


LIMITING INFLUENCE

SHAPING DECISIONS TO USE FORCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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


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CONTENTS

ABOUT THE AUTHOR.....	iv
ABSTRACT	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vi
Chapter 1 National Security Policy and the US Military.....	1
Chapter 2 Decision-making and the National Security Apparatus	29
Chapter 3 Comparative History Methodology.....	99
Chapter 4 Gulf War	124
Chapter 5 Kosovo	177
Chapter 6 Afghanistan.....	239
Chapter 7 Libya.....	304
Chapter 8 Deciding to Use Force.....	364
Appendix Coding the Powell Doctrine.....	388
Bibliography	402

Illustrations

FIGURE

Figure 1. Comparison of Weinberger and Powell Doctrines.	117

TABLES

Table 1. Coding variables (notional assessment).....	119
Table 2. Purpose.....	140
Table 3. Commitment	145
Table 4. After Conflict	148
Table 5. War's Nature	155
Table 6. Constituency	158
Table 7. Variable coding: Standing Guidance	162
Table 8. Variable coding: Chairman's Advice	166
Table 9. Variable coding: Relative Advisor Influence	168
Table 10. Variable coding: Competing Alternatives	171
Table 11. Variable coding: Domestic Pressure	172
Table 12. Coding Persian Gulf variables	174
Table 13. Purpose	196
Table 14. Commitment	203

Table 15. After conflict.....	207
Table 16. War's nature.....	212
Table 17. Constituency	215
Table 18. Variable coding: Standing Guidance	219
Table 19. Variable coding: Chairman's Advice	224
Table 20. Variable coding: Relative Advisor Influence	228
Table 21. Variable coding: Competing Alternatives	232
Table 22. Variable coding: Domestic Pressure	233
Table 23. Coding Kosovo variables	234
Table 24. Purpose	253
Table 25. Commitment	264
Table 26. After conflict.....	275
Table 27. War's nature.....	281
Table 28. Constituency	286
Table 29. Variable coding: Standing Guidance	289
Table 30. Variable coding: Chairman's Advice	291
Table 31. Variable coding: Relative Advisor Influence	294
Table 32. Variable coding: Competing Alternatives	299
Table 33. Variable coding: Domestic Pressure	299
Table 34. Coding Afghanistan variables.....	301
Table 35. Purpose	325
Table 36. Commitment	330
Table 37. After conflict.....	334
Table 38. War's nature.....	341
Table 39. Constituency	345
Table 40. Variable coding: Standing Guidance	350
Table 41. Variable coding: Chairman's Advice	353
Table 42. Variable coding: Relative Advisor Influence	357
Table 43. Variable coding: Competing Alternatives	358
Table 44. Variable coding: Domestic Pressure	359
Table 45. Coding Libya variables.....	362
Table 46. Assessing the Powell Doctrine: Tenets and Indicators.....	390

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the professional officer corps' influence over decisions to use US military force after the Cold War. Case studies evaluate consistency of use-of-force decisions with criteria derived from the Powell Doctrine. Using evidence from applications of force in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya, analysis relies on a coding method to assess indicators of criteria within each case. After assessing the criteria, within-case analysis codes the influence of independent and intervening variables on the decision to use force. Independent variables include standing guidance, the advice of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and relative influence of other advisors. Intervening variables include domestic pressure and available alternatives. The within-case analysis produces an associated typology useful for comparing results across cases. The typology comparison produces conclusions useful for policy makers considering changes to the American system entrusted with decisions to use military force.



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Chapter 1

National Security Policy and the US Military

Of all the enemies of public liberty, war is perhaps the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies. From these proceed debts and taxes. And armies, debts and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few...No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.

-James Madison

In short, the state of war at the beginning of the twenty-first century is one of vexatious complexity and puzzlements to those whose task it is to fight them, plan for them, and harness them to the achievement of policy. All these tasks have turned out to be considerably more difficult and complex than anyone anticipated in the heady days of the Cold War's end, when some believed in a permanent triumph of liberal democracy and market capitalism, an 'end of history,' as it were, and assumed that high-tech Western military forces would henceforth triumph easily and cheaply over less sophisticated enemies.

-David Betz
Carnage and Creativity

Fifteen years have passed since New York City's twin towers fell. Memorials now stand to honor the victims who awoke that morning unaware of their fate. In the tragedy's aftermath, US military personnel continue to carry the mantle of America's response. As described by Secretary Rumsfeld, the military went to war with the equipment and training they had.¹ Myriad authors have documented the high cost in lives and national treasure expended by the United States and its

1. Lloyd Vries and Robert Burns, "Iraq-Bound Gis Grill Rumsfeld," *CBS News*, 9 December 2004, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/iraq-bound-gis-grill-rumsfeld/>.

partners to fight the war on terrorism.² Like their predecessors, twenty-first century leaders apply lessons learned from the past in pursuit of their objectives. Yet, success in this war, indeed the war itself, differs greatly from that sought by military practitioners and desired by American citizens. No matter how great the effort, wishing for a dramatic conclusion akin to the dissolution of the Soviet Union can overcome neither the wounds inflicted by centuries of ethnic and religious struggles nor the very nature of human conflict.

The US emerged as a hegemonic power in a unipolar world after the Cold War, yet America's strategic position has declined since winning the ideological conflict. From geopolitical rivals to non-state actors, and nuclear proliferation to cyber warfare, national security challenges abound despite clear US advantages in military and economic strength. Challenges include a rising near-peer in the Far East, chaos in the Middle East, and a resurgent Russia. Domestic politics offer no respite as the US economy clings to tenuous gains since the 2008 recession in the face of record national debt and a lack of popular options available to curb the domestic spending that consumes a greater share of US wealth each year. The dawn of the information age coincided with America's emergence as the global hegemon, helping to create an opportunity for a panoply of actors to challenge the status quo while seeking control over their environments.³ The desire for liberty that confronted oppression in 1787, left an indelible mark on a unified nation in 1865, and overcame

2. Walter Pincus, "The Cost of War," *The Cipher Brief*, 22 March 2016, <http://thecipherbrief.com/column/fine-print/cost-war>. Beyond the cost in money and lives, Pincus highlights the contemporary lack of US military readiness due to decades of conflict in the Middle East.

3. Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and Islamic State in the Levant are all examples of numerous movements whose influence and mobility greatly increased due to social media and extensive information-technology networks.

Nazism and communism in the 20th century, remains at the core of the republic despite constant threats from around the globe.

US policy makers represent the nation with each decision they make, and the Constitution provides a method for the American people to hold them accountable for their policy choices. Yet, the Constitution does not specifically appoint an office responsible for developing US strategy. Further, one can easily argue the nation's founding document describes a system of government fundamentally incapable of subscribing to a national strategy.⁴ Among other important issues, the framers debated the military's role in American society. Revealing their intent to prevent a large standing military force while hedging against protracted conflicts, the Constitution restrained Congress's ability to support a national army by limiting its funding to no longer than two years.⁵

4. George Kennan claimed America is "a nation which has no traditional concepts of military strategy or of the place of military power in the structure of our national life." George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, Expanded ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 175. Conveyed in the waning years of the Cold War, Kennan's observation reflected America's ongoing adjustment to the large standing military necessitated by the imminent threat of a nuclear exchange. As evident in the Federalist Papers, opinions varied regarding how much power to vest in one branch of government. The more important matter at hand during the Constitutional Convention was preventing the abuse of government power by separating responsibilities among the three, co-equal branches of federal government and the states comporting the union. The very nature of the word strategy implies a sustained effort to achieve specific ends. Given the complexity of the current national security environment, a divided US polity on anything but the most basic responsibilities of US government, and the Constitution's provisions requiring diffuse power, sustaining a strategy to achieve political ends requires an existential and immediate threat to the vast majority of US citizens.

5. *The Constitution of the United States and the Declaration of Independence*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 29 July 2009; repr., 24th). In contrast to its provision for providing and maintaining a Navy, the Constitution limits Congress's role to only raising and supporting Armies, and deferring to states the responsibility to train the militia, including the appointment of officers.

The nascent country's unique position on the globe, its society's liberal ideals, and technological limitations of potential enemies all favored the policy choice. The nation's geography and liberal philosophy remain largely the same more than two hundred years later; but technology overcame the tyranny of distance in the twentieth century and exposed America to threats previously ignored.⁶ The United States also occupies a much different position on the world stage than it did when the Constitutional Convention established the basic structure of the American system of government. As the strategic landscape has increased in complexity, so has the requirement for a coherent strategy

6. Paul Rogers, *Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty-First Century*, 2nd ed. (London; Sterling, Va.: Pluto, 2002), 119-31. Multiple authors have highlighted a growing trend toward unconventional tactics by borderless organizations pursuing agendas at odds with Western society. Enabled by information-age communications capabilities and seeking maximum effect by threatening to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction, these groups threaten the assumptions of international order that undergird the national security apparatuses of modern states. Rogers prescribes a fundamental change in Western assumptions about security policy made necessary by socioeconomic fault lines, environmental factors, and modern weapons proliferation. Desiring to overturn a centuries-old belief that the Western elite can keep a lid on the actions of marginalized dissenters using conventional military power if required, Rogers believes this old security paradigm no longer applies due to the increasing inability of modern security establishments to defend against the asymmetric tactics of unconventional threats. Rogers seeks a new, proactive paradigm for state security that addresses causes before they manifest into open conflict. Rogers' argument assumes Western security establishments cannot develop effective counter-tactics and that Western elites can better decrease the potential for violence by expending resources to develop long-term solutions with the potential to satiate the requirements of people around the globe. David Betz, *Carnage and Connectivity: Landmarks in the Decline of Conventional Military Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 10, 24-25. Similarly, Betz concludes that conventional forces no longer have a monopoly on war. Accordingly, contemporary strategists still concerned primarily with the interaction of powerful states should recognize that the neglect of Clausewitz's moral factors has reduced the strategic effectiveness of Western states.

to guide US decision-making and assuage the concerns of partners in the international system of states.

The Constitution still provides the foundation for America's system of government, yet more than two hundred years of national history have tested its provisions in vastly different domestic and international contexts. Described as results of a national requirement unforeseen in 1787, the existence of today's professional officer corps and the nation's vast national security apparatus appear inconsistent with the founders' intent. Notwithstanding the merits of a constructionist case against extra-Constitutional activities, one can hardly argue the need for a large military without also arguing the requirement for a national strategy. The purpose of this research is to examine the role of the professional military officer in shaping the national strategy. Given the post-Cold War reality of a large, standing US military force, what role has the professional military officer assumed in determining national strategy? To what extent has this extra-Constitutional role influenced US policy choices?

Immediately following the Cold War, General Colin Powell leveraged his position as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to influence the Bush administration as it considered options for responding to an act of aggression by Iraq against its smaller neighbor. The first chairman appointed after the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986, Powell relied on his experience as a former National Security Adviser to President Reagan and more than thirty years of service as a US Army officer to perform his duties.

With a perspective shaped by two tours in Vietnam and a difficult post-conflict drawdown, Powell's advice conformed to lessons he learned during the nation's apparent failure to produce a strategic victory using its military strength. He asserted the importance of nine primary considerations before pursuing the ends of foreign policy by military force. Bound together and posed as questions for policy maker

consideration, others labeled his questions the Powell Doctrine. Powell used them to set a high threshold for decisions to use force, and succeeded in his attempt to inform the strategy used to remove Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait.⁷

The DOD Reorganization Act affirmed Powell's responsibility to influence policy by describing the chairman's role as the principal military advisor to the President, Congress, and the National Security Council.⁸ Born from Congress's desire to improve US military operations, particularly those integrating more than one branch of the armed forces, the legislation directed changes to the national security establishment more fundamental than any policy since President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947 into law. Among its many changes, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation strengthened the CJCS role as a method to provide the best possible advice from the professional officer corps regarding the use of force.⁹ As the Bush Administration explored options to remove Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait in 1990, Powell asserted his nine questions to shape the strategy and put into practice his professional convictions regarding the use of force.

US military forces and their coalition partners rapidly achieved an operational victory, sustaining minimal casualties while ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Debate still rages regarding results of the conflict.

7. Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 261-62, 85, 302-03, 47.

8. Department of Defense Reorganization Act, HR 3622, Public Law 99-433, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., (1 October 1986).

9. Jeffrey G. Barlow, *Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950*, 1st Brassey's ed. (Washington: Brassey's, 1998). Barlow describes the fractious state of inter-service rivalry and the multiplicity of options for roles and missions explored by the service chiefs immediately following World War II. Ian Horwood, *Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam War* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006). Horwood further describes a convoluted chain of command reflecting little coordination and unity of purpose that led to numerous failures during the American experience in Vietnam.

Critics argue the relative value of contributions made by components of the armed services or the method and results of the negotiation held after coalition forces achieved their objectives. Academic counterfactuals abound, yet faultfinders can say precious little to criticize the administration's patience and preparation as it considered options for military operations. Powell's influence assisted the President with prioritizing means and helped position US forces where they could leverage their strengths. In its first military engagement of the post-Cold War era, the US military achieved an overwhelming victory and sent a clear signal to states unwilling to heed international law.

US military engagements resulting in victory have diminished since the Iraqi Army's defeat in the desert. American presidents have sent forces into major conflicts nine times during more than two decades since the restoration of Kuwait's border, yet results from these conflicts range from complete withdrawal to protracted conflicts with no end in sight. Did the professional officer corps influence presidential decisions to use military force in these conflicts? Did the CJCS advise in a manner consistent with the tenets of the Powell Doctrine, or did a different use-of-force philosophy inform the framework upon which the principal military advisor recommended employing means to achieve political ends?

Using a comparative history methodology, the following analysis examines whether post-Cold War chairmen have used the tenets of the Powell doctrine to inform US Presidents who have chosen to use military force.¹⁰ Relying on the breadth of US military actions and their stated goals over the past quarter century, conclusions from multiple case studies will support or challenge the hypothesis that Powell's espoused tenets have not informed the use of force in America's foreign policy.

10. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

Results obtained from this research will inform the development of national strategy by illuminating nearly thirty years of themes and tensions that have developed since Goldwater-Nichols altered the structure of America's national security apparatus. Only time's passage can provide the perspective required to assess results of today's policy choices; yet strategists and military practitioners alike, fall short of their responsibilities when they fail to learn from the experiences of their predecessors.

Terra Incognita

Both strategist and practitioner, General David Petraeus emerged from America's recent intervention in Iraq with household name recognition. Champion of the counter-insurgency effort and credited with setting conditions for Baghdad's elected government to assume its place in Iraq's society, Petraeus became the most popular American general since the 1991 Gulf War. Earning a reputation for unmatched brilliance and endurance, he rose out of a desperate situation in Iraq to rekindle America's sense of hope and purpose. Less than two years after departing his post in Iraq, he also symbolized the fatigue of the entire all-volunteer force when he fainted during questioning on the state of operations in Afghanistan.¹¹

Potential for the US military to apply force has increased in the post-Cold War era. Uses of force for purposes other than those specified in the US Constitution began long before the current-day struggle against terrorists and their state sponsors. Soon after the 1991 Gulf War, the US military began a decade-long continuous operation defending southern and northern no-fly zones from Saddam Hussein's efforts to

11. David A. Graham, "Gen. David Petraeus Faints During Senate Hearing on Afghanistan," *Newsweek*, 15 June 2010, <http://www.newsweek.com/gen-david-petraeus-faints-during-senate-hearing-afghanistan-214346>.

assert influence. While keeping a wary eye on the Iraqi dictator, they also conducted major operations in the Balkans, North Africa, and Haiti for purposes ranging from peacekeeping to regime change. US military missions only expanded after the September 11 attacks as major operations began in Iraq and Afghanistan. Like Petraeus' counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq, America's all-volunteer force struggled to overcome significant odds while stretched across the globe and tasked with accomplishing political ends for which they were inadequately trained and resourced.

Petraeus' earliest experiences in the profession of arms took place against the backdrop of an apparent military defeat at the hands of the North Vietnamese and their communist forces in Southeast Asia. Like Powell, Petraeus attempted to apply lessons learned from previous conflicts in pursuit of objectives derived from US political ends. The only post-Cold War US military leader to earn notoriety similar to that bestowed on Petraeus, Powell believed the lessons of Vietnam were clear. As America rebuilt its national security establishment, he resolved to prevent the ill-advised use of military means in situations similar to those he had experienced first-hand. Both men rose to the top of a sprawling military establishment made possible by changes in US policy following World War II.

A Superpower Emerges

Prior to World War II, American history played out the founders' arguments both for and against centralizing power under a chief executive. From the American Revolutionary War effort to World War I, the US raised large forces where none had previously existed as the need arose. Similarly, the forces raised and equipped to fight conflicts rapidly demobilized after the crisis as soldiers returned to society as civilians and veterans. As demonstrated during the Civil War and World War I, Congress yielded a wide berth to American presidents conducting

military affairs during the crisis, but then quickly limited their scope thereafter as drafts ended, funding stopped, and America returned to a state of relative peace. World War II changed the country's accommodation for a standing military and provided American presidents with a readily available means from which to conduct foreign policy.

As World War II raged across the globe, the failure of the League of Nations to prevent global calamity and a realization that the Great War was not the last of its kind propelled a profound change to America's defense establishment. Published in 1941, American political scientist Pendleton Herring's *The Impact of War: Our American Democracy Under Arms*, made the case for centralizing more power under the US President.¹² Chief architect of the 1947 National Security Act, Herring played a leading role in the development of the most significant legislation on American defense matters since ratification of the US Constitution. As the Japanese planned their fateful attack on Pearl Harbor, Herring advocated for the institutionalization of a large American military force within American society. Even before the US joined the war effort, Herring argued threats associated with a shrinking globe had eroded the measure of protection previously guaranteed by America's unique geographic position.¹³

The mobilization of society during the war, and an uneasy relationship with the Soviet Union thereafter reinforced the perception that the US required a large military even after the Axis powers surrendered in 1945. America emerged from the conflict with the world's largest economy by a significant margin.¹⁴ As national leaders negotiated

12. Pendleton Herring, *The Impact of War: Our American Democracy under Arms* (New York, Toronto,: Farrar & Rinehart inc., 1941), 9.

13. Herring, *Impact of War*, 12-16.

14. Andrew J. Bacevich, *The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism*, 1st Holt pbk. ed. (New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2009), 24. Measured in its leading share of the

the transition from a wartime economy, they quickly confronted the responsibilities resulting from the country's new role in the international system of states. Herring's thesis gained in popularity as the grim realities of a post-war world revealed themselves.¹⁵ Instead of returning to a normal state of peace governed by the Constitution's limitations on standing military forces, Congress broke with tradition and ushered in a new era of US military strength when it passed the landmark National Security Act in 1947.

The legislation institutionalized many facets of the sprawling complex still inherent in American government today, including the National Security Council, the Department of Defense (originally labeled the National Military Establishment in the 1947 bill), the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The act did not specify a minimum number of military personnel or amount of funding for these institutions, but the roles and authorities it established provided American presidents with new mechanisms to inform, coordinate, and conduct defense policy. With increased emphasis on military strength, US lawmakers moved away from the founders' intent. The country's primary concern had shifted from preventing an abuse of government power to ensuring an immediate response with military force when threatened.

While the return to a state of relative peace after the war may have allowed a traditional American recession of military power under normal circumstances, the dawn of the Cold War virtually guaranteed a break

world's gold reserves and manufacturing capacity, lopsided export-import ratio, dominant role in the international monetary regime, and number one ranking as producer in numerous product categories, the United States emerged from World War II with a colossal economic advantage. 15. Perhaps the abject failure of the League of Nations had as much influence on American leaders' fear of the post-war world as did the relative strength of the Soviet Union compared to its war-torn European neighbors or the specter of nuclear warfare.

with history. Shortly after the Soviet Union demonstrated its ability to build and detonate atomic weapons in 1949, the United States found itself under the constant threat of a nuclear exchange with its archrival. The resultant fear produced an abnormally influential defense department that evolved into an unwieldy military-industrial complex lamented by Dwight Eisenhower in his presidential farewell address.¹⁶

Consistent with Samuel Huntington's theory that a constant threat to national security increases the likelihood of a powerful military, fear of nuclear annihilation provided fertile ground for a military agenda. Such a dynamic is not unique in American history. Huntington suggests the recently professionalized officer corps of the 1880s and 1890s substituted "their own views on the essentiality of power which were, however, derived not from the needs of foreign policy, but from the needs of the military profession."¹⁷ During the Cold War, society's fear provided the professional officer corps further opportunity for unprecedented influence in the absence of open conflict.

The massive capacity for destruction inherent in nuclear weapons resulted in a tense period in world history wherein the threat of complete destruction was perhaps the only obstacle preventing a direct confrontation between rival superpowers. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow vividly portray how the world arrived at the brink of Armageddon as President Kennedy sought the removal of Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba. Allison and Zelikow highlight the influence of power brokers within the bureaucracy as they describe the decision-making process as viewed through their Government Politics model.¹⁸ With the

16. Campbell Craig, *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 118.

17. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 265.

18. Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 255-313.

embarrassment of the Bay of Pigs debacle fresh in the minds of the administration, the service chiefs' influence declined significantly.

As exemplified by the role they played during the Vietnam conflict, the service chiefs' influence on national security policy and their relationship with presidents changed dramatically throughout the Cold War. Allison and Zelikow describe the strained relationship between the service chiefs and President Johnson during the Vietnam conflict, blaming the military leaders for prioritizing their parochial service interests over the development of more effective strategy to achieve the administration's objectives.¹⁹ In contrast to a relatively quick conclusion to the crisis in Cuba, the proxy war in Vietnam tested the mettle of the containment strategy's advocates for more than a decade and left behind multiple examples of what not to do in future conflicts. Even as the current administration considers military options to solve security dilemmas, critics and zealots alike must wrestle with the ghosts of Vietnam as they struggle to differentiate the considered action from festering wounds left behind by a painful chapter in American history.

As if the long road to Saigon's fall was not painful enough, distilling lessons learned from the event has proven just as difficult. In the conflict's aftermath, most in the professional officer corps blamed the shackles of restrictions placed on them by civilian authorities with limited understanding of warfare. With roots dating back to the Bay of Pigs debacle, a schism had developed between American presidents and their senior military advisors that undermined the development of solutions during critical decisions regarding the use of force.²⁰ During

19. Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 286-87.

20. Gordon M. Goldstein, *Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam*, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt and Co., 2008), 35-44. Goldstein describes some of the significant forces of the US national security establishment influencing decisions regarding the use of force and President Kennedy's vow after the Bay of Pigs that he

the Vietnam conflict, President Johnson's Tuesday lunch sessions and Defense Secretary McNamara's metrics focusing on enemy combatants killed in action reinforced the notion among military officers that civilians with limited knowledge of the history of warfare were putting American lives at risk for little potential gain. The service chiefs each pursued disparate strategies to serve the interests of their branch of service after deeming the conflict unwinnable and acknowledging their lack of influence over decisions made on the path to that inevitable conclusion.²¹

For the younger military officers who experienced firsthand the horrors of Vietnam and a homeland suspicious of its military and government officials in general thereafter, a few had the opportunity to leverage their own lessons learned against future national security challenges. Colin Powell's two tours in Vietnam and experience as a field-grade officer during the hollow-force years that followed led to deeply held convictions regarding the role of the US military. Commissioned one year before Saigon's fall, David Petraeus spent four years at West Point learning about leadership and studying warfare under the shadow of the protracted conflict. Both men would rely on these formative experiences in key leadership roles later in their careers.

Perhaps as poignant as the lingering Vietnam experience was the widening rift between military leaders and the civilians under whom they served. The structure of the establishment created by the National Security Act of 1947 and the immense pressure to solve the crisis in Vietnam resulted in three branches of service incapable of conducting operations jointly. Five years after Saigon, President Carter announced the failure of another attempted use of military force. Instead of a protracted conflict, the attempted rescue of American hostages in Iran

would consider future advice from his military advisors with much greater scrutiny.

21. Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 286-87.

resulted in dead US military personnel, destroyed aircraft, and a failed mission.

Published in 1985, *Military Incompetence* describes the military shambles that continued to persist a decade after hostilities ended in Vietnam. Listing numerous military failures between the Son Tay prison raid in 1970 and Grenada in 1983, Richard Gabriel levies the responsibility for incompetence on the military leaders tasked with planning and readiness.²² The Cold War and containment strategy continued, yet multiple defeats in smaller conflicts called into question the efficacy of US conventional forces.

Defense Reform and the Transition to Unipolarity

In 1986, with the goal of increasing US military effectiveness, Congress passed the most significant national security legislation in nearly forty years.²³ Sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative William Nichols, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act enjoyed nearly unanimous support from both

22. Gabriel concludes “the evidence is overwhelming—they have failed to fulfill this responsibility.” Richard A. Gabriel, *Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win*, 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 34.

23. Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 993-94. The act specified eight specific objectives: 1. to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department; 2. to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense; 3. to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands; 4. to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands; 5. to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; 6. to provide for more efficient use of defense resources; 7. to improve joint officer management policies; and 8. otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.

legislative chambers, and President Reagan signed it into law in October. The bill emphasized the importance of conducting effective, joint operations and altered fundamentally the roles of senior military officers in the national security establishment.

Goldwater-Nichols reduced the influence of individual service chiefs in two ways. First, geographic combatant commanders effectively replaced the chiefs in the operational chain of command. Second, the act emphasized the role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over all other officers in matters of strategy and policy by clearly highlighting the CJCS as the principal military advisor to the president, National Security Council, and secretary of defense. The bill required the CJCS to provide the range of military advice and opinion after consulting with the respective geographic combatant commanders and the service chiefs. The act also required the CJCS to present views differing from her or his own if submitted by any service chief. Finally, the act explicitly established the role of the CJCS in the formulation of plans, policy, and strategy.²⁴

Goldwater-Nichols culminated a larger effort by the Reagan administration to restore the domestic and global image of America's military. Three years earlier, the president dispatched US forces to invade the small island of Grenada with the objective of restoring the island's former government. Although successful, the operation once again revealed significant deficiencies. A year after the Grenada invasion and the Beirut bombing responsible for the deaths of more than 200 US military personnel, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger delivered the administration's views on the role of US military forces in his remarks at The National Press Club in Washington, DC. As set forth in his opening comments, Weinberger intended to define circumstances necessitating use of the American military to achieve policy ends.²⁵

24. Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 1007-08.

25. Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," (Address, National Press Club, Washington, DC, 28 November 1984).

Designed to address critics of US foreign policy who questioned the need to risk American lives in distant regions seemingly unrelated to US national security, Weinberger cautioned against two extreme positions before proposing six criteria US policy makers should consider before using military forces abroad. The secretary cautioned against one extreme leading to an isolationism that refused to consider the use of force abroad in any circumstance. He also cautioned against the opposite viewpoint that US forces could go anywhere and solve any problem. Highlighting the drawbacks to each extreme, Weinberger underscored the threat to civil-military relations and national defense if political leaders were unable to clearly articulate what they intended to achieve by using the means of military force.²⁶

With an emphasis on accurately assessing the stakes involved, Weinberger postulated the importance of six considerations before sending American military forces abroad.²⁷ First, the dispute must involve the vital national interests of the US or its allies. Second, only send military forces if fully committed to winning. Third, US leaders must clearly define political and military objectives, and know how the use of force will accomplish them. Fourth, employing combat forces requires continued reevaluation of the broader context to determine if requirements have changed. Fifth, Congress and the American public must support the action. Sixth, the use of military force is a last resort. Weinberger concluded his comments by stressing the importance of using these six criteria to avoid protracted, unnecessary conflicts resulting from insufficient and incrementally increased force.²⁸

26. Weinberger, "Uses of Military Power."

27. According to Weinberger, "we should only engage our troops if we must do so as a matter of our own vital national interest. We cannot assume for other sovereign nations the responsibility to defend their territory—without their strong invitation—when our freedom is not threatened." Weinberger, "Uses of Military Power."

28. Weinberger, "Uses of Military Power."

Notwithstanding the ill-defined concept of vital national interests and the gray line between friends and enemies in the international system, Weinberger's espoused use-of-force criteria emphasized the administration's philosophy that an efficacious military has an important, but limited role in US foreign policy. Since the end of World War II, the biggest limitation on American presidents' use of force was not the philosophy of the president or his administration. The context of the Cold War and the fear of escalating hostilities with the Soviet Union served as the first and primary caution against using American military forces. The fall of the Berlin Wall signaled more than just Germany's reunification and the end of communism in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union's demise removed the greatest barrier restraining American presidents from leveraging military force to conduct foreign policy. In the decades following the Cold War, the question changed from "why use military force" into "why not use it."²⁹

As the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union dissolved, America emerged as the world's lone superpower. Decades of preparing for nuclear war while using the threat of force to deter aggression ended and George H.W. Bush became the first American president to serve the nation in its new role as global hegemon.³⁰ For decades after World War II, US leaders built a Cold War force designed to counter the Soviet threat. The complex

29. Even before the end of the Cold War, George Kennan presciently lamented that demonizing the Soviet Union post-World War II and going into debt to increase United States nuclear capacity resulted in the "extreme militarization not only of our thought but of our lives that has become the mark of this post-war age. We have made ourselves dependent on this invidious national practice—so much so that it may fairly be said that if we did not have the Russians...we would have to invent some adversary to take their place." Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, 170-73.

30. During his January 1992 state of the union address, George H. W. Bush claimed that the death of communism represented a change in the world of "almost Biblical proportions." George H.W. Bush, "State of the Union," (Address, Joint Session of the Congress, 28 January 1992).

and extensive processes of intelligence, research and development, acquisition, strategy, plans, doctrine, logistics, and training had all focused intently on deterring (and if necessary, fighting) the archrival superpower. When the threat all but disappeared, America's ominous military capacity appeared ill suited to the realities of the post-Cold War world. As American political and military leaders observed the world from their new vantage point, the massive apparatus that had so long devoted itself to defeating a now-vanquished foe attempted to define its new role.³¹

The changing focus of national strategy documents demonstrates how provocations previously considered too insignificant to warrant attention took the place of the Soviet Union as immediate or emerging threats to US national security. Written before the Cold War's end, the 1988 National Security Strategy (NSS) recommended against direct involvement by American military forces in low intensity conflict.³² Yet subsequent documents, written after the conflict's end, underscored the primacy of threats that existed in the past but did not merit consideration.

As post-Cold War administrations elevated their concern with new threats, they sought options to fit the round peg of the Cold War national security apparatus into the square hole of a unipolar international

31. Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 358. Benjamin Fordham describes the conspicuous absence of a significant decline in military spending after the Cold War.

32. Consistent with the principles espoused by Weinberger, the document stated "the most appropriate application of U.S. military power [for low intensity conflict] is usually indirect through security assistance—training, advisory help, logistics support, and the supply of essential military equipment. Recipients of such assistance bear the primary responsibility for promoting their own security interests with the U.S. aid provided." President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1988, 35.

political system. The 1990 NSS described the administration's quest to address more threats with existing combat forces created and sustained to conduct the Cold War.³³ Adjusting to a world absent the Soviet Union, the elder Bush Administration expressed increasing concern regarding conflicts in third-world countries.³⁴ Bush also warned of a threat from terrorist organizations and their state sponsors.³⁵ US policy makers continue to struggle with these security challenges today.

Genesis of the Powell Doctrine

Unrestrained by a peer competitor, and armed with the most capable military the world had ever known, US leaders quickly discovered a threat to address with military force. Months after publishing its first NSS without mention of Iraq or Saddam Hussein, the Bush Administration led a coalition of states in a campaign against the country's armed forces after their invasion of Kuwait. Few US citizens or military members were familiar with the regions' politics or military affairs, but the Bush Administration feared Iraq's potential to affect the world's oil supply and believed the role of global hegemon included a responsibility to uphold international law.³⁶ In the event, the US military and its coalition partners rapidly delivered a decisive operational victory

33. The document describes the administration's intent to find "new and imaginative ways to apply flexible general purpose forces to these problems." President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1990, 28.

34. As described by the administration in the NSS "in a new era, some Third World conflicts may no longer take place against the backdrop of superpower competition. Yet many will, for a variety of reasons, continue to threaten U.S. interests. The erosion of U.S.-Soviet bipolarity could permit and in some ways encourage the growth of these challenges." President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1990, 6.

35. President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1990, 6.

36. Woodward, *Commanders*, 226, 84.

over their opponent that allowed restoration of the international border between the two countries.

Unlike Kennedy's skepticism regarding advice from the military or Johnson's broken relationship with the service chiefs, President Bush sought out the advice of the professional officer corps and often acted on its recommendations during operations in Kuwait and Iraq. In particular, Colin Powell proved immensely influential in his role between Norman Schwarzkopf and the president. The twelfth chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the first to serve a complete four-year term under the landmark Goldwater-Nichols legislation, Colin Powell brought a wealth of political experience to the Bush administration.³⁷ A former White House Fellow, Powell had only recently left his post as Ronald Reagan's National Security Advisor before Bush appointed him chairman.³⁸

Although experience enhanced Powell's ability to evaluate implications of policy choices, Dick Cheney considered the CJCS role limited to military matters. The distinction became significant after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. At the first National Security Council meeting after the invasion, Powell and Cheney disagreed about the appropriate American response.³⁹ In the ensuing preparation for conflict, Cheney wanted a menu of military options, while Powell wanted clear political objectives.⁴⁰ After his time handling significant matters of state as

37. Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell*, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 2006), 185.

38. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 194. Powell went to his fellowship with the intent to narrow the gap between the White House and the military.

39. After the meeting, the secretary of defense told Powell, "Colin, you're chairman of the Joint Chiefs. You're not Secretary of State. You're not the National Security Adviser anymore. And you're not Secretary of Defense. So stick to military matters." Quoted in Christopher D. O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell: American Power and Intervention from Vietnam to Iraq*, Biographies in American Foreign Policy (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009).

40. O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell*, 87. Cheney also told Powell "his job was not to force a discussion of press Bush for policy answers; it was to provide a

Reagan's national security adviser, Powell chafed at Cheney's attempts to minimize his influence.⁴¹

Powell's aggravation at Cheney's reproach only increased based on his strong beliefs about the appropriate use of military force. His views on when and how to use force derived from his earlier experiences. As a junior officer, Powell had distinguished himself from his peers with flattering performance reports and his love of the military.⁴² After Vietnam, he concluded America's warriors had answered their nation's call but the country's leaders had poorly "conceived, conducted and explained" the war.⁴³ Fundamentally, Powell believed senior military leaders had failed their subordinates by not speaking truth to power, and political leaders failed at their responsibility to supply the necessary means.⁴⁴

Like many of his contemporary officers, Powell believed the institutional legitimacy of the military profession required avoiding future conflicts resembling Vietnam.⁴⁵ These officers found little respite in the years following the conflict, yet Powell's reputation as an outstanding professional with great potential continued to grow.⁴⁶ He believed in a two-way chain of command that obligated obedience downward and the responsibility to protect subordinates upward.⁴⁷ Powell attributed to

range of military options and then shut up." Quoted in DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 194-95.

41. O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell*, 86-87.

42. Powell's supervisors from his time as a lieutenant characterized him as someone who "expresses his opinions...convincingly," and who "should be considered for more rapid promotion than his contemporaries." Additionally, based largely on the chaotic events of the American civil rights movement in society at large, Powell determined "the real world began at the post." DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 39, 70.

43. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 91.

44. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 96-97.

45. Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 42.

46. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 99.

47. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 142.

senior military leaders the responsibility to explain to policy makers what force can or cannot do in any potential situation.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the moment of decision remained sacred. Powell maintained faith in the chain of command, up to and including its civilian leadership, believing that loyalty required him to carry out the policy decision as if it were his own.⁴⁹

In nearly three months after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Bush still had not made a decision to use force. During this period, Powell continued to advise caution against doing so without exhausting all options.⁵⁰ After months of Powell's cautions and warnings in the face of Bush's determination to take action, the president finally decided to issue an ultimatum to the Iraqi dictator.⁵¹

As the administration continued to pressure Saddam Hussein with the diplomatic and economic tools at their disposal, Bush finally decreed that his enemy would face military action if he did not extricate his forces from Kuwait by the end of January 1991. Having voiced his warnings and exhausted his levers of influence within the administration, Powell relegated his skepticism about the president's ultimatum to his private

48. As chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Powell saw his role as laying out "to my political leaders the full range of military options, to let them know what we can do, to let them know how we can solve a political problem, to let them know where I do not believe military force will solve a political problem, and to make them understand all of the consequences of the use of military force." Quoted in David Roth, *Sacred Honor: A Biography of Colin Powell* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1993), 190-91.

49. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 146. See also Roth, *Sacred Honor*, 197.

50. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 197-99. Powell briefed Bush in person in September, warning him of the potential for harm from an imprudent use of force. A month later, Powell continued to beat the drum of caution while privately discussing the matter with Secretary of State Baker.

