A Stochastic Game Theoretical Model for Cyber Security
Abstract
The resiliency of systems integrated through cyber networks is of utmost importance due to the reliance on these systems for critical services such as industrial control systems, nuclear production, and military weapons systems. Current research in cyber resiliency remains largely limited to methodologies utilizing a singular technique that is predominantly theoretical with limited examples given. This research uses notional data in presenting a novel approach to cyber system analysis and network resource allocation by leveraging multiple techniques including game theory, stochastic processes, and mathematical programming. An operational network security problem consisting of 20 tactical normal form games provides an assessment of the resiliency of a cyber defender's network by leveraging the solutions of each tactical game to inform transitional probabilities of a discrete-time Markov chain over an attacker-defender state space. Furthermore, the Markov chain provides an assessment of the conditional path through the operational problem with an expected cost of damage to the defender network. The solutions of the tactical games and, in turn the operational problem, are utilized to determine the effects and risks of projected network improvement resource allocation decisions via an integer program. These results can be used to inform network analysts of the resiliency of their network while providing recommendations and requirements for improving their network resiliency posture against potential malicious external actors
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 21, 2019
- Accession Number
- AD1077500
Entities
People
- Michael T. Larkin
Organizations
- Air Force Institute of Technology