

What Leadership Approaches, Organizational Structures, and Contracting Methods

Enable Speed to Award in the Army?



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ABSTRACT

America's National Defense Strategy sets forth building a more lethal force and reforming the business practices of the Department of Defense for greater performance and affordability (Mattis, 2018). Additionally, the 2019 Army research topics published by ASA(ALT) DACM office included a review of the Army's contract award process to discover ways to streamline and improve speed in contract award (Colson, 2018). Prior research on organizational structure, leadership literature, and contracting methods offer a research baseline to provide the Army with an examination of the question: "What contracting methods, organizational structure, and leadership approaches enable speed to award in the Army?"

The methodology applied to this research topic was an examination of peer reviewed articles and books on leadership theory, organization structure, and contracting methods. A qualitative literature review methodology was used for this research.

This paper explores the federal government contracting process using a systems approach to discover relationships that enable speed in reaching contracting award. Acknowledging that contract award is not the end game with testing and fielding also required, seeking efficiencies in the contracting process remains a worthy pursuit.

Recommendations from this analysis provide several avenues to explore with the goal of creating a faster contracting process where a variety of perspectives, highlighted techniques, and enabling methods may increase speed in awarding U.S. Army contracts.

In view of the current world situation with near peer adversaries attempting to field technology more rapidly drives a renewed interest in U.S. ability to field at a faster rate. Additionally with the newly formed 4-star command, U.S. Army Futures Command, faster approaches might be useful in updating acquisition processes. Further exploration and discussion of this research topic may generate new approaches.

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What Contracting Approaches, Organizational Structure, and Leadership Methods

Enable Speed to Award in the Army?

Chapter 1 – Introduction

America's 2018 National Defense Strategy sets forth an objective to build a more lethal force and reform business practices in the Department of Defense for greater performance and affordability (Mattis, 2018). Current National Defense Strategy drove 2018-2019 Army research topics published by the Directorate of Acquisition Career Management office which included a review of the Army's contract award process to discover ways to streamline and improve speed in contract award (Colson, 2018). Additionally, GEN Milley's press conference opening remarks at the new Futures Command stand up described his future vision using the Army blast protective vehicle fleet purchase as a case of contracting and fielding innovation quickly, saving countless lives due to this rapid delivery (Milley, 2018). Quickly capturing future innovations from industry in robotics, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and artificial general intelligence (Esper & Milley, 2018) will be critical in maintaining the battlefield superiority of the United States. The Honorable Ellen Lord, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, has issued her intent to reduce the time to get contracts awarded by 50 percent (Berteau, 2018). Subsequent public statements by other senior DoD officials make clear that one key area in reducing the procurement acquisition lead time is focusing on the contracting piece which stretches from receiving the requirements statement to awarding the contract (Berteau, 2018).

Problem Statement

In reviewing the Army acquisition process, there appears to be a knowledge gap with respect to which acquisition techniques best enable speed in contract award. While certain procurement matters may take longer lead times, even rapid fielding middle tier acquisition strategies taking five years (Jette, 2018) may hurt America's ability to harness rapid, evolving technologies for the battlefield.




Figure 1. Rapid Prototyping and Rapid Fielding Timelines. Jette, B. (2018). Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, Training) Middle-Tier Acquisition Policy.

Without implementation of faster procurement methodologies, our Army could lose competitive advantages afforded by a more rapid process which the honorable Ellen Lord is directing.

Purpose of the Project

The framework developed for this project is a holistic approach reviewing research in three areas that might improve the procurement process: 1) Contracting Methods; 2) Organizational Structure; and 3) Leadership approaches. The purpose of

this project centers on researching contracting methods, organizational structure, and leadership approaches found to have enabled speed in the contract award process.

Critical analysis of these three areas provided multiple recommendations.

Recommendations listed in the final section of this paper may be useful for implementing or in promoting further research that would enable faster Army contracting in order to stay technologically competitive against our adversaries.

Significance of the Research

Near-peer adversaries attempting to field technology more rapidly drives renewed interest in the U.S. Army's ability to contract field innovation at a faster rate (Mattis, 2018). Additionally, the newly formed 4-star command, U.S. Army Futures Command, creates renewed Army emphasis on innovation and a systems approach towards updating the process (Milley, 2018). Exploration of this research topic generates recommendations, if implemented, which may lead to faster contracting.

Research Question

Research on organizational structure, leadership literature, and contracting methods offers a baseline to provide the Army with an examination of the question: "What contracting methods, organizational structure, and leadership approaches enable speed to contract award in the Army?"

Recommendations from the analysis in this paper provide several avenues to explore with the goal of providing faster contracting processes where a variety of perspectives, highlighted techniques, and processes, could contribute to faster award times in U.S. Army contracts.

Objectives and Outcomes

The propositions and answers to the questions presented shed light on contracting methods, organizational structure, and leadership tools available to increase speed in awarding contracts. This paper explores the research in these areas and makes immediate recommendations so Army contracting leaders have what they need whether they are running a small contracts office or changing the acquisition culture. Results from this research will add new models and strategies to the toolkits of future Army contracting leaders.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review

This literature review has three sections, each grouped by related bodies of literature, flowing from the body of knowledge in contracting approaches to organizational structure analysis, and finally a review of leadership approaches. The objective of this chapter is to review the research and connect the findings in this paper with the fundamental concepts already found in scholarly literature.

With the central research question looking at what contracting approaches, organizational structures, and leadership methods enable speed to award in the Army, an overview of topical literature and studies in these three areas provided historical context and body to the question at hand.

These bodies of knowledge are important in understanding the research conducted to date in these areas. This literature review contains the following sections:

1. Contracting Methods
2. Organizational Structure
3. Leadership Approaches

Primarily, peer-reviewed sources were researched to draw conclusions. However, some recent articles on Other Transaction Authority were also referenced, as it has been a current evolving pursuit within the Army and Department of Defense.

Contracting Methods

Multiple business processes and contracting methods exist in any contracting organization. To center the research, general business processes that could relate to Army contracting organizations became the focus. This literature includes scholarly works focused on seminal business theory in leadership, organizational structure, and contracting methods.

Seminal Business Theory

Mintzberg's (1987) seminal work suggests that attempting to craft a strategy is more of an art form than a rigid process. The current Army contracting process may appear more rigid than art form to the casual observer, but there may be ways to speed up the process (Dubrin, 2016, Cascio, 1995; Cohen, et al., 1996; Hackman, 1990; Manz & Sims, 1993; Sahin, 2004; West, 1990).

Speed in contract award referenced by Frank Kendall (2016) in *Getting Defense Acquisition Right*, addresses speed at the expense of quality. But there may be times when speed is more important and the perfect contract that takes longer is of less value to the field units.

Porter's (1996) business framework consists of:

1. Industry rivalries.
2. Threat of New Entrants
3. Threat of Substitutes
4. Bargaining Power of Buyers
5. Bargaining Power of Suppliers (Porter, 1996).

Porter's (1996) Five Forces business model creates a lens in which to view business strategy when comparing to future competitors, or in this case enemy innovations, examining changes in the market similar to changes on the battlefield, demonstrates the world environment has changed for the U.S. Army. Using Porter's lens, the Army and Army contracting could benefit from their bargaining power as a buyer leveraging first mover efforts in industry (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) and then, as a late entrant, applying the proven technology to the Army mission. A first mover industry partner executes investment dollars and the Army benefits by rapidly acquiring a product as a late entrant gaining already tested and validated equipment.

Self-driving military vehicles and self-flying rotary technology applied to the Army mission translates to military convoys with less lives lost to roadside bombs (Milley, 2018). At a macro-level, if future wars are decided with more robotics, fewer soldiers may be killed. This could enhance a country's will to keep fighting and the nation's manufacturing base play a larger role in determining a wars' outcome.

