedy administration, which saw Israel as a crucial part of its containment policy in the Middle East. As Egypt deployed its military into the Yemen War, the U.S. reacted by selling increasing amounts of weapons to Israel.¹³⁴

The Six-Day War in 1967 solidified the strategic partnership between Israel and the United States. After Israel's overwhelming success over its Arab neighbors, U.S. aid increased by over 450 percent. Both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon continued to escalate weapons support as a counter-balance to Soviet arms given to Israel's Arab neighbors.¹³⁵ The logic of this Cold War strategy was that helping Israel keep military dominance would prevent the Arabs and their Soviet patrons from taking the territory by force.¹³⁶

¹³⁰ Elbahtimy, 2.

¹³¹ Williams, "Moral Support, Strategic Reasoning, or Democratic Politics," 20.

¹³² Williams, 21.

¹³³ Williams, 21.

¹³⁴ Williams, 21.

¹³⁵ Williams, 21–22.

¹³⁶ Williams, 22.

Israel's efforts to save the Hashemite regime in Jordan during its civil war further convinced the United States of the strategic importance of the Israeli relationship.¹³⁷ It was not until the Yom Kippur War and the arrival of the Carter administration that U.S. shipments of military aid were questioned and pressure was applied to Israel to find some common ground with its neighbors, a position that eased after domestic pro-Israeli interest groups applied sufficient political pressure.¹³⁸

The Reagan administration performed an about-face and focused on increasing the strategic relationship with Israel. During the Reagan presidency, a formal agreement to increase strategic planning and cooperation was signed between the United States and Israel, and increasing military supplies were provided. Israel's use of these supplies in the invasion of Lebanon came back to haunt the United States.¹³⁹ As the Cold War came to an end, critics increasingly questioned the relationship between the United States and Israel, and the interests of the Palestinians and Arab states entered the public debate, but the decades-long dynamic had already left an impact.¹⁴⁰ Communism may have been gone, but the narratives created to support the Cold War discourse were already cemented.¹⁴¹ So, too, were the narratives created about the United States and Israel as occupiers and enemies of the Arab and Islamic world.¹⁴²

D. LIMITED GOODS

As the discussion shifts to limited goods, the reader should note the scarcity of the land each side claims makes limited goods a crucial factor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Land-holdings in the Israel/Palestine region have been very much a zero-sum

¹³⁷ Williams, 22.

¹³⁸ Arlene Lazarowitz, "Ethnic Influence and American Foreign Policy: American Jewish Leaders and President Jimmy Carter," *Schofar: Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies* 29, no. 1 (2010): 124, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/shofar/v029/29.1.lazarowitz.html>; and Williams, "Moral Support, Strategic Reasoning, or Democratic Politics," 22–23.

¹³⁹ Williams, "Moral Support, Strategic Reasoning, or Democratic Politics," 23.

¹⁴⁰ Williams, 23.

¹⁴¹ Randolph C. Kent, "Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy since the Cold War," *International Affairs* 55, no. 2 (April 1979): 338, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2616388>.

¹⁴² Kent, 338.

game. When one party has controlled the land and its economic output, the other has seen it as a loss of limited goods and honor. After the 1967 war, Israel occupied all of the territories that were held by Arabs as part of the 1947 UN partition plan. Both Israel and Jordan saw the West Bank as critical to their economic success. Both coveted the land so much that they sought to actively undermine Palestinian nationalists in the area by working directly with local community leaders when they held the West Bank.¹⁴³ Jordan controlled the West Bank from 1948 to 1967 as part of broader Trans-Jordanian Kingdom. Under this system, large landholders benefited from exporting their products to the East Bank and holding key positions in the Jordanian regime, but the majority of Palestinians merely subsisted while the rest of the region grew economically.¹⁴⁴

When Israel took over the West Bank, it also worked to erode any notion of a Palestinian nationalist movement. It worked with local leaders and attempted to incorporate the West Bank into its overall economy, albeit in a manner that primarily benefited Israeli farmers and factories. Palestinians living in the West Bank were allowed to participate in the overall economy, work for Israelis, and buy Israeli products. Israeli products were subsidized in the West Bank and helped local Israeli industry at the expense of Palestinian producers and farmers. Israelis were able to sell their excess products at prices that were unaffordable for locals without subsidies. Palestinians worked for Israeli firms at wages that most Israelis would have deemed unlivable; this allowed Israeli firms to thrive in the decade and a half preceding the invasion of Lebanon. It is estimated that the Israeli economic conditions in the occupied territories mitigated the cost of occupation and may have even generated a positive net worth for the Israeli treasury.¹⁴⁵ Holding the land, employing a cheap workforce, and partnering with local leaders over quasi-national figures allowed Israel to increase its economic output and decrease Palestinian nation-building in the region—strategic advantages that served as power and honor losses to the PLO.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 359.

¹⁴⁴ Smith, 360.

¹⁴⁵ Smith, 361.

¹⁴⁶ Smith, 359–361.

Acquiring the occupied territories and utilizing cheap Arab labor also had another effect. The Oriental Jews who were neither European immigrants nor descendants of immigrants began to see their socioeconomic status rise.¹⁴⁷ They no longer did the menial work that Palestinians were doing, and they gained the benefits of owning capital, being appointed to increasingly important government positions, and garnering political influence. They were not about to see Israel surrender the land back to Arabs and lose the status they had gained.¹⁴⁸ Oriental Jews originally saw the European Jews as having an unfair share of economic and political power in the Israeli establishment. They were rapidly closing this gap and hardened the Israeli mentality toward giving back the occupied territories. Oriental Jews supported Begin in his calls for holding the Israeli-named territories of Judea and Samaria for all time.¹⁴⁹ They provided Begin the support he needed to win the 1977 elections and encouraged Sharon to push for more Israeli settlements in the West Bank.¹⁵⁰ As Oriental Jews gained majority status in Israel and their ideology became mainstream, it set Israel on the path to invading Lebanon in 1982. Land, nationalism, and religion blended into a political ideology of a greater Israel with hegemony in the region.¹⁵¹

To facilitate the seizure of lands, Israel enacted absentee laws, which allowed Israelis to settle in lands that were held by Arabs who had fled the occupation.¹⁵² Israeli leaders saw land and expansion as so important to their cause that they even resorted to extra-legal expulsion of entire villages of Israeli Arabs.¹⁵³ Many Arab communities were concentrated in Galilee along the Lebanese border, which Israel saw as crucial to its

¹⁴⁷ Nadav Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1978), 90–91; and Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 361.

¹⁴⁸ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 361.

¹⁴⁹ *The Colonization of the West Bank Territories by Israel: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, Judiciary Committee, Senate 95th Cong., 1st sess., October 17–18, 1977*, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=479240>.

¹⁵⁰ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 362.

¹⁵¹ Smith, 362.

¹⁵² Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 362; and Senate, *Colonization of the West Bank*.

¹⁵³ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 362.

national security. After the 1977 election of Begin and the Likud party, Judaization of Galilee increased in pace and scope. Where Arab villages could not be razed and replaced with Israeli settlements, the most valuable land was expropriated for Jewish development to break up the “Arabness” of the area.¹⁵⁴ Israeli policy focused on fragmenting and eroding the Arab population. Essentially, the Israelis tried to reshape the identity of the occupied territories into a new Israeli state identity. The national fund paid for the expansion of this identity through building settlements.¹⁵⁵ Israeli settlements received practically free electricity, roads, water, and sewage while Arab communities went without the most basic services. This strategy succeeded in changing the demographics and identity of the occupied region but at the cost of further alienating the Arab Palestinians and pushing their more desperate population into the hands of the PLO and other Palestinian nationalist movements. When Palestinians protested Israeli land grabs, the Israelis often fired on the protestors, killing some and pushing many more to seek revenge for their honor loss.¹⁵⁶

Begin and Sharon were so dogmatic in their view of land as a limited good for Israeli Jews that they declared their own Arab citizens “foreigners on state lands.”¹⁵⁷ Sharon announced an offensive to reduce the threat of these foreigners through aggressive Judaization of Galilee. By 1980, more radical political parties had built on Begin and Sharon’s views and were actively calling for the expulsion of all Arabs, whether citizens or otherwise, from Israel. These dogmatic views unified Israelis but did the same for their Palestinian and Arab counterparts. In 1980, the Israeli government took the expropriation of lands from Arabs a step further and seized some 500,000 acres of land for settlement by Israeli Jews.¹⁵⁸ Running parallel to this was the World Zionist Organization’s strategy of purchasing massive tracts of private land from Arabs.¹⁵⁹ Israel was able to rapidly increase

¹⁵⁴ Smith, 362–363.

¹⁵⁵ Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally*, 179.

¹⁵⁶ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 362–363.

¹⁵⁷ Smith, 363.

¹⁵⁸ Smith, 364.

¹⁵⁹ Janet Abu-Lughod, “Israeli Settlements in Occupied Arab Lands: Conquest to Colony,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 11, no. 2 (Winter 1982): 31, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2536268>.

its presence in the occupied lands, erode Arab identity, and stabilize its control of the occupied territories.¹⁶⁰

Israel's annexation and establishment of settlements in the occupied territories, specifically in Galilee, were part of a parallel plan in Lebanon to establish hegemony in the broader region.¹⁶¹ Along with effectively reducing any Palestinian national movements within the occupied territories, Israel formed alliances with Christian Maronites in Lebanon, hoping to catapult them into power and deny the PLO a base of operations. Israeli hoped to quash the PLO and finally extinguish any chance the Palestinians might have had for self-determination within the *Eretz Israel* (greater Israel). To the Israeli leadership at the time, the only way to permanently secure Israel from PLO subversion was to force it out of neighboring Lebanon and put into power a friendly client state run by Christian Maronites.¹⁶² By 1981, Israel had dramatically increased its collaboration with Lebanese Christians against Syria and the PLO. After Palestinian assassins murdered the Israeli ambassador to Britain, Israel had the pretext it needed for invasion and finally set into motion the plan to permanently secure its land and establish hegemony in the region.¹⁶³

Israel was wildly successful in achieving its goal of pushing the PLO out of Lebanon and effectively dismantling much of its political and military capabilities.¹⁶⁴ There were, however, unintended consequences for Operation Peace for Galilee. In addition to the strong international criticism Israel received, it also undermined the very clients it had intended to install as leaders of the new regime in Lebanon.¹⁶⁵ By overtly supporting the Maronites and conducting such a massive invasion into Lebanese territory, Israel polarized many of the other Lebanese identities into the camps of its enemies. The

¹⁶⁰ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 365.

¹⁶¹ Smith, 365–366.

¹⁶² Todd W. Lyons, “Military Intervention in Identity Group Conflicts” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2000), 31.

¹⁶³ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 365–371; and Lyons, “Military Intervention in Identity Group Conflicts,” 31–32.

¹⁶⁴ Lyons, “Military Intervention in Identity Group Conflicts,” 31–32.

¹⁶⁵ Lyons, 34.

Maronites were unable to build an interconfessional coalition and dominate the country as Begin and Sharon had initially intended. Additionally, while the PLO was no longer a threat to the Israeli border with Lebanon, Iran had built a strong presence in Lebanon by sponsoring client organizations such as Hezbollah, which eventually became a dominant group in Lebanon.¹⁶⁶

After the peace negotiations that removed the PLO from Lebanon and allowed the IDF to exit Beirut, President Reagan expressed his continued support for Israel and his hope for a new peace process.¹⁶⁷ He said that Israeli settlements were not necessary for the defense of Israel and that the Israelis should withdraw from the occupied territories, including Eastern Jerusalem.¹⁶⁸ He proposed a plan that gave Palestinians sovereignty from Israel but was tailored toward the nation-state hermeneutic of the West and would place them under the leadership of the Jordanian monarchy.¹⁶⁹ Begin and his cabinet responded that Israel would not enter into further negotiations with any party—with Jerusalem as the undividable capital of the Israeli state—and that the further creation of settlements in the occupied territories was an “inalienable Jewish right.”¹⁷⁰ These statements were followed with a formal vote by the Knesset to reject the American peace plan. Furthermore, Begin’s cabinet approved the creation of 42 additional settlements and allocated \$18.5 million toward the construction of Jewish communities in the occupied territories.¹⁷¹ With the PLO removed from Lebanon, Israel continued its policy of Judaization in Israel/Palestine.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁶ Lyons, 34.

¹⁶⁷ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 600.

¹⁶⁸ Tessler, 603.

¹⁶⁹ Tessler, 603.

¹⁷⁰ Tessler, 604.

¹⁷¹ Tessler, 605.

¹⁷² Tessler, 605.

E. CONCLUSION

In summary, Israel's history with the PLO is one of cyclical conflict. Israeli leaders in 1982 acted to eliminate an enemy they believed could not be placated without serious loss of limited goods and honor among their constituents.¹⁷³ Israel exists as an island, surrounded by what it views as a sea of hostile out-groups; it, therefore, aligns with in-groups both below and above its patronage line. Land, water, honor, and security are all things that exist as limited goods to Israel. These findings depict the viewpoints and strategies of Israeli leaders leading up to and during Operation Peace for Galilee.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 361–362.

¹⁷⁴ Williams, “Moral Support, Strategic Reasoning, or Democratic Politics,” 7–9.

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IV. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND THE PALESTINIAN PERSPECTIVE

There are many sub-hermeneutics within Palestinian society. Palestinians who are members or sympathizers of the PLO do not see themselves as part of a terrorist organization but rather a liberation movement.¹⁷⁵ Palestinians see the use of Israeli firebombs and the shelling of schools in Beirut as terrorism. They define themselves as victims and freedom fighters trying to throw off the yoke of colonialists.¹⁷⁶ This chapter focuses on general and readily identifiable issues involving the PLO around the time of Operation Peace for Galilee.

A. CHALLENGE-RESPONSE CYCLE

When Israel and the United States discuss Palestinian hostage-taking and hijackings, Palestinians argue that Israel hijacked the first plane in the Middle East when it forced a Syrian Airways flight to land and detained its passengers in 1954.¹⁷⁷ They point out the multiple massacres of Palestinians by Israel and its Christian clients in Lebanon, using weapons from a U.S. patron.¹⁷⁸ They conclude that Western discourse on terrorism is framed by a racist perspective that focuses only on Arabs and Muslims while ignoring the acts of Jews. Palestinians and their Arab-Muslim sympathizers believe that the Western hermeneutic is a construct of colonialism—that the oppressed are delegatized, dehumanized as terrorists, and deemed backward, evil, cowardly, and inferior.¹⁷⁹

Meanwhile, Israelis market their version of reality to the West and gain military and developmental support to further suppress Palestinians. In this line of thinking, members of the PLO act because they believe they cannot effectively negotiate for lost lands, honor, and sovereignty from a position of weakness. From their perspective, they

¹⁷⁵ Barakat, “Liberation or Terrorism,” 133.

¹⁷⁶ Barakat, 133.

¹⁷⁷ Barakat, 135.

¹⁷⁸ Barakat, 135.

¹⁷⁹ Barakat, 135.

are using the same tactics Israel has used against them.¹⁸⁰ This section considers the Palestinian hermeneutic by first assessing the history of the challenge-response cycle in Palestine, starting around the time of the PLO's creation.

Many leading members of the constituent groups that comprise the PLO trace their roots back to the failure of Arab states to respond to the Israeli Zionist forces that mobilized to create the state of Israel.¹⁸¹ Men like George Habash and Hani al-Hindi—observing the lack of cohesion among Arab states and the failed attempt to apply Jordanian, Syrian, and Egyptian interests to Palestinians—felt embittered about Pan-Arabism.¹⁸² They set out to attack Israeli and Western interests as a way to punish and overturn the decisions of Arab leaders to make peace with the West. These actions directly challenged Israeli leaders and required kinetic responses to show their constituents Israel could defend the public.¹⁸³

The Arab nationalism that Nasser mobilized sought to liberate the Arabs in Palestine but saw a broader Arab unity and freedom from Western interests as a prerequisite for Palestinian independence from Israel.¹⁸⁴ Most of the Arab Nationalist Movement's efforts and military resources were, therefore, directed at broader objectives than liberation for the Palestinian people.¹⁸⁵ When the Arab Nationalist Movement lost momentum and broke down in favor of individual national interests, the Palestinians needed an individual movement focused solely on their interests.¹⁸⁶

Fatah and the PLO rose to prominence as the Arab Nationalist Movement fell apart.¹⁸⁷ Fatah was created in 1957 but did not fully take shape until 1962. One of Fatah's narratives told of Arab nations not acting in the interest of Palestinians but in their own

¹⁸⁰ Barakat, 137.

¹⁸¹ Şāyigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 72.

¹⁸² Şāyigh, 72.

¹⁸³ Şāyigh, 72.

¹⁸⁴ Şāyigh, 75.

¹⁸⁵ Şāyigh, 76.

¹⁸⁶ Şāyigh, 76–77.

¹⁸⁷ Şāyigh, 87.

interests, showing the shifting mentality toward a Palestinian nationalist movement.¹⁸⁸ Headed by Yasser Arafat, Fatah intended to force a favorable outcome for Palestinians—a move initially scorned by Arab states—by attacking Israeli and Western interests.¹⁸⁹ The PLO, on the other hand, was formed by the heads of 13 Arab states at the 1964 Arab Summit in Cairo.¹⁹⁰ Its first leader, Ahmad Shuqayri, was tasked with establishing plans for a Palestinian group that would assist in the struggle against the Israeli state.¹⁹¹ However, many Palestinians began to see their neighboring Arab states wanting to restrain the PLO's actions against Israel out of fear that the PLO might provoke a war.¹⁹² This encouraged the growth of guerrilla movements outside the control of the PLO. Arafat's Fatah was one of the largest of these more active guerrilla groups.¹⁹³

Shortly after the PLO's creation, Arafat determined that the PLO would not make any headway against Israel and that Shuqayri was a puppet of Nassir. Fatah established a formal militia and began to conduct commando raids against Israel.¹⁹⁴ The humiliating defeat of the Arab states in the Six-Day War and the subsequent peace settlements further reinforced the belief of many Palestinians that the Arab states could not deal with the Israeli problem—that a solution for Palestinian Arabs had to be initiated by Palestinian groups.¹⁹⁵ Fatah, on the other hand, continued its rise to prominence. It continued to facilitate attacks against Israel, and in 1968, Arafat attempted to establish a base of operations in the West Bank.¹⁹⁶ Israel responded by decimating his group, forcing Fatah to flee across the river into Jordan.¹⁹⁷ Fatah had to make a stand to recover its standing. In what has become a

¹⁸⁸ Şāyigh, 88.

¹⁸⁹ Şāyigh, 89.

¹⁹⁰ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 373.

¹⁹¹ Tessler, 373.

¹⁹² Tessler, 375–376.

¹⁹³ Tessler, 376.

¹⁹⁴ Tessler, 376–377.

¹⁹⁵ Andrew W. Terrill, “The Political Mythology of the Battle of Karamah,” *Middle East Journal* 55, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 95, ProQuest; and Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 423.

¹⁹⁶ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 424.

¹⁹⁷ Tessler, 425.

defining moment in Fatah's history, it fought against the Israelis in the Jordanian town of Karameh.¹⁹⁸

While Fatah viewed its operations as a resistance movement, Israel saw them as cowardly terrorism.¹⁹⁹ The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had crushed Fatah's operations in the West Bank and now sought to permanently extinguish its movement in Jordan. Fatah located its command center in Karameh after retreating from the West Bank. The IDF decided to target Karameh three days after the Palestinians blew up a school bus in Israel.²⁰⁰ Jordanian intelligence units learned of the pending attack and warned Fatah, but Fatah chose to stand its ground. On March 21, 1968, 1,500 IDF forces engaged 300 Palestinian rebels.²⁰¹ Twenty-eight Israelis died, and 90 more were wounded. Despite losing 170 Fatah fighters and 100 Jordanian soldiers, the battle was seen as a victory for Fatah and the Palestinians.²⁰² Karameh became a recruiting tool for Fatah and many other Palestinian resistance groups. Palestinian narratives portrayed the battle as a band of heroes fighting bravely against the Israeli military.²⁰³ Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and other organizations under the PLO saw major gains in recruitment and bases of operation across the East Bank of the Jordan.²⁰⁴ The number of recruits was so numerous that many had to be turned away.²⁰⁵ This battle allowed Fatah and Arafat to gain enough influence to replace Al Shuqayri as the head of the PLO.²⁰⁶ Arafat and his followers argued that the PLO was created as an arm of the neighboring Arab states, and Al Shuqayri was not acting in the interests of Palestinians but of the broader Arab community. Arafat and leaders of other guerrilla groups feared Shuqayri would accept the

¹⁹⁸ Tessler, 425.

¹⁹⁹ Tessler, 425.

²⁰⁰ Terrill, "The Political Mythology of the Battle of Karameh," 95–96; and Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 425.

²⁰¹ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 425.

²⁰² Tessler, 425–426.

²⁰³ Terrill, "The Political Mythology of the Battle of Karameh," 91.

²⁰⁴ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 426.

²⁰⁵ Terrill, "The Political Mythology of the Battle of Karameh," 102.

²⁰⁶ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 422–426.

peace that Egypt had accepted after the Six-Day War. By April of 1968, Fatah had gained sufficient influence to have Arafat appointed as head of the PLO.²⁰⁷

The Fourth Palestinian National Council occurred in July, and Arafat consolidated his role in the PLO. Thirty-eight of 100 seats on the PLO council went to Fatah, 10 went to George Habash's PFLP, and the remaining were allocated to the most active members of the PLO.²⁰⁸ The PLO charter was re-defined to reflect Arafat's more active intentions for a Palestinian nationalist liberation movement.²⁰⁹ Article 9 declared the only way to liberate Palestine was through armed struggle. Article 21 stated that the Palestinian armed revolution rejected all solutions that did not include the total liberation of Palestine. By 1970, the change in the PLO had been consolidated, and command operations against Israelis became more centrally unified.²¹⁰

Another important development occurred in 1970; an escalating series of raids between PLO elements in Jordan and retaliatory strikes from Israel increasingly burdened the Hashemite monarchy.²¹¹ Additionally, King Hussein began to view the power of the PLO in Jordan as a threat. Elements of the PLO had started challenging the Jordanian regime in 1969.²¹² By September 1970, the PLO, led by PLFP elements, had attempted to assassinate Hussein and had hijacked four commercial airlines.²¹³ The monarchy saw these attacks as a direct threat to Jordanian sovereignty, and the response was an overwhelming series of assaults on Palestinian strongholds in Jordan through 1971. The PLO had been forced out of Jordan and sought refuge in Lebanon.²¹⁴

²⁰⁷ Tessler, 427.

²⁰⁸ Terrill, "The Political Mythology of the Battle of Karamah," 103; and Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 428.

²⁰⁹ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 429.

²¹⁰ Tessler, 430.

²¹¹ Tessler, 456.

²¹² Tessler, 459.

²¹³ Tessler, 461–462.

²¹⁴ Tessler, 462–463.

As the PLO began to concentrate in Southern Lebanon after the Six-Day War and its re-organization under Arafat, attacks on Israel intensified. It necessitated responses from the Israeli government, which politically could not afford to sit idly by and wanted to discourage Palestinian violence. These Israeli attacks further increased the internalization of the Palestinian cause in the eyes of Lebanese Muslims, who began to act increasingly as patrons of the Palestinians.²¹⁵

When Israel seized Gaza, the West Bank, the Sinai, and the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War, it was perceived by Palestinians and articulated by Arafat to be proof of Zionist colonialist intentions for the region.²¹⁶ According to Shlaim, when Israel officially annexed the Golan Heights in 1974, “it sent a message to the world that there would be no further Israeli territorial withdrawals after Sinai, erased any hopes of the previously promised Palestinian autonomy, and set the region aflame.”²¹⁷ The concept of Palestinian statehood passed to the proto-state led by the PLO in southern Lebanon.²¹⁸ The PLO had been carrying out attacks and hijackings against Israel for quite some time. As the PLO gained recruits, capability, and respect, it attracted increasing ire from Israel.²¹⁹

Israeli leaders like Sharon and Begin sought ways to remove the PLO from Lebanon and away from their power base in the refugee camps.²²⁰ When an Israeli ambassador was gunned down by Palestinians in June 1982, Israel found its justification for a war to destroy the PLO.²²¹ The man behind the assassination was Abu Nidal. He had been expelled from the PLO in 1974, but this did not stop Israel from using the assassination as an excuse to target the organization. Israel launched a series of massive air strikes on PLO assets in Beirut; the PLO responded by shelling Galilee. Until this exchange occurred, there had

²¹⁵ Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, 63–65.

²¹⁶ Scheuer, *Through Our Enemies' Eyes*, 4–5.

²¹⁷ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 393–394.

²¹⁸ Shlaim, 393.

²¹⁹ Shlaim, 395.

²²⁰ Shlaim, 395.

²²¹ Thomas Davis, *40 km into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987), 2.

been eight months of peace between Israel and Palestine. During those eight months, not a single Israeli had been attacked by the PLO in Galilee. To the PLO, the shaky premise of Operation Peace for Galilee was proof that Israel was trying to initiate more conflict.²²²

B. HONOR-SHAME PARADIGM

Honor and shame are central tenets of Arab society that permeate Arab cultures throughout the broader region, from nomadic Bedouins to the wealthier urban areas. Western notions of society, governance, and jurisprudence are foreign and are not widely accepted among many Middle Eastern cultures.²²³ Patron-client relationships have strong implications for conflict and peace in the Middle East. Parties that are shamed seek justice through their networks, often guided by political and religious leaders. The concept of honor is so endemic to Middle Eastern cultures that it manifests in formal state legal systems. In Jordan, honor is recognized as an extenuating factor in murder trials. Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon all have reduced or eliminated sentences for murders related to the concepts of honor and shame.²²⁴

Revenge is a natural byproduct of honor and shame in the broader region. Murders of family or community members by outsiders must be avenged to restore honor to the family or tribe. Failing to avenge a fallen member of the in-group is widely seen as dishonorable behavior from family and community members. These traditions directly contrast the Western notions of justice—those forms of justice directly tied to Westphalian jurisprudence—which Israel and U.S. backers follow.²²⁵

Honor and shame are intimately tied to the Arab community's concept of *hamula*, a structure of hyperextended family and clan lines. The hamula is the core ideal for which all community members owe their loyalty. When an affront to one member of the hamula occurs, it is an honor challenge to every member of that community, one that requires a

²²² Davis, 2.

²²³ Pely, "When Honor Trumps Basic Needs," 209.

²²⁴ Pely, 210.

²²⁵ Pely, 210.

response. If community members do not take revenge, they are dishonored and increase the shame felt by their clan. The only two options are immediate revenge or long ceremonial forgiveness involving religious or political elders.²²⁶ Therefore, when the Christian Maronites committed mass rape and murder in the Palestinian villages of Sabra and Shatila, any Arab or Muslim who identified with those individuals was honor-bound to respond violently to the Maronites and their Israeli patrons. By extension, the United States was implicated in this massacre because it was Israel's patron, which put the Maronites indirectly into the U.S. patronage line.²²⁷

Anthropologists believe the continued prominence of honor, shame, and revenge in the Israel/Palestine region are due to the nomadic herder communities from which modern Arabs have descended. Honor challenge responses were crucial for herder communities in building a reputation for violence to deter theft and offense.²²⁸ This history starkly contrasts that of the Western system of justice to which the Israelis and their patrons subscribe. Europeans, Americans, and most Israelis are descended from farmers who did not need such reputations. If someone steals cows, a herding community could starve to death. If someone steals crops, a farming community could plant more.²²⁹

Arguably, honor and shame were major reasons Arafat and the PLO could not fully negotiate a peace with Israel in the years leading up to the 1982 invasion.²³⁰ In the late 1970s, President Jimmy Carter attempted to bring the PLO into peace talks with Israel. Carter hoped to have the PLO recognize UN Resolution 242, which declared the Israeli state's right to exist as a separate entity without threats or acts of violence and called for an eventual withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories it occupied after the 1967 war. Arafat could not accept the resolution without losing honor because many Palestinians believed the United States did not have the political will to force Israel to withdraw from

²²⁶ Pely, 211.

²²⁷ Pely, 211.

²²⁸ Pely, 214.

²²⁹ Pely, 214.

²³⁰ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 355.

the occupied territories, and the resolution referred to Palestinians not as a national entity but as refugees. The rejectionist constituency was too strong for Arafat to act without losing honor and legitimacy.²³¹ In the years before Operation Peace for Galilee, PLO elements saw themselves as further marginalized in the area when Egypt agreed to the Camp David Accords, made peace with Israel, and recognized its right to exist without the constant threat of war. Arafat attempted to search for peace options that involved Palestinian self-determination well into 1981, but escalating violence between the PLO and Israeli-supplied militias in Lebanon proved too much. By July, Israel and the PLO were raining bombs and rockets on each other, resulting in hundreds of dead civilians. Neither party could back down without a serious loss of honor. It took a U.S. envoy named Phillip Habib to negotiate a cease-fire, which proved short-lived. The assassination of an Israeli ambassador to Lebanon was too much for Begin and Sharon to ignore and served as the pretext for the invasion.²³²

When President Reagan sent Habib to negotiate a peace for the region, Sharon demanded the unconditional evacuation of the PLO from Beirut with the additional stipulation that all PLO members leave their arms behind. This demand was tantamount to unconditional surrender and a complete honor loss to the PLO. It attempted to mitigate its position by demanding a mutual disengagement and withdrawal by both major belligerents. When this was refused, the PLO attempted to obtain a UN declaration for the Palestinians' right to self-determination. The United States vetoed this proposal, forcing Arafat to settle for his final demand, a request that the United States guarantee the safety of civilians in Beirut. America agreed to the request. While this may have seemed a total loss, it allowed the PLO to withdraw with some honor intact because, as the underdog, it needed only to have the bare minimum of demands satisfied. When the PLO finally began its withdrawal on August 21, 1982, it did so with its weapons on full display, a signal to the world that it had not surrendered or submitted to the Israeli aggressor and its allies.²³³ The massacre at

²³¹ Smith, 355.

²³² Smith, 369.

²³³ Strindberg, "From the River to the Sea," 141.

Sabra and Shatila was a deep blow to the honor of PLO militants who had just evacuated Lebanon. The fact that the United States and its allies had pulled out peacekeeping forces just five days before led to deepening contempt for Israel and its U.S. patron.²³⁴

Arafat and his organization were at their weakest point; he sought solutions to which he would not have agreed before the expulsion from Lebanon. Arafat unveiled a peace plan with King Hussein that suggested a union between Jordan and the Palestinians without a requirement for Palestinian independence.²³⁵ This, combined with the shame of losing in Lebanon and the massacre at Sabra and Shatila, pushed Palestinian opposition groups like the PFLP and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine further into the hands of rejectionism, further weakening the PLO. Syria was tacitly supporting this breakaway movement to regain patronage over the Palestinian people. The rejectionists argued that Israel was winning in its effort to destroy the PLO and eliminate the Palestinian cause. The invasion of Lebanon had lasting consequences for Arafat's patronage line that ultimately led to his joining the peace process and cooperating with the United States, a move that effectively divided the Palestinian cause at the Oslo Accords.²³⁶

C. PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS

The patron-client relationships for the PLO were more complex and shifting than they were for Israel. This complexity was in part Arafat's design to ensure that the organization remained independent of other nation's prerogatives and focused on Palestinian national independence.²³⁷

The PLO came into existence at the Cairo Summit of the Arab League in 1964. The League sought to sponsor an organization that would represent the Palestinian people and work toward the liberation of their lands. However, leaders involved in this summit viewed the PLO very differently. Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser sponsored the creation of the PLO

²³⁴ Strindberg, 142.

²³⁵ Strindberg, 146.

²³⁶ Strindberg, 147.

²³⁷ Şāyigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 325.

to bring the group under his patronage. He hoped this would prevent Palestinians from provoking Israel into a conflict that would involve Egypt.²³⁸ The ties were initially so deep with Egypt that the PLO's first head, Ahmad al-Shuqayri, was known as "Nasser's man." Jordan's King Hussein viewed the PLO as a threat to his regime. At that time, 60 percent of his subjects were Palestinian as he still ruled the West Bank. When Shuqayri declared that Jordan and the West Bank were part of Palestine proper, Hussein banned the PLO from any activity in his country. Hussein saw the West Bank as a critical piece of his country's economy, and he feared the potential power of the Palestinians in his realm.²³⁹ Conversely, the Syrian regime, which was competing for influence with Egypt, felt that the PLO was not acting boldly enough. The Syrians attempted to bring Shuqayri under their patronage and sponsored Fatah aggression in the region. These Syrian power plays were a major contributor to the Six-Day War in 1967.²⁴⁰

Fatah was created in 1958, consisting primarily of Palestinians who had escaped to Gaza when Israel gained statehood. Its members were prominent in the Palestinian Students League while attending Cairo University in the 1950s and had close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.²⁴¹ While most Palestinian factions tied their group identity to George Habash's version of the Arab Nationalist Movement, which argued that the Palestinian liberation from Israel would occur after Arabs unified, Fatah believed that liberation had to come before Arab unity. This meant that military action precluded political unification. The recent Algerian revolution against France largely influenced this mindset.²⁴² The group closely identified with Franz Fanon, who argued that violence was the only way to cleanse the people of the shame of colonialism.²⁴³

²³⁸ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 270.

²³⁹ Smith, 270.

²⁴⁰ Smith, 271.

²⁴¹ Smith, 271.

²⁴² Smith, 272.

²⁴³ Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 37.

Syria's sponsorship of Fatah steered the latter group toward its first attacks on Israel, which targeted water diversion projects. Syria did not want a direct confrontation with Israel but sought revenge for Israeli attacks on its water diversion projects. By the end of 1965, Fatah had perpetrated nearly 40 attacks. The fact that Jordan and Egypt opposed these provocations further strengthened the patronage lines between Fatah and the Syrian Baathists.²⁴⁴

After Israel launched the Six-Day War in 1967 and defeated the Arab forces, Palestinians began to identify with Arafat's call for a unified Palestinian solution to the Israeli question. Now that Israel occupied all of Palestine and Arab nations no longer held parts, the sentiment of the masses shifted to Arafat's Palestinian nationalism and away from Arab nationalist leaders like George Habash. After the war ended, Arafat entered the occupied territories and began setting up recruitment and finance offices.²⁴⁵

After the War, Egypt's Nasser looked to regain influence in Palestine from the Syrians and recognized Arafat as the leader of the Palestinian people. Nasser offered Fatah and the PLO arms and money. He even went as far as inviting Arafat on a trip to the U.S.S.R. Jordan sought some middle ground and began to work tacitly with Arafat, the PLO, and Fatah. These moves shifted the Palestinian patronage role from Arab-state leaders to Arafat. By 1969, Arafat was made the leader of the PLO, and Fatah gained a majority of the seats in the organization. This new relationship meant more attacks on Israel were coming out of Jordanian territory, inviting a large Israeli military response into the town of Karamah, Jordan. This temporarily strengthened the patronage lines between King Hussein and the PLO, whose members were viewed as heroes among Arabs for killing members of the occupier out-group, despite having lost the battle. Meanwhile, George Habash created a rival group to the PLO, the PFLP, which itself later broke into four separate groups. This factionalism became part of the fabric of the PLO. The PLO became a loose patronage coordinator over several competing client groups. The PLO itself was a

²⁴⁴ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 272.

²⁴⁵ Said Aburish, *From Defender to Dictator* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1999), 70–96.

client to Egypt and Syria while it focused its financing efforts on private donors to avoid getting too attached to any one Arab nation's interests.²⁴⁶

By 1969, Palestinian refugees living in Southern Lebanon constituted 14 percent of the Lebanese population. Fearing this rise in the Muslim population would challenge the antiquated census-based unity, the Christian Maronite-dominated government repressed the Palestinians. Lebanese Muslims who identified with the Palestinians came to their aid, and that same year, Lebanon granted Palestinians autonomy in Southern Lebanon.²⁴⁷ The patronage lines between King Hussein and the PLO were broken when Jordan signed a cease-fire with Israel in August 1970. Jordanian and Palestinian forces took to fighting in the streets, and in the end, the PLO was banished from Jordan. The group took refuge in Lebanon and began exercising leadership over the Palestinian refugees there.²⁴⁸

The PLO continued to increase its influence and wealth in Southern Lebanon through the 1970s. In 1974, the Arab Summit recognized the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” and granted it the right to establish an independent national authority.²⁴⁹ One month later Arafat was invited to address the UN General Assembly. Arafat used this opportunity to lend the world the Palestinian perspective of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He shared a message that unified Palestinians of all creeds under his cause.²⁵⁰ According to Thomas Friedman, “He spoke to the lowest common denominator in Palestinian politics, something which all Palestinians from the far left to the far right, from those living under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to those living as refugees spread out all across the world would accept—the principle that Palestine was Arab land—and the aim of Zionists to establish a permanent state there could

²⁴⁶ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 302–308; Said Aburish, *Nasser: The Last Arab* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004), 289–292; and Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, 45–49.

²⁴⁷ Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, 63–65.

²⁴⁸ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 316.

²⁴⁹ Smith, 341.

²⁵⁰ “UN Arafat - 1974.”

never be accepted.”²⁵¹ Every Palestinian, whether Christian, Muslim, atheist, or communist, could relate to this message and associated with Arafat’s patronage line. This appeal filled the ranks of Arafat’s guerrilla army and fed his bureaucracy.²⁵² Arafat and his PLO could be internalized as part of the Palestinian experience because he shared their frustrations with the world and articulated their hope to return to their lost homes and land.²⁵³

Arafat’s strategy of publicity-grabbing terrorism against the “Israeli occupiers” worked well in furthering his patronage lines. Muslim and Arab communities throughout the region lost hope in an external military solution and began large-scale financing of Arafat and the PLO. He built such a large support network that he was able to provide \$200 million per annum in welfare payments, scholarships, newspapers, radio stations, healthcare, weapons, education, and salaries to his clients. At the PLO’s peak, 60,000 families depended on it economically.²⁵⁴

When, in the late 1970s, Egypt’s Sadat negotiated through President Carter to make peace with Israel, the PLO shifted its patronage further away from Egypt and joined a unified front with Syria, Libya, Algeria, and Yemen to reject peace. Iraq eagerly stepped into the void left in the patronage line and offered large grants to the PLO, which helped the latter organization grow deeper roots in the occupied territories. Despite these shifting sponsorships, Arafat kept the PLO independent of any Arab country, believing that Palestinian national aspirations could not rely on outside actors—they could only be achieved through the self-determination of the Palestinian nation.²⁵⁵

²⁵¹ Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, 112–113.

²⁵² Friedman, 112–113.

²⁵³ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 241.

²⁵⁴ Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, 114.

²⁵⁵ Şāyigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 325.

D. LIMITED GOODS

The concept of limited goods is closely tied to honor and shame. Land, water, money, and debts all tied directly to honor, dignity, and shame.²⁵⁶ The scarcity of land in Israel makes it a particularly contentious limited good. Even before the creation of the Israeli state, local Arabs saw the increasing Jewish settlement as a minimal loss of land. Acquisitions of land during the British mandate were seen as an ever-increasing gain of land for Israel and an ongoing loss of land for local Arabs. Palestinians recall the words of Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, who in 1937 called for the creation of a large army to abolish partitions and expand Israeli lands to the entirety of Palestine. They cite Ben-Gurion's 1941 call for brutal compulsion in removing Arabs from Palestine.²⁵⁷ During the first Arab-Israeli war, some 700,000–800,000 Palestinians were driven or fled from their lands and were not allowed to return.²⁵⁸ Ben-Gurion stated to the World Jewish Congress president,

If I were an Arab leader, I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have taken their country. Sure, God promised it to us, but what does that matter to them? Our God is not theirs. We come from Israel, it's true, but two thousand years ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti-Semitism, the Nazis, Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we have come here and stole their country. Why should they accept that?²⁵⁹

During the 1967 war, Israel expelled another 260,000 Palestinians from the West Bank into Lebanon and Jordan. Every war pushed more and more Palestinians from their homes and into the impoverished life of aliens living in refugee camps.²⁶⁰ These land grabs are ongoing honor challenges to the now millions of Palestinians living abroad in camps. Palestinian children grow up hearing stories of the flight from violence, denial of return, and life in a foreign land because the Israeli Zionists wanted their land. Palestinian

²⁵⁶ Pely, "When Honor Trumps Basic Needs," 209.

²⁵⁷ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 362–365; and Mearsheimer and Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," 36.

²⁵⁸ Mearsheimer and Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," 37.

²⁵⁹ Mearsheimer and Walt, 37.

²⁶⁰ Mearsheimer and Walt, 38.

liberation groups have published countless stories of Palestinian Arabs being expelled from their homes by the Israeli military or settlement developers. The publishing of these stories in various nationalist journals has shared the narrative of the collective Palestinian experience, the stories hardening the in- and out-group dynamics into the hearts of the people. These articles call for action against the “twin-terrorists” of Israel and its patron, the United States.²⁶¹

In 1974, Arafat and the PLO were given the opportunity to be the bannermen of the Palestinian people when Arafat was invited to address the UN General Assembly. He passionately defended Palestinians as a disenfranchised minority group being uprooted and suppressed by an out-group of Israelis who were racist, colonialist, and expansionist. He used the UN as a platform to share the Palestinian story and unite the people under the PLO. This in and of itself was a major honor challenge to Israel. The Israeli state did not want an official Palestinian nation to challenge its possession of the land, and Arafat was able to garner international recognition by representing his nation.²⁶²

By 1977, the ferocity of Israeli land grabs truly change the demographics of the West Bank, further radicalizing the Palestinian population. More and more land was being expropriated at the expense of the local Palestinian landholders. Israeli Jews increasingly were settling in the most valuable and fertile areas.²⁶³ At this point, the PLO had been denied a homeland in Palestine, exiled from Jordan, and set up camp in Lebanon. When Israel sought to deny it this base of operations and put in place a Phalangist client regime, it served as a rallying cry for the Palestinian cause. To the Arab world, Israel had gone outside the borders of the UN partition plan to annex all of greater Palestine. Now it saw Israel trying to deny its people a homeland in foreign lands. Israelis saw Operation Peace for Galilee as a strategy to secure peace from terrorists who wanted to erase their state, but Palestinians saw it as a strategy to oppress and permanently annihilate their people. This is

²⁶¹ Mearsheimer and Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” 38; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, “Editorial”; and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, “Voluntary Work,” *PFLP Bulletin*, no. 55 (October 1981): 8.

²⁶² “UN Arafat - 1974”; and Tajfel, *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, 104–105.

²⁶³ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 362–365.

why, after Beirut had been bombed and Arafat agreed to permanently remove the PLO from Lebanon, a rift began to form between the PLO and some of its sub-groups. The abandonment of this alien homeland was an honor loss it could not bear. Peace attempts by Arafat signaled a break from resistance negotiation as a point of weakness that could permanently undermine any notion of a Palestinian nationalist movement by the rejectionist camps.²⁶⁴

E. CONCLUSION

In summary, Arafat and the PLO's actions leading up to the 1982 invasion were defined by a people trying to achieve self-determination in a land that was occupied by the Israeli state and in response to failures of other Arab states to find a solution to the problem. The cycle of violence with Israel has been a long series of challenges and responses, fed in part by the honor-shame paradigm and fueled by the concept of limited good. The PLO is part of a fluid and changing patronage line, which helps explain its involvement in Lebanon leading up to Operation Peace for Galilee.²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ Strindberg, "From the River to the Sea," 146.

²⁶⁵ Strindberg, "From the River to the Sea," 141; Pely, "When Honor Trumps Basic Needs," 209; and Şāyigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 325.

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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

The four markers used in the social identity analytical method are closely related and affect one another. Changing any aspect of one marker has implications for the analysis. Every challenge by Palestinian or Israeli forces affects the honor, limited goods, and patronage lines of the opposing parties. Understanding these markers is like constructing a systems-thinking map. Each variable affects the other as it is adjusted. Both sides of this conflict blame the other for starting it. The purpose of this research is not to decide who is at fault. Rather, this analysis gives systematic insight into what the various groups' interpretations mean for policymakers and practitioners of homeland security.

Both sides lay claim to Israel/Palestine as their homeland, and both sides want national self-determination. In the lead-up to Operation Peace for Galilee, Israel wanted to stamp out the PLO because it saw the organization as a threat to its sovereignty. The construction of settlements, the retaliatory strikes, the adoption of Christian clients in Lebanon, and the projection of power were all attempts to exert and sustain sovereignty over the whole of Israel/Palestine.²⁶⁶

A. ISRAEL'S LEGITIMATE CONCERNS

Israel had legitimate security concerns over Palestinian movements launching attacks against strategic and civilian populations. Israelis view the conflict through a Western hermeneutic from which they are dealing with legitimate nation-states and illegitimate terrorists.²⁶⁷ The Begin government acted aggressively and invaded Lebanon because it sought to permanently stamp out the violence of the PLO and establish regional hegemony. The Begin cabinet was acting to defend its people from what it saw as an unending war on its sovereignty.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁶ Pely, "When Honor Trumps Basic Needs," 212; Maoz, "War and Peace," 35–38; Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 365–366; and Lyons, "Military Intervention in Identity Group Conflicts," 31.

²⁶⁷ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 425.

²⁶⁸ Pely, "When Honor Trumps Basic Needs," 212; and Maoz, "War and Peace," 35–38.

From the day it was declared a state, Israel has been under siege from neighboring allies and an internal population of Palestinian Arab groups. Israel has faced nearly 25 years of wars with its Arab neighbors until international mediation forced them to recognize Israel as a state.²⁶⁹ Even after gaining recognition from Egypt and Jordan and winning a succession of wars, Israel still faced threats to its sovereignty and existence by non-state Palestinian liberation movements whose very charters called for the eradication of the Israeli state.²⁷⁰ Israelis have suffered the loss of life and property to terrorist attacks every year since it gained statehood.²⁷¹ Geographically, Israel does not have much strategic depth and thus has historically sought to increase its depth outward into traditionally Palestinian and Arab territories.²⁷²

B. PALESTINIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Palestinians see their movements not as terrorist movements but as liberation movements. Palestinians also lay claim to this land and are seeking national self-determination. The failure of existing Arab states to deal with the emergent Israeli state, their inability to coordinate a liberating response, and their acceptance of peace with Israel all gave rise to the PLO as an independent nationalist movement centered on Palestinian identity over Pan-Arab identity.²⁷³ Arafat and the PLO fought in what they saw as a freedom movement against a racist and colonialist Western power. Arafat sought to establish a state for the Palestinian people in Israel, Jordan, or Southern Lebanon.²⁷⁴ The events from 1964 through 1982 denied him these havens, forcing him to work toward peace in a path that ultimately led to the Oslo Accords.²⁷⁵

²⁶⁹ Safran, *Israel: the Embattled Ally*, 43.

²⁷⁰ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 355; and Sharon, *Life of a Leader*, 356–357.

²⁷¹ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Terrorism Deaths in Israel, 1920–1999.”

²⁷² Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally*, 226.

²⁷³ Şāyigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 72–88.

²⁷⁴ “UN Arafat - 1974”; Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 465–467; and Strindberg, “From the River to the Sea,” 141.

²⁷⁵ Strindberg, “From the River to the Sea,” 146.

While the Israeli invasion forced the PLO out of Lebanon and led to the Oslo Accords, it failed to protect Galilee and Israel overall from terrorism.²⁷⁶ The number of Israeli deaths from terrorism were on the decline leading up to 1982 but rose after the invasion, peaking in 1994 (see Figure 3).²⁷⁷ Brute force from either side has not brought lasting peace to Israel/Palestine. Moreover, the use of U.S. weapons, money, and political support to Israel has negatively affected Arab opinions of the United States.²⁷⁸




Figure 3. Israeli Fatalities in Terror Attacks, 1964–1999²⁷⁹

The Palestinian perspective sees its organizations as liberation movements. A 2007 survey of PFLP members suggests that they are proud of their membership and intend to

²⁷⁶ Strindberg, 146.

²⁷⁷ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Terrorism Deaths in Israel, 1920–1999.”

²⁷⁸ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 607.

²⁷⁹ Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

serve until retirement.²⁸⁰ Being labeled terrorists by Israel and the United States does not matter as the narratives of the PFLP have a substantial impact on Palestinian social identity.²⁸¹ Palestinians, whose identity is tied to organizations like the PFLP and the PLO, do not consider themselves part of a terrorist organization but part of a revolutionary struggle against a neo-colonialist out-group and its ally, the United States. This is demonstrated in an interview with the now-deceased leader of the PFLP, George Habash, who passionately describes his organization as a group of revolutionaries instead of terrorists. Habash tells the interviewer that he refuses to use the word terrorism because his group is not made up of terrorists. He states that his people are resisting “Israeli conquests” and asks why this resistance is called terrorism.²⁸² This is the revolutionary passion that Arafat used to unite the various Palestinian factions while building a pseudo state in Lebanon. He captured their views of the Israeli conqueror and channeled their message for the world.²⁸³

C. THE POLARIZING EFFECT OF AGGRESSION

Aggressive actions against Palestinians polarize their supporters against Israel and the United States. In 2004, Osama bin Laden laid out his reasons for the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. homeland. His narrative highlighted the U.S. support of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Bin Laden claimed his order to strike the Twin Towers came after “the oppression and tyranny of the Israeli-American coalition against our people in Palestine and Lebanon.”²⁸⁴ Bin Laden shared stories of “blood, severed limbs, women and children sprawled everywhere. Houses destroyed with occupants and high rises demolished over their residents, rockets raining down.”²⁸⁵ He painted a portrait of emergent justice, telling his viewers that he looked at the destroyed towers in Lebanon and decided to strike back

²⁸⁰ Ludwick, “Closing the Gap,” 43.

²⁸¹ Ludwick, 43.

²⁸² “Dr George Habash Speaks on ‘Terrorism’ and Resistance.”

²⁸³ Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, 124.

²⁸⁴ Scheuer, *Through Our Enemies’ Eyes*, 4.

²⁸⁵ Scheuer, 4.

at the “oppressors” by taking down towers in America, so “they could taste some of what we tasted and . . . be deterred from killing our women and children.”²⁸⁶ Bin Laden compared Americans to the Crusaders who preceded them by 900 years in their lack of respect for Muslims. Using his talents as an orator, bin Laden sought to unify Arab Muslims under the banner of his anti-Western jihad. He outlined a story of Muslims rallying around al Qaeda to defend the lives and lifestyle of their brothers in faith against a warmongering out-group that wanted to destroy their culture and faith.²⁸⁷

Understanding the appeal of bin Laden’s narrative requires setting aside the etic of the Western practitioner and examining the emic of the individuals in the local Arab-Islamist community. From the hermeneutic of the Palestinians and those who identify with their cause, bin Laden’s narrative underscores the horrors that the invasion brought to the local populace. These experiences are portrayed in terms the West would label terrorism. Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg define terrorism as consisting of the following attributes:

The Threat or use of force,
With the intent to influence political or social situations,
By affecting an audience beyond those directly targeted in the violence,
And targeting those traditionally perceived as non-combatants in an effort to create fear.²⁸⁸

From the perspective of Palestinians and those who identify with them, they experienced all of these factors during Operation Peace for Galilee. The tactics of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were as follows:

Using overwhelming strikes
To force the PLO into a political agreement,
By affecting individual in Beirut, besieging the PLO and offering death as the only alternative to complete surrender.

²⁸⁶ Glazzard, “Losing the Plot,” 13.

²⁸⁷ Scheuer, *Through Our Enemies’ Eyes*, 4.

²⁸⁸ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioners Way Forward*, 43.

Whether directly or not, killed thousands of non-combatants in an effort to create enough fear to dislodge the PLO from Lebanon.²⁸⁹

Bruce Hoffman argues that terrorism is distinguished from other forms of criminal activity.²⁹⁰ He defines terrorism as:

Ineluctably political aims and motives;

Violent—or, equally important, threatens violence:

Designed to have far reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target;

Conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia); and

Perpetuated by a subnational group or non-state entity.²⁹¹

From the perspective of non-Westerners, Hoffman's definition is also a double standard, which legitimizes only the Westphalian state-centric use of violence.²⁹² For those whose hermeneutics do not include Westphalian concepts or who have taken an anti-systemic campaign against the international system, this definition reveals an inherent Western bias against the concepts of actors endowed with the right to use violence as a political instrument.²⁹³ Since Palestine is not an internationally recognized state with a central governing body, any actions taken by Palestinian groups have been de-legitimized by Western definitions of terrorism. Labeling Palestinians and their supporters as terrorists—because they are not members of a nation-state—and leaving them out of the negotiating room will not facilitate peace. Marginalizing these groups does not deter them as the modern world has allowed for the diffusion of support and strike capabilities beyond the local population to the global community of believers. To believers in the ummah, the

²⁸⁹ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 411.

²⁹⁰ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 42.

²⁹¹ Hoffman, 42.

²⁹² Andrew Phillips, "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Jihadism—Transnational Religious Insurgencies and the Transformation of International Orders," *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 2 (April 2010): 259, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510000021>.

²⁹³ Phillips, 259–260.

nation-state is simply a Western construct imposed on the community to fragment it and ensure the primacy of Western interests.²⁹⁴

It is possibly more important than ever to bring non-state actors to the negotiating table as the interconnectedness of the globe facilitates greater support and access to violent capabilities than their ideological forebearers had.²⁹⁵ Phillips takes this argument further, noting the parallels between modern-day insurgents in Palestine and the Protestant insurgents who arose during the European Reformation. Protestants worked through transnational networks with the help of patron–client ties and state-sponsored assistance from confessional allies to fight for the political rights they desired.²⁹⁶ Just as in Palestine and the broader Middle East, the Protestant insurgencies of Reformation Europe “aggregated the social grievances of their constituents and re-framed them around questions of religious identity.”²⁹⁷ The rulers of Reformation Europe were largely able to overcome the challenges of transnational conflict by institutionalizing tolerance and non-intervention at the Peace of Westphalia. Arguably, a similar agreement of mutual acceptance and differentiation is needed between Israel and Palestinian groups.²⁹⁸

Israel’s use of military equipment from the United States fed narratives like bin Laden’s. The IDF used F16 and F15 fighter jets acquired through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the United States to attack Palestinian assets in Beirut.²⁹⁹ This provided extremists ammunition for their anti-Western and colonialist narratives. Anyone who identifies with the Palestinians, Arabs, or Muslims who suffered and died during the siege of Beirut is susceptible to these sorts of narratives. If the reader views Operation Peace for Galilee through the emic approach and empathizes with the local population, one might see how Palestinians and their supporters view the campaign as terrorism.³⁰⁰ An

²⁹⁴ Phillips, 259–60.

²⁹⁵ Phillips, 261.

²⁹⁶ Phillips, 265.

²⁹⁷ Phillips, “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Jihadism,” 266.

²⁹⁸ Phillips, 269.

²⁹⁹ Shlaim, *The Iron Wall*, 385.

³⁰⁰ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioners Way Forward*, 70.

editorial in Israel's leading daily newspaper, *Ha'aretz*, describes the aggressive attempt to break Arab resistance as not worth the brutal and repressive tactics used to achieve it. Another article from this same paper portrays the defense minister as the "greatest recruitment officer the PLO ever had."³⁰¹ Begin and Sharon's plan backfired, and the Israeli populace could see it. Immediately after the campaign, Palestinian support for an independent Palestinian state had risen to 98 percent; 86 percent wanted the PLO to run the state.³⁰² By continuing to fight the Israeli occupation when the neighboring Arab states had accepted peace, the PLO amassed support among Palestinian Arabs but invited a massive military response from Israel that drove it from its haven in Lebanon³⁰³

The Israeli leadership, on the other hand, sought to root out PLO bases in Lebanon because it was sponsoring continued attacks in Israel. Furthermore, seeing the buildup of Palestinian firepower and militias units in Lebanon, Israeli leaders grew increasingly concerned about the destruction these capabilities might bring to Israeli cities in Galilee. The constant raids, bombings, and hijackings left no doubt in the Israeli psyche that the PLO was an organization of terrorists who had to be dealt with.³⁰⁴ That the PLO charter stated it would not accept anything short of the full eradication of the Israeli state was an obvious sign to Israelis of their inability to accept a peaceful coexistence.³⁰⁵

Every kinetic attack, every slight to the group's honor, every attempt to seize land, and every partnership with a patron or client group was seen by the other group as an escalation of the conflict that must be met with force. This analysis shows that meeting the out-group with force only further entrenches in- and out-group dynamics. If there is anything that the 1982 invasion teaches, it is that confrontation does not give either side a lasting victory over the other. Through brute force, Israel may have driven the PLO from

³⁰¹ Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 568.

³⁰² Tessler, 567.

³⁰³ Tessler, 425–428, 569.

³⁰⁴ Tessler, 569.

³⁰⁵ Sharon, *Life of a Leader*, 356–357.

Lebanon, but it further polarized the Palestinian population in the occupied territories.³⁰⁶ Furthermore, the increasingly polarized Lebanese Shiite population welcomed Iranian-backed Hezbollah to secure itself from Israeli aggression.³⁰⁷ Hezbollah rose to political prominence in fighting the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory for over two decades after Operation Peace for Galilee and is generally seen as a positive force in Lebanese political life.³⁰⁸ The group even has the support of Christian factions in national elections and has a mutually supportive relationship with the Christian President of Lebanon, Michel Aoun.³⁰⁹ If there is a clear indicator that brute force cannot project Israeli and Western interests in the region, it is the rise of Hezbollah in response to the Israeli invasion. Finally, the atrocities at Sabra and Shatila during the invasion entrenched the distrust of the United States and increased hatred for Israel among the PLO and their affiliate groups.³¹⁰

D. THE UNITED STATES AS A NEO-COLONIALIST POWER

By supporting Israel over the past 70 years, the United States has cemented an image of a neo-colonialist power at war with Arabs and Islam. Cold War strategy heavily influenced the decade's long patronage lines between the United States and Israel. Communism may have fallen, but the narratives created by the West to support the Cold War discourse have already been solidified. So, too, are the narratives created about the United States and Israel as occupiers and enemies of Arab and Islamic realms.³¹¹

³⁰⁶ Strindberg, "From the River to the Sea," 142.

³⁰⁷ Lyons, "Military Intervention in Identity Group Conflicts," 34.

³⁰⁸ Gareth Smyth, "Hizbollah Basks in Wave of Lebanese Support," *Financial Times*, November 26, 2001, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/249202556?accountid=12702>.

³⁰⁹ Rebecca Collard, "Hizbollah Makes Gains in Lebanon Poll: Parliamentary Vote Success of Militia-Backed Group May Increase Iranian Influence," *Financial Times*, May 8, 2018, <https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/2051410395?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:primo&accountid=12702>; and Halim Shebaya, "Where Do Lebanon's Christians Stand on Hezbollah?," *Al Jazeera*, November 30, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/lebanon-christians-stand-hezbollah-171128102446572.html>.

³¹⁰ Strindberg, "From the River to the Sea," 142.

³¹¹ Kent, "Primacy or World Order," 338.

Davis argues that by invading Lebanon to the extent it did, Israel overextended its military to attain a political goal it could not achieve. He argues Israel ignored Clausewitz's lessons about war as an extension of politics and tried to solve a political problem with sheer military force. Arguably, Israel and the United States have failed to consider the impact of identity politics in Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon. This thesis finds that Israel was drawn into a challenge-response cycle that grew out of control, became the patron of a client that could not retain control of Lebanon, took part in honor challenges that upset the international order and the image of its U.S. patron, and sacrificed its international standing to gain more direct control over occupied Palestinian territories and destroy the PLO's base of operations in Lebanon.³¹²

Israel's incursion into an area that Syria traditionally saw as its sphere of influence resulted in the latter state moving closer to the Soviet Union, thereby undermining the Reagan administration's vision for a more balanced region. It also launched the United States into a long and costly entanglement in Beirut, resulting in hundreds of U.S. casualties.³¹³ Israel had successfully removed PLO leadership and paramilitary assets from Lebanon, but Iranian-backed Hezbollah filled the vacuum left behind. Hezbollah filled its ranks with members of the Shia community in Lebanon who had been compelled to join the identity conflict and wanted Israel out of their country. Israel and Hezbollah later initiated their own escalating challenge-response cycle that resulted in Israel's full withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.³¹⁴

Since 1948, the United States has supported Israel for myriad reasons including post-Holocaust humanitarianism as well as religious and strategic motives.³¹⁵ To Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East, U.S. policy in the region is seen as unbalanced in that it props up Israel while keeping Arabs in a state of neo-colonialism. Public opinion in the Middle East has increasingly expressed resentment against U.S. primacy and Western

³¹² Davis, *40 km into Lebanon*, 12.

³¹³ Davis, 12.

³¹⁴ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 376–378.

³¹⁵ Williams, "Moral Support, Strategic Reasoning, or Democratic Politics," 7–9.

arrogance.³¹⁶ Despite this, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the United States received support from governments and fundamentalist groups throughout the Islamic world. Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Jamaat-e-Islami were among 46 Islamist groups that formally denounced al Qaeda for its attacks.³¹⁷

Nevertheless, the United States continued its imbalanced treatment of Muslims in the region, invading Iraq after toppling the Afghan Taliban. Since these actions, most Salafist Muslims have believed that the United States is waging war against Islam in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.³¹⁸ Jihadist groups use this message as a rallying cry for total war against the United States and its citizens.³¹⁹ They argue that Israel exists as an extension of the U.S. war against Muslims, and the conflict in Palestine is one of the many strategic conflicts designed to uphold U.S. hegemony in the region.³²⁰

The same identity markers used in analyzing the Palestinian perspectives vis-à-vis Israel can be used to understand the broader jihadist hermeneutic against the United States. Muslims, particularly Salafist Muslims who believe in offensive jihad, relate to the suffering of their brothers in Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Jihadist soldiers flock to war zones to fulfill what they see as a religious duty to defend their faith against the Western out-group.³²¹ Islamist charities, Arab governments, and wealthy families contribute millions of dollars to fight the outsiders.³²² Al Qaeda lists support for Israel and the oppression of Palestinians as one of many theaters against which the United States wages war against Islam. It lists U.S. support against its Muslim brothers in Indian Kashmir, East Timor, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Philippines, and Iraq as evidence of this war.³²³ Just as

³¹⁶ Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, "Killing in the Name of Islam: Al-Qaeda's Justification for September 11," *Middle East Policy* 10, no. 2 (2003): 77.

³¹⁷ Wiktorowicz and Kaltner, 80.

³¹⁸ Wiktorowicz and Kaltner, 80.

³¹⁹ Wiktorowicz and Kaltner, 80.

³²⁰ Wiktorowicz and Kaltner, 83.

³²¹ Wiktorowicz and Kaltner, 84.

³²² Wiktorowicz and Kaltner, 84.

³²³ Wiktorowicz and Kaltner, 85.

the United States failed to understand the hermeneutics of the Vietnamese in the Vietnam conflict, the sectarian perspectives in Iraq, and the tribal dynamics of Afghanistan, it seems the United States continues to underestimate the importance of balancing its support for Israel with the hermeneutics of Palestinians.³²⁴

E. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Building on the work of Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, this thesis promotes the idea that the United States homeland security enterprise should shift its focus in the region from countering terrorism to understanding the group hermeneutics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and seeking a more balanced approach to the peace process. Without understanding these groups, the United States cannot hope for any successful peace initiatives.³²⁵ This is not without precedent. During the Carter and Clinton administrations, the United States shifted from primarily strategic military support for Israel to a more balanced treatment that recognized the grievances of Palestinians and included them in the peace process.³²⁶

Any hope for lasting peace would require buy-in from all major stakeholders and a future in which both sides of the divide imagine they benefit from reducing conflict.³²⁷ The asymmetric balance of power in Israel's favor has encouraged continued conflict and prevented a superordinate set of goals from resolving the problem.³²⁸ This means that any peace proposal ought to include a two-state solution with Palestinian sovereignty and self-

³²⁴ Isabella Krysa et al., "Capturing Postcoloniality in Action," *Critical Perspectives on International Business* 12, no. 3 (2016): 270–271, <https://doi.org/10.1108/cpoib-05-2015-0025>; Jeffrey W. Jackson, "Military Intervention in Identity Group Conflicts: A Social Movement Theory Perspective on the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008), 37–38, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/2443/06Dec_Jackson.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; and Bivainis Andrius, "Contemporary Afghanistan Outlook: Between Counterinsurgency and Search of the Social Contract," *International Journal of Area Studies* 10, no. 2 (2015): 123–124, <https://doi.org/10.1515/ijas-2015-0006>.

³²⁵ Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, "Talking to 'Terrorists,'" 14.

³²⁶ Williams, "Moral Support, Strategic Reasoning, or Democratic Politics," 23.

³²⁷ Leach and Williams, "Group Identity and Conflicting Expectations," 876–877.

³²⁸ Gordon Neve and Yinon Cohen, "Western Interests, Israeli Unilateralism, and the Two State Solution," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 41, no. 3 (2012): 7–8, <https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1041009095?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:primo&accountid=12702>.

determination. Otherwise, if Israel follows the road it has in the past, it will continue to occupy Palestinian territories with its oppressive military, political, and economic institutions while Palestinians will continue to use terrorism as a tactic to undermine the Israeli power gap.³²⁹

The limitations lie in the ability of any U.S. or Israeli politician to muster enough political support to initiate such a change in policy. Hermann argues that the likelihood of foreign policy change depends on three factors: the level of institutionalization or commitment of the government to the policy, the degree to which domestic political actors support, oppose, or are indifferent to a policy, and the significance of an issue in a nation's domestic power structure.³³⁰ Domestic politics plays a powerful role in foreign policy. Issues can become a central point of focus in power struggles and elections. A significant policy change would require a major upset in a candidate trying to differentiate oneself from the establishment.³³¹ The dominant beliefs of constituents are also influential factors in changing foreign policy. Realignment of foreign policy requires a realignment of domestic political views.³³² The politics and narratives supporting Israel against Arab and Islamic states have been ingrained in Americans for almost 70 years. Changing course on this will prove challenging. Conversely, the policies and narratives of Palestinians and their Arab client-states have been in play equally as long. Changing the course of the U.S. relationship with much of the Middle East is unlikely at this point. The water is under the bridge, and the United States will have to deal with the repercussions for the foreseeable future.³³³

The recent Trump administration decision to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem in Israel is particularly damaging to any future peace plan. Moving the embassy has deeply

³²⁹ Neve and Cohen, 8.

³³⁰ Charles Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (March 1990): 7, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600403>.

³³¹ Hermann, 7.

³³² Hermann, 7.

³³³ Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009), 162.

symbolic implications for Palestinians and their Arab supporters. It is a step away from the traditional two-state solution advocated by past U.S. presidents and implies American acceptance of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Previously, Palestinians had worked directly with the U.S. government through a consulate general in Jerusalem. The administration has proposed that the consular mission be absorbed into the embassy. U.S. consulate generals have independent missions, and Palestinians are hostile to the idea of reporting to a U.S. embassy in Israel as a route to the U.S. government. Former U.S. ambassador to Israel, Dan Shapiro, argues these moves undermine the concept of Palestinian sovereignty and signify that the United States sees the Palestinian Authority as under Israeli jurisdiction. Saeb Erekat, the top Palestinian peace negotiator, says that Palestinians will not negotiate with the Trump administration as long as it backs right-wing Israeli policy and undermines any hope of a two-state solution.³³⁴

Compounding the embassy issue is the U.S. decision to cut more than \$200 million in aid to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. This decision came months after the United States also cut more than \$300 million in aid to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees. Palestinians are rejecting calls by the Trump administration to negotiate, stating that the United States is no longer a neutral facilitator of negotiations. PLO Secretary General Saeb Erekat states that Trump's decisions show "the real aim of U.S. aid is to interfere in the internal affairs of other peoples and affect their national rights" and that the administration's cutting of aid "is a sign that [Washington] has abandoned its international obligations."³³⁵ In a similar line of criticism, Hossam Zomlot, head of the Palestinian Authority, stated that recent U.S. policies show Palestinians the Trump White House's "abandoning of the two-state solution and its full adoption of the agenda of [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu."³³⁶

³³⁴ "After Embassy Move, Trump Weighs Jerusalem Consulate Changes," Al Jazeera, June 1, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/embassy-move-trump-weighs-jerusalem-consulate-180601180158323.html>.

³³⁵ Arwa Ibrahim and Maram Humaid, "U.S. Aid Cut to Palestinians Hits NGOs Hard," Al Jazeera, August 25, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/08/aid-cut-palestinians-hits-ngo-hard-180825102944853.html>.

³³⁶ Ibrahim and Humaid.

In shifting toward a more pro-Israeli stance, the U.S. government is ignoring the hermeneutic of the Palestinian people, who have adopted a distinct identity over the past 70 years.³³⁷ They see themselves as a people displaced from their homes, denied the right to return, and deprived of the right to national self-determination.³³⁸ Any hope for peace requires a two-state solution and full Palestinian sovereignty.³³⁹ If the United States truly wants peace in Israel/Palestine, it must reiterate its support of a two-state solution, rebalance its support to be more bilateral, and pressure Israel to close settlements as these have been created with the intent of undermining the Palestinian national movement.³⁴⁰

³³⁷ Şāyigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 88.

³³⁸ Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 355.

³³⁹ Neve and Cohen, "Western Interests, Israeli Unilateralism," 8.

³⁴⁰ Neve and Cohen, 11.

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