51. O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell*, 88. Powell described his discomfort with the president's demonization of Hussein, concerned that he was building up the Iraqi dictator as a bigger threat than he presented in reality and that Bush's rhetoric would result in a military objective to remove Hussein from power.

thoughts. The commander-in-chief had made his decision, and he resolved to follow orders.⁵²

As the US military and its coalition partners embarked on their quest to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait, American leaders enjoyed no guarantee of success. As described by Prussian Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, no plan survives contact with the enemy.⁵³ The Bush administration, like so many of its predecessors, had to await the battlefield reports while submitting to the forces of Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity.⁵⁴ They wanted to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, yet no amount of theory and study can supplant debates that still rage on matters ranging from what went wrong in Vietnam to whether US policy succeeded despite the high price paid by so many. Similarly, some continue to debate the merits of stopping the American military's advance into Iraq without levying additional restrictions on Saddam Hussein.

For Powell, there existed no debate on the lessons of Vietnam or the correct course in the Middle East in 1991. Based on his assessment of mistakes made three decades prior, he described four major accomplishments of America's use of force in the Middle East: the stated policy goal was clear, the military had the resources necessary to achieve it; the American people supported the effort, and the conflict set an international precedent as a warning against territorial aggression.⁵⁵ In short, Powell believed he and the administration had succeeded in preventing another Vietnam.

52. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 200-01.

53. Helmuth Moltke and Daniel J. Hughes, *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 45.

54. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 89. Clausewitz suggested the interaction of three forces produce war's results. These three forces include: 1. Primordial violence, 2. Hatred and enmity, and 3. Chance and probability.

55. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 208.

The American military's dominance over their enemy in the Middle East was more than an operational victory. The public display of significant advances in technology, and their effective and coordinated use to conduct warfare, set a benchmark for prospective enemies to overcome in future conflicts.⁵⁶ Domestically, the war had an almost cathartic effect for those who had lived through the military disasters of the previous two decades. Arriving almost simultaneously with America's emergence as global hegemon, the conflict's lopsided results demonstrated that US military forces possessed asymmetric advantages permitting them to defeat an enemy quickly and with minimal collateral damage at relatively low cost.⁵⁷

Powell subscribed to no illusions regarding the nature of war and reasons for the military's success.⁵⁸ He had exerted significant influence on policy decisions resulting in limited objectives, sufficient means, and

56. Media coverage of the war was extensive, including regular briefings on strategy, operations, and tactics delivered by general officers. On a daily basis, television coverage transmitted US capabilities to leverage advances in maneuver warfare, precision weapons, space systems, and night vision devices around the world.

57. Nese F. DeBruyne and Anne Leland, *American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics*, Congressional Research Service, RL32492, US Library of Congress, 2015, 3. In lives, the cost of the conflict for America included 383 killed (of this number, 148 were killed due to injuries sustained in battle), and 467 wounded. "Gulf War Fast Facts," *Cable News Network, Inc.*, 15 September 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/15/world/meast/gulf-war-fast-facts/>. In treasure, the conflict cost Americans \$61 million, with the vast majority of expenses paid by other nations in the coalition. Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 126. Bacevich describes America's reaction to the end of the Cold War as an obsession with military supremacy instead of simply maintaining military strength.

58. "The quick victory left the illusion that war could be antiseptic, without costs. It created a mythology that military power could achieve anything and, with the Soviet Union in decline, that there would be few restraints on the future use of military force. Powell did not succumb to this illusion, but others, such as Cheney and Wolfowitz, did." O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell*, 92.

popular support at home and abroad. In its first test, the Goldwater-Nichols Act appeared to have achieved its stated objectives. The centralized influence of the CJCS as the principal military advisor, a restructured chain of command, and the emphasis on joint operations all played pivotal roles in the military's success.

Powell used the prestige garnered by US forces in the Middle East to articulate his perspective on the military's role in the post-Cold War world. In a 1992 article, he described America's responsibility to lead despite myriad threats and crises looming around the globe. Powell suggested the US military's role was crucial to the future of the country and the world, but also cautioned against the potential to make a situation worse by using force incorrectly or at the wrong time.⁵⁹

He considered rigid adherence to a recipe for when to use force anathema to gaining a strategic advantage, but his test for an appropriate context when US forces could best serve US interests abroad gained notoriety as the Powell Doctrine.⁶⁰ Powell articulated nine criteria in need of evaluation prior to engaging in hostilities.⁶¹ Rooted in realism, Powell's prescribed evaluation of the situation's suitability to using force intentionally imposes a difficult standard on decision makers considering the violent use of military means. Based on his study of history and

59. Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 5 (Winter 1992): 39-40.

60. Woodward, *Commanders*, 117-18. Powell had served as Secretary Weinberger's military assistant when the Secretary developed and espoused his six criteria for when to use force known as the Weinberger Doctrine. Powell questioned the value of publicly announcing the country's use-of-force doctrine and the perception of the criteria as a kind of straightjacket requiring perfect conformity, but he believed Weinberger's principles were useful as a way to curtail unwise notions of force application.

61. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," 37-38. Powell posed his criteria in the form of questions. Chapter 3 provides details of the questions and their inclusion in this research.

experiences in Vietnam, he sought to avoid war where possible. When unable to avoid war, he desired to minimize its duration.⁶²

Summary

The framers of the US Constitution sought to limit the power of the president and potential for oppression by separating control of the military among different branches of government and restricting Congress from funding the US Army for a period exceeding two years. The United States broke from its Constitutional roots after the dramatic conclusion to World War II and the country's emergence as leader of the Western world. The National Security Act of 1947 provided the framework against which a large standing military developed into an American institution. The imminent threat of nuclear war with a rival superpower during the Cold War provided continuous justification for a growing defense budget while deficiencies in military leadership revealed themselves in smaller conflicts. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 once again strengthened America's military capability by focusing on joint operations, restructuring military leadership roles and responsibilities, and centralizing power in the CJCS as the nation's principal military advisor.

The 1991 Gulf War provided the first test for the legislation and an opportunity for the CJCS to influence the Bush administration via a new role in the development of policy and strategy. A clear operational success, the conflict ushered in the post-Cold War era by demonstrating awesome new American military capabilities. Powell relished the success of the effort, but also cautioned against overreliance on military force by describing his criteria for its use in foreign policy.

62. Powell agreed with President Lincoln's assessment that war is the "scourge of God." Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," 42.

Instead of starting a peaceful period in world history, the end of the Cold War resulted in myriad conflicts wherein American presidents opted to use military force. Still the nation's principal military advisor by statute, multiple chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have followed Powell. The following case studies examine their influence, and that of the Powell Doctrine, over decisions to use military force.



Chapter 2

Decision-making and the National Security Apparatus

Dwight Eisenhower was the last American president to believe that military spending which was not absolutely necessary was money wasted and that a well-founded economy was as important to the security of the country as armed might.

-Neil Sheehan
A Fiery Peace in a Cold War

We're in a fight for our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them.

-George W. Bush

Justification for conflict between states has changed little throughout history. Fear, honor, and interest continue to motivate twenty-first century states to warfare as much today as they have for more than two thousand years.¹ The fear of nuclear war largely defined international relations after the end of World War II. After Germany's embarrassing defeat in World War I, Adolf Hitler rose to power by appealing to his country's sense of honor and created a terrifying regime responsible for the slaughter of millions. From abolishing slavery to containing communism and maintaining access to global markets, the concept of national interest has provided a foundation for nearly every US national defense policy. Furthermore, those who doubt that the weak

1. Thucydides, Robert B. Strassler, and Richard Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Free Press, 1996), 43. In 432 BC, Athenian envoys argued that fear, honor, and interest were three of the most influential motivators of state action while justifying their position at a Spartan assembly.

suffer what they must while the strong do what they can need look no further than the proxy wars of the twentieth century for proof.²

The relevance of power to international relations remains unchanged, but the decision-making apparatus responsible for deciding to use military force on behalf of the US hardly resembles the one envisioned by the nation's founders. Three branches of government still exist, but the role each plays in national defense has evolved immensely. The framers granted the legislative branch power to raise and support an army for short periods, federalize state militias in defense of the union, and maintain a navy. Based on their poignant and recent experience under British rule, the founders well understood the navy's importance in protecting international trade vital to the nation's growth and the potential for domestic oppression inherent in a standing ground component.

Likewise, the Constitution describes a limited role for the judicial branch, and highlights the executive's role as commander in chief of each service branch and the militia when federalized. The document describes times of war as an exception to the rule, and provides no description of the commander in chief's duties or authority over decisions to use force during times of peace. Samuel Huntington suggests that despite their obvious appreciation for the concept of centralized command, the framers ambiguously defined the power of the commander in chief for the purpose of political expediency.³ Finally, the judicial branch interprets the Constitution's guidance regarding treason.

Idealistic in its assumption of relative peace as the norm, the document does not prescribe a method to ensure readiness in the case of

2. Thucydides, Strassler, and Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides*, 43. The Athenians described the notion that the weak are subject to the strong as a natural law.

3. "The American constitutional system thus does not facilitate the stable existence of a balanced pattern of executive civil-military relations." Huntington, *The Soldier*, 178, 89.

long-standing, imminent threats to the US homeland absent a Congressional war declaration. It does not confer any responsibility for determining national strategy. Furthermore, it does not explicitly authorize or prohibit the use of US military forces in the conduct of foreign policy absent a declared war. The Constitution grants control of the military to civilian authorities, but provides little guidance on specific roles beyond dividing responsibilities to avoid centralization of power within one branch.

Civil-Military Relations

In his landmark book *The Soldier and the State* published in 1957, Samuel Huntington surveyed American military history to support his thesis that a professional military detached from political influence best serves US security interests. Huntington laments the Constitution's ineffectiveness at providing a framework for the national security apparatus. He attributes the absence of improved Constitutional guidance to two primary causes.

First, the framers drafted the document prior to the professionalization of western militaries.⁴ The western concept of a professional officer corps developed in European states during the nineteenth century as a response to the rise of nationalism and move away from aristocracy.⁵ Major changes in the methods and tools states used to conduct warfare took place as the social upheaval ushered in by revolution enveloped European states. Conduct of warfare evolved from the mere sport of aristocrats to a massive and complex function of the state requiring education, expertise, and standardization.⁶

4. Huntington suggests, "The Constitution was drafted at just the wrong time in history." Huntington, *The Soldier*, 164.

5. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 37-39.

6. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 26-28.

Second, the Framers drafted the Constitution in an environment of hopeful and insulated personal safety. The Atlantic Ocean provided a barrier against old-world influence, and success in the War of Independence caused the men to embrace fully the personal liberties described in the Declaration of Independence ten years earlier. Their fundamental belief in individual liberty over all other considerations caused the framers to develop multiple barriers to a strong military force given its potential for oppression.⁷ Beyond the basic division of powers between the legislative and executive branches, they further reduced federal power by emphasizing the role of state militias (today's National Guard) and providing no clarification of the president's role as commander in chief.⁸ In short, Huntington blames the time and place of its development for shortcomings in the US Constitution's provision for an effective security establishment.

Absent greater Constitutional clarity, the relationship between US political and military leaders developed over the course of history. Unlike the major continental powers in Europe, America's isolation from the rest of the world permitted the absence of external pressure that may have forced revisions of the Constitution. Even as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau developed the Prussian professional military system to address the threat of a bellicose France at the beginning of the nineteenth century, America's system remained largely unaffected until the Civil War more than a half century later.⁹

Internal state dynamics, and not the threat of conflict with another nation, wrought the professionalization of America's military. The conclusion of the Civil War provided the incentive and political dynamics

7. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 167. Huntington described an almost utopian hope that somehow the country's new location or its philosophy of individual freedom could render war obsolete despite the admission that some form of standing force was required to protect the western frontier.

8. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 163-64.

9. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 30-31.

necessary for US military leaders to pursue changes necessary for a professionalized officer corps. After military necessity drove US policy throughout the total war between North and South, the bipolar country once again emphasized individual liberty and clung to a stubborn hope that it had somehow overcome the possibility of evil wars now relegated to the dustbin of history.¹⁰

As focus turned to economic development, America embraced its Constitutional limits on standing armies and the notion that diminishing the war-making apparatus also diminished the potential for war. The last vestiges of frontier defense and new requirements in the Pacific provided justification for a small army, but further divorced the military from the country's citizens as these missions had little bearing on the forces of urbanization gripping the nation.¹¹ The resultant isolation of the military from society provided a unique opportunity for America's military leaders to change their institution.¹²

The officers surveyed the military institutions of their European counterparts. Primarily taking cues from the German system, they instituted changes in three major areas to create a professional officer corps.¹³ Where none had existed in 1865, the American military system in 1915 included a comprehensive education system for instructing its

10. "The American tends to be an extremist on the subject of war: he either embraces war wholeheartedly or rejects it completely. This extremism is required by the nature of the liberal ideology." Huntington, *The Soldier*, 151.

11. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 226-28.

12. "The practical work of professional reform, frustrated while the military were associated with the South in the prewar years, became possible once all ties with civilian society had been broken. Universal hostility permitted what limited support prevented. The foundation of this advance was the absence of any significant threat to national security. The isolation of the military was a prerequisite to professionalization, and peace was a prerequisite to isolation... The dark ages of military political influence were the golden ages of military professionalism." Huntington, *The Soldier*, 229.

13. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 54-55.

officers with a curriculum emphasizing military matters. Major revisions included the creation of technical schools for postgraduate work, establishment of war colleges to provide advanced instruction on the study of war, and the military academies' departure from a previously myopic focus on technical applications.¹⁴ Second, US military leaders instituted significant personnel reforms, including revisions to officer accessions, increased emphasis on merit-based promotion, and the institution of a military retirement system.¹⁵

Finally, both the US Army and Navy instituted organizational reforms. Both services removed divisions between staff and line officers that had led to a bifurcated and inefficient system. Additionally, both services altered and clarified the roles and responsibilities of their service secretaries and their highest-ranking military officers.¹⁶ Huntington suggests the development of the US professional officer corps created an isolated segment of the country's population whose conservative ideals differed from civilian society, but provided a measurable increase in US military readiness by the eve of the country's entry into World War I.¹⁷

The uneasy peace following the Great War once again left the geographically separated United States to consider the future of the large military force it had created as wartime requirements once again drove policy. Seeking to avoid another post-war dismantling, military leaders set out on a quest to endear their profession to the American people. With its creation of the Reserve Officer Training Corps program and other updates to the national security apparatus, the National Defense Act of 1920 contained provisions designed to begin a new era of civil-military relations.¹⁸

14. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 237.

15. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 244.

16. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 247-54.

17. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 229, 57, 68-69.

18. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 283.

In spite of the military's massive effort, ghosts of past conflict between the country's overall philosophy and that of a conservative and professional military organization once again doomed the relationship to failure. America's opposition to a powerful government, association of the military apparatus with the evil inherent in war, and expectations of a future absent armed conflict combined to create an insurmountable obstacle.¹⁹ In the interwar years, the American people rejected the fundamental tenants of military service as hostile to their beloved cause of individual liberty on economic, social, and ethical grounds.²⁰

In contrast to the professional military's view of international politics derived from the realist perspective, pervading American thought focused on a permanent international peace brought about by international law and common interests among nations.²¹ Only after the mobilization during World War II, and the constant threat of war with a rival superpower thereafter, did the US opt for a large, standing military. Implications of ongoing friction between the core tenets that defined American liberty prior to World War II, and the policy shift yielding the world's strongest military force ever since, undergird study of twenty-first century civil-military relations.

Initial Theory Meets Dynamic Reality

Throughout his survey of history conducted to describe major developments in American civil-military relations, Huntington emphasized what Eliot Cohen later described as the normal theory. Huntington railed against the corrosive effects of political influence on the military profession and the importance of maintaining a clear distinction between the functions of civilian and military leaders. His theory concluded that only a mutually exclusive separation could

19. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 288.

20. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 290-92.

21. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 307.

generate the full benefits of a professional officer corps. In short, he proposed that political leaders decide the “what,” while subordinate military leaders determine and execute the “how.” The theory further resolves that infringements of either group on the exclusive territory of the other inherently degrade national security. Huntington’s work provides important historical context and a starting point for the subject matter, but offers only limited explanatory power regarding American civil-military relations.

Numerous power brokers within the national security apparatus exert influence over decisions resulting from competing interests and ideas, yet each still fits within lanes created by the Constitution. Huntington’s theory of civil-military relations articulates clearly defined lines between each role. According to his theory, policy makers determine policy. Huntington does not specify how it happens, but describes the fundamental responsibility of elected officials to provide political ends. Congress sets spending policy; the president establishes foreign-relations policy; and senior officers provide politically sterile military advice when asked for their input. Once the policy has been determined, the professional officer corps executes its function by conducting military operations to achieve political ends. After setting the policy, political leaders then await operational results produced by the military. Huntington’s assignment of roles provides a starting point for analysis, but neither articulates sufficiently the essence of policymaking nor its connection to policy execution.

In his zeal to define the best civil-military relationship for the provision of security, Huntington developed a theory with internal inconsistencies and refutable assumptions. He championed the concept of objective control to champion the importance of complete political neutrality in the officer corps. A version of civilian administration over the military apparatus set apart from its subjective-control counterpart by maintaining a politically sterile military force, objective control

purports to provide the officer corps with complete autonomy over the military profession.²² The disastrous results of military leaders endangering national security interests by pursuing selfish political objectives are self-evident, but Huntington describes this potential as though it were an infection spreading from a virus embedded in the Constitution.

Huntington laments the document's lack of clarity on the professional officer corps' proper place in American government as the source of the virus. He asserts that the ambiguity allowed excess access to US presidents by military leaders, resulting in sub-optimal US strategy during World War II. Written to justify his assertion that dysfunctional civil-military relations produced a bad decision to seek unconditional surrender above a favorable peace after the war, Huntington postulates that too much access to the president corrupts military analysis.²³ His ascription of the problem to lack of Constitutional clarity bears further exploration, but his contention regarding presidential access lacks specificity and fails to illuminate completely the nature of the relationship between senior military leaders and policy makers.

Notwithstanding numerous examples of corruption following access to power, recent American history does not suggest a direct correlation between the availability of presidents to military officers and the development of ineffective strategy. Even if one accepts Huntington's contention that unconditional surrender was the wrong policy in World

22. According to Huntington, "a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority with thin the state." Huntington, *The Soldier*, 84.

23. Huntington relies heavily on his analysis of World War II civil-military relations, asserting that "if, instead of moving into the seats of power and embracing civilian goals, the Joint Chiefs had preserved their military roles and warned the political leaders that no war is the last war and that the problem of military security would still be with us after V-day, the United States would have come out of the war in a far better strategic position than it did." Huntington, *The Soldier*, 344.

War II, and that it was attributable to excess presidential access by the military, only an unsupportable counterfactual can provide improved policy and a commensurate end state. Alternatively, one could consider the possibility that the influential role of senior military leaders during and following World War II had more to do with the demands of a crisis than it did with the president's time-management preferences.

Subsequent conflicts do not support Huntington's theory. Different from World War II, the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam conflict provide two examples where access had the effect of isolating military leaders from influence over the president's decisions. Five years after Huntington published his book, the Cuban Missile Crisis took the world to the brink of nuclear war—a time when one misstep or push of a button had the potential to unleash a torrent of death and destruction unlike any the world has ever known. Yet President Kennedy did not bend to the whim of his military leaders. The military chiefs had access to the president, but he refused to take their professional advice on decisions of policy while still trusting them to execute the naval blockade after he had set the policy.

Similarly, during the Vietnam conflict President Johnson invited military leaders to provide new ideas for achieving his political ends, but did not allow them to set US policy objectives. American experiences in the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam suggest the nature of the relationship between the president and his advisors, and the context of the national security dilemma, have a larger effect on national security decision-making than does the amount of access presidents afford their military leaders.

Huntington recommended clear subjugation of the military under the nation's defense secretary to prevent corruption of the sacrosanct military thought he believed endemic in excessive presidential access. Admiring the system employed by the British in World War II as a better model, Huntington believed the secretary should manage all facets of the

defense department the way other president-appointed secretaries run their departments. Huntington's approach has the potential to yield bureaucratic efficiency, but the recommendation he offers elevates his concept of objective civilian control over multiple cautions against its implications.

First, the president cannot delegate his Constitutional authority as commander in chief. Insertion of a civilian into the military chain of command at the highest level undermines Huntington's entire premise regarding the importance of developing military professionals steeped in the study of warfare. Creating a barrier to the commander in chief's access to professional advice certainly increases bureaucracy, but offers little self-evident benefit to the development of sound strategy. Additionally, empowering a civilian other than the president to wield US military power, as recommended by Huntington, establishes a de facto Constitutional amendment fundamentally altering the framer's intent to limit potential for abuse of government power.

Multiple examples of influential defense secretaries since Huntington published his analysis suggest caution in consideration of his approach. Robert McNamara's influence on strategy during the Vietnam conflict, and Donald Rumsfeld's with regard to operations in Iraq, do not at face value support the notion of a civilian appointee governing matters of strategy while also overseeing administration of the bureaucracy. Huntington's solution is tantamount to an affront against the highly regarded military axioms of centralized control and decentralized execution with unity of command under authority of the commander in chief. Roosevelt granted his military leaders the degree of political autonomy he desired to confer. That Roosevelt worked directly and comfortably with his senior military leaders does not mean all

presidents will do the same; nor does the same relationship guarantee similar results in future conflicts.²⁴

Even in the permissive environment of wartime policy, the pluralistic US government decision-making apparatus alters, rejects, and restricts presidential freedom to act unilaterally.²⁵ As demonstrated in Vietnam and Iraq, an empowered defense secretary insulating the president from professional advice yields no apparent strategic improvement over the access Roosevelt granted Eisenhower. Huntington provided sound rationale to highlight the benefits of a professional officer corps, but history reveals significant flaws in his theoretical notion of objective civilian control.

Huntington also relied on an ill-advised parallel between the concepts of obedience and professionalism as he developed his theory. With numerous pages spent on each topic, he emphasizes the relationship between the two in order to make his point that a politically impotent government agency (what Huntington calls professionalism) is more likely to do a given task without questioning the action's merit (Huntington describes this as obedience).²⁶ While making his argument for objective civilian control, he insufficiently relates obedience with professionalism as if to create fear of military officers who refuse to obey orders because of their political interests.

24. Neil Sheehan, *A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon*, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 2009), 442-45.

President Kennedy sought the best advice of senior military officers during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but retained his decision-making authority while considering their counsel in the larger political context of the dilemma.

25. Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 269.

26. Huntington provides an example of strict professionalism as exemplified by the post-Civil War US Army, stating the organization "had no peculiar field of responsibility; instead, it was a vast, organic, human machine, blindly following orders from on high." Huntington, *The Soldier*, 261.

Military service is certainly unique in numerous ways, but no definition equates professionalism with slavery to the political whims of centralized power. One could hardly consider doctors more professional if they willingly put lives at risk by performing unsound medical procedures or focused their efforts on tasks unrelated to the medical profession based on political pressure. Obedience may indeed resemble the hallmark of US military service, but its nuanced relationship with professionalism extends well beyond blindly following orders. US military officers take an oath to defend the Constitution against foreign and domestic enemies and bristle at the thought of equating command with ownership. They are compelled to obey legal, moral, and ethical orders; but their professionalism stems from the institution's expertise in the application of force, distinct institutional values, unique legal code, and acceptance of inherent risks.

Huntington's loose analysis of obedience raises the specter of mass atrocities ranging from Third Reich genocide to domestic purges directed by Mao or Stalin. Perhaps a better example of professionalism is instead the military officer who refuses to obey because his conscience and principled understanding of American ideals require it. General Zinni's rejoinder to a Clinton administration tasking provides an example of principled leadership Americans should demand from their professional officer corps.²⁷ In fact, military leaders should expect similar queries from future administrations and stand prepared to articulate a thoughtful response instead of immediate, blind obedience.

Why does Huntington's description of obedience matter? Like much of his theory, Huntington draws clear lines in an attempt to

27. Mackubin Thomas Owens, *U.S. Civil-Military Relations after 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain* (New York: Continuum, 2011), 77. Zinni demanded a direct order in writing when asked by the administration to have US pilots provoke the Iraqis into attacking them. Zinni's response provides an excellent example of the difference between obedience and professionalism.

delineate proper roles and responsibilities within the national security apparatus. He follows his delineation between obedience and politicism with an assertion that politics is separate from operations. Using German officers who resisted Hitler in the 1930s as an example of improper disobedience, he later asserts that an officer can disobey on grounds of professional competence if ordered to complete a nonsensical operational or tactical action as long as the action is apolitical.²⁸ Here again, Huntington's analysis falters due to his lack of appreciation for the nature of strategy.

Military operations and tactics lead to the accomplishment of strategic objectives for the achievement of political ends. As such, there exist no apolitical operations and tactics. Even if they did exist, the law requires junior officers receiving legal, moral, and ethical orders to carry them out regardless of their opinion of the orders' military merits. Contrary to Huntington's assertion, operational and tactical obedience is the exact behavior the chain of command must demand and assume to conduct military operations successfully. Moreover, one must question any point made that requires the use of Hitler's rise to power as a parallel to the American system of government.

That the policy maker retains responsibility for determining the ends has gone without question throughout the entirety of American history. In the US system of government, the professional officer corps owes its best military advice to the policy maker *especially* when it contradicts the advice of others. If unable or unwilling to carry out legitimate orders with the intent to use every available tool to achieve the ends of policy, officers at any level fail to meet the demands of their profession and are subject to the scrutiny of their chain of command and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

28. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 76-77.

Even for those officers conducting their role in an exemplary manner, Huntington's theoretical world of military affairs devoid of any political influence caused him to assert the inability of military leaders to perform the functions of political leaders.²⁹ He desires to delineate clearly the specific functions each role performs, yet he describes the difference as if it were a complete and definitive explanation of reality. Inconsistently, his analysis confirms the opposite is true.

Whether describing Eisenhower as president or Marshall as secretary of state, Huntington himself explains how easily the nation's best military minds made the transition to their civilian roles in America's system of government.³⁰ Perhaps instead of suggesting none can successfully accomplish both roles in a lifetime, Huntington intended to illustrate the importance of each role maintaining theoretical purity during the same event. If so, his analysis appears flawed when considered within the historical context of numerous successful leaders who simultaneously fulfilled both functions.³¹

Within the American system of divided responsibilities, the importance of personalities and relationships between power brokers increases as the number of established boundaries among them

29. Huntington asserts, "Politics is beyond the scope of military competence and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values. The military officer must remain neutral politically." Huntington, *The Soldier*, 71.

30. According to Huntington's own analysis, "the professional officers blended into their new civilian milieu, serving nonmilitary ends, motivated by nonmilitary considerations, and performing jobs little differently from their civilian predecessors and successors... The 'civilianizing' of the officers was not the exception." Huntington, *The Soldier*, 361, 72-73. Furthermore, Huntington describes how a leader steeped in the military system became the system's greatest antagonist as president.

31. Beyond American presidents Roosevelt and Lincoln, other examples include Napoleon, Attila the Hun, and Julius Caesar.

decreases. Offering three potential relationship schemes among the major players in the executive branch, Huntington highlights the nebulous relationship between the president, defense secretary, and military chief. The power vacuum created by this ambiguously defined relationship resulted in a growth opportunity for other entities given the importance of national security matters following World War II. The list of national security power brokers arriving after the war includes the now-robust National Security Council and associated staff, the position of National Security Advisor, an entirely new Department of Homeland Security, and numerous other influential groups including think tanks and retired senior officers.³²

Additionally, at the heart of Huntington's frustration with national security affairs lies the relationship between the legislative branch and the executive regarding the conduct of military operations. As demonstrated by counterinsurgency operations in Iraq circa 2007, complications associated with this relationship receive additional attention when US military forces conduct lengthy or politically contentious operations. President Bush originally received wide latitude from Congress after the September 11 attacks; however, Congress's budgetary role resulted in multiple threats to sever funding for US military operations in Iraq as the lengthy conflict continued. Powerful

32. Karen Deyoung, "White House Tries for a Leaner National Security Council," *The Washington Post*, 22 June 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-tries-for-a-leaner-national-security-council/2015/06/22/22ef7e52-1909-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html. Although presidents tailor the size and composition of their National Security Council teams, analysts estimated the group had reached 400 people by the summer of 2015. Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009). In his book on the Iraq War, Ricks highlights retired US Army General Jack Keane as just one example of the myriad influential retired officers.

figures in key committees within both legislative chambers have the ability to influence popular opinion and limit strategic options.

Finally, the relationship between senior military leaders and policy makers in both government branches changes with administrations and the personalities involved. Senior officers walk a fine line when required to provide their best military advice to Congress, especially if they disagree professionally with policy options under consideration by the president.³³ Huntington emphasized blind obedience and political neutrality, but both characteristics effectively threaten the basic premise of the American form of government.

The colonists fought in the eighteenth century to remove the yoke of human tyranny that demanded unreasonable obedience from a disenfranchised population. The framers wrote the Constitution to create a system of self-governance, restrain future leaders from demanding personal allegiance, and encourage citizens to exercise inalienable rights. The Second Amendment's provision for citizens to own and use weapons hardly sounds like a call for blind obedience. Beyond encouraging individual liberty, the framers emphasized political involvement with a representative system contingent on votes of the country's citizens. Only then could the proposition of a government of, by, and for the people manifest itself in reality.

Contemporary political discourse remains a contentious and nasty affair, but an organization's intentional refusal to participate in the messy fray of human discourse and opinion does not guarantee an apolitical effect. To the contrary, embracing a politically neutral opinion in an inherently political society can certainly result in the exact opposite

33. Huntington, *The Soldier*, 414-18. Huntington acknowledged the precarious position of the military chief based on the Constitution's division of powers as he declared, "The military chief has the professional duty to speak frankly to both President and Congress," and highlighted the explicit permission Congress granted to members of the JCS in 1949 to provide their professional opinion to Congress.

effect of Huntington's theory, for the solace of perceived neutrality provides an enhanced position of power from which to exert influence. In reality, the influence of a purportedly neutral institution reaches its peak in hotly contested debates between evenly split sides of a divided polity and in matters divorced from public scrutiny.³⁴ Huntington desired politically deaf military leaders who solve military problems as if they were no more complex than the finite output of a mathematical algorithm. In doing so, he failed to embrace the reality that human beings and military operations are inherently political.

Huntington's theory still provides the basis for discussing American civil-military relations. His civil-military relations analysis culminated with a melancholy admission that achieving his version of objective civilian control requires altering the division of power described in the US Constitution. To his credit, Huntington admitted the unlikelihood of Constitutional change. He provided the study of American civil-military relations with a first attempt at describing the important relationship between the professional officer corps and policy makers vying for power and influence.

Huntington's initial descriptions of roles and responsibilities still provide a point of departure useful in analyzing the creation and execution of policy within today's national security labyrinth. Instead of ignoring or lamenting the existence of a professional officer corps that affects American political discourse, policy makers should guide the civil-

34. According to Christopher Plebus, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, "public deference to the judgment of military professionals has become a problem. All of the respect the military has is understandable. But it's as though if a military officer endorses an idea then it must be a good one. That is not necessarily the case." Quoted in Nancy A. Youssef, "Top Brass: Military Should Stay out of Politics," *The Daily Beast*, 14 April 2016, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/04/13/top-brass-military-should-stay-out-of-politics.html>.

military relationship within Constitutional limits. Available tools include determination of roles, boundaries, authorities, and incentives.

Given that war is an extreme of human interaction between its participants, politically aware officers bound by their legal and professional obligations produce strategy and operations most likely to achieve political ends. The Constitution's lack of guidance regarding a standing military force does not necessarily inhibit the development, capability, or professionalism of the nation's military. Without consolidating power in any one person or officer, the document allows policy makers to adjust military influence and power as dictated by the needs of the country.

A bloated national defense force since the 1940s has undoubtedly influenced policy more than it did in earlier American history, but it has done so at the behest of the civilian leaders appointed over it and with the consent of the American people. Unless and until a majority of US citizens decides to forfeit the security it provides, America's military will continue to play an influential role. Military leaders serving the needs of the American people must remain engaged in the political process to accomplish their mission.

Engagement does not imply that active duty officers should concurrently run for political office or that a branch of service should promote a political candidate. Political engagement in this context provides the counterpoint to Huntington's description of apolitical professionalism. If senior officers believe skyrocketing national debt represents a clear and present domestic threat to the US Constitution, they must advise their civilian leaders and seek options to protect and defend the nation. Furthermore, today's combatant commanders provide a powerful representation of American power and prestige in their areas of responsibility. Their very presence influences US foreign policy. These leaders' ignorance of their political role could only serve to undermine their purpose in support of US policy objectives.

America's elected representatives must continue to evaluate the roles and responsibilities of various power brokers in the national security apparatus against the requirements of national security. The National Security Act of 1947 and its subsequent changes, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, federal budget constraints, and executive policy statements provide examples of civilian control with the intent to alter military strength, efficiency, or influence.

Numerous authors have lamented the dearth of strategic thinking in the American national security system, offering solutions ranging from structure to education. A tenuous civil-military relationship in the 1990s gave way to more friction in the next decade as the country struggled to reconcile an enormous investment of blood and treasure in the Middle East with its resultant lack of tangible benefits. Violence and extremism continues to swell in the Middle East, thwarting US administration's desire to disengage and focus instead on security issues in other regions.

Notwithstanding the importance of studying history and warfare, the US government's ill-defined structure requires continuous assessment and adjustment to meet the needs of the liberal society it serves while also defending against an evolving list of threats. Has a direct connection between civilian leaders and the operational level of war at the geographic combatant commands provided a strategic benefit or deficit? Does the defense secretary's role add too much ambiguity to an already ill-defined relationship among power brokers? Has the president's freedom to use force without a Congressional declaration of war resulted in strategically beneficial foreign policy choices? Specifically related to the research presented in the following chapters, has empowering the CJCS as the principal military advisor provided the independent analysis and influence intended?

Revised Theory

Numerous authors have analyzed Huntington's theory, offering new perspectives ranging from wholesale replacement to minor adjustment. As highlighted above, Huntington's work provides a stepping-off point from which to pursue an improved theory better able to explain American civil-military relations in reality. Eliot Cohen's examination of military leadership during war highlighted the relationship between highly effective heads of state and the militaries they led.

Beginning with Abraham Lincoln and including an analysis of political leadership following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Cohen concludes the most effective national leaders have consistently intervened in military affairs, and that less capable leaders still have an obligation to do so.³⁵ During the American Civil War, Lincoln controlled his generals, shaped the war, and intended to dictate the peace after its completion.³⁶ Throughout World War II, Winston Churchill monitored the military closely and discovered staff errors on multiple occasions.³⁷ Regardless of their familiarity with military matters before taking office, each of the leaders analyzed by Cohen believed they had to know a great deal about war in order to lead effectively.³⁸

Instead of considering politics and military matters as things apart, Cohen understood war as a form of politics.³⁹ Huntington argued for a clear separation of military professionals and politicians allowing policy makers to set goals for military leaders to achieve, but Cohen's

35. Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Free Press, 2002), 206.

36. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 18.

37. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 118, 21.

38. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 214.

39. Cohen illuminates this point through the eyes of Ferdinand Foch: "War is not a dual object, but a unity; so, for that matter, is peace. They are not divided into military and civil departments. The two aspects are closely and inseparably linked." Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 85.

assessment of reality dictates otherwise. Labeling Huntington's concept the normal theory of civil-military relations, Cohen believed it failed to consider war's effect on objectives and methods.⁴⁰ Lending credence to Cohen's position, early twenty-first century American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan provide examples of conflicts where military realities radically changed the objectives and strategy of the war.

Both Huntington and Cohen value dissenting views in strategic decision making during war. To ensure multiple viewpoints, Huntington advocates for an apolitical professional officer corps. Diverging from Huntington's faith in the generic structure of the system, Cohen lays the responsibility for dissenting advice largely at the feet of the commander in chief. Citing England in World War II as an example, Cohen describes how Churchill picked and tolerated military leaders who disagreed with him.⁴¹ Although the relationship between Georges Clemenceau and Ferdinand Foch in World War I France provides an example of a popular military leader elevating his dissenting opinion to a damaging level, Cohen asserts the responsibility of the civilian leader to negotiate such tempestuous waters for the benefit of the state.⁴²

Instead of insisting on a sterile system that forces people to stay in respective lanes, Cohen elevates the political role of senior military leaders by advocating the less restrictive premise of an unequal dialogue between military professionals and their senior leaders.⁴³ Cohen describes this dialogue as a relationship where political leaders welcome differences of opinion, but also retain final authority over the decision.⁴⁴ Cohen illustrates the significant burden borne by American presidents,

40. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 31.

41. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 120, 28.

42. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 85-94.

43. "Except under uniquely favorable conditions the outcome of civilians taking military advice without question is unlikely to be a good one."

Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 207.

44. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 10, 209.

yet also eludes to the military's importance when he claims the combination of American experiences in Vietnam and the Gulf War resulted in a version of the normal theory of civil-military relations that eroded civilian control, created mistrust, and politicized the military.⁴⁵

Cohen's work acknowledges the important role of the leader in setting policy, but does not provide a specific role for the military beyond acknowledging its inherent involvement in politics. His in-depth analysis of four powerful leaders fashioned a compelling narrative, yet did not provide a negative example to demonstrate the power of his theory. Furthermore, the fact that he only included one American president prevents his research from overcoming the Constitutional predicaments Huntington lamented.⁴⁶ Perhaps Cohen's theory provides its best

45. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 199.