A review of several contracting business process studies, to include the Government Accountability Office report entitled *Status of Open Recommendations on Improving Operations of Federal Departments and Agencies* (GAO, 2000), focused on the \$155 Billion per year spent on contracted goods, services, and major weapons systems in the Department of Defense. The results showed the largest amount of crossover knowledge in business processes over the past few decades of research between innovations from private to public has been in the information technology field and robotics. The predominant focus of these studies is to apply innovative techniques

from the business world to government operations through information technology and robotics (Dubrin 2016: Anttiroiko, 2005; Brandvold, 1982; Poostchi, 2003; UCSD, 2001; Von Osdol, 1998). IT and robotic innovation between business and government are exchanged with the U.S. Government receiving late entry benefits without the risks associated with first mover market entry (Sahim, 2004).

Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity Contracts (IDIQ).

IDIQ contracts are procured products or services when exact quantities or delivery schedules are unknown (Mosher 2017). Brevity of solicitation and competition are characteristics that make IDIQs attractive in the focus of this paper. The contracting officer can shorten timelines for task order placement (30 days) streamlining the task order award process (Runyon, 2018). There are other types of contracts such as Indefinite Delivery, Definite Quantity (IDDDQ) or Requirements contracts, but the IDIQ allows more flexibility and the ability for the Contracting office and Program Management office to adjust to priority changes and funding adjustments (FAR, 2018).

IDIQ contracts can also be multiple award contracts with several vendors who then compete individually for orders (Manuel, 2011). IDIQs can be competed or awarded as a sole source to one vendor or as the result of a competition or to multiple vendors (Multiple Award IDIQ). Additionally, while IDIQs are still subject to FAR Subpart 15.3 Source Selection Procedures for initial award, IDIQ contract orders have unique authorities, granting the contracting officer the ability to exercise broad discretion in developing appropriate order placement procedures (Manuel, 2011).

A review of IDIQ orders placed at the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center during fiscal year 2016 shows an average of 174 days (less than 6 months) from pre-request for proposal to award (Mosher, 2016). This is significantly faster than the average lead-time for other major competitive contracts (Mosher, 2016). Another advantage of IDIQ contracts is that the tool is responsive to the program where the contracting officer, in 30 days or less, can execute the task order award creating a significant advantage when considering the rapidly changing environment in combat operations.

Other Transaction Agreements (OTA).

In 1958, President Eisenhower signed legislation creating NASA, and agreements *for* other transaction authority. This legislation created OTAs or other transaction agreements (Dobriansky & O'Farrell, 2018).

OTAs are contracting actions with unique authorities used to streamline the pre-award processes and circumvent barriers to commercial contractor participation in defense procurements (Other Transactions Guide for Prototype Projects, Version 1.2.0 DOD, 2017). OTAs were first instituted by Congress in 1958 as part of the National Space Aeronautics and Space Act as a means to catch up with the Soviet Union in the space race (National Aeronautics and Space Act, 1958).

OTAs are not subject to Federal Acquisition Regulations. This removes barriers that inhibit participation from certain commercial vendors for weapons systems procurements (Dobriansky & O'Farrell, 2018).

OTAs are required to meet one of the following conditions for approval:

- One participant (minimum) is nontraditional defense contractor;
- All participants are small businesses; and vendors agree to provide one-third of the cost or more;
- Procurement requires innovative business arrangements not allowable under a FAR based contract or provides an opportunity to expand defense supply base with vendors who normally do not participate in federal contracting (Other Transactions Guide for Prototype Projects, Version 1.2.0 DOD, 2017).

In addition, OTAs develop prototype projects not intended for production contracts. Effective application of OTAs can foster dual-use technology, establish industrial capabilities, and advance our national defense system (Other Transactions Guide for Prototype Projects, Version 1.2.0 DOD, 2017)

OTA's in Action.

The passage of Section 815 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016, Congress amended the OTA authority in the Department of Defense (DOD) for prototype projects, permanently codified in Title 10, Section 2371b, of the U.S. Code (Runyon, 2018). With this new authority, OTAs are now a useful tool in creating speed to award given the right scenario (Manning, 2018; Piedmont, 2018; Dobriansky & O'Farrell, 2018).

OTA's appeal to the U.S. Army's need to field technology and innovation ahead of the technology-fielding rate of our adversaries, essential in creating battlefield

advantages. This need drives DoD to look to all capabilities that are available in the marketplace for rapid acquisition that is quick and can be accomplished without encumbrance (Runyon, 2018; Dobriansky & O'Farrell, 2018; Mosher, 2016).

OTAs are being used by all DoD services up to \$250 million before requiring review by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (Runyon, 2018). Today's global threat demands the U.S. Army require an extremely high state of readiness and places value on fielding leading edge technologies. Traditional FAR Part 15 based competitions for major weapon systems, platforms, and services with procurement administrative lead times counted in years are boosting the popularity of OTAs. (Runyon, 2018, Dobriansky & O'Farrell, 2018). However, an OTA is not a one size fits all solution and may even be the wrong fit for many traditional production contracts of major weapons systems, or other ground and air platforms (Runyon, 2018).

One example where an OTA is used properly would be the DoD's award of a complex \$950 million OTA agreement to a nontraditional defense contractor, REAN, for IT production services moving to a computing cloud. The OTA preceding the production award covered prototype development, testing, and evaluation into production. The OTA award only used 60% of the time taken in traditional FAR-based acquisition methodologies (Dobriansky & O'Farrell, 2018). This is a single anecdotal example where contract award was accelerated. The recent emphasis on OTAs does not have peer-reviewed statistical, quantitative data to support this finding. However, Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs) where the government acquires innovative technologies are much faster than typical Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)-based acquisitions

(Piedmont, 2018). Fewer restrictions outside the FAR lead to faster, more flexible acquisitions (Piedmont, 2018). OTAs are considered legally binding agreements that provide incredible advantages in both flexibility and speed (Mosher, 2018; Piedmont, 2018).

Multi-Year Contracts

Multi-year contracts are different from IDIQ contracts in that delivery and quantity are specified. Additionally, Congress is consulted up front for the funding of a contract that might cover a period of five years for budgeting and annual appropriation consideration. In annual contracting, DoD might use one or more contracts for a year's worth of procurement (Everycrsreport.com, 2018). Under a Multi-year contract, DoD uses a single contract for two to five years' worth of procurement of a production item without having to exercise contract options. Additionally, there is some flexibility for the contracting officer and program manager with foreign military sales (FMS) worked into the production line as options on a Multi-Year contract. In the case of the Apache Multi-Year awarded in 2017, there was a guarantee of only USG efforts for 5 years. The program management office and contracting office planned, per contract, a re-man of United States Government aircraft at the amount of 46 per year for 5 years (Carey, 2017). Also, included on that Multi-Year contract was the ability to use priced options each year for either USG or FMS aircraft. On the first year of the Multi-Year Apache contract, options were included. Saudi Arabia was getting the same price as the Multi-Year price but there was also the option built in the quote another price in the options language of the contract which created flexibility for the U.S. Government, program manager, contracting officer, and foreign country (Carey, 2017).

DoD needs congressional approval to use Multi-Year procurements. The statute governing Multi-Year contracting is 10 U.S.C. 2306b (Everycrsreport.com, 2018). Under this statute, the Navy and Army have supplied their military forces with Blackhawk helicopters from a Multi-Year production contract.

Comparing estimated costs of Multi-Year contracts versus annual requirement contracting, estimated savings for Multi-Year programs range from 5% to 15% (Everycrsreport, 2018). In the case of Blackhawk production, \$800M was saved in taxpayer monies (Everycrsreport, 2018, Stephenson, 2017).

Multi-Year procurements are specialized contracting mechanisms; Congress permits usage for defense acquisition programs (Everycrsreport.com, 2018). Compared to the standard or default approach of annual contracting, Multi-Years have the potential for reducing time and procurement costs (Everycrsreport, 2018). This is due to stability of funding that is created once a Multi-Year is in place and the longer period of performance, such as five years, which can reduce human resources dedicated to awarding annual obligations.

