Nuclear Deterrence as a Complex System
Abstract
We establish that the US system for nuclear deterrence is a complex system in the formal sense, that nuclear deterrence must be regarded as a system-level function, and that the consequence of this is that there is the possibility of system-level failures not obviously connected to any component failures. These are emergent properties not predictable from an understanding of each of its components and interactions that may be candidates for Taleb's black swan events. To understand the potential risk of failure of the US nuclear deterrence system as it exists in the United States and in the larger context of multiple state actors, it is necessary to understand the potential interactions of components and command authority. For the analyst, this means constructing models that attempt to capture the non-linearities of interactions, the existence of which is increasingly apparent.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 14, 2019
- Accession Number
- AD1075533
Entities
People
- Edward Toton
- James Scouras
Organizations
- Johns Hopkins University