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THESIS

**ROBUST CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS—ONE OF
THE MOST POWERFUL TOOLS TO COUNTERACT
RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE: THE CASE OF UKRAINE**

by

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March 2019

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TOOLS TO COUNTERACT RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE:
THE CASE OF UKRAINE**

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ABSTRACT

Currently, we are living in the time of hybrid wars. States use both conventional and unconventional methods of warfare simultaneously. This thesis presents three key findings: a framework for building and retaining robust democratic civil-military relations in times of hybrid warfare; a description of the crucial role of civil-military cooperation in this framework; and an examination of Ukraine's response, which implements this framework, to the Russian Federation's hybrid warfare since 2014. The most effective elements of Ukraine's response are analyzed in detail, including military, economic, humanitarian, political, informational, cyber, diplomatic, and special/law enforcement services activities and methods.

Policy recommendations are made for Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and global security in countering Russian hybrid warfare; Ukraine should continue to increase its defense potential and raise the quality of life for its citizens; develop the Ukrainian economy and national identity; and continue pursuing lawsuits against Russia in international courts. Additionally, NATO and the EU should extend and expand sanctions against Russia, increase resilience, and intensify cooperation in the information, energy, and cybersecurity areas.

Beyond providing guidance for Ukraine, the determinations can also assist other nation-states facing similar challenges in countering adversaries' "help" while maintaining sovereignty.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ATO	Antiterrorist Operation
BTG	Battalion Tactical Groups
CHS	Counterhybrid Strategy
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CMI	Civil-Military Interaction
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMR	Civil-Military Relations
COE	Center of Excellence
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DNR/LNR	Donetsk People's Republic/Luhansk People's Republic
EU	European Union
JFO	Joint Forces Operation
KGB/FSB	Committee of State Security/Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
STRATCOMM	Strategic Communications
UOC(MP)	Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)
USSR	United Soviet Socialist Republics
VJTF	Very High Readiness Joint Task Forces

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Finally, this thesis is dedicated to my Motherland—Ukraine.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

On February 27, 2014, the Russian Federation started the armed annexation of a part of the Ukraine—the Crimean Peninsula. This event launched the combat phase of Russian hybrid aggression against Ukraine. By using propaganda, subterfuge, covert operations, and strategic blackmail measures in the beginning, Moscow established a strategic stranglehold via political, diplomatic, economic, and other types of pressure towards Ukraine. When these measures were insufficient to the end of policy, Russia started direct regular and irregular combat against Ukraine by supporting paramilitaries, locals, mercenaries, and intermixing Russian regular military troops and separate military instructors among the separatist forces.¹ Such tactics came, in fact, from an old Soviet and Russian strategic “box of tools,” which, all the same, shocked a strategic community overly fixated on jihadist violence and counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East.

In the year 2019, Ukraine comprises a proxy battlefield on an epic scale in which a semi-frozen conflict/open battle unfolds between Russia and a coalition of Western countries led by the United States. Here operates a battle between two geopolitical and ideological systems—one democratic and the other, authoritarian. Russia, even under the influence of sanctions, continues to try to separate the coalition of Western countries by the use of so-called hybrid methods. The time-tested devices of political operatives are being used in their variety, propaganda, subterfuge, Trojan horses and fifth columns among them, as well as actual military forces across the board (to include the threat of nuclear weapons). One hardly need comment on the manner that Russian subterfuge via digital means and links to American political figures in various modalities have spread this conflict from the Donbas and waters of the Sea of Azov to the heart of the U.S. political system.

¹ Maksimilian Czuperski, John E. Herbst, Alina Polyakova, and Damon Wilson, “Putin’s Secret Warriors: Russian Soldiers Sent to Fight in Ukraine,” *Newsweek*, June 6, 2015, <http://www.newsweek.com/putins-secret-warriors-339665>.

One hardly overstates the issue to say that if Ukraine loses its political independence, a similar fate awaits other countries in Europe and in the wider world. The speed with which the Syrian operation followed the Crimean coup de main included bloody witness to the Russian offensive and the more or less lame response of the Western security structure to this diplomatic and strategic revolution. Vladimir Putin will surely not stop only in Ukraine in his bid to revive Russian world power at the expense of the order led by Washington and Berlin. His concept of the “Russian world” is a threat to all democratic countries where the Russian-speaking population lives—for instance, in the Baltic Republics in NATO—but not solely those.

This thesis examines the question of how to retain robust democratic civil-military relations in a time of hybrid warfare. This research focuses on the opportunities for the government and armed forces of Ukraine to effectively resist Russian hybrid warfare and enable Ukraine to survive as an independent nation state amid a gathering prospect of world war and generalized ideological conflict that threatens to end the promise of the 1990s forever. Additionally, this thesis will help other nation states being eyed by Moscow and targeted by its doctrine of aggression to prevent and avoid Russian “help” and keep their sovereignty as well.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has gained independence. As an independent state, Ukraine has proclaimed a pro-European course of development. But neighboring Russia imposed and continues to leave its imprint on Ukraine’s actions in the international arena. Russia has always regarded Ukraine within the sphere of its closest interests, and throughout the period of Ukraine’s independence has influenced the political life of Ukraine.

Russia, as the direct heiress of the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), did not accept the loss of superpower status and with the coming to power of Putin as president has actively sought to restore this status. Thanks to high prices for oil and gas (the main Russian export products), Russia has been able to restore the economy and to regain some of its status as a great power. For a time, it seemed that nothing could prevent Russia from

becoming the second USSR. Russia became a member of the G-8 and G-20, but after the annexation of the Crimea was excluded from these organizations and economic sanctions were imposed against it. The United Nations, in resolution 68/262, underscored the territorial integrity of Ukraine, underlining that the so-called “Crimean referendum” on March 16, 2014, “has no legal force.”² The subsequent resolution (71/205) specifically identified Russia as occupying Crimea.³

The Ukraine crisis is one the most serious crises in Europe since the end of the Cold War.⁴ The system of interstate relations created after World War II was changed by force. Ukraine has suddenly become an important research subject for U.S. and European scholars.⁵ Scholars have debated whether it was active Western involvement or, on the contrary, a weak Western foreign policy that prompted Russian aggression against Ukraine.⁶

According to Daniel R. Coats, “the conflict in eastern Ukraine is likely to remain stalemated and marked by fluctuating levels of violence.”⁷ The war that Russia unleashed on the Donbas threatens not only Ukraine, but also other countries that have not been lucky enough to be neighbors to Russia. Using lies, denial, propaganda, cyberattacks, and interference in the internal affairs of other countries, Russia is trying to split the West and force it to sit down at the negotiating table with Moscow. In this situation, the key factors are the unity of democratic countries within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

² Tetiana Pechonchuk, “New UN Resolution on Crimea Confirms Russia Is an Occupying Power, Brings 10 Important Changes for Ukraine,” *Euromaidan Press*, December 20, 2017, <http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/12/20/new-un-resolution-on-crimea-confirms-russia-as-an-occupying-power-brings-10-important-changes-for-ukraine/>.

³ Pechonchuk.

⁴ Nicholas Burns, “The Aspen Strategy Group on the Old and the New Cold War,” *The Aspen Idea*, Winter 2014–2015, 63–67.

⁵ Alexander Motyl, “The Surrealism of Realism: Misreading the War in Ukraine,” *World Affairs* (January/February 2015): 79.

⁶ John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusion That Provoked Putin,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014. Note: see also Motyl, “The Surrealism of Realism: Misreading the War in Ukraine.”

⁷ Daniel R. Coats, *Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* (Washington, DC: National Intelligence, 2017), <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf>.

(NATO) and the European Union (EU) that will not allow Russia to divide the West and the construction and maintenance of a robust system of civil-military relations within those states that belong to the West.

Robust civil-military relations during hybrid warfare is becoming one of the key factors for confronting the aggressor. The unity of the civilian and military, as Ukraine's example has shown, can stop a stronger adversary; for instance, contrary to the Kremlin's plans, Kyiv did not surrender, but after retreating from the shock, continued its struggle for independence and restoration of territorial integrity.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

This work exists at the intersection of two topics: civil-military relations and hybrid warfare. Traditionally, these topics have been considered separately; so, I will also consider these topics separately. On the topic of civil-military relations, the works of Samuel P. Huntington, Samuel Finer, Gordon A. Craig, Claude E. Welch and Carl von Clausewitz are analyzed, and the works of Frank Hoffmann and Valerii Gerasimov are examined on the topic of hybrid warfare.

1. Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations, as well as the role of the military in the political life of the country, have long been a theme of scholarship about power in the state. In the United States' case, particularly in the wake of the Truman-MacArthur incident in 1951, Huntington gained recognition as the "founder" of the modern theory of civil-military relations. He adapted the European concept of civil-military relations and outlined his own theory, however flawed, that has become a staple of this field of inquiry.

According to Huntington, such relationships are based on the professionalism of the officer corps as contrasted to civil society and officer's attitude toward the country's policy. He wrote: "the principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the state. Here the conflict between functional and societal pressure comes to a

head.”⁸ Military professionalism is a fundamental tenet of Huntington’s theory, and he argues that a society without a professional officer corps cannot achieve optimal civil-military relations; i.e., objective civilian control.⁹

According to Huntington, in a time of objective civilian control, the officer corps remains out of politics, i.e., “be politically sterile,” and politicians should be excluded from military issues. He clarifies that “politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence. ... The military officer must remain neutral politically.”¹⁰

Gordon Craig seems to agree with Huntington about military neutrality as the former wrote also in the shadow of the Truman-MacArthur events in the early Cold War. Craig mentions: “The ideal aim of the healthy state is that its military establishment shall remain merely the executive will of the sovereign power.”¹¹ He also underscores the crucial role of the military in the history of the state, in this case Prussia and Germany, which always plays a central role in how the United States thinks about this challenge of policy: “[the] army played a decisive part in determining the political destiny of the nation.”¹² The successes of the military, their victories, as well as their defeats, are inextricably linked with the form of government and the impact of society on government.

The actions (or inaction) of the military can exercise a significant influence not only on state policy, but also on the country as a whole, when one considers this issue in both Germany and the United States. It is especially notable in the case of the United States, which, after it became a world power in 1898, supported coups abroad to bring to power leaders the U.S. government believed would do more than their predecessors for the good of a state. And, in the case of Germany, it was a matter of acquiescence, when the army

⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 1–3.

⁹ Huntington, 83.

¹⁰ Huntington, 71.

¹¹ Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640–1945* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1964), 560.

¹² Craig, 560.

command was on Hitler's side in 1933, and more or less tolerated his accession to the chancellorship via the machinations of Hindenburg to Papen via Schleicher).¹³

Meanwhile Claude Welch identifies two bases of civilian control: a mutual sense of political restraint on the part of officers and politicians alike, keeping the armed forces within a relatively narrow, circumscribed set of responsibilities; and the existence of a legitimate, widely supported political institution able to ensure military compliance.¹⁴ He also indicates five means of civilian control that have been devised and utilized by the government:

- constitutional constraints on the political impact of the military;
- ascriptive factors (e.g., class, ethnicity) affecting the relationship between civilian and military leaders;
- use of party controls by establishing the parallel chain of command;
- geographic and historical factors permitting the maintenance of relatively small armed forces with narrow responsibilities; and
- delimitation of military responsibility domains, leading to a military ethic of subordination.¹⁵

Another scholar of civil-military relations, Samuel E. Finer, also does not deny the role of the professionalism of the officer corps. He agrees with Huntington as well, and adds that professionalism comprises “three ingredients: expertness, social responsibility and corporate loyalty to fellow-practitioners.” Currently, armed forces consist of professionals. Military “are technicians in the management and organization of violence; they feel responsibility to their client (i.e., the state); and they have a powerful corporate tradition and organization.”¹⁶

¹³ Craig, 560.

¹⁴ Claude E. Welch, Jr, *Civilian Control of the Military* (Albany: State University of the New York, 1976), 317.

¹⁵ Welch, 5–6.

¹⁶ Samuel Finer, *The Man on the Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics* (Abington-on-Thames, UK: Routledge, 2002), 24.

Finer also discusses the circumstances under which the military can intervene or refrain from interfering in state affairs and politics. He points out those motives that can inhibit the military from intervention:

- professionalism and its consequences;
- the principle of civil supremacy; and
- other inhibiting factors, such as “fear for the fighting capacity of the armed forces, generals’ fear of a civil war in which comrade will have to fire on comrades and a fear that if they [the military] intervene and are vanquished, not only their lives but the army itself will be forfeit.”¹⁷

With the development of technology, as well as the emergence of new forms and methods of warfare, civil-military relations are undergoing a new stage of transformation. Even in the 21st century, however, the contemporary interpretation of one aspect of Clausewitz’s theory about the nature of war pertains to a civil-military codicil, which says less about the Napoleonic era and more about the Cold War and especially the praetorian tendencies of the post-Cold War era, and post-9/11 epoch of conflict.

The “Trinity of War”—the People, the Military, and the Government—is indicated as well as in the past the set of features governing the running of war and relations between those factors. Clausewitz wrote:

As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity ... of the play of chance and probability ... and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.... These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.¹⁸

¹⁷ Finer, 24–31.

¹⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

In this trinity Clausewitz examines People as a source of support of the government, and their motivation and dedication should support government and motivate the military; Military is considered from the point of view their competence, obedience, and organization; and Government demonstrates pragmatism, leadership, and ability to mobilize the people's support for war.¹⁹ He points out that "Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets."²⁰

All the aforementioned authors agree that in order to establish civilian control over the military, the military (officer corps) should ideally be apolitical (to be uninvolved in politics). Their influence on the adoption of political decisions should be minimized, and their professionalism must be used to achieve political goals. All authors agree with the assertion that the military is one of the most important layers of society without which the existence of the state would be impossible. The military not only protects the state from the external enemy, but also it is one of the most important factors supporting the functionality of the state and the existing political system. The relations between the civilian and the military spheres should ideally be in harmony; that is, the military defends the country, does not interfere in politics and governance of the country while civilians shape the state's policy, govern the state, and regulate the military sphere through legislative and financial (budgetary) mechanisms, its development, and thus control the military.

2. Hybrid Warfare

Clausewitz's statement that war is "a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means"²¹ remains enduringly the case. His other statement that "war is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case"²² leads us to

¹⁹ Iris Malone, "Clause-whaaaaa:" A Cheat Sheet to Clausewitz's "On War," teaching notes prepared for POLS 114: *International Security in a Changing World*, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 2016, <https://web.stanford.edu/~imalone/Teaching/pols114/ClausewitzOnWarCheatSheet.pdf>.

²⁰ Clausewitz, 89.

²¹ Clausewitz, 87.

²² Clausewitz, 89.

the idea that war evolves along with politics, economy, culture, and society, i.e., with the development of society and a newly aggressive form of policy, the new forms and methods of conducting combat operations are emerging. One such form is hybrid warfare—which in this work is seen from a combination of Eastern European and professional U.S. military perspectives. The goal, however, is to make this term move toward a truth that is useful on the theoretical and practical planes relative to civil-military relations.

There are numerous definitions of hybrid warfare in the contemporary literature. The term is made current by the revival of irregular warfare and toxic ideological conflict, where the soldiers of counterinsurgency (as seen in its classical form) have seized the high ground of writing and forming of doctrine. According to Frank Hoffman, the former U.S. Marine officer who first used this term, “hybrid warfare” is “the coordinated use of different modes of warfare, both military (use of force) and non-military (irregular tactics, criminal disorder, terrorist acts, etc.) to achieve ‘synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict’ within the main battlespace.”²³ Another veteran of the post-9/11 campaigns, Peter Mansoor defines hybrid warfare as “conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces and irregular (guerillas, insurgents, and terrorists), which could include both state and non-state actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose.”²⁴ By this definition, of course, both World War I and World War II, to say nothing of the Cold War in its many forms, were all hybrid wars.

Another scholar from the United Kingdom, Lawrence Freedman, identifies hybrid warfare as “an approach that draws upon a number of types of force from across the full spectrum, including terrorism, insurgency, and regular combat, along with the extensive use of information operations.”²⁵ Further, U.S. author Stephen Blank gives one more definition of hybrid war: “...hybrid war is a doctrine utilizing all the instruments of power

²³ Frank Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War,” Potomac Institute, December 2017, http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf.

²⁴ Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray, *Hybrid Warfare. Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2.

²⁵ Lawrence Freedman, *Ukraine and the Art of Limited War* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019), 11.

to compensate for military weakness by developing alternatives to and surrogates for military power to corrode ... societies.”²⁶

There are many discussions about the definition and meanings of hybrid warfare because hybrid warfare has elements (features) of asymmetric, unconventional, guerilla, irregular, ambiguous, and compound warfare. In fact, it is all of these. For instance:

- **Asymmetric warfare** is “warfare that is between opposing forces which differ greatly in military power and that typically involves the use of unconventional weapons and tactics”²⁷ or “in military operations, the application of dissimilar strategies, tactics, capabilities and methods to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weakness.”²⁸

- **Unconventional warfare** is an “activity conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”²⁹

- **Guerilla warfare** is a “type of warfare fought by irregulars in fast-moving, small-scale actions against orthodox military and police forces and, on occasion, against rival insurgent forces, either independently or in conjunction with a larger political-military strategy.”³⁰

- **Irregular warfare**, according to the United States Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, is “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and

²⁶ Stephen Blank, “Russia, Hybrid War and the Evolution of Europe. Second Line of Defense,” Second Line of Defense, February 14, 2015, <http://www.sldinfo.com/russia-hybrid-war-and-the-evolution-of-europe/>.

²⁷ *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* s.v. “Asymmetric Warfare,” accessed June 2, 2015, [http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/asymmetric warfare](http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/asymmetric%20warfare).

²⁸ Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, JP 1-02 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

²⁹ Department of Defense.

³⁰ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, s.v. “Guerilla Warfare,” accessed July 27, 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/guerrilla-warfare>.

asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will."³¹

- **Ambiguous warfare**, according to Mary Ellen Connell and Ryan Evans, “applies in situations in which a state or non-state belligerent actor deploys troops and proxies in a deceptive and confusing manner—with the intent of achieving political and military effects while obscuring the belligerent’s direct participation.”³²

- **Compound warfare**, as Thomas M. Huber points out, “is the simultaneous use of a regular or main force and an irregular or guerrilla force against an enemy. In other words, the compound warfare increases military leverage by applying both conventional and unconventional force at the same time.”³³

As we see, all of these types of warfare have elements of hybrid warfare. Even Hoffman mentions: “hybrid wars are not new, but they are different. In this kind of warfare, forces become blurred into the same force or are applied in the same battlespace.”³⁴ He tries to find an answer as to how to fight against the adversary if the opposing forces use all forms of war (conventional and unconventional) simultaneously, especially when an enemy would use nonconventional weapons and tactics against large, cumbersome, and hierarchical organizations that are intellectually or doctrinally inflexible.³⁵ He points out the complexity of modern warfare when an adversary employs combinations of capabilities to gain an asymmetric advantage.³⁶ These are the key points of his theory of hybrid warfare.

³¹ Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept*, JOC (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joc_iw_v1.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162020-260.

³² Mary Ellen Connell and Ryan Evans, “Russia’s ‘Ambiguous Warfare’ and Implications for the U.S. Marine Corps,” *CNA Occasional Paper, Strategic Studies* (CNA Analysis and Solutions, May 2015), 1, accessed July 27, 2018, <https://www.cna.org/research/2015/russias-ambiguous-warfare>.

³³ Thomas M. Huber, *Compound Warfare: A Conceptual Framework* (Stockton, CA: University of the Pacific, 2004), 1.

³⁴ Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 52 (Fourth Quarter, 2009): 34–39, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqhoffman.pdf>.

³⁵ Hoffman, 34–39.

³⁶ Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict,” *Strategic Forum*, No. 240 (April 2009): 1.

Despite the numerous criticisms from those more at home with the history of war and the evolution of military doctrine in a more rigorous form, the term hybrid war appeared in the U.S. Field Manual in 2011.³⁷ In the same year, NATO initiated work on countering hybrid threats. The Russian Federation military leaders also closely followed the new tendencies in the field of military science: they not only studied Hoffman's theory of hybrid war, but also developed it further, focusing on unconventional and non-military measures. The trends of armed conflicts in the future were identified by General Valerii Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, in the journal "*Voenno-promishlenniy Kurier*" in 2013.³⁸

Analyzing this article, several key points can be singled out:

- the differences between wartime and peace time are blurred, wars are no longer declared, they just start;
- the role of non-military methods during conflicts in future will increase, and their effectiveness significantly surpasses the strength of weapons; and
- the importance of the non-military approaches such as economic, information, political, diplomatic, and other non-military actions can be realized with the use of the potential of local protesters. These actions are augmented by military measures of a hidden nature, including the implementation of information confrontation activities and the activities of special forces.³⁹

Gerasimov in his work also emphasizes the increased role of asymmetric actions, which can reduce the superiority of the enemy even before the beginning of active hostilities. He predicts extensive use of special forces and the creation of internal opposition in the territory of an opposing state in order to apply constant pressure on the enemy. In addition, according to the experience of the war in Libya, Gerasimov offers to use private military companies broadly in cooperation with the armed opposition

³⁷ U.S. Army Field Manual, *Operations*, FM 3-0 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2017), <http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-0.pdf>.

³⁸ Valerii Gerasimov, "Tsennost' Nauki v Predvideniy," [The Value of Science in Foresight. New Challenges Require Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Warfare] *Voyenno-promishlenniy Kurier*, February 27, 2013, <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632>.

³⁹ Gerasimov.

formations. He also states that the role of information impact will increase; the information confrontation opens wide asymmetric opportunities to reduce the enemy's combat potential, and the forms and methods of information impact should be modernized and improved.

Instead of conventional forms and methods, Gerasimov proposes these new forms and methods:

- use of peacetime-size troops at the beginning of military operations;
- use of extremely maneuverable non-contact fighting interspecific groups of troops;
- decrease of military and economic potential of the opposing country by defeating its critical military and civil infrastructure facilities within a short period;
- massive application of precision-guided munitions, large-scale use of special forces, robotic complexes and weapons based on innovative physical principles;
- participation in combat actions other formations, such as a civil-military (paramilitary, proxy) elements;
- synchronized impact on the adversary's troops and facilities in the full depth of its territory, armed struggle in all spheres;
- application of asymmetric and unintended actions; and
- management of forces and assets in a unified information space.⁴⁰

All these forms and methods were used during the annexation of Crimea in 2014; however, preparation for this operation began long before 2014. Military experts now consider the annexation of Crimea as a vivid example of hybrid warfare, when in full accordance with the "Gerasimov doctrine" the proportion of non-military and military measures was 4:1; that is, four times more non-military measures were employed than military actions. Namely, non-military measures such as political and diplomatic pressure, the creation of political opposition, the activities of opposition forces, and the massive

⁴⁰ Gerasimov.

conduct of information campaigns led under a single plan and under a single leadership allowed Putin to annex Crimea.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The question of civil-military relations is particularly pertinent during instability, insecurity, and war. Most scholars (such as Huntington, Craig, Finer) underscore that democratic civilian control is the key element of robust civil-military relations in which the military must remain out of politics (be neutral, apolitical and focus exclusively on military issues). Yet, in a time of hybrid warfare when all is blur and blend it is hard to draw a clear line between civil and military actions: very often military measures have political consequences and vice versa.

In the 21st century the actors of Clausewitz's Trinity: the People, the Military, and the Government,⁴¹ must work together as one mechanism aimed at the counteractions to hybrid threats. Hitherto, this trinity has fought in the conditions of a traditional war or counterterrorism/counterinsurgency (COIN). Nowadays, however, the states should rebuild the COIN strategy, or rather, build a new, counter hybrid strategy (CHS). Moreover, the role of civil-military relations in this CHS is crucial, because Russia prefers acting not in the conventional military domain, but primarily focusing on non-military measures. As ex-senior United States intelligence officer with 30 years' experience, Kevin McCauley mentions: "Russia's new-generation warfare constitutes a unique combination of political warfare, public diplomacy, economic leverage and intimidation, active measures, disinformation, propaganda, reflexive control, covert operation, conventional and unconventional military power, psychological warfare, and support of ethnic Russian fifth columnists, which has served Kremlin's objectives well to date."⁴²

Since autumn 2015 Ukraine's situation in Donbas is more or less the same: a stationary warfare is continuing, actively using special small sabotage groups and snipers. In addition to supporting and supplying the illegal armed groups, Russia has changed the

⁴¹ Clausewitz, 89.

⁴² Kevin McCauley, *Russian Influence Campaigns against the West: From the Cold War to Putin* (North Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016), 371.

main vector of its actions; now Russia's nefarious purpose is establishing internal conflict within Ukraine, conducting the information operations and propaganda campaigns, and destabilizing the country by perpetrating killings and acts of sabotage. Demonstrative killings of Russian and non-Russian citizens in Ukraine, Great Britain, and other countries should first of all show the Russians themselves that the "traitors" of the current regime will pay for their actions, no matter where they hide from Russian special services.

Russia's ideology focuses on dividing the Ukrainian society: to introduce into the Ukrainian nation the idea that there is no reason to fight against their Russian brothers. Instead of this, the ideology maintains, the people of Ukraine should struggle against Ukrainian oligarchs and people who have dragged Ukraine into a war with Russia. This is the classical technique of Russia—the substitution of concepts, when one stands out for another, and a lie is presented as a truth that does not lend itself to doubt and criticism. In these circumstances robust civil-military relations is a key to success in a time of fight against Ukraine's hybrid neighbor.