Organizational Structure

In his book Radical Inclusion, General Martin Dempsey (2016) describes multiple ways to approach Army organizational structure. Dempsey (2016) believed decentralization, ownership, and creating an environment that allows decisions at company grade levels in the Army was the way to ensure organizational success. When studying complex structures from differing points of view of organizational models, solutions come forward (Dempsey & Brafman, 2016). The literature review in this

section focuses on research related to the role played by organizational design (Sanford, 2005; Clayton, 1997). In this research, organizational structure's impact on enabling speed in contract award was the focus.

Seminal Works in Organizational Structure.

Fayol's Administrative Theory emphasized management functions attempting to generate broad administrative principles served as guidelines for the rationalization of organizational activities (Scott, 2003). Two examples of this executive management theory in the Army is unity of command where no participants receive orders from more than one superior, and a span of control theory that a leader can best manage five to nine people (FM 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 2014). This emphasis on management theory is found in the Army with the size of a squad and fire team and orders coming down an Army chain of command. In Army Contracting Command, there are two chains of command, an acquisition chain and a mission chain, for legal reasons in order to not put undue pressure on a contracting officer to do something unethical or not in line with the statute in order to meet mission requirements.

Weber's Theory of Bureaucracy looks at traditional authority, rational-legal authority and charismatic authority (Dubrin, 2016). These authorities create basic changes in an administrative system over time (Dubrin, 2016, Scott, 2003). As an example in the Army, charismatic leaders such as Colin Powell, Douglas MacArthur, or Dwight Eisenhower, during unstable times, can create change to the current system in order to move from crisis to another stabilized system. In Army contracting, charismatic authority may enable speed for a short period, but is not likely to render sustainable results for an extended, long period of time. This trait leadership characteristic of

charisma is further described in Dubrin (2106) where charismatic leadership is not considered a sustainable approach for an organization.

Simon's Theory of Administrative Behavior examines simplifying decisions for participants in how organizations support participants in decisions they are supposed to make (Dubrin, 2016; Scott, 2003). As an example, Chief of Staff of the Army General Milley's goal that our number one priority is readiness which assists in focusing parameters and providing Commander's intent (Milley, 2018). The commander's intent portion of a mission statement builds on simplifying decisions, enabling leaders in times of reduced guidance, to choose actions that align with the commander's intent. This aligns with Army Mission Command Principles where the Army's organizational structure applies six principles to its organizational doctrine:

1. Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.
2. Create shared understanding.
3. Provide clear commander's intent.
4. Exercise disciplined initiative.
5. Use mission styled orders.
6. Accept prudent risk. (Drake, 2017)

Deciding on what the Army's number one priority is and pushing a culture of Mission Command principles, such as shared understanding, cohesion, trust, accepting prudent risk, assists in simplifying decisions in organizations.

Reframing to Analyze Organizations.

Bolman and Deal (1991) refer to four principles of reframing when viewing an organization. The four areas: human resource, political, symbolic, and structural, help to see what is indeed happening in an organization. Using these structural areas as a lens, Bolman and Deal reveal change and realignment areas. Specifically, individual skills and confidence do not guarantee success unless structure realignment occurs with the new initiative. Structure provides clarity, predictability, and security where formal roles prescribe duties and create outlines on how work is to be performed and establishes policies and standard operating procedures to synchronize various and diverse efforts into well-coordinated programs (Bolman & Deal 1991; Twersky & Kahneman, 1986).

Organizational Models in the Army.

Rational system models are collectivities oriented to the pursuit of relatively specific goals and exhibiting relatively highly formalized social structures (Scott, 2003). A rational system has several features. First, organizations are purposeful; focused on the achievement of specified goals. The goals are specific, clearly defined and the organizations have a high level of formalization (Scott, 2003). The second feature in rational systems is an organization displaying a high level of formalization. A formalized structure would be a structure where rules governing behavior are precisely and explicitly formulated (Scott, 2003). Another characteristic of a formalized structure is role relations prescribed independently of the personal attributes and relations of individuals occupying positions in the organizational structure (Scott, 2003). An

example of a rational system in the U.S. Army is a high level of formalization and the goal is very specific: to win our nation's wars.

A natural system model is one that focuses on behavioral structure. A natural system recognizes the organization itself as a major asset and precious resource, instead of seeing only a means to attaining other ends. A natural system puts greater emphasis on the informal and social structure of the organization as well (Scott, 2003). In a natural system, participants pursue multiple interests, both disparate and shared, but recognize the value of perpetuating the organization as an essential resource.

An open system is a set of operations of interdependent activities linking shifting coalitions of participants. The systems embedded and dependent on continuing exchanges with and constituted by the environment in which they operate (Scott, 2003). An open system has interdependent flows and activities linking shifting coalitions of participants embedded in wider material-resource and institutional environments (Scott, 2003).

The key to these three systems is the informal structure of relations developed among participants becomes more influential in guiding behavior of participants than the formal structure (Covey, 2018, Scott, 2003; Blanchard, 1996; Barley & Kunda, 1992).

The United States Army is a vast and complex organization striving to service over 500,000 active duty soldiers with a presence in virtually every corner of the world. To assess or view such a complex organization requires looking from different angles. When looking at the United States Army through the lens of rational, natural, and open systems models, a clearer picture can be seen of this highly complex organization.

Army Contracting Organizational Structures.

In organizational structure, there are three primary organizational structures when looking at Army contracting implementation: hierarchical, horizontal, and matrix.

Hierarchical organizations. In reviewing the literature on organizational structure, three organizational designs may best fit current military research offices. In one example of organizational structure, the hierarchical organization has commonly seen in large businesses, the military, and the private sector. According to Ostroff (1999), in traditional hierarchical organizations, the objective is already in focus; work divided by function, then departments, and tasks. The primary building block of performance is splitting the task and matching the right individuals with the right job. Some may intuitively feel, the larger the size, the longer the delay. However, this is not always true. Hsieh and Woo (2000) clarify that under a particular critical value, delay and size are hyperbolic. As an organization expands, a delay can decrease as size increases, but there is a point where more will not mean faster.

The hierarchical model is commonly used but is not perfect. Athanassiades (1973) showed a relationship in hierarchical organizations between needs of subordinates, aspects of organizational climate, and the impacts of a hierarchical structure. The study results showed there is an impact with distortion of upward communication in a hierarchical organization (Hsieh & Woo, 2000). This distortion could negatively influence Army Contracting offices in adequately addressing and solving the problems facing soldiers in the field and awarding contracts quickly. Case studies by

Burgelman, Maidique, & Wheelwright (2000) show upward communication distortion to have an impact on the success of innovative projects.

Horizontal organizations. According to Ostroff (1999), horizontal organizations structure work primarily around a small number of workflows and business processes, which link employee efforts to the needs, and capabilities of suppliers and customers. Teams instead of individuals generally perform the labor and management of work. The design is flatter, but still hierarchical, where arrangements of teams replace steeper, more functional, oriented methods. Army contracting successes such as source selection teams and more other areas with a more horizontal alignment have had some successes and research supports this as innovation and speed can occur with the right size, not too hierarchical, not overly horizontal (Sahim, 2004; Ostroff, 1999). An organizational structure built around these types of teams could have a positive impact on speed to award for the Army.

Matrix organizations. In reviewing literature on matrix organization, there are several similar definitions. Dunn, Keller & Marks (1998) define matrix organization as a complex organizational structure in which groups of individuals from different functional areas come together to accomplish a common purpose, typically set as a project. Matrix structures are common alignments for multinationals that have extended geographies and multiple product lines serving very different markets (Daft, 2004; Dunn, 2001; Spector, 1999; Baber & Bartlett, 1990).

A common consequence resulting from matrix organizations is dual reporting lines for management. Managers in this type of organization also cope with the tension

between multiple bosses (Krugar, 2000). Other factors that may affect the decision process include the overall style of management in a matrix organization. The matrix organization may have tight central control or only broad guidelines from headquarters with considerable local autonomy (Krugar, 2000). The matrix approach was in effect in the 1990s for the Army with Head of Contracting Agency authority given to Commanding Generals, contracting principals and their contracting organizations matrixed into each command. There were dual reporting chains where the contracting officers received evaluations from their contracting chain to create autonomy and prevent compromising pressure. Today, there is some matrix activity with contracting organizations co-located with their Program Manager counterparts. These current alignments are helpful in Army contracting organizations allowing for quick problem solving to support combat operations. Effectiveness in Army contracting environment in a matrix designed with co-located organizations may allow opportunities to enable speed to award to occur in future Army contracting operations.

Descriptive research already conducted on the three predominant organization structures of hierarchical, horizontal, and matrix along with seminal works on organizational design are useful tools in examining the Army contracting community; but research of which organizational structure enables speed shows a version of matrix in the form of cross functional teams to be best suited for speed in the public sector (Pakarinen & Virtanen, 2018). Cross-functional teams (CFTs) studies in the public sector reveals that while the proven utility of matrix organization is unclear, CFTs are linked to better organizational performance, improved coordination, internal collaboration and development of cross-boundary tasks and speed (Pakarinen &

Virtanen, 2018). Empirical research on matrix organizations in the form of cross-functional teams (CFTs) in the public sector, focused on systematic literature reviews compiled from several databases. Data cover 1990-2015 and are confined to academic articles (Pakarinen, & Virtanen, 2018). In public contracting, proven utility of CFT's appeared in organizational performance, improved coordination and speed in internal collaboration and development of cross-boundary tasks (Pakarinen & Virtanen, 2018).

Leadership

Leadership approaches were reviewed to determine if there is a certain leadership style that improves collaboration and increases speed in project completion, or in this case of contracting speed to award, for an organization. Seminal theory and contemporary studies in leadership were reviewed.

Seminal Research in Business Leadership

Frederick W. Taylor's (1911) original works on scientific management along with Mary Parker Follett's (1926) early pioneer study on leadership entitled *The Giving of Orders* are seminal early works on leadership, organizational behavior, and climate. However, these initial concepts of scientific management may have stifled innovation with traditional command and control; top-down leadership less useful for organizations desiring creativity and change (Manz & Sims, 2001).

Douglas McGregor's (1960) Theory X/Theory Y and Contingency Theory (Robbins, 2003) built on this research, and aligns with other seminal works such as Dr.

Collins research on Level 5 leadership (Ott, Parkes, & Simpson, 2002, Ellerman, 2001) and Tischi & Ulrich's studies on the Transformational Leader (Ott, Parkes, & Simpson, 2002). Dvir, et al. (2002), produced an empirical study on Transformational Leadership detailing the results of transformational leadership in developing subordinates (Dvir, et. al., 2002). Other studies, such as Dr. Chemer's study at the University of California, Santa Cruz, on leadership and its connection to intelligence have all seemed to evolve from early classic theories in organizational behavior and leadership (Chemer, 2000). From early works to modern research and new studies such as Stephen M.R. Covey's Speed of Trust (2018) and Dr. Goleman's (1998) work on emotional intelligence seem to have their roots tied in some way to leadership theory and have assisted in developing a framework for studying leadership.

Leadership research by Collins (2001) on Level 5 leadership details ascending leader levels, aligns better with creating conditions for innovation. The almost saintly tone of a Level 5 leader description who displays personal humility and strong professional will (Collins, 2001) leans more towards the ability for workers to seek innovative improvements than the scientific management environment. The swing from scientific management to a more humanistic approach towards employees has created conditions for innovation in these times.

Bass (1990) describes leadership as the ability to influence to create real and intended changes. This fundamental leadership theory is worth reviewing when looking at an organizational culture change in the Army Contracting towards continued acceleration of contract awards.

Frederick Taylor's (1911) focus was on efficiency. There are several ties to efficiency and leadership (Kanigal, 1997; Nelson, 1980). However, there are no studies demonstrating the longer timeline to be the more efficient leadership approach. Every contracting leader in the U.S. Army desires the wise use of taxpayer funds as a taxpayer and from a fiduciary standpoint. At issue is determining if current timelines described in the Army's procurement acquisition lead times (PALT) are the most efficient use of the workforce and the organization.

Several works center on ways a leader can change the climate of the organization to create speed which translates to efficiency (Covey, 2018; Shein, 1992; Stodgill, 1974).

Transformational and Transactional Leader Model.

In looking at the relationship between transformational and transactional leadership, Tischi & Ulrich define two types of leaders:

1. Transactional Leader: Attempts to increase efficiency and effectiveness of present organization. Primarily attempting to improve rather than change.
2. Transformational leader: Creates new based on vision and ideals (Tischi & Ulrich, 1984).

Eighteen years later, Diver, Edin, Avolio, & Shamir's (2002) published a research article on transformational leadership that proved the value of transformational leadership. In their study, the team looked at 54 military leaders, 90 direct followers, and 724 indirect followers. During the study, officer candidates training as infantry cadets in the

Israeli Defense Force went through experimental and control workshops designed to enhance their leadership before becoming platoon leaders (Dvir Edin, Avolio, & Shamir, 2002). In Dvir, Edin, Avolio & Shamir's (2002) findings, the Israeli Officer Candidates are given transformational training had better scores and measurements from the cadets they led when measured against a control group. This empirical study on transformational leadership was monumental publishing positive results on the effects of transformational leadership in the development of subordinates. The study revealed transformational training of the leaders alone could improve the training scores of the cadet-led by a transformation-trained leader. Scores improved in varied and unrelated areas such as weapons qualifications and fitness tests (Dvir, et.al, 2002). Transformational leadership approach is well suited for today's dynamic contracting environment. Transactional leadership is not (Parry & Thompson, 2002).

Transformational Leadership.

Bass (1985), Avolio and Bass (1988, 1990), Tischi and Devanna (1990), Tischi and Ulrich (1984) wrote on transformational and transactional leadership and proposed that leaders can better influence workers in transformational settings. Empirical research on transformational leadership by Dvir, Eden, Avolio, and Shamir (2002) studied transformational leadership and the results of transformational leadership training on the development of subordinates in which the results showed Israeli leaders improving the performance of subordinates simply by personally receiving instruction on how to be a transformational leader.

Crawford (2004) cites the link between leadership and influencing change. Research on transformational leadership has consistently shown transformational leaders to be more adaptive and innovative than transactional leaders. The concept of change fundamentally links transformational leadership and innovation (Crawford, 2004).

DiLiello (2006) researched the impact of leadership on an organization's climate. Specifically, leader-managerial approaches such as humanistic and transformational approaches have a more positive effect on the environment and culture (Katzenbach & Smith 1993; Manz & Sims, 1986, 1993; Taylor, 1911; Van Amelsvoort & Scholtes, 1994; West, 1990; Zenger et al., 1994).

Contemporary Leadership Research.

Studies on leadership have continued in areas such as the effectiveness of innovative leadership styles, guidance on international marketing strategies, and progressive leadership in organizations and job rewards with strategic global human resource management research (Dubrin, 2016). Management literature has also looked at leader scenarios studying roles not only by the manager but also their employees.

These recent studies advance well past leader trait study and employ leadership models that emphasize both leader and follower, and investigate the context and environment (Dubrin, 2016).

Current research in Stephen M.R. Covey's efforts on the value of trust in an organization emphasizes the importance of business relationships and office atmosphere (Covey, 2018). Dubrin (2016), Chemers (2000), Goleman (1998), all

conclude there is value in the relationship between leader, employee, and environment.

There is new research studying on psychological capital. Psychological capital (PsyCap) refers to an employee's positive mental state. PsyCap characterized by four characteristics: self-efficacy, optimism, hope, and resiliency. Positive PsyCap in the workplace has the possibility of the high return of 200% in investment when companies invest the time and energy into individuals (Luthans, Youssef, & Avolio, 2007).

Researchers have suggested that psychological capital (PsyCap) is an essential environmental framework to potentially improve performance, safety, and productivity (Abbas & Raja, 2015; Ghaffaripour, 2014).

Qualitative research conducted on resiliency and confidence in multiple industries to include maritime workers and offshore drillers make the connection between these elements of positivity and leader climate (McVeigh, MacLachlan, Stilz, Cox, Doyle, Fraser, & Dyer, 2017). Previous studies on examined how the supervisor and employee relationship and PsyCap contributed to organizational climate (Berg, 2013; Bergheim, Nielsen, Mearns, & Eid, 2015; Bergheim, Eid, Hystad, Nielsen, Mearns, Larsson, & Luthans, 2013; Chen, McCabe, & Hyatt, 2017; Edmondson, & Lei, 2014; Ghaffaripour, 2014; Kouabenan, Nguetsa, & Safiétou, 2015).

There is also an ongoing research of whether rewards in the workplace motivate or is an honest wage for an honest day merely enough. Transformational leadership also seems to address this issue stronger than the functional and skills model. There is extensive research on rewards. There are two broad categories of awards, extrinsic and intrinsic. According to several authorities, the proper approach to work motivation lies in a careful distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic rewards (Ellis, 1984;

Herzberg, 1959). Herzberg distinguishes between extrinsic rewards surrounding a job such as salaries, fringe benefits, and job security and intrinsic rewards of the job itself such as self-respect, sense of accomplishment, and personal growth. Intrinsic rewards, according to Herzberg, are more satisfying and motivating (Herzberg, 1959, Ellis, 1984).

Another significant leader skill in public sector organizations is senior managers possessing more developed and improved narrative skills. Compelling stories about ordinary people can spark imagination and innovative capacity in government (Leadbetter, 2004). This new skill study informs the research question in that there are leader skill traits that can be developed to enhance a change in current processes to drive new ways to deliver products and services to the Soldiers.

There are many leadership models: Transformational, Skills and Functional approaches to name but three - all of which contribute to understanding leadership, yet, there appears to be no unified theory. A significant advantage to these models lies in the contribution where one can look at leadership from different perspectives: at the employee level (work executed), in middle management (the glue in organizations), and (strategic ambition and vision) for the boardroom (Liversidge, 2001).

These leadership styles receive emphasis in the Army through its doctrine entitled Mission Command Principles. These principles push the Army's organizational structure and leadership style which could enable speed in contract award.

These six principles include:

1. Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.
2. Create shared understanding.

3. Provide clear commander's intent.
4. Exercise disciplined initiative.
5. Use mission styled orders.
6. Accept prudent risk. (Drake, 2017)

In looking at leadership as a whole, the one are that prevails and bleeds through an organization, its design, and business processes every day is leadership and leadership climate (Bossink, 2004). The Army is known for its emphasis on leadership and applying these same principles to Army contracting culture may have a positive impact towards enabling speed in the contract award process. Trust and prudent risk taking (Drake, 2017) would enable contracting officers to move faster with reduced oversight and more confidence in the process. Additionally Mission Command Principle culture, enables civilian acquisition personnel to work and operate with a common understanding and common terminology when briefing Army Program Managers and Army leadership using Mission Command Principles (Drake, 2017) as a leadership culture change to influence speed in the contract award process.

Chapter 3 – Methodology

Research Hypothesis

Research methodology selected for the following research question:

What contracting methods, organizational structures, and leadership approaches enable speed to award in the U.S. Army?

Methodological Approach

The methodology used was literature review.

Data Collection

Multiple articles and books exist within these topic areas. Seminal works and contemporary studies were reviewed to show where the researcher entered the discipline. Research conducted of several university scholarly databases for peer reviewed work was invaluable. Adding search terms such as Contracting Methods, Organizational Structure, Leadership Army Contracting Command, Speed to Award, PALT and peer-reviewed reduced the searches to a more manageable level. A review of historical works along with contemporary research had a limitation in terms of time. Research data services under Google Scholar was useful and Purdue Owl yielded less useful results.

Government information reviewed through Thomas.gov, OPM, GAO, DTIC, and Army Regulations produced several policies and Army guidelines. Additionally, field trips to other senior service college locations including Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama and Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania provided superior insight.

Qualitative research was the primary method which gave context and rendered breadth to the findings. Secondary quantitative analysis was performed on a more limited scope, but sufficient primary or secondary research was not available to prove the qualitative findings in this paper. The literature review of qualitative findings included three areas to enable speed in contracting by studying peer-reviewed qualitative studies, then drawing warrantable conclusions and recommendations from these findings.

Validity of the Research

The key to ensuring validity in the data was to rely heavily on peer-reviewed literature. The validity of the data collection was primarily established using university search engines to find articles typically recognized in scholarly circles. In some cases, peer-reviewed research was augmented with current articles in different subjects that are evolving. For example, peer-reviewed research on Other Transaction Authority was complemented with recently published articles on the subject.

Limitations of the Study

This paper did not address improvements to the process from the Program Manager side. This paper did not address efficiencies in Army testing and fielding. The focus of this paper was the contracting piece of the Acquisition process. Speed gained from requirements generation and testing are other areas for research. Additionally, this paper did not address the post-award fielding process, which also may have areas to enable speed. There was also a limitation of time in research with the Senior Service College fellowship being an academically intensive 10-month course.

Chapter 4 – Analysis and Findings

In ‘Getting Defense Acquisition Right’, Frank Kendall (2016) points out there are times when speed in awarding a contract may be more important and some quality may be sacrificed. Even though risks in quality of the contract document may occur, speed might be a more important a prudent risk given that current circumstances when fielding proven technology faster than our adversaries is a priority. Current near-peer enemy competition (Mattis, 2018) may point to a time in our history where Army contract awards need a primary emphasis shift to speed in the award process. In these current times, the goal may not be to award the perfectly written contract. The larger, more strategically important goal may be to deliver supplies and services to our warriors in combat in the timeliest fashion possible. Good enough and on time may prevail over the 100% perfectly written contract, over-reviewed, and yet delivered late.

Contracting Type Analysis

Creative acquisition methods such as considering an engineering change proposal versus an entirely new contract action needs to prevail by empowering the contracting officers and educated Program Managers to make decisions that best apply for the situation at hand. Speed to award may be enabled through post-award modifications through modifications versus completely re-starting and throwing out an awarded contract in favor of a new contract. The approach of throwing out an existing contract in favor of a new contract translated into avoidable delays and longer procurement acquisition lead times (PALT).

Additionally, end-user juries or joint acquisition review boards could be stressed early in the process to ensure all stakeholders are on board. Early collaboration up front is stressed in order for the team to have a shared understanding of the common outcome. (Berteau, 2018; Kendell, 2016; Mosher, 2017; Stringer, 2014). In a recent 2017 case for Apache contracting, a \$10.8B production contract was awarded in ten months for five years of performance with the ability to procure over 468 aircraft that could satisfy both U.S. and FMS sale requirements for our allies. The use of early customer meetings and a single focus along with a leadership climate and organizational structure allowed an IDIQ contract to be awarded in 10 months for \$10.8B (Carey, 2107). The flexibility of the five year contract offered 30 day task orders for Apache production with all stakeholders on board for speed to contract award.

In another example, in the case of contract for Army Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) , the concept to leverage the nation's industrial base and have multiple contractors ready to deploy at a moment's notice runs into drawbacks with task orders now subject to protest (Federal Register, 2018). This change de-rails the speed of task orders in a multiple award scenario. Contractors embedded with their regional COCOM staffs ready to deploy with their units are now on hold from a protest. This co-location is useful. However, if the awarded task order is protestable by a contractor on a Multiple Award contract when the time-phased force deployment sequence begins, this delays contractor deployment and defeats the Army's concept of LOGCAP. Army worked to reduce task order protests by presenting a regional focus for each contractor, but this regulation is changeable not allowing a protest on task orders.

OTAs are seeing a resurgence since the original NASA initiation in 1958. They are currently prevalent across all of the services of the DoD, as well as DARPA, Departments of Homeland Security, Transportation and Energy (OTA Guide, 2017; Dobriansky, 2018; Manning, 2018; Runyon, 2018). Recent uses of OTAs include NASA's Commercial Orbital Transportation Services agreement with SpaceX and Rocketplane Kistler, Defense Innovation Unit Experimental's (DIUx) Commercial Solutions Opening, and the Rocket Propulsion System (RPS) development effort with several contractors to include SpaceX, Aerojet Rocketdyne, and Orbital ATK (Manning, 2018; Dobriansky & O'Farrell, 2018)

NASA and USAF other transaction agreements have demonstrated multiple successful advancements of commercial launch services supporting national security and Department of Defense needs. Speed in award created in the case of DIUx shows evidence of 12 OTAs awarded in an average of 59 days from initial submission, validating a significant reduction in pre-award timelines when compared to traditional contracting timelines (Manning, 2018, Dobriansky, 2018; Mosher, 2016).

Organizational Structure Analysis

There were several areas of interest in organizational structure including decentralization, small teams, self-leadership, organizational climate, and reframing.

These areas were further explored in analysis and findings section below.

Small, Self-Managed Teams.

Sahin (2004) and West (1990) research proved when smaller, self-managing teams are responsible for certain parts of the production process, and function with significant autonomy, they are used in many organizations to improve innovation, performance, flexibility, and well-being for all employees (Cascio, 1995; Cohen et al. 1996; Hackman, 1990; Manz & Sims, 1993).

As stated by the Congressional Research Service, “When compared to military services, SOCOM can be seen to operate like a small business. Many analysts argue that small businesses and organizations can be more nimble, more innovative, and more adaptable than large enterprises. (Purdy & Schwartz, 2018, p. 8).”




Figure 2: Special Operations Contracting Structure (Purdy & Schwartz, 2018, p.13).




Figure 3: Army Acquisition Structure (Purdy & Schwartz, 2018, p. 17).

Studies have shown smaller, self-managing teams need a directive leader when the team begins, but once the team has developed and grown in maturity, a more consultative, coaching leadership approach is most effective (Manz & Sims, 1986; Zenger et al., 1994). The leader of a proximal group might need first to be directive, and then once the team has formed, unveil a coaching approach to help foster teamwork to meet organizational goals.

When researching Special Operations Command (SOCOM) structure, its smaller size and scope of acquisition efforts result in SOCOM having a smaller workforce of 500 civilian and military personnel or less than 1% of the DoD Acquisition workforce of over 150,000 (Purdy & Schwartz, 2018). Several government officials argue that SOCOM benefits from its size relative to the military services and the ability to move relatively fast is a function of scale being a smaller organization (Purdy & Schwartz, 2018). However, the speed afforded the smaller organization has only a few areas that may be scalable to a larger organization such as the Army (Purdy & Schwartz, 2018). The organizational size of SOCOM illustrates transformational benefits of user closeness, rapid delivery and a culture that addresses risk (Purdy & Schwartz, 2018). Research analysis and findings show speed in contract award may be enabled and scalable in co-location, and a culture that addresses risk (Purdy & Schwartz, 2018).

Self-Leadership.

Hackham and Oldham (1975) identified a link of autonomy, accountability, and responsibility adding to the level of job satisfaction. Empowerment literature by Conger and Kanungo (1988) presented the concept of self-efficacy in employees. Manz and Sims (2001) developed a current leadership style entitled *Superleadership*, which is defined as "leading others to lead themselves" (p. 23).

The primary goal for Superleadership is to encourage self-leadership capability in followers (DiLiello, 2006). This self-leadership style is an effective leadership style (Manz & Sims, 2001) for small, self-managed teams charged with innovation and could be applied to the contracting officer, contract specialist cell.

The research on SOCOM organizational structure and in self-managed teams is a compelling reason for a contracting agencies to explore co-location and taking prudent risk in their organization. “Superleadership” training by the contracting officer and contract specialist workforce might also be useful. Superleadership training implemented in phases might be beneficial to the Army’s contracting officer and contract specialist workforce. Co-location and principles from Mission Command (Ward, 2017) may also be useful in this regard. For example, executing commander’s intent and establishing mutual trust might enable speed in contract award.

Organizational Climate.

Countless innovations came from U.S. military research projects leading up to and during our World Wars. After World War II, the government and many leading U.S. companies invested heavily in business innovation research. Multiple studies and research papers show organizational design and climate, such as the more horizontal special operations contracting design has a positive impact on quicker contract response times (Sahin, 2004; Edmondson & Lei, 2014; Berteau, 2018). Innovation flourishes in decentralized, flatter organizations. Interest grew in the entrepreneurial model. Startups formed around core innovations and sharply focused on bringing those innovations to market. Many studies (Sahin, 2004; Abbey & Dickson, 1983; Bobic & Davis, 1982) explored change as a process where the result showed organizational structure affected speed and timeframes which became an essential dimension towards change management. Although decentralization may not always be the right approach, Dempsey and Braufman (2016) feel the Army needs decentralization now when executing leadership in a post-9/11 world.

Reframing.

Bolman and Deal (1991) clarify that formal distribution of authority lets everyone know who is in charge, when, and over what. The issue that comes with organizational change is an undermining of some existing arrangements, creating ambiguity, confusion, and distrust. Employees no longer know what to expect from others. Workers become unsure about their duties, confused about how to relate to others, and uninformed about who can make what decision. Clarity, predictability, and rationality can give way to confusion, loss of control, and a sense that politics rather than policies now rule. In some situations, execution is informal. In other organizations, the structural arrangement is a formal process (Bolman & Deal, 1991).

Leadership Approach Analysis

Successful management of change heavily links to transformational leadership, primarily concerned with installing a sense of purpose in those led and encouraging emotional identity with the organization and its goals (Dubrin, 2016; Bryant, 2003; Parry & Thompson, 2002; Humphreys, 2001; Brown, 1994; Hartog, et. al., 1997, Howell & Avolio, 1993). The strengths of transformational leadership, widely studied and tested, has intuitive appeal, and treats leadership as a process that occurs between followers and leaders (Dubrin, 2016; Brown, 1994).

The leader skill for innovation in public sector organizations where senior managers possess more developed and improved narrative skills could be applied to contracting agencies in the public sector. This skill informs the research question in that that they can be developed to enhance a change in current processes to drive new

ways to deliver products and services to the Soldiers.

There are many leadership models: Transformational, Skills and Functional approaches to name but three - all of which contribute to our understanding, yet, there appears to be no unified theory. After looking at all three models, the transformational leadership approach may be the one that gets a company farther down the road and keeps current and on pace with a changing environment. Globalization and technology require new business paradigms and new leadership competencies. In looking at transformational leadership and its alignment with globalization, one qualitative study conducted 26 interviews with international leaders from several countries whose average international expatriate experience was 48 months. The results obtained demonstrated that the model was predictive. The results presented also indicate that leaders consider the following to be some of the most critical global leadership competencies and these qualities align well with transformational leadership: (1) communication skills, (2) motivation to learn, (3) flexibility, (4) open-mindedness (5) respect for others, and (6) sensitivity (Bueno & Tubbs, 2004). Therefore, in analyzing this study, transformational leadership training would be an excellent first step in most leadership situations involving globalization.

In comparing transformational and skills leadership to the functional model, the transformational, and skills leadership approaches are more leader-centered, where the functional model is more inclusive of the subordinates or followers. In looking at the influence and impact of other leadership models on the three models, all have roots with similar beginnings. At the office leadership level, beginning with Frederick Taylor's development of scientific management, followed by Douglas McGregor's X and Y

theories, and modern thought on Transformational Theory, each period in our recent work history has a leadership approach adjusting to what is going on in the workplace of the day. The transformational model might be the leadership model fit for today's business environment. Herzberg work fits well with transformational leadership. Deci (1975), in his book *Intrinsic Motivation*, shows how injudicious use of extrinsic rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation (Ellis, 1984). Deci's conclusions are also a good fit for the transformational leadership model.

Oversight.

There are no studies directly tying contract delay to oversight. The oversight levels appear accurate. \$1B for sole source and \$500M for competitive actions (OSD DASA-P policy, 2016) seems to be the correct level for preventing fraud yet not cumbersome. Delays appear to come from the leader climate leading up to the OSD peer review where allowing for some risk in the minor detail tends to paralyze the process. Research on transformational leadership and risk management is abundant (Campbell & Whote, 2003; Anderson & West, 1998; Colins, 1997; Howell & Avolio, 1993; Burmington & West, 1995; Hambrick, 1981). However, there are no relevant studies on risk leadership when leading teams to address risk and take on reasonable risk.

Humanistic Approach.

Jong and Carpay (1991) analyzed the relationship between leadership behavior and government teams outcome variables such as team effectiveness and satisfaction and found consultative and considerate leadership styles correlated best with outcome

variables. Teams perceived themselves as more effective when their leader was considerate and showed initiating structure. This research aligns with McGregor's (1960) humanistic school of thought and his Theory Y approach in being a positive leader.

Leadership Models.

Leadership model research conducted has resulted in competency models presented to improve managerial leadership skills and an innovative environment. Emiliani's (2003) research demonstrated a new construct for conventional management showing how leader beliefs lead to behaviors, which, in turn, lead to competencies. When adding the desire for a new approach, research demonstrates specific leadership approaches, such as a humanistic and transformational, foster new and enable change better than other leadership styles (Dubrin, 2016; Pierce, 2004; Abrashoff, 2002; Manz & Sims 2001).

Leadership Models for Transformational Organizations.

From this point, the evolution to Contingency Theory Management was introduced where focus on open systems planning, organizational design, and a flexible leadership approach with roots in humanistic or scientific management could be chosen to handle different leadership issues (Bowditch & Buono, 2001). West (1990) and Manz, Bastlen, Hostege & Shapiro (1989) developed similar ideas within government research with a development context. These studies corroborated the claim that the role of leading changes during different process steps when fostering new or promoting a change. Numerous authors contend teams develop in different stages towards self-

management and that a leader should change styles in harmony with these stages (Katzenbach & Smith 1993; Manz & Sims, 1986, 1993; Van Amelsvoort & Scholtes, 1994; Zenger, Musselwhite, Hurson, & Perrin, 1994). When promoting a new culture or process, a leadership style that changes with each stage is best.

In analyzing how the three areas of contract methods, organizational structure, and leadership approaches connect, there are several findings. The transformational model is different from transactional leadership focusing on revolutionizing the system versus making a more efficient, or working within the existing system. Most leaders exercise both transactional and transformational leadership styles to manage change (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999). Unlike other leadership approaches, such as contingency theory and situational leadership, transformational leadership does not provide a clearly defined set of assumptions about how leaders should act in a particular situation (Northouse, 2001). The skills approach is different from the leadership trait model in the shifting away from innate, relatively fixed, personality characteristics and focuses on leadership knowledge and abilities needed for effective leadership (Northouse, 2001). The functional leadership model seems to include and recognize the needs of the followers more than other models. All three models are unique in that each give a different lens for a leader to look through and decide on an appropriate course of action.

As a result of research in the literature review, contract type, organizational structure, and leadership approach show several areas where outcomes could be positively changed with regards to speed to contract award. Critically important organizational decisions are made based on managerial foundations and underlying assumptions about human nature, business processes, and organizational structure

(Dubrin, 2016). In the case of shifting towards speed to contract award, process changes could enable speed to award.

Chapter 5 Recommendations and Conclusion

Army Contracting Command obligates over fifty billion dollars every fiscal year (Pardew, 2018). Army contracting can affect faster gains than our near peer enemies in the future by embracing an enduring culture of speed in contract award. By fostering critical and creative thinking to analyze the appropriate contract vehicle, organizational structure, and leadership conditions, the Army can keep its competitive superiority on the battlefield. In reviewing contracting vehicles, organizational structure, and leadership to enable speed to contract award, this research proposes three recommendations for Army leadership to consider in addressing these areas and three more system level recommendations:

Recommendation #1: Leverage long term IDIQs and Multi-year contracts for speed.

Although counter-intuitive, putting in time upfront is faster later. As a result of studying research on contract methods IDIQs and Multi-Year contracts with five to ten year periods of performance are optimal as demonstrated in Aviation production contracts and LOGCAP. Multi-Year contracts have also brought value to the Aviation Program Executive Officer & Program Management offices in Blackhawk and Apache in locking in funding from Congress. In the case of the Apache Multi-Year awarded in 2017, \$10.8B obligated in 10 months for five years covering production of United States and foreign partner Apaches for a total of 468 Aircraft. An additional advantage is the rarity for Congress to later mark or eliminate that funding in the out years.

In a long-term indefinite delivery-indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract, the concern the Army is hamstrung to a specific technology or contractor for the entire period of performance is not factual. For example, a ten-year IDIQ could have a one-year base year and nine option years, allowing the Army to shut the contract down each year by not renewing the option or incrementally spiral in new technology with modifications.

The most substantial benefit regarding speed to award is task orders take little time and give great flexibility to the customer. The task order can be awarded in less than thirty days and usually no later than six months, which is significantly quicker than one and two-year stand-alone contract timelines. A program manager may have a breaking issue, and if the contracting office has a long-term contract vehicle in place, the contracting officer can respond quickly to the program management office and program executive office allowing flexibility for all to address changing world situations.

In the case of a Multiple Award IDIQ, also recommend Department of Defense directives go back to not allowing the protesting of multiple vendor task orders. This change in regulation allowing task order protests slows speed in awards of task order omnibus styled MAIDIQ contracts such as LOGCAP.

Recommendation #2: Assign full-time, co-located contracting assets to Army's CFTs.

Assigning dedicated contracting assets to the Army's Cross-functional teams (CFTs) where public sector studies have shown CFTs are linked to better organizational performance, improved coordination, internal collaboration and development of cross-boundary tasks would enable speed to contract award (Pakarinen & Virtanen, 2018).

This organizational structure recommendation is based on matrix research, and research on the functionality of decentralized, co-located organizational contracting structures that have worked best in PEO Aviation. Co-location of program management office and its supporting matrixed contracting office has proven successful in PEO Aviation. Co-location fosters communication, teamwork, and ownership which is an excellent blueprint for many contracting offices.

A decentralized, horizontal contracting organizational structure empowers the contracting officer. Designing the organization to give power to the warranted contracting officer to make decisions at that level with reduced mandatory contract reviews at the OSD and PARC level enables speed to award and increases ownership of the process for the warranted contracting officer and contracts specialist. Decentralization with customer co-location and reduced ASAALT and OSD oversight return ownership to the contracting officer. There is risk or a down side in this approach as found with the Gansler commission and Packard report. However, the pendulum may have swung too far over the last decade. To overcome these risks, technology such as the use of a wiki-board to post all comments on a slide deck or approval presentation to go forward would enable speed and reduce risk. The contract specialists could post their documents for Contracting Officer, Team Leader, Division Chief, Director, Deputy PARC, PARC, and OSD DPAP review which could be executed concurrently. This would reduce risks due to oversight but also allow for decentralized execution and enable speed with concurrent reviews.

Recommendation #3: Apply Army Mission Command principles to ACC culture.

Applying Mission Command principles (Davis, 2017) to Army Contracting Command is a culture approach that could enable speed to contract award. Particularly, the principles of mutual trust, understanding commander's intent, and taking prudent acceptable risk (Davis, 2017) could enable speed in contract award. Emphasis on Army on Mission Command Principles doctrine could create better communication between contracting officer and Army customer (speaking their language) and training on mutual trust and taking acceptable risk could enable speed in contract award.

As a result of the literature review and analysis, further research in transformational leadership and risk leadership as it applies to speed in contract award could also be executed. This recommendation is based on scalable Special Operations lessons learned from the research.

In addition, PsyCap research applied to any contracting organization to create a positive organizational climate would enable speed in the contract award process. Additionally, leaders provided with more detailed PALT data loaded in the Federal Procurement Data System, beyond what is dictated in Section 886, adding interim milestones beyond dates for solicitation release, proposal submission, extensions, and date of award (Berteau, 2018) could assist leaders in identifying lag areas. These interim dates would help leadership identify contractor delays, contracting office and customer delays.

Risk leadership should be encouraged at all levels. Tolerance for experimenting, learning and modifying could be a culture change to create speed.

Recommendation #4: Benchmark with other services also studying speed to award.

In 2016, the U.S. Air Force stood up a cell at the Air Force War College to study acquisition issues as part of the war college curriculum. Research of several Air Force organizations such as Big Safari and AF Special Ops units were studied to cull best practices that are transferable to all services. Flatter, more horizontal, de-centralized organizations were found to be faster in awarding contracts as was shared in this paper. Scalable efforts such as co-location and culture changes are recommended in this paper as a result of benchmarking with other services and Special Operations Command. As more studies become available from the Air Force War College and other services, formal sharing with the Army could add value. Additionally, the Army could mirror this Air Force effort at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania or through Defense Acquisition University.

Recommendation #5: Invest in contracting AI and machine learning software.

Per Secretary of the Army Mark Esper and General Milley's (2018) vision, recommend leveraging data analytics and historical data via AI, AGI, and machine learning. If the Federal Tax Code can be automated to user-friendly programs such as TurboTax®, so can the FAR where all areas but negotiation are executed via contracting officer inputs to prompts. Even negotiations could be supported with AI where pricing models and historical information on profit, labor rates, and supplier rates

can be offered via AI pricing support. Production contracts that have a history, such as a Chinook Helicopter Aviation fleet, which have been purchased for over 50 years by the Army. Data saved on profit rates, labor rates, supplier rates, previous certifications, representations and clauses, could be maintained with electronic sample contracts that could be captured in a software database to enable quicker contracts for purchases over the next 60 years of planned Chinook productions buys. Applying the Army's Vision (Esper & Milley, 2018) with an interest in leveraging artificial intelligence into Virtual Contracting Enterprise, VCE, and further automating the contracting process could create speed to award. Some organizations such as Defense Logistics Agency have already begun using AI to increase efficiency and enable speed in their processes.

Investment at this level could also allow concurrent electronic oversight at all levels which would also enable speed. Investment in an interactive, user friendly, next generation paperless contracting folders could enable speed in the process and negotiations. The negotiation piece of contracting would still remain a human endeavor, but it could be augmented by contracting software that supports Army negotiation positions.

Recommendation #6 – Prioritize speed to award where technology is rapidly evolving.

Technology gains are rapidly occurring in IT, AI, and AGI and these areas are where speed in awarding contracts, testing, and fielding should be the priority. Army commanders and contracting officials could pinpoint certain contracting efforts that favor speed and issue a Mission Command principle of commander's intent for certain Army contracts taking prudent risk by identifying which contracts need speed in the award

process most. This could enable a competitive advantage with near-peer enemies in contracting for new technologies that are designated as an Army priority. For example, the Army awarding 5 OTA's in the CFT's is an example of prioritized, pinpointed contracting actions that leverage speed in award.

A military convoy of self-driving vehicles and self-flying military aircraft fleets with test data from the commercial sector that offers military application should also be a priority for a quick win at U.S. Army Futures Command. Once our Army has less Soldiers endangered, then America's collective will to continue in warfare is stronger. The country that wins on the battlefield in the future could be based more on a country's manufacturing capabilities and at the same time reducing casualties on the battlefield. Thus, keeping the country's resolve strong and will to fight high, if provoked. Not all contract actions need to have disruptive speed applied to the process. Some known production contracts in low technologically advancing areas can continue with current acquisition timelines while emphasis on speed can be focused on growth technologies where quickly capturing, contracting, and fielding is the priority. Speed in areas where technology is evolving faster than Army acquisition timelines should be the speed to award priority for the U.S. Army.

Pinpointing first mover commercial technologies that have been tested in the private sector could enable process speed to with military procurement as a late entrant to new technologies. This approach could leverage some commercial testing creating speed on the Army contracting and testing side.

Conclusion

On 1 November 2007, a six-member special commission, led by Dr. Jacques Gansler, investigated the contingency contracting crisis from Kuwait and delivered its findings (Gansler, 2007). The report recommended the Army hire 2,000 additional contracting officers and that the Army provide more training to its acquisition workforce (Gansler, 2007). However, the reverberation and impact to the Army was far-reaching beyond contingency contracting affecting climate. Oversight changes in organizational structure, leadership approaches, and contract vehicle selection at the highest levels added months and years to many contracts awarded over the last decade.

These oversight changes not only applied to contingency contracting missions but the larger Army-wide acquisition community to include Army production contracts, major weapons system contracts, major service contracting such as LOGCAP and Army pre-position stocks have created a risk-averse culture over the years with many decisions pushed up instead of down which has caused delay.

Although the Gansler findings in 2007 accomplished several goals, now in 2019, the Army faces a different time paramount in capturing innovation from industry and rapidly field these innovations ahead of our adversaries. Speed to award, all under a new Army Futures command culture, oriented on capturing innovation from our nation's industries and quickly applying them to our Armed Forces in combat may be where the pendulum has swung now.

The purpose of this research is not to undermine efforts made towards contracting oversight from the Gansler commission, but to propose a new climate

oriented on delivering, with co-located, nimble offices experiencing concurrent oversight. There are organizational structure changes and other culture changes that can be led by leaders who are tolerant towards prudent risk with an end goal in mind, and flexible contracting tools that enable speed in contract award. The recommendations in this paper address the risk of a focus on speed and offer ways to conduct oversight concurrently. As stated in the Army's Mission Command principles, recommendations offered are acceptable prudent risks in order to keep technological domination over our adversaries. With recommendations offered ranging from minor to full on systems change overhaul, there are possibilities to incrementally spiral changes where the U.S. Army can deploy innovations from our nation's industry base quickly into the field with quicker contracting contributing to a faster acquisition process and still have reduced risk via oversight.

OTAs may be the latest flavor for speed, and there is excellent value when executing OTAs in the prototype and R&D fields. However, IDIQ and Multi-Year contracts from a contracting and PEO/PM perspective help take funding concerns off the table and enables speed to award over a longer period of performance. Multi-Year and 10-year IDIQs lock in efforts and creates speed in delivery of an already existing contract vehicle. Task order contract vehicles allow the program manager more flexibility and, force harder looks by Congress, DoD, and Service Budget review teams when considering taking funds away.

This research offers recommendations to add to the body of knowledge going forward and provide recommendations to enable speed in contract award. Army contracting leaders of tomorrow must possess the right set of tools in their toolboxes,

whether leading a small contracts office or changing the world. This paper offers new recommendations to augment current mid-tier and the Honorable Ellen Lord's vision. The recommendations in this paper can be added to the toolsets of our future Army contracting officers with a goal of enabling speed in the contract award process.

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Appendix A

Acronyms

ACC	Army Contracting Command
AFLCMC	Air Force Life Cycle Management Center
AI	Artificial Intelligence
AGI	Army General Intelligence
AO	Area of Operation
ASA	Assistant Secretary Army
ASA(ALT)	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)
CFT	Cross Functional Team
DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DACM	Director Acquisition Career Management
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DIUx	Defense Innovation Unit Experimental
DOD	Department of Defense
DTIC	Defense Technology Information Center
FAR/DFAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation/Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GEN	General (4-star)
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IT	Information Technology
LOGCAP	Logistics Contractor Augmentation Program
MAIDIQ	Multiple Award Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity
MRAP	Mine-Resistant Ambush Protective
MY	Multi-Year
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PALT	Procurement Acquisition Lead Time
PARC	Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting
PEO	Program Executive Officer
PM	Program Manager
R&D	Research and Development
RFP	Request for Proposal
US	United States
VCE	Virtual Contracting Enterprise

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed in this research paper are those of the author; no agency or department of the United States Government has officially sanctioned any of these views or opinions.