21st Century Anti-Scouting for Carrier Strike Groups - Countering Detection in the Anti-Access/Area Denial Environment

Abstract

As peer/near-peer adversaries continue rapid growth in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, long-range strike, and development of maritime platforms, the U.S. faces great challenges in maintaining maritime superiority. Operational commanders must perfect and employ creative techniques to prevent being detected, located, and targeted by the multiple threats posed by China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. The author asserts that success for the U.S. Navy and the viability of a first strike capability from a carrier strike group (CSG) in the Western Pacific requires a significant paradigm shift in operational thinking. This paper considers the effectiveness of the current CSG and whether anti-scouting is a realistic concept today. Objective analysis will conclude that for a carrier strike group to attack effectively first in today's threat environment, it requires more than emissions control and dispersal; it must be able to counter-detect in multiple war fighting domains simultaneously.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 07, 2019
Accession Number
AD1077931

Entities

People

  • Michael Jr P. Hettinger

Organizations

  • Naval War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Counter WMD
  • Cyber
  • Electronic Warfare
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Sensors
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Area Denial
  • Ballistic Missiles
  • China
  • Command And Control
  • Department Of Defense
  • Doctrine
  • Electronic Warfare
  • Intelligence Collection
  • Military Operations
  • Naval Operations
  • Naval Warfare
  • Navies (Foreign)
  • Navy
  • Operations Security
  • Signals Intelligence
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Maritime Combat Support and Expeditionary Logistics.
  • Maritime and Naval Warfare Studies