46. Feaver and Kohn, *Soldiers and Civilians*, 448. Cohen also believed that Huntington's theory contained an analytical flaw regarding its description of military professionalism. Unfortunately, he once again missed the mark when attempting to describe the flaw's nature. Instead of questioning Huntington's internal argument in his description of military professionalism (Huntington's prescription for blind obedience and political neutrality), Cohen focused on the external argument labeling military officers as professionals. Cohen suggested the nature of the profession differs from that of doctors or lawyers precisely because the purpose of military officers is to achieve the political ends of elected officials. More representative of slavery or brainwashing than professionalism, Cohen's assumptions about the role of the military in American society lie at the heart of the argument put forward in this analysis. Specifically, he describes the role of US military officers as if it were no different from the role of any other military officer of any other Western state since the days of Napoleon. Cohen suggested the ultimate goal of the military is to conduct foreign policy at the behest of the political leader. If Cohen's generalization were true, the American people should expect a military with objectives and processes little different from those found in Germany or Italy during World War II. Whereas Huntington labelled military officers professional because he considered them completely apolitical, Cohen claimed the profession unique due to its purely political nature. Both polarized views fail to describe accurately the nature of the military profession in the United States. Clausewitz aptly described war as an extension of politics, but one could argue the same is true of health care provided by doctors and legal representation

explanatory power over American cases when a total war like the American Civil War preoccupies every citizen and the people and their legislators cede significant power to the executive. Since World War II, no American president has arrived in a similar situation.

George W. Bush's freedom to act after the September 11 attacks best illustrates a recent point in American history where Cohen's theory should prove best suited. Yet in his own prologue, Cohen's analysis widely misses the mark as he considers the relationship between Donald Rumsfeld and the professional officer corps during preparation for the invasion of Iraq. Cohen suggests the civil-military relationship followed his unequal-dialogue theory, and hints that planning failures largely resulted from an obstinate officer corps that wielded its political power against the defense secretary.⁴⁷

With the benefit of hindsight more than a decade after he wrote his book, Cohen's prologue now stands as a counterpoint to his own thesis in some respects. First, he seldom mentions the president and appears comfortable with substituting his role in the unequal dialogue one-for-one with his defense secretary. Of course, the crux of Cohen's theory

provided by lawyers. One can imagine a parallel statement, even more blatantly obvious in states with socialized medicine, that medical intervention is an extension of politics by other means (as any moral state government desires the best health care possible for its citizens). Similarly, the appointment of a court-ordered legal representative to a defendant unable to afford one (as required in the US) is also an extension of politics by other means derived from the nation's legal code. Regardless of the relationship between a profession and the state's government, professionals carry out their duties to the best of their ability according to the requirements, standards, and best practices of the profession. Just as few medical or legal professionals likely argue the nature of their profession is politics, neither do military officers. To continue Cohen's analogy, like the doctor's ultimate goal is to treat patients and the lawyer's is to represent the interests of a client, the US military officer's is to protect and defend the US Constitution against all enemies.

47. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 225-40.

rests on the deep, personal involvement of leaders with all aspects of the military's actions.

Secondly, Cohen claims Rumsfeld (and not the president) won his war in Iraq despite having to bend an obstinate officer corps to his will.⁴⁸ Here, Cohen seems to split hairs. None can argue that the American military defeated Saddam Hussein and deposed the Iraqi government. Nevertheless, numerous authors have documented how Rumsfeld's influence over the use of force prevented the military planning necessary to ensure early operational victories led to strategic benefits.⁴⁹

Furthermore, the secretary's abrasive and condescending personality proved unwelcome to dissenting views and prevented the unequal dialogue from taking place in a manner better suited to the development of strategy.⁵⁰ In the case of Iraq, the Bush administration actually prevented the president and his senior leaders from engaging in Cohen's unequal dialogue.

The greatest limitation of Cohen's theory is its narrow focus on political leadership during war without examining cases of relative peace. Since World War II, the American military has fought numerous conflicts,

48. Cohen, *Supreme Command*, 240.

49. Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 104-11.

50. A statement by General Tommy Franks, Commander of US Central Command, exemplified the relationship between Rumsfeld and senior military leaders. When President Bush asked his opinion during a National Security Council Meeting in October 2001, Franks responded by telling President Bush, "sir, I think exactly what my secretary thinks, what he's ever thought, what he will ever think, or whatever he thought he might think." Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 251. See also Jim Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 2004), 307. Mann describes Rumsfeld's intentional domination over the professional officer corps, and suggests the secretary intended to prevent another military officer from achieving Colin Powell's level of political influence.

yet none of these events approached the definition of war as experienced in the leadership examples provided in Cohen's analysis. Does the unequal dialogue apply to the low end of the spectrum of conflict the same way it applies to the high? Does Cohen's analysis consider all civil-military relations equal, or does a different style apply based on a conflict's character? What is the role of the commander in chief during an absence of conflict? Despite Donald Rumsfeld's apparent ineffectiveness as a strategist, perhaps his strengths as a bureaucratic manager could have produced excellent results under different circumstances.

The US chose to maintain a large, standing force after World War II, but the nation's devotion to individual liberty requires increased scrutiny of the military institution in the absence of an enemy threat. What are the appropriate roles for military and civilian leaders when the country's security needs are relatively low? Does Congress's policy role outweigh the executive's until the realities of war require otherwise? When the global hegemon engages in conflicts of choice rather than conflicts of necessity, competing political priorities more easily obfuscate the demands of strategy.

Today's civil-military dialogue takes place against the backdrop of civilian leaders with scant experience in military matters, a liberal population more afraid of an economic recession than of an attack by an enemy's military force, and a peerless but expensive national security establishment. The primary challenge facing contemporary elected officials is not Cohen's wartime leadership, but instead making difficult choices with limited resources to place the United States in a position of advantage in the event of another imminent threat to the republic.

Seven years after Cohen described the unequal dialogue, Suzanne Nielsen and Don Snider surveyed the civil-military relations landscape with the intent of updating Huntington's theory. Their compilation of essays by well-regarded political scientists examined myriad issues as

the Obama administration entered the White House and American military forces continued operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. After considering the essays, the editors distilled numerous conclusions. Many reflect realities made evident by US military operations since the Cold War; some require further examination as they fail to provide a level of detail useful to practitioners; and others once again fail to explain reality because they reject historical truths in favor of contemporary political challenges.

Despite their articulation of numerous salient points, Nielsen and Snider's assessment falls short in specific areas when considering the effect of civil-military relations on the development of strategy. Similar to previous authors, they struggle most when attempting to assess the military's side of the bargain. They opine, "Partisan behavior remains inappropriate, but military leaders do have an obligation to be effective contributors in a policymaking process that is inherently political."⁵¹

If all academe comported similar vagaries, practitioners should look elsewhere for critically considered perspectives useful in their pursuit of vocational excellence. Nielsen and Snider struggle with the notion of military politicism primarily because Huntington made the topic a major concern in his original work. To fit Huntington's concerns into their analysis, Nielsen and Snider reduced their concerns with the officer corps' political activities to partisan statements and a concern with political leaders coopting military leaders to increase their popularity.

Nielsen and Snider's version of politicism is inconsistent with Huntington's as his theory of objective control demanded complete abstention of military leaders from political thought. Nielsen and Snider concede the connection between military leaders and politics, but oppose Cohen's thesis by charging the military with responsibility for defining

51. Nielsen and Snider, *American Civil-Military*, 291.

the line between too little and too great a role in the political discourse.⁵² Whereas Huntington conceded the unlikelihood of a Constitutional change making objective control possible, Nielsen and Snider place unrealistic hope in the professional obligations of the officer corps to define adequately their proper place within the American system of government.

In contrast to their lack of realism regarding the nature of politics, Nielsen and Snider recommend a practical but flawed emphasis on developing military leaders who can govern nations as well as they can employ force on the battlefield.⁵³ This logic has also become popular within the military as the joint community struggles to reconcile their professional obligation to defend American interests while acknowledging the nature of their task to police and govern for more than a decade in Afghanistan and Iraq.

As stated earlier, military leaders must use every tool at their disposal in pursuit of their objectives. Nielsen and Snider claim today's military must prepare for conflicts where they will provide services beyond the use of force, including medical services, the provision of basic human needs, electricity generation, and engineering. Yet officers have understood the importance of these skills to their ability to accomplish the mission since well before the end of the Cold War, so why the emphasis on this topic in 2009?

Nielsen and Snider commit two basic errors by emphasizing the importance of non-traditional responsibilities as a primary concern of civil-military relations. First, their assertion falsely assumes US military operations conducted since the Cold War represent the future character of warfare and therefore merit first-order consideration by the strategist. Especially at a time of limited budgets, Middle East turmoil, and bellicose

52. Nielsen and Snider, *American Civil-Military*, 303.

53. Nielsen and Snider, *American Civil-Military*, 295-98.

actions by near-peers, emphasizing supporting functions important in the last conflict only obscures the already-difficult task faced by policy makers in preparation for the next.

Second, Nielsen and Snider apply their lesson learned from recent operations to the wrong side of the civil-military relationship. Of the two primary entities considered in civil-military relations, Nielsen and Snider chose to attribute the importance of preparing for civic duties to the military. The strategist must ask to what end such preparation benefits the nation. Has the United States now shifted to a foreign policy that seeks out entanglements in distant countries?

On the contrary, the Obama administration demonstrated little appetite for reconstruction and stabilization operations while simultaneously reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise. If anything, America's recent experiences in the Middle East have resulted in a backlash of sentiment that makes another Iraq experience unlikely in the next twenty years.⁵⁴

Perhaps instead of suggesting military leaders place increased emphasis on governing other countries, Nielsen and Snider might have concluded that America's foreign policy objectives should highlight the need for whole-of-government solutions and policy makers should develop the necessary means to provide them. Given the remote possibility of such a policy, shifting the military's focus to secondary tasks will only reduce its effectiveness to fulfill its obligation to the nation. Elected officials may charge the military with defeating an enemy or performing the role of government in a distant region, but the professional officer corps must prioritize endless preparation for the former despite their potential responsibility for the latter.

54. By Iraq experience, I mean invading with US land forces to overthrow a regime followed by counterinsurgency operations conducted during an extended occupation of a sovereign nation.

In their quest for a go-anywhere-do-anything military, Nielsen and Snider reveal their perceived lack of an imminent threat to US national security interests. This feeling of relative safety, when combined with the reality of a large national security apparatus, creates a challenge to civil-military relations in the post-Cold War era unlike any before in US history. To be sure, the world is no safer now than it has ever been from the potential of an outbreak of human conflict or the destructive acts of villains possessing substantial power to maim and destroy. Yet the American military has fought its post-Cold War conflicts absent Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity.⁵⁵

Political leaders have provided rationale, and military commanders have conducted operations; however, in no case has anything approaching the Prussian theorist's description of hatred and enmity enraged the entire population against another nation. The September 11 attacks aroused cries of revenge that fell far short of Clausewitz's standard, but even then the president effectively convinced the American people to return to normal life as soon as possible while his administration addressed the issue on their behalf.

The kind of popular sentiment Clausewitz described was obvious during the great upheavals of European society he personally witnessed. It was present on Germany's eastern front in World War II as a fanatical hatred engulfed the forces of both belligerents. Today's opinion polling that measures the percentage of Americans who support or disapprove of US military operations abroad fails to move the popular-passion barometer above zero by way of comparison.

55. Clausewitz, *On War*, 89. Clausewitz described the nature of war as a "paradoxical trinity" of three forces influencing and interacting with one another. These forces include the "blind natural force" of the population's primordial passion; the uncertainty of operations conducted between human belligerents despite probabilities inherent in their conduct; and the subordination of the war to its political rationale.

Without the passion of the people, policy makers choosing military operations conduct them with an eye toward managing associated political risks. When military leaders conduct operations to ensure the continuity of the American system of government, they clearly understand their professional obligation and operate in an environment conducive to developing politically neutral military advice. When conducting operations abroad without a clear connection to America's security, apolitical military considerations carry much less influence over policy maker decisions regarding the use of force. In the latter type of conflict, the entire command chain's tendency toward risk aversion undermines the potential for achieving desired ends and often elongates the fighting.⁵⁶

Frustrated by their undermined role as military advisors and lacking a connection between personal sacrifice and national security, many high-ranking officers in recent history sought options to correct the system responsible for their dissatisfaction.⁵⁷ Nielsen and Snider hope to address the dissonance between professional expectations and dismissive reality with a potentially necessary but certainly insufficient solution that adds the additional quality of mute to Huntington's call for blind obedience by military leaders.⁵⁸ Others attempting to solve the dilemma have offered a similarly insufficient alternative of providing better education and training programs to prepare military leaders for

56. Betz draws a sports analogy to describe this highly political war when he states, "to use a way of war designed to avoid engaging the passion of the people is akin to being a heavyweight boxer with one hand tied behind the back and boot laces tied together. Even a scrawny flyweight in such a fight has the chance of doing real damage." Betz, *Carnage and Connectivity*, 6.

57. Betz, *Carnage and Connectivity*, 96-97. Betz clearly describes the deleterious effect of lack of passion on the practical side of war fighting where people engage in violent combat, but even more so in the virtual dimension of war where belligerents espouse their ideas.

58. Nielsen and Snider, *American Civil-Military*, 303.

their role in a political realm.⁵⁹ These solutions undervalue the significance of the problem, fail to address its root cause, and lay responsibility for a remedy at the feet of the less powerful participant in the unequal dialogue.

Plentiful challenges confront American civil-military relations, but addressing them effectively requires the authority of policy makers and support of citizens. The genius of the American system of government was the framers' recognition of a tendency toward abuse of power by insufficiently restrained governments. The professional officer corps arrived in western states after ratification of the US Constitution, but the country's citizens and their representatives are as responsible for the delicate balance of power that preserves individual liberty today as they were in the eighteenth century. Like any of numerous government entities, the professional officer corps requires boundaries to exploit fully its capability and responsibility to the republic.

Yet scant literature exists from which to discern realistic policy recommendations. Absent requirements driven by a national security crisis, perhaps the academic community can best begin by framing the issue with questions that address clear omissions in the guidelines governing the political role of the professional officer corps. Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act to strengthen civilian control of the military and improve operational effectiveness of the joint force, but the contemporary issue requiring examination in the post-Cold War era lies between these two levels of analysis.

Given the realities of the country's domestic political system and a functioning joint force structure able to conduct effective operations

59. Nielsen and Snider, *American Civil-Military*, 148. Among others, Williamson Murray and Mackubin Thomas Owens have vividly described the importance they place on professional military education as a means to overcome civil-military relations' ills. Owens, *U.S. Civil-Military Relations*, 200.

across the spectrum of conflict, what agency, group, or institution can best develop long-term US strategy? The recent tradition of strategy development includes breaking apart seemingly exclusive areas of interest to develop strategies specific to them. This effort resulted in myriad national strategies for everything from homeland defense to cyberspace and winning the war on terrorism.

These exercises no doubt revealed numerous concerns and focused thought on a particular set of problems, but they also created virtually unlimited demand for limited resources. No one debates the merits of preventing a terrorist attack, but a national strategy should put each threat in prioritized context in a way that a document focusing only on one threat could never accomplish. Instead, bloated defense agencies with overlapping functions struggle under the burden of excess demands and insufficient resources in an age where technology requires decision makers to honor the potential of every threat.⁶⁰

Multiple authors have addressed the relationship between strategy and civil-military relations in the US, but few agree on concrete ideas useful in leveraging the latter to improve the former. In 2008, Risa Brooks examined the relationship between national security perspectives and power distribution in her book *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment*. She suggested the best strategic assessments result from civil-military relations characterized by coincident perspectives on national security issues and power distribution clearly favoring policy makers.⁶¹

60. Senate, *Revisiting the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces: Hearings before the Armed Services Committee*, 114th Cong., 1st sess., 2015. In Congressional testimony on 5 November 2015, retired US Air Force Lieutenant General David Deptula articulated his support for a Congressional review of national security roles and functions while lamenting bureaucratic inefficiencies and outdated perspectives driven by the structure of an incredibly large defense establishment.

61. Risa Brooks, *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

In 2011, Mackubin Thomas Owens highlighted the problematic linkage between US military operations and political objectives in his book *US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain*.⁶² He highlighted three factors resulting in poor strategy development: 1. pervasiveness of thought that reinforces Huntington's separation between the territory of military and civilian leaders on national security issues, 2. organizational culture of the services that emphasizes conducting apolitical operations instead of connecting them with political ends, and 3. marginalization of JCS advice by policy makers.⁶³

Notwithstanding the merits of Brooks' and Owens' conclusions, improving strategic decision-making requires more than a theory for what went wrong the last times. Few debate America's questionable record of making strategy since the Cold War, but fewer still agree about what steps to take to improve it. More specifically, opinions vary widely regarding the merits of Goldwater-Nichols.⁶⁴ Owens aptly describes a desired end state wherein both sides understand and operate within an improved structure that facilitates rigorous debate over key policy

62. Owens, *U.S. Civil-Military Relations*, 120.

63. Owens, *U.S. Civil-Military Relations*, 120-21.

64. Senate, *Future of Defense Reform: Hearings before the Armed Services Committee*, 114th Cong., 1st sess., 2015. During recent congressional testimony regarding the future of national security reform, former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates praised Goldwater-Nichols for the enhanced influence it provides to the CJCS and the combatant commanders relative to that exerted by the individual service secretaries. In contrast, retired US Air Force Lieutenant General David Deptula postulated the exact opposite conclusion during testimony on service roles and functions. Senate, *Revisiting the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces: Hearings before the Armed Services Committee*. Whether considering their different sides of the civil-military relationship or their opposite point of view, their contrasting opinions represent the lack of consensus on results of the structure imposed by Goldwater-Nichols.

issues.⁶⁵ Policy makers must first assess the effectiveness of previous changes before charting a course to create such a structure.

Congress should conduct an analysis to determine whether its most recent requirement for national strategy, as described in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, provides sufficient structure for strategy development.⁶⁶ The following chapters of this study examine one aspect of the required analysis: specifically, how did the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advise policy makers who opted for military force? Congress can use the answer to this question, but must also consider the usefulness of annual national security strategies produced over decades by multiple administrations.

The analysis must also include an assessment of the role of the secretary of defense and his staff in strategy formulation. Any such undertaking should begin with a review of the impetus for, and effects of, implementing the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The benefits of in-depth analysis on the topic of US strategy making are manifold, and their outcome must keep in mind an intent to institutionalize a process whereby American citizens can expect to benefit from the structure of the relationship between policy makers and the professional officer corps.

Retired Air Force Lieutenant General David Deptula's recommendation for a Congressional review of national security roles and

65. Owens, *U.S. Civil-Military Relations*, 200.

66. Catherine Dale, *National Security Strategy: Mandates, Execution to Date, and Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, R43174, US Library of Congress, 2013. Catherine Dale developed a Congressional Research Service report highlighting numerous issues regarding the content and synchronization of strategy documents, reporting, and congressional oversight requirements. Notwithstanding the importance of the issues she raises in her report, the complexity and maladroitness of the current process (represented by a lack of synchronization among government agencies, the demonstrated failure of the executive branch to meet congressional requirements, and a general lack of standardization between and within agency strategy documents) she captured reflect the requirement for better structure.

functions, important for a host of additional reasons, should follow an examination of strategy formulation or perhaps take place in parallel to avoid creating additional confusion and inefficiency.⁶⁷ Separate from creating a strategy, Congress plays a key role in determining the structure that can best take advantage of the unequal dialogue mentioned by Cohen while including all necessary stakeholders.

National Security Apparatus Expansion

The sheer size of the American national security apparatus impedes Congress's ability to assess accurately the results of its reform efforts. The role of the United States in world affairs has grown substantially, yet the breathtaking number and scope of US entities focused on national security issues exceeds anything the nation's founders could possibly have imagined. Comparing the organizations sanctioned to perform defense activities in the US Constitution with a contemporary list provides one way to visualize the influence of national security issues on domestic policy considerations. Numerous, large organizations have assumed influential positions in five primary areas: the executive and legislative branches, private sector, military, and international obligations.⁶⁸ Each of these entities represents an expansion of influence and beyond that established in the earliest form of American government.

67. Senate, *Revisiting the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces: Hearings before the Armed Services Committee*.

68. Christopher A. Preble and John Mueller, *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2014), 281-303. In Benjamin Friedman's analysis of US threat inflation, he describes six entities responsible for exaggerating the potential threat of external actors: national security agencies, Congress, the defense industry, foreign states, the news media, and the presidency. Friedman suggests each group exaggerates threats to serve its own interests. He suggests we can understand their individual efforts best as a cacophony of competing voices (where multiple organizations occasionally sing the same note) which demand a response.

Executive Branch: Beyond the Commander-in-Chief

The role of the executive branch in national defense has expanded far beyond the concept of the commander-in-chief as described in the US Constitution. The framers' design left state militias in charge of the frontier in a role perhaps most similar to that of today's Department of Homeland Security. The only national security role reserved for the executive branch was that of Commander in Chief, a title with little meaning or power until a declaration of war by Congress.

In contrast to the framers' intent, US presidents today are perhaps no more visible to the rest of the world than in their role as Commander in Chief. Absent a formal declaration of war since World War II, continuous US military operations around the globe take place under the authority of a chain of command that begins with the president. Combat operations without a declaration of war include everything from the invasion of Iraq in 2003 using conventional military forces to the killing of Osama Bin Laden and other terrorist organization leaders by US Special Forces in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency. Beyond the president's constant influence executing duties as commander in chief, creation of large national security organizations represent the greatest expansion of influence within the executive branch.

Multiple three-letter agencies have grown to enormous, influential sizes within the executive branch, including the Departments of Defense (DOD), National Intelligence (DNI), and Homeland Security (DHS). Often considered the cabinet term representing the US military, DOD has significant resources and influence beyond administration and coordination of military personnel. DOD includes enormous organizations with civilian employees who play key roles in intelligence, logistics, acquisition, program administration, testing and development, personnel, and many others.

When considering non-seasonal, full-time, permanent civilian positions in 2014, DOD personnel comported more than 36 percent of the executive branch work force. This number excludes military personnel, and yet still dwarfs the next closest agency (paradoxically, the Department of Veterans Affairs) by more than double.⁶⁹ Discussing the size of his former department, Secretary Gates referred to it as “probably the largest organization on the planet.”⁷⁰ As large as the defense department is, it is only one of many large pieces in the country’s national security system.

DNI and DHS expanded significantly in the past two decades. DNI provides oversight for 17 different intelligence agencies, including the National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency. Already a large enterprise, the department experienced dramatic growth and restructuring after the September 11 terrorist attacks.⁷¹

In 2010, the Washington Post reported approximately 854,000 people held top-secret security clearances while 1,271 government organizations joined nearly 2,000 private companies who address counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence concerns from 10,000 US locations. The Post’s article sighted numerous senior officials who struggled with the size of the intelligence bureaucracy and its lack of

69. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, *Sizing up the Executive Branch: Fiscal Year 2014*, August 2015, 7. By design of the report, these numbers under-represent reality because they exclude civilians assigned to many intelligence agencies.

70. Senate, *Future of Defense Reform: Hearings before the Armed Services Committee*.

71. According to the newspaper’s research, “the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency, for example, has gone from 7,500 employees in 2002 to 16,500 today. The budget of the National Security Agency (the agency that conducts electronic eavesdropping) doubled. Thirty-five FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces became 106. This phenomenal growth began almost as soon as the Sept. 11 attacks ended.” Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, “A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control,” *The Washington Post*, <http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control>.

accountability. The newspaper's investigators sifted through public records to report the number of top-secret clearances because they found that opening their research to include secret-level clearances increased the amount of data to an unmanageable level.

Despite the enormity of DNI, DHS is perhaps the clearest example of an extra-Constitutional department in the national security apparatus, in that its mission is to perform the task explicitly assigned to Militia forces by the framers.⁷² The DHS has one military advisor within its organizational structure, but primarily conducts its activities through civilian law-enforcement agencies such as Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The post-9/11 reorganization placed an amalgam of organizations under the DHS umbrella while also increasing emphasis on the size and influence of activities conducted by the agency's 240,000 employees—making DHS the third largest agency in the executive branch.⁷³

Beyond the influence of departments who conduct national security operations on a daily basis, the most powerful entity within the executive branch with regard to policy decisions is the National Security Council (NSC). The National Security Act of 1947 created the deliberative body as a means to disseminate and coordinate defense policy throughout agencies of the federal government. During his recent Congressional testimony on the future of national security reform, former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates accurately captured the legislation's intent by highlighting the council's nature as a coordinating

72. *The Constitution*, 6. Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution states three purposes for calling forth the militia, including repelling invasions. According to its official web site, "the Department of Homeland Security has a vital mission: to secure the nation from the many threats we face." "About DHS," US Department of Homeland Security, <http://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs>.

73. "About DHS."

body with effectiveness proportional to its principals' relationships.⁷⁴ In 2005, David Rothkopf emphasized the importance of personalities, relationships, and access in his analysis of the NSC's recent history.⁷⁵

In 2010, Richard Best's assessment described the original intent for the council as providing a body to coordinate across government functions regarding security issues in order to prevent holes in awareness that could lead to another event akin to Pearl Harbor.⁷⁶ Since creating the NSC, Congress has provided minimal oversight. Meanwhile, presidents tailor the council to suit their leadership style, including its overall size and structure, as well as the people and departments invited to participate.⁷⁷ Despite Congress's intent for the council to serve as a coordinating mechanism, its function has shifted to an advisory role and created a search for consensus Rothkopf considers detrimental to the development of effective policy.⁷⁸

74. Senate, *Future of Defense Reform: Hearings before the Armed Services Committee*.

75. David J. Rothkopf, *Running the World: The inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power*, 1st ed. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005).

76. Richard A. Best Jr., *The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment*, Congressional Research Service, RL30840, US Library of Congress, 2010.

77. Colin Clark, "National Security Council: Fractured Advice, Conflicting Messages," *Breaking Defense*, 14 January 2016, <http://breakingdefense.com/2016/01/national-security-council-fractured-advice-conflicting-messages/>. Colin Clark calls into question the effectiveness of the Obama Administration's NSC, highlighting its growth from 40 to nearly 400 members, odd relationship with executive branch departments, and recent series of questionable policy recommendations. More to the point, Clark emphasizes the disparity between the body's intended role as a coordinating mechanism and its transformation into a policy-making body.

78. "National Security Council," The White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/>. The White House's official website states that the National Security Council has advised and assisted President Obama with developing national security policy. Rothkopf, *Running the World*, 458-59.

Further, the ambiguous nature of international politics in the post-Cold War world and the massive burden on analysts due to information-age realities have resulted in an expansion of NSC staff and a reactionary, crisis-mode reality for NSC activities.⁷⁹ Rothkopf cites the council's lack of forethought he believes resulted in conflation of tactics with strategy as the nation began its war on terrorism.⁸⁰ The NSC's advisory role and increased size have resulted in an expansion of the council's influence well beyond Congress's original intent.

Legislative Branch: Beyond Raising Armies and Maintaining a Navy

Justifications for today's sprawling and influential national security apparatus abound, but no institution bears responsibility for the massive enterprise more than the US Congress. As it has from the beginning, the legislative branch maintains responsibility for taxing and providing for the nation's common defense. Perhaps no fact illustrates the significant influence of the national security apparatus better than

79. Colin Clark, "NSC Staff Too Big, Too Activist: Top Former Generals, Officials," *Breaking Media, Inc.*, 14 March 2016, <http://breakingdefense.com/2016/03/nsc-staff-too-big-too-activist-top-former-generals-officials/>. During a meeting of recently senior defense officials, former Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre suggested the NSC has actually taken on an operational role in the execution of defense policy with burdensome demands that warp the way the department functions. Hinting at just how influential the NSC has become, Hamre suggested that the next administration needs to decide if the NSC should return to its less powerful advisory role. Of course, as already described, the US Congress did not establish the body to provide advice. Its founding purpose was simply to coordinate the execution of policy among US government agencies.

80. Suggesting the NSC's shift in function to an advisory role has reduced the quality of advice provided to US presidents, Rothkopf warns "we need to avoid the bias toward consensus, because it leads directly to mistakes." Rothkopf, *Running the World*, 466.

the large portion of the federal budget dedicated to national defense—easily the largest percentage of discretionary spending.⁸¹

Of course, the nation's defense budget does more than simply maintain the US Navy and sporadically raise armies of necessity. Contemporary defense expenditures include provisions for the Defense Department and CJCS staffs, three service branches, Special Operations Command, numerous intelligence and logistics organizations, DHS, the Coast Guard, and the capabilities and personnel resident in the nation's guard and reserve forces. Beyond the military members of these organizations, a significant portion of the budget funds the enormous civilian workforce of defense contractors and government service employees. These vast funding outlays clearly exceed anything the framers could have imagined both in their relative size within the overall budget and in the massive array of personnel and equipment constantly funded and employed despite seventy years without a war declaration.

In addition to its expanded role in funding national security initiatives, Congress has also expanded the nation's propensity to engage in military conflicts by decoupling the use of military force from a requirement to declare war. Given the numerous conflicts in American history and relatively few declarations of war, some conclude Congress has ceded its war-declaring power to the executive branch. On the contrary, Congress's demonstration of willingness to fund US military operations absent the declaration of war, and tacit or statutory approval of presidents' decisions to use military forces without asking permission, reflects a clear expansion of government power beyond Constitutional limitations. Different from acts of commission such as expanded funding

81. Congressional Budget Office, "Historical Budget Data: January 2016," Budget and Economic Data, https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget_economic_data#2. Although dwarfed by non-discretionary spending, discretionary defense-spending outlays have roughly equaled the total of all other categories of discretionary outlays since 1992.

or statutory authority, Congress's unwillingness to regulate the use of military force given its Constitutional obligation increases the influence of the national security apparatus through an act of omission.⁸²

The War Powers Act of 1973 reflected Congress's America-centric perception regarding US military operations in foreign countries as an activity other than war. Congress has encouraged the executive to interpret broadly presidential authorities over foreign policy and to conflate them with expanded activities undertaken by the Commander in Chief. War and peace remain extensions of politics, but under the Constitution, the US president is not the only policy maker. Congress opting for a diminished role in decisions to use force removes one check on power in the framers' system of checks and balances, and further incentivizes the growth of a defense apparatus to address an endless list of foreign policy challenges.

Private Sector: Beyond Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness

Many of the unresolved questions regarding America's foreign affairs stem from the infant nation's unique geography, allowing the framers to prioritize domestic policy to the near exclusion of foreign policy considerations. The unquestioned perspective of war as an aberration to avoid in the future, while establishing and expecting the norm of peace precluded a foreign policy debate. The liberated Americans perceived no enemy or goal justifying the establishment and sustainment of an apparatus suitable to threaten force in pursuit of foreign policy

82. Amy Schafer describes the connection between Congress's constitutional role and national defense when she writes "the compartmentalization of the military as a separate entity from the rest of society. As this civil-military divide grows, we as a nation have lowered the threshold for the use of military force." Amy Schafer, "Ignoring War Authorization Widens the Civil-Military Divide," *The National Interest*, 25 January 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/ignoring-war-authorization-widens-the-civil-military-divide-15003>.

objectives. The idealistic and liberty-driven founders minimized defense expenditures to provide moderate security on the frontier and protection of trans-Atlantic trade.

Perhaps the framers focused on the correct priority as the nation's largest wartime death totals resulted from the grim realities of the American Civil War less than a century later. Generally, Americans still prioritize domestic concerns over considerations of foreign policy, but multiple trends have exposed the lack of Constitutional guidance and provide fertile ground for increased awareness of potential threats emanating from beyond the nation's borders.

First, technological advances in weaponry have diminished geography's provision of national security. Powerful rocket motors, precise guidance systems, and incredibly destructive warheads allow equipped enemies to threaten substantial population centers with the push of a button. America's use of the earliest atomic bombs in World War II, and the subsequent arms race with the Soviet Union, created an inescapable awareness of the proximity of devastation and death within the American psyche that resulted in a continuous and wholly unfruitful quest for assurance of security. Even the dissolution of the Soviet Union failed to comfort wary citizens as technology proliferation has increased the potential of groups operating outside international norms to employ these weapons of mass destruction.

Second, one result of the information age is increased awareness of people's nefarious actions. The information age allows the vivid portrayal of acts of violence and killing that might have previously gone unnoticed by a far larger portion of the world's population. Cheap recording and viewing devices, demands of the 24-hour news cycle, and instant network access to internet users around the globe have reduced the perceived separation between actions of others and their effect on the individual. Terrorist groups staging gruesome acts of violence have capitalized on information-age realities to spread their message of fear,

but US urbanization may have caused an even larger effect as local news channels regularly display images of violence taking place in close proximity to viewers. The information age has decreased American citizens' perception of security by providing unavoidable reminders of human depravity and the general lack of personal security available in the world's wealthiest nation.

The third trend causing citizens to question the lack of Constitutional guidance over foreign policy is globalization. In the 1990s, the American economy rapidly expanded after a Cold War victory enhanced the nation's freedom of action and global influence. Buoyed by information-age technologies, private companies sought out new opportunities abroad. International regimes like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations reinforced the notion of interconnectedness. Global concern over topics ranging from pollution and health issues to climate change and trade agreements created greater awareness of America's roles and responsibilities within the community of nations. Increasingly, American citizens perceive a connection between domestic realities and international relations.

The final trend germane to the discussion of a lack of foreign policy guidance in the Constitution is America's abrupt assumption of a leading role within the international community. The nation's relative influence was growing prior to World War II, but none could question US economic preeminence after the scourge of war mobilized the American economy while disproportionately depleting the populations, resources, and prestige of the other world powers. Given their vastly dissimilar position, the men responsible for drafting the nation's founding document could not possibly have foreseen the emergence of a nuclear-armed, global superpower with a leadership role in world affairs.

As the country assumed its new role, foreign policy questions gained higher priority among policy makers. Citizens accustomed to retreating into the security of American idealism after the war found

themselves party to foreign conflicts fought under the banner of individual liberty. Fear caused by the first two trends listed above may have driven some change in the American system, but obligations resulting from the final two have caused citizens to seek some measure of control over the activities of other nations.

The preceding trend analysis highlights the relationship between America's evolving foreign policy and Thucydides' description of motivations for war. The fear of foreign threats has combined with a proliferation of American interests to produce a perspective unlike that of early American history. Instead of seeking to avoid foreign entanglements, US political leaders feel compelled to solve them. One must look no further than America's recent interventions in Libya and Syria to see the cycle continue.

With increasing sunk costs from these conflicts, Thucydides' final motivator gains greater influence as citizens motivated by the honor of lost loved ones or expended treasure seek a tangible benefit. The ideology of policy makers plays a greater role in foreign policy than it does in domestic politics due to the lack of restraints provided over the former in the Constitution's guidance. In contrast to the numerous checks and balances inherent in the US system regarding the relationship between citizens and their government, Constitutional ambiguity and popular anxiety provide little resistance to interest groups clamoring for intervention.

Whereas the US Congress bears greatest responsibility for the country's large national security apparatus, interest groups with ties to defense exert tremendous influence over the decisions of policy makers. The military-industrial complex lamented by Eisenhower more than half a century ago makes its profits from domestic and international expenditures on weapons.⁸³ This fact by itself has changed little since

83. Craig, *Destroying the Village*, 118.

before the Greeks armed their hoplites with spears, but the exorbitant cost of modern weapons systems carries with it a proportionally extensive degree of influence over policy decisions.

As delivery of Lockheed Martin's F-35s began in earnest in 2015, the most expensive weapons system in world history provides a case-in-point. Using a method that has become the norm for expensive programs, managers broadly distributed the sub-system supply chain to insulate the project from public scrutiny. Additionally, contractors continue to play a large role in ongoing operations in diverse areas ranging from logistics to private security firms. The ever-growing gray area between combatants and non-combatants has created an incentive for these firms to develop marketable services suitable to the pressing foreign policy conundrums of the day. The long list of defense-oriented private entities includes think tanks, media organizations, and special interest groups motivated by foreign organizations and governments.

Whether considering increasingly globalized interests or the political influence of security-oriented organizations, America's system of government of, by, and for the people leverages fear as justification for the expensive burden of a large security apparatus. As candidates debated prospective policies in the lead up to the 2016 presidential election, myriad references to extremist organizations, terror groups, nuclear-armed rogue nations, and bellicose near-peers exemplify the threats touted to emphasize a requirement for vast military strength.

Notwithstanding the potential for an attack on the US, policy makers must convince the polity of two things: 1. that the threat affects them directly, and 2. that they have a solution to reduce the threat. In the information age, demonstrating the former has become a relatively simple task. Using the equation $S_T = S_L^2 + S_D/2 + \sqrt{S_F}$ as an approximation of the average citizen's interest in security issues, any change in the perception of local security has a disproportionately large effect on the population's willingness to sacrifice personal freedoms and prosperity in

exchange for the perception of reduced risk.⁸⁴ Unfortunately, reductionist and familiar solutions to previous security threats often substitute for strategic thought regarding the latter requirement.