My main hypothesis is that in this situation Ukraine's top priority must be robust civil-military relations that unite the country in order to avoid annihilation of independence and, in fact, the Ukrainian state as well. Thus, the military should be involved in political matters because the absolute separation of military from political functions as a way to help solve the problems of civil-military relations is ruled out as impossible to achieve.⁴³

The key question here is how to retain a civilian democratic control in a time of hybrid warfare and keep the balance between democratic freedoms and military necessity. From my perspective, in order to retain effective civil-military relations when one's country is involved in hybrid warfare, it is necessary to provide strong and robust vertical and horizontal communication and interconnection between all members of the security sector and civil society on all levels (in the particular frameworks of special working groups and organizations).

⁴³ Paul Y. Hammond, *Organizing for Defense. The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 8.

Moreover, it is necessary to establish legislative support of the security sector in order to enhance the defense and security sector (create new laws/regulations and change outmoded ones). In addition, democratic civilian control should focus on military issues and control how the military spends the money of the citizens (efficiency). Correspondingly, the military should show the results of its expenditures to society. For instance, 110 new houses (barracks) were built for the military, military salaries increased two times, wounded soldiers have undergone rehabilitation at the expense of the state, and so on. Besides, the Ukrainian military has to inform the population about the real current situation to mitigate the influence of Russian propaganda and aspire to dominate in the information sphere.

In a vivid example of such circumstances, only a comprehensive approach by all members of Ukrainian society, in which civilian and military actors trust each other to work together and help each other, will protect the state and system of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). Another key point in a time of hybrid warfare is the explanation of the ways, ends, and means of the rival; it is essential to talk to the people and unite them against the adversary, and all these tasks must be made by CIMIC Teams on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Additionally, one of the most important issues in hybrid warfare is protecting the national identity and formulating a national ideal (as Churchill did in 1940, when England was one step from conquest by Nazi Germany). This must be carried out while enhancing civil preparedness and societal resilience. France in 1939–1940 had neither first, nor second and third; they did not prepare for a fight and they did not want to fight, and as a result France fell.

Finally, in a time of hybrid warfare the best advice is to keep calm, retain a clear mind, use critical thinking to reject Russian propaganda, and be ready to fight on all fronts.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to prove the hypothesis mentioned earlier in this chapter, this thesis considers comparative case studies of Crimea and Donbas in Ukraine. Using my own military experience, as well as local and international eyewitness accounts, I try to prove

the point that robust civil-military relations is one of the crucial factors for counteraction in a time of hybrid warfare. Further, the work relies on an examination of appropriate literature, open-source documents, as well as media materials in English, Russian, and Ukrainian. Necessary materials may be taken from the policy documents and institutional reports as well as academic papers, reinforced by evidence in a variety of NATO, EU, and U.S. legal documents.

The cases of Crimea and Donbas are clear examples of Russian hybrid actions: however, if in Crimea the Russians completely achieved their political goals, in Donbas, Russian hybrid aggression was stopped. Ukraine has shown to the entire world that a country with less military potential may not only stop a formidable aggressor, but also zealously fight and not give up. The unity of Ukrainian society and the unpredictable resistance of most Ukrainians in Donbas came as a surprise to Russia. In the Kremlin it was thought that Donbas would be easy prey, but when the Ukrainian military got a clear order from the civilian Supreme Commander (Acting President of Ukraine), they started to push back the separatists. In this case, Russia had no other choice but to begin a direct military invasion into Donbas. Currently, Russia continues to deny the direct involvement of Russian military; however, as Heidi Reisinger and Alexander Golts have observed: “the escalation of operation had already reached a level where it no longer made any sense to deny the participation of Russia. The number of their casualties had inevitably grown. This forces Moscow to adapt its narrative.”⁴⁴

Nowadays, Ukraine is experiencing its second birth; the army of Ukraine is recognized as one of the strongest in Europe.⁴⁵ It stopped the Russian horde and prevented the collapse of the country. And the military parade that took place on the main street of Ukraine on August 24, 2018, is an element of this hybrid war as well. This is Ukraine’s response to Russia and all the skeptics. For four and a half years the army of Ukraine has

⁴⁴ Heidi Reisinger and Alexander Golts, “NATO’s Response to Hybrid Threats. Russia’s Hybrid Warfare: Waging War below the Radar of Traditional Collective Defence,” *NATO Defence College “NDC Forum Paper Series”* (November 2014), 121.

⁴⁵ Mykola Bielieskov, “Ukraine’s Military Is Back,” *The Buzz* (blog) *The National Interest*, last modified February 27, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/ukraines-military-back-24674>.

changed; a new uniform, weapons, military equipment, and armaments have been established. Nevertheless, the fight is continuing; the overwhelming majority of the population of Ukraine is ready to fight against Russia on all fronts—military, political, diplomatic, economic, and others.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter has introduced the historical background of Russian-Ukrainian relations and explained why Ukraine is so important for the Russian Federation. Additionally, the first chapter has also described the Russian use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine and provided case studies of Crimea and Donbas. Chapter II focuses on civil-military relations in Ukraine during Ukraine's independence from 1991 to 2013 and after the Revolution of Dignity to the current time. Chapter III explains the CIMIC: the case study of the creation of the Ukrainian CIMIC system since 2014 and why this tool is effective and important during hybrid warfare. I compare and contrast the "classical" peacekeeping CIMIC and modern, present-day Ukraine's approach of CIMIC. Chapter IV clarifies what Ukraine has already done to counter Russian hybrid aggression. Finally, Chapter V ties the thesis together, draws overall conclusions, and provides policy recommendations for Ukraine, NATO, and the EU in the light of counteracting Russian hybrid warfare and implications for European and global security.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: WHY UKRAINE IS SO IMPORTANT TO RUSSIA, THE RUSSIAN APPROACH TO HYBRID WARFARE IN UKRAINE

On December 5, 1994, Ukraine, the United States, Great Britain, and the Russian Federation signed the Budapest Memorandum, which stated that these members of the “nuclear club” would provide security to Ukraine in exchange for its relinquishment of nuclear weapons. Ukraine, which at that time possessed the world’s third-largest nuclear potential, agreed to become a nuclear-free state.⁴⁶ Ukraine has believed the guarantees of these countries, primarily Russia, a country with which the Ukraine shares a common history during the era of the USSR.

Precisely 20 years later, at what it considers a convenient moment, however, Russia has broken this memorandum. The leadership of the Kremlin believes that Ukraine remains a significant part of the “Russian world” and is in the sphere of Russia’s most important geopolitical interests. Ukraine’s desire to be part of the EU absolutely does not match the interests of Russia. Moscow has always been firmly convinced that if it does not control Ukraine, Russia will never become a world-leading state and that a democratic and prosperous Ukraine will threaten the authoritarian power in Russia.

In order to understand why robust civil-military relations is such an important issue in a time of hybrid warfare in Ukraine, it is critical to understand the historical background of Russo-Ukrainian relations—the source of the present situation between the two countries, which in turn has spurred Ukraine’s development of CIVIL-MILITARY relations. Understanding this history will give insight into the motivations of one of the world’s leading hybrid threats, and is essential to countering it.

Why has Russia been trying with such stubbornness to conquer Ukraine? Simply put, Ukraine is vital for Russia. The history of the relationship between Russia and Ukraine

⁴⁶ “Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (official memorandum, Budapest, December 19, 1994), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_1994_1399.pdf.

shows that Russia has long considered Ukraine to be its colony and has mercilessly exploited its rich natural and human resources. Moreover, while Ukraine has protected the southwestern borders of Russia from diverse rivals, an independent Ukraine would have threatened Russia, as it could conduct an independent policy and become a potential ally in the struggle of other countries against Russia.

This chapter therefore explores why Ukraine is so important for the Russian Federation and why the world's largest country over the centuries has aimed to destroy Ukrainian statehood. This chapter contends that Ukraine is a regional gateway, a transnational intersection, and a hub of natural and human resources, all of which makes it valuable to Russia and to Russia's intent to expand its empire. This chapter examines how the Russian Federation annexed and, in fact, captured part of Ukrainian territory—the Crimean Peninsula—and started hybrid (including conventional) warfare in the eastern regions of Ukraine-Donbas. Finally, this chapter explains the situation in Ukraine and the future prospects of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: WHY UKRAINE IS SO IMPORTANT TO RUSSIA

This section explores historical review of Ukraine-Russia relationship from 18th century to nowadays.

1. Relations with the Russian Empire, 1700–1917

At the end of the 17th century, Ukrainian lands were a regional gateway that linked the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. Eighty percent of the territory of Ukraine was subject to the Russian emperors; the rest inhabited the Hapsburg Empire. The majority of the population of Ukraine at that time consisted of peasants, which allowed Ukrainian landlords who served the Russian Empire a means of control. Destruction of Ukrainian statehood in the 17th century by Russian tsarism was accompanied by russification of the indigenous population. This colonial policy toward the Ukrainian people was carried out

both ideologically and administratively. Tsarist administrators displaced the Ukrainian language from imperial and educational institutions on all levels.⁴⁷

At the end of the 19th century, Russia started actively exploiting rich natural resources of Ukraine. In Ukraine heavy industry such as coal, iron, steel, metallurgy, and machine-building began to develop rapidly. The main coal base in Ukraine was the Donetsk Basin, which at the beginning of 20th century provided almost 70 percent of the total coal of the Russian Empire.⁴⁸ However, the development of the Ukrainian industry was one-sided. Before the World War I, Ukrainian industry accounted for 70 percent of the total extraction of raw materials in the Russian Empire and only 15 percent of finished goods.⁴⁹ This imbalance was the result of Russia's colonial economic policy toward Ukrainian lands and its ruthless exploitation of Ukraine's natural and human resources.

Russia became the Russian Empire thanks to Ukraine and the access it provided Russia to the Black and Azov seas. This access allowed Russia not only to expand its territory but also to increase its influence in Europe and the Middle East. Additionally, Ukraine's natural and human resources gave the Russian Empire great benefits for further development of heavy industry during the industrial revolution.

2. Relations during Soviet Times, 1917–1991

In November 1917, a revolution took place in Russia and Ukraine, creating a source of natural and human resources for the new Soviet Republic that evolved from this revolution. As a result, Russia experienced five years of civil war and replaced the former Russian Empire in 1922 with one of the most powerful states in the world—the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). As a result of this civil war, Ukraine “joined” the USSR. Thus, Ukraine obtained socialist industrialization and collectivization. Thousands of wealthy peasants in Ukraine were declared “kulaks,” arrested, and sent to Siberia. Their

⁴⁷ “Ukraine in the Composition of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires (the End of the 18th and the Beginning of the 20th Century),” Training Materials Online, accessed November 29, 2018, https://pidruchniki.com/13990908/istoriya/ukrayina_skladi_rosiyskoyi_avstro-ugorskoyi_imperiya.

⁴⁸ “Ukraine in the Composition of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires.

⁴⁹ “Ukraine in the Composition of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires.

property and houses were confiscated and distributed among the poor, who had to cultivate farmland not for money but for working hours; instead of actual money people obtained a virtual paydays. One of the most terrible crimes of the Soviet government in relation to Ukraine was the *Holodomor*, or artificial famine. Due to the *Holodomor* in Ukraine, according to the updated data, between 3 and 3.5 million people died.⁵⁰ At that time, most of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and military leaders were killed, executed, and imprisoned by Soviet repressive machine because of their political views, which differed from those of Stalin and the Communist Party.

World War II had a great influence on the whole of humanity, and Ukraine was not an exception. For 40 months—from June 22, 1941 to October 1944—the war took place in the territory of Ukraine. When Nazi Germany came to Ukraine, a regime of violence and terror began in the territory of the state. From 1941 to 1944, the deadly wave of war swept through Ukraine twice; during the war years, every sixth inhabitant of Ukraine died.⁵¹

In 1944, the liberation of the territory of Ukraine began. It took place in several stages, and on October 28, 1944, the whole territory of Ukraine was liberated from the enemy.⁵² In extremely difficult and unfavorable conditions, Ukraine returned to peaceful life. The years of post-war reconstruction of Ukraine's economy were very difficult and debilitating, because Soviet leadership implemented a system that concentrated on the reconstruction of industry and the military-industrial complex instead of raising the standard of living of the people.⁵³

After World War II, there was a certain increase in the welfare of the people and in salaries. Nevertheless, the relative welfare of the people in the 1960s and 1970s came at the expense of the sale of national natural resources, including oil, gas, coal, and the forests.

⁵⁰ "10 facts about the Holodomor," BBC, November 22, 2013, https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/science/2013/11/131120_holodomor_10_facts_ko.

⁵¹ "Ukraine after the Second World War. Ukraine in the Post-war Years. The Crisis of Totalitarianism," Osvita.ua, March 23, 2013, <http://osvita.ua/vnz/reports/history/35642/>.

⁵² "Ukraine in the Composition of the USSR," Education.ua, accessed December 1, 2018, https://web.posibnyky.vntu.edu.ua/icgn/azarova_krayinoznavstvo_inozem_sluhachiv/5.html.

⁵³ "Ukraine after the Second World War. Ukraine in the Post-war Years. The Crisis of Totalitarianism," Osvita.ua, March 23, 2013, <http://osvita.ua/vnz/reports/history/35642/>.

With the end of the oil boom of the 1970s, billions of U.S. dollars began to appear in the USSR budget. As a result, tens of billions of rubles were not used to modernize the national economy as a whole or to significantly improve the socio-cultural sphere, but instead used on development of military potential.⁵⁴

The USSR had an equally devastating impact on Ukrainian social institutions, including the institutes of history of Ukraine, the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and Ukrainian newspapers and magazines. The USSR launched a campaign against prominent figures of Ukrainian culture. Ukrainians were once again reminded that they were living in a state that was not interested in developing Ukrainian national culture. In response, in the 1950s, a dissident movement arose in Ukraine. The dissident movement was an all-Ukrainian phenomenon. It aimed at the unrestricted development of Ukrainian language and culture and the provision of civil rights.

The leadership of the Communist Party was not able to respond adequately to the demands of the time. The general crisis of society was aggravated. The issue of change turned into a question of the life or death for the Soviet system. In March 1985, Gorbachev was elected the new head of the USSR. He initiated in the USSR the beginning of the restructuring of society, culminating in the disintegration of the USSR in 1991.

3. Relations after the Collapse of the USSR, 1991–2018: Trade Wars

There is nothing new in the fact that the real causes of war are rooted not in politics, but in economics. Of course, the famous Clausewitzian⁵⁵ assertion that war is “a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means”⁵⁶ is still true, as it is true that politics is a continuation of the economy. Delving deeply into the causes of wars usually reveals an economic reason, either the seizure of resources (natural or human) or the reduction or destruction of the economic potential of an adversary.

⁵⁴ “Collapse of Democracy,” Training Materials Online, accessed November 29, 2018, https://pidruchniki.com/1988051944792/istoriya/zgortannya_demokratiyi.

⁵⁵ Prussian general and military theorist (June 1, 1780–November 16, 1831).

⁵⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, 87.

Ukraine is not Russia. This is not only the title of one of Leonid Kuchma's books,⁵⁷ but it is also the whole process of awareness of Ukraine's national and mental affiliation. Unfortunately, even now, the majority of ordinary foreigners perceive Ukraine as part of Russia. The problem here is not only insufficient promotion of a positive image of Ukraine in the international arena by Ukrainian politicians and diplomats but also the absence of an internal request from Kyiv to form and promote the idea that "Ukraine is not Russia."

"The Soviet Union is impossible without Ukraine," said Boris Yeltsin⁵⁸ in a television interview on November 30, 1991.⁵⁹ This is true; not all other countries with common history meet Russia's strategic interests. It must be said that the initial position of Russia on the global stage after the breakdown of the Soviet Union was greatly superior to Ukraine's. Moscow inherited a seat on the UN Security Council, obtained the Diamond Fund, Gold USSR currency reserves, and avoided claims that it possessed a nuclear weapons arsenal. Comparing the disconnection of the former Soviet republics from Russia makes it clear that, in the early 1990s, other republics were almost deprived of the family of "brother" nations. It is necessary to remember that Russia privatized a significant part of the common historical heritage of the USSR, thereby laying the foundations for the future enslavement of Ukraine because Russia and Ukraine are "one nation," and Russia used this argument as well when it annexed Crimea.

At the time of Ukraine's independence, its fuel and energy complex was an integral part of the energy complex of the former USSR. Ukraine depended directly on the decisions made in Moscow about the methods and mechanisms of mutual settlements, ensuring the stability of the energy systems, the volumes of energy supplies for consumers in Ukraine, and their transit across the territory.⁶⁰ After gaining political independence, Ukraine,

⁵⁷ The President of Ukraine, 1994–2004.

⁵⁸ The first President of the Russian Federation, 1991–1999.

⁵⁹ Andrei Illarionov, "Why the SSG Was "Completely Unacceptable" without Ukraine: The Answer to the Question Asked Earlier," *Live Journal*, December 21, 2016, <https://aillarionov.livejournal.com/968319.html>.

⁶⁰ *Analytical Report of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada "About Internal and External Status of Ukraine in 2018"* (Kyiv: National Institute of Strategic Research, 2018), accessed October 10, 2018, http://www.niss.gov.ua/public/File/analit_dopovid_POSLANNYA_2018_FINAL_Oct_02.pdf.

unfortunately, did not gain energy independence in terms of resources and technology. Until 2014, Ukraine remained virtually completely dependent on decisions made in Moscow, in particular regarding the supply of nuclear fuel, natural gas, oil, and other petroleum products. It was also dependent on Moscow's decisions for the loading of transit routes of hydrocarbons. This arrangement would ensure the stability of the power and gas transmission systems.

The Russian Federation did not hesitate to use Ukrainian dependence on Russian gas to put pressure on Ukraine.⁶¹ Russia used the “gas question” for the first time in September 1993 when, after negotiations, Ukraine exchanged part of its Black Sea Fleet ships for the cancellation of \$800 million of its first gas debt to Russia.⁶² Russia understood the power of the “energy weapon” and continued to use it as a lever in order to apply political and economic pressure on its opponents. In March 1994, Gazprom⁶³ suspended supplies of gas to Ukraine. At that moment, Ukraine's gas debt exceeded 1 trillion rubles.⁶⁴ Gazprom demanded a solution to the debt problem by transferring a part of the property rights of Ukrainian gas pipelines and enterprises. On March 10, during the Ukrainian–Russian negotiations, Gazprom decided to continue supplying gas to Ukraine. Russia was once again convinced of the effectiveness of its “energy weapon” and firmly consolidated it as an element of non-military influence.

The first war in Chechnya in 1995 temporarily forced Russia to shift its vector of attention from external to internal problems. Nonetheless, when Putin came to power in 1999, Russia again actively began to increase the degree of its influence, primarily in the neighboring countries important for Russia, primarily in economic terms. Unfortunately, Ukraine was one of the first on this list. In 1999–2001, Ukraine continued its policy of concessions, which are now perceived by Ukrainian political experts as completely

⁶¹ Olena Sukhodolia, “World Hybrid Warfare: Ukrainian Front” (Kyiv, National Institute of Strategic Research, 2017), 229.

⁶² Vitaliy Knyazhansky, “Stories of Gas Wars,” Day.kyiv.ua, last modified February 23, 2016, <https://day.kyiv.ua/uk/article/ekonomika/istoriyi-gazovyh-voyen>.

⁶³ The Russian state gas corporation, the main Russian gas supplier-monopolist.

⁶⁴ Leonid Kuchma, *Ukraine Is not Russia* (Kyiv: Vremia, 2003), 220.

unjustified. For gas debts, Ukraine transferred to Russia eight Tu-160 strategic bombers, three Tu-95MS, about 600 X-22 cruise missiles, as well as all kinds of ground equipment.⁶⁵ At the same time, there were constant allegations from the Russian side that Ukraine stole gas from a transit pipe.

Analysis of Russia's behavior since 2000 shows that it has continued to consistently utilize economic leverage based in energy as a weapon. The Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2030 has a statement: "Russia has significant reserves of energy resources and a powerful fuel and energy complex, which is the basis of economic development, an instrument of domestic and foreign policy."⁶⁶ Russian President Vladimir Putin signed this document in August 2003, and it has served as an instrument to achieve Russia's political goals in its relations with Ukraine.

The most important and powerful applications of this instrument were the two "gas" trade wars that Russia waged against Ukraine in 2005–2006 and again in 2008–2009. The first gas conflict against Ukraine started in 2005 and was a clear example that the economy was to be a continuation of politics. Ukraine held presidential elections in 2004, in which Russia supported the pro-Russian presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich. By contributing to the victory of Viktor Yanukovich, the Russian authorities approved an additional agreement for a contract between Gazprom and Naftogaz (the Ukrainian state gas company), which, for a five-year term lasting until 2009, set for Ukraine a fixed price for Russian gas—\$50 per thousand cubic meters.⁶⁷ It would show Ukrainians that Yanukovich could obtain benefits for the people of Ukraine on the very sensitive matter of gas and would give additional benefits to Yanukovich as president. Instead of Yanukovich, however, Viktor Yushchenko became the President of Ukraine due to the Orange Revolution.

⁶⁵ Knyazhansky.

⁶⁶ Institute of Energy Strategy, *Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2030* (Russian Federation, Moscow, 2010), http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_%28Eng%29.pdf.

⁶⁷ Knyazhansky.

In March 2005, Russia decided that the time of “privileges” (this “discount” gas price of \$50 per 1000 m³) for Ukraine ended, and Russian Gazprom demanded that Ukraine pay for gas from 2006 onward at prices close to European equivalents, about \$250 per 1000 m³. Gazprom tried to increase its profits from the sale of gas from \$3 billion to \$5 billion annually⁶⁸ and began to engage in the construction of gas pipelines around the territory of Ukraine, called “Yamal – Europe” and the “Nord Stream.” These new gas routes led to a decrease in the amount of gas transit through Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine’s energy policy started to find ways to get rid of its dependence on Russian gas, to search for alternative fuels and pursue energy efficiency.

At the end of 2005, Ukraine received an actual Russian ultimatum: before December 1, Ukraine would accept the Russian gas price of \$160 per 1000 m³. Ukraine did not agree, and by mid-December, the price offered by Russia was raised to \$220–\$230 per 1000 m³. Ex-advisor to the Russian President for Economic Affairs Andrei Illarionov later called this conflict between Russia and Ukraine “a gas war” and acknowledged that Russia had used “energy weapons” against Ukraine.⁶⁹ Under such dictation, Ukraine refused to sign contracts for gas supplies in 2006. Correspondingly, it blocked Russian gas from January 1.

The conflict was suspended overnight between January 3 and 4 with the signing of documents that seemed to satisfy both sides. The parties succeeded in signing an agreement that ended the practice of barter trade (transit for gas in exchange for gas supplies), and as a result, these two things began to be considered separately. The five-year contract provided gas supplies to Ukraine through an intermediary company, RosUkrEnergo, while Russia offered gas to Ukraine at a rate of \$95 per 1000 m³ for the first half-year.⁷⁰

In autumn 2008, however, Russia started the second gas war. This conflict was preceded by a powerful Russian informational campaign. Through controlled media (both Russian and Western), Russia conveyed to Western states the idea that Ukraine continued

⁶⁸ Institute of Energy Strategy.

⁶⁹ Knyazhansky.

⁷⁰ Knyazhansky.

to steal gas from the transit pipe, which was why Western consumers were losing their gas. The result was that Russia halted the supply of gas to Ukraine from January 1, 2009; and since January 5, its supply to European customers decreased. After January 7, transit of gas from Russia through Ukraine was suspended completely. At the same time, representatives of Gazprom cynically blamed Ukraine for blocking gas that was already paid for from reaching the European countries. The supply of Russian gas was only renewed on January 20, after the relevant contracts were signed in Moscow.⁷¹

Similar to three years prior, the attack on Ukrainian interests started in January and was accompanied by a massive outreach program supported by statements from representatives of the political leadership of Russia. Actually, the cessation of gas supplies to Ukraine took place according to the same scenario as in 2006. First to shut down were compressor stations that supplied gas to eastern Ukraine, whose population was mostly friendly to Russia and critical of Ukraine's authorities.

The gas conflict of 2009 had far-reaching goals. Russia intended the absence of gas in Ukraine to play the role of a detonator for provoking East–West confrontation and political conflict in Ukraine. The idea was that in the case of full cessation of Russian gas, the Ukrainian government would not provide gas from the western gas storage facilities to the main industrial centers in the East, in which case those areas would remain without heat. The development of the situation was supposed to provoke, according to the plan of the Russian strategists, social protests and unrest in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine.

In 2009, the Russian Foundation used a “semi-rigid” or “soft power” scenario in order to subdue Ukraine. This scenario provided for emergency deployment of Russian military contingents to Ukraine. The scenario consisted of several tasks: these contingents would protect the “interim government,” the dynamic deployment of local authorities’ in the occupied territories based on well-prepared “forces of defense” (marginalized groups who criticized the power in Kyiv), and the creation of “independent” quasi-state

⁷¹ Knyazhansky.

formations.⁷² It was not by chance that on January 12, 2009, Russian mass media broadcast publications on the subject of border revision and statements by Russian politician Konstantin Zatulin, a member of the Russian State Duma. He said that Russia would “Give the sign at the right moment to the south-eastern regions of Ukraine for joining Russia.”⁷³ In 2009, this scenario did not work because the Ukrainian gas transportation system was restarted in the reverse regime of exploitation and the central, eastern, and southern regions of Ukraine received gas from western gas storage facilities. Nonetheless, in 2014, Russia implemented an improved hybrid war scenario, which it had been preparing for in advance.⁷⁴

B. RUSSIAN USE OF HYBRID WARFARE IN UKRAINE

This section clarifies how Russia annexed Crimea and started war on Donbas, the eastern part of Ukraine.

1. Annexation of the Crimea: Ways, Means, and Consequences

The operation to seize the Crimea was being prepared not for some days, but for several years. Russia tried to implement a “peaceful” invasion for the first time in 2003, when it “suddenly” began to pour an artificial dam from the Russian Kuban in the direction of Ukrainian territory, the island Kosa Tuzla. Yevhen Mahda, a Ukrainian political scientist, mentions: “The conflict over the island of Kosa Tuzla demonstrated Moscow’s desire to return Ukraine into Russia’s sphere of monopoly power. It is not episodic, or accidental. Vladimir Putin launched an offensive on the Ukrainian position, armed with a strategy of indirect actions.”⁷⁵ Indeed, it was the first attempt to use non-military measures in order to achieve political goals.

⁷² “Hybrid War in Eastern Europe. Energy Component,” Information Resistance, accessed October 17, 2018, <http://sprotyv.info/ru/news/10317-gibridnaya-voyna-v-vostochnoyevrope-nevoennoe-izmerenie-energeticheskoy-komponent-chast>.

⁷³ “Ettinger Acknowledged the Likelihood of Gas Theft by Ukraine,” Lenta.ru, August 28, 2014, <http://lenta.ru/news/2014/08/28/stealgas/>. Accessed October 17, 2018.

⁷⁴ Yevhen Mahda, *Hybrid War: Survive and Win* (Kharkiv: Vivat, 2015), 114.

⁷⁵ Yevhen Mahda, *Russian Hybrid Aggression: Lessons for the World* (Kyiv: Kalamar, 2018), 55.

Putin claimed that no dam was being poured—merely that the shore was being strengthened. It was a classic example of *ikhtamnet*—“there is nobody there.” Yet, the Russians wanted to seize control of the Kerch Strait. It is the only channel where the sea is so deep that ships can pass from the Black Sea to the Azov Sea; this channel runs between Tuzla and Crimea and was completely under the control of Ukraine. In addition, while controlling the Kerch Strait, Russia could prevent the entry of NATO warships into the Azov Sea.⁷⁶

Ukraine reacted quickly, rigidly, and adequately. On the island a border outpost was immediately established; heavy military vehicles appeared, Ukrainian military aircraft began patrolling over Kerch straits, and Ukrainian warships pulled up to the island. The President of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, interrupted his visit to Brazil and personally visited the island. This was a clear signal to Russia that Ukraine was ready to fight for Ukraine’s land.

More than a month after the beginning of the conflict, Russia stopped construction of the dam and negotiations were started. As a result, Russia stopped construction of the dam and Tuzla remained Ukrainian, but no other countries’ military ships could pass through the Kerch Strait without Moscow’s consent. To put it differently, for Ukraine it was not a victory at all: Russia wanted to share this part of the sea together and got what it wanted. Nevertheless, on the wave of success, Ukrainian politicians and society missed this point, and the right conclusions were not drawn: The Ukrainian political establishment did not enhance Ukraine’s defense and information capabilities. On the other hand, Russia drew the right conclusions. Russia understood that blackmail, insolent lies (“they are not there”), intimidation, and provocation are effective tools to capture what belongs to another country.

The Russian Federation closely followed the new tendencies in the field of military science. Russians studied Hoffman’s theory of hybrid warfare: “the coordinated use of

⁷⁶ Valentina Eminova, “The War for Tuzla: How 14 Years ago We Beat her off from Russia, and How We Defended it during the “Russian Spring,” Depo.ua, September 29, 2018, <https://www.depo.ua/rus/life/viyna-za-tuzlu-yak-rosiya-14-rokiv-repetiruvava-okupaciyu-20170928648584>.

different modes of warfare, both military (use of force) and non-military (irregular tactics, criminal disorder, terrorist acts, etc.) to achieve ‘synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict’ within the main battlespace.”⁷⁷ Moreover, they developed it further, focusing on nonconventional and non-military measures. The chart in Figure 1 is from a 2013 article that appeared in the Russian military magazine *Voennopromishlenniy Kurier*. In this article, the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General Gerasimov, describes the Russian vision of modern warfare, wherein the role of non-military methods in achieving political goals will significantly increase.⁷⁸ According to Gerasimov, military measures will start only during the crisis phase of a conflict (steps four and five along the x-axis of the chart; see the gray area) and only to enhance and support non-military actions.

⁷⁷ Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid War.”

⁷⁸ Gerasimov.




Figure 1. Russian vision of hybrid warfare.⁷⁹

The operation to capture Crimea was planned and carried out in full accordance with this chart. Pro-Russian political parties and movements in the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine were created and financed by Russia; leading officials in Crimea and continental Ukraine were bribed; in 2013, people who had Russian citizenship and who worked for Russia were appointed as Ukraine's Minister of Defense and its Head of the Security Service. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs wrote that "Dmitry Solomatin and Pavel Lebedev, Ministers of Defense in 2012–2014, were Russian citizens.

⁷⁹ Michael Kofman, "Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Dark Arts," War on the Rocks, March 11, 2016, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/>.

The head of Ukraine's State Security Service in 2013–2014, Alexander Yakimenko, was a Russian national as well and had served in the Russian army.”⁸⁰ They all were Russian “people of influence.”

In order to achieve its goals in Crimea, Russia used several tools: a Russian-speaking population, the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and a colossal propaganda campaign. In addition, it undertook corruption in high- and middle-level Ukrainian politics and military. It also engaged in political warfare and put economic pressure on Ukraine as well. One of the most powerful destabilizing factors in Crimea was its Russian-speaking population. Russia used it as a base and a cause for the invasion. Where did the Russian-speaking population come from? Here it is necessary to recall 1944, when, in accordance with Stalin's order, more than 200,000 Crimean Tatars, the native local population, together with Greeks, Armenians, Bulgarians, and other “German accomplices,” were forcibly deported from Crimea into Siberia's concentration camps, allegedly because of “treason and cooperation with Nazi Germany.”⁸¹ In their houses, Russian residents from Siberia and central regions of Russia were resettled. It is their descendants who supported the separation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, and it is these people at whom Moscow's propaganda was aimed.

Another form of leverage Russia used to influence Ukraine was the Russian Black Sea Fleet based in Crimea. Despite the fact that Article 17 of the Constitution of Ukraine prohibits the deployment of any foreign military formations on the territory of the state, in 1997, both Ukraine and Russia ostensibly agreed upon the terms of stay of the Russian fleet in Sevastopol until 2017.⁸² Over time, however, it became clear that the deployment of a foreign military fleet in the territory of Ukraine was one of the main threats to the

⁸⁰ Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau, “Russian-Ukrainian Relations: The Farewell that Wasn't” (briefing paper, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2018), <https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/russian-ukrainian-relations>.

⁸¹ Serhiy Gromenko, “Deportation Crimean Tatars,” Radio Svoboda, accessed June 12, 2018, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/crimean-tatars-deportation/28495741.html>.

⁸² Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the status and conditions of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 643_076 (2010), accessed August 12, 2018, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_076.

security of Ukraine.⁸³ In addition, the deployment of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet in Crimea was one of the factors preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, as membership is prohibited to states in whose territory the military formations of non-NATO countries are located.⁸⁴

Russia also conducted a powerful propaganda/information operation to discredit Ukraine in the eyes of the international community. Along with the two Russian-Ukrainian “gas” wars previously discussed,⁸⁵ the purpose of which was to take control of the Ukrainian gas transportation system and thereby dictate conditions to Kiev, Russia imposed sanctions against Ukrainian goods and used other economic levers of pressure on Ukraine. At the same time, Russian propaganda focused on Ukraine stressed that Ukraine and Russia are two “brotherhood nations” with common Slavic roots, history, values, and even the church.

To support this idea of Russian propaganda—the idea of a “commonality” of Russians and Ukrainians—Russian propaganda produced movies, books, newspapers, and magazines in the Russian language in large volumes. In addition, many Russian radio stations and television channels were created, and on these radio stations and TV channels, pro-Russian politicians and public figures paid by Russia propagandized this “commonality.”⁸⁶ All these initiatives in total allowed Russia to control the Ukrainian information space, thereby making easier the seizure of the Crimea.

Before turning to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, it is necessary to understand the situation in Ukraine at that time. In autumn 2013, a group of students announced that they were against the suspension by the Ukrainian government of preparations for signing an association agreement between Ukraine and the EU and, in

⁸³ “Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the Territory of Ukraine: As it Was (1995-2014),” Ukrainian Military History, accessed August 14, 2018, http://www.ucrainarma.org/ww_ii_and_after/chornomorskyj-flot-rf-jak-ce-bulo-1995-2014.html.

⁸⁴ “Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the Territory of Ukraine: As it Was (1995-2014).”

⁸⁵ Yevhen Mahda, *Hybridnaja voyna – vyzyht’ i pobedit’* [Hybrid Warfare – Survive and Win] (Kharkiv: Vivat, 2015), 102–111.

⁸⁶ Joanna Szostek, “Russia and the News Media in Ukraine: A Case of ‘Soft Power?’” *East European Politics & Societies* 28, no. 3 (July 2014): 463–486.

protest, installed a tent city in the center of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. On the night of November 29 to 30, 2013, the tent camp was demolished by Ukrainian police units, and the protesters were brutally beaten. In response, immense protests began against the authorities in the center of Kyiv; protesters demanded the resignation of government officials and new presidential and parliamentary elections. In the clashes between the police and protesters, as well as due to sniper fire, more than 100 people were killed. The confrontation between protesters and the then-current political powers lasted until the end of February 2014, when on February 22, President Yanukovych of Ukraine fled to Russia. The next day, Alexander Turchynov, the newly elected Speaker of the *Verkhovna Rada* (Ukrainian Parliament), was appointed as the Acting President of Ukraine. He began to form the new government of Ukraine immediately.

During this conflict, Russia actively supported Yanukovych. In Russia the protest was called another “color revolution” and a special operation by the West to shift the legitimate authorities in Ukraine.⁸⁷ In full accordance with Gerasimov’s table, the massive information operation was launched and conducted in order to split Ukrainian society. On the one hand, “nationalists” were demanding change; on the other hand, a “normal” population [was] wishing to leave everything as is and prevent the seizure of power by neo-fascists.⁸⁸

Russia very successfully chose the time to start an invasion of Crimea. The new government was just beginning to form; Kyiv was trying to take control of the situation in the country, and in various regions, clashes between supporters of Yanukovych and his opponents continued. A viable line of power was absent; at that time, it just did not exist, and this absence allowed Russia to deploy its troops to the Crimea.

The date of the beginning of annexation can be considered February 20, 2014, when units of the 3rd Special Forces brigade of the Russian Armed Forces were transferred to

⁸⁷ “Study: A Third of Moscow News is about Ukraine, and 90% of It is Negative,” Euromaidan Press, June 2, 2018, <http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/06/02/study-a-third-of-moscow-tv-news-is-about-ukraine-and-nine-tenths-of-it-is-negative/>.

⁸⁸ “Study: A Third of Moscow News is about Ukraine, and 90% of It is Negative.”

Crimea, allegedly during the rotation after the Sochi Olympics.⁸⁹ After negotiations with Crimean politicians, Russian troops initiated pro-Russian unrest against the Ukrainian authorities.⁹⁰ From February 21 to 27, the transfer of Russian units continued. On February 27–28, 2014, military units of the Special Forces of the Russian Federation, disguised as local civilians and cooperating with the local pro-Russian population, paramilitary, and proxy groups, captured the most important sites in Crimea. The Simferopol international airport and airport “Belbek,” the Council of Ministers in Simferopol, the Parliament of Crimea, and Ukrainian air defense military installations were captured. Similarly, Russian military troops without insignias (who later were called “green men”) blocked the Ukrainian ground military installations in Crimea, and the main Crimean naval base of Ukraine in Balaklava Bay.⁹¹ They disrupted radio and Internet connections and cut off all lines of communication.⁹² The Russian military further established checkpoints on major roads leading to the Crimean peninsula from the continental Ukraine.⁹³ These actions were carried out by the troops of the 810th Marine brigade, the 2nd, the 3rd, the 10th, the 16th and the 22nd Brigades of the Special Forces units of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Federation.⁹⁴

After these activities had been carried out, the Russian Armed Forces controlled the Crimean peninsula. In order to give legitimacy to its actions, the Russian Federation Council authorized the use of the Russian Armed Forces outside of Russia. For the same purpose, a so-called Crimean “referendum” was held, which the UN and the absolute majority of the countries of the world did not recognize.

⁸⁹ Dmitry Gorenburg, “Crimea Taught Us a Lesson, But Not How the Russian Military Fights,” *War on the Rocks*, May 19, 2014, <https://warontherocks.com/2014/05/crimea-taught-us-a-lesson-but-not-about-how-the-russian-military-fights/>.

⁹⁰ Stephen Cimbala, “Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics: Vladimir Putin and Military Persuasion in Ukraine, 21 February – 18 March,” *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 27, no. 3 (July 2014): 371.

⁹¹ Emmanuel Karagianis, “The Russian Interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea Compared: Military Performance, Legitimacy and Goals,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 35, no. 3 (September 2014): 400–420.

⁹² Charles K. Bartles and Roger N. McDermott, “Russia Military Operation in Crimea,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 61, no. 6 (2014): 46–63.

⁹³ Karagianis, 400–420.

⁹⁴ Bartles and McDermott.

In Crimea itself, there were neither civilian leaders nor high-level military commanders willing to fight for the Ukrainian Crimea. On February 9, 2014, Viktor Yanukovych took from Crimea the Commander of the Navy, Admiral Yuri Ilyin, and appointed him the Chief of the General Staff. That is to say, until March 1, 2014, Crimea did not have a regular commander of the navy; his duties were instead fulfilled by his deputy, Sergei Yeliseyev. Together with the Chief of Staff, Dmitry Shakuro, in connection with the aggravation of the political situation and reluctance to assume responsibility, Yeliseyev and Shakuro wrote reports requesting their release into the reserve. From February 28, they entered the hospital for a medical commission. In the end, both betrayed Ukraine and ran to the Russian side. On March 1, the new Naval Commander Denis Berezovsky was appointed; he also betrayed Ukraine the next day.

For Ukraine and for Ukrainians it was shock. It was hard to believe that a neighboring state next to which Ukraine had peacefully lived for 23 years was capable of doing this. Even in this new reality, though, the Ukrainian people supported the Ukrainian military: they brought them food, drinking water, batteries, medicine, and other goods. This started with military personnel who were in Crimea and then spread into all Ukraine. In light of this, it is necessary to say that under those circumstances, only representatives of the armed forces and border guards kept tenacious until the end and explicitly showed the Russian military that they did not agree to reconciliation. After more than a month's confrontation, however, Russian units captured all Ukrainian military units and ships. Disguised as civilians the Russian military stormed the Ukrainian units, acting behind their backs and using them as a living shield. Under such conditions, the Ukrainians could not open fire in order to prevent civilian casualties.⁹⁵

The situation also was catastrophic due to the large number of traitors, a result of the Russian information operation:

- of the 13,468 soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces only 3,990 (29.6%) came to Ukraine;

⁹⁵ "How We Lost Crimea. The Testimony of Senior Officials of Ukraine," *Ukrainian Pravda*, April 10, 2017, www.pravda.com.ua/cdn/graphics/2017/04/jak_my_vtrachaly_krym_svidchennja_pershyh_osib_ukrainy/.

- of the 1,870 border guards only 519 (29.7%) returned to Ukraine;
- of 2,240 Security Service employees only 242 (10.8%) did not become traitors;
- of 10,936 personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs only 88 people (0.8%) did not become traitors; and
- of the 527 officers and ensigns, only a 20 (3.8%) people in the Office of the State Guard did not betray Ukraine.⁹⁶

This huge quantity of traitors was a result of the Russian information operation and political warfare. Not one of the traitors believed that Ukraine would exist after the flight of Yanukovych. Massive, immense Russian propaganda forced them to abandon their oath and not hold allegiance to Ukraine. In the very beginning of the operation, Russia denied that its troops had participated in the seizure of Crimea. Putin, answering questions from Russian journalists on December 19, 2013, completely denied the possible entry of Russian troops into the territory of Crimea. Then, on March 4, 2014, he said that Russia did not acknowledge any claims about the annexation of Crimea to Russia: there were no Russian troops in Crimea and the people with weapons blocking Ukrainian military units were Crimean self-defense units. On April 7, 2014, Putin acknowledged that “behind the back of the self-defense forces of Crimea stood Russian servicemen,” and on November 15, 2014, he pointed out that the Russian armed forces blocked Ukrainian military units. Finally, on March 16, 2015, Putin mentioned that on the night of February 22–23, 2014, after a meeting that lasted all night, preparation for joining Crimea to Russia began.⁹⁷ In short, he lied to the Russians, he lied to the world, and he has thus far not faced any punishment for his lies.

In sum, how can Russia’s operation to seize Crimea be considered hybrid warfare? Russia used both conventional and unconventional methods of warfare simultaneously. It put political, economic, and diplomatic pressure on Ukraine. It also conducted information and military operations, which were conducted under the same leadership and in

⁹⁶ “How We Lost Crimea. The Testimony of Senior Officials of Ukraine.”

⁹⁷ “Putin about the Crimea. DIRECT FALSE.” YouTube video, 1:22, posted by marc dean, September 14, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2fOPUDx3A1Q>.

conjunction with a unified plan (that has continued since the seizure of the Crimea until today). It also made active use of paramilitary groups, Cossacks, proxies, and local residents, under cover of which the Ukrainian military units were captured. In addition, the international community, for the first time, was faced with plausible deniability at the highest political level. Actually, the plausible deniability turned out to be Russian “know-how,” for which the West was not ready.

According to the acting Chief of the General Staff, General Muzhenko, as soon as the first state buildings in the Crimea were captured, the Ukrainian General Staff developed a military operation that would keep the Crimean Isthmus and take control of the bigger, steppe part of Crimea. It was a chance not to spread the gangrene of separatism in the Crimea.⁹⁸ By contrast, the politicians made a different decision: they did not provoke Russia and did not send troops into Crimea. Russia, inspired by its Crimean success, began to conduct operations under the same scenario in the southern and eastern parts of continental Ukraine. Further victims (killed in actions and wounded in actions people) could perhaps be avoided if during the seizure of Crimea the Ukrainian authorities acted as rigidly, harshly, and decisively as in 2003 on Tuzla.⁹⁹

History does not have a subjunctive mood, however, and after the seizure of Crimea by Russia, Ukraine faced the question of its own existence as an independent state. Ukrainian soldiers and officers in Crimea who remained loyal to their oaths more than a month defended their units in a harsh environment, practically without communication, hiding in many ways the prevailing forces of the enemy and giving Ukraine time to prepare for the second act of Russian aggression against Ukraine.

2. War in Donbas (Project “Novorossia” in the South-eastern Part of Ukraine)

After the annexation of the Crimean peninsula, Russia continued its hybrid warfare and launched an undeclared war in the eastern regions of the country, Donbas, in order to gain full control over the southern and eastern part of Ukraine. In March–April 2014,

⁹⁸ “How We Lost Crimea. The Testimony of Senior Officials of Ukraine.”

⁹⁹ “How We Lost Crimea. The Testimony of Senior Officials of Ukraine.”

numerous actions took place in the east and south of Ukraine, with the support of Russian Special Forces. Participants in these actions, including Russian proxy, paramilitary, and local criminal groups, began to demand the Russian language become a second state language in Ukraine, and held a referendum on the federal structure of Ukraine in an attempt to join the eastern and southern regions to Russia. On April 6, 2014, as in Crimea, the Russian proxy captured the building of the Donetsk Regional State Administration, and on April 12, 2014, Igor Girkin, a former KGB/FSB officer also known as “Strelkov” (“Shooter”), with a group of armed Russian people, captured the small town of Sloviansk. This day can be identified as the beginning of the Russian aggression on Donbas.

Following these events, in southeastern Ukraine, Russia tried to establish a new state, Novorossia. In pursuit of this goal, Russia used everything in its hybrid threat toolkit: propaganda, media (social media as well), political and economic leverage, diplomatic pressure, cyber, proxy and paramilitary organizations, Russian Special Forces groups, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the “fifth column” (collaborants who support invaders in Ukraine and Western countries). In the realm of political leverage, Russia repeated the Crimean scenario with a “referendum” to join these territories to Russia as well. On May 11, 2014, in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions controlled by separatists, such “referendums” were held. As a result of the Donbas “referendums” (which, as with the Crimean “referendum” the UN and the absolute majority of the countries of the world did not recognize), new quasi-state structures were created: Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR). To put it differently, Russia tried to use these referendums not only to legitimize the “will” of the people of Donbas but also to legitimize Russia’s hostile actions against Ukraine. Under the pretext of those “referendums” and for the maintenance of DNR and LNR, Russia sent reconnaissance and sabotage groups headed by officers of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Federation.

The escalation of the conflict in the east of Ukraine began in mid-April 2014, when armed groups of pro-Russian activists, paramilitary formations of the Russian Cossacks, the notorious Chechen battalion “East,” and armed groups of mercenaries—“Wagner,” “Russian sector” and “Oplot”—with the participation of Russian Special Forces units, began to seize administrative buildings and units of police and security forces in the cities

of Donetsk, Luhansk, and others. In Kharkiv and Odessa, it was possible to prevent separatists from seizing power. In addition, these groups attacked the Ukrainian Land Forces troops and aircraft of the Air Forces of Ukraine.

In response to these actions, in order to stop the rampant terrorist attacks and separatism in the eastern regions of Ukraine, on April 13, 2014, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine declared the beginning of a large-scale Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) with the involvement of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Russia's efforts to seize eastern Ukraine soon became deadlier on July 17, when it tried to take down a Ukrainian military aircraft; Russian forces shot down peaceful civilian aircraft from Netherlands and killed 298 people. There is another version voiced by V. Nalyvaychenko, who at that time headed the Security Service of Ukraine: Russia wanted to shoot down the Russian plane Aeroflot, which was on the flight AFL-2074, Moscow-Larnaca. The Russian plan was to accuse Ukraine of this catastrophe and, in order to protect the Russian population living in Ukraine, to start a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

When Ukraine started this ATO, the armed forces felt the whole power of Russian hybrid warfare. The units of the Ukrainian Army sent to participate in the ATO became a target for hybrid tactics. Pro-Russian locals stopped Ukrainian troops. They took over military vehicles and forced Ukrainian military to hand over their weapons.¹⁰⁰ There were cases when information about the location of these army units was handed over to the separatists, and they passed this information to their Moscow masters, and thereupon Russian artillery fire from the territory of the Russian Federation was unleashed on the Ukrainian positions. There were also cases of local residents poisoning the Ukrainian servicemen's food. The group of locals established mass meetings and protests against the location of Ukrainian Army units near local towns and populated areas, and arranged to sabotage Ukrainian checkpoints.

Certainly, the Russian Federation used the factor of the ethnic local population of Donbas as a tool of hybrid warfare, particularly as the occasion to defend ethnic Russians

¹⁰⁰ "Ukrainian Troops Handed Weapons to Separatists in Kramatorsk," *Ukrainian Pravda*, April 16, 2014, www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/04/16/7022729/.

abroad from any threats. Protection of ethnic Russians has been a central justification for Russian invasions of Georgia and Ukraine. Here again, Russia used Russian ethnic groups in the Crimea and Donbas in order to obtain support from the local population and legitimize the Russian invasion in Ukraine. Yet, if we carefully study the history of Ukraine, we encounter many questions about the “ethnicity” of the Russians and the Russian-speaking population living in Ukraine, particularly in Crimea and the Donbas region. It has already been mentioned how “ethnic Russians” emerged in Crimea. Donbas was one of the regions of Ukraine where in 1932–1933 the *Holodomor* occurred—a massive physical destruction of Ukrainian farmers by artificial famine. In place of Ukrainians who died—from 3 to 5 million by different estimates—residents of central regions of Russia were relocated into the Donbas. In three generations, these people would support the appeals of the Russian Federation to withdraw from Ukraine and join these territories to Russia.

On May 25, 2014, an all-Ukrainian referendum was held, and Petro Poroshenko was elected the new President of Ukraine. The next phase of the ATO began, and on July 11, 2014, Russian troops began participating in the war, inflicting a rocket strike on Ukrainian troops from Russian territory. Following that strike, the entire line of Ukrainian formations near the border, from the Luhansk region to the Azov Sea coast, was under systematic artillery shelling from the territory of Russia during July–August 2014, to which Ukrainian units did not respond. Artillery units of the Russian Armed Forces made a minimum of 149 attacks against Ukrainian Armed Forces in the summer of 2014. Ukraine could not respond to this shelling because Russia would have immediately blamed the Ukrainian side for unleashing a war, thereby giving Russia an occasion for moving its troops into the territory of Ukraine. General Ihor Gordiychuk, explains: “What was the biggest problem, and why I was very angry at our leadership, was that on the Russian side, abroad, they forbade to correct artillery fire on the Russian territory. The artillery correctors gave me the exact coordinates, but the headquarters answered: this is Russian territory, we have no right.” As a result, Ukraine lost control of part of the eastern Russian–Ukrainian state border.

In August 2014, a massive invasion into the territory of Ukraine began, conducted by Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) of the Armed Forces of Russia based on units of regular Russian troops (6th Armored Brigade, 8th Mechanized Brigade, 31st Assault Airborne Brigade, 331st Paratroopers Regiment, etc.). Various sources indicate that on the night of August 23 to August 24, approximately four BTGs invaded the Lugansk region, and four more BTGs in the Donetsk direction. Fierce battles began between the regular units of the Armed Forces of Russia and the Armed Forces of Ukraine. As the fighting continued, Ukrainian forces captured Russian officers and soldiers, as well as the latest versions of Russian military equipment and weapons. After more active fighting in the autumn and winter of 2015, the phase of a position war came to Donbass. There were constant local battles. Every day in the media (Ukrainian and foreign) there were reports of skirmishes, bombardments, injuries, and deaths.

The war in Donbas is another example of Russian hybrid warfare. At the beginning of the conflict in Donbas, Russia tried to use the Crimean scenario: it used, basically, only non-military (unconventional) measures in order to achieve its political goals. When the situation became dangerous and Russia began to lose control, however, it started a conventional military operation and invaded Ukraine to support separatists and restore its control over the Donbas territories. Russia in Donbas acted according to Gerasimov's chart: when non-military actions were not enough, Russian Armed Forces enhanced previous successes and used military measures to achieve Russia's strategic goals.

3. Current Situation in Ukraine

Five years after the war's onset, the situation is more or less the same as in 2015. Ukraine continues to resist the hybrid aggression of Russia. On February 23, 2018, the President of Ukraine signed the Law of Ukraine "On the Peculiarities of State Policy Concerning the State Sovereignty of Ukraine in the Temporarily Occupied Territories in the Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts," also referred to as the "law of the de-occupation" of Donbas. According to this law, the ATO in Donbas is over and the Joint Forces Operation has begun. The main tasks of this operation are the implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense, the rebuff and deterrence of armed aggression of the Russian

Federation, and protection of the rights and freedoms of local populations. Russia has been forced to sit down at the negotiation table due to the resistance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as well as to the consolidated position of Western countries condemning Russia's aggression and their intensified application of sanctions against Russia.

Russia has therefore “frozen” the conflict; however, according to the Chief of the General Staff of Ukraine, General Muzhenko, the conflict in Donbas cannot be considered truly “frozen.” The Ukrainian side is preparing to repulse full-scale aggression by the Russian-terrorist forces. The Head of the General Staff points out that nowadays the total number of Russian and separatist troops in the occupied territories is about 32,000. There are also more than 700 tanks, guns, and artillery systems. There, Russians are increasing their material stocks as the Russian military columns carry tangible goods, including ammunition, into the occupied territories. Interestingly, this is not a group of so-called LNR/DNRs. They are regular Russian military units that are controlled and headed by the 8th Russian Joint Army.

Russia continues its aggression and provocations toward Ukraine; on November 25, 2018, Russian ships and aircrafts opened fire on the ships of the naval forces of Ukraine in the neutral waters of the Black Sea and captured them. Onboard the Ukrainian ships were 24 officers and sailors, six of them were injured, three severely. Ukraine has indisputable evidence that this happened in neutral waters and not in the territorial waters of Russia. In response to this act of undisguised aggression against Ukraine, martial law was declared for 30 days in ten regions of Ukraine on November 28.¹⁰¹

The Ukrainian territory itself, first of all, is considered by the Kremlin as a geostrategic “buffer zone” between the Russian Federation and NATO countries, and is an integral part of Russia's territorial defense. Russia manages an armed conflict in the east of Ukraine to block initiatives on Ukraine's withdrawal from Russia's influence and to foster uncertainty among geopolitical opponents regarding prospects for further

¹⁰¹ Maria Romanenko, “Ukraine Declares Martial Law in Regions Bordering Russia and Unrecognized Transnistria,” Hromadske International, November 26, 2018, <https://en.hromadske.ua/posts/ukraine-declares-martial-law?fbclid=IwAR2QkDW576WonOAg84-pvWEmV7dDdI1ide2OUelAHL4G6xSQRgPiTfrkcAc>.

development of the situation in Eastern Europe. Russia is currently demonstrating readiness for a full-scale war in order to excite the situation, and obtain benefits from and modeling for future agreements with Western countries (in particular, the United States and the leading powers of the EU) regarding the distribution of future spheres of geopolitical influence.¹⁰²

C. CONCLUSIONS

Ukraine, as a regional gateway, a transnational intersection, and a hub of natural and human resources, always has and will continue to be a target for Russia. Russia over the centuries has tried to destroy Ukrainian statehood. In order to be an empire and a great power, Russia must either capture or control Ukraine. All Russian rulers have understood this fact; they all imposed on Ukraine the Russian language and culture and other “Russian values,” and have attempted to break the unity of Ukrainian society as well.

The historical importance of Ukraine for the Russian Federation is hard to overestimate. Ukraine has given Russia not only billions of tons of natural resources but also outstanding human resources; many great scholars, inventors, sportsmen, engineers, writers, and cultural and art workers who have lived and worked in Russia were from Ukraine. In many ways, Russia owes its prosperity to Ukraine. Even Siberian oil and gas fields, which the USSR and then Russia used as a main source of foreign money, were discovered and developed mostly by Ukrainian oil and gas specialists.¹⁰³

Using hybrid warfare in Ukraine, Russia has been continuing its policy of destroying Ukraine as an independent actor of geopolitics.¹⁰⁴ In pursuit of this goal, Russia has used everything in its hybrid threat toolkit: propaganda, media/social networks, political and economic leverage, diplomatic pressure, cyber, proxy and paramilitary organizations, Russian Special Forces groups, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the “fifth

¹⁰² *Analytical Report of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada “About Internal and External Status of Ukraine in 2018”* (Kyiv: National Institute of Strategic Research, 2018), accessed October 10, 2018, http://www.niss.gov.ua/public/File/analit_dopovid_POSLANNYA_2018_FINAL_Oct_02.pdf, 424.

¹⁰³ Mahda, *Hybrid Warfare: Survive and Win*, 108.

¹⁰⁴ *Analytical Report of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada “About Internal and External Status of Ukraine in 2018.”*

column” (collaborants who support invaders in Ukraine and Western countries). The main aim of these hybrid actors is to destroy the civil-military unity of Ukrainian society, weaken a societal resilience, and control Ukraine directly or through pro-Russian politics.

Russia continues its hybrid aggression against Ukraine. Ukraine, in turn, must rely on its own forces and continue to persuade European countries and the United States of the necessity for more rigorous sanctions against Russia. Nonetheless, leadership in Ukraine understands that Ukraine should not only rely on its own forces, but also strengthen domestic civil-military relations. It is crucial for the defense against hybrid attacks; correspondingly, the next chapter describes civil-military relations in Ukraine before and after 2014, the year when hybrid warfare in Ukraine began. The next chapter also demonstrates how a volunteer movement became one of the cornerstones of the struggle against Russian hybrid warfare and enhanced cohesion between the Ukrainian state and its society.

III. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN UKRAINE

This chapter provides information about civil-military relations in Ukraine, which has become a key component of the Ukrainian response to Russian hybrid warfare. The first part of this chapter explains the civil-military relations in Ukraine from the time when Ukraine became an independent state in 1991 to the Revolution of Dignity in 2013. The second part provides information about the civil-military relations in Ukraine after 2014, when war against the Russian Federation started, until 2019. As this chapter shows, Ukraine's strong volunteer movement and the robust civil-military resilience of Ukraine's society became the unpredictable factor for Moscow, which broke Russia's plans to subdue Ukraine.

A. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN UKRAINE FROM 1991 TO 2013

After independence in 1991 from the recently vanished USSR, Ukraine began to form its own new state institutions and to build—with the Soviet legacy at hand—relations between those institutions. Civil and military institutions stood at the center of this process of reform, as Ukraine had to build its own national armed forces. Given the history of the soldier and party in the USSR, Ukraine had to redefine its entire security and defense sector. In the process, the government and society with it had to create effective mechanisms, as in the Western democracies, that would enable the security and defense forces to operate within the constitutional and international systems of a new independent nation state in Eastern Europe.

Understanding the development of civil-military relations (CMR) in Ukraine requires knowing the history of civil-military relations in the USSR, which were the origin of CMR in post-independence Ukraine. In Soviet times, CMR consisted of control of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union by the Communist Party via the system of *politruks*. *Politruks* appeared when the government did not trust its army and was therefore afraid of rebellion, betrayal, or desertion. A *politruk* (also known as a *military commissar*) was an officer, assigned to a military unit by the government, whose task was to ensure loyalty and execution of orders. The Communist Party involved its *politruks* in all military units,

formations, institutions, and military schools. Only “flawless” revolutionaries could be appointed as military commissars, those able in the most difficult circumstances to remain the embodiment of Soviet duty. These people were in the military but they were subordinate to the Party, not to the military command.

Politruks had broad rights: they controlled every step of the commanders; any order was invalid without their signature; they were in charge of recruitment and reported to higher authorities about everything they considered necessary. The main tasks of the *politruks* was to carry out the policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet government in the army, including the political education of personnel, implanting the spirit of revolutionary discipline and organization, and the control of *voenspets*—military experts, former officers of the tsarist army who went over to the Red Army. Later, almost all of them were killed by the Soviet regime as “spies and agents of foreign intelligence.”

The system of *politruks* (later known as *zampolits*) existed until the collapse of the USSR. The Communist Party knew too well that an uncontrolled army is a potential source of coup and revolution and mercilessly annihilated those commanders who allowed themselves to doubt the leadership role of the Party. *Politruks* (*zampolits*) allowed the Communist Party to exercise direct control of the armed forces, with no input from the civilian populace. Thanks to the *politruks* (*zampolits*), the Soviet Army was an obedient tool in the hands of the Communist Party, ready to carry out even the cruelest of tasks.

After independence in 1991, Ukraine had to re-build its CMR; however, it could not fundamentally change the system that existed for more than 70 years. Unfortunately, as an alternative to the leading role of the Communist Party, the military was not offered any other national idea by the new Ukrainian government.

The issue of CMR in the first years of Ukraine’s independence was not as acute as the re-foundation of the state and the economy. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Ukrainian system of management and operation of enterprises and state institutions that ensure the vital functions of the country required a new foundation and fundamental reforms to adjust to the market, as was generally the case in central and Eastern Europe after 1989. The military in Ukraine at that time had its own problems: many troops returned

to Ukraine from other republics of the USSR or from abroad and had to be barracked somewhere. First and foremost, there was no military housing for them and few resources to build such housing.

During the formation of the Ukrainian state, state authorities distanced themselves from these pressing problems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, a process that had huge negative consequences. Salaries remained unpaid for months due to lack of funding; military equipment gradually deteriorated and became obsolete; military infrastructure deteriorated and was sold, destroyed, or stolen in the process of privatization. These ills discredited military service in the eyes of many Ukrainians, which destroyed the military's sense of honor in serving one's Motherland. This chaos caused spiritual, social, and moral deprivation in Ukraine's new socio-political conditions. In addition, with nearly no resources, the state undertook a markedly simplified combat training system of units and formations of the army compared to Soviet times.¹⁰⁵

Nevertheless, in spite of these serious difficulties, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were formed in 1992 and assumed the leadership of the new Ukrainian armed forces. The question arose about the model of the construction and functioning of CMR in Ukraine relative to the reforms begun in Central Europe in, say, Prague, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Bratislava where a Western model, if not yet a NATO model, had become desirable in the course of the first half of the 1990s.¹⁰⁶ The main idea of these reforms was to ensure democratic control by the elected bodies of political power over the components of the security and defense sector.

The so-called "U.S. American" and "Federal German" variants of CMR were studied by the Ukrainian government while reflecting the choice of the Ukrainian CMR development option. Neither the Russian nor the Chinese models held any appeal for those in a position of responsibility in Ukraine in the 1990s. Therefore, Ukraine turned to the U.S. American and Federal German models, as both systems are products of Euro-Atlantic

¹⁰⁵ Volodymyr Biloshitsky, "Fundamentals of Civil-Military Relations: World Experience and Ukraine," *Social-Science*, 2012, <http://social-science.com.ua/article/898>.

¹⁰⁶ Alexandra Gheciu, "NATO in the 'New Europe.'" *The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War* (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2005), 367.

democratic culture; at the same time, they differ significantly as a result of different military and political experiences.

The American version of CMR is as follows:¹⁰⁷ as in the British case, the executive and the legislative branches share responsibility for military matters. The President is the commander-in-chief, while the Congress has the right to approve the military budget, to require a report from senior military officials on the state of affairs in the armed forces, to issue statutes, and to regulate the actions of the troops. Within the executive branch, but answerable to the legislative the Department of Defense, of which the Secretary and deputies are usually civilians, who exercises direct democratic political control of the troops and leads the making of strategy; under this system, political rights and freedoms of service members are under significant legal constraints.

The German version of CMR is different, with the role of parliament being uppermost in response to the constitutional errors of the German and Prussian past, by the crown and later by the Fuehrer. In addition to the legislative rights of the parliament, Germany established a special office of the authorized *Bundestag* on defense for the protection of service members' fundamental rights and as a subsidiary body of the *Bundestag* in exercising parliamentary control.¹⁰⁸ The Commissioner is elected for a term of five years by the parliament, which is beholden only to him or her. The Minister of Defense is a civilian and member of the federal cabinet as well as parliament; the Minister's deputies and other military leaders are professional service members and defense civilians. Service members are considered "citizens in uniform." They are guaranteed equal rights with civilians, including the right to join political parties (although it is prohibited to agitate in the party's interests while in the service) and the right to participate in political events during non-working time. Agitation, political speeches, distribution of printed materials, and the combination of service with deputy activity are not allowed. The tragic experience of the development of the German state thus casts its shadow over German CMR,

¹⁰⁷ Richard H. Kohn, *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789–1989* (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 175.

¹⁰⁸ Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross. The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 316.

particularly the period when, with the authority of the National Socialist Party, the “Third Reich” (1933–1945) was established; as a result, modern Germany does not allow even hypothetically the possibility of totalitarianism and militarism.

The discussion about which model—U.S. or German—is better for Ukraine was not only for Ukrainians specialists; the questions of the CMR in Ukraine were of interest of foreign scholars as well. In order to choose the better model of CMR for Ukraine, foreign scholars have analyzed the problems of the formation of CMR in Ukraine in its first years of independence. They have identified several principles that determined the course of further processes in this area:

Civil-political institutions in Ukraine were relatively stable, while their level of political culture was low. Most civil servants in the government and other power structures lacked the experience of managing an independent nation state. The question of the division of power between the three branches of the state was not established and ingrained as it is in the United States or Western Europe. Military institutions in Ukraine were also weak for reasons similar to those that explain the weakness of its civilian institutions. Both Ukrainian civilian structures and the Ukrainian Armed Forces were new government bodies that have been in the process of development since 1991.¹⁰⁹

The nature of the division of powers between the military establishment and its socio-political environment in Ukraine was uncertain. It is necessary to identify the type and scope of formal, that is, constitutional civilian control over the military, as well as to establish the informal relations between military personnel and other social groups, leading political and economic circles.¹¹⁰

In the years immediately after independence, analysts at the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies (Razumkov Center) in 2000 assessed the effectiveness of democratic civilian control of the military in Ukraine according to five criteria. These criteria included the right of the civil authorities not only to receive information about the

¹⁰⁹ Biloshitsky.

¹¹⁰ Biloshitsky.

armed forces and supervise them but also to assume the responsibility for defining the functions and tasks of the law enforcement agencies. Presently, this is called the security sector, and it recognizes the legacy of the Communist Party in the USSR and in the Warsaw Pact overseeing not only the army but the internal security and policy realms as well. Analysts emphasize that these included: “establishing a legal framework for their activities, defining their structure and size, providing the necessary resources, developing long-term development programs in accordance with needs and capabilities of the state, and making provisions for legal and social protection of servicemen and members of their families.”¹¹¹

Based on the results of this study, Ukrainian experts concluded that, “despite significant achievements, Ukraine has not yet succeeded in building a reliable system of civilian control over the military sphere, with a clear demarcation of powers between civilian and military. The state of civilian control ... cannot be considered satisfactory, since one of its main principles is violated—the responsibility of civilians for the effectiveness of the security forces.”¹¹² In other words, the balance of CMR in Ukraine has not been achieved. Regulatory requirements for its provision at that time sounded like a political wish.

In order to resolve the problem of Ukrainian CMR on the legislative level, in 2003, the Law of Ukraine “About Democratic Civilian Control over the Military Organization and Law Enforcement Bodies of the State” was adopted. This law defined CMR as a “set of legal relations between society and component parts of the Military Organization of the State that encompass political, financial, economic, and social and other processes in the field of national security and defense.”¹¹³ This law thus attempts to guarantee firm civilian control over the armed forces and prevent any abuse of power by the army.

Nevertheless, the condition of all actors in the defense and security sector and, correspondingly, the quality of CMR in Ukraine only worsened as the general security

¹¹¹ Olexander Halushko, email message to author, December 10, 2018.

¹¹² Halushko.

¹¹³ “On Democratic Civilian Control over the Military Organization and Law Enforcement Bodies of the State,” Pub. L. No. 975-IV, (2003), accessed June 6, 2018, <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/975-15>.

situation deteriorated in the shadow of a revival of Russian power in Moscow and its impact on Ukraine. On May 23, 2012, the ex–Minister of Defense of Ukraine and the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada’s Committee on National Security and Defense, A. Grytsenko, noted the following shortcomings of the national defense sphere:

- the condition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as the defense-industrial complex, is characterized by deep economic and morale depression;
- the degradation of the military-technical potential of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has become dangerous;¹¹⁴
- the slow pace of reform hinders the activity of law enforcement organs in accordance with European standards designed to ensure national security;¹¹⁵ and,
- the political radicalization taking place in Ukrainian society is not sufficiently taken into account and extremist sentiment is growing, which can create a real threat to the public peace, state sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine.¹¹⁶

Grytsenko further stated that “there is no combat-ready battalion in the Land Forces. The Air Force does not have any fully-fledged squadron. In Naval Forces there is no subdivision of ships that could carry out all assignments.”¹¹⁷ He also pointed out that “thoughtless reduction of the army in the conditions when Ukraine, with its non-aligned status, renounced its allies; when the armed forces are not equipped with new equipment and weapons; and when, with each passing month, combat training—mean only one thing: the reduction of combat readiness of the armed forces and the further destruction of the Ukrainian army.”¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ “Gritsenko: Yanukovych Will Finally Destroy the Ukrainian Army,” 24TV.ua, August 15, 2011, https://24tv.ua/gritsenko_yanukovich_ostatochno_zruynuye_ukrayinsku_armiyu_n124921.

¹¹⁵ “Gritsenko: Yanukovych Will Finally Destroy the Ukrainian Army.”

¹¹⁶ “Gritsenko: Yanukovych Will Finally Destroy the Ukrainian Army.”

¹¹⁷ “Gritsenko: Yanukovych Will Finally Destroy the Ukrainian Army.”

¹¹⁸ “Gritsenko: Yanukovych Will Finally Destroy the Ukrainian Army.”

Since that moment, prior to the events of 2013–14, the situation in the defense sector of Ukraine has not improved. Hard economic conditions, corruption, and political irresponsibility have undermined the basic principles required to maintain the optimal state of CMR: the practical application of civil liability for the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies led to the fact that the main actor in the defense sector, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, was not ready to repel aggression when it finally came with a surprise blow in 2013–2014. Unfortunately, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which, in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine, are entrusted with the defense of Ukraine, the protection of its independence, state integrity, and inviolability, failed to do so in the face of the Russian irregular offensive—that is, “hybrid war”—with the “Anschluss” of Crimea and the ensuing low-intensity conflict in the eastern parts of the nation.

B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN UKRAINE AFTER 2014

This section describes what happened in a framework of civil-military relations after Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine.

1. Volunteer Movement

One of the main factors in 2013–2014 that prevented Russia from dividing Ukraine and destroying it as a separate subject of geopolitics was the robust volunteer movement in Ukraine. This *levée en masse*, a revival of the partisan ideal of men- and women-at-arms, is a significant part of political culture in central, eastern, and northern Europe. Even so, the heritage of the *levée en masse* and other paramilitary responses to armed crisis found little attention among political scientists, and is poorly examined in much of the CMR literature.

A more comprehensive species of civil response, occurring not only in Kyiv but also in other cities of Ukraine, emerged after the Revolution of Dignity. The mobilized residents of Kyiv and other settlements of Ukraine began bringing food, warm clothes, and other things to EuroMaidan¹¹⁹ defenders in November of 2013. These people helped

¹¹⁹ Civil unrest in Kyiv, Ukraine, which began on November 21, 2013, with peaceful protests of civilians in the center of Kyiv on Independence Square.

organize the round-the-clock functioning of EuroMaidan, defending it from the internal and external provocateurs. They brought the necessary materials to the protesters and even died in the fighting of the EuroMaidan for European ideals.

Representatives of volunteer associations during EuroMaidan accumulated such resources as food, medicine, and household items and provided the necessities of life in tent cities. They also personally performed social work, offering educational, medical, and other information to the protesters. Many thousands of Ukrainian patriots actually did volunteer work without going to the organized cells: they provided refuge to the protesters, provided them with food products, and carried out other volunteer functions. A characteristic feature of the volunteer movement's development during this period was the involvement of social networks to support and spread civic initiatives, which mostly functioned as "informal volunteer groups." Information technologies helped to create a new quality of communication between like-minded people and minimized the time for the volunteer projects to be brought to the level of their practical implementation. Such flexible forms of volunteering were the most productive. Bypassing bureaucratic procedures in extraordinary circumstances saved time, which positively influenced the quality of volunteer services.¹²⁰

The volunteer movement in Ukraine continued when Russia annexed Crimea in February 2014. The local concerned civilians of Crimea began to help Ukrainian servicemen who were blocked in their military installations by Russian military units. The range of assistance was very diverse, from providing batteries, food, and drinking water to the Ukrainian servicemen to collecting money for their family members. The Armed Forces of Ukraine, not for the first time since their existence, understood that they were indeed part of the people, and this relationship provided additional forces and motivation to Ukrainian soldiers.

It was these concerned civil activists who prevented the creation of the "Odessa People's Republic." During the riots that took place in Odessa in early May 2014, this

¹²⁰ Dmitro Gorelov and Oleksiy Kornievsky, *Voluntary Movement: World Experience and Ukrainian Citizens' Practices* (Kyiv: National Institute of Strategic Research, 2015), <http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/volonter-697e4.pdf>.

southern city of Ukraine managed to defend itself from the “Russian world.” The cities of Kharkiv and Dnipro, due to the rigid pro-Ukrainian position of engaged civil activists, remained under the control of Kyiv and did not turn into “quasi-republics” as happened with Donetsk and Lugansk. Due to their social resistance, Odessa, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and many other settlements in southeastern Ukraine are now free from Russian military presence and war.

Events associated with these separatist movements in the south and east of Ukraine have affected the design of volunteering and the conditions for its implementation: the emphasis has shifted to helping the civilian population and supplying everything necessary for the ATO. The volunteer movement made the most effective contribution to strengthening the state’s defense capabilities precisely at the beginning of hostilities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, when the state slowly provisioned the power units, even while lacking basic security systems, uniforms, and foodstuffs. In a matter of months, volunteer initiatives had turned into powerful organizations whose activities were aimed at providing almost the entire spectrum of needs of both security forces and civilians affected by hostilities. Two factors have played a decisive role in this process: the patriotic upsurge in society, which led to the emergence of an unprecedented number of volunteers and benefactors, and the managerial skills of the leaders of volunteer organizations.¹²¹

Of the many volunteer activities aimed at counteracting external aggression and its consequences, the four main activities are as follows:

- collecting and delivering the necessary resources to the zone of ATO;
- providing medical assistance to victims during its conduct;
- offering assistance to internally displaced persons; and
- searching for missing soldiers/release of prisoners.

The most common form of volunteering during hostilities is the aggregation and provision of Ukrainian military personnel involved in the ATO with the necessary

¹²¹ Gorelov and Kornievsky.

resources. Concerned people in Ukraine and abroad supported the call for their collection formed in social networks by volunteer groups.¹²² The Ukrainian diaspora sends money transfers, medical preparations, clothes, household goods, among other necessities to Ukraine to give tangible support to the volunteer movement. In many countries where Ukrainians form a united diasporic cell, local volunteer organizations carry out numerous community actions in support of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.¹²³

The powerful volunteer movement is represented by a medical initiative. Volunteer physicians were involved in the collection of medicines for the needs of participants in a public confrontation during the EuroMaidan and in the area of the ATO. At the same time, they created their own teams and joined volunteer battalions, provided medical care in front-line hospitals, and provided them with the necessary equipment. The volunteer physicians carried out their functions during the fighting to establish a stable medical service.

Volunteer groups provided a plethora of other services. The psychosocial service organized in the time of EuroMaidan was transformed during the next year into a Psychological Crisis Service, whose units dealt with the wounded and the families of the dead. Individual groups of volunteer psychologists have been constantly in the ATO area, where they conduct psychological training with Ukrainian military personnel and deal with the rehabilitation of victims during hostilities.¹²⁴ It is also important to note the significant contribution of Ukrainian citizens who use computer technology in volunteering. During the course of EuroMaidan, they created sites that provided information support to the participants and helped to coordinate joint protest actions. Events in the eastern Ukraine transformed the activities of information technology (IT) volunteers, who began to develop electronic tablets for gunners, automation of military communications systems, the creation

¹²² Galina Tytysh, "Soldiers of Goodness. Georgiy Tuka," *Ukrainian Pravda*, September 18, 2014, <http://life.pravda.com.ua/person/2014/09/18/180486/>.

¹²³ Maryna Daniliuk, "Three Stories about How Ukrainians Are Arming the Ukrainian Army," *Ukrainian Pravda*, July 11, 2014, <http://life.pravda.com.ua/person/2014/07/11/174797/>.

¹²⁴ Galina Tytysh, "Volunteer Psychologist who has Returned from ATO: Our Best Assistance to Fighters at Home is the Presence Nearby," *Ukrainian Pravda*, October 1, 2014, <http://life.pravda.com.ua/person/2014/10/1/181349/>.

of unmanned aerial vehicles, etc.¹²⁵ Human rights activities of volunteers were mainly aimed at protecting the rights of those people who fell into difficult life situations. Thus, volunteer lawyers monitored and tried to counteract the illegal actions of the Russia-backed Ukrainian authorities during EuroMaidan. Currently, they help internally displaced persons to arrange the necessary documents. They are also part of the negotiating groups that deal with the release of hostages and mitigate their conditions of detention.

One of the successful methods of volunteer assistance to the security forces is to provide targeted assistance to their separate/individual units. Thus, in 2018 alone, the volunteer S. Prytula, who is a public figure and a well-known Ukrainian showman, assembled and transferred to the Special Operations Forces units and the Airborne-Assault Troops thermal vision equipment, night sights, sniper rifles, ammunition for these rifles, sights/scopes, and other property worth five million *hryvnias* (around \$179,000).¹²⁶ Another volunteer project, “The Field Post,” was organized to deliver small but necessary things to the service members: shoes, clothing items, and even letters and drawings from Ukrainian schoolchildren.¹²⁷ Some volunteers have become part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They are service members of the operational reserve and assist the Ukrainian Army in various areas, from the purchase of unmanned aerial vehicles, which are then transferred to units in the areas of the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) in Donbas, to work as instructors in different disciplines, ranging from tactical medicine to training of the crews of large-scale machine guns.¹²⁸

The development of the volunteer movement in some regions of Ukraine has its own characteristic features. Thus, Kharkiv’s volunteers have created a collective network

¹²⁵ Galina Tytysh, “IT Volunteering ‘SOS Army,’” *Ukrainian Pravda*, October 16, 2014, <http://life.pravda.com.ua/volunteers/2014/10/16/182233/>.

¹²⁶ “Already Spent Half a Million Hryvnia: Pritula Called for Help to Paramedics and Snipers,” *Rbc-Ukraine*, October 10, 2018, <https://styler.rbc.ua/ukr/zhizn/potratil-polmilliona-griven-pritula-prizval-1539172370.html>.

¹²⁷ Field Post, Home Page, accessed December 10, 2018, <http://poshta-ato.com.ua/>.

¹²⁸ Serhii Prytula, “Official web page”, accessed January 5, 2019, <https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100007930985506>.

of activists, “Help Army,” which employs up to ten volunteer groups.¹²⁹ Each group conducts its activities in the region: assistance to state security structures, medical institutions, refugees, and the wounded and their relatives. At the same time, in order to provide necessary items to the regional security forces, local businessmen have created a Foundation, “World and Order,” which began to coordinate the activities of volunteers and Kharkiv’s regional authorities. Volunteers nominated by the foundation became advisors to the head of Kharkiv’s state administration and take care of the problems of the army, refugees, and wounded. Thus, the businesses took on responsibility and created an important dialogue platform for volunteer organizations and government structures.¹³⁰

While this and other volunteer initiatives are often very effective, they sometimes lack a clear interaction with the state authorities; as a result, they lose a potential synergistic effect. Therefore, the creation of the Volunteer Council in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine is helped by the Minister of Defense to rebuild the work of the Ministry. By entering into departments and services of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, representatives of volunteer organizations have made the work of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine more open and effective, greatly improving the material support of troops. Representatives of volunteer organizations have received positions in the Department of Public Procurement and Supply of Material Resources of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and other supply services of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in order to carry out an operational monitoring of price proposals and provided information on the supply and timely purchase of property, fuel, lubricants, and foodstuffs. Volunteers in the Personnel Department of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine are further engaged in the formation of a personnel operational reserve from the people who have served in the ATO and the issues of their awards and rewards.¹³¹

¹²⁹ Help-army.org, Home page, accessed December 10, 2018, <http://help-army.org.ua>.

¹³⁰ Ekaterina Sergatskova, “Vsevolod Kozhemyako: We Managed to Make People Believe that “Light” People in Kharkiv more than “Dark” People,” *Ukrainian Pravda*, September 30, 2014, <http://life.pravda.com.ua/person/2014/09/30/181385/>.

¹³¹ “Poltorak Announced Personnel Decisions in the Ministry of Defense: They Will Attract Volunteers to Work in Departments,” Unian.net, November 1, 2014, <http://army.unian.net/1004055-poltorak-anonsirovalkadrovyyie-resheniya-v-minoboronyi-k-rabote-v-departamentah-privlekut-volonterov.html>.

2. Building a New Civil-Military Relations in Ukraine

In 2014, however, there were no such initiatives, and weak and ineffective CMR was one of the reasons for war in Ukraine. Since 2010, the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been in decline, and its power potential was decreased artificially. In the light of this, in 2018, a new law “About the National Security of Ukraine” was adopted. This law took into account the experience of the latest hybrid war with Russia and stated that, after the adoption of this law, three existing laws of Ukraine, “About the Fundamentals of National Security of Ukraine,” “About Democratic Civil Control over the Military Organization and Law Enforcement Bodies of the State,” and “About the organization of defense planning,” were annulled.

According to Article 4 of this new law, the system of civilian control consists of the control exercised by the President of Ukraine; control carried out by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; control carried out by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine; control carried out by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, executive bodies, and local self-government bodies; judicial control; and public control.¹³²

The subject of civilian control is:

- compliance with the requirements of the Constitution and laws of Ukraine in the activities of the security and defense sector bodies, prevention of their use for usurpation of power, and violation of human and civil rights and freedoms;¹³³
- the content and state of implementation of strategies, doctrines, concepts, state programs, and plans in the areas of national security and defense;¹³⁴
- the state of law and order in the security and defense sector, their staffing, equipment with modern weapons, military and special equipment, the provision of necessary supplies of material and readiness to perform assignments in peacetime and in a special period;¹³⁵ and

¹³² About National Security of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 2469-VIII (2018), accessed December 15, 2018, <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2469-19>. <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2469-19>.

¹³³ About National Security of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 2469-VIII (2018).

¹³⁴ About National Security of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 2469-VIII (2018).

¹³⁵ About National Security of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 2469-VIII (2018)..

- the efficiency of the use of resources, in particular budget funds, by the security and defense sector.¹³⁶

Particularly interesting is article 10 of this law about public control. According to this article, citizens of Ukraine participate in the implementation of civilian control through public associations of which they are members and through the deputies of local councils. Additionally, they participate personally via the Commissioner of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on human rights or state bodies in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution of Ukraine and other laws of Ukraine.

According to this law, public associations that register in accordance with the procedure established by Ukrainian law can

- receive information from the state authorities, in particular from the leaders of the components of the security and defense sector, in accordance with the established procedure, and information on activities of the components of the security and defense sector, except for restricted information;¹³⁷
- carry out research on national security and defense, publicly present their results, and create public funds, centers, and teams of experts for this purpose;¹³⁸
- conduct a public examination of draft laws, decisions, programs, and present their findings and proposals for consideration by the relevant state bodies;¹³⁹ and
- participate in public discussions and open parliamentary hearings on issues of activity and development of the security and defense sector, and issues of legal and social protection of servicemen and intelligence and law enforcement officers, in particular dismissed or resigned combatants and their family members.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶ About National Security of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 2469-VIII (2018).

¹³⁷ About National Security of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 2469-VIII (2018).

¹³⁸ About National Security of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 2469-VIII (2018).

¹³⁹ About National Security of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 2469-VIII (2018).

¹⁴⁰ About National Security of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 2469-VIII (2018).

In addition, this law states that the media inform the society about the condition of defense of Ukraine's national interests. Moreover, the media ought to systematically inform the society about the activity of the security and defense sector of Ukraine, the validity of decisions of state bodies on issues of national security and defense, and about the implementation of measures for the development of the security and defense sector. In order to inform society periodically, but not less than once every three years, actors of the security and defense sector publish "White books" or other analytical documents—reviews, national reports, etc.

C. CONCLUSIONS

Currently, a new system of CMR and civil democratic control is being created in Ukraine. The main idea of the new civilian democratic control is not just controlling the actors of the defense and security sector and reporting to the public but strengthening parliamentary control over the Armed Forces of Ukraine, implementing the defense programs, and procuring in the sector of security and defense. Civilian democratic control is the transformation of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine into a civilian office where professional service members are involved in the planning and management of the armed forces and competent civilian experts are thinking about security, information, cooperation, and other bureaucratic or diplomatic issues. Realizing this initiative will only be possible if a conscious civil society understands that it does not just elect a deputy in elections but take part in the life of the armed forces in this case and therefore are responsible for the security of their country. Correspondingly, the media will formulate requests for officials, based on the needs of civil society, for this information and demand answers in the framework of civil democratic control.¹⁴¹

The role of the volunteers is very important in this process. They are one of the main engines of this reform and a vivid example of the possibility of change. New people bring new ideas, enhancing cohesion and fruitful cooperation between the military and

¹⁴¹ Irina Sampan, "Democratic Control over the Armed Forces. What Is this and Why Ukraine Is a Civilian Defense Minister?" 112.ua, January 10, 2018, <https://ua.112.ua/interview/demokratychnyi-kontrol-nad-zsu-shcho-tse-take-i-dlia-choho-ukraini-tsyvilnyi-ministr-oborony-428250.html>.

civilian spheres that is very important in the time of hybrid warfare. The example of Crimea, when weak CMR allowed Russian forces to annex the peninsula due to weak political leadership, points to how the lack or sometimes absence of coordination and cooperation between the civil and military spheres, and insufficiently robust CMR significantly can reduce the ability to resist Russian hybrid aggression.

In order to build and retain robust CMR in new conditions and interact and cooperate with volunteers, other civil persons, and governmental/nongovernmental institutions and organizations, the military units of CIMIC of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were created. Representatives of the Ukrainian CIMIC not only represent the position of the armed forces at diverse meetings with civilians on different levels but also enhance cohesion, avoid tensions between civil and military institutions, and find a consensus in complex questions, all of which the next chapter discusses in more detail.

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IV. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE IN UKRAINE

The previous chapter described the creation of new systems of CMR and civil democratic control in Ukraine. Based on these findings, this chapter argues that in order to build and retain robust CMR under new conditions and to cooperate and coordinate with volunteers, other civil persons, and governmental/nongovernmental institutions and organizations, decision makers in Ukraine have to use the tool of CIMIC. The chapter begins with a discussion of different CIMIC approaches; it then examines the participation of CIMIC Teams in counterpropaganda and information operations, which is an inevitable part of their work. Unlike military intelligence, which focuses on military adversaries' capabilities, CIMIC Teams are focused on the civil population. Finally, this chapter sets forth the current achievements and future prospects of Ukrainian CIMIC.

A. CREATION OF THE SYSTEM OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC) IN THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE

The roots of CIMIC go back to 1943, when the American Civil Affairs Division was created; Sebastian Rinelli and Isabella Duyvesteyn note that “The main goal was to lessen effects of war on the population in the operational environment and to secure its support.”¹⁴² After World War II, however, cooperation with local civilian populations in a time of military operations was absent in the concepts of Western armies; only after the Balkan war in 1991 did militaries start thinking about it again. Numerous peacekeeping missions around the world and wars in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan gave further impetus to the development of CIMIC. In 2013, NATO approved the Allied Joint Publication 3.4.9, detailing the new doctrine of CIMIC. According to this document, CIMIC has three main functions: 1) Civil-Military Liaison; 2) Support to the Force; and 3) Support to Civil Actors and their Environment.¹⁴³ NATO also created the Center of

¹⁴² Sebastian Rinelli and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, *The Missing Link: Civil-Military Cooperation and Hybrid Wars* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 312.

¹⁴³ Rinelli and Duyvesteyn.

Excellence of Civil-Military Cooperation in Delft, the Netherlands, to train and educate NATO and non-NATO military and civilian personnel in the domain of CIMIC.

At the same time, some countries have developed their own national CIMIC concepts. For instance, Germany is focusing more on domestic CIMIC operations and suggests civil-military cooperation during cases of emergency triggered by natural disasters in the German territory. On the other hand, the United States of America in 2013 created Joint Publication 3-57–Civil-Military Operations, which defines CIMIC in the format of military operations:

Civil-military operations (CMO) are the activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, and during all military operations, CMO are essential to the military instrument to coordinate the integration of military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency, and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.¹⁴⁴

In other words, the U.S. military states that civil-military interaction is vital to achieve the goals of military operations. Different Western scholars identify three levels of relations between the civil and military sides: civil-military relations, civil-military interactions, and civil-military cooperation. Speaking in military language, they belong to the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, respectively. Civil-military relations are about civil democratic control of the military; these are relations on a high political level between civil and military decision makers. Civil-military interactions encompass broad interaction between the civil and military spheres during military operations. This is a new concept introduced by NATO in 2014 underscoring the significance of the civilian aspect in all types of military operations. Finally, civil-military cooperation is about the functioning of military teams in a time of military operations and establishing robust liaisons between all

¹⁴⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine of Civil-Military Operations*, JP 3-57 (Washington, DC: Joint Chief of Staff, 2018), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_57.pdf.

actors of a conflict in order to avoid collateral damage, support the military operations, and help the local civil population in a war zone.¹⁴⁵

Nevertheless, despite the wide range of contemporary theories about policies concerning, and implementations of CIMIC globally, no one except Ukraine has any practical experience of CIMIC during hybrid warfare. The experience of hybrid war in the eastern part of Ukraine (Donbas) shows that if a military formation wants to control the territory, its personnel should be involved in the process of restoring the normal working procedures of the public administrations, indeed, to be the military part in newly created military-civil administrations. The vital functions of life for the local population in Ukrainian territories liberated from separatists require not only mechanized and armored units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations but also, and in fact primarily, CIMIC Teams.

B. ROLE OF CIMIC TEAMS IN UKRAINE

What is the difference between “traditional” CIMIC and Ukrainian CIMIC? According to Ukraine’s military manual (2016),

Civil-Military Cooperation is the systematic, planned activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in coordination and cooperation with the other executive and local authorities, public associations, organizations and citizens in the areas of military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine deployment in order to create a positive public opinion and provided favorable conditions for the implementation of the tasks and functions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by assisting the civilian population in solving of life problems with the use of military and non-military capabilities.¹⁴⁶

Ukrainian CIMIC therefore differs from “traditional” CIMIC in a number of ways. First of all, whereas “traditional” CIMIC is usually employed abroad in peacekeeping missions, Ukrainian CIMIC is working in its home territory in a time of combat actions. This situation allows Ukrainian CIMIC Teams to avoid misunderstanding due to language issues and use their capabilities more widely: all team members can operate

¹⁴⁵ Rinelli and Duyvesteyn.

¹⁴⁶ Ruslan Kokhanchuk, email message to author, January 22, 2019.

simultaneously, they do not depend on an interpreter. Moreover, working in their own home territory gives Ukrainian CIMIC Teams an advantage with respect to cultural awareness: members of the CIMIC Teams deeply understand cultural traditions of the local population and focus groups of Donbas because they share that culture and those traditions, which are common to most Ukrainians.

Second, CIMIC Teams in Ukraine have performed many tasks that are unprofitable under “traditional” CIMIC. Within the framework of “traditional” CIMIC, to establish liaison, avoid tensions between military and civilians, and conduct reconstruction projects are the main tasks of CIMIC Teams. Ukrainian CIMIC Teams do the same, but they make many additional missions. There are coordination and participation in humanitarian demining, negotiations with separatists about local cease-fire agreements, as well as repairing electricity lines and water stations. Moreover, they participate in the exchange of captive servicemen and bodies of persons killed in action, search and delivery to the burial place of killed soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other Ukrainian military formations. In addition, CIMIC Teams continuously search the sources and identity resources to help the affected local population (primarily in, but not limited to, Donbas) and many other urgent tasks related to the interaction between the military and civilians.

Ukrainian CIMIC is thus the “latest version” of CIMIC and combines different CIMIC approaches from different states. CIMIC Teams in Ukraine working in a time of hybrid warfare use a dynamically developing system that draws on the latest experiences of Western countries in the CIMIC domain while creating its own new forms and methods. Ukrainian CIMIC Teams can operate in uncertainty and ambiguity; they are very flexible, ready for unpredictable measures by rivals, and often act preemptively. The rebirth of the Ukrainian Army has given CIMIC in Ukraine the chance to be not only a military tool but also a mechanism that in a time of hybrid warfare can show tremendous results in the realm of interaction and cooperation between the civil and military spheres.

At the beginning, according to Ruslan Kokhanchuk, the main tasks of CIMIC Teams in Donbas were “to prevent the creation of humanitarian disaster in the area of the Anti-Terrorist Operation, to preclude the emergence of social tensions, and to form a

positive public opinion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”¹⁴⁷ Currently, the CIMIC Teams form one of the most effective parts of the liaison between the local civilian population and the military in Donbas.

1. Activities of Ukrainian CIMIC

Current CIMIC Teams in Donbas are focusing on several areas:

- organization of CIVIL-MILITARY cooperation in areas of responsibility of military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
- formation of positive public opinion about the activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; and
- analysis of socio-political, economic, religious, demographic, ecological, sanitary, and epidemiological conditions and forecasting their influence on the possible actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.¹⁴⁸

Its performance of these tasks makes Ukrainian CIMIC one of the unconventional Ukrainian answers to Russia’s hybrid threat. As of 2019, the main efforts of CIMIC Teams in Ukraine are focused on two main tasks: assisting to the civilian population in particular areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and supporting Ukrainian military units. These actions give military commanders at operational and tactical levels an opportunity to focus on military issues and have allowed them to concentrate on planning and executing combat actions. Moreover, all these CIMIC activities allow the citizens of Ukraine to know more about the real situation in Donbas (fill the information gaps, prevent the spread of rumors and unreliable information) and to work as a part of civil-military relations.

In the context of hybrid warfighting, the peaceful settlement of the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine becomes a long-term task, both politically and economically. It will require consolidation of the efforts of the entire society, introduction of new approaches and principles of cooperation between the Armed Forces of Ukraine and international governmental/nongovernmental and national organizations, associations of citizens

¹⁴⁷ Kokhanchuk.

¹⁴⁸ Kokhanchuk.

(volunteers), local self-government bodies, and individual citizens of Ukraine and other states.

These efforts must be established on all levels: civil-military relations, civil-military interactions, and civil-military cooperation. As of 2019, Ukrainian CIMIC is successfully working not only on the lowest (tactical) level, but also on the middle (civil-military interactions) and highest (civil-military relations) levels, providing a strong connection between high-level military commanders and high-level civil decision makers. Currently, CIMIC in Ukraine is working as a part of Strategic Communication (STRATCOM)¹⁴⁹ efficiently and effectively.

That said, in order to work more productive, civilian decision makers at different levels must have special knowledge and education. They should know and understand that fighting in hybrid conditions means fighting not only on the battlefield but also in heads and brains; civil preparedness and social resilience must be in Ukrainian hearts and minds and that is why CIMIC participates in Counterpropaganda/Information operations.

2. CIMIC and Counterpropaganda/Information Operations

Before 2014, no CIMIC doctrine in any country indicated that CIMIC units should plan and conduct or participate in counterpropaganda and information operations. Marian Corbe and Eugenio Cusumano point out that “CIMIC is the practical tool that facilitates cooperation between military and non-military actors.”¹⁵⁰ CIMIC, however, is not only the most useful tool the military can use to communicate with the civil population living in a war conflict zone but also an indispensable tool for the military in counterpropaganda and information operations because CIMIC Teams are focused on the civil population, while military intelligence is focused on military adversaries’ capabilities. Thus, as Corbe and Cusumano emphasize, “CIMIC and intelligence capabilities are key to gaining the

¹⁴⁹ Steve Tatham, *Strategic Communication: A Primer* (England: Defence Academy of the UK, 2008), 27: “A systematic series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted across strategic, operational and tactical levels that enables understanding of target audiences, and identifies effective conduits to promote and sustain particular types of behavior.” https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/94411/2008_Dec.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ Marian Corbe and Eugenio Cusumano, *A Civil-Military Response to Hybrid Threats. Conclusions* (Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 306.

environmental understanding of the local context that is required in order to formulate a tailored response.”¹⁵¹

The unique feature of Ukrainian CIMIC Teams is effective participation in counterpropaganda and information operations. Although Russia used half-truths, manipulated public opinion, and spread disinformation, Ukraine continues to collect and disseminate, in real-time, facts and evidence of Russian hybrid and illegal activities in foreign territories using modern information technologies, and CIMIC Teams are playing a significant role in this process. CIMIC Teams are recording the results of shelling by Russian troops in areas where civilians live as evidence of the violation of the Geneva Convention by Russians. This information is attached to other information about Russian crimes in order to use it against Russia in the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

Persuasion of the local population is also the work of the Ukrainian CIMIC. Jonathan Freedland mentions that:

The initial denial by the Russian chief commanders of the presence of Russian soldiers in Crimea allowed Russia to gain time to take over strategic positions in Crimea. Since the start of the Crimean campaign, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly denied that the “men in green” were part of the Russian Armed Forces, insisting they were groups of a local militia who had obtained their weapons from Ukrainians and even suggesting that they may have acquired their Russian-looking uniforms from local shops. Only on April 17, 2015 did he finally and publicly acknowledge that Russian Special Forces were involved in the events of Crimea.¹⁵²

During meetings with locals in Donbas, CIMIC Teams discussed this example and asked whether it is possible to trust a man who lied in public, especially if this person is the president of a “great country.” As a result of these discussions, most locals agreed that Putin lied and he would surely lie again.

¹⁵¹ Corbe and Cusumano.

¹⁵² Jonathan Freedland, “We Have to See through Putin’s Fog of Lies, and Take Action Now,” *Guardian*, March 16, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/16/putin-lies-action-moscow-salisbury-attack>.

To achieve its goals, Russian propaganda has spread the wrong impression about events in Ukraine via domestic and international media. Russian speakers have called the Ukrainians “Banderites,”¹⁵³ “fascist junta,” and created myths about Ukrainian’s atrocities. One of these myths was the crucifixion of a small boy in the town of Sloviansk.¹⁵⁴ Other Russian journalists wrote that the Ukrainian government promised every Ukrainian soldier and officer two slaves from the local Donbass population; Ukrainian military were mailing to their relatives severed heads of the local people of Donbas.¹⁵⁵

As a part of counterpropaganda, CIMIC Teams provided modern Ukrainian newspapers and magazines to the people in the Donbas area in order to inform people about the true situation in Ukraine. In addition, they organized broadcasting of Ukrainian radio (CIMIC Teams provided access to the radio stations and helped to restore them) in order to give people an alternative source of information. CIMIC Teams are focused on Russian speakers in Donbas, and during conversation, negotiation, and practical help, they aim to persuade them that the Ukrainian military are not the invaders and horrible people that Russian propaganda has alleged. Moreover, CIMIC Teams have provided food and first aid for old and disabled people who live in a zone of conflict.¹⁵⁶

Yet, CIMIC Teams in Ukraine have to think not only about civilians but also the Ukrainian warriors who have fought and died during this hybrid warfare. CIMIC Teams have delivered items to military units (camouflage nets, medicine, clothes, and other things from the civil population of Ukraine) and brought them fresh Ukrainian newspapers and letters from Ukrainian children. Those letters have played a very significant role for soldiers; they have felt the support of the Ukrainian nation and increased their motivation to fight. Some soldiers have said that they are fighting in Donbas not for the current

¹⁵³ Referring to Stepan Bandera, Ukrainian leader of movement for Ukraine’s independence during World War II.

¹⁵⁴ “Fake: Crucifixion in Slovyansk,” StopFake.org, July 15, 2014, <https://www.stopfake.org/en/lies-crucifixion-on-channel-one/>.

¹⁵⁵ “Fake: Crucifixion in Slovyansk.”

¹⁵⁶ “Officers of CIMIC’s Groups Deliver Humanitarian Aid to Servicemen and Local Residents in Donbas,” Ministry of Defense, accessed December 28, 2018, <http://www.mil.gov.ua/en/news/2015/12/22/officers-of-groups-of-civil-military-cooperation-deliver-humanitarian-aid-to-servicemen-and-local-residents-in-donbas/>.

President of Ukraine or current Parliament staff but for Ukrainian children, for Ukraine's future.

Another unpleasant but very important task of CIMIC Teams, one related to optics and information operations, is the task of the Mortuary Affairs Team. Within the framework of this task, from September 3, 2014 to December 2018, CIMIC Teams transported from the ATO area 1,464 bodies (remains) of the killed military servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, law enforcement agencies, and other military formations. Equally important were the 254 bodies they recovered from temporarily uncontrolled territory of Donbas.¹⁵⁷

Unfortunately, Ukrainian fighters have died, and the question of delivering and burying the body of a warrior is a very sensitive question. It may seem strange at first glance, but this question will also be relevant to the sphere of counterpropaganda because Russia still denies its participation of Russian soldiers and officers in the war in Ukraine, and thousands Russian dead military men are buried by Russia as unknown people. By contrast, Ukraine officially declares its losses, and the dead soldiers have been buried with all military honors. The photo on the right in Figure 2 shows how Ukrainians escort to the last road those who died for the freedom of Ukraine. On the left in Figure 2 are graves of Russian soldiers; the inscription on the plate is “Unknown Soldier # 1” and the date—06.06.2015.

¹⁵⁷ Ruslan Kokhanchuk, email message to author, January 22, 2019.



Figure 2. Different approaches to honor killed in action in Ukraine (left)¹⁵⁸ and Russia (right).¹⁵⁹

Under these circumstances, the issue of honoring a deceased warrior becomes not only a matter for his family; it becomes a powerful factor influencing the consciousness of both civilians and the military, and CIMIC Teams play a significant role in this process. They have conducted counterpropaganda and information operations in very tumultuous times and areas of the country.

3. The Current Achievements and Future Perspectives of Ukrainian CIMIC

CIMIC's work to assist the civilian population since spring 2014 to winter 2019 has led to tremendous results. According to Ukrainian CIMIC Directorate, Ukrainian CIMIC Teams in Donbas have:

- created conditions for the conduct of elections of local authorities in areas of Anti-Terrorist Operation/Joint Forces Operation on Donbas;
- distributed 5,428,900 tons of humanitarian aid to the local population of Donbas;

¹⁵⁸ Source: "Motoroshne video zustrichi zagyblogo voyna na kolinakh," [Creepy video of the meeting of the killed warrior on the knees], 24 Channel, September 28, 2016, https://24tv.ua/motoroshne_video_zustrichi_zagiblogo_voyina_vse_selo_na_kolinah_n731357

¹⁵⁹ Source: "Vantazh 200" bez mogyl i sovisti – v merezhakh zjavylysja spysky zahyblykh rosijskykh terorystiv na Donbasi," ["Cargo 200" without tombs and conscience – in social networks appear the lists of the Russian terrorists on Donbas], 5.ua, March 5, 2018, <https://www.5.ua/suspilstvo/vantazh-200-bez-mohyl-i-sovisti-v-merezh-ziavylysia-spysky-zahyblykh-rosijskykh-terorystiv-na-donbasi-166005.html>

- engaged the strength and resources of local communities and organizations to restore the infrastructure of Donbas;
- organized the collection and distribution of assistance to boarding schools;
- conducted and participated in more than 600 patriotic events;¹⁶⁰
- coordinated and supported the permanent restoration of electric power lines in towns suffering from constant shelling;¹⁶¹
- launched the project of information-gathering on disabled people and organized the delivery of food to them;¹⁶²
- evacuated the local population of several towns and villages in combat areas, in cooperation with national nongovernmental organizations, in order to avoid collateral damage;¹⁶³
- started conducting social projects aimed to counter the negative influence of Russian propaganda; more than 2.5 million copies of the newspaper “Voice of Ukraine,” “Facts of Donbas,” “Donbas Inform,” “Message of Donbas,” “East and West Together,” “Peaceful time,” campaign materials of the “Open Policy” fund were distributed;¹⁶⁴ and
- launched a mine safety program and humanitarian demining projects in cooperation with international organizations and international non-governmental organizations, as well as cleaned more than 26,000 acres of territory.”¹⁶⁵

All of these actions have prevented humanitarian disaster in Donbas, helped people who live in areas of combat action to survive, and prevented collateral damage among the civilian population.

As part of procedures to support military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, CIMIC Teams perform the following tasks:

¹⁶⁰ Civil-Military Cooperation Armed Forces of Ukraine, CIMIC, January 22, 2019, <https://civic.com.ua/en/>.

¹⁶¹ Civil-Military Cooperation Armed Forces of Ukraine.

¹⁶² Civil-Military Cooperation Armed Forces of Ukraine.

¹⁶³ Civil-Military Cooperation Armed Forces of Ukraine.

¹⁶⁴ Civil-Military Cooperation Armed Forces of Ukraine.

¹⁶⁵ Civil-Military Cooperation Armed Forces of Ukraine.

- search and exhume bodies of soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as and other military formations of security and defense sector, who were killed in action (since September 2014 to January 2019 – 1,464 bodies and remains of bodies);¹⁶⁶
- conduct evacuation of personnel who were seriously wounded in action, and who were prisoners of war and kept on the temporarily Russian-controlled territory of Donbas;¹⁶⁷
- establish delivery of medical supplies to the soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine remaining at the hospitals in the temporarily Russian-controlled territory of Donbas;¹⁶⁸
- share information about the current situation in Donbas with locals, helping them to restore peace and law enforcement in the area of Donbas region;¹⁶⁹ and
- continue distribution of donations to the separate military units in Donbas.¹⁷⁰

Ruslan Kokhanchuk, one of the officers of the CIMIC Teams mentions: “The work of the civil-military cooperation units has contributed to a significant increase in the confidence of the civilian population in the Armed Forces of Ukraine as an institution of the state and helped to minimize the impact of the military action on civilians in Donbas.”¹⁷¹ In addition, this work has contributed to the formation of positive public opinion of the activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the areas of deployment of military units from 20 percent in 2014 to 60 percent in 2018 and expanded the possibilities for counteracting the enemy’s negative informational influence on the population of the state.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁶ Kokhanchuk.

¹⁶⁷ Kokhanchuk.

¹⁶⁸ Kokhanchuk.

¹⁶⁹ Kokhanchuk.

¹⁷⁰ Kokhanchuk.

¹⁷¹ Civil-Military Cooperation Armed Forces of Ukraine.

¹⁷² Julia Tunik, “Colonel Alexei Nozdrachev: In the Donbass, the Armed Forces of Ukraine Is in a Better Position than the State Power,” Glavcom.ua, December 6, 2017, <https://glavcom.ua/interviews/polkovnik-andriy-nozdrachov-na-donbasi-do-zbroynih-sil-ukrajini-stavlyatsya-krashche-nizh-do-derzhavnoji-vladi-455547.html>.

Ukraine has continued resisting the hybrid aggression of Russia. On February 23, 2018, the President of Ukraine signed the Law of Ukraine “On the Peculiarities of State Policy Concerning the State Sovereignty of Ukraine in the Temporarily Occupied Territories in the Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts,” also referred to as the “law of the de-occupation” of Donbas.¹⁷³ According to this law, the ATO in Donbas is over and the JFO has begun: the main tasks of this operation are the implementation of measures to ensure national security and defense, the rebuff and deterrence of armed aggression of the Russian Federation, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of local populations.¹⁷⁴

CIMIC Teams will continue to participate in this operation as well and will not stop their activities focused on the local civil population of Donbas, especially on children and old people. In addition, as a part of civil-military relations, CIMIC will integrate a system of prevention of losses among civilians. CIMIC Teams also continue to work actively with military-civilian administrations and units of the State Border, National Guard in order to optimize the structure of checkpoints and crossing points on the separation line. Such activities address the civilian population’s security issues as well as contribute to the improvement of conditions for people who stay in these areas.¹⁷⁵

C. CONCLUSIONS

The effectiveness of the military Operation of Joint Forces in Donbas directly correlates with efficiency. Taking into account that Donbas is highly populated, in order to preclude plentiful civil casualties, this complex operation has had to be conducted extremely efficiently and effectively. U.S. General Louis A. DiMarco points out:

Future urban military operations, as the historical record supports, will not just be about urban combat. Because the civilian population is integral to the urban environment, urban combat must be closely and effectively coordinated and synchronized with political policy. It will not possible to

¹⁷³ “OFFICIAL: Full text of the law on the de-occupation of the Donbas,” Novinarnia.com, February 23, 2018, <https://novynarnia.com/2018/02/23/ofitsiyno-povniy-tekst-zakonu-pro-deokupatsiyu-donbasu>.

¹⁷⁴ Illia Ponomarenko, “As ATO Ends, Joint Forces Operation Launched in Donbas,” *KyivPost*, April 30, 2018, <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/ato-ends-joint-forces-operation-launched-donbas.html>.

¹⁷⁵ Kokhanchuk.

execute truly successful urban combat operations unless those operations account for the welfare of the civilian population, and political policy ensures that the needs and grievances of urban residents are adequately satisfied. To help accomplish this, military leaders must carefully plan urban combat operations in conjunction with political guidance so that, unlike the French in Algiers, military victory does not contribute to political defeat.¹⁷⁶

Correspondingly, the success of the military operation in Donbas considerably depends on particular processes, one of which is the facilitation of the local civilian population of Donbas, as well as civil society in Ukraine on the whole, and CIMIC Teams play a vital role in these processes.

CIMIC in Ukraine is one of best examples of robust CMR in a time of hybrid aggression. Establishing a two-way connection between the civilian and military realms, informing civilians about actions of all members of the security sector via traditional and new media, and protecting the civil local population all require acting ahead of time without allowing the enemy to impose its initiative. Currently, in addition to official newspapers and webpages in social networks, several Ukrainian generals periodically inform society about the current situation in the Donbas region and other parts of Ukraine. Russia will continue using propaganda, forgeries, disinformation, and numberless agents of influence, conventional and unconventional military power in order to win this war. In this situation, one of the main tasks of CIMIC is to unite the people and obtain their trust in a time of total distrust. Politicians, journalists, and public figures, all military, and civilians should combine efforts to achieve peace, economic, and social recovery of Donbas.

CIMIC is an essential part of military efforts during hybrid warfare in war zones on strategic, operational, and tactical levels in order to prevent potential threats of hybrid aggression and achieve political and military goals. From the military perspective, on a strategic (civil-military relations) level, high-level decision makers have used information from CIMIC Teams in order to make effective and productive decisions and statements. On an operational (civil-military interaction) level, CIMIC Teams are given essential

¹⁷⁶ Louis A. DiMarco, *Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare from Stalingrad to Iraq* (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 215.

information for commanders of joint military units in order to better cooperate and coordinate their efforts. On a tactical (civil-military cooperation) level, CIMIC Teams are organized in cooperation with civilians in particular sectors; commanders and military commanders can use information about the civil environment—the attitude of the civilian population—when planning operations in order to avoid collateral damage and prevent losses among the civilian population.

In hybrid warfare, a vigorous system of civil-military cooperation can contribute to important growth of trust among the civil population toward the Armed Forces of Ukraine as a state organization and can reduce the effect of military action on noncombatants in combat areas. Besides, such a system has helped to form positive public opinion about actions of military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the zones of the military unit's disposition and enlarged its ability to counter the destructive influence of the Russian Federation's propaganda on the populace of Ukraine's Donbas.¹⁷⁷

CIMIC in Ukraine must give new opportunities not only for military commanders, but also for the civilian population as well as in counteracting hybrid threats. The next level of development should integrating the use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other actors of the defense and security sector into the planning process, and managing them during engagement in battles and combat operations. In addition, CIMIC should be interconnected with civilian ministries and organizations and represent, explain, and even defend the military's point of view among civilians. Further, CIMIC should participate in post-conflict settlement (reconstruction), including the task of restoring the destroyed infrastructure of the region.

¹⁷⁷ Civil-military cooperation Armed Forces of Ukraine, January 22, 2019, <https://civic.com.ua/en/>.

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V. LESSONS LEARNED ON HOW TO COUNTERACT RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE: THE CASE OF UKRAINE

As the previous chapters have shown, Ukraine is trying to build new robust CMR in a time of hybrid warfare, and CIMIC is a very effective tool in this process. Russian aggression has evolved from direct military intervention in sovereign countries to “indirect measures” such as information and energy wars and cyberattacks aimed at achieving the Kremlin’s political goals. It is “non-military measures,” in the opinion of the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation General Gerasimov, that represent the main direction of Russia’s action; according to Gerasimov, military measures start only in the crisis phase and solely to enhance and support non-military actions.¹⁷⁸

Currently, Ukraine struggles not only for the freedom of the Ukrainian people and state independence but also for Western values, because they are also Ukraine’s values. Ukraine today is not only a shield for the Western and Central European states, but also a warning: it shows to all countries of the Euro-Atlantic world what can happen if they do not respond to the Kremlin and what happens if they allow Russia to buy politicians and bribe officials and to increase Kremlin information and business space, corroding the loyalty of citizens and forming pro-Moscow lobbies and pro-Moscow public opinion using aggressive propaganda. It is necessary to remove the “rose-colored glasses” and understand that the threat to the West from the Russian Federation is more serious than illegal migrants or international organized crime. It is a deadly threat, because if the Russian ideology is not defeated, then the Euro-Atlantic territories will be in ruins and full of fugitives.¹⁷⁹

Ukraine has gained unique experience in confronting hybrid aggression, as Ukraine became the first country in which the Kremlin tried to test this kind of aggression in its entirety. Ukraine was able to defend itself (but could not reinstall territorial integrity) by creating mechanisms for counteracting the most aggressive manifestations of the Kremlin’s

¹⁷⁸ Gerasimov.

¹⁷⁹ Olexandr Vlasyuk and Serhiy Kononenko, *Kremlin Aggression against Ukraine: Reviews in the Context of War* (Kyiv: National Institute of Strategic Research, 2017), http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/niss_Kreml-agressin__druk-d7e5f.pdf.

hybrid aggression and continuing a positional warfare with a much stronger opponent. The world should study the unique experience of Ukraine because the world (the United States and the countries of the Euro-Atlantic community first of all) will assuredly have to deal with hybrid threats. This chapter therefore sets forth what Ukraine has already done to counter Russian hybrid warfare.

A. HOW UKRAINE COUNTERACTS RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE

In the fifth year of the war, Ukraine has shown the world how to withstand a much larger and more powerful adversary. Nonetheless, in order to win this war, it is necessary that Ukraine's experience, paid for at a very high price (more than 10,000 dead and more than 2,000,000 internally displaced),¹⁸⁰ should be studied and implemented. What needs to be done to ensure that suffering has not been in vain? What lessons should be learned from this situation to avoid similar losses in the future? In which areas should the first steps be made?

Analyzing the works of Ukrainian and foreign experts it is evident that the following are the main considerations Ukraine has used to counteract Russian hybrid actions/aggression:

- military
- economic
- humanitarian
- political
- informational
- cyber defense
- diplomatic

¹⁸⁰ Cynthia Buckley, Ralph Clem, Jarod Fox, and Erik Herron, "The War in Ukraine Is More Devastating than You Know," *Washington Post*, April 9, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/09/the-war-in-ukraine-is-more-devastating-than-you-know/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6b56eabc78e6.

- special and law enforcement services activity

Since 2014, Ukraine has made tremendous progress in each of these areas.

1. Military Developments

Militarily, Ukraine has

- nearly doubled the size of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, from 150,000 in 2014 to 255,000 in 2018;¹⁸¹
- increased the military budget and spending in the security sector and on defense as a whole: the Ukrainian military budget in 2014 was 27 billion *hryvnias*,¹⁸² 1.78 percent of GDP; in 2018, 86.1 billion *hryvnias*, 2.56 percent of GDP; and in 2019, 101.4 billion *hryvnias*, approximately 5 Percent of GDP,¹⁸³ with the salary of service members also almost doubled;¹⁸⁴
- developed and adopted new weapons and military equipment, and upgraded old Ukrainian armaments and military equipment to modern standards—1,400 new and modernized units of weapons and armaments in 2017 and 920 units in 2018;¹⁸⁵
- renewed the leadership of the Armed Forces, with further promotion to the next service position and study in the National Academy of Defense now requiring combat experience in the area of ATO/JFO;
- reconciled the ATO format itself to the JFO, which has allowed improved planning procedures and C3 (command, control and communication) system of the operation in the east of Ukraine;

¹⁸¹ “The Number of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Has Reached 255,000,” Korrespondent.net, March 3, 2018, <https://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/3947234-chyselnist-zsu-dosiahla-255-000-osib>.

¹⁸² Ukrainian currency.

¹⁸³ Irina Sampan, “83.3 billion UAH for the Army. How Will the Ministry of Defense Spend Its Budget for 2018?” 112.ua, December 8, 2017, <https://ua.112.ua/statji/833-miliardy-hryven-na-armiiu-yak-minoborony-rozpodilylo-svii-biudzheth-na-2018-rik-413970.html>.

¹⁸⁴ “Defense and Security budget for 2019,” *Ukrainian Military Pages*, September 19, 2018, <https://www.ukrmilitary.com/2018/09/budget-2019.html>.

¹⁸⁵ “The Ministry of Defense Reported on Progress in the Reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” Korrespondent.net, December 26, 2017, <https://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/3922263-minoborony-vidzvituvalo-schodo-dosiahnen-v-reformi-zsu>.

- gained unique combat experience, now actively implemented in combat regulations and manuals and shared by Ukrainian service members with NATO troops during international military exercises;
- based on this combat experience, created a new services of the Armed Forces – Airborne-Assault Troops (instead of Paratrooper Troops) and Special Operation Forces; additionally, to inform commanders about the civil environment in the area of operations, established the system of CIMIC, working on strategic, operational, and tactical levels;
- reformed practically “from scratch” the Command of the Naval Forces and the Naval Forces of Ukraine themselves; and
- increased the flight time of military pilots several times over—from 30 to 40 hours per year in 2013 to 110 to 120 hours 2017.¹⁸⁶

Furthermore, a program for the construction of military housing for contract servicemen was launched, including 184 dormitories by the end of 2018;¹⁸⁷ a new modern military uniform and equipment for military personnel have been developed; and a new food supply system was established. Currently, 52 dining facilities of the military units have been changed to a new food supply system under the new menu of food. The new system of nutrition for service members was introduced along with a new MRE;¹⁸⁸ in the framework of approaching NATO standards, transfer of the headquarters to the J-structure has also been implemented. Moreover, the number of military exercises has significantly increased: in 2017, the Ukrainian Army conducted 421 tactical military exercises (up from 415 in 2016), 107 battalion-tactical (99 in 2016), and 26 exercises at the brigade level (15 in 2016).¹⁸⁹ In total, in 2017 the Armed Forces of Ukraine conducted more than 5,000

¹⁸⁶ “Results and Plans of the Ukrainian Army: Impressive Figures,” *Segodnya.ua*, December 7, 2017, <https://ukr.segodnya.ua/ukraine/rezultaty-i-plany-ukrainskoy-armii-vpechatlyayushchie-cifry-1096107.html>.

¹⁸⁷ “Due to the Returned Funds, 184 Hostels are Being Built in Ukraine for 23 Thousand Troops – Poroshenko,” *Gordonua.com*, October 12, 2018, <https://gordonua.com/ukr/news/politics/-za-rahunok-povernutih-koshtiv-v-ukrajini-budujut-184-gurtozhitki-dlja-23-tis-vijskovih-poroshenko-420650.html>.

¹⁸⁸ “2018 Is the Year of the Largest Development of Military Infrastructure for the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, July 20, 2018, <http://www.mil.gov.ua/news/2018/07/20/2018-rik-dlya-zbrojnih-sil-ukraini-e-rokom-najmasshtabnishoi-rozbudovi-vijskovoi-infrastrukturi/>.

¹⁸⁹ “Results and Plans of the Ukrainian Army: Impressive Figures,” *Segodnya.ua*, December 7, 2017, <https://ukr.segodnya.ua/ukraine/rezultaty-i-plany-ukrainskoy-armii-vpechatlyayushchie-cifry-1096107.html>.

combat training activities.¹⁹⁰ In addition, in the framework of democratic civilian control over the security and defense sector, the role of Minister of Defense of Ukraine, formerly a military position, is now a civilian one.

As a result of these developments, according to the Global Firepower analytical report in 2018, Ukraine holds 29th position in the world rankings and tenth position among the most powerful armies in Europe.¹⁹¹

2. Economic Developments

In the area of economics, Ukraine also has produced good results in counteracting Russian hybrid aggression. While the Ukrainian armed forces restrained Russian military aggression in the Donbas, Ukraine is pursuing a series of countermeasures to reduce Russia's share of capital in Ukraine and, in fact, to reduce Ukraine's dependence on the Russian market and Russian energy resources. As a central part of this effort Ukrainian producers have redirected their markets and succeeded in geographically diversifying their exports. For instance, in 2017, domestic exports of goods to the EU grew by 29.9 percent relative to 2016, which allowed Ukraine to exceed the pre-crisis level of 2013 by 4.6 percent. Moreover, on October 1, 2017, the EU Regulation 2017/1566 on the granting of additional trade preferences to Ukraine for a period of three years came into force.¹⁹² According to this document, Ukraine was given additional quotas for five items of Ukrainian agricultural products: honey, grape juice, barley and flour, tomato processing, and oats; from January 1, 2018, additional preferences for wheat, maize, and barley were introduced. The quota for duty-free imports of corn was increased by 625 thousand tons, barley by 325 thousand tons, and wheat by 65 thousand tons. In addition, this decision

¹⁹⁰ "The Ukrainian Army is Training More – Since the Beginning of the Year Conducted More than 5,000 Events," *Ukrinform.ua*, November 7, 2017, <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/2339320-ukrainska-armia-trenuetsa-bilse-z-pocatku-roku-proveli-ponad-5000-zahodiv.html>.

¹⁹¹ "2018 Military Strength Ranking," *Globalfirepower.com*, accessed November 5, 2018, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>.

¹⁹² "Regulation (EU) 2017/1566 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2017 on the introduction of temporary autonomous trade measures for Ukraine supplementing the trade concessions available under the Association Agreement," *EUR-Lex*, September, 30, 2017, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32017R1566>.

completely eliminated import duties on several industrial products such as fertilizers, dyes, pigments, footwear, copper, aluminum, as well as television- and sound-recording equipment.¹⁹³ It is significant for Ukraine because when Ukrainian producers have redirected their markets they reduced Ukraine's dependence on the Russian Federation.

Ukraine has also established itself as one of the leading suppliers of sunflower oil and cereals in the EU market. In 2017, Ukraine became the largest non-EU supplier of grain to the EU market with a share of 9.3 percent, second only to France, which is the primary grain supplier to the EU as a whole. In the market of sunflower products, Ukraine has a more powerful position: 40 percent of the EU's sunflower oil imports come from Ukraine. In addition, after Australia and France, Ukraine is the third largest supplier of rapeseed to the EU market—13.5 percent of the total import of this category—and falls below only Brazil and Canada in iron ore, with a share of 12.3 percent.¹⁹⁴

Another important direction for Ukrainian trade is Asia. In 2017, trade with Asian countries amounted to 25.5 percent of Ukraine's foreign trade turnover (30.0 percent of exports and 21.5 percent of imports), second only to its trade to the EU, which has helped to diversify the geographical spread of Ukrainian foreign trade.¹⁹⁵ Moreover, after a long decline in trade volume, Ukrainian companies have rebuilt their positions in the U.S. market.

In addition to increasing its trade with other parts of the world, Ukraine has also taken steps to distance itself economically from Russia. Besides expanding its export market, Ukraine has also successfully diminished Russian imports. Thus, during the years 2014–2017, for the first time since independence, Ukraine has laid the legal basis for the creation of energy markets, based on the principles of free competition, adequate consumer protection, and security of supply, capable of integration with the markets of the members

¹⁹³ “Regulation (EU) 2017/1566 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2017 on the introduction of temporary autonomous trade measures for Ukraine supplementing the trade concessions available under the Association Agreement.”

¹⁹⁴ *Analytical Report of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada “About Internal and External Status of Ukraine in 2018.”*

¹⁹⁵ *Analytical Report of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada “About Internal and External Status of Ukraine in 2018.”*

of the Energy Community.¹⁹⁶ At the same time, as a part of economic countermeasures, Ukraine has continued the practice of filing lawsuits against Russia. Thus, according to the results of two arbitration proceedings in Stockholm, Gazprom (the Russian state gas corporation, the main Russian gas supplier-monopolist) has to pay \$2.56 billion to Naftogaz (the Ukrainian state gas company).¹⁹⁷ Moreover, 18 Ukrainian organizations and one individual filed a lawsuit against the Russian Federation. According to the decision of the International Arbitration Court in The Hague of May 2, 2018, Russia illegally expropriated the property of the plaintiffs, “Everest Estate LLC” and 17 other Ukrainian business-structures, as well as a former head of the Ukrainian bank “Privatbank,” Oleksandr Dubilet, in Crimea. The court ordered that Russia must compensate the Ukrainian businesses for their lost assets with interest payments, as well as cover the costs of legal services and court proceedings. The payments amounted to \$159 million.¹⁹⁸ Russia did not recognize the decision of the Court of The Hague and announced that it would file an appeal. To date, the appeal was not officially filed; at least, the lawyers of the Ukrainian side do not know anything about it. Thus, the second stage of the case will soon begin—the seizure of Russian property abroad in favor of Ukrainian businessmen.

Economic sanctions imposed on Russia by Western countries have also helped Ukraine in its fight against a hybrid aggressor. The first sanctions imposed against the aggressor were applied after the annexation of Crimea by Russia. The international community has deemed the Crimean referendum and its results illegitimate and the further incorporation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea into the Russian Federation, illegal. The United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Liechtenstein, Iceland, France, Poland, Latvia, Israel, Albania, Moldova, Bulgaria, and Montenegro decided to support Ukraine and impose

¹⁹⁶ *Analytical Report of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada “About Internal and External Status of Ukraine in 2018.”*

¹⁹⁷ “Gazprom Stated that the Stockholm Arbitration Ordered Naftogaz to Pay \$2 Billion in Overdue Debt,” *Gordonua.com*, December 22, 2017, <https://gordonua.com/news/money/v-gazprom-zayavili-cho-stokgolmskiy-arbitrazh-obyazal-naftogaz-vyplatit-2-mlrd-prosrochennoy-zadolzhennosti-223380.html>.

¹⁹⁸ “Russia Will Challenge the Payment to the Ukrainian Business of “Compensation” for the Crimea,” *Comments.ua*, October 23, 2018, <https://comments.ua/world/638538-rossiya-osporit-viplatu-ukrainskomu.html>.

political, financial, and economic constraints on Russia.¹⁹⁹ According to Bloomberg, Russian businessmen (and hence Russia) have already lost in excess of \$16 billion since the introduction of the United States' sanctions alone.²⁰⁰ During the four years of anti-Russian sanctions, the trade relations between the Russian Federation and the EU decreased by more than \$150 billion.²⁰¹ The total losses are much bigger.

3. Humanitarian Developments

Even with military and economic countermeasures, combating Russian hybrid aggression is impossible without rallying around humanitarian considerations. The main threats for Ukraine in the humanitarian area are the threat to Ukrainian national identity (denial of Ukrainian identity by Russia), aggravation of conflicts in the field of ethno-politics (language issues), manipulation of historical memory (falsification of history), use of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)²⁰² for social destabilization in Ukraine (church occupation of Ukraine), strong Russian influence in the areas of education, science, culture, and art, and the precarious situation of children in currently uncontrolled territories of Ukraine. Russia wants to use the internal tensions and contradictions of society in Ukraine and complete its conquest and occupation by the hands of local traitors.

Currently, Ukraine is counteracting Russia in all these areas, most successfully in the area of church occupation. According to Putin, “the traditional confession [Russian Orthodox Church] of the Russian Federation and the nuclear shield of Russia—those components that strengthen Russian statehood, create the necessary prerequisites for

¹⁹⁹ Taras Muskevich, “Law of Ukraine “On Sanctions.” Problems of the Mechanisms of Its Implementation,” Social Communication Research Center, accessed October 29, 2018, http://www.nbuviap.gov.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=399:agresiya-rf&catid=8&Itemid=350.

²⁰⁰ “Russia’s Oligarchs Have Already Lost more than \$16 Billion Because of U.S. Sanctions,” *Economichna Pravda*, April 10, 2018, <https://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2018/04/10/635844/>.

²⁰¹ “Putin Voiced Losses from Sanctions against Russia,” *Obozrevatel.ua*, June 5, 2018, <https://www.obozrevatel.com/ukr/economics/putin-ozvuchiv-vtrati-vid-sanktsij-proti-rosii.htm>.

²⁰² Before 2018, Ukraine had two Orthodox Churches: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) – headquartered in Kyiv and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) – headquartered in Moscow.

ensuring internal and external security of the country.”²⁰³ Nowadays, the Russian Orthodox Church constitutes a serious threat to the national security of Ukraine due to its destructive influence on the sociopolitical and, in particular, humanitarian spaces of Ukraine. The priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate [UOC (MP)]) refuse to perform church ceremonies (funeral, remembrance, burial) for Ukrainian patriots or people who are free-thinking and critical of events in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Many representatives of the UOC (MP) are anti-Ukrainian activists. The priests of the Russian Orthodox Church and the UOC (MP) take direct part in terrorist formations, and even lead militant gangsters,²⁰⁴ provide temples and monasteries for hiding weapons and military equipment,²⁰⁵ provide information to adjust (make corrections to) artillery fire of Russian invaders on Ukrainian military positions,²⁰⁶ and conduct intelligence on the deployment of units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.²⁰⁷

In order to be free from the Russian Church in Ukraine, President Petro Poroshenko initiated the creation of the Ukrainian Local Orthodox Church, which will be completely independent from the Russian Orthodox Church. In April 2018, President Petro Poroshenko appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew with a request for *Tomos*, the church decree of the Ecumenical Patriarchate on the granting of autocephaly (independence) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.²⁰⁸ On October 11, 2018, Ukraine

²⁰³ President Putin believes that Russian security is strengthened by nuclear weapons and Orthodoxy,” Pravoslavie, accessed November 6, 2018, <http://www.pravoslavie.ru/news/20667.htm>.

²⁰⁴ “Russian terrorists serving in the Moscow Patriarchate,” Inform Napalm, July 11, 2016, accessed November 6, 2018, <https://informnapalm.org/ua/rosijski-terorysty-na-sluzhbi-v-moskovskogo-patriarhatu/>.

²⁰⁵ Dmytro Tymchuk, “Temples of the Moscow Patriarchate in Donbas served as warehouses for Russian troops,” *Apostrof*, July 4, 2016, <http://apostrophe.com.ua/ua/article/society/2016-07-04/hramy-upts-mp-na-donbasse-slujili-skladami-orujiya-dlya-rossijskih-voysk/5939>.

²⁰⁶ “Adjusts “artillery fire”: Priest of Moscow Patriarchate flees to Russia after service of “DNR,” Obozrevatel.ua, February 13, 2017, <https://www.obozrevatel.com/crime/06837-korrektiroval-artu-svyaschennik-upts-mp-sbezhal-v-rossiyu-posle-sluzhbyi-dnr.htm>.

²⁰⁷ “Adjusts “artillery fire”: Priest of Moscow Patriarchate flees to Russia after service of “DNR.”

²⁰⁸ “Tomos is the ecclesiastical decree of the Ecumenical Patriarchate on the granting of autonomy (without separation) or autocephaly (independence) of the church. Tomos of autocephaly can be provided to Ukraine by the end of 2018,” Rbc.ua, July 17, 2018, <https://www.rbc.ua/rus/tag/tomos-17072018>.

received the *Tomos*, and now the process of separating the churches has begun.²⁰⁹ In order to understand the scale of the issue, according to the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine, at the beginning of 2018, there were more than 12,000 churches in the UOC (MP) and only 5,000 in the UOC-Kyiv Patriarchate.²¹⁰

Why is this church issue so important? Because the church is one of the main pillars of the concept of the “Russian World,”²¹¹ which Putin declared for the first time in 2001 during his speech before the first World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad: “The notion of the Russian World extends far from Russia’s geographical borders and even far from the borders of the Russian ethnicity.”²¹² At least twice, in 2008 in Georgia and in 2014 in Ukraine, Russia used the Russian-speaking population as a cause and cover-up of military invasion. Thus, with the receipt of *Tomos* by Ukraine, Russia loses another powerful lever of influence on Ukraine, religious.

4. Political Developments

Another key threat for Ukraine is located in the political area. In order for Russia to influence foreign and domestic Ukrainian policy, Russia formed a legal political lobby in parliament and the executive branch, openly promoting and supporting the pro-Russian politicians and political parties at the local and regional levels in a time of nationwide elections. Russia is trying to destabilize the internal situation in Ukraine and using irredentists and proxies for these nefarious purposes.

²⁰⁹ “On the verge of absurdity” Moscow Patriarchate reacted violently to its “abolition” by Constantinople,” Obozrevatel.ua, November 2, 2018, <https://www.obozrevatel.com/ukr/society/na-mezhi-absurdu-v-upts-mp-prokomentuvali-rishennya-konstantinopolya-po-tomosu.htm>.

²¹⁰ “Tomos is the ecclesiastical decree of the Ecumenical Patriarchate on the granting of autonomy (without separation) or autocephaly (independence) of the church. Tomos of autocephaly can be provided to Ukraine by the end of 2018.”

²¹¹ Marlene Laruelle, *The “Russian World.” Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination* (Washington, DC: Center of Global Interests, 2015), http://globalinterests.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FINAL-CGI_Russian-World_Marlene-Laruelle.pdf.

²¹² “Speech by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin at the Congress of Compatriots,” Scientific-Information Agency “Heritage of Motherland,” October 11, 2001, http://old.nasledie.ru/politvnt/19_44/article.php?art=24.

In lieu of defeating Ukraine in a military confrontation, Russia banked on a political solution to the conflict. According to the Kremlin's plans for power in Ukraine, during the next presidential elections (March 2019) and the parliamentary elections (October 2019), pro-Russian politicians must gain power with the aim of resolving the conflict through favorable considerations for Russia. All this will be presented to the Ukrainian people and the world community as a democratic choice of the Ukrainian people, who are tired of the war and want peace and prosperity. But now, looking at Russia's annexation of Crimea and the Donbas area, which are under the control of Russia, one can say that no prosperity is being achieved. The lack of freedom of speech, the complete suppression of the individual by the state, and the tyranny of law enforcement authorities, an absolutely dependent court are just a few vivid characteristics of Putin's Russia.

Political warfare is one part of Russian hybrid warfare. Russia has rich experience intruding in the political issues of Western countries. The main purpose of Russian political warfare is the formation of favorable public opinion of Russia in a particular state or region. The United States, France, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands comprise a short and incomplete list of countries where Russia has used political warfare.²¹³ Russia is using overt and covert actors and different methods in order to achieve its goals. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, "the overt actors are Russian state media such as RT, Sputnik, Ruptly TV; covert – social media trolls (e.g., the Internet Research Agency–IRA), automated accounts (bots), impersonation accounts on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, WikiLeaks, DCLeaks."²¹⁴

In some countries, especially from the former socialist camp, Russia is using more drastic "active measures." These measures include the organization, preparation, and full

²¹³ "Thirteen Russian nationals associated with the IRA were indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice on February 15, 2018, as part of the special counsel investigation into foreign interference in the 2016 U.S. election. The indictment documents how the IRA, based in St. Petersburg, Russia, carried out an intelligence and influence operation against the United States that included disinformation, impersonation of U.S. citizens, and intelligence gathering in the United States." See *United States of America v. Internet Research Agency LLC et al.*, Criminal no. (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 1349, 1028A), <https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download>.

²¹⁴ Alina Polyakova and Spencer P. Boyer, *The Future of Political Warfare: Russia, The West, and the Coming Age of Global Digital Competition* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2018), <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/the-future-of-political-warfare.pdf>.

support of mass protests against governments that are trying to constructively resolve long-standing conflicts with their neighbors (Greece-Macedonia, Serbia-Kosovo-Albania), or that are trying to accelerate their accession into NATO (Macedonia, Montenegro); stimulating unrest and terrorist acts to overthrow a legitimate government or influence elections (Montenegro); and supporting radicals, ultranationalists, paramilitary groups, and proxies (Serbia, Hungary, and Poland).²¹⁵

Currently, Ukraine is trying to build a robust system of counteraction, but the situation is very uncertain due to the huge number of Russian agents who disseminate disinformation through traditional and new media. Russia is also using bribery of political consultants and experts who can form the opinion of leading political forces. In addition, Russia is bringing into play individual politicians and informational and financial support of radical parties that profess intolerance to non-natives, advocate the idea of national exclusiveness and superiority toward other peoples or races, and idealize authoritarian methods of government.²¹⁶ To counteract Russian political warfare effectively a country should explain to people the ends, ways, and means of Russian leadership. For instance, in May 2017, the head of the BfV (the German intelligence service) publicly warned Moscow against making the political decision to interfere.²¹⁷

5. Information Developments

Accordingly, next area of battle against the Russian hybrid menace is the information space—that is to say, media wars and propaganda. The information war that Russia has activated against Ukraine has set new challenges in the sphere of information security. Anti-Ukrainian propaganda, including fake/staged news stories circulated by Russian media and social networks, has had a significant impact not only on supporters of

²¹⁵ *Analytical Report of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada “About Internal and External Status of Ukraine in 2018.”*

²¹⁶ *Analytical Report of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada “About Internal and External Status of Ukraine in 2018.”*

²¹⁷ Lizzie Dearden, “German Spy Chief Warns Russia Cyberattacks Aiming to Influence Elections,” *Independent*, May 4, 2017, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-spy-chief-russian-cyber-attacks-russiaelections-influence-angela-merkel-putin-hans-georg-a7718006.html>.

Russia who live in Crimea and on the temporarily occupied part of Donbas, but also on many representatives of the world community. Russian information attacks have become global in nature and are receiving more and more government funding: in 2016, the internationally broadcast television channel Russia Today (RT), distributing information in English, Spanish, and Arabic, received 19 billion rubles (US\$307 million) in funding, while for state media Russia allocated 80.2 billion rubles, which is 30 percent more than in 2015.²¹⁸

In addition, there are several research centers operating in Russia whose tasks are information activities in the territories of former Soviet republics, in particular Ukraine.²¹⁹ Ukrainian experts emphasize the next key tasks of these centers in the sphere of information warfare:

- waging strategic disinformation campaigns, which Russia continues not only against Ukraine but also against Western countries;
- actively using current information resources and creating new sources to destabilize the situation;
- imposing and achieving negative informational influence on a regional level; and
- ensuring Russian information is dominant in temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas.

Additionally, Russia uses the media to discredit Ukrainian authorities, to sow seeds of discord between the authorities and the citizens of Ukraine as antagonistic actors, to discredit Ukraine on the international scene, and to legitimate of the annexation of Crimea and creation of terrorist quasi-states in the east of Ukraine. Moreover, Russia instigates an internal political explosion, including using tensions between Ukraine and some neighboring states. At the same time, the aggressor is looking for a variety of ways to influence the Ukrainian media space, using its network of agents of influence from among

²¹⁸ Natalia Tarasenko, "The Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine in Expert Assessments," Social Communications Research Center, accessed November 13, 2018, http://nbuviap.gov.ua/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2759:doktrina-informatsijnoji-bezpeki-yak-zasib-protidiji-informatsijnim-zagrozam&catid=8&Itemid=350..

²¹⁹ Tarasenko.

the representatives of the political elite, the media, church structures, pseudo-nongovernmental organizations, and certain public figures. All of them are actively involved in attempts to counteract the emergence of Ukraine as a united, independent, sovereign state.²²⁰

In order to counteract Russia in information warfare, Ukraine has created “The doctrine of information security,” adopted by the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine in December 2016 and signed by President Petro Poroshenko on February 25, 2017.²²¹ Its purpose is “to protect Ukrainian society from the aggressive informational influence of the Russian Federation, aimed at promoting the war, incitement of national and religious hatred, the change of the constitutional order by violent means, or violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.”²²² This doctrine is intended to provide more rigorous control over the information disseminated by various media and Internet resources. increasing the powers of state regulatory bodies “which carry out activities concerning the state of the informational space,” and “legislative regulation of the mechanism of detection, fixation, blocking and removal from the information space of the state, in particular from the Ukrainian segment of the Internet.” As a result of the instatement of this doctrine, in 2017, two Russian social networks, “*Odnoklassniki*” (“Buddies”) and “*Vkontakte*” (“In contact”), were closed in Ukraine.

Certainly, the appearance of the doctrine does not mean that the information space of Ukraine will radically change. Moreover, as experience shows, the information war, like any other, depends largely on the financial component. If Ukraine, in addition to adopting the doctrine, allocates financial resources to implement it, then Ukraine will have a chance to win on the information front. In the meantime, the obvious positive is that Ukraine has begun to understand that information warfare is very important.

²²⁰ *Analytical Report of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada “About Internal and External Status of Ukraine in 2018.”*

²²¹ On the decision of the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine dated December 29, 2016, “On the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine,” Pub. L. No. 47/2017, (2017), accessed November 13, 2018, <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/47/2017>.

²²² On the decision of the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine dated December 29, 2016, “On the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine,” Pub. L. No. 47/2017, (2017).

6. Cyberspace Developments

A particularly important area of informational confrontation with the aggressor remains cyberspace. In 2017, within the framework of the Russian campaign to eliminate Ukrainian statehood, Russia conducted a number of cybernetic operations against Ukraine, including

- BugDrop (June 2016–March 2017);
- “WannaCry” (known as “WannaCwt,” June 2017); and
- NotPetya (also known as “Petya.A” or “Petya,” June 27–30, 2017).²²³

The goals of these cyberattacks were to obtain confidential information on the activities of critical infrastructure objects, state administration organs, international offices (including human rights organizations in the temporarily occupied territories of Donbas and in Crimea, inter alia), political parties, and influential media. Furthermore, Russian cybertroops have impeded the operation of large business companies, energy and transport infrastructure, and banking institutions to weaken the Ukrainian economy.²²⁴

One of the most dangerous of these challenges is protecting the Ukrainian democratic electoral process, at all stages, from Russian cyberattacks. In 2019, presidential and parliamentary elections are planned in Ukraine, and Russia has already begun a large-scale information campaign aimed at influencing the results of these elections; here, the cyber component of the information operations plays a key role. The peculiarities of this information operation are likely to include manipulating social sentiment and shaping the behavior of potential voters, thereby providing the Kremlin the necessary changes in the political course of Ukraine to Russia, not to the EuroAtlantic direction.

Ukraine is preparing for such developments in advance and developing preventive decisions and actions. For instance, in May 2018, a powerful cyberattack against Ukraine

²²³ *Analytical Report of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada “About Internal and External Status of Ukraine in 2018.”*

²²⁴ On February 22, 2017, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation announced the creation of information operations troops. In fact, this was not the creation of new ones, but the legalization of already existing units, which have carried out information and cyberattacks for a long time and quite successfully.

was prevented: international research structures and law enforcement agencies of Ukraine exposed large-scale infection of network devices with malicious VPNfilter software. According to the Security Service of Ukraine, this attack was being prepared for both cyber-intelligence activities and cyber-sabotage, particularly against objects of critical national infrastructure.²²⁵

7. Diplomatic Developments

The diplomatic area is another very significant area in which Ukraine must counteract Russian hybrid aggression. Ukraine intensifies the processes of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, a legally established foreign policy course designed to bring Ukraine back to a united Europe. With attention to these directions, since June 11, 2017, Ukrainian citizens have been able to travel to the countries of the European Union without visa documents. The provision of visa-free travel by the EU has a historic significance for Ukraine and demonstrates the final break of Kyiv with the post-Soviet past.²²⁶ Now, Ukrainians can travel without visas to 134 countries of the world.²²⁷

Diplomacy is also critical because counteracting Russian hybrid aggression requires the consolidation of the efforts of other states, building anti-Putin's allies, and ensuring the recognition of the Russian Federation's status as an aggressor, and the continuation of the West's sanction policy. Despite all Moscow's efforts to split the Allied countries that support Ukraine, these Western countries continue to implement a policy of countering the aggressor. A vivid example of this steadfastness is the prolongation of sanctions imposed on Russia. The European Union has repeatedly prolonged anti-Russian sanctions over the past years. The Russian delegation did not participate in the PACE meetings in 2018; it was therefore not able to achieve the lifting of restrictions imposed in 2014 against it. The fact that such successes were achieved in the face of a rigid opposition

²²⁵ *Analytical Report of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada "About Internal and External Status of Ukraine in 2018."*

²²⁶ "Ukraine Hails Visa-free Travel to European Union," BBC, June 11, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40241348>.

²²⁷ "Visa-free Countries for Ukrainians in 2018," Lenivskyi Group, accessed November 10, 2018, <http://tuipravo.info/en/legal-news/1072-visa-free-countries-for-ukrainians-in-2018.html>.

from the Russian leadership, which increased its pressure on certain European powers, demonstrates the professionalism of Ukrainian diplomats.²²⁸

Ukrainian diplomacy also makes an important contribution to improving Ukraine's defense capability. The clearest example of this contribution is the use of diplomacy to ensure the supply of American lethal weapons to Ukraine. The U.S. Congress approved a package of aid worth US\$47 million, in which Ukraine received 37 anti-tank launchers "Javelin" and 210 missiles for them.²²⁹ The American armaments have already arrived in Ukrainian territory, and the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have begun to familiarize themselves with the equipment. Additionally, in May 2018, the U.S. Congress also approved US\$250 million of military assistance to Ukraine for 2019, and Washington is ready to enlarge arms supplies to Ukraine to build up Ukrainian air defense forces and its navy.²³⁰

Thus, the Ukrainian diplomatic service demonstrates a comprehensive approach to the realization of its functions; Ukrainian diplomacy is aimed primarily at implementing the strategic goals of Ukrainian foreign policy: preventing the collapse of the Western anti-Putin coalition, keeping the world's attention on events in Ukraine, recognizing the official level of aggressiveness of Russian politics, and, as a result, extension of economic sanctions. The crisis of the modern international environment and the presence of direct and hybrid threats to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine require the continuation of this hard work.

²²⁸ *Analytical report of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada "About internal and external status of Ukraine in 2018"* (Kyiv, National Institute of Strategic Research, 2018), http://www.niss.gov.ua/public/File/analit_dopovid_POSLANNYA_2018_FINAL_Oct_02.pdf, 363.

²²⁹ Tara Palmieri, "U.S. Announces Sale of Anti-tank Missiles to Ukraine over Russian Opposition," ABC News, March 1, 2018, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/us-announces-sale-anti-tank-missiles-ukraine-russian/story?id=53450406>.

²³⁰ Julian Borger, "U.S. ready to boost arms supplies to Ukraine naval and air forces, envoy says," *Guardian*, September 1, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/31/ukraine-kurt-volker-us-arms-supplies>.

8. Developments in Special and Law Enforcement Services

The last area Ukraine is leveraging to counteract Russian hybrid warfare, and by no means the least important, is the activity of special services. The special services of Russia were heavily involved in planning, organizing, and implementing a set of measures to create the necessary conditions (political, economic, ideological, etc.) in Ukraine at the “pre-war” stage. Their role remains significant during the active phase of the hybrid war against Ukraine. For Russia, the level of readiness to resist the object of aggression is vitally important; it is therefore the main task of the aggressor to reduce the level of resistance within the country it is targeting. Thus, Russia needs intelligence information regarding the situation in Ukraine in the area of national security and defense, combat capability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, etc. Russian intelligence services had a sufficient number of sources of information to influence the situation in the security and defense sectors of Ukraine, which provided conditions for influencing state decisions, as when Ukraine did not resist Russian troops at the time of Crimea’s annexation.

Currently, Russia has placed its stake on non-military actions. According to the Kremlin’s plans, Russian special services have focused on exaggerating the slightest mistakes of the Ukrainian authorities through the pro-Moscow media and purchased politicians in Ukraine. In such materials, Moscow plays mainly on emotions: “they deceived us again,” “we were sold/betrayed,” etc.²³¹ The idea is that, systematically, broadcast by broadcast, Russia will create a picture of total “hopelessness” and “betrayal” until the people, tired of deception and disappointment, “pumped over” with propaganda, will support another coup and will change the development vectors of the country.

Russian special services also conduct political assassinations. During the period of 2014–2017, in Ukraine and in other states, several people were killed for running from the Russian regime and accusing Russia and Putin of massive violations of public rights, invasion of Ukraine, financing terrorism, and other crimes and who knew vital information

²³¹ “Kremlin Agents Began to Shake the Situation in Ukraine from the Inside,” *ZIK.ua*, December 6, 2016, https://zik.ua/ru/news/2016/12/06/agenti_kremlya_nachaly_rasshativat_sytuatsyyu_v_ukrayne_yznutry_1004189.

about Putin or his accomplices. The following is a list of many victims of Russian special services:

- Anna Politkovskaja, Russian journalist, killed in Moscow in 2006;
- Alex Litvinenko, ex-officer of Russian intelligence, killed in London in 2006;
- Sergei Magnitskii, accountant, partner of the British law firm Firestone Duncan, killed in Moscow in 2009;
- Boris Berezovskii, Russian oligarch, who financed Russian opposition, “suddenly” died in Great Britain in 2013;
- Boris Nemtsov, Russian opposition leader, killed in Moscow in 2015;
- Pavel Sheremet, Belarus journalist, killed in Kyiv in 2016;
- Max Shapoval, senior Ukrainian military intelligence officer, killed in Kyiv in 2017;
- Denis Voronenkov, ex-representative of Russian Parliament, killed in Kyiv in 2017;
- Vitalii Churkin, Russian UN representative, “suddenly” died in New York in 2017.²³²

The latest case is an attempt to poison ex-officer of Russian military intelligence Serhii Skripal and his daughter on March 4, 2018, in Great Britain.²³³ As a result, Theresa May, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accused Russia and expelled 23 Russian diplomats and their families from the country. Additionally, 29 countries, including Germany, the United States, Canada, and France, expelled 145 Russian diplomats, and NATO ordered ten Russians out of its mission in Belgium.²³⁴

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian special and law enforcement services have learned to adequately respond to the Moscow assassins. For instance, on May 30, 2018, in Kyiv,

²³² “Political Assassination Is a Tradition of Russian Political Culture,” *Divis info*, March 27, 2017, <https://dyvys.info/2017/03/27/politychne-vbyvstvo-tradytsiya-rosijskoyi-politychnoyi-kultury-politolog/>.

²³³ “Russian Spy Poisoning: What We Know so Far,” BBC, October 8, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-43315636>.

²³⁴ “Russian Spy Poisoning: What We Know so Far.”

