Toward High-Assurance Interface Protocols For Department Of Defense Applications (Op-ed)
Abstract
The primary focus of the authors research so far has been on cyber-hardening the interface protocols used by legacy systems. These systems present a unique challenge, in that making an invasive change to their design may be impossible without threatening interoperability or inviting undue re-accreditation burden. Thus, the current path is one of producing a bump-in-the-wire device that protects an interface external to its host system. The authors encourage policymakers and system engineers alike to instead embrace more holistic and intrinsic approaches to cybersecurity. LangSec, HAIP, and other correct-by-construction methodologies have demonstrated the viability of securing otherwise vulnerable systems through a combination of principled design and formal verification. Their opinion is that assuming a more proactive and objective posture, like the one enforced by these methodologies, is the best way to end the cybersecurity game of cat and mouse in which the DoD finds itself.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 26, 2019
- Accession Number
- AD1078548
Entities
People
- Adam Shull
- Evan Austin
- Robert Templeman
- Ryan Gagnon
Organizations
- Naval Information Warfare Center Atlantic