Specifically because of the US military's popularity as an effective and apolitical institution, two lines of thought converge to result in the recommendation for increased military strength. First, when a foreign political challenge arises for which there exists no organic solution within the US government, national leaders have become accustomed to assigning responsibility to the military. Second, the contemporary trend of non-state actors conducting criminal activity, including cybercrime and terrorism, has challenged the American system because these activities do not fit neatly into a category assignable to one government institution.

The convergence of these two trends results in calls for the professional officer corps to diversify its skill set and prepare for a panoply of missions more akin to governing than to conducting combat operations. To address myriad threats at the low end of the spectrum of

84. This equation's purpose is not mathematical precision. Instead, it highlights US citizens' traditional lack of concern over foreign threats that have not demonstrated the ability to affect their lives. In the equation $ST = sL^2 + sD/2 + \sqrt{sF}$, the dependent variable ST represents an individual's total perception of threats to their security. The independent variables sL, sD, and sF represent an individual's local, domestic, and foreign perceptions threats to their security, respectively. Traditional examples of security concerns affecting sL include local crime rates, responsiveness and effectiveness of local police forces, degree of confidence in neighborhood security measures, etc. Traditional examples of security concerns affecting sD include trust and confidence in the state and federal legal system, including the morality of the law and the ability of state and federal institutions to uphold it. Finally, sF includes the perception of foreign threats to the country's way of life, including the credibility of hostile foreign actors and confidence in US institutions to defend against them. In the information age, the interconnected globe makes possible large changes in the variable sF. When people perceive foreign entities have the ability to affect their local security (sL), drastic changes in ST empower the influence of security firms.

conflict, military leaders must constantly leverage the infinite skills and technologies required to find, track, exploit, and assess a vast and growing network of actors around the globe. US interest groups who profit from the production of national security goods and services flourish in a market with nearly unlimited potential.

US Military: Beyond Defending the Constitution

The American military services recruit and retain personnel by advertising their role in the provision of national security for the benefit of the country. Individual rationale for serving varies, but often includes elements of patriotism, personal satisfaction (including assigned responsibilities, compensation, and organizational pride), and professional aspirations (e.g. a path to building skills and experience useful in future endeavors). Each branch of service encourages a unique perspective, but all members share common, foundational aspects of US military service. These shared facets include a unique legal system as described by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a pay scale based on rank and longevity of service, and an oath sworn to protect the US Constitution from domestic and foreign enemies.

Contemporary security challenges have called into question the definition of enemy and literal interpretation of defending the Constitution. Recent testimony of senior military officials highlighting the threat presented by unrestrained national debt underscores the importance of interpretation when considering the military's role. Historically, militaries existed to prevent overthrow of a nation's government as represented by its king or capitol city. In a system established to prevent abuse of power and protect its citizens' individual liberties, defending the Constitution implies a role transcending its historical roots.

With humble beginnings and several chapters in its existence wherein the ideals of the society it served demanded its exclusion from

national power, the global influence of the US military dwarfs that of any other government institution. Whether considering the millions who serve in Active Duty, Reserve, or National Guard capacities, the disproportionate size of combatant-command forces compared to State Department entities, the expansion of staffs and service branches following World War II, or simply relative budget share, the US military's role in foreign policy has expanded well beyond anything envisioned by the nation's founders. That domestic pressure did not demand virtual elimination of US military influence following World War II or the Cold War begs examination of altered national priorities that place fear of domestic government oppression below fear of attack from a foreign enemy.

Given the ability of modern technology to reduce the security provided by geographic separation, US foreign policy challenges have evolved to approximate more closely those of Europe's nineteenth century land powers than those of America's progenitors across the English Channel. As America's security challenges have evolved, so too must the country's perspective on leveraging military force as the one-size-fits-all solution. The evolution of one more aspect of America's national security apparatus deserves attention here due to its potential to influence significantly the decision-making calculus of the nation's political leaders.

International Obligations: Beyond Avoiding Foreign Entanglements

One stark difference between the demands on America's national security apparatus in the twenty-first century and those placed on it more than two-hundred years ago results from responsibilities levied by remnants of past activities. Results of military actions have generated multiple, standing requirements for military power not present immediately following the end of British tyranny in America. A hostile relationship with the Soviet Union after World War II resulted in the

formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its requirement that member nations consider an attack on one as an attack on all. By entering into this treaty, United States leaders chose to bear responsibility for the security concerns of all NATO members. The requirement remained even after the Cold War's end.

Additionally, an incomplete military conflict in Korea resulted in a standing requirement to defend South Korea. Finally, national commitment to the effectiveness and credibility of the United Nations has resulted in multiple instances of American military forces taking part in operations around the globe. Beyond these three primary examples, US leaders have entered into bilateral defense relationships with a multitude of states for reasons ranging from access (e.g. Kuwait) to balance of power (e.g. Japan).

Myriad security arrangements between the US and a multitude of foreign powers require the credibility of US forces to produce the desired effect of altering the strategic calculus of other states. Notwithstanding the immediate benefits offered by these agreements regarding their ability to restrain state behavior, the resultant requirement of credible military power continuously prepared to respond places at risk the ideals and principles championed by the nation's founders.

Furthermore, combat operations conducted against foreign powers by America's military cause entities excluded from American security agreements to balance against a potential, future act of force. The self-perpetuating cycle only continues with greater requirements and increased stakes as non-participatory regimes seek weapons of mass destruction to balance against those allied with the most powerful global hegemon in world history. Recent US interventions against states opting to eliminate their weapons of mass destruction (specifically, Libya and

Syria) demonstrate the lack of a compelling incentive for other regimes to do so.⁸⁵

Foreign Policy Lenses

Recent US interventions in Libya and Syria represent policy decisions resulting in applications of US military force under examination in this research. Specifically, how did US military senior leaders advise President Obama regarding the decision to use force under these circumstances? In situations where enemy forces represent an existential threat to the United States, the purpose for examining military advice necessarily becomes one of evaluating its ability to repel an attack or defeat an aggressor. Of course, the Obama administration did not support an air campaign against the Libyan government because the regime represented a threat to the US. Quite the opposite was true, considering Libya had recently opted to destroy or remove its weapons of mass destruction. The nature of the decision to invade instead related to an evaluation of the regime's governance.

The coalition of countries who took part in the operation resolved that Gadhafi's government had failed at its responsibility to govern its own people, and that the nature of the failure justified use of military force to prevent further abuses of power. The coalition therefore framed the issue as a humanitarian effort on behalf of the Libyan people against an oppressive regime. Unfortunately, as so often happens, pressing issues today can produce decisions with disastrous consequences tomorrow. Since the coalition's departure, the nation has descended into chaos characterized by the lack of a viable government, a fractured society in the midst of civil war, and geography ripe for exploitation by

85. Libya and Syria both descended into chaos immediately following their removal of weapons of mass destruction.

violent extremist organizations. Syria's ongoing civil war provides a remarkably similar example.

As America continues to struggle with the contentious decision to invade Iraq in 2003, further uses of military force in Libya and Syria exemplify the difficulty of holding US political leaders accountable for foreign policy decisions. After running for office on a platform that disparaged the injustice of US military operations in Iraq, President Obama opted for military force in another Middle East country in 2011. In 2012, the American people re-elected him to the presidency. Similar to the personal security equation described earlier, myriad campaign strategists have described the primacy of domestic issues (in particular, the US economy) over matters of foreign policy.

In the absence of short-term and obvious consequences, the manifest difficulty of assessing present foreign policy choices using future costs leaves open the possibility of a better future. No reasonable person stipulates an absence of oppressive tactics employed by the Gadhafi regime, but the widespread destruction and human suffering resulting from his ouster hardly testify to the success of Operation Odyssey Dawn on behalf of the nation's people. As policy makers and theorists concern themselves with the latent potential of ungoverned spaces to spawn acts of terrorism, Libya now represents a greater threat to US security interests than it did five years earlier.

Beyond their own ideology and perspective, American political leaders have the benefit of advisors and theorists as aids in their decision-making endeavors. Later chapters examine one source of policy maker advice from the CJCS, but international relations theory provides the context within which leaders assess foreign policy options. The next section of this chapter provides an overview of major international relations theories and their implications for US foreign policy. The chapter concludes with an examination of Just War Theory and its increasing influence on the international community of states.

Realism

Realist theory emphasizes the importance of the international system's structure and the primacy of the state within it. Given the lack of hierarchical order within the international system, realists deduce a self-help system in which self-interested actors pursue their objectives. Acknowledging the existence of minor actors, realists highlight nation-states as the primary actors within the system. With a rich history including the writings of Thucydides and Sun Tzu, realist theory describes the behavior of states by emphasizing their interest in power and suggesting that states act to balance the power of other states within the anarchic system.

Realist Kenneth Waltz wrote his *Theory of International Politics* in 1979, describing seven different components of national power relevant to states within the self-help system.⁸⁶ Less than ten years later, Stephen Walt emphasized the role of fear in state decision-making when he theorized that states balance not only based on an assessment of power, but instead based on their perception of the threat presented by other states in the system.⁸⁷

For realists, self-interest of the state best explains US foreign policy since the Cold War. When the US arrived as a hegemonic power after the fall of the Soviet Union, a significant shift in the balance of power (or threat) occurred that resulted in numerous regional and local conflicts around the globe. The US role transitioned from balancing

86. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1st ed. (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 131. These components include size of population, territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence.

87. Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 21-26. In addition to power, Walt subdivided the concept of threat into components of geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions.

against the Soviet Union and their communist allies to consolidating gains and sustaining the system in which America emerged as the most powerful nation.

For realists, the expenditure of significant resources to fight conflicts in other regions represents the reality of human propensity toward hubris as described in Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian Wars and the folly of poor choices by US policy makers. Regarding the former, US actions resemble those of fifth-century Athens and exemplify how unchecked power seeks to justify its actions while weaker nations suffer the consequences. The latter assessment regards the balance-of-power theory's contention that other nations will attempt to counter America's dominance. Instead of ushering in a new era of global peace, the end of the Cold War ushered in an era of US military actions that will result in other states seeking means and ways to limit US power.

Liberalism

In contrast to realists' concern with an anarchic international system and the primacy of states, liberalism underscores the central role of the individual. Whereas realist theory contends all states are equal regarding their function (although certainly not their relative power) within the international system, liberalist theory considers state behavior a variable function with individual actors exerting influence. Rooted in philosophical perspectives born during Europe's Age of Enlightenment, John Locke and Immanuel Kant provided many of liberalism's theoretical underpinnings. Both described the importance of individual liberty and democratic governance.

The progenitor of *Democratic Peace Theory*, liberalism's emphasis on the moral sovereignty of individuals led to Kant's hypothetical description of a permanent peace built on the diminished importance of borders and a common interest in preventing conflict and maintaining international trade relations. Liberalist concern for individual rights

provides the philosophical foundation for values espoused in international law and used to justify action by the international community. Despite evidence suggesting the unlikelihood of violence between democratic states, the world wars and failure of interwar institutions to maintain international peace represent significant setbacks for the theory.

Liberalism views the end of the Cold War as one more step on the path to Kant's permanent peace as individual liberty associated with western democracies triumphed over the Soviet Union's assault on personal freedoms following the Bolshevik Revolution. Furthermore, liberalists assert the importance of international institutions and their protection of individual rights. Ergo, the United Nations plays a key role in international governance as it represents another step toward a federation of states concerned with the common interest of maintaining peace for the benefit of all.

Liberalism views the post-Cold War era from a conflicted viewpoint. On the one hand, they encourage the removal of oppressive regimes and the right of individuals to self-governance. In reality however, the politics of states around the globe represent a much more nuanced spectrum of governance than the polar opposites of perfect liberty and relentless oppression. Liberalists might welcome the grass-roots movement of the Arab Spring and vilify China's strong central government, yet grass roots movements do not always result in democracy and individuals do not always seek out governments aligned with Enlightenment philosophy. Based largely on this intellectual impasse, liberalists can both celebrate the international intent to remove oppressive men like Slobodan Milosevic or Saddam Hussein while also lamenting the results of forceful regime change based on an unrealistic hope that it will inevitably lead to the birth of a new democracy.

Constructivism

Whereas realism focuses on the structure of the international relations system and liberalism emphasizes the influence and preeminence of individuals, constructivism includes some elements of each as it defines international relations as a human construct resulting from social interactions between societies and institutions. The theory does not reject the importance of realist's structure, but instead argues that the structure, and state behavior within it, can change since both are human constructs. Constructivists also join liberalists in emphasizing the importance of human influence within international relations, but focus on the dynamics of societal interactions rather than the primacy of individual liberty.

Constructivism's roots lie in the social sciences and lead to a theory that scientific inquiry can explain human behavior and rational decisions can alter the reality of human interaction, including the nature of international relations. Constructivist emphasis on the role of sociology and history provides explanatory power over changes and realities in inter-state relations resulting from catalysts other than power and fear as societies serve as both dependent and independent variables in defining the international system.

For constructivists, post-Cold War conflicts result from the dynamics and limitations of human discourse. Instead of focusing on America's desire to sustain its power as the global hegemon in an anarchic system, constructivists instead examine the norms and history of societies, international organizations, and cultures to explain state behavior. Counter to the liberalist view that the Arab Spring represents a movement of individuals seeking self-governance; constructivists might argue it resulted from a clash of perspectives and expectations between significant portions of populations in Middle East countries and their governments. Whereas realists might see Iranian actions in the region as evidence of their intent to gain state power in the vacuum left behind by

weakened neighbors, constructivists might argue Iran conducts its foreign policy based on its perspective of history and pervading cultural or religious beliefs.

Why Does Theory Matter?

Different versions of numerous theories inform policy makers struggling with foreign policy challenges. Realism, liberalism, and constructivism do not represent the entirety of international relations theory, nor do the three labels or the brief descriptions provided above substitute for significant nuances or sub-theories under each of them. Classical and modern versions of the three theories mentioned here, Neo-conservatism's focus on leveraging power to spread American ideals, Marxism's interest in economics and class warfare, and numerous others provide just a few of the theories available to explain international relations.

Although they are only theories, adherence to them by politically influential advisors can significantly alter the course of history. National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) provides a clear example, as a study group led by Paul Nitze in 1950 emphasized the role of power and fear far above any other while asserting the intentions of the Soviet Union after its recent acquisition of the atomic bomb. The report caused US policy makers to chart a course for the expansion of military power, as containment of communism became the defining aspect of US foreign policy for decades.⁸⁸ Similar to results of the neo-conservative

88. In their first page of analysis, the architects of NSC 68 claimed "the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency." National Security Council Executive Secretary, *United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*, 14 April 1950, NSC 68, 4.

perspective maintained by George W. Bush's inner circle, NSC-68 demonstrates the critical role of theory in the hands of politically powerful leaders.

Just War Theory

State policy makers weighing the decision to enter into conflict do so within the context of international, contemporary thought regarding war's proper role. Specific to the study of human conflict, Just War Theory encompasses the history of justifications made for war. As asserted by James G. Murphy, the term theory does not adequately describe this body of literature since there is no accepted and comprehensive theory of just war. Murphy offers the term tradition instead of theory. Societies have provided their justifications for war for as long as war has existed. The nature of the international system affects rationale provided, although little research exists purporting to recommend specific international structures best suited to protecting the peace. Democratic Peace Theory approaches this notion, but places impetus for causation on the nature of state governments instead of the nature of the international system of states.

Despite assertions that it should expand to include the justice of post-war activities, Just War research to date focuses on the separate but related ideas of *jus ad bellum* (justification for war) and *jus in bello* (justice in war's conduct) to describe justice associated with the unique circumstance of war. While *jus ad bellum* refers to considerations shaping a nation's decision to enter into war, *jus in bello* addresses actions of the belligerents. Notwithstanding the importance of *jus in bello*, the portion of Just War Theory most applicable to this research emanates from *jus ad bellum* considerations.

International institutions play an increasingly significant role in the relations between states due to the efforts of national leaders to

support and empower them. Despite the apparent failure of the League of Nations after World War I, enhanced authorities of the United Nations after World War II have provided a forum for the community of nations to influence state activities. Myriad organizations such as the International Court of Justice, World Trade Organization, and World Bank, provide fora that establish and maintain norms used by individuals, organizations, and societies conducting activities across state borders. Few dispute the value of international institutions, but world leaders have regularly voiced concerns regarding the extent of their authority and jurisdiction.

In 2011, Luke Glanville dispelled the myth that recent interventions by international military forces set a new precedent of violating the rights of state governments. In his book *Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect*, Glanville examines the concept of state sovereignty and its ongoing transition from right to responsibility since the Treaty of Westphalia. He consistently supports international intervention when state governments fail to meet basic responsibilities.

Nevertheless, Glanville's analysis also documents the post-Cold War expansion of conditions justifying intervention and the simultaneous increase in UN resolutions authorizing action.⁸⁹ States increasingly take the position that the international community has a responsibility to protect people when their state governments do not. Citing the results of the 2005 World Summit, Glanville highlights the expansion of conditions requiring action to include war crimes, previously prohibited crimes under international humanitarian laws, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.⁹⁰ Most recently, the 2011 Libya resolution was the first time the UN Security Council has authorized use of force for the

89. Luke Glanville, *Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 181.

90. Glanville, *Sovereignty and the Responsibility*, 198.

protection of citizens without the consent of their functioning state government.⁹¹

The decision to invade Libya represents another step on the journey away from the international community's reaction to World War II. As nations recovered from the global crisis of the early twentieth century, world leaders initially sought to create international safeguards against the potential for a similar crisis in the future. As evidenced by the creation of the United Nations and conduct of the Nuremberg Trials, the allies demonstrated desire to establish and maintain justice within the international system of states. As allies evolved into enemies shortly after the war, an ideological confrontation between two world powers slowed the development of international institutions.

The imminent potential of a cataclysmic nuclear exchange forced rapid adjustment to a bipolar world order best characterized as an anxiety-driven stalemate for the next forty years. As the threat of annihilation withdrew following the collapse of the Soviet Union, attention once again shifted to the relationship between the international community and rights of sovereign, independent states to govern. In its new role as global hegemon, America used its influential position to champion its heritage by emphasizing the importance of holding states accountable for protecting the individual liberty of their citizens. The international community sent a strong signal in Libya by demonstrating its perceived responsibility to protect individuals when their state government does not.

Unfortunately, military interventions to remove oppressive regimes have proven limited in their ability to improve conditions of citizens even when they are successful. In his book *Just and Unjust Wars*, Michael Walzer examines moral considerations regarding different types of military operations upon which states can embark. Influenced by not

91. Glanville, *Sovereignty and the Responsibility*, 216.

only the horrors of World War II, but also the frustrations of the US experience in Vietnam, Walzer draws a clear line between wars of self-defense and those fought as the aggressor when he argues that people condemn conflicts as immoral when soldiers no longer volunteer to fight them.⁹² Walzer further distinguishes between morally acceptable pre-emptive wars as wars of self-defense and immoral preventive wars as aggression foisted on citizens by political leaders interested in justifying their political ambitions.⁹³

Walzer does not condemn all military intervention other than self-defense, however. He allows for the morality of humanitarian intervention as a special case when state government's commit acts "that shock the moral conscience of mankind."⁹⁴ As demonstrated recently by international efforts in Somalia and Libya, intervention does not necessarily result in improving human rights conditions of the country's citizens, even if it does remove an oppressive regime from power. This very dilemma has resulted in recent contentions that Just War Theory must expand to incorporate study of justice in post-war activities.

Perhaps a sense of realism prevents just war theory from including examination of post-conflict justice. As Nicias so aptly described in the 5th Century BC, nations who invade other nations should only expect hostility if they do not become masters of lands they invade.⁹⁵ Realism

92. Walzer further regards every other kind of conflict beyond one conducted for self-defense of rights as illegal and immoral, including "preventive wars, commercial wars, wars of expansion and conquest, religious crusades, revolutionary wars, military interventions." Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 4th ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 29, 72. Walzer concludes people subjected to these types of warfare by an attacker are justified in resisting forcefully.

93. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 76-85.

94. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 107.

95. Nicias described his belief that nations attempting to introduce a new government in a foreign land by means of force "should be prepared to become master of the country...or failing in this to find everything hostile

allows three, unappealing possibilities for post-conflict interventions: withdrawal, occupation, or nation building. Given its focus on morality, just war theory omits withdrawal as an option due to the obligation for post-conflict society incurred by conducting the intervention in the first place. Occupation is equally unattractive given its fundamental conflict with broader American ideals of self-determination and individual liberty.

In his book, *Armed Humanitarians: the Rise of the Nation Builders*, Nathan Hodge documents the massive effort to engage in the third of the three options in Iraq and Afghanistan. Describing nation building as armed social work, Hodge highlights numerous risks associated with the transition, including personal death or injury of civilians, priority reduction of domestic agenda items, diminished US prestige, seemingly unlimited funding requirements, decreased national security readiness, personnel shortages, and increased potential for use of military force domestically.⁹⁶

The biggest risk of committing to a nation-building strategy is the lack of promise it holds for providing a long-term solution. Hodge clearly highlights the paradoxical relationship between level of investment and level of success in the nation-building enterprise.⁹⁷ Regardless of the investment or the sincerity of the investor, building an effective government based on democratic ideals requires significant time. Just War Theory purports to provide a compelling case for intervention, but it does so without any feasible method to forecast post-intervention conditions.

Recent Just War theorists contend the peace sought after the conflict provides moral justification for war's conduct. In his book *War's*

to [them].” Thucydides, Strassler, and Crawley, *The Landmark Thucydides*, 375.

96. Nathan Hodge, *Armed Humanitarians: The Rise of the Nation Builders*, 1st U.S. ed. (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011), 17, 285-303.

97. Hodge, *Armed Humanitarians*, 138-40.

Ends, James Murphy argues twentieth-century theorists focused too narrowly on self-defense as the only just rationale for war. Murphy suggests self-defense falls within broader justification for war's conduct that concerns itself primarily with the ends of peace.⁹⁸ He goes on to describe six considerations for determining a war's justice and places them in order of consideration.⁹⁹ Murphy highlights the conflict of just war theory with the realist perspective, but also suggests the potential to develop further the theory of just war in a measured manner better suited to account for realities of the current international political system. For Murphy, the nature of contemporary international politics limits the ability of states to enter into an era characterized by an empowered authority governing international behavior to preserve the good of peace.¹⁰⁰

For the purposes of this research, Murphy makes two points worthy of consideration. First, he describes his second-to-last criterion for just war as last resort. More specifically, he enhances the concept's clarity and includes it in the justification for war. Like Colin Powell, Murphy describes the last-resort criterion as a practical assessment that ensures all other options have been considered or attempted before arriving at a place where the only solution is war. Unlike the Powell Doctrine, Murphy describes moral obligations that may necessitate the use of force.¹⁰¹ Showing deference to his political leaders, Powell remained clear of this assessment and simply asked whether the political objective is important, clear, and understood.

98. James G. Murphy, *War's Ends: Human Rights, International Order, and the Ethics of Peace* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 17.

99. Murphy lists these criteria as follows: 1. good authority, 2. just cause, 3. intention, 4. succeeding, 5. last resort, and 6. proportionality. Murphy, *War's Ends*.

100. Murphy, *War's Ends*, 22.

101. Murphy, *War's Ends*, 175-76.

Second, Murphy echoes Glanville's contention of the progressive nature of Just War Theory. Both authors share the constructivist perspective that rational consideration can shape the structure of the international system to better protect against the eventuality of war and the potential for actors to violate basic rights of individuals within it. Such a contention appears hopeful, but suffers from lack of evidence during the contemporary period of instability wherein chaotic civil wars engulf multiple states, nations threaten other nations with annihilation, and violent extremist organizations demonstrate increased capacity to maim and kill indiscriminately.

Both Murphy and Glanville acknowledge post-Cold War changes in the international system's concept of intervention based more on the willingness of states to intervene than on changes in people's perception of morality. Whether enabled by altered state priorities after the Cold War or the cautious movement away from rigid ideas of sovereignty reinforced by the Nuremberg Trials, states have demonstrated increasing willingness to intervene in domestic affairs of other states in the past three decades.¹⁰²

In contrast to the US founders' convictions regarding the distribution of power and prohibition against standing military forces, Murphy and Glanville seem to yearn for a time when an empowered international body leverages military force to protect human rights. As elected officials debate the merits of filling a role as policers of the world, limited budgets and lack of realist interests provide little impetus for assuming the function. Conversely, ceding responsibility to other entities also carries with it the necessary result of reduced US influence. American interventions since the Cold War have sent clear messages to the community of nations. Given the mixed record of Murphy's goods of

102. Murphy, *War's Ends*, 74. Murphy suggests the priority afforded to a state's right to sovereignty from 1945-1990 made international war a greater act of crime than the conduct of genocide.

peace obtained from these actions, doubtless many view these interventions with less optimism than the hopefulness of Just War Theory's advocates. The theory provides necessary justification for intervention in the domestic affairs of states, but insufficient evidence that military intervention is a moral alternative.

Summary

For contemporary theorists and practitioners convinced of their solutions' ability to overcome historic characteristics of the human condition, President Washington's admonition to avoid the abyss of foreign commitments finds no audience. In the US Constitution, the nation's founders provided a framework on which future generations could build to meet the demands of representative government, but the inspiration for their ideas originated from an overwhelming desire to prevent tyranny. More than 200 years later the Constitution still provides the foundation for US government, but few question the constitutionality of a national security apparatus far exceeding that prescribed by the document.

Instead, proponents leverage the tyranny of fear to justify the burden of enormous defense spending despite the absence of declared war since the conclusion of World War II. As demonstrated repeatedly at the beginning of the twenty-first century, deeming the nation's security apparatus effective requires more than the absence of war or the successful conclusion of military operations. American strategists must link ways and means to the ends of policy in support and defense of the Constitution. This study examines relative influence of the professional officer corps to illuminate the military's influence on decisions to pursue foreign policy ends using the means of force.

This chapter provides background information and perspectives relevant to examining the chairman's role as principal military advisor. Relationships between the various agencies and institutions of the US

national security establishment affect the activities of those who work within it. Policy makers and their representatives struggle for influence as they fight for individual and organizational interests while considering the interplay of domestic and international affairs. As described above, the incredibly large and influential military-industrial complex has grown beyond its roots as a break-glass-in-case-of-emergency tool into a constant representation of America to the rest of the world.

A simplistic assessment might suggest that weapons and geopolitics have evolved, so America's system of government must also evolve. Yet the evolution of the national security apparatus has not taken place within a systematic approach to reconcile the nation's founding principles with contemporary realities. Instead of the relatively insulated environment in which the nation's founders debated principles, contemporary preoccupation with weapons of mass destruction and global terrorist organizations substitutes fear as the primary change driver. To gain better perspective over numerous changes that have resulted in a system unrecognizable to its founders, policy makers should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the national security establishment and its role in the American form of government.

Any review of US defense policy must include analysis of the relationship between senior military officers and elected decision-makers. Just as they did in 1787, policy makers must go beyond Huntington's sterile lanes of responsibility to determine the system and structure best equipped to support and defend the Constitution in the twenty-first century and beyond. Recent analysis blaming current or retired military officers for ineffective civil-military relations addresses only a symptom of the broader issue.¹⁰³

103. Military leaders did not fund a standing army or create extra-Constitutional organizations. These departures from Constitutional guidance require policy makers to provide the strategic context within which citizens and their military act.

The professional officer corps' arrival as a fixture in state governments represents a necessary reaction to the evolution of technology requiring significant technical expertise to wage war. As crossbows gave way to firearms, ships of the line to aircraft carriers, and biplanes to stealth jets, countries could ill afford to dismantle their military forces in hopes of raising enough experts in time of need. The realities of innovation continue to reveal themselves in information networks and long-range weapons that still demand experts but dramatically increase the destructive potential of fewer people. As demonstrated in the Iraqi desert, contemporary technology has rendered massed formations little more than an easy target on the modern battlefield.

Consistent with early air power theorists, the American way of war continues to leverage technology to gain an advantage. The only thing more difficult to predict than the next war is the next evolution in weaponry, but knowledge of neither is required to examine the way America approaches strategic decision-making. Despite their obvious relevance as advisors and subject matter experts, national defense practitioners do not possess the perspective from which to broadly assess and institute system-wide change. America's elected representatives must meet their most basic requirement to provide for the nation's defense by examining the effectiveness of the system. Policy makers determine the tenor of the unequal dialogue appropriate during peacetime and war.

Assessing the role of America's national security system must include an examination of its actors' relative influence. As noted by Huntington, military leaders played an important role in developing American strategy during and after World War II. Policy makers must determine the requisite degree of military influence, particularly since passage of Goldwater-Nichols. Additionally, they must determine the theoretical foundation undergirding the advice. A recommendation for

defending US coastal waters represents military advice par excellence, but senior officers have recently advised presidents on military matters regarding conflicts in other nations. The international relations philosophy of the CJCS will necessarily influence military advice regarding a president's foreign policy options.

The president appoints an officer to the position of CJCS, but the appointment does not relinquish the officer from responsibilities of the military profession. Nearly every American conflict since the Cold War suggests a planning deficit regarding post-conflict operations. Nielsen and Snider argue the best way to address this problem is for the military to get better at performing non-combat operations. Alternatively, any analysis examining the effectiveness of the US national security apparatus should consider the alignment of senior military advice with international relations theories.

The degree of consistency with a particular theory could provide insight into options for improving military advice before a conflict begins. Colin Powell asserted his list of questions for policy makers considering the use of military force based on his understanding of realism, yet there exists no requirement for military leaders to subscribe to any particular theory. Instead, the Constitution, federal law, and executive orders provide the only guidance compelling the national security apparatus to act. A senior officer who subscribes to contemporary Just War Theory principles will likely reach far different conclusions than one whose views more closely represent the principals of realism. A liberalist viewpoint might differ greatly from either. Given that the organizations responsible for national defense no longer represent those of the late eighteenth century, today's assessment must consider the role of military officials in determining foreign policy. Had each of America's post-Cold War conflicts been required to meet the strict standards of the Powell Doctrine, many may not have started.

Contemporary discussions of the US role in foreign policy have evolved from whether America should lead to how best America should lead. Few proclaim any benefit from an isolationist America resembling that of the interwar years. Meanwhile pundits lament the inevitability of America's decline while critics seek to point out the mistakes of those who decide and execute national policy. The research that follows, however, starts from the assumption that US leaders, military and civilian, carried out their responsibilities to the best of their abilities. Further, it assumes the qualification of these individuals to perform their duties and that reasonable people faced with the same context would have similarly conducted themselves. This is not to suggest that personalities are irrelevant or that everyone possesses the same abilities; but instead to highlight the effect of decision-making structure on decisions made.

As such, the purpose of this background information is not to lament the size of the national security establishment or the extra-Constitutional behavior of government institutions. Instead, the question posed here is whether the institution sworn to defend the United States against all enemies produces the consistent, rigorous, well-informed advice upon which presidents depend when faced with a foreign policy dilemma. Further, this research seeks to address first-order questions about the development of senior military officers and to highlight what limitations and objectives govern the advice they provide. Finally, the analysis described in the following chapters attempts to provide a starting point for assessing the amount and type of influence levied by the CJCS over decisions to use force.

Chapter 3

Comparative History Methodology

We have profited by our past mistakes. This time we shall know how to make full use of victory.

-Franklin D. Roosevelt

If Powell's criteria (hereafter referenced when considered together as the Powell Doctrine) led to an overwhelming operational success for the US in 1991, should policy makers confronting emerging threats abroad apply them in every context? Have subsequent military leaders serving as the CJCS used the precepts of the Powell Doctrine to advise presidents under whom they served? If not, did the president give them the opportunity? In the decades following the 1991 conflict, America's military has conducted campaigns around the globe for purposes as dynamic as Powell predicted. While no two conflicts are identical, the methods American presidents have chosen to employ military force could hardly differ more over that same period.

The following chapters include case studies that detail the advice provided by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, examining it for consistency with the Powell Doctrine criteria. In instances where their advice deviated, the case studies will compare and contrast substitutions, additions, or omissions. This research does not start from the position that the Powell Doctrine was perfect, but instead seeks to examine the evolution of America's use-of-force doctrine and the consistency of the advice military professionals provide when presidents consider military action.

Contemporary elected officials govern during a distinct era in world and national affairs defined in part by the modernization of war's character and America's emergent role in international relations. Following the Axis Powers' surrender, four decades of bipolarity and the

threat of nuclear annihilation defined state relations. When the Soviet Union dissolved, America emerged as the sole Great Power in a unipolar world. Nuclear weapons still represent the destructive pinnacle of technology's influence on the battlefield as the industrialization of war that started in 1840 continued to its logical conclusion.¹

Meanwhile, America's strategic effectiveness drifts as an ad hoc decision-making process regularly assigns military forces to address intransigent political problems abroad.² Despite several congressional attempts to manage the professional officer corps, the military's ill-defined role in US foreign policy fails to maximize the benefit of the institution's expertise. Ghosts of Vietnam cannot compete with the World War II paradigm's promise that America can avoid conflict at home by sending military forces to fight abroad.³ Originally considered a threat to liberal ideals emanating from unchecked government power, the US military grew alongside the past century's technological transformation

1. William Hardy McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 224.

2. Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17. The concept of strategy is often misunderstood or misapplied. As described by Colin Gray in 1999, strategy "is the bridge that relates military power to political purpose." Colin S. Gray, *Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy*, Pbk. ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2009), 34, 107. A decade later, Gray described America's susceptibility to a false promise of military solutions for political problems exacerbated by a belief in the separation of military and political thought. Gray contends that turning military operations into political victory requires the difficult work of developing strategy. He argues America's emphasis on operational victory produced by material advantages often fails to produce political victories due to a lack of emphasis on the development of strategy.

3. David Betz, "Carnage and Connectivity: How Our Pursuit of Fun Wars Brought the Wars Home," *War on the Rocks*, 2 February 2016, <http://warontherocks.com/2016/02/carnage-and-connectivity-how-our-pursuit-of-fun-wars-brought-the-wars-home/>. Betz argues that applying this paradigm in the post-Cold War era has actually resulted in the exact opposite—fighting abroad has actually caused violent conflict at home.

to become the nation's most trusted institution.⁴ American citizens continue to trust their large, standing military in the post-Cold War era despite the lack of strategic benefit resulting from its recent applications of force.

Little research has examined the professional officer corps' role in decisions to use military force in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. My objective is to evaluate how military advice has influenced post-Cold War decisions to use force. I use adherence to the Powell Doctrine as my means of analysis for three reasons. First, Powell developed his questions while serving as the military's senior ranking officer and after significant experience advising policy development as Reagan's National Security Advisor. Second, Powell's tenets provide the most complete substitute available for NSC 68's role in informing US strategy. Finally, no analysis or evidence has refuted the validity of the doctrine's tenets.

These three reasons lead to the following research question: when a post-Cold War US president opted to use military force, did the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff inform the decision using Powell Doctrine tenets? Whether policy makers adhered to the doctrine or discarded it in favor of other considerations, I explain their rationale and examine the conflict's results to understand implications of their choices. In addition, I examine the necessity and sufficiency of considerations used to inform use-of-force decisions.

4. Jeffrey M. Jones, "Confidence in Institutions," *Gallup, Inc.*, 15 June 2015, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/183593/confidence-institutions-below-historical-norms.aspx>. Americans ranked organized religion as the most-trusted institution in America from 1973 until 1985. From 1989 through 2015, the US military assumed this position every year with the exception of one year (in 1997, small business occupied the top spot). Additionally, 2015 polling reveals significant disparity among government institutions. Seventy-two percent of respondents claimed confidence in the military, with the next highest government institution at 52% (the police). The US presidency (33%) and Congress (8%) inspired much lower confidence.

This research offers no panacea to cure the ills of US strategy development. Too much information is still required to offer solutions, so my purpose is instead to inform and improve development of policy maker questions. Ill-defined roles and responsibilities at the nexus of foreign policy and military operations serve as fertile ground for the ideas of politically influential people and institutions. Neither George Washington's foreboding warning against foreign entanglements nor the well-documented demise of the Athenians in ancient Greece have prevented US policy makers from engaging in military conflicts abroad. Compelled by a sense of morality and responsibility, yet hamstrung by ill-suited tools and a lack of local context, elected officials resort to using military force. Has America arrived in an era ripe for a different approach to long-term strategy development?

Since the Cold War, policy makers have claimed American ideals required the use of military force to address foreign policy concerns in regions around the globe. Presidents have broadly interpreted their constitutionally derived authority to send American forces into conflicts abroad absent a war declaration. Despite the best efforts of US military forces, Somalia, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Syria struggle with internal unrest, violent extremist organizations, and crimes against humanity. Grim realities after military intervention have often fallen short of the ideals used to justify intervention, and call into question the effectiveness of America's strategy to address foreign-policy challenges.⁵

5. "UN: Violence Kills 849 across Iraq in January," *Yahoo! News*, 1 February 2016, <http://news.yahoo.com/un-violence-kills-849-across-iraq-january-170804386.html>. Perhaps no operation exemplifies the juxtaposition of intentions with reality better than Iraq. Once a well-organized and functioning society governed by a ruthless dictator, Iraq now symbolizes the failure of US policy. US investment of life and treasure for more than a decade has delivered continued suffering for the country's citizens, increased debt and loss of prestige for America, and a shifted balance of power in the Middle East favoring a hostile Iran. Multiple violent extremist organizations and international terrorist

As policy makers consider their options, the absence of decision-making norms results in remarkably dissimilar processes between and within administrations considering the use of military force. Constitutional guidance and legal precedents omit specific guidelines for elected and appointed officials considering military solutions to foreign policy challenges. The influence of senior military advisors under George H.W. Bush waned significantly in the next two administrations. Likewise, a relatively small group influencing George W. Bush's decisions stands in stark contrast to the large, bureaucratic system used in the Obama administration. Despite the emergence, enlargement, and acceptance of the US professional officer corps, its role in establishing the link between force application and strategically beneficial results remains undefined.