Ukrainian special services prevented the murder of Russian journalist Arkadii Babchenko.²³⁵ As a result of a special operation of Ukrainian special services, the man who organized this murder was detained. Irrefutable evidence of the involvement of Russian special services in the organization of this murder has been obtained. In addition to Babchenko, the organizer of the assassination attempt planned to kill 30 more men and women in the territory of Ukraine.²³⁶ Another case happened on November 15, 2018: the officers of the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine arrested a citizen of Ukraine recruited by Russian special services to organize and commit acts of terrorism against public activists of the Kherson region.²³⁷ Russia denies the involvement of Russian special services in this plot and denies Russian interference in the affairs of another sovereign and independent state.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The goal of Russia is the total destruction of the Ukrainian state as a subject of international law and as a geopolitical actor. Russia seeks to realize this goal through hybrid warfare. This hybrid warfare has several components, but the most important and dangerous for Ukraine are 1) armed aggression and 2) humanitarian aggression.

The purpose of armed aggression by Russia is the physical destruction of the most active and conscious parts of the Ukrainian society: pro-Western volunteers and the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the capture of the territory of Ukraine, and the suppression of any resistance. The purpose of humanitarian aggression is the destruction of the national identity of the Ukrainian population and the destruction of its will to resist.

²³⁵ Doug Stanglin, "Murder" Russian journalist says police faked his death to catch his assailant," *USA TODAY*, May 30, 2018, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/05/30/russian-journalist-arkady-babchenko-fiercely-anti-kremlin-fatally-shot-kiiev/654823002/>.

²³⁶ Stanglin.

²³⁷ "The GPU reported on the detention of an agent of the Russian Federation, who prepared a terrorist act against the activist of the National Corps," *Novoe vremya*, November 15, 2018, <https://nv.ua/ukraine/events/hpu-soobshchila-o-zaderzhanii-ahenta-rf-hotovil-terakt-protiv-aktivista-natskorpusu-2507560.html>.

A country can be defeated as a result of armed aggression, but it will resist and resurge if its moral identity is preserved. Clausewitz emphasized the importance moral factors over the physical factor:

The physical seems little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade. History provides the strongest proof of the importance of moral factors and their often incredible effect: this is the noblest and most solid nourishment that the mind of a general may draw from a study of the past.²³⁸

First and foremost, moral and national identity directly correlates to the will to fight against aggression. Three hundred Spartans, who preferred death to disgraceful humiliation, are one of the vivid examples of such identity. However, if a country loses its identity, it will never recover and never again become an independent state. If humanitarian aggression is successful against any state, then the state simply disappears.

Consequently, Ukraine continues to need a comprehensive approach—not only strengthening the defense capacity of the country but also providing a robust and adequate humanitarian policy, which will become an instrument against the destruction of Ukraine’s identity. In addition, it is necessary to repel and counteract Russia in other areas—economic, political, information, cyber, diplomatic—and actively engage the special services in this struggle. In confrontation with Russia, Ukraine can survive only when it conducts round-the-clock and purposeful work in all these areas.

Western countries must study the experience of Ukraine—not only helping Ukraine (because if Ukraine loses, then the West will be the next)—but also relying on the Ukrainian experience to develop its capabilities, forms, and methods to counter Russian hybrid warfare.

²³⁸ Clausewitz, 185.

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VI. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

As the preceding chapters have shown, despite the Russian Federation's use of intimidation, subterfuge, and irregular combat to annihilate Ukraine as an independent geopolitical actor, the nation has resisted at great cost and in a kind of martyrdom for the West. Ukraine has been able to defend itself with mechanisms to negate the most aggressive manifestations of the Kremlin's hybrid warfare, thereby as a David sustaining warfare with a much stronger Goliath. One of these essential means of defense has been Ukraine's efforts to build new robust CMR in a time of hybrid warfare. In this respect, CIMIC as conceived in NATO countries is a very effective tool in this process, allowing Ukraine to continue its resistance. Drawing upon Ukraine's experience in counteracting the Russian campaign of revanchism and aggression, this chapter reviews the current situation in Ukraine and gives an overview of its regional implications, then provides policy recommendations for Ukraine, NATO, and the EU that will be useful to Ukraine and other states and allies engaged in the process of countering Russian hostile hybrid actions.

A. UKRAINE SUMMARY

According to the Law of Ukraine "On National Security of Ukraine" (adopted on June 21, 2018),

the national interests of Ukraine are state sovereignty and territorial integrity; democratic constitutional order; prevention of interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine; sustainable development of the national economy; maintaining civil society and the state to ensure the quality of life of the population; integration of Ukraine into the European political, economic, security, legal space; gaining membership in the European Union and NATO; and the development of equal and mutually beneficial relations with other countries (Chapter II, Article 3, para. 3).²³⁹

²³⁹ About National Security of Ukraine, Pub. L. No 2469-VIII, (2018), accessed January 2, 2019, <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2469-19>. <http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2469-19?nreg=2469-19&find=1&text=%E4%E5%F0%E6%E0%E2%EN%E8%E9+%F1%F3%E2%E5%F0%E5%ED%B3%F2%E5%F2+%D3%EA%F0%E0%BF%ED%E8&x=0&y=0>.

Protecting and ensuring the realization of these national interests is the basis of Ukraine's viability and the condition for its further development. In the context of the transition from an armed confrontation in the Donbas region to a state of protracted conflict, the Kremlin's main efforts are focused on undermining these basic principles of Ukrainian nationhood.

To that end, the internal destabilization and discredit of Ukraine and the gradual weakening of Ukraine and its military strength are today the main goals of the anti-Ukrainian policy of Russia. This multi-pronged policy consists of several battlefields, some obvious and the others concealed: disorganization of political, state, and military departments in Ukraine; introduction of crisis conditions; the aggravation of tensions among the national and regional elites of Ukraine; the splitting of Ukrainian society; discrediting the current Ukrainian authorities and disrupting its Euro-integration course; undermining the Ukrainian economy and weakening state and military resources; formation of anti-government sentiment in Ukraine; preparation of preconditions for the emergence of social tension and anti-government protest activity among the population; the destruction of the unity of the policy of the Western powers on the issue of the introduction and extension of sanctions; misleading the world community about the nature and causes of the situation generated by Russian aggression; and imposing on the countries of the European Union and the United States the decision of whether it is inappropriate for them to cooperate with Ukraine directly, without taking into account the position of Russia.²⁴⁰

At the same time, the Russian Federation continually demonstrates its military power and readiness for a full-scale war in order to incite the military-political situation as a ceaseless theater of intimidation. This strategy seeks to obtain diplomatic benefits, and gradually model future agreements with the Euro-Atlantic community regarding the distribution of spheres of geopolitical influence: a classic goal of Russian and Soviet statecraft since at least the darkest years of the 1930s. Moreover, Russian leadership may

²⁴⁰ *Analytical Report of the President of Ukraine to the Verkhovna Rada "About Internal and External Status of Ukraine in 2018."*

dare to implement the concept of “revenge” against Ukraine; this scenario could take the form of destabilization of the socio-political situation in Ukraine during the 2019 elections coupled with embedded pro-Russian political actors, aimed at the change of power in Ukraine to a pro-Russia government.

That is why the Ukrainian society and the state face a strategically important task: to preserve the Ukrainians’ unity and awareness of the priority of national values, interests, and goals to secure internal political agreement in the country and to prevent destructive manifestations of Russian interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs. Nevertheless, in the modern world this task is impossible to achieve without partners and allies. With attention to this, on February 7, 2019, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted the presidential law on amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (regarding the strategic course of the state on acquiring full-fledged membership of Ukraine in the European Union and NATO).²⁴¹ Certainly, this is not a question of tomorrow; this is a strategic goal of Ukraine, to be a full partner of the European society.

At the same time, Ukraine is not the only target for the current Russian Federation’s leadership. NATO and the EU should also heed the warning about Russian hybrid warfare and how to counteract it. Ukraine, as a potential NATO and EU member, could provide for both organizations the full spectrum of effective counteracting measures. NATO and the EU should change their activity to enhance counter hybrid warfare capabilities.

B. NATO AND THE EU: CURRENT APPROACHES TO RUSSIAN IRREGULAR AGGRESSION

Unfortunately, Ukraine is not the only country that has been targeted by Russian aggression in its many startling forms: Russia continues to intervene in the internal affairs of numerous foreign nations. Most prominent in this respect, Russian intervention in the election process in the United States, Netherlands, France, and Germany can be regarded by the international community as an act of aggression toward these countries. In France

²⁴¹ “Rada supports changes of Constitution of Ukraine about membership in NATO and the EU,” Unian.ua, February 7, 2019, <https://www.unian.ua/politics/10437480-rada-pidtrimala-zmini-do-konstituciji-shchodo-vstupu-ukrajini-v-yes-i-nato.html>.

in January 2019, “yellow vest” protesters were photographed with the flag “DNR” (the Russian quasi-republic in Ukrainian Donbas) and heard shouting profanity in Russian during the riots, suggesting that international borders are not an obstacle to Russian subterfuge and fifth column aggression.²⁴² The Russian Federation continues to export hostile irregular, concealed warfare to destroy the European anti-Putin coalition and unity and stability in Europe as well.

NATO and the EU understand these threats; Ukraine is a vivid example what could happen if a state does not react immediately and forcefully to hybrid war stratagems. Thus, NATO and the EU focus on resilience as a key concept of countering hybrid threats; that is to say, these organizations subscribe to Clausewitz’s classic will to defend themselves by maintaining a sense of national and moral identity in in these combatant populations. Clausewitz emphasized the importance of moral factors: “History provides the strongest proof of the importance of moral factors and their often incredible effect: this is the noblest and most solid nourishment that the mind of a general may draw from a study of the past.”²⁴³

Based on the differing goals that formed in NATO and the EU, there are some differences in their approaches to the union of politics and psychology in strategy. For the North Atlantic Alliance, resilience is primarily related to the principles of military cooperation and deterrence to assure collective defense against a variety of threats either obvious or concealed. As a result of Russia’s large-scale and diverse aggressive actions across the international arena, however, NATO allies struggle to increase the resilience of its treaty signatories in both the military and civilian spheres. Makers of strategy once more consider resilience to be one of the main factors that provides the effectiveness of the military component of NATO. To be sure, this aspect of defense has merely revived an old factor of strategy, which had been obscured in counterterror campaigns since 9/11 and the amnesia that afflicts the West relative to the epoch of total war. The latter has become

²⁴² Carol Matlack and Robert Williams, “France to Probe Possible Russian Influence on Yellow Vest Riots,” Bloomberg, December 7, 2018, updated December 9, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-08/pro-russia-social-media-takes-aim-at-macron-as-yellow-vests-rage>.

²⁴³ Clausewitz.

merely a theme park for a culture of memory, but the merits of character and intellect and morale need to be rediscovered. In this respect, the example of Ukraine under attack since 2013 offers NATO allies an example of toughness and combat spirit in the face of overwhelming force.

Meanwhile, the EU has used the concept of resilience in the context of social preparedness versus combat power in the conventional sense. The EU emphasizes rightly good governance, human rights, and development of states. Yet, there has recently been an attempt to develop a security component of the EU, as well as a tendency toward expansion of cooperation with NATO, in particular, in order to counter the hybrid threats in the information sphere.

C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Hybrid threats to peace and security in Central and Eastern Europe are an increasing problem across the globe; containing Russian and other possible hybrid aggression will require the efforts of many nations effectively countering them. These recommendations focus on reducing the risks associated with Russian hybrid warfare for Ukraine, NATO, and the EU, and for global security in the world as well.

1. Ukraine

For the past five years, Ukraine has successfully withstood Russian hybrid warfare at great cost to itself and as a challenge to the statecraft of the Western democracies. The latter are themselves under assault by the unseen invader via the Internet, suffocated in a ceaseless barrage of Russia Today balderdash about state, society, their economies, and culture. In order to protect Ukraine from Russian aggression in future, it is necessary to further develop security governance on the Western model for counteracting these threats. This policy means a perfection of democratic CMR. It is impossible to defend Ukraine's national interests from hybrid threats solely via military methods. Coupled with military means, a significant role should be therefore devoted to non-military means—economic, humanitarian, political, informational, diplomatic, cyber, and other realms.

Based on these criteria, Ukraine should, first and foremost, retain and rebuild robust CMR and reinforce unity of society because in the time of hybrid warfare this unity is notably important. Robust CMR increases civil preparedness, societal resilience, defense spirit, and persistence of society. It provides the will to fight even if the conditions for fighting are not favorable. That is why destroying truly strong and robust CMR is the one of the first tasks of the adversary, especially, in hybrid warfare.

Additionally, the system of Ukraine's fighting during hybrid warfare should include the following measures:

- increase the defense potential of Ukraine
- develop the economy and create new jobs
- look for new markets for Ukrainian products
- increase energy efficiency and switch to new energy sources (solar energy, wind energy, etc.)
- raise the quality of life in Ukraine
- continue the practice of pursuing lawsuits against Russia in international courts
- continue work on European integration (reforms, laws)
- complete the reform of the courts and continue anti-corruption reform
- extend sanctions against Russia
- increase the international anti-Russian coalition
- further develop national identity: the Ukrainian church, language, and culture
- create a new patriotic upbringing of youth
- inform the population of Ukraine and the world about the real situation in Ukraine and resolve the propaganda myths perpetuated by Russia; and
- intensify the activities of special services to improve intelligence and counter-intelligence activity.

Therefore, based on the current situation in Ukraine, in the realm of countering Russian hybrid warfare, state authorities and local government bodies of Ukraine should

- 1) Intensify efforts to
 - enhance capabilities of Ukrainian Armed Forces and all actors of the defense and security sector in Ukraine; focusing on cooperation with NATO and the EU;
 - create the maximum contrast between the situation in the Russian-occupied territories of Donbas and Crimea and the Donbas regions under the control of Ukrainian troops in terms of satisfaction of political, economic, and the social rights and needs of citizens;
 - provide accurate information about the events of the Russo-Ukrainian War and Ukraine's policy regarding the temporarily occupied regions of Donbas and annexed Crimea; and
- 2) Pursue outreach actions conveying Ukraine's position on humanitarian security issues (educational, scientific, cultural, religious, informational spheres, etc.), especially focusing on work with children and young people.

The successful struggle of the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian people against Russian aggression requires, first of all, the unity of the Ukrainian nation, the preservation of internal stability, and the improvement of all forms and directions of state policy. This complex task, which ensures the strength of the Ukrainian state from the inside, must be pursued simultaneously with the maximum possible activity in the foreign policy arena, as well as with the development and further strengthening of the defense capabilities of our country. Under these conditions, CMR in Ukraine should focus on promoting the unity of the Ukrainian nation. Building and retaining such relations in a time of hybrid warfare is a hard task, but without such robust relations, Ukraine will not achieve unity of society, and CIMIC is one of the best mechanisms to reach this goal.

2. NATO

Changes in the European security environment—most pressingly, the annexation of Crimea and warfare in eastern Ukraine from 2013 onward—have become a catalyst for NATO and the EU to pursue new approaches to resilience and find a common platform for

countering security and defense threats across the board. Currently, the leadership of NATO and its leading allies understand the necessity to counter hybrid conventional and nuclear threats. The present efforts, from a Ukrainian perspective, however, are not sufficient. The leadership of NATO should continue developing strategies for counteracting Russian hybrid aggression, taking into account the experience of Ukraine and other countries that have already fallen victim to cyberattacks and political destabilization (Estonia, France, etc.).

NATO should continue to focus on developing the resilience and readiness of its military forces to resist hybrid threats as well as improving the decision-making process, on a constitutional basis, in order to reduce the time required to react quickly to these threats. In addition, it is necessary to increase the number of Very High Readiness Joint Task Forces (VJTF), and to expand the number of multinational military exercises aimed at achieving a complete interoperability of NATO units, and actively involving Ukrainian military units in these multinational exercises. Additionally, NATO states should meet their commitments to finance defense needs at 2 percent of the states' gross domestic product.

Furthermore, after cementing Ukrainian's path to membership in NATO, Ukraine and NATO should create a Membership Action Plan for several years, and CMR must be a significant part of this plan. NATO, as a political-military organization, fully understands the necessity of robust CMR, especially, in the time of hybrid warfare.

To combat Russian hybrid warfare, NATO should therefore fulfill the following necessary measures:

- strengthen the military presence of the Allies in the eastern NATO member states bordering Russia (notably the Baltic States) and intensify military cooperation with the armed forces of these countries;
- increase NATO combat capabilities, especially for special forces and cyber units of the NATO VJTF;
- continue to develop new weapons and military equipment designed to improve NATO's combat capabilities, in particular in VJTF;
- enhance cooperation with Ukraine, considering it as the forward zone of the struggle against Russian hybrid warfare; increase military aid to

Ukraine: provide intelligence information, weapons, military equipment, material resources, instructional and methods assistance;

- improve the exchange of intelligence information within NATO and with interested partner countries, such as Finland, Sweden, Ukraine and Georgia;
- create ad hoc groups in each NATO country that will track potential hybrid threats in these countries; collect information 24/7 and provide it for analysis and reaction at NATO HQ in Brussels;
- strengthen the protection of NATO's critical infrastructure, especially cyber and energy elements;
- establish effective cooperation and interaction of NATO's civilian and military components;
- continue and intensify cooperation between NATO Centers of Excellence (COE) – including COE Hybrid, StratCom, CIMIC, Cyber, and EU East StratCom Center, EU Hybrid Fusion Cell;
- intensify StratCom and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) in cooperation with the EU, particularly in countries that may become the first victims of Russian hybrid warfare (such as Baltic States and Poland) and with partner countries (including Ukraine and Georgia);
- educate and explain to leaders of NATO countries, major cities, regions, and districts the necessity and importance of the fight against Russian hybrid warfare, involving specialists of NATO COE Hybrid, CIMIC, StratCom, and CIMIC units of the NATO countries in this process; and
- exchange lessons learned from experience in combating Russian hybrid warfare between NATO member states and with other countries (such as Ukraine and Georgia) as well, and implement the most effective methods and techniques in the day-to-day activities of NATO.

Overall, the relationship between NATO, the EU, and other international organizations and between the civilian and military spheres should be reviewed in the direction of their strengthening and improvement. The new strategy should have a more active and offensive character; it is impossible to win this war by sitting alone on the defensive. Moreover, the concept of resistance should be improved; NATO members should identify medium- and long-term goals and tools for achieving these goals.

One of the Ukrainian experts of hybrid warfare, Victor Gvozdz, emphasizes: “It is necessary to move from restraining Moscow’s actions to taking active steps to influence the situation in Russia and its foreign policy with the use of a whole range of political, economic, informational, and special methods and measures.”²⁴⁴ Robust cooperation at all levels between military and civilians, a comprehensive approach and quick, adequate reaction: these are NATO’s areas of response to hybrid actions and where the Alliance should focus.

3. The EU

In April 2016, the EU formulated its policy on countering hybrid threats in “Joint Framework for Counter-Hybrid Threats.” This document prescribed of 22 actions.²⁴⁵ Nonetheless, the EU should further improve its security architecture to include strategic communication, cooperation between civil and military spheres, myth-busting, and preventing of interference in the electoral processes of the EU states. In addition, the EU should continue and perhaps even tighten its sanctions policy against Russia, a state that only understands the language of power. Current hybrid threats require comprehensive responses from all EU members, strong cooperation between all actors, and synergy of all efforts in this struggle.

In order to continue responses to hybrid threats, the EU should implement the following recommendations:

- continue cooperation and coordination between the EU and NATO within the framework of the hybrid threats; intensify cooperation with NATO on the deployment of additional NATO military units in the north-eastern (Baltic States, Poland) and south-eastern (Bulgaria, Romania) EU countries;

²⁴⁴ Victor Gvozdz, “Russian Hybrid Aggression against the Free World and Democracy Continues. Can It Be Effectively Counteracted?,” Borysfen Intel, March 15, 2018, <http://bintel.com.ua/uk/article/03-15-rzeszow/>.

²⁴⁵ European Commission; “Joint Communication to The European Parliament and The Council, Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats a European Union Response” (Brussels, 2016), <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Joint-Framework-on-countering-hybrid-threats-1-2.pdf>.

- analyze efficiency, if necessary, making changes, and continue the implementation of the EU Joint Framework for Counter-Hybrid Threats; continue cooperation and coordination among EU countries in countering hybrid threats;
- extend authority and finance the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell as a main concern. It is necessary to ensure proper financing of measures to respond to hybrid threats and to increase and control the efficiency of financial expenditures. Russia spends a great deal of money on bribery of politicians in European and other countries and on propaganda and the formation of Eurosceptic and pro-Russian opinions. Accordingly, all measures to counter Russian hybrid aggression should be financed by the EU on a priority basis;
- increase the level of cyber security, especially to protect critical infrastructure and governmental organizations of the EU;
- create in the EU countries special groups and centers to monitor, analyze, and evaluate hybrid threats to the country; propose and implement measures to counter these threats and protect national interests;
- equalize the financing of measures to counter hybrid threats to the financing of steps against terrorism at the legislative level; hybrid threats are not less serious than terrorism, and are possibly more, destructive and a greater menace to the national interests of the EU countries;
- extend economic sanctions against Russia; increase economic pressure on Russian companies that support Russian hybrid warfare;
- involve in the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and in the EU StratCom Center representatives of Ukraine as a country that has successfully opposed Russian hybrid aggression for more than five years; organize an exchange of information about relevant experiences with Ukraine on an ongoing basis; and
- strengthen efforts to combat misinformation; organize projects to explain the goals and methods of Moscow propaganda and disinformation for EU citizens. Specialists of the EU StratCom Center with the involvement of representatives of Ukraine and interested nongovernmental organizations through media (traditional and new forms such as social networks) should create short programs (video clips) focusing on different audiences and specific groups in the EU. In these programs, it is necessary to explain in simple words and images how the Kremlin factory of disinformation and propaganda works and what results can be obtained if these threats are ignored.

In addition, to counter hybrid threats, it is important to organize training of the relevant specialists. These specialists will not only be able to assist countries and organizations in shaping measures to combat hybrid aggression but also to carry out appropriate educational activities to inform the target audiences – leaders of countries, organizations, and representatives of various segments of the population - while protecting national interests in a hybrid war. Moreover, nongovernmental organizations should be actively involved in the fight against hybrid threats.

Passive observation of hybrid threats will not lead to any positive results. The problem of hybrid threats from Russia or other countries will not be resolved by themselves. Thus, to counter this problem, the EU should involve all the available forces and means in this process and act in cooperation with all states and actors.

D. IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE FOR EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL SECURITY

Even after the events in Ukraine in 2014–2015, specifically the annexation of Crimea and the initiation of the war on Donbas, Putin has continued to destroy the global system of international relations that emerged following the collapse of the USSR. Putin and his entourage are trying to build a system of international relations in which they and their country will have a place in the international order that corresponds to their view. Currently, Putin partially manipulates the European states and exploits the reluctance of individual countries and their leaders to take necessary but important and unpopular decisions to enhance military budget and counteract Russian hybrid warfare. This manipulation is accompanied by the lack of critical vision, corruption, and helplessness of the European elites. In addition, this is accompanied by the reluctance of the majority of NATO and the EU populations, who have lived for decades without a war on their territory, to change their consumer lifestyle or to recognize the hybrid threat from Russia.

It is possible to combat this threat now by implementing the recommendations described in this thesis, but they will not necessarily be sufficient in the future. Hybrid threats are persistent and unpredictable; that is why people have to understand the consequences of these threats. Therefore, the formulating and implementing effective

measures in the years to come will require adhering to a set of principles and awareness of the consequences for security in Europe and in the world if Putin's Russia wins.

What should people do and how should they withstand Russian hybrid war? Firstly, NATO and the EU countries need to understand that the war has begun. It is not an accident, a mistake, or a conflict—it is a war. It is a hybrid war, but a war nonetheless, one that has already come to Europe and the United States in the 21st century. By itself, it will not end and will not go away. It must be explained to people in NATO and the EU. And as with any war, it can either be won or lost. It is up to the European and other peoples who are the targets of Putin's regime to decide what they want; nobody will make this choice for them. Then they should act in accordance with their choice. But the choice must be made now.

Secondly, it is necessary to understand that the nature and the main cause of this hybrid war is Putin's regime, which, thanks to the disinformation, militarization of society, propaganda, and suppression of the opposition and freedom of speech in the Russian Federation, has the support of Russian society in Russia itself and among the Russian-speaking population beyond its borders. Much of the Russian population supports Putin's idea of revenge and revision of the established world order. The concept of "*pobedobesie*,"²⁴⁶ or "we can repeat," in Russia, referring to the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II, has lately been used to justify all that Putin and his subordinates have done in the world and has become a key narrative for Russians. The implications for Europeans, if this "Russian world" comes to Europe, will be awful: the current Ukrainian Donbas war is a vital example of what the "Russian world" is: death, devastation, and the complete destruction of all European norms and principles.

Ukrainian expert of hybrid warfare, Victor Gvozd, assesses:

²⁴⁶ The word and the concept of *pobedobesie* was invented and introduced in 2005 by a Russian archpriest, professor of the St. Petersburg Spiritual Academy, Georgy Mitrofanov. This word comes from the Russian word *mrakobesie* (which means obscurantism), and *pobedibesie* is the obscurantism of the victory. The phenomenon of *pobedibesie* involves using the symbols of victory in the war and the attributes of the war in the context of other manifestations of Russian culture, incompatible with the memory of the dead.

The implementation of these actions will require the political will of the leadership of all interested countries, including overcoming fears of further deterioration of relations with Russia, favoring common values over national interests, and resolving existing interstate contradictions based on common interests. The rejection of this approach will have extremely negative consequences in terms of weakening and undermining the unity of Western civilization.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁷ Gvozden.

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