Method

Complex processes that result in decisions to use military force are not the exclusive domain of one political party, government institution, personality type, or leadership style. Each exhibits characteristics as unique as the conflicts they begin, rendering examination by the comparative method all but impossible. Complex interactions between states, institutions, layers of bureaucracy, and people make it difficult to apply the logic of elimination associated with John Stuart Mill's methods or its derivatives.⁶

As described by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Mill's methods only work well under specific conditions difficult to find in the realm of foreign policy challenges.⁷ In particular, the method chosen

organizations waited for the departure of US forces to start operations in the chaos left behind. Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL), Al Shabaab, and Al Qaeda each benefited from weakened state governance in the wake of US military operations in Iraq, Libya, and Syria.

6. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory*, 151-60.

7. George and Bennett list three conditions required to use Mill's methods: 1. "The causal relation being investigated must be a

must account for the possibility that different policy makers can arrive at the same conclusion to use force for different reasons. George and Bennett describe this characteristic of processes and associated outcomes as equifinality, and highlight the significance of the problem it causes for the comparative method.⁸

Additionally, the few cases available for examination (post-Cold War cases of US military force application) prevent development of a large-*n* study more suitable to statistical analysis techniques.⁹ To produce practical theory useful for policy makers, analysis requires research methods with the potential to determine causal inferences within a case and to compare results with those found in others cases.

My research uses structured, focused comparison to analyze decision-making processes within and across cases. Within-case comparison relies on combining the results of congruence testing and process tracing to determine relative changes between independent and dependent variables while also examining the process that links them together. For instance, congruence testing examines whether the provision of advice consistent with the Powell Doctrine corresponds to an expected result regarding the policy maker's decision to use force. Testing for congruence offers the potential to determine variable covariation, but understanding the process resulting in a relationship between variables requires process tracing.¹⁰ Causal inference requires

deterministic regularity involving only one condition that is either necessary or sufficient for a specified outcome," 2. "All causally relevant variables must be identified prior to the analysis," and 3. "Cases that represent the full range of all logically and socially possible causal paths must be available for study." George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory*, 155.

8. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory*, 20, 161-62.

9. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory*, 164.

10. George and Bennett assert, "process-tracing is the only observational means of moving beyond covariation alone as a source of causal inference." George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory*, 224.

intimate knowledge of the historical narrative associated with the decision-making process.

Additionally, process tracing forces the researcher to account for equifinality by considering alternative paths while mapping out one or more causal paths consistent with the outcome in a specific case.¹¹ For example, the George H.W. Bush administration's decision to use military force during the Persian Gulf War may have resulted from a combination of Margaret Thatcher's influence, the conflict's consistency with Powell Doctrine tenets, and lack of deterministic, standing policy. Process tracing provides a method to examine this causal inference and those of other potential paths to the outcome.

Process tracing also provides a step toward typological theory development by producing one or more typologies associated with a case. Inductive and deductive approaches to case comparison provide a method to move from individual typologies to typological theory with the potential to offer conclusions useful for policy development.¹² Across-case comparison further accounts for equifinality by postulating different causal paths to the same outcome in different cases.¹³ Using these within-case and across-case methods, I examine the professional officer corps' role in foreign policy by analyzing the process by which policy makers decide to use military force.

Case Selection

This research does not examine every case of US military involvement in human conflict since the Cold War ended. Examples of

11. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory*, 207.

12. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory*, 262. George and Bennett argue that combining inductive and deductive techniques to develop typological theories from case comparison, when used in conjunction with within-case techniques, has the potential to improve upon controlled comparison techniques often favored in social sciences.

13. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory*, 207, 15.

potential cases not considered include the raid resulting in Osama Bin Laden's death, anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, and counter-drug operations conducted in Central and South America. I excluded numerous operations not due to their strategic relevance or assessment of their conduct's efficacy, but instead because they lacked size, scope, or singularity required for examination and comparison as distinct and public foreign policy choices on behalf of the nation. The level of commitment, risk tolerance, and public scrutiny in considered cases far exceed levels ascribed to normal or covert operations. Cases examined in this research meet the following criteria:

- US conventional forces conducted direct-combat operations (does not include cases where only special operations forces were used, all combat operations were conducted from a standoff location removed from threat of direct retaliation, or conventional forces maintained a support-only role); and
- More than 2,000 US conventional forces deployed to fight; and
- The conflict resulted in more than 500 friendly and/or enemy combatants killed in action (KIA); and
- The conflict lasted longer than 30 days.

For selected cases meeting these criteria, I evaluate the historical narrative using within-case and across-case methods described above. Evidentiary answers to the same questions applied to each case provide the basis for assessing relative influence of independent variables on the dependent variable.

Why only consider cases of conventional force application? Special operations forces also conduct combat operations in pursuit of US policy objectives. However, they take place nearly continuously and rarely experience the public scrutiny of decisions to conduct combat operations

with conventional forces. Additionally, special operations tend to focus on specific activities of limited scope (e.g. foreign internal defense or unconventional warfare). Their omission from this research results from the desire to begin the research effort from a reasonably high threshold regarding the size and scale of the conflict.

Why exclude standoff or support-only operations? As remotely controlled machines expand into an increasing number of missions, American policy makers will undoubtedly desire to capitalize on their potential to achieve objectives at the lowest possible risk to personnel. Omission of standoff operations underscores the vast difference to the decision maker between engagements risking death or injury to enemy combatants, and those risking death or injury to US forces. This distinction does not represent a value judgment on people from different countries; rather, it acknowledges US representatives' fundamental responsibility to protect their constituency. More specifically, the distinction between standoff or support-only operations and those involving direct combat establishes the threshold for decisions to use force at a level where decision-makers clearly accepted the potential for friendly casualties.

Why restrict cases to the number thresholds listed above? I did not borrow the thresholds set for total deployed, KIA, and length of conflict from previous research efforts. Based solely on my knowledge of US military organizations and experience with contingency operations, these thresholds ensure comparison of cases with similarly high and well-publicized levels of risk for participants in the conflict. US military forces regularly take personal risks while conducting operations around the globe, but most Americans know little of their efforts or details of the context surrounding their conduct. By contrast, the cases considered here received significant media attention and endured the scrutiny of public debate before, during, and in most cases after the conflict. The following cases meet the criteria listed above:

- Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm/Northern and Southern Watch)
- Somalia (Operation Restore Hope/Gothic Serpent)
- Haiti (Operation Uphold Democracy)
- Bosnia (Operation Deny Flight/Deliberate Force)
- Kosovo (Operation Allied Force)
- Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom)
- Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom)
- Horn of Africa (Operation Ocean Shield)
- Libya (Operation Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector)
- Islamic State (Operations conducted to defeat the Islamic State terrorist organization)

Of the qualifying cases, four—the Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya—provide variance required to assess CJCS advice without excessively weighting presidential administrations, the executive’s political party, or the chairman’s background or personal beliefs. Assessing these conflicts also provides data points over the span of time since the Cold War’s end. Finally, these cases include two examples of hostilities conducted by US ground forces, and two without boots on the ground. The Gulf War provides a departure point from which to examine the other cases and Powell’s context as he developed the doctrinal questions bearing his name.

Inclusion of one or more negative cases has the potential to offer increased clarity regarding conclusions drawn from comparison of these case studies. Unfortunately, finding cases where the US could have used force but did not presents a significant research challenge given the

continual turbulence of world politics and the US role as global hegemon. In effect, one negative case persists throughout the post-Cold War era—the remainder of time between the cases listed above. The mass killing of Tutsis during the Rwandan civil war in the early 1990s presents the best example of US policy makers choosing against military force despite its potential to limit loss of life and crimes against humanity.

Others have written extensively on this decision, but counterfactual arguments regarding what might have happened had US forces deployed provide little context from which to glean useful insight. Undoubtedly, Clinton administration priorities, the recent tragedy resulting in a well-publicized massacre of US military personnel in Mogadishu, and an antagonistic relationship between the administration and senior military officers influenced the decision. Although this research does not include Rwanda as an entirely separate case, later chapters will include portions of the administration's debate where they aid in supporting or refuting evidence discovered in considered cases.

Case Analysis

My primary objective within each case is to determine the degree of consistency with Powell Doctrine principles. Within-case results do not rely on a chairman's overt admission of reliance on any set of principles, including those of the Powell Doctrine. Instead, I developed a method to analyze the consistency of the advice with the doctrine's tenets. The Powell Doctrine includes the following nine questions:

1. Is the political objective important, clear, and understood?
2. Have all nonviolent means failed?
3. Will the forces considered decisively achieve the objective?
4. How much will it cost to achieve the objective?

5. Have we critically considered the desired outcome and associated risks?
6. Have we assessed the consequences of using force?
7. Does the use of force complement other instruments of national power?
8. Do unambiguous military objectives link with the political objective?
9. Do the American people support using force?¹⁴

Of these nine principles, I omitted four from this study. Powell included questions two, four, seven, and eight to inform the policy maker, but they do not aid determination of a latter chairman's consistent application of the doctrine. Any reasonable assessment of decisions to use force after the event must assume policy makers sufficiently met the intent of these omitted questions.

As described in the second question regarding the exhaustion of nonviolent means, Powell wanted to ensure all other options had been attempted and failed before resorting to military force. He asked this question as a way to highlight that using force is a significant escalation and different from other means. I omit this question for two reasons. First, the answer is entirely a matter of judgment. While some subjectivity affects every assessment, no possible measure exists to distinguish between cases. Strictest interpretation of the question must always result in the answer no given the impossibility of proving all nonviolent means ineffective. Economic sanctions or other penalties could continue indefinitely; unconsidered or improbable events could remove the cause of the conflict at any time; and changing the personalities involved often changes the realm of possible options. All three of these alternatives to military force application offer a degree of

14. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," 35-38.

explanatory power over the eventual resolution of the Cold War after more than four decades without a direct confrontation between the belligerents.

Additionally, I chose to exclude the second of Powell's questions in my analysis because I assume every US president believed no other means could achieve the objective sought before making the decision to use military force. Critics may debate rectitude of the objective, champion counterfactual realities based on a different assessment of the enemy, or harbor dissimilar views on the military's role altogether. Regardless, this study assumes every US president made a conscious decision that military force was the only means capable of achieving the objective within any measure of reasonable constraints.

Similarly, I omitted Powell's fourth question—the chairman asked for an assessment of the projected cost to achieve the objective—due to its immunity to examination. Here again, Powell intended to use the question of cost as a starting point to ensure clear understanding of the real and diverse consequences of war. He had experienced many of these costs firsthand during and following his experience in Vietnam.

Notwithstanding the potential benefits of a military historian elucidating numerous risks involved in war's conduct, this study rests on the assumption that US policy makers fulfilled the basic requirements of their position. Ergo, one can only assume that no US president has chosen to start a conflict without first calculating its cost even if those calculations proved wildly errant. Once again beginning from the position that every president fulfilled the duties of the office, I assume each conducted an assessment and determined the value of achieving the conflict's objective outweighed his calculation of the cost projected to achieve it.

The final two excluded tenets of the doctrine—seeking complementary use of national instruments and linking military and political objectives—do not warrant examination in this study due to

their focus on post-decision matters. Powell did not include these questions to evaluate the suitability of force, but instead to remind policy makers of their importance to successfully planning and conducting the campaign. The chairman's experience in Vietnam caused him to seek assurance that the president intended to leverage all the instruments of national power coincident with an application of force.

Finally, Powell's eighth question regarding linkages between military objectives and the desired political ends also focuses on post-decision planning and execution. Analysis of these questions belongs in an assessment of the conflict's conduct more so than an evaluation of the chosen means. Consideration of these two questions could indeed aid the decision-maker's visualization of implications, but neither rises to the level of first-order concern regarding a decision to use military force.

After omitting these four questions, I use the remaining five Powell Doctrine tenets to analyze each case on its own merits. Specifically, to what degree did each CJCS advise in a manner consistent with Powell's emphasis on the following areas: 1. the political objective, 2. potential for a decisive result, 3. desired outcome and associated risks, 4. consequences of using force, and 5. popular support. In some instances, assessment involves qualified answers requiring additional explanation for which the study's overall conclusions account. Occasionally, answering a question definitively requires differentiating between intentions and word choice. When required, discerning the best possible answer incorporates context and the influence of past events or experiences on policy maker decisions.

After assessing the consistency of CJCS advice with Powell's tenets, my secondary objective is to assess the degree of influence over use-of-force decisions conferred by presidents to their chairmen. The ill-defined relationship between policy makers and the professional officer corps allows for significant variance regarding the sources of information and influence upon which policy makers evaluate national security

options. Two chairmen who rely on Powell's tenets may provide similar advice; but the relative weight given their counsel may result in vastly different policy choices.

Regarding this secondary objective, my intent is not to challenge the wisdom of individual advisors or a president's freedom to seek counsel, but instead to elucidate consistency of the decision-making process with military advice. Specifically, does available evidence suggest that policy makers considered the CJCS their principal advisor when they chose military force? If not, who fulfilled the role?

When combined with the study's primary objective, the research's overall purpose is to examine whether military advice conformed to Powell Doctrine tenets and whether or not it influenced the policy choice. To examine the evidence, three questions provide a starting point for evaluating each case:

1. Who advised policy makers and what did they recommend?
2. Did the CJCS make a recommendation for or against using force?
3. Did the CJCS base advice on the Powell Doctrine's tenets?

Nothing in this analysis challenges ownership or responsibility of the elected decision maker. These questions necessarily focus on the advisors since the focus of this study is to examine CJCS advice. In the following chapters, each case describes the historical context and pre-conflict preferences of policy makers and their advisors.

The American public holds policy makers, not their advisors, accountable for policy choices. No legal or constitutional precedent holds military leaders accountable for policy decisions to use force, so why does their advice matter? The simple answer to this question is that citizens interested in America's prosperity want experts to provide advice

on their behalf. Additionally, three constituencies maintain distinctive interests regarding CJCS advice when America's leaders consider using military force. Policy makers, citizens, and the military institution each have specific reasons why the chairman's advisory role matters to them.

Beyond their generic interest in expertise, policy makers considering force application have two primary concerns regarding military advice. First, the relationship between military leaders and elected officials affects public opinion of policy choices. As demonstrated by the well-documented and antagonistic relationship between President Clinton and senior officers during the 1990s, dissenting opinions can limit policy options. The second reason policy makers concern themselves with CJCS advice regards the performance and effectiveness of military operations.

Trained from the beginning to follow orders, military members are no more one-dimensional than any other members of American society. They are human beings, citizens, taxpayers, family members, and friends motivated by a unique responsibility to their country that provides context for their service. As much as they must obey lawful commands, America's military members also demand leaders with trustworthy judgment and competence. Doubt regarding chain-of-command's belief in a conflict's justification erodes potential for efficacious operations by undermining basic assumptions about the relationship. Policy makers who want to win desire the best possible advice from their military advisors.

The American people also want to win, and they expect their representatives to address current and future security threats with an effective strategy. The chairman's advice matters to American citizens precisely because the Constitution provides little guidance for the professional officer corps, and even less on responsibility for developing national strategy. Term limits, competing priorities, and political interests govern the actions and words of elected officials.

By contrast, American citizens fund their military because they expect it to focus narrowly on their security. Teachers, doctors, scientists, and engineers all provide recommendations on how best to deliver their specialties. Political leaders determine which programs receive government funding and support on behalf of the American people, but base those decisions on the advice of experts. Americans expect military practitioners to provide advice on use-of-force decisions the same way they expect engineers to influence decisions governing choice of an architectural technique or tool when building a structure. The financier may choose not to heed the engineer's advice, but then also assumes liability under the American justice system if the building collapses and injures or kills its inhabitants. Americans are interested in the chairman's advice because they want a return on their investment. They expect the professional officer corps to know best their institution's limits, conditions, and potential.

Finally, The CJCS advisory role matters to the American military because it represents the professional opinion of the institution itself. Clausewitz aptly described war as an extension of policy, but in a representative democracy, policy results from the will of the nation's citizens. Americans chose to entrust a standing, professional officer corps with national defense in the twentieth century based largely on realities presented by technological innovation.

Human expansion into new domains, the development of nuclear warheads, and battlefield implications of Moore's Law all pointed to the need for constant vigilance and the capability to respond immediately. Clausewitz also provided the most thorough description ever written on war's nature. Still, only a practitioner of war can fully grasp his analysis in the same way physicists best comprehend implications of Albert Einstein's theories.

Discerning the potential, conditions, and limitations of military force requires a practitioner's understanding of the nature of war

informed by lessons revealed in the sobering history of human conflict. Effective application of military force requires the discipline of professional expertise and study to guard against ill-considered or misinformed conclusions with the potential to result in a position of strategic disadvantage.

Protecting and defending the Constitution of the United States knows no time limit for the nation's professional officer corps. No other institution operates at the nexus of military operations and foreign policy. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the chairman's advisory role represents the US military's understanding of its post-Cold War role in national security. In the wake of NSC 68, and given the threat's evolution from peer competitor to networked and amorphous entities unrestricted by national borders, the chairman's advice reflects on the professional image of the institution entrusted by the nation's citizens for their defense.

The institution expects the CJCS to speak on behalf of the entire profession by participating in the development of effective national strategy and defining the role of US military force in the post-Cold War era. The chairman's advice provides insight into the profession's expected role in US foreign policy and its posture relative to partners and threats. Perhaps most significantly, the advice itself (its accuracy, consistency, and reliability) represents one measure of the institution's value to policy makers facing difficult choices. Presidents may choose to ignore the institution's recommendations, but a record of consistent advice underscores the professional officer corps' expertise.

A Point of Clarification

Both Secretary Weinberger and General Powell suggested a set of criteria for use by American policy makers when examining the suitability of military force to a foreign policy problem, but their

recommendations differed. As depicted in Figure 1, four of Weinberger's six tenets resemble or match completely four of Powell's.




Figure 1. Comparison of Weinberger and Powell Doctrines.

Source: Adapted from Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 5 (1992): 35-38, and Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," (address, National Press Club, Washington, DC, 28 November 1984).

Weinberger and Powell both emphasized the political objective, force as a last resort, linking force with objectives, and public support. Different from Powell, Weinberger emphasized the importance of fighting with the intent to win and continual reassessment of the relationship between means and ends. Exclusion of these additional points does not suggest they are insignificant now or that Powell disavowed their importance. That Weinberger and Powell highlighted three of the five tenets analyzed in this study only further emphasizes those issues'

relevance to use-of-force decisions. Regardless, this study specifically seeks to examine the advice provided by the principal military advisor.

Measuring Results

My research tests the hypothesis that post-Cold War chairmen have not influenced the decision to use military force using Powell Doctrine tenets.¹⁵ Support or rejection derives from two primary questions. First, did the CJCS provide advice consistent with the Powell Doctrine? Second, did policy makers choose military force based on the doctrine's tenets? To answer these questions, each case study includes an assessment of the following variables (see Table 1 for example assessment):

- Dependent variable: Did the US use military force?
- Independent variables:
 1. Was the decision consistent with standing policy?
 2. Was CJCS advice consistent with the Powell Doctrine?
 3. How influential were other advisors?
- Intervening variables:
 1. Did advisors recommend competing alternatives?
 2. To what degree did citizens support using military force?

15. Walter LaFeber, "The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine," *Political Science Quarterly* 124, no. 1 (Spring 2009). LaFeber describes policy maker resistance to the Powell Doctrine from the Persian Gulf War to Powell's departure as Secretary of State. See also Betz, "Carnage and Connectivity." Betz concludes a departure from the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine led to pursuit of fun wars by US policy makers that have resulted in those conflicts arriving in the United States.

Table 1. Coding variables (notional assessment)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Persian Gulf</i>	<i>Kosovo</i>
<i>Dependent</i>		
US military force used? ^y	M	O
<i>Independent</i>		
Consistent with guidance? ^a	G	A
Chairman's advice ^b	P	D
Relative advisor influence ^c	I	U
<i>Intervening</i>		
Competing alternatives ^{x1}	C	S
Domestic pressure ^{x2}	H	N

Source: Author's original work

y: M = military force used; O = other option(s) selected instead of military

a: G = consistent with standing guidance; A = ambiguous or inconsistent

b: P = consistent with four or more Powell Doctrine tenets;

D = Advice differs from two or more Powell Doctrine tenets

c: I = disproportionately influential; U = unremarkable, relative influence

x1: C = two or more available and feasible; S = single alternative or none

x2: H = high; N = neutral or low (public support for military intervention)

This study measures the dependent variable (labeled *y* in Table 1) as a binary yes or no in accordance with the above-stated criteria for case selection. Advisors may have offered nuanced advice, but the final policy choice provides a measurable, objective result.

Independent variables (labeled *a*, *b*, and *c* in Table 1) examine the primary questions for each case study as described above. Before examining the chairman's advice, each case study includes an analysis of standing policy guidance to account for pre-existing policy maker direction recommending or requiring military force under certain circumstances. Examples of standing guidance include national strategy documents, Congressional resolutions, or previous policy statements.

Next, I compare CJCS advice against the five selected tenets of the Powell Doctrine to determine consistency. If the chairman provided advice consistent with four or more of the five tenets examined, this variable considers the overall advice consistent with the doctrine. If consistent with three or fewer tenets, I code the variable as inconsistent.

Finally, I examine degree of influence over the decision asserted by other advisors relative to that asserted by the CJCS. Goldwater-Nichols describes the chairman as the principal military advisor, but it does not prescribe a specific role for the chairman in the development of US foreign policy. Numerous other officials advise the president on these decisions, including other heads of state, the vice president, chief of staff, national security advisor, secretaries of state and defense, and members of Congress. This final independent variable represents the relative influence exerted by other advisors compared to that exerted by the CJCS.

Two intervening variables (labeled in Table 1 as $x1$ and $x2$) also have the potential to diminish influence of independent variables over a policy maker's decision. In the first case, the number and feasibility of competing alternatives to using force varies across cases. Alternatives always exist, but this study considers documented alternatives scrutinized by the administration and dismissed in favor of using force. I code a case's available alternatives high (C) when policy makers considered two or more alternatives and low (S) when they considered no more than one. Additionally, the degree of domestic pressure has the potential to diminish the influence of other variables since US citizens elect policy makers to represent their interests.

Both Powell and Weinberger highlighted the importance of popular support for the use of force, and I have included this tenet in my analysis of Powell Doctrine consistency. The intervening variable of domestic pressure differs in that it represents Clausewitz's allowance for influence resulting from citizens' passion. This intervening variable assesses more

than polling results asking whether people support or object to the use of American military force. As an intervening variable, domestic pressure examines whether the policy maker's constituency exerted influence over the decision by threatening consequences for the elected official. Examples of high domestic pressure include public demonstrations, threats of impeachment, recall elections, or votes of no confidence.

Possible Typologies

The three dichotomous, independent variables listed in Table 1 have the potential to generate eight possible typologies ($a + b + c = y$). Additionally, influential intervening variables can enhance or diminish the explanatory power of each typology. For example, one might assume that the Persian Gulf conflict resembled the typology $A + P + I = M$, meaning the decision to use force was ambiguously described in standing guidance, consistent with the tenets of the Powell Doctrine, and disproportionately affected by Margaret Thatcher's influence.

Additionally, one might assume the intervening variables x_1 and x_2 did not diminish or enhance the influence of the independent variables on the decision. In other words, neither a public outcry for the use of force nor the potential effectiveness of considered policy alternatives altered the relationship between independent variables and the decision to use force. If multiple cases reveal typologies containing high values for Powell Doctrine consistency and variance in the other two independent variables, evidence refutes the hypothesis; whereas multiple cases revealing advice inconsistent with Powell's tenets supports the hypothesis.

Translating Theory into Policy

I enumerate the study's results and conclusions in chapter eight by using deductive methods to construct a typological theory from results described in preceding case analyses. Chapter eight must

necessarily include a discussion of hypothetical cases that reflect typologies not revealed by any of the considered cases. For instance, if no cases present a typology of $G + P + U = M$ (standing policy maker guidance to use force, CJCS advice consistent with the Powell Doctrine, and unremarkable influence from other advisors), one can reasonably assume there are instances when political leaders have already considered and rendered unpersuasive the doctrine's considerations.

This typology, when considered in the context of the conflict's outcome, provides a potentially rich field for follow-on studies to examine the specific conditions under which Powell's tenets do not provide a useful point of departure for considering suitability of military force. Academe can consider this area cause for further study, while the professional officer corps must seek clarification from political leaders to understand implications for force structure and Phase Zero activities.

After considering each of the possible typologies and their relationship with the intervening and dependent variables, chapter eight asserts a typological theory based on the study's findings. Based on this theory, the final chapter provides recommendations for policy changes to address the study's conclusions. It also highlights implications for improvements to the landmark Goldwater-Nichols legislation, construction of US foreign policy, and development of joint officers.

Additionally, results of this research highlight the potential for further analysis useful in determining the role of military force in the post-Cold War era. By design, this study focuses on the influence of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assess relative influence of factors used by policy makers considering the use of force. Additional research could examine barriers to effective advising to discern additional recommendations for structural changes.¹⁶ Further study

16. If consistent advice yields ineffective results, what barriers prevent more effective advising? Has a combination of inconsistent advice and inconsistent results jeopardized persuasiveness, or has lack of adherence

could also illuminate options for improving America's use of force doctrine.



to consistently sound advice prevented strategic gains? Answering these questions requires determining a degree of causality that goes beyond the scope of this study's analysis.

Chapter 4

Gulf War

An end has been put to the 'Cold War,' the arms race, and the insane militarization of our country, which crippled our economy, distorted our thinking and undermined our morals. The threat of a world war is no more.

-Mikhail Gorbachev

Colin Powell served as the nation's CJCS during a tumultuous period in world and national history. Cold War victory emerged in dramatic fashion at the end of a bipolar power struggle that had defined international relations since the conclusion of World War II. After decades of tension, America's archrival disintegrated rapidly as the Communist Party lost its grip on power and Eastern European nations removed their pro-Soviet governments. The clash of philosophies responsible for taking the world to the brink of nuclear Armageddon ended without a pitched battle.

America's pursuit of victory further strained the relationship between its founding principle of limited government and the exigencies of armed conflict.¹ The Reagan administration relied on deficit spending to double down on the influence of an expansive military-industrial complex, but exerted no direct control over their enemy's internal deliberations. After serving as Reagan's vice president for eight years and director of the Central Intelligence Agency beforehand, George H. W. Bush admitted his administration's complete surprise at the Soviet

1. Sunzi and Samuel B. Griffith, *The Illustrated Art of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 205. Eastern theorist Sun Tzu concluded his ancient text's examination of terrain's significance by asserting that knowledge of the enemy and yourself ensures victory. The Cold War proved the possibility of winning without either.

Union's abrupt demise.² Wrought by long-term adherence to a strategy of containment and deterrence, the multigenerational effort culminated with America's emergence as the global hegemon.

The Cold War's end profoundly altered assumptions upon which US policy makers defined the realm of achievable goals for decades. A new era called into question the rationale, objectives, and limitations that had previously shaped the US military's role in national strategy. Nearly three decades later, America continues to wrestle with the value of maintaining a large force as post-Cold War administrations engage US military forces in conflicts around the globe. Despite relatively consistent achievement of objectives at the operational level of these conflicts, linking military success to the nation's strategic benefit has proven difficult in the post-Cold War era.

If bipolar equilibrium defined international relations during the Cold War, the Soviet Union's demise tipped the scales in favor of force application. From the expansion of missions in the 1990s to preventive wars and continuous drone operations after the turn of the century, America has suffered no lack of imagination for potential uses of force. Regardless of political party, US policy makers consistently choose military force to address foreign-policy challenges in the post-Cold War era.

Loss of a peer competitor removed one control on America's interventionism, and the success and spectacle of American military dominance displayed in Operation Desert Storm removed another.³ The lopsided operational victory achieved by US forces in the Persian Gulf accentuated an asymmetric advantage fueled by the Reagan

2. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 239-49.

3. O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell*, 92. In the "Defense Planning Guidance Paper of 1992," senior officials in the administration described a plan to leverage US military power in pursuit of a hegemonic strategy of dominance.

administration's Cold War strategy. Subsequent US policy makers interpreted the conflict's results as evidence that the political price of inaction outweighed that of action. Unable to produce comparably efficient results using other means, they resorted to the instrument of national power able to demonstrate clearly the success of their policy choice. As they did in ancient Greece, today's strong nations continue doing what they can.

The Stage

Even before the Cold War's end, the Bush administration needed no pointers from Thucydides to exploit a disparity in national power. Manuel Noriega had become a thorn in the side of US policy in Panama. Despite US Justice Department indictments, economic sanctions, and the CIA's covert actions to unseat him, the dictator remained in power as the American presidency transitioned from Reagan to Bush. Powell's predecessor, US Navy Admiral William Crowe noticed a distinct difference in the way the two administrations set national security policy.⁴ Shortly after Noriega's forces arrested a CIA operative, Bush began to increase pressure on the dictator by publicly calling for the country to overthrow its leader.⁵ Less than five months later, Powell replaced Crowe as CJCS.

After a failed coup attempt in Panama called into question the administration's preparedness, their resolve to depose Noriega heightened. Powell and Cheney recommended consideration of a contingency plan named Blue Spoon (later changed to Operation Just Cause).⁶ The plan's purpose was to conduct offensive operations against Panama's military defenses with a numerically and qualitatively superior

4. Woodward, *Commanders*, 81. Crowe described an increased emphasis on leveraging foreign policy and related messaging to shape the public's opinion of the administration.

5. Woodward, *Commanders*, 92.

6. Woodward, *Commanders*, 173.

force.⁷ The service chiefs concurred with the plan's implementation, though some highlighted the potential for perception of an excessive use of force.⁸ After a successful operation overcame minor resistance and led to the capture of Noriega, Powell defended his perspective on the proper use of US military force. He believed the large force employed in Panama had quickly and effectively accomplished the mission, reduced the potential for casualties, and demonstrated the importance of US military strength despite calls for defense cuts.⁹

As the Soviet Union began to unravel, the ominous threat used by generations of US policy makers to justify deficit spending became increasingly benign. America's Cold War military represented just one vestige of the sprawling, military-industrial complex now deeply entrenched in its system of government. Officials responsible for oversight faced the onerous task of reorienting and recalibrating the vast apparatus in a dramatically altered environment. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait occurred at precisely the same moment as policy makers and the professional officer corps endeavored to establish the military's role in the post-Cold War era.¹⁰

7. Woodward, *Commanders*, 164.

8. Woodward, *Commanders*, 165-67.

9. Woodward, *Commanders*, 194.

10. Woodward, *Commanders*, 194, 231, 345. The same day Iraq invaded Kuwait, Powell and Cheney had already planned to meet with congressional defense experts to discuss a plan for reducing the military's size. Seeking to prevent another hollow force, Powell developed a strategy to guard against excessive cuts to a force he had worked to rebuild during the Reagan administration. Aware of the connection between demonstrated success and negotiating advantage, Powell welcomed the perception of success in Panama. As Soviet power receded, the CJCS developed a base-force construct recommending a 25-percent reduction over five years. As the Persian Gulf crisis met with debates over defense cuts, some questioned the purpose of maintaining a large military if unwilling to use it in Kuwait. Espousing thoughts eerily similar to a statement made years later by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Congressman Les Aspin (later the Clinton administration's secretary of

Chairman

For American presidents, conducting successful military operations requires the professional officer corps' effective stewardship of the nation's war-making apparatus. Like George Marshall and John Pershing before him, Colin Powell served as the administration's senior military officer overseeing the military's preparation for conflict. The son of Jamaican immigrants, Powell experienced World War II during the earliest memories of his youth in the suburbs of New York. Growing up in the shadow of his older sister, he felt his first sense of belonging and identity outside his family in the Reserve Officer Training Corps program while attending college at City College of New York.¹¹ Powell earned a regular commission as a distinguished military graduate and entered Active Duty service as an infantry officer in the US Army during the Eisenhower administration.

Shortly thereafter, Powell began his first tour in Vietnam. His experience provided a harsh lesson juxtaposed with romantic notions of war cultivated by childhood memories of victory in World War II. As a junior officer, Powell distinguished himself from his peers with flattering performance reports and his love of the military.¹² He deeply resented the decisions leading to the retreat from Vietnam. After two tours in the conflict, Powell concluded America's warriors had answered their nation's call but the country's leaders had poorly planned and managed the

defense) disclosed his view that the US military served little purpose in the post-Cold War era if circumstances in Kuwait did not justify its use.

11. Colin L. Powell and Joseph E. Persico, *A Soldier's Way: An Autobiography* (London: Hutchinson, 1995), 26.

12. Evaluating Powell's performance as a lieutenant, his supervisors described him as someone who "expresses his opinions...convincingly," and who "should be considered for more rapid promotion than his contemporaries." Additionally, based largely on the chaotic events of the American civil rights movement in society at large, Powell determined "the real world began at the post." DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 39, 70.

war.¹³ He believed that senior military leaders had failed their subordinates by not speaking truth to power and political leaders had failed at their responsibility to supply the necessary resources.¹⁴ Like many of his contemporary officers, Powell believed the Army's ability to regain its reputation as a professional institution began with steering clear of future conflicts resembling Vietnam.¹⁵

Unfortunately, these officers found little respite in the hollow-force years that followed. Published in 1985, *Military Incompetence* describes the military shambles that continued to persist a decade after hostilities ended in Vietnam. Listing numerous military failures between the Son Tay prison raid in 1970 and Grenada in 1983, Richard Gabriel levied the responsibility for incompetence on the military.¹⁶ As a field-grade officer, Powell saw firsthand the corrosive effects of rampant drug use and racial division, while practicing leadership and disciplinary methods intended to remove their causes.¹⁷ His reputation as an outstanding professional with great potential continued to grow.¹⁸

As the twelfth chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell accepted his appointment to the position with a resume unique in modern military history. With a compendium of academic study, political experience, and command, Powell's career after Vietnam included an MBA from George Washington University and selection to the prestigious National War College at Fort McNair. Interspersed between command assignments at the brigade, division, corps, and army level, Powell gained significant exposure to policy matters. Beginning with his

13. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 91.

14. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 96-97.

15. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War*, 42.

16. Gabriel, *Military Incompetence*, 34.

17. James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 125-31.

18. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 99.

selection as a White House Fellow in 1972, he served in the Office of Management and Budget in 1973 and the Defense Department in 1977, 1981, and 1983. In 1986, he became deputy national security advisor and then Ronald Reagan's final national security advisor one year later.¹⁹ The first to serve a complete four-year term under the landmark Goldwater-Nichols legislation, Powell brought a wealth of political experience to the Bush administration in 1989.

Powell's love of the military and his experience during the Vietnam era caused him to view civil-military relations as a two-way responsibility, with junior officers obligated to obey orders and senior officers required to protect those under them.²⁰ Powell believed senior military officers owed their subordinates the responsibility to explain to policy makers what force could or could not do in any potential situation.²¹ Nevertheless, the moment of decision remained sacred. Powell believed loyalty demanded carrying out policy decisions as if they were his own.²² Like his military counterparts, Powell maintained faith in the chain of command up to and including its civilian leadership.²³

George H. W. Bush appointed Powell as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ahead of other officers with more seniority. Almost immediately, Powell worked with Cheney to oversee preparation and execution of offensive operations in Panama. The blueprint Powell advocated included implementation of an off-the-shelf contingency plan, assembly of a large military force, and civilian authority implemented through the CJCS serving as trusted agent between the secretary of defense and the uniformed military. After a quickly executed and successful operation, the administration turned its attention to

19. O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell*, x-xii.

20. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 142.

21. Roth, *Sacred Honor*, 190-91.

22. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 146.

23. Roth, *Sacred Honor*, 197.

monitoring matters in Eastern Europe and considering their repercussions.

Administration

The Bush administration represented a family as much as it did a team. The central figures saw the world through a similar lens, and everyone understood their role.²⁴ George H. W. Bush was the last American president who experienced World War II firsthand. In one sense, the greatest generation celebrated their war's final victory on his watch as Eastern Europe's iron curtain fell. A US Navy officer and aviator who flew combat missions in the Pacific theater, he maintained an abiding interest in foreign policy with roots in the war's conduct and outcome.²⁵ The president and his administration placed a premium on loyalty and enforced high standards for message discipline within the executive branch.²⁶

The president consulted a tight inner circle of confidants when facing difficult policy decisions. Brent Scowcroft, Bush's national security advisor, and James Baker, the president's secretary of state, served as his closest advisors. Each man had a long history with the president, assuming roles resembling trusted brothers.²⁷ The 41st president of the United States enjoyed familiarity and a deeply loyal relationship with his advisors.²⁸

The president exercised his role as commander in chief using a clearly defined chain of command that ran straight to his secretary of defense before extending to the military. He rarely jumped over his secretary of defense to engage with the CJCS or other military officers in

24. Bartholomew H. Sparrow, *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security*, 1st ed. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2015), 271-72.

25. Sparrow, *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft*, 280-81.

26. Sparrow, *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft*, 289.

27. Sparrow, *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft*, 267, 71.

28. Sparrow, *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft*, 280.

an official capacity, but still developed a close personal relationship with Powell.²⁹ Cheney further simplified the relationship by intentionally inserting Powell into the flow of information between himself and military issues, including those handled by the service chiefs and operational field commanders.³⁰ Powell understood and complied with the established relationship while earning a reputation as an honest broker between the military and the administration.³¹

Conflict

Oversight of operations in Panama had solidified roles within the administration, and they collectively returned their focus on the president's agenda after Noriega's capture. Saddam Hussein's aggressive move south surprised them. They watched in disbelief as the dictator marshalled his forces north of the Kuwait border in the middle of July 1990. Despite warnings from experienced US intelligence analysts that the Iraqi dictator intended to attack, Cheney, Powell, and Schwarzkopf refused to believe it. The only explanation they could conceive to explain his behavior was that he had assembled eight divisions and 100,000 troops in southern Iraq as a bluff designed to pressure Kuwait.³² On 2 August 1990, the dictator revealed his true intentions by sending forces across the border under the cover of darkness to overthrow the small nation's government.

The next morning, President Bush met with the full National Security Council before departing for a previously planned event in Aspen, Colorado. The meeting ended with more questions than answers

29. Roth, *Sacred Honor*, 240.

30. Woodward, *Commanders*, 175, 238. The few times Cheney pursued information without working through Powell caused the CJCS great consternation as he desired central control of the military's message in a manner not unlike that demonstrated by the Bush administration.

31. Woodward, *Commanders*, 127, 62, 79.

32. Woodward, *Commanders*, 205-22.

as the principals struggled for perspective. With little concluded, President Bush placed his first post-invasion phone calls to heads of state in the region. Jordan's King Hussein and Egypt's President Mubarak each spoke to Bush during the same call since they were meeting together in Alexandria, Egypt. Both leaders urged caution as they vowed to engage with other Arab leaders to resolve the crisis.³³ Bush asked British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher for her view of the situation while meeting with her in Aspen. The president's generational peer drew a parallel to Hitler's World War II-era aggression, emphasizing the importance of stopping Saddam before he could consolidate his gains and grow stronger.³⁴

From the outset, Scowcroft thought Iraq's invasion required US condemnation and resolute rejection, but he believed Thatcher's counsel had significantly moved the president closer to his perspective.³⁵ President Bush also spoke with Saudi Arabia's King Fahd from the Oval Office after returning from his trip. Fahd expressed surprise and indignation at Saddam's move while characterizing the Iraqi dictator as arrogant and duplicitous.³⁶ The king had also experienced World War II as a young adult, and used the Hitler analogy to share his conviction that reversing Iraq's course would require military force. Bush made clear to the monarch that he was willing to do whatever was necessary to restore Kuwait's sovereignty, including the use of US military force.³⁷

33. The White House, *Memorandum: Telephone Conversation with King Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt*, 2 August 1990.

34. Sparrow, *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft*, 388.

35. Sparrow, *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft*, 386-88.

36. The White House, *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telecon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia*, 2 August 1990. In their first conversation after Iraq's invasion, the monarch told President Bush that if the Iraqi dictator survived and did not remove his forces from Kuwait, his behavior required a response capable of teaching him an unforgettable lesson.

37. House, *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telecon with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia*, 2 August 1990.

A few days later, the president demonstrated clear resolve as he publicly declared his determination to end Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. Preceding NSC deliberations focused on the imminent threat to Saudi Arabia and world oil markets posed by Iraqi military forces in Kuwait.³⁸ Other nations highlighted similar concerns as world leaders voiced their support for the administration's conviction. Four days after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, the commander in chief publicly disclosed his intent to take action.³⁹

With the decision made for US intervention, the question quickly turned to military options. General Schwarzkopf had briefed the NSC on two tiers of options at the first post-invasion meeting.⁴⁰ The first alternative presented was to conduct retaliatory strikes against Iraq. The substantially larger option included implementation of another, off-the-shelf plan. Designed for defense of the Arabian Peninsula, Operations Plan 90-1002 called for hundreds of thousands of US forces, months to execute, and a regional country's consent to serve as a base for operations. This time, instead of the CJCS recommending use of a large force and prepared plan as he had in Panama, the administration selected the option without seeking Powell's counsel.⁴¹ They then sought Saudi Arabia's permission to establish a US military presence.⁴²

Faced with the Iraqi threat, King Fahd acquiesced to US offers for military assistance.⁴³ US forces poured into Saudi Arabia to begin

38. Sparrow, *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft*, 388-89.

39. Woodward, *Commanders*, 260. Bush famously declared Iraq's aggression "will not stand" while answering a reporter's question during televised comments made on the White House lawn immediately following his return from Camp David.

40. Woodward, *Commanders*, 228.

41. Woodward, *Commanders*, 233, 41-42. After taking a less active role as Powell provided military solutions in Panama, Cheney felt the CJCS was not moving fast enough as the defense secretary sought solutions for a president determined to take action.

42. Woodward, *Commanders*, 232-42.

43. Woodward, *Commanders*, 266-73.

Operation Desert Shield as additional Iraqi forces moved into Kuwait. Initially concerned for the safety of a small contingent with limited self-defense capability, Powell notified the president as US strength approached the required number of forces to defend Saudi Arabia against further aggression. The CJCS needed to know whether to stop the flow of forces or send more for another purpose.⁴⁴

The administration asked for additional information on the forces required to build an offensive capability. Powell made it clear to Schwarzkopf that he could count on any resources and personnel deemed necessary to accomplish the mission. The chairman delivered an expansive list of required forces during a meeting with the president, Scowcroft, Baker, and Cheney in the Situation Room on 30 October. The request roughly doubled what the president had already approved, including VII Corps from Europe and three more aircraft carriers.⁴⁵ Despite the initial shock from some in the room, Bush approved the request. The president set course for a military offensive to remove the Iraqi invaders by force.

Bush gave the order to start Operation Desert Storm with a withering air campaign against a technologically inferior opponent on 17 January 1991. Precision targeting, night-vision systems, satellites, stealth, and a host of advanced weapons wielded by a well-trained force provided an asymmetric advantage that quickly yielded air superiority. In accordance with the plan, US ground forces awaited 30 days of assault from the air before advancing against the enemy. The ground offensive proceeded quickly, culminating in a demoralized, defeated, and heavily damaged Iraqi contingent attempting to avoid complete destruction via hasty retreat from Kuwait.

44. Woodward, *Commanders*, 298-99, 318-20.

45. Woodward, *Commanders*, 319.

Conflict Termination and Results

The tension of the conflict's first month rapidly transitioned to gratification as progress on the ground clarified the coalition's battlefield dominance. As the remnants of Saddam's military ran back to Iraq, anxiety about the offensive's success turned into concern over the extent of damage inflicted. A trail of destruction wrought by US air power on retreating Iraqi forces revealed the gruesome reality of human conflict in startling fashion.⁴⁶ Several worried images of the carnage might transform a stunning operational victory into political backlash in the court of world opinion. After consulting Schwarzkopf, they elected to cease the attack.

Coalition forces left no doubt about results on the battlefield, but history has since delivered a harsh critique of the administration's choices at the end of the conflict. In Vietnam, successive presidents struggled with overcoming the implications of a disparity between determination and objectives on either side of the conflict. In the Persian Gulf two decades later, disparate interests and goals once again resulted in an elongated conflict.

Saddam Hussein's grip on power benefitted from a disparity between the administration's rhetoric and its actions. They had characterized him as an unstable threat to world order on the level of Adolf Hitler before hostilities began.⁴⁷ They had cited his numerous war crimes as justification for their plan to use force.⁴⁸ Yet after little more than a month of conflict, they left establishment of ceasefire terms to the

46. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 207. Powell described how coalition air power was killing thousands of retreating Iraqi forces along a stretch of road media began referring to as the "Highway of Death."

47. O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell*, 86, 88.

48. These included violence associated with his regime in Iraq, attack and dismantling of Kuwait, treatment of Kuwaitis and other prisoners, and use of chemical weapons in the fight against Iran.

military officers.⁴⁹ Instead of supporting a coup they had incited, they ordered US forces to stand by idly as Saddam killed more than a hundred thousand of his own people to assert control.⁵⁰ The coalition's massive force accomplished its limited objective and then stopped. Failure to hold Saddam Hussein personally accountable for his actions left successive US administrations to face continuing challenges from a rogue tyrant emboldened by his perceived victory.

Evaluating Doctrinal Tenets

The president declared the ghosts of Vietnam exorcised in the conflict's immediate aftermath.⁵¹ As if to address the final holdover of national regret from an earlier mistake, US citizens greeted their returning forces with exuberant displays of adoration. Parades honored those responsible for the war's conduct as coalition forces returned to

49. "Norm went in uninstructed," a senior Bush administration official recalled. "He should have had instructions," but he did not. "The process broke down. The generals made an effort not to be guided. It was treated as something that was basically a military decision, not to be micromanaged." Quoted in Geoffrey Dr. Wawro, "The Sins of the First Gulf War," *The Daily Beast*, 22 January 2011, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/01/22/first-gulf-wars-mistakes-explain-us-presence-in-iraq.html>.

50. Woodward, *Commanders*, 237, 82. Bush ordered the CIA to conduct a covert operation to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Sparrow, *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft*, 417. The intelligence agency encouraged the coup using leaflets urging them to rebel. Powell and Persico, *A Soldier's Way*, 530-31. Saddam also unleashed his anger in northern Iraq, where he displaced approximately 500,000 Kurds using military force. His attacks on Iraq's citizens in the south and north led to the establishment of southern and northern no-fly zones policed by coalition air forces for more than a decade after the conflict ended. Saddam's post-conflict attacks resulted in the deaths of more than 100,000 people as the ruthless dictator sought to reassert control.

51. George H. W. Bush, "Remarks to the American Legislative Exchange Council," (Address, Room 450, Old Executive Office Building, Washington, DC, 1 March 1991).

their respective nations.⁵² Powell concluded victory in the desert stood as an example of what US military force could do when applied correctly. The CJCS asserted the use-of-force criteria ascribed to him as the Powell Doctrine in an article he wrote for the winter 1992 edition of the *Foreign Affairs* international relations journal.⁵³

The doctrine's tenets undergird Powell's perspective on the role of force in US strategy, but the administration did not fully embrace his philosophy. Powell had not yet published his nine-question litmus test in August 1990. On the other hand, he exerted more personal influence over the role of force in the Persian Gulf case than in any of the others considered in this study. As described below, deviations from a thorough examination of the doctrine's requirements led to disappointments in Iraq and the United States.

The following section examines consistency of US policy in the Persian Gulf conflict with each of the five Powell Doctrine tenets considered in the overall study. Introduction of each tenet includes its assessment within the case (yes: consistent with the Powell Doctrine; no: inconsistent with the Powell Doctrine). The narrative that follows describes analysis resulting in the tenet's assessment, and considers indicators for each as described in the coding appendix.

Purpose—Yes

Of the nine tenets articulated by the chairman, his first sought clarity regarding the policy-maker's objective. Powell's question did not pass judgment on the objective itself, but emphasized the importance of understanding desired ends to ensure unity of effort throughout the planning and execution phases of the endeavor. As the administration considered options in the Middle East, Powell did not seek to determine

52. Powell and Persico, *A Soldier's Way*, 531-32.

53. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," 32-45.

the objective, but instead described considerations if the administration intended to use military force in its pursuit.

The Bush administration pursued an important, clear, and well-understood political objective in the Persian Gulf. Results of analyzing the objective's importance produced mixed results, primarily due to the lack of a direct connection with US national security and the American public's divided opinion. The tenet receives a positive assessment due to the support of the international community and the US Congress for restoring the border, and the American public's increasing support for the offensive. Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf voiced various concerns about the plan, but investigation produced insufficient evidence to conclude the professional officer corps either agreed or disagreed with the importance of the political objective.

Not every American agreed about the objective's importance, but few questioned the administration's clarity. During months of preparation for the offensive, the American public, US government agencies, military planners, and coalition partners understood the mission's purpose to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restore the international border. The objective remained unchanged throughout the operation and post-conflict settlement. The only evidence of mixed results regarding the objective's clarity stems from the dissonance between President Bush's rhetoric about the significant threat presented by Saddam Hussein and the limited objective of reclaiming Kuwait's territory without removing him from power. Table 2 displays results of indicator and tenet analysis.

Table 2. Purpose

Is the political objective important, clear, and understood?*		<u>Y</u>
Important	US national security compromised if not accomplished	N
	Benefactors' security compromised if not accomplished	Y
	American public agrees	B
	International community agrees	Y
	Professional officer corps agrees	U
Clear and understood	American public aware	Y
	Consistent public statements	B
	Consistent military planning	Y
	Consistent military actions	Y
	Consistent national instruments of power	Y
	Consistent coalition actions	Y

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell-Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

Immediately following Iraq's unexpected invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the administration struggled to develop a coherent military response. The president and his team quickly coordinated economic and diplomatic options with international partners, but determining the role of force proved more difficult.⁵⁴ As US and Middle Eastern heads of state considered the threat posed by Iraq's military, contemporary concerns contrasted with the proclivities of centuries-old suspicions to determine the limits of coordination between civilizations. If the administration wanted to remove Iraq's ground forces from Kuwait by force, they needed permission to stage military operations from a nearby country.

54. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 192-96.

They capitalized on King Fahd's fears by sharing intelligence showing the close proximity of Iraqi forces and emphasizing his country's unpreparedness to defend itself from a stronger opponent. The monarch granted approval to establish a base of operations.⁵⁵ Operation Desert Shield, the mission to defend Saudi Arabia, began with US F-15s landing in the country on 8 August 1990.

The arrival of US forces only six days after Iraq's invasion demonstrated the president's interest in forcefully countering Saddam's advance. Bush's rationale hinged on remorseful thoughts held over from an earlier era. Born in the 1920s, Bush, Thatcher, and Scowcroft all came of age as the world conceded a missed opportunity to stymie Adolf Hitler's ambitions before he gained enough power to unleash the horrors of war on a global scale.⁵⁶ None of Bush's advisors articulated a challenge to the president's analogy despite several, contextual differences.

Bush's public statements conflicted with one another from the beginning, but he never strayed from his private resolution to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait as soon as possible by any means necessary.⁵⁷ The president announced his decision to deploy US forces in defense of Saudi Arabia. He also stated Saddam Hussein's forces could not stay in Kuwait, but left unresolved more specific questions of his mechanism's ways, means, and timeline. The president's authoritative position

55. Woodward, *Commanders*, 254-59, 63-73.

56. Woodward, *Commanders*, 317. The president drew parallels from the current situation with those he found in a book he chose to read during military preparations. He vowed not to repeat history as described in Martin Gilbert's *The Second World War: A Complete History*, a book that outlined the role of appeasement in the series of events leading to World War II.

57. Sparrow, *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft*, 418. Sparrow describes the president's interest in offensive military operations as soon as possible to prevent Saddam Hussein from profiting from his aggression in any way. Bush and Scowcroft remained impatient throughout the military buildup preceding the coalition's attack.

underscored his objective, but undermined his assertion that the US military's mission was limited to preventing further Iraqi aggression.

Bush's rhetoric transitioned into a quest for public support of a coalition offensive, but his objective remained the same.⁵⁸ Unlike the removal of Noriega from power in Panama, the administration never strayed from its political end state. The clear goal made it easy for planners to determine intermediate objectives. They sought to erode the combat capability of Iraq's forces until their surrender, retreat, or demise.⁵⁹ Powell publicly described the plan, asserting his intent to cut off, and then kill Saddam's ground forces.⁶⁰

Throughout the offensive, the coalition conducted operations in support of the overall plan. Despite minor challenges due to political pressure resulting from collateral damage and the possibility of Israeli retaliation for scud missile attacks, the air component weakened Iraq's combat capability with deep strikes and interdiction. As coalition ground forces started operations, their rapid progress better resembled a race to the finish than a pitched battle. In one hundred hours, coalition ground forces had reclaimed Kuwait. After conferring with his subordinate commanders, Schwarzkopf reported they had accomplished their objective. President Bush gave the order to stop.

58. Adam Clymer, "Confrontation in the Gulf; Congress Acts to Authorize War in Gulf; Margins Are 5 Votes in Senate, 67 in House," *New York Times*, 13 January 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/13/world/confrontation-gulf-congress-acts-authorize-war-gulf-margins-are-5-votes-senate.html?pagewanted=all>. Closer in the Senate than in the House, congressional debate centered on a contrast between the objective (countering Saddam's aggression) and cost (measured in American lives and economic implications).

59. Woodward, *Commanders*, 305-07. The military's scheme of aerial and naval attack met with quick approval, but the plan for ground forces required multiple iterations. Despite changes to the scheme of maneuver, the objective remained clear throughout the planning effort

60. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 205.

Due to remarkably little resistance from Iraq's military and few losses, the coalition occupied a strong position of advantage from which to dictate terms. For more than six months, President Bush had remained resolute that Saddam could not continue his occupation of Kuwait. To gain international and domestic support for his military offensive, he had consistently emphasized Iraq's threat to the region and world order. On 28 February 1991, coalition forces completed a rout of their opponent that lasted less than two months and achieved the objective sought.⁶¹ Saddam Hussein did not request it, but President Bush unilaterally declared a ceasefire with the menacing dictator still in power.

The objective remained unchanged during the post-conflict settlement. Convinced Saddam's own people would overthrow their weakened dictator, the administration rapidly removed coalition forces. Several limitations explain the unalterable focus on reestablishing the border. Domestically, policy makers and military practitioners interested in minimizing defense spending cuts perceived political advantage in a quick, decisive victory.⁶² Additionally, no one wanted the US to take responsibility for administering Iraq's government. Externally, Saudi Arabia feared Saddam's demise might usher in a new government more closely aligned to Iran. The administration also considered Iran the larger

61. Sparrow, *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft*, 414, 16-17. Despite light losses (of nearly 700,000 deployed, US forces lost 383 personnel related directly to the war; of those, 235 deaths resulted from injuries not inflicted by enemy forces), the coalition destroyed half of the Republican Guard's equipment and inflicted damage on Iraq characterized by a March 1991 UN report as "near apocalyptic."

62. This purpose united Colin Powell and other military leaders personally invested in avoiding another hollow force, congressional representatives interested in preserving profitable defense contracts, and administration appointees desiring increased flexibility to use military power in pursuit of unprecedented foreign-policy objectives without fear of Soviet reprisal.

threat to US interests in the region.⁶³ Finally, coalition support for the offensive emanated from the UN's mandate to end Iraq's occupation. Changing the objective implied an undesirable and lengthy process to renegotiate new terms.

If the president's narrow objective called into question its own value for his domestic audience, the departure of coalition forces confirmed the limited extent of US regional interests for the entire world. Saddam Hussein exploited his opportunity to consolidate power, Iraq's dissidents lacked the support required to resist his strength, and other nations observed the global hegemon's fickle application of force by its powerful military.⁶⁴ America's ambivalent exit sheared a tenuous thread connecting the conflict to US interests—the Hitler analogy Bush had invoked to gain support for war.⁶⁵

Commitment—Yes

In the buildup to the offensive, the president underscored his personal commitment by emphasizing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Bush maintained consistency with his public statements by supporting the professional officer corps' request to build an overwhelming force. Fully aware of self-imposed limitations and their

63. The White House, *National Security Directive 26: U.S. Policy toward the Persian Gulf*, 2 October 1989.

64. The reaction produced effects for Western-friendly and opposing regimes. Those countries aligned with US interests confirmed that the US would use military force to protect them from aggressors. Would-be antagonists noted that Saddam had escaped unscathed while also observing the futility of confronting US influence using conventional military forces.

65. David W. Moore, "Americans Believe U.S. Participation in Gulf War a Decade Ago Worthwhile," *Gallup, Inc.*, 26 February 2001, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1963/americans-believe-us-participation-gulf-war-decade-ago-worthwhile.aspx>. Polling results reflected a distinction between support for going to war to thwart a US enemy and the more limited objective of liberating people from a different nation.

effects, planners developed clear military objectives and designed a successful operation. The administration exerted significant control over ways and means, but evidence also reveals extensive dependence on other nations in the region for political and logistic support. By January 1991, the administration had assembled a force capable of decisively achieving the objective. Table 3 displays results of indicator and tenet analysis.

Table 3. Commitment

Will the forces considered decisively achieve the objective?*	<u>Y</u>
Practitioners' requests supported	Y
Trained, equipped practitioners available	Y
Clear objectives established	Y
Aware of self-imposed limitations and their effects	Y
US policy makers control required means and ways	B

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

As he fought to gain public support, Bush met the officer corps' requests for resources with remarkable acceptance. His willingness to unleash subordinate commanders while holding together a broad coalition of countries proved enormously effective on the battlefield.⁶⁶

66. See also Clausewitz, *On War*, 184. Beyond cold calculations of combat capability determined by a belligerent's experience, weapons, resources, and numbers, Carl von Clausewitz described the importance of moral factors in determining war's outcome. Like so many before it, the dispute in the Persian Gulf pitted unique assumptions, goals, and limitations of opposing sides against one another in life-or-death circumstances.

Support for the administration's policy increased as painstaking diplomatic, economic, and military preparation quickly yielded results. A dictator isolated from international support witnessed the systematic dismantling of his ability to project power. The joint and international coalition of well-trained forces wielded modern weapons in an awesome display of coordinated violence directed at a weaker enemy. Just as he had in Panama, Powell once again supported his contention that going big minimizes risk.

As obvious as the chairman's assertion may seem, US presidents have not always chosen overwhelming force. In fact, the disproportionately dominant ground forces used in Panama and the Persian Gulf distinguish these conflicts from subsequent US military operations. Powell's passionate interest in avoiding conflict unless policy makers commit to achieving the objective decisively resulted from personal experience in Vietnam. His role as trusted proxy between Schwarzkopf and the administration proved influential.

Liberation from the Soviet threat also increased the administration's flexibility to devote significant resources to Iraq.⁶⁷ Powell encouraged Schwarzkopf to ask for more combat power, and convinced the administration they needed it. US and coalition forces at the height of Cold War readiness descended on Iraq's military in Kuwait at the behest of a president determined to deliver a knockout blow. Armed with a clear political goal, planners had little difficulty determining military objectives for subordinate commanders. The administration imposed relatively few limitations on military actions beyond those typically associated with *jus in bello*.

Maintaining the coalition presented the only significant challenge to military freedom of action during the conflict. Great pains taken to

67. Woodward, *Commanders*, 310. Dissolution of the Soviet Union meant VII Corps could deploy to Iraq from Europe.

secure international approval and build a multinational coalition isolated Saddam, but also invited external limitations. America provided the preponderance of combat power, but needed regional bases to conduct operations and a coalition for legitimacy. Support from regional powers necessitated isolation of Israel from the conflict. Sustaining coalition resolve all but eliminated the possibility of altering the conflict's calculus (e.g. changing the objective).

After Conflict—No

The coalition held together throughout the conflict, ejecting the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The-24-hour news cycle broadcast nearly continuous coverage of the operation's progress into American homes. Iraq's military proved incapable of resisting the coalition offensive, and the US-led ground force quickly regained control of Kuwait with minimal losses. The rapid conclusion to hostilities placed responsibility for the next step on the coalition.

The Bush administration focused intently on preparing to fight the conflict, but did not critically consider the desired outcome and associated risks. They considered post-conflict disposition of forces, relations with regional and coalition governments, and effects on Iraq's government, infrastructure, and population. However, they left contingency planning and establishment of the political settlement following the conflict to the professional officer corps. Lack of consideration for risks associated with leaving Saddam Hussein in power and a related increase in Western presence in the Middle East challenged the connection of operational victory to strategic benefit. Table 4 displays results of indicator and tenet analysis.

Table 4. After Conflict

Have we critically considered the desired outcome and associated risks?*		<u>N</u>
Desired Outcome	Status of opposition military force	Y
	Status of opposition government	Y
	Status of opposition infrastructure and population	Y
	Position of friendly forces	Y
	Status of relations with coalition members	Y
	Terms of political settlement established	N
	Contingency planning capability established	N
Associated Risks	Mission	Y
	Political	N
	Economic	N
	Long-term risk	N

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

Each nation entered the conflict based on its assessment of the situation, but concerns over Saddam Hussein's increased control of the world's oil reserves played a significant role. The 1980s had been unkind to oil prices. President Bush's extensive connections to the oil market caused him to fear further economic repercussions from Iraq's aggression.⁶⁸ The annexation of Kuwait increased Saddam Hussein's

68. Monica Perin, "Adios, Zapata! Colorful Company Founded by Bush Relocates to N.Y.," *Houston Business Journal*, 25 April 1999, <http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/1999/04/26/story2.html>. The president co-founded an oil business in the 1950s in Midland, Texas. He later bought out his share of the company, converted it from a production business to an offshore-drilling venture, and moved it to

share of the market, but the president's greater concern was the threat Iraq's military posed to Saudi Arabia's control of vast oil resources.⁶⁹ Given his oil-market background, none of Bush's advisors possessed the knowledge required to question his assessment of the threat.

For Bush the perceived threat stemmed from Saddam's potential path to increased power and control as much as it did to concerns about US access. In the event, Iraq lit fire to Kuwait's oil fields while the Western coalition conducted numerous attacks on Iraq's oil infrastructure. In one sense, the choice for conflict denied the entire world access to oil in that the destruction of infrastructure severely reduced Iraq's and Kuwait's capacity to export oil for years following the conflict.⁷⁰ If vital interests in the region extend to controlling who profited from oil's sale, stopping short of removing the regime appears inconsistent with the risk assessment.

Consequences of the Persian Gulf conflict extended far beyond its influence on the world's oil market, but the president's view of the end state focused primarily on the disposition of forces. The coalition removed or destroyed all Iraqi forces in Kuwait while weakening Saddam's ability to wage war and minimizing civilian casualties. The administration also made clear expectations for maintaining multi-

Houston. After more than a decade in the oil business, he resigned as the company's chairman to run for Congress. A collapse in oil prices during the 1980s caused the company Bush founded to face bankruptcy multiple times. By 1990, it had gone more than five years without a profitable quarter.

69. Woodward, *Commanders*, 226. Iraq's control would increase from 20 percent to 40 percent of the world's oil reserves if they took over Saudi Arabia.

70. U.S. Energy Information Administration, "International Energy Statistics," *eia Beta*, <http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=53&aid=1&cid=r5,&syid=1990&eyid=2000&unit=TBPD>. The states' total oil supplied did not recover to pre-conflict levels for three years in Kuwait and eight years in Iraq.

national support of coalition members while ensuring enough friendly forces remained in position to discourage a future attack.

The conflict's aftermath demonstrated the critical importance of strategy's role in tying political ends to operational outcomes. After conceding the illegitimacy of Iraq's aggression, the American public narrowly sided with the president's plan to repel his advance using military force. The administration's domestic support fell from nearly unanimous approval ratings immediately following the conflict to a lost election the following year. The rapid decline in popularity underscores the political risk of US intervention in the Persian Gulf, the signature event of Bush's first term. The defeated president reflected on the perplexing reality that his military victory portended his political defeat.⁷¹

One reason for the decline in Bush's popularity after the conflict was the administration's omission of post-conflict planning.⁷² They left the discussion of settlement terms to the professional officer corps and their Iraqi counterparts.⁷³ Consistent with the guidance he had operated under since the beginning of planning for offensive operations, Schwarzkopf demanded little of his adversary beyond remaining out of Kuwait. The Iraqis had not requested a ceasefire, but quickly agreed to the unobtrusive terms offered.

Their leader interpreted the ceasefire through a lens unconsidered by the administration. They dwelled on possible risks of leaving Saddam unchallenged and risks to accomplishing the mission of removing his

71. Powell and Persico, *A Soldier's Way*, 560-61.

72. Sparrow, *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft*, 417-18. Sparrow describes a lack of post-conflict contingency plans and critical thought dedicated to risks associated with successful mission accomplishment because the administration expected the Iraqi people to overthrow their leader. Sparrow's assertion suggests incredible hubris considering Washington did not control the change mechanism. Perhaps the administration expected the population in Iraq to embrace US influence as the Panamanians had a year earlier.

73. Wawro, "Sins of the First."

forces from Kuwait.⁷⁴ President Bush had viewed Iraq's aggression through a World War II paradigm, but instead of demanding an unconditional surrender, the president chose to stop fighting and remove most of his forces. His decision reflected a belief that battlefield dominance certainly ensures policy success. The flawed assumption failed to consider broader risks caused by the administration's chosen course.

For Saddam Hussein, the conflict's unexpected end liberated him from fearing consequences of his actions as he quickly turned his attention to maintaining power. In the years to come, he killed untold numbers of his own people. Instead of conforming to international norms, he defied them by refusing to comply with UN mandates and maintaining the illusion of a nuclear weapons program as a hedge against his enemies. His international insolence and murderous regime undermined America's foreign policy and escalated regional tension. Pursuit of a limited objective intended to reduce a rogue dictator's belligerence instead illuminated altogether different risks than those considered by the Bush administration. After one of the most lopsided military defeats ever recorded in history, the dictator likened to Adolf Hitler still presided over an oppressive regime in Iraq. Worse, the US now owned some measure of responsibility for his actions.

In the months following the ceasefire, parades and celebrations quickly gave way to concern over the next step in the Middle East. The administration's desire for Iraq's indigenous people to overthrow their dictator proved hopelessly optimistic after indifference during the political settlement gave way to more conflict. As Saddam Hussein

74. Woodward, *Commanders*, 349. Few questioned military superiority of the US-led coalition beyond wide-ranging casualty estimates. In December 1990, Schwarzkopf described the senior medical officer's estimate of 20,000 casualties and 7,000 killed in action as a worst-case assumption.

turned what remained of his military might against rival factions inside Iraq's borders, President Bush found it difficult to maintain ambivalence. Now that the US had intervened, and especially given its encouragement of a coup, the administration felt responsible for addressing Saddam's bellicosity. Along with protecting millions of displaced Kurds from Saddam's retaliation during Operation Provide Comfort, a US-led coalition patrolled no-fly zones in Southern and Northern Iraq for more than a decade after the conflict.

Bush's World War II analogy, post-conflict pronouncement of liberation from the legacy of Vietnam, and employment of prolific military power implied a vital mission with self-evident results and tangible benefits for the victor. Instead of a better peace, Americans inherited a quarter century of tragic disappointments in Iraq. Successive administrations have overseen no-fly zone enforcement, retaliatory missile strikes, conventional conflict to overthrow the government, counterinsurgency operations, and today's anti-terrorism efforts in search of a desirable political outcome.⁷⁵ The country expected a better return on its investment of blood and treasure. One can only guess whether knowledge of the conflict's results might have altered the Bush administration's risk assessment or patience with alternatives to using force.

President Bush committed the coalition to removing Iraq's forces from Kuwait, but his espoused end state better resembles a starting point for decades of US military involvement in the Middle East. The administration focused so intently on maintaining international and domestic support, they devoted little time to considering broader

75. Sunzi and Griffith, *The Illustrated Art*, 115. America's painful, contemporary history in Iraq supports Sun Tzu's contention that winning battles demonstrates less skill than figuring out a way to "subdue the enemy without fighting."

consequences.⁷⁶ A watershed event in Middle East politics immediately following the Cold War's dramatic conclusion, the conflict ushered in a new era of US military presence.⁷⁷ US bases of operation sprung up throughout the region, including service component headquarters in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar.

Assessing long-term risk requires the passage of time. In 25 years since the Persian Gulf conflict, no other region in the world has received more attention from US policy makers. Saddam Hussein's defiance of international law throughout his dictatorship forced the community of nations to consider international norms and the value of other states' compliance with them. As de facto leader of the recently established international order, America's response established a precedent for international intolerance of recalcitrant state actions and their consequences.

Non-Western observers of the crisis inferred two self-evident messages. First, Western states will use military force to influence political outcomes in other regions. That the US chose Western military power instead of non-violent means in support of measures taken by other states in the region underscored a preference for direct control.⁷⁸ Second, the Persian Gulf conflict sent a cold message of regional indifference regarding US concern for human suffering. Despite an enormous power disparity between opposing sides, the decision to stop

76. The historical record suggests little specific consideration of a broader strategy in the Middle East beyond restoring the border, maintaining access to oil, and hedging against Iran.

77. If the administration considered the conflict as a benefit for long-term US interests because it allowed greater US presence in the region, the strategy appears to have been an abject failure after 25 years of conflict in Iraq and the proliferation of global terrorist networks enabled by the turmoil.

78. Despite the heads of state from Jordan and Egypt asking for US patience as they worked with other regional leaders to address Iraq's aggression, the administration convinced Saudi Arabia's King Fahd of his need for US military power.

short of holding Saddam Hussein accountable legitimized the Iraqi dictator's authority. One need only consider the objective in Panama to confirm the signal.

The Bush administration described rolling back Saddam Hussein's advance as a defensive reaction required to protect world order, but the region's post-conflict upheaval undermines their thesis. In 1991, no American could have predicted the 9/11 attack or the Arab Spring, but the administration's narrow objective and apathetic approach to the conflict's conclusion revealed their lack of appreciation for broader effects. Extensive literature ascribes the escalation of twenty-first century terrorism to Western military presence in the Middle East.⁷⁹ *Takfirists* in numerous terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda and the Islamic State, claim foreign encroachment in the region justifies their methods.⁸⁰

War's Nature—No

Viewed using a World War II paradigm, Operation Desert Storm was an unmitigated success wherein US forces defeated their opponent, negotiated settlement terms, and returned home. Considering nearly three decades of post-Cold War history, the event appears less like a success than as the beginning of a constant struggle against despotic regimes and terrorist networks in the Middle East. These actors have demonstrated little interest in conventional warfare with the West. Instead, they leverage technology, ideology, and fear to counter US influence in the region and around the globe.

79. Robert Anthony Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Random House Trade Paperback ed. (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2006). Pape established the connection between suicide terrorists' countries of origin and those Middle Eastern states with a large US military presence.

80. David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 285-86.

The Bush administration did not assess the consequences of using force during the Persian Gulf conflict in accordance with the Powell Doctrine. The evidence suggests the entire chain of command, including President Bush, understood well the potential for uncertainty, unforeseen challenges, and physical losses. The consequences they failed to assess had less to do with the fighting itself than with the aftermath of the conflict. With limited knowledge of the region and its people, their view of the problem using the World War II paradigm precluded understanding how the population would interpret the conflict's conclusion. Additionally, they did not assess the potential for escalation and elongation of the conflict after the negotiated settlement. Table 5 displays results of indicator and tenet analysis.

Table 5. War's Nature

Have we assessed the consequences of using force?*	<u>N</u>
Uncertainty	Y
Unforeseen challenges	Y
Relationship with population	N
Physical losses	Y
Potential for escalation/elongation	N

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell-Docctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

Contemporary proliferation of violent extremists in Iraq and the Middle East underscores warnings from numerous military theorists regarding prolonged conflicts fought abroad against a religious ideology

or an armed population.⁸¹ President Bush resolved to avoid embroiling the nation in another quagmire. Beyond his limited objective, he understood the potential for fog and friction and projected resolute determination to overcome both. During the conflict, he overcame setbacks associated with friendly fire and collateral damage. He also exerted the political influence to keep Israel on the sidelines, and thereby prevented dissolution of the coalition he had so diligently worked to build. The administration also prepared for large numbers of casualties and Saddam's potential to use chemical weapons.⁸² President Bush understood the potential for bad news, but believed his plan precluded the possibility of another conflict like Vietnam.

Unfortunately, two unintended consequences thwarted US policy in Iraq. First, the administration's demonstration of ambivalence toward Saddam's reassertion of power undermined their justification for intervention on moral grounds. After inciting a coup before the conflict, they watched as Saddam brutally suppressed the post-conflict uprising. The dictator conducted mass executions and turned what remained of his military against the rebels. Untold numbers of Iraqis paid with their lives, and US forces still in the area did not intervene to stop the

81. Sun Tzu asserted, "there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited." Sunzi and Griffith, *The Illustrated Art*, 107. French theorist and Napoleon contemporary Antoine-Henri Jomini described wars of religion as the "most deplorable," and lamented horrors observed during the early 19th Century Spanish insurgency. Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. Capt. G.H. Mendell and Lieut. W.P. Craighill (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2008), 20-25. Finally, Clausewitz described the nature of wars fought against a "people in arms," asserting "the people who have not yet been conquered by the enemy will be the most eager to arm against him; they will set an example what will gradually be followed by their neighbors. The flames will spread like a brush fire, until they reach the area on which the enemy is based, threatening his lines of communication and his very existence." Clausewitz, *On War*, 479-83.

82. Woodward, *Commanders*, 331, 49.

bloodletting.⁸³ The Bush administration failed to plan for consequences associated with the intervention's effect on the people of Iraq.

The second unintended consequence of using force was the administration's lack of control over the conflict's end. Clausewitz described a battle of wills wherein each side influences the stopping point. The Bush administration declared a ceasefire after expelling Iraq's forces from Kuwait. Irrespective of Western goals, Saddam Hussein remained in charge of a large and capable military force while his enemy departed the battlefield. The Iraqi dictator asserted his grip on power and continued to challenge US interests long after the coalition's dissolution. Concerns over his failure to cooperate with weapons of mass destruction inspections led the second Bush administration to embark on an eight-year combat mission in Iraq. In 1990, the failure to assess consequences of resorting to force virtually guaranteed a resentful Iraqi population and an emboldened tyrant.

These unintended consequences of the Persian Gulf conflict underscore a noteworthy characteristic of force application in the post-Cold War era. To provide a strategic benefit, decisions to use force must include objectives, mechanisms, and measures designed to avert manifestation of an unacceptable or disadvantageous peace.⁸⁴ As demonstrated in Kuwait, the US has an incredibly effective military capable of defeating enemy forces on the field of battle. Furthermore, the

83. Dave Johns, "Saddam's Road to Hell: The Crimes of Saddam Hussein," *Public Broadcasting Service*, 24 January 2006, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/events_uprising.html.

84. In short, planning for a military offensive must include the resources and critical thought required to win the follow-on peace. This is a substantially different kind of planning than that required for national defense. Instead of the World War II model of an all-out effort from a fearful nation to secure an unconditional surrender from a menacing threat, the post-Cold War era requires competent authority to develop an all-out plan for a better state of peace.

achievement of military objectives has the potential to affect substantially the nation's future policy choices. In the post-Cold War era, the hegemon's responsibility for the state of peace increases with every use of military force.

Constituency—Yes

Fear of Saddam Hussein's despotism, not the promise of greater involvement in the Middle East, played a primary role in the Bush administration's strategy to secure public support for an offensive. President Bush railed against the dictator's aggression to convince a hesitant American public of the requirement for military intervention. As demonstrated by polling results, congressional support, and public approval ratings, the administration focused intently on their constituency throughout the buildup to war. Table 6 displays results of tenet and indicator analysis.

Table 6. Constituency

Do the American people support using force?*	<u>Y</u>
Polling results	Y
Congressional support	Y
Public demonstrations	Y
Public approval ratings	Y

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell-Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

As Saddam assessed his post-conflict situation, citizens of the US celebrated an apparent victory and rapid end to the conflict. The

president had struggled to maintain support for his policy after the initial announcement of a defensive mission with a short duration.⁸⁵ Despite increasing public awareness of Kuwaiti mistreatment, oil market consequences, and Saddam Hussein's brazen aggression, the Bush administration lacked domestic support for a military offensive to liberate Kuwait in December 1990.⁸⁶

They worked to increase support for the offensive. In pursuit of international legitimacy, they worked for months to secure the UN's approval. In October, the Security Council passed Resolution 678 authorizing removal of Iraq's forces in Kuwait by any necessary means.⁸⁷ Despite the authorization, polls revealed American support for the administration's policy in the Gulf was down thirty percent.⁸⁸ At the end of November, Senator Cohen asserted that US citizens were not behind the idea of sending Americans to die for the benefit of another country.⁸⁹

Buoyed by the UN's authorization, the administration increased their lobbying efforts. Despite the refusal of support from congressional defense experts during a meeting with the president on 30 November, they continued to engage. Cheney and Powell described the

85. Woodward, *Commanders*, 277.

86. Woodward, *Commanders*, 316.

87. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 678, 29 November 1990. The authorization to use force against Iraq was the UN's most extensive since the Korean conflict in 1950. See also Woodward, *Commanders*, 333-35. The Bush administration worked diligently to ensure United Nations' authorization for the use of force against Iraq. The most significant resistance came from France and Russia, but neither voted against the authorization as it passed the UN Security Council by a vote of 12-2, with only Yemen and Cuba dissenting.

88. Woodward, *Commanders*, 325. The more the administration admitted the possibility of taking offensive military action against Iraq, the less public support they received. Whereas public support of the administration's policy stood at 82 percent initially, it had dwindled to 51 percent by November 1990. The steep, downward trend in public support surprised President Bush and his national security advisor--perhaps the most ardent supporters of a decision to use force.

89. Woodward, *Commanders*, 339.

administration's perspective at a congressional committee hearing on 3 December.⁹⁰ The president emphatically distinguished the conflict from Vietnam in personal conversations with various congressional representatives. As a vote on authorization to use force approached at the beginning of January, the president sent a personal letter to both houses of Congress seeking their approval.⁹¹ The administration conveyed their belief that congressional authorization for war offered a final opportunity to convince Saddam to withdraw before the coalition offensive began.

Their efforts produced results as Congress authorized the use of force via a narrow margin in the Senate and a slightly wider margin in the House on 12 January.⁹² The president signed Public Law 102-1 into law two days later. The bill did not mention vital national interests or US access to oil, but it did provide a proxy for the American people's support of the planned offensive.⁹³

The president had not forgotten the importance of public support throughout the crisis. When polling results revealed a decline in favorability for his desired course, he pursued a strategy to convince the public. Garnering Russia's support for a UN resolution, convincing Secretary Baker to advocate for his plan, and lobbying congress for authorization to use force all proved pivotal.⁹⁴ Despite modest pushback,

90. Woodward, *Commanders*, 341-43.

91. Woodward, *Commanders*, 354-58.

92. Woodward, *Commanders*, 362.

93. Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution, Public Law 102-1, 102d Cong., 1st sess., (14 January 1991). In addition to citing condemnation of Iraq's aggression by the international community, the resolution justified use of force based on Iraq's possession of, and demonstrated willingness to use, weapons of mass destruction. It also underscored Iraq's brutality during its illegal occupation of Kuwait.

94. Moore, "Americans Believe U.S." Although American support for an offensive increased in January 1991, Gallup's analysis suggested that only 50-60 percent of the nation agreed with a decision to attack. See also Woodward, *Commanders*, 337. A *Washington Post* poll on the eve of

the administration had solicited and received approval for the offensive before it commenced.

Considering the Tenets

As coalition forces engaged their first targets, five months of preparation and planning culminated in the president's order to attack. The administration had followed no blueprint for going to war. The president and his advisors considered the circumstances, viewed them through the prism of their own experiences, and made a decision to use force in pursuit of foreign-policy objectives on behalf of the American people.

As described above, President Bush's decision was consistent with three of the five Powell Doctrine tenets considered in this study. The president established an important, clear, and well-understood objective. He then committed forces capable of decisively achieving the objective, and earned domestic support for his desired policy choice. The use of force was inconsistent with the Powell Doctrine in that it failed to consider critically the desired outcome and associated risks. Additionally, the administration failed to assess the consequences of using force as they pertained to moral grounds justifying an offensive and the enemy's influence over its conclusion.

Typology

Having evaluated the crisis for consistency with the Powell Doctrine, the following section examines influence of variables within the case. This portion of the analysis assesses the study's independent variables: standing guidance, CJCS advice, and relative influence of other advisors. Variable assessments accompany their introduction

war revealed 90 percent of the country still hoped for peaceful resolution of the issue.

below, including a table describing coding options. After addressing independent variables, this section ends with an assessment of the study's intervening variables.

Standing Guidance—Coded G

Table 7. Variable coding: Standing Guidance

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Consistent with standing guidance	G
Ambiguous, or inconsistent with guidance	A

Source: Author's original work

With the notable exceptions of existing US commitments similar to the Korean War's armistice or the breaching of NATO's Article 5, US administrations consider the military's role in foreign policy based on their understanding of the stakes involved. Two key pieces of evidence suggest the Bush administration arrived at a decision to use force in a manner consistent with previously stated policy. The president's pre-conflict National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Security Directives (NSD) suggest standing guidance played a key role in the administration's view of Iraq's hostile act.

Throughout the four years of Bush's presidency, each subsequent NSS increasingly underscored threats previously considered too insignificant to highlight. Emphasizing deterrence, the Reagan administration's final NSS recommended against direct involvement by American military forces in the event of low intensity conflict.⁹⁵ One year

95. "The most appropriate application of U.S. military power [for low intensity conflict] is usually indirect through security assistance—training, advisory help, logistics support, and the supply of essential military equipment. Recipients of such assistance bear the primary responsibility for promoting their own security interests with the U.S. aid

later, adjusting to a world absent the Soviet Union, the Bush administration expressed increasing concern regarding conflicts in third world countries.⁹⁶ The 1990 NSS also goes a step further. The document asserted the administration's intent to expand its use of the military to address emerging threats.⁹⁷ Despite its publication months before the invasion of Kuwait, the 1990 NSS did not mention any threat from the country of Iraq or its leader, Saddam Hussein.

After emphasizing an expanded role for military force in the 1990 NSS, the administration's post-conflict NSS highlights their intention to restrain the role of force in US foreign policy. As if seeking to assuage the concerns of other nations regarding America's enforcement of world order, the 1991 NSS underscored the administration's intent to avoid taking responsibility for global law enforcement.⁹⁸ Although it preserved the right to act on behalf of American interests, the document advocated for resolving disputes through negotiations instead of military force.⁹⁹

provided." President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1988, 35.

96. "In a new era, some Third World conflicts may no longer take place against the backdrop of superpower competition. Yet many will, for a variety of reasons, continue to threaten U.S. interests. The erosion of U.S.-Soviet bipolarity could permit and in some ways encourage the growth of these challenges." President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1990, 6.

97. The administration asserted its plan to develop "new and imaginative ways to apply flexible general purpose forces to these problems."

Regarding low intensity conflict, the strategy stated, "it is not possible to prevent or deter conflict at the lower end of the conflict spectrum in the same way or to the same degree as at the higher. American forces therefore must be capable of dealing effectively with the full range of threats, including insurgency and terrorism." President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1990, 28.

98. The Bush administration asserted, "we cannot be the world's policeman with responsibility for solving all the world's security problems." President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1991, 2.

99. As described in the document, "in the end, we are answerable to our own interests and our own conscience—to our ideals and to history—for

The administration's final NSS struck a balance between its two preceding documents. The strategy highlighted once again the potential for destruction from conflict in and among smaller states.¹⁰⁰ Seeking middle ground between their desire to confront an emerging threat and an international community of states concerned about a great power with a hair trigger, the administration advocated for discriminate uses of force by international coalitions.¹⁰¹ The document described America's role in convincing allies to assume a portion of the responsibility for maintaining global security.

Updates to the NSS directly correlate with the Bush administration's foreign-policy activities and outcomes. The emphasis in 1990 on expanding the roles and missions of the US military addressed a need to redefine the institution's purpose in the post-Cold War world while also highlighting the success in Panama. The specific situation in the Persian Gulf fit within the administration's generic description of a role for employing US military force abroad. Subsequent versions of the NSS demonstrated their struggle to reconcile outcomes in the Persian Gulf with their goals.

Beyond his overarching guidance, the president described US policy toward the Persian Gulf region in security directives. The administration articulated US interests in the region in NSD 26. A derivative of the Carter Doctrine, the directive labeled US access to oil

what we do with the power we have." President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1991, 2, 10.

100. According to the document, "even as the danger of global war recedes, the potential for smaller but still highly destructive conflicts between nations and within nations is growing." President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, January 1993, ii.

101. The document stated, "there are limits to what we can or should do—we will have to be selective and discriminate in our global undertakings." President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, January 1993, 3.

and security of certain nations in the region as vital national interests.¹⁰² After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the administration released NSD 45 to articulate specific methods authorized to defend US national interests.¹⁰³ In its final pre-war directive, NSD 54 spelled out the military objectives of US forces conducting operations in coordination with the international coalition.¹⁰⁴

Standing guidance in NSD 26 and the NSS informed the inclination to respond with military force after Iraq's invasion. The initial deployment of US forces provided a deterrent against further aggression and implemented a strategy consistent with decades of US policy during the Cold War. Taking the next step of initiating a military offensive was not as easy. Senator Cohen and Colin Powell each questioned the notion of risking American lives on behalf of another nation.¹⁰⁵ Two former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided congressional testimony asserting a rush to war.¹⁰⁶ Unable to make the case for conflict based strictly on US security concerns, the administration cited other causes to justify their intended offensive.¹⁰⁷

102. House, *National Security Directive 26: U.S. Policy toward the Persian Gulf*, 2 October 1989. The policy expressed interest in working with Iraq to normalize relations between the two countries. It proposed offering US economic, political, and military assistance in the wake of the nation's recovery from war with Iran.

103. The White House, *National Security Directive 45: U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait*, 20 August 1990. Among other measures, the directive included sending US forces to Saudi Arabia to deter and defend against additional aggression by Iraq's military forces.

104. The White House, *National Security Directive 54: Responding to Iraqi Aggression in the Gulf*, 15 January 1991.

105. Woodward, *Commanders*, 311, 39.

106. Woodward, *Commanders*, 331-32.

107. Woodward, *Commanders*, 316-18, 37, 43, 45, 54. Woodward described the administration's and other US policy makers' quest for the rationale justifying the use of US military force. Reasons included establishment of international precedent regarding sanctity of borders, effect on the world's oil market, protection against Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruction, and responsibility to protect the Kuwaitis from

Chairman's Advice—Coded P

Table 8. Variable coding: Chairman's Advice

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Consistent with four or more Powell Doctrine tenets	P
Different than two or more Powell Doctrine tenets	D

Source: Author's original work

Despite congressional approval to use force, the close vote also made clear that not everyone endorsed an offensive. During the first meeting of the NSC following Iraq's invasion, Powell had questioned openly the value of taking additional military action beyond defending Saudi Arabia.¹⁰⁸ Powell's personal experience with war in Vietnam and his study of war's nature as a military officer caused him deep concern over the administration's plan in Kuwait. Throughout the buildup of coalition forces in Saudi Arabia, Powell advocated for restraint and cautious oversight of the military's role. He also sought out individual members of the administration to advocate for alternatives to an offensive.¹⁰⁹

The CJCS resigned himself to the futility of his efforts only after the president personally rejected his case for continuing Iraq's containment and isolation. Unable to persuade the policy maker, Powell

documented immoral actions conducted by the Iraqis. Opinions in Congress varied, but as polls showed waning public support for use of the US military, the Bush administration suggested the maltreatment of US hostages held by the Iraqis in Kuwait further justified using force. Several congressional representatives questioned relevance of the issue on a use-of-force decision, since Iraqi maltreatment of hostages was not a new topic.

108. Woodward, *Commanders*, 229.

109. Woodward, *Commanders*, 299-302.

focused on other areas of planning.¹¹⁰ He exerted significant influence over the discussion between policy maker and field commander as he convinced the president to send a large and capable force, and worked to clarify the president's objective for the mission.¹¹¹

President Bush granted Powell substantial authority over the planning and execution of military operations, but did not seek his counsel regarding the overall strategy. Powell's concerns regarding the consequences of using force precluded him from conceding that its application in Kuwait necessarily implied a benefit for US interests. He advocated for the large force specifically because he wanted to ensure a conclusive result most likely to avoid the detrimental effects of elongated conflict and its erosion of support from regional powers and US citizens.¹¹² Powell had seen the devastating effects of the enemy's vote in Vietnam and he pursued all available options to minimize Iraq's influence over the outcome in Kuwait.

The CJCS provided advice consistent with all but one of his tenets as he sought to prevent another lengthy conflict bearing resemblance to his experience decades earlier. His marginalization on policy issues within the Bush administration precluded an opportunity to engage the president or his closest advisors in a realistic discussion of risks and

110. Woodward, *Commanders*, 233-34, 98-99. Powell pushed back in the interest of responsible stewardship when pressured by Cheney to provide military options in the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi invasion. He also fought for a decision on Operation Desert Shield troop levels commensurate with the administration's intent for their use.

111. Woodward, *Commanders*, 233-34, 38-39. Powell rejected early inclinations to conduct air strikes against Iraq as an ineffective application of military force likely to disappoint.

112. Woodward, *Commanders*, 194, 260-62, 81-82, 320. Consistent with the advice he offered in Panama, Powell recommended a large, dominant force. His request for coalition forces in Saudi Arabia forced the president to declare his commitment to success. When the president decided to prepare for offensive operations, Powell considered limitations of the transportation system the only limit on the size of the military force assembled to conduct it.

their relationship with the desired outcome.¹¹³ Fiercely loyal to the president, Scowcroft and Baker largely ignored Powell's concerns. Cheney, Bush's second choice as defense secretary, also lacked the influence to question the president or his inner circle. He insulated the president from Powell's policy challenges by rebuffing the CJCS when his comments strayed from military operations.¹¹⁴ The administration's job description for their principal military advisor did not include direct influence over national strategy.

Relative Advisor Influence—Coded I

Table 9. Variable coding: Relative Advisor Influence

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Disproportionately influential	I
Unremarkable, relative influence	U

Source: Author's original work

The military's strategic role on behalf of the nation lay at the heart of the Bush administration's decision in the Persian Gulf. For decades, the professional officer corps focused almost exclusively on deterring the Soviet Union. At the dawn of a new era, the administration established the post-Cold war precedent for international conflict resolution. The world watched as the US used its enhanced influence to garner international and domestic support for unleashing vast military power against a substantially weaker nation.

113. Woodward, *Commanders*, 260-62. Perhaps no better example illustrates Powell's marginalization than his surprise at Bush's declaration that he would not allow Iraq's occupation of Kuwait to continue.

114. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 195.

The administration set its course in Iraq based on the influence of its most influential members. Bush's cabinet deferred to him as a subject matter expert due to his extensive experience and active role in policy development.¹¹⁵ Additionally, the president had more experience than the rest of his staff with the oil market and inferred consequences of Iraq's increased control over it.¹¹⁶ Bush also revealed his interpretation of nearly unlimited executive authority over the decision to use force in the Persian Gulf.¹¹⁷ A former CIA director and eight-year vice president with a personal interest in foreign policy, Bush's credentials, positional power, and personal involvement set a high bar for dissenting opinions.

No advisor had more opportunity to express an opinion about the president's policy in the Persian Gulf than did Brent Scowcroft. Bush's NSA disdained the Weinberger Doctrine's restraining effect and believed the Constitution's division of power authorized the president to use force without asking permission.¹¹⁸ From the outset, the NSA advocated using force to not only counter Iraq's invasion, but also remove Saddam from power.¹¹⁹ Scowcroft tolerated the containment and strangulation strategy primarily because of the time required to build the coalition's military power in the Saudi desert.¹²⁰ He remained dubious of non-violent means

115. Woodward, *Commanders*, 262.

116. Woodward, *Commanders*, 226.

117. In a conversation with Saudi Arabia's King Fahd on 31 December 1990, the president explained his views on the division of power among America's branches of government. Desiring to ease the monarch's anxiety over congressional resistance to the use of force against Iraq's military, Bush stated, "Congress is covering its own tracks. They do not want to take action and do not have the power or right to tie the hands of the President." The White House, *Memorandum: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia*, 31 December 1990.

118. Woodward, *Commanders*, 230-31.

119. Woodward, *Commanders*, 237.

120. Woodward, *Commanders*, 230. Scowcroft believed the Carter Doctrine's declaration of Middle East oil as a vital national interest justified the use of force to remove Iraq's forces from Kuwait.

throughout the crisis and regarded using force as the most efficacious policy alternative at the president's disposal.¹²¹

After Scowcroft, James Baker occupied the next most influential position regarding the administration's Persian Gulf strategy. The president's campaign manager and friend for 35 years, Bush's secretary of state offered little resistance to the initial deployment of forces in defense of Saudi Arabia, but refrained from supporting Bush's plan for a military offensive until October 1990.¹²² Keenly aware of the political capital expended by the president to apply pressure on Saddam Hussein, Baker eventually conceded the necessity of using force to ensure policy success. The longest holdout of Bush's inner circle, Baker ultimately used his influence to garner international and congressional support for the offensive.¹²³

Beyond Scowcroft and Baker, the remaining members of Bush's Gang of Eight provided little influence over the administration's Persian Gulf policy.¹²⁴ Dick Cheney advocated for defending Saudi Arabia and believed the fall of Kuwait represented a direct threat to US interests justifying a military response.¹²⁵ Despite implications of the president's hyperbole, Cheney was unable or unwilling to reduce it. Additionally, Bush's chief of staff wielded little influence over the policy discussion. By

121. Woodward, *Commanders*, 299, 301. Powell eventually came to believe that President Bush's closest advisors were not presenting him with an objective assessment of potential alternatives to conflict.

122. Woodward, *Commanders*, 318.

123. Woodward, *Commanders*, 316. Baker emphasized the maltreatment of US hostages in Iraq as a way to convince reluctant members of Congress to support an offensive.

124. Sparrow, *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft*, 392. Scowcroft attempted to improve the NSC process by creating a decision-making body known as the Gang of Eight. In addition to the president and vice president, the group included Baker, Scowcroft, Scowcroft's Deputy Robert Gates, Bush's Chief of Staff John Sununu, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and Powell.

125. Woodward, *Commanders*, 227, 34.

October 1990, he took the opposite view of Powell and actually encouraged the president to use strong language threatening military action against Iraq.¹²⁶

Outside the administration, other nation's representatives pushed the president toward an offensive. The president sympathized with the Kuwaiti emir's description of barbarity by Iraq's occupying force.¹²⁷ He also demonstrated significant loyalty to Saudi Arabia as he offered a solution to King Fahd's fear of further Iraqi aggression. Saudi Arabian Prince Bandar played a pivotal role in carrying the administration's message to the monarchy.¹²⁸ The prince advocated for a large US military presence initially, and personally received Bush's promise that he would stand with Saudi Arabia.¹²⁹ Finally, Scowcroft believed Margaret Thatcher produced the greatest effect on the president's perspective. The British prime minister advocated for a forceful response to Iraq's aggression and fortified Bush's resolve as the crisis unfolded.¹³⁰

Intervening Variables: Coded C and N

Table 10. Variable coding: Competing Alternatives

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Two or more available and feasible	C
Either one or zero alternatives	S

Source: Author's original work

126. Woodward, *Commanders*, 312.

127. Woodward, *Commanders*, 298.

128. Woodward, *Commanders*, 255.

129. Woodward, *Commanders*, 241, 43-45.

130. Sparrow, *The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft*, 388.

Table 11. Variable coding: Domestic Pressure

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
High pressure for US military intervention	H
Neutral or low pressure for US military intervention	N

Source: Author's original work

As others encouraged the president to take a firm stand against Iraq, neither of the intervening variables considered in this study pushed the president to take action. The administration considered and dismissed several alternatives to using force. They assessed some of these alternatives as ineffective after invoking them for a period of time (containment, economic sanctions, political isolation, diplomatic pressure), and deemed others unworthy of an attempt (retaliatory missile strikes).¹³¹ President Bush explored several alternatives to using military force, but grew increasingly pessimistic about their potential to achieve the desired result as the buildup of US forces in Saudi Arabia continued into January 1991.

Domestic pressure also yielded little influence over the administration's decision to use force. The administration made a public and private case for military action, and sought approval for intervention from the UN and Congress. Although Americans supported the initial deployment of US forces to Saudi Arabia by a large majority (78 percent for and 17 percent against), they also opposed starting a war to remove Iraq's military from Kuwait. When polled by Gallup for the first time in

131. Woodward, *Commanders*, 300-02. Powell believed Bush's closest advisors refused to advocate for alternatives to force despite reasons to believe some of these alternatives were working. Others (Paul Wolfowitz, Les Aspin, and William Cohen) believed sanctions had the potential to work, but that they required significant time. The administration did not provide reasons justifying the timeline they established for removing the Iraqis beyond Bush's interest in accomplishing the offensive as soon as the US chain of command agreed it was ready.

November 1990, 51 percent of Americans opposed initiating hostilities while 37 percent supported the use of US forces to eject the Iraqis.¹³² Far from responding to an outcry for retaliation, the administration spent considerable time and effort convincing the domestic audience of the need for an offensive. By the eve of the American offensive the numbers virtually swapped, with 50 percent in favor and 44 percent opposed.¹³³

Conclusions

As described in the previous chapter, this study considers variables with influence over decisions to use force in pursuit of foreign-policy objectives. The administration decided to start a military offensive in the Persian Gulf to end Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. As they considered options, standing guidance promoting a military role undergirded the perspective of the most influential members, Bush and Scowcroft. Powell advised in a manner consistent with four of the five Powell Doctrine tenets examined in this study, and might have advocated for the fifth as well if policy makers had afforded him the opportunity. The relative influence of others in the administration greatly exceeded that of the CJCS. Neither Bush nor his closest advisors sought out Powell's advice regarding the role of military force in US national strategy. When the chairman exploited his few opportunities to influence policy, his input received either little attention or condemnation from the defense secretary.¹³⁴

132. Moore, "Americans Believe U.S."

133. Moore, "Americans Believe U.S."

134. At the first National Security Council meeting after the invasion, Powell and Cheney disagreed about the appropriate American response. After the meeting, the secretary of defense told Powell, "Colin, you're Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. You're not Secretary of State. You're not the National Security Adviser anymore. And you're not Secretary of Defense. So stick to military matters." Quoted in O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell*, 87. After his time handling significant matters of state as Reagan's national security adviser, Powell felt frustrated that he was now expected

Table 12. Coding Persian Gulf variables

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Assigned code</i>
US military force used? ^y	M
Consistent with guidance? ^a	G
Chairman's advice ^b	P
Relative advisor influence ^c	I
Competing alternatives ^{x1}	C
Domestic pressure ^{x2}	N

Source: Author's original work

^y M = military force used; O = other option(s) selected instead of military

^a G = consistent with standing guidance; A = ambiguous or inconsistent

^b P = consistent with four or more Powell Doctrine tenets;

D = advice differs from two or more Powell Doctrine tenets

^c I = disproportionately influential; U = unremarkable, relative influence

^{x1} C = two or more available and feasible; S = single alternative or none

^{x2} H = high; N = neutral or low (public support for military intervention)

The decision to use force in the Persian Gulf represents the typology G + P + I = M where intervening variables *x1* and *x2* (coded C and N respectively) did not affect the outcome. This case represents a combination of variables consistent with Huntington's normal theory of civil-military relations. A broad view of the typology suggests the administration anticipated the potential for a conflict (standing guidance), received military advice from the professional officer corps (consistent with the Powell Doctrine), and exerted civilian control over the military (relative influence of civilian officials). Initial results of the offensive certainly suggested an effective use of military force with few

to stay in his lane as a military advisor. In the ensuing preparation for conflict, Cheney wanted a menu of military options, while Powell wanted clear political objectives. The defense secretary told him "his job was not to force a discussion or press Bush for policy answers; it was to provide a range of military options and then shut up." DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 194-95.

negative consequences.¹³⁵ Saddam Hussein's forces were no longer in Kuwait, the international community supported the offensive, and the American public celebrated their powerful, effective military and few casualties.

The years following the border restoration revealed a close connection between war and politics with a much less positive critique of the administration's policy. As the number of US casualties in Iraq once again rises during the spring of 2016 amid international terrorist organizations' threat to destabilize Iraq and the broader Middle East, analysis of the Persian Gulf typology requires further examination. How did a decisive military victory quickly turn into a political liability? How has the decision to lead a military offensive in the Middle East affected long-term US interests in the region? Typologies revealed while examining subsequent cases will help to identify considerations useful to understanding possible explanations for these questions, and a starting point for examining the importance of structure to the development of effective strategy.

One of the structural changes made by the landmark Goldwater-Nichols legislation pertained to advice provided by the professional officer corps. Powell's role in the Bush administration's use-of-force decisions established expectations and limits for the nation's principal military advisor. The president and his inner circle determined the military's role while the chairman used resources at his disposal to fulfill it. Regarding the development of national strategy, the principal military advisor's role better represented sub-contractor than design-team member. Powell

135. DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 208. Powell believed he and the administration had succeeded in achieving his personal goal of not leading the nation into another Vietnam. Powell listed four major accomplishments: the stated policy goal was clear, the administration had resourced the military achieve it, they gained and maintained popular support, and they set an international precedent for dealing with territorial aggression.

finished his four-year term as the next administration established a new team of foreign-policy specialists in the White House.¹³⁶

The next chapter examines their application of force at the close of the twentieth century. The Persian Gulf conflict had demonstrated America's military dominance. Lacking a peer competitor, the next administration broadly expanded the US military's charter while establishing a strategy of global engagement. Despite dramatically different context, they labored under the umbrella of multilateralism and the latent effects of an early tragedy that unfolded at the beginning of their term. Despite his departure early in their tenure, Colin Powell affected the administration's decisions throughout the duration of their stay in the White House.



136. Powell and Persico, *A Soldier's Way*, 233. Most often associated with his service during Republican administrations, Powell's first experience with national-security policy actually happened while he served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the Carter administration.

Chapter 5

Kosovo

What's the point of...[the] military...if we can't use it?

-Madeleine Albright

Civil-military relations entered into an era of friction and competition after the inauguration of William Jefferson Clinton as the 42nd president of the United States. The new administration labored to exert control over US military issues while international crises demanded attention.¹ As debate raged, emergence of two national-security concerns exerted influence over post-Cold War foreign policy. America's security apparatus refocused its attention on conflicts within states and terrorism. Additionally, the increasing ability of non-state actors to exert

1. Peter Feaver underscores the effect of Clinton's relationship with the military using an illustration: "like a divorced parent trying to get a child to support a custody arrangement, the White House effort to win the allegiance of those who were already obligated to obey only reversed the lines of de facto authority." Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 214. According to Bacevich, the administration assisted in the redefinition of the military's role in foreign policy while the military also emerged as a powerful political entity. Bacevich suggests, "the terrain where civilian interests, values, and fears intersected with those of the military became fiercely contested." Bacevich, *American Empire*, 171-72. Describing the events leading up to the air war over Kosovo, Herspring states, "The situation in Washington, however, was much the same as it had been over the last six years since Clinton took office. The White House provided no leadership, no policy, and no focus. The president did not address the deep divide between the military and civilians concerning the use of force." Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush*, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 367.

influence challenged old assumptions regarding the severity of their threat to US national security.²

As policy makers considered evolving threats in a new era, they sought politically feasible solutions capable of striking the middle ground between global dominion and oblivious disengagement. In the Persian Gulf, George Bush demonstrated that using force as part of a coalition offered the benefits of overcoming domestic resistance, decreasing national investment, and establishing legitimacy. Multilateralism offered the potential to reap benefits from military operations while diluting its political consequences. However, the Clinton administration quickly discovered that US military participation in an international mission did not guarantee favorable results.

Two different military operations during their first year in office resulted in embarrassing failures, and one of them ended in tragedy. The first was Somalia, where the Bush administration sent a task force at the end of 1992 to protect food and aid distribution in a failed state experiencing famine.³ Operation Restore Hope rapidly achieved its objectives under the Bush administration, but the follow-on effort overseen by the Clinton administration ended in disaster.⁴ Violence

2. The administration established a precedent by responding to terrorist attacks with missile strikes.

3. Guy Arnold, *Historical Dictionary of Civil Wars in Africa*, 2nd ed., Historical Dictionaries of War, Revolution, and Civil Unrest (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2008), 332. By August 1992, one UN representative “reported that 1.5 million Somalis would be at risk of starvation within a few weeks; hundreds were believed to be dying every day.” Walter S. Poole, *The Effort to Save Somalia, August 1992-March 1994* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), 8.

4. Poole, *The Effort to Save*, 24-26, 32-38. With operations beginning in December 1992, military planners provisioned 24 days for Phase I, with a primary focus on securing key distribution centers in the country’s interior. With little resistance, they accomplished Phase I in only seven days. By the end of January 1993, UNITAF was drawing down its forces and preparing to transition operational control to the broader UN

increased after the majority of US forces departed.⁵ The mission shifted from protecting supply lines to countrywide security, and eventually a manhunt for a Somali warlord.⁶ Two days after Powell retired in 1993, US forces sustained heavy casualties, including nationally televised images of Somalis dragging corpses through the streets of Mogadishu.⁷ Clinton's resultant decision to abandon the effort led to the end of US and UN operations in Somalia.

Just a week after the tragedy in Mogadishu, the administration oversaw another embarrassing rebuke of US military power.⁸ Despite Powell's cautions against using force in Haiti, Clinton had campaigned on his predecessor's lack of desire to address the humanitarian crisis.⁹

mission. Transfer of responsibility continued until 4 May 1993, when UN Operations in Somalia II officially relieved UNITAF.

5. Poole, *The Effort to Save*, 32-38. See also C. Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), 19. At its height, UNITAF included 24,500 US forces. For the transition to UNOSOM II, the administration provided American support forces starting at 4,000 with a planned reduction to 1,400 by January 1994. The transition also included provision of a US Central Command quick-reaction force of 1,150 personnel responsible for responding to emergencies.

6. Poole, *The Effort to Save*, 37-38, 41-42.

7. David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001), 262. After observers transmitted their videos to the world showing deceased and disfigured American military personnel drug behind vehicles in Mogadishu, Clinton referred to his Somalia foes as "two-bit pricks" and wondered how such bad publicity could have happened to him. See also DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life*, 239. During a conversation with Powell on the day of his retirement, the chairman revealed his realization that sending military forces into the country had been a mistake. He warned Clinton to get them out as soon as possible.

8. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 271.

9. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 249. See also Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 268. Although convinced the United States military could easily take over the island, Powell, concerned about the lack of a clear exit strategy, cited a 1915 American intervention on the island that resulted in nineteen years of military involvement as he advised both administrations to avoid using military force.

The administration sent a contingent of several-hundred forces as part of a UN mission to conduct nation-building activities on the island.¹⁰ The *USS Harlan County* transported the contingent, but a hostile crowd in Port-au-Prince refused to moor the ship, and it eventually returned to the US.¹¹

The early experiences of Somalia and Haiti cast a long shadow over the remainder of Clinton's presidency.¹² His disdain for their political implications caused the administration to reconsider its perspective on the use of force.¹³ In April 1994, a month after the last US forces departed Somalia, the Hutus began their brutal campaign of genocide against Rwandan Tutsis. An estimated 800,000 people died in only 100 days.¹⁴ The administration decided against US intervention, attempting

10. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 250.

11. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 272-73. Despite failing to participate during strategy discussions, Clinton lashed out at the other members of his National Security Council and his aides for not spinning the situation in a manner that maintained his popularity. Displaying exasperation, he suggested the Reagan administration had invaded Grenada as a method of sustaining the former president's popularity in the face of the attack on United States marines stationed in Lebanon. Baffled by his reaction, Clinton's staff concluded his anger had impaired his judgment. Frustrated by the negative image bestowed on him by his administration's foreign-policy failures, Clinton waited ten months before deciding to stage an invasion of the island.

12. Secretary of Defense William Cohen described Somalia as "the indelible stain" on the Clinton administration. Quoted in Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 442.

13. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 265. In contrast to the Powell Doctrine's restrictions on the use of force, many senior Clinton administration officials believed "that the United States had an obligation to help build a multinational community by providing military forces when necessary." Herspring, *The Pentagon*, 338. Nevertheless, Cimbala describes how failure in Somalia led to constraints on using forces for peacekeeping. He further underscores the administration-developed decision-matrix for engaging in peacekeeping. A derivation of the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines, the matrix was an attempt at tempering the desire to intervene. Stephen J. Cimbala, *Clinton and Post-Cold War Defense* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), 160-63, 70.

14. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 273-77.

to avoid another foreign-policy failure.¹⁵ Criticized for poorly managed interventions in Somalia and Haiti on the one hand, and for not intervening at all in Rwanda on the other, the administration struggled to implement a new approach to foreign-policy challenges.¹⁶ Their early failures and Colin Powell's retirement created a chaotic milieu of conflicting ideas regarding the appropriate use of force in a new era.¹⁷

The Stage

The string of political defeats did not result in a break from the demands of foreign policy. The previous administration had largely passed on involvement in the Balkans, where Serbs under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic swept the region village by village committing

15. Dag Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998-1999* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 85. In his memoirs, Clinton described the decision as one of his primary regrets. He cited his administration's focus on Bosnia, the recent memory of Mogadishu, and congressional opposition to US military interventions as reasons for his lack of action to stem the tide of Rwandan violence. Writer Philip Gourevitch describes the conflict in Rwanda as the most "pure and unambiguous genocide since the end of World War II." Quoted in Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 273.

16. Frustration with the administration's foreign policy remained throughout the 1990s. Examining the issue near the end of Clinton's first term, Sarkesian concluded, "The United States remains ill disposed and ill prepared to respond to unconventional conflicts...There is a serious need, therefore, to clarify the meaning of U.S. national interests with respect to Third World instability, rethink strategic orientation, and reconsider the utilization of the U.S. military. In many instances, it may be best that the United States not become involved in OOTW or unconventional conflicts, lest U.S. involvement change the dynamics of the situation to the disadvantage of American interests. Moreover, given the nature of the U.S. domestic setting, the Weinberger Doctrine may be the best guide to the commitment of U.S. forces." Sam C. Sarkesian, "Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict (Unconventional Conflicts), and the Clinton Defense Strategy," in *Clinton and Post-Cold War Defense*, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 118.

17. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 283. A live interview with Clinton on the ground in Sarajevo revealed the administration's incoherent policy to the entire world.

human atrocities.¹⁸ Clinton's team entered the White House intending to intervene, but Powell's counterarguments caused them to retreat from their campaign rhetoric.¹⁹

In the summer of 1995, three changes reinvigorated their interest in taking action. The American-trained Croat military joined the Bosnian Muslim military to stage an offensive against the Serbs, the Srebrenica massacre represented a tipping point, and French President Jacques Chirac scorned the administration for their ineffective policy.²⁰ Pressure escalated to the point where Clinton believed his political survival and America's stature in the world depended on the outcome.²¹

While the Clinton administration was rallying support for a NATO offensive in Bosnia, tensions continued to escalate. The Croat Army began to take back lost territory.²² Their attacks included acts of revenge against Serb military forces and the civilian population, but progress on the ground demonstrated a legitimate threat to Milosevic's plans.²³ After the Serbs killed thirty-eight people in a Sarajevo marketplace, NATO

18. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 261. Neither the European Union nor the UN proved effective at resolving the crisis. Despite Powell's best efforts at preventing military intervention, Bush eventually decided to implement a no-fly zone in Bosnia in October 1992. See also Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 45-46, 93, 128-35, 296-97. See also Herspring, *The Pentagon*, 355.
19. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 263.

20. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 314-16, 32-38. Under the umbrella of the state department, Clinton had earlier authorized the training of the Croat army by retired US officers and NCOs who now operated in the private sector.

21. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 306-07, 16-17, 30-31. Two days after Srebrenica, Vice President Al Gore claimed the US had a moral obligation to intervene during a meeting of the principals. By the end of the meeting, Clinton mentioned the possibility of using force and his frustration with others taking advantage of US inaction.

22. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 339.

23. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 312-14. Their reclamation of territory also added legitimacy to their position regarding redrawing of borders during negotiations to end the conflict.

decided to act.²⁴ Two weeks later, the Serbs stopped their offensive.²⁵ The administration had not explicitly linked the air campaign to an overarching strategy, but they assumed it caused the Serbs to capitulate.²⁶ The experience in Bosnia taught them that the only language Milosevic understood was force and that air power could scare him into submission.²⁷

The Dayton Peace Accords, an agreement reached in Dayton, OH in November 1995 and officially signed the next month in Paris, ended more than three years of violence in Bosnia by dividing the territory along ethnic lines between two states: a Croat-Bosnian Federation and a Bosnian Serb republic.²⁸ The delicate agreement required 20,000 US forces to keep the peace. Aware of the domestic unpopularity of sending American troops to Bosnia, Clinton arbitrarily declared a twelve-month limit on their use. His timeline extended past the following year's presidential election.²⁹ Like Powell before him, Army General John Shalikashvili played an important role between policy maker and practitioner in preparation for the conflict in Bosnia, and throughout implementation of the agreement that ended it.

24. "On 30 August 1995, NATO began the heaviest bombing in its history, using its most modern weapons." Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 348.

25. Herspring, *The Pentagon*, 358-59. President Clinton took a more active role in Bosnia than he had in Somalia. According to Herspring, the president combined an air campaign with diplomacy for the first time in Bosnia, despite disagreement from senior civilians and military officers.

26. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 118-19.

27. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 109-10. Henriksen argues that this is a false conclusion. He argues six different factors combined to create the conditions leading to the Dayton Accords in 1995: economic embargo of Yugoslavia, war exhaustion on all sides, relative strength of opposing ground forces resulting from the federation of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, US political and diplomatic offensive, Milosevic's lack of interest in Bosnia, and Operation Deliberate Force.

28. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 358.

29. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 358-59.

Chairmen

The thirteenth chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Shalikashvili was the second of three officers who served as CJCS during Clinton's tenure. As the administration considered candidates for Powell's replacement, they hoped for a less obstinate alternative.³⁰ Shalikashvili exceeded expectations.³¹ With a unique perspective as a Polish-born immigrant, he replaced a politically powerful chairman with well-established ideas on the role of force in national strategy.³² Powell had

30. Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr, "Military Professionalism and Policymaking," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, ed. Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 242. Feaver's agency theory describes a complex relationship between policy makers and the military that leads to instances of shirking and working. In Feaver's model, Powell's resistance to the administration's desire for action is shirking. According to his theory, "the military can engage in behavior that constitutes shirking even if it is technically following the explicit orders of a civilian principal. The military can shirk by shading its advice so the civilian principal chooses to give an order contrary to the one that he would have given had the military advice been more sincere." Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 287.

31. Madeleine Albright described Shalikashvili as a "breath of fresh air" for the administration and as someone who, in contrast to his predecessor, listened to the administration's opinions and perspectives. Quoted in Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 325.

32. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 241, 53-54, 59-63. One of many senior advisors to the president advocating against the use of force in Bosnia, Powell voiced concerns about the lack of domestic support for military involvement and the unlikelihood of success using a limited application of force. After choosing to make his sentiments known to the public in a *New York Times* article, Powell received significant criticism from analysts suggesting he had used his uniform to shape the policy debate in a way that represented a departure from traditional interpretation of civilian control of the military. While other analysts suggest Powell's position was consistent with that of the administration, Feaver opined Powell's behavior regarding Bosnia policy did not conform to traditional notions of civilian control of the military. Further supporting Feaver's assertion, Warren Zimmerman, the last American ambassador to Yugoslavia, suggested that instead of actually saying no, military leaders

prevented the administration from using force in the Balkans, but Shalikashvili helped implement a decision to use it.³³

Well-respected by his peers, the chairman used his influence to establish new roles for America's military forces. Shalikashvili's ties to Europe, and the reputation he had earned as commander of Operation Provide Comfort, made him a perfect choice for the Clinton White House.³⁴ Whereas few senior officers had openly disagreed with Colin

influenced policy by providing large estimates for the use of force exceeding numbers the administration could authorize due to political constraints. Feaver suggested Powell was so adamant about not using force in Bosnia that he agreed to use force in Somalia and Haiti because he believed doing so decreased the likelihood of intervention in the Balkans.

33. Powell used his authority regarding military matters to claim that freeing the Sarajevo airport from the surrounding Serb artillery "would take tens of thousands of troops, cost billions of dollars, probably result in numerous casualties, and require a long and open-ended commitment of U.S. forces." O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell*, 110. "He did not frame the issue in a way that made it possible for the president to do what he wanted," says former Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill "Tony" McPeak, who served under Powell from 1990 to 1993. "Instead, he said, 'here's Option A, it is really stupid. Here's Option B, it is dumber than dirt.' It wasn't disloyalty, it wasn't because it was a Democratic administration; it was just because it was Powell's view." Michael Steinbrenner, "Misoverestimated," *The American Prospect*, 25 October 2005, <http://prospect.org/article/misoverestimated-0>. Madeleine Albright described Powell's intimidating presence, saying, "in the face of all his medals and prestige, I found it hard to argue with Powell about the proper way to employ American force. Even though I was a member of the Principals Committee, I was still a mere female civilian. I did however, think then as now that the lessons of Vietnam could be learned too well." Exasperated by her inability to overcome Powell's resistance, Albright finally asked, "what's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?" Quoted in O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell*, 111. Powell resented her question, responding that "American G.I.s were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board." Quoted in O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell*, 111. The chairman referred to himself as "the skunk at the picnic." O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell*, 111.

34. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 319-22. Of Russian and Polish descent, the new chairman's parents had survived the worst of World War II,

Powell's views on the use of force, many resisted those asserted by Shalikashvili.³⁵

The CJCS worked diligently to find a middle ground between the administration's desire for flexibility and the Pentagon's resistance to an expanded role. Shalikashvili did not publicly reject Powell's restrictions on using force, but his deeply personal interest in alleviating human suffering aligned his motives with those of the administration.³⁶ The new

eventually arriving in the US as refugees. The first foreign-born CJCS, Shalikashvili arrived in the US as a child with his displaced parents. Drafted into the Army as a private after high school, he earned his commission and eventually served in Vietnam as part of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Nearly two decades later, he gained his reputation for strong, competent leadership while averting a humanitarian catastrophe. Shalikashvili relocated hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees to their villages in the face of hostility from the Iraqi military during Operation Provide Comfort at the end of Desert Storm.

35. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 389-91. The emerging Clinton Doctrine's support of liberal interventionism and nation building met with significant resistance in the Pentagon. So convinced were senior military leaders of the new chairman's affiliation with the Clinton administration, they debated which of the two wanted American intervention more. Some insiders credited him with considerable influence over European security policy. As evidence of the difficulty he had distinguishing between his role as policy maker and policy advisor, Shalikashvili described how the "lines get blurred" between the two. Roman and Tarr, "Military Professionalism and Policymaking," 421. Boyer concludes John Shalikashvili "proved to be more attuned to the wishes of the civilian leadership." Peter J. Boyer, "General Clark's Battles: The Candidate's Celebrated-and Controversial-Military Career," *The New Yorker*, 17 November 2003, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/11/17/general-clarks-battles>.

36. As chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he cried at a holocaust memorial in Jerusalem because it reminded him of atrocities he had witnessed in Warsaw's Jewish ghettos as a child. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 319. According to Morton Abramowitz, American ambassador to Turkey from 1989-1991, Shalikashvili had "something unusual, a sensitivity to refugee problems you did not normally expect to find in military men, a genuinely profound humanitarian streak." Quoted in Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 322.

chairman wanted a lower standard to justify American military intervention.³⁷ He advocated for executing Operation Uphold Democracy in September 1994.³⁸ The mission's combination of diplomacy and the threat of an imminent attack served as a template for future interventions.

Shalikashvili did not initially support a similar strategy in Bosnia; however, Clinton's interest in intervening and the genocidal act at Srebrenica changed his opinion.³⁹ He helped the administration expound on its coercive-diplomacy model using a NATO offensive as the threat to secure Milosevic's acquiescence. Shalikashvili lobbied his NATO counterparts to conduct a bombing campaign despite his previously held belief that air power offered little hope of success in a complex environment.⁴⁰ The administration claimed another foreign-policy success after the respective sides signed the Dayton Accords in December 1995.

After celebrating Clinton's reelection in 1996, the administration began the search for a new principal military advisor. Five years of turf

37. Halberstam specifically cites Shalikashvili's desire to modify the Weinberger Doctrine by deleting the word vital. The new chairman believed the United States military's responsibilities went beyond such a narrow notion of the military's role. Desiring a more flexible use of force doctrine, Shalikashvili suggested the military cannot hang a sign on the door saying "I'm sorry—we only do the big ones." Quoted in Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 350, 90-91.

38. Despite resistance from most in the Pentagon, the chairman suggested nation building in Haiti could garner a success for the troubled Clinton presidency and "move away from negative to more positive foreign policy and military images." Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 279.

39. Halberstam describes how numerous civilians who worked for the Clinton administration and its predecessor viewed the "appointment of Shalikashvili as an important step in the slow turning around of the existing policy." Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 324-26.

40. Shalikashvili's change of perspective caused his counterparts in the Pentagon to believe "the civilians had gotten to [him]." Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 325-27.

wars with the Pentagon informed their decision, and the president appointed Henry “Hugh” Shelton as the fourteenth chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A competent officer accepted by his peers, Shalikashvili’s quiet replacement was unlikely to challenge the administration’s position.⁴¹ Instead of resisting a more liberal use-of-force doctrine, Shelton lobbied for the enormous resources required to fund it.⁴²

Skeptical of its potential to diminish war-fighting competencies, Shelton nevertheless believed the military needed to accept responsibility for low-intensity conflicts with limited objectives.⁴³ Unlike the last two men who had occupied the post, he had no inclination to delve into matters of foreign policy.⁴⁴ His unique background in special operations distanced him somewhat from the direct influence of the service chiefs, and informed his familiarity with low-intensity threats.⁴⁵ He advocated a

41. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 282, 412, 14-19. General Shelton’s earlier selection to command Operation Uphold Democracy’s invading force in 1994 (an invasion obviated by Cedras’ settlement) reflects confidence in his leadership ability and familiarity with the nature of the mission.

42. Henry H. Shelton, Ronald Levinson, and Malcolm McConnell, *Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior*, 1st ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010), 310-11, 20-26.

43. Elaine Sciolino and Steven Lee Myers, “Military Chief Hits the Ground Learning,” *New York Times*, 5 December 1997, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/05/us/military-chief-hits-the-ground-learning.html>.

44. In December 1997, Sciolino and Myers suggested Shelton lacked the international experience of Shalikashvili and political experience of Colin Powell. They described Shelton as “probably the most unusual choice in a generation for the job of chief military adviser to the President. He had little experience in the political minefields of Washington or the regional commands around the world and has yet to articulate fully a military world view.” Sciolino and Myers, “Military Chief Hits.” Similarly, Halberstam described Shelton as a man of his institution who did not possess a political mind. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 414-15. Herspring also emphasized Shelton’s dissimilarity with Colin Powell by stressing the fact that he was not the type to recommend policy. Herspring, *The Pentagon*, 362.

45. Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 264-85.

flexible-response capability across the spectrum of conflict, while also contending that force cannot solve every problem.⁴⁶

Administration

The fuzzy line Shelton described represented more of an attempt to hedge against overextending a downsized force than it did a standalone statement of doctrine. Neither issue prevented the Clinton administration from revealing its desire to broaden the scope of contingencies justifying the use of military force. Faced with political pressure to secure a post-Cold War peace dividend, their expansion of force's role in foreign policy tempered expectations.⁴⁷ A dominant performance in the Persian Gulf supported their thesis that they could use force to solve foreign-policy crises.⁴⁸

Unlike the preceding administration, Clinton's team did not view him as an expert on foreign policy as much as they did an expert on politics. Where George H. W. Bush had arrived at the presidency with vast foreign-policy experience and interest, Clinton was a former state governor who considered it a distraction from his focus on domestic issues. He rarely made appearances at NSC meetings, and assumed a deferential and informal role when present.⁴⁹ Especially during conflicts early in his presidency, the president played a minimal role in determining strategy.⁵⁰

Clinton gained familiarity with foreign policy and challenges in the Balkans throughout his presidency, but his ability to influence a deteriorating situation in Kosovo declined substantially in 1998. Starting

46. Gen Henry Shelton, "Remarks from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," (Address, National Press Club, Washington, DC, 14 December 2000).

47. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 76.

48. O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell*, 110.

49. Powell and Persico, *A Soldier's Way*, 575-77.

50. Herspring, *The Pentagon*, 333, 67.

in January and continuing for over a year, the president became the subject of an investigation resulting in his impeachment by the House of Representatives in December 1998 and acquittal by the Senate in February 1999. The administration's preoccupation with the investigation and trial forced foreign-policy issues even lower on their priority list, and weakened their political influence.⁵¹ Civil war or not, Kosovo had to wait until the domestic political storm passed.

Conflict

Of all the areas in the Balkans, Kosovo had the greatest potential for conflict. Riddled by centuries of vengeful hatred and violence between Albanians and Serbs, one visitor in 1908 described the ethnic struggle as a zero-sum contest between animals trying to kill their enemies before their enemies killed them.⁵² Within this context, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) sprang up from the aftermath of Bosnia. They terrorized the population in hopes of another Western intervention triggered by Milosevic's heavy-handed response.⁵³ As the administration considered its options, the Serb slaughter of all the males in Račak became the Kosovo version of Bosnia's Srebrenica.⁵⁴

The autocrat in Belgrade shared some similarities with his contemporary in Iraq. Both men displayed little regard for human life as they implemented policies to increase their personal grip on power.⁵⁵

51. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 371-76. Halberstam describes how the investigation and trial undermined the administration's influence overall and factored into national-security decisions specifically.

52. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 364-65.

53. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 141-47. See also Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 366-67, 97.

54. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 162-64. See also Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 409-10.

55. Henriksen labels Milosevic "an opportunist rather than an ideologue, driven by power rather than nationalism, and not an ethnic exclusivist." Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 181-82. General Klaus Naumann, a German general officer senior to Wes Clark in the NATO chain of command as the

Rather than a broad strategy for regional or world domination, each exploited difficult circumstances for personal gain. Recent events in Serbia had weakened Milosevic to the point of desperation as his failure to advance the Serb cause in Bosnia, a lost election in 1996 (later annulled), and failed economic policies diminished his power.⁵⁶

The rise of the KLA complicated the situation in Kosovo for Milosevic and the US. Their guerrilla tactics in spring 1998 achieved the desired response in the summer, as reinforced Serbs sought retribution with a harsh response resulting in 200,000 refugees.⁵⁷ General Wesley Clark lobbied hard for a response. Initially unwilling to expend the political capital, the administration consented to threaten another NATO attack in October.⁵⁸ Despite opposition from the Pentagon and the distraction of Clinton's impeachment proceedings, Albright pushed hard for action in the Balkans in January 1999. Similar to the way Serb atrocities at Srebrenica overcame opposition to intervention in Bosnia, the massacre at Račak solidified support of an otherwise unwilling alliance.⁵⁹

A final attempt at negotiating an agreement failed, and NATO's air campaign began on 24 March. At the outset, questionable political will throughout the alliance and in Washington hindered the effectiveness of Operation Allied Force. National caveats and incomplete planning produced an impotent attack plan pursued by an underequipped air

alliance's Military Committee Chairman, described Milosevic as "a man that does not have the slightest respect for human life. He was a power-oriented man, power meant everything to him." Quoted in Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 181.

56. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 183.

57. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 397-99.

58. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 399-400. Halberstam describes a distinct change in the nature of US negotiations with Milosevic as Lieutenant General Mike Short personally delivered the threat of bombardment.

59. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 409-10.

component.⁶⁰ An inauspicious start may have led to mission failure had Milosevic himself not strengthened the alliance's resolve. His decision to push Serbian forces into Kosovo displaced nearly one million Kosovar Albanians and led to more atrocities.⁶¹ For an administration that had justified its policy on moral grounds, Milosevic's plan demonstrated how right they had been.

A 78-day air campaign ended with Milosevic's capitulation, but only after demonstrating the importance of the allies' political will. At a NATO summit in late April, Clinton and Tony Blair agreed that NATO's political viability was at stake in Kosovo.⁶² With strengthened resolve, the alliance streamlined target approval and planned for the addition of a ground component. Damage inflicted by a reinvigorated air campaign convinced Milosevic's cronies of his responsibility for their suffering.⁶³ Additionally, Russia intervened diplomatically after noting NATO's unity.⁶⁴ Faced with political isolation and the possibility of military defeat by NATO and KLA ground forces, he accepted Russia's presentation of terms on 4 June 1999.⁶⁵

Conflict Termination and Results

NATO's offensive produced effects far beyond the humanitarian cause used to justify its execution. Operation Allied Force provided confirmation of the KLA's theory that their political ends justified the

60. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 452.

61. Of the estimated 1.8 million ethnic Albanians residing in Kosovo before the conflict, by two weeks into the war approximately "three-quarters of the Albanian population had fled their homes, some eight hundred thousand had been driven out of the country, and another five hundred thousand had become refugees within Kosovo, hiding in the hills." Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 452-53.

62. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 470. Political resolve quickly turned into a military mandate to win.

63. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 474.

64. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 475-76.

65. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 473, 77-78.

means of terrorism.⁶⁶ After condemning the group as a terrorist organization as late as the spring of 1998, the Clinton administration effectively joined their cause to defeat Milosevic's forces.⁶⁷ The region's population of extremists grew rapidly from a negligible number in 1997 to a substantial presence by the time the conflict ended.⁶⁸ Some blame these conflicts in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s for importing extremist Salafists into the region. Albania's former Defense Minister, Fatmir Mediu suggests the area now serves as a critical access point to Europe exploited by the Islamic State terrorist organization.⁶⁹

Despite its lack of a long-term solution to ethnic hostilities in the region, the conflict's end did have a decidedly final effect on the villain against whom NATO had directed its air campaign. On 24 September 1999, Milosevic lost an election to Vojislav Kostunica. He tried to hold onto power for two weeks thereafter, but succumbed to massive protests.⁷⁰ Six months later, local authorities arrested him at his house.⁷¹ Eventually extradited to The Hague, Netherlands, Milosevic died during the course of a multi-year trial for numerous crimes against humanity.

66. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 124-25. Henriksen describes how the West's settlement of the conflict in Bosnia fed the radicalization of Kosovar Albanians, as they recognized that violent extremism provided the only way for them to get the international community's attention.

67. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 184-85. Henriksen describes how the KLA learned from Bosnia that violence was the most effective means to achieving their goal of full independence in Kosovo. They exploited the West's myopic concern with Serb nationalism by inciting Serb violence. After the conflict, German General Klaus Naumann, and US diplomats James Dobbins and Christopher Hill, each described the KLA's effectiveness at manipulating circumstances to their advantage.

68. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 125-26.

69. Kaitlin Lavinder, "ISIS in the Balkans," *The Cipher Brief*, 13 May 2016, <https://thecipherbrief.com/article/europe/isis-balkans-1089>.

70. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 486-87.

71. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 488.

Evaluating Doctrinal Tenets

Milosevic's removal from power pleased his enemies, but the presence of an international peacekeeping force in Kosovo 17 years later testifies to the continuation of hostilities that have defined the area for centuries. Powell and his successors understood the Balkans' tragic reality, but different conceptualizations of US interests in the region produced different perspectives on the utility of applying force to the problem. Powell omitted Weinberger's use of the phrase *vital national interests* from his nine questions. Substituting instead the requirement for an important objective, he deferred responsibility for its assessment to policy makers.⁷²

The following section examines consistency of US policy in Kosovo with each of the five Powell Doctrine tenets considered in the overall study. Introduction of each tenet includes its assessment within the case (yes: consistent with the Powell Doctrine; no: inconsistent with the Powell Doctrine). The narrative that follows describes analysis resulting in the tenet's assessment, and considers indicators for each as described in the coding appendix.

Purpose—No

Examination of the first tenet produced mixed results, but the political objective leading to military operations in Kosovo fell short of the Powell Doctrine's standard for importance and clarity. The Clinton

72. Any issue can rise to the level of security concern, but this study narrowly defines US national security as defense of citizens' lives and territory. Examples of non-traditional security concerns include climate change and the national debt. Neither directly threaten the lives of US citizens or national territory, but they could indirectly affect both given a particular set of circumstances and cause-effect relationships. The administration argued that attacking Serbia prevented a larger conflict with the potential to erupt into world war. Invoking the same logic for other non-traditional threats, the US military could attack countries who fail to conform to US emissions or monetary standards.

administration assigned blame for the violence in Kosovo to Slobodan Milosevic, and wanted it stopped. The international community and the Kosovars believed the objective important, but the American public signaled ambivalence to US military involvement. Casting further doubt on the objective's importance, the mission lacked a connection to America's security and the professional officer corps remained hesitant to involve US forces. Despite these obstacles, the administration supported the military campaign with other instruments of national power and publicly argued the case for intervention.

Numerous limitations on the use of force further undermined perception of the objective's importance, and frustrated military practitioners responsible for planning and executing the operation. Hampered by lack of ground forces, restrictions on the employment of air power, and disagreement among coalition members, offensive operations began well before establishing clear understanding of the connection between ends and ways. The president's public statements before the conflict also appeared inconsistent, raising the specter of world war on one hand, and restricting US investment to address the problem on the other.

The administration remained committed to ending the violence in Kosovo, but evidence reveals the majority of Americans and senior officers started the conflict unconvinced of the objective's importance and the justification for US military involvement. Powell emphasized the political objective precisely because he wanted all members in the chain of command to understand the common goal for the operation, and their role in achieving it. In Kosovo, coalition operations struggled to coalesce behind the political objective until initial ineffectiveness called into question NATO's relevance as an institution. Table 13 displays results of tenet and indicator analysis.

Table 13. Purpose

Is the political objective important, clear, and understood?*		<u>N</u>
Important	US national security compromised if not accomplished	N
	Benefactors' security compromised if not accomplished	Y
	American public agrees	N
	International community agrees	Y
	Professional officer corps agrees	N
Clear and understood	American public aware	Y
	Consistent public statements	N
	Consistent military planning	N
	Consistent military actions	N
	Consistent national instruments of power	Y
	Consistent coalition actions	N

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

Operation Allied Force disconnected the US military from its traditional role as a defender of America's national security.⁷³ US forces instead defended the security of others. President Clinton made two arguments for attacking Serbia. He based his first argument on moral grounds, suggesting US values regarding human life required action to stop Milosevic's army from continuing its ethnic-cleansing campaign.⁷⁴

73. Sarkesian, "Special Operations, Low-Intensity," 112. Sarkesian also warned against the administration's disassociation of military force with national interests in 1996.

74. William J. Clinton, "Statement by the President to the Nation," (Address, Oval Office, The White House, Washington, DC, 24 March 1999).

The president's second justification for entering the conflict asserted a form of preventive-war logic, raising the specter of another world war if US forces did not intervene.⁷⁵ Neither argument justified US involvement based on an imminent threat to US citizens or national territory.⁷⁶

That the administration pursued a multilateral bombing campaign under the umbrella of NATO, without authorization from Congress,

75. "Clinton Says U.S. Interests at Stake in Kosovo," *Cable News Network, Inc.*, 26 February 1999, <http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/02/26/clinton.foreign.policy/>. The Bush administration used a similar argument for invading Iraq four years later. Claiming the threat of a despot armed with weapons of mass destruction justified preventive war, the Bush administration used military force to invade Iraq and overthrow its dictator. No one found the weapons of mass destruction after the conflict. See also "The Kosovo Body Count," *The Orange County Register*, 22 November 1999, Editorial Section. Debate continues regarding the state of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo before NATO started its air campaign. Few dispute that each side committed atrocities, but some have asserted KLA culpability for massacres attributed to Serbs. In a conflict with familial and ethnic grievances dating back to the earliest days of the Ottoman Empire, neither side owned the moral high ground in 1999.

76. Peacekeeping Operations in Kosovo Resolution, House Congressional Resolution 42, 106th Cong., 1st sess., (11 March 1999). On 11 March 1999, the House of Representatives passed Resolution 42 authorizing the use of US peacekeepers in Kosovo contingent on President Clinton meeting several requirements before sending them. Among the stipulations, the House asked Clinton to describe US interests at stake there. The bill made no mention of an air campaign despite the fact that NATO started air operations two weeks later. See also Authorizing the President of the United States to Conduct Military Air Operations and Missile Strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Senate Congressional Resolution 21, 106th Cong., 1st sess., (23 March 1999). The day before the start of Operation Allied Force, the US Senate passed Resolution 21 authorizing air and missile strikes on Serbia. See also Louis Jacobson, "Rep. Peter King Says Bill Clinton Continued Kosovo Air Campaign after Rebuke by House," *Politifact*, 4 September 2013, <http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2013/sep/04/peter-king/rep-peter-king-says-bill-clinton-continued-kosovo/>. The House defeated this resolution with a 213-213 tie vote after more than a month of bombing.

underscores the American public's disinterest in the political objective.⁷⁷ No massive movement of US citizens demanded the use of force against Slobodan Milosevic because the dictator did not pose a threat to them.⁷⁸ In contrast to the parades and celebrations held after Operation Desert Storm, US forces returned to a country that hardly seemed to know Americans had been involved in a conflict, much less its purpose or outcome.⁷⁹ Not only did the resolution authorizing an air campaign fail to pass both chambers of Congress, the House did not even vote on the measure until one month after the bombing started.

The international community demonstrated consent in multiple ways. First, NATO agreed to conduct offensive operations.⁸⁰ Second, the United Nations Security Council passed multiple resolutions in support of actions taken on behalf of the Kosovars, including condemnation of excessive uses of force by Serbia and demand for withdrawal of its forces.⁸¹ Additionally, Russia stepped back from its support of Milosevic

77. Samuel Berger, National Security Advisor, To Bill Clinton, President of the United States, Memorandum, Subject: Kosovo: Preparing for an Ultimatum, 24 September 1998. As early as September 1998, Samuel Berger advised Clinton of the lack of interest in Kosovo from both Congress and the American public.

78. Frank Newport, "Support for U.S. Kosovo Involvement Drops," *Gallup, Inc.*, 26 May 1999, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/3826/support-us-kosovo-involvement-drops.aspx>. Polling results revealed that an even number of Americans favored and opposed US involvement in the NATO air campaign before it began. A large majority of Americans opposed the use of US ground forces. Gallup's carefully worded poll omitted a question asking if the respondents themselves considered the conflict important enough to risk their own lives fighting against Milosevic's forces.

79. Boyer, "General Clark's Battles."

80. Roger Cohen, "NATO Nears Final Order to Approve Kosovo Strike," *New York Times*, 11 October 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/11/world/nato-nears-final-order-to-approve-kosovo-strike.html?pagewanted=print..>

81. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1160, 31 March 1998. See also United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1199, 23 September 1998. See also United Nations Security Council, Resolution

and the Serbs in May, allowing NATO to increase the intensity of its bombing campaign.⁸² Even China's response to the accidental bombing of its embassy in Belgrade did not result in a meaningful demonstration of opposition to the offensive.⁸³

Despite international consent, the professional officer corps did not agree with the importance of the objective.⁸⁴ In the officer corps, only General Wesley Clark advocated for US military intervention in Kosovo, expecting Milosevic's capitulation after only a few days of bombing. Clark had an influential position as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and used it to great effect with sympathetic contacts in the US State Department.⁸⁵ The CJCS and Joint Chiefs did not share Clark's enthusiasm.⁸⁶ For them, Kosovo represented another US offensive in an undesirable conflict and an increased strain on dwindling resources.

1239, 14 May 1999. See also United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999.

82. Boyer, "General Clark's Battles."

83. "Beijing Demands End to Bombing," *The Moscow Times*, 12 May 1999, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/beijing-demands-end-to-bombing/277394.html>. The Chinese government officially denounced the bombing of their embassy and called for a stop to NATO's bombing. Additionally, Chinese citizens protested by attacking and damaging US embassy locations in China. Still, China's actions did not stop the air campaign. See also Steven Lee Myers, "NATO Raid Hits China Embassy; Beijing Cites 'Barbarian Act'; Allies Admit Striking Hospital," *New York Times*, 8 May 1999, <https://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/050899kosovo-military.html>.

84. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 165. General Shelton and Secretary Cohen resisted the idea of increased involvement in the middle of another nation's civil war.

85. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 179-80.

86. Peter Boyer suggested that, "to the Joint Chiefs, who cautioned against involvement in Kosovo, the Balkan issue was complicated but the American position was simple. As one of them put it, 'The Chiefs never believed that Kosovo, by itself, was vital to the U.S. national interest.'" Quoted in Boyer, "General Clark's Battles."

The effort lacked a purpose beyond sending a strong signal to Milosevic. There existed no strategy beyond punishing the dictator until he capitulated.⁸⁷ Similar to the Persian Gulf conflict, the administration made a covert attempt to incite a coup resulting in Milosevic's removal from power.⁸⁸ They considered his susceptibility to forceful resistance, as demonstrated in Bosnia, their only option to stem the tide of atrocities in Kosovo. Despite palpable dislike of the Serbian dictator, multiple people concurred that no one really knew the objective or the larger strategy.⁸⁹

President Clinton's 26 February speech linking US interests with Kosovo made clear to the American public that the administration had determined the United States needed to play an active role in ending the violence there.⁹⁰ Unfortunately, Clinton's subsequent speech on the first day of the air campaign undermined the importance citizens attributed to winning the conflict and the assumption practitioners made regarding political support for their effort.⁹¹ As American Airmen completed their plans for the first sorties of the air campaign, the president stated publicly that he did not intend to send US troops to fight a war in Kosovo.⁹²

Military planning and actions throughout the alliance demonstrated the lack of a clear and understood objective. The air component wanted permission to conduct a classic strategic bombing campaign, but saw its requests for targets thwarted by the SACEUR.⁹³ Clark also wanted more flexibility to strike Milosevic, but sought it by slowly baiting NATO's least willing countries into increasing the severity

87. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 147.

88. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 157.

89. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 175.

90. "Clinton Says U.S."

91. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 275.

92. Clinton, "Statement by the President."

93. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 445-47.

of strikes.⁹⁴ Domestically, Shelton and Cohen ran interference between a resistant Pentagon and a zealous field commander. Lacking congressional support for the campaign, the administration struggled to maintain US political will. Not until after NATO's April summit did military planning and actions begin to demonstrate consistent pursuit of the political objective.⁹⁵

Despite the lack of agreement on a military solution, the administration took multiple actions to isolate Milosevic and undermine his power. Diplomatic engagements with the UN resulted in three Security Council resolutions in 1998, and three statements by the UN president, between August 1998 and January 1999.⁹⁶ They also engaged diplomatically with all stakeholders, including direct talks with Slobodan Milosevic through Richard Holbrooke. They isolated Milosevic economically, using sanctions to block him from accessing credits through the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.⁹⁷ Finally, Clinton authorized incitement of a coup to remove the dictator from power months before the air campaign began.⁹⁸

94. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 450.

95. Indicators included a streamlined target-approval process, fewer restrictions on targets, availability of aircraft and weapons to conduct strikes, and planning for a potential ground invasion.

96. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1239.

97. Agence France Presse, "List of International Sanctions against Serbia," *Global Policy Forum*, 9 October 2000, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/global-taxes/42528.html>. These steps went beyond those taken by the European Union (EU) and United Nations, which also included the following: air embargo, freeze on assets and investments, ban on export credits, arms embargo, and ban on VISAs. See also Steven Erlanger, "U.S. And Allies Set Sanctions on Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, 9 March 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/10/world/us-and-allies-set-sanctions-on-yugoslavia.html?pagewanted=print>. For the effect of the West's economic policy, see Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 182-83. Henriksen describes how widespread unemployment and significantly lower wages had weakened Milosevic politically.

98. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 157.

Commitment—No

In addition to stopping the violence in Kosovo, or perhaps as a method to end it, President Clinton's authorization revealed his interest in regime change. Evaluation of the next Powell Doctrine tenet considers means the administration committed to achieve the objective. As the allies developed plans for Operation Allied Force, many believed Milosevic would capitulate after only a few days of bombing. No one questioned superiority of NATO's air power, and the restriction against land forces meant the allies required little time to prepare for a ground offensive.

Instead of overwhelming force to achieve an objective decisively, the Clinton administration's plan in Kosovo used limited force to coerce an enemy decision. As demonstrated in Panama and the Persian Gulf, Powell wanted the president to commit enough forces to ensure a rapid conclusion to hostilities with minimal friendly losses. In Kosovo, success relied on Milosevic's decision that the cost of continuing his ethnic-cleansing campaign outweighed the benefits he ascribed to it. The Clinton administration committed the force they believed could exact enough cost; a force that increased in size and decreased in restrictions as Milosevic refused to settle.

During the first weeks of Operation Allied Force, Milosevic's reaction highlighted the NATO force's ineffectiveness as he pushed his ethnic-cleansing campaign further into Kosovo. The administration had trained and equipped forces available, but did not support the requests of their military practitioners to use them. Numerous national caveats rendered ineffective a targeting scheme designed to achieve various military objectives, leaving practitioners to question the objectives and their mission. The administration demonstrated little concern for the effects of self-imposed limitations on the mission as it focused instead on ensuring participation by other NATO nations. What many projected would only take three days required nearly three months as the

administration lacked control over ways and means required to achieve the objective sooner. Table 14 displays results of tenet and indicator analysis.

Table 14. Commitment

Will the forces considered decisively achieve the objective?*	<u>N</u>
Practitioners' requests supported	N
Trained, equipped practitioners available	Y
Clear objectives established	N
Aware of self-imposed limitations and their effects	N
US policy makers control required means and ways	N

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

The administration's approach to conflict in Kosovo demonstrated their lack of concern for decisively achieving the objective.⁹⁹ The decision to use force better represented a frustrated reaction rather than a calculated plan to produce a desired outcome.¹⁰⁰ Lacking US support for unilateral operations, the administration pursued and implemented a politically feasible option without reason to expect success beyond their

99. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 425. Perhaps no example better illustrates the lack of commitment to achieving the objective than the guidance given to the air component commander that his campaign could only last two or three days because political resolve in Washington and some members of the alliance could not permit anything more.

100. On the first night of the air campaign, Clinton publicly confirmed the existence of limits on commitment of forces when he said, "I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war." Quoted in Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 423-24.

questionable assessment of Milosevic's resolve.¹⁰¹ Only after observing positive developments (both NATO's commitment and results from the air campaign) did Sandy Berger offer critically considered options to the president.¹⁰²

Before the conflict started, lack of political will prevented support for a robust operation. Clinton removed the possibility of supporting any requests for ground forces when he publicly stated his intention not to send any. Additionally, the war-by-committee approach reduced the air campaign's potential to compel as disparate caveats of alliance members severely reduced the approved target list.¹⁰³ Trained and equipped practitioners were available but not in position, as demonstrated by lack of concern for the fact that no aircraft carriers were within range at the start of the conflict.¹⁰⁴ Only a third of the aircraft eventually required to wage the air campaign were available when it began.¹⁰⁵

The alliance's effort also suffered from lack of clear, military objectives the allies believed necessary to produce the desired coercion. The administration based their theory of victory on influencing Milosevic's cost-benefit equation by increasing cost of resistance to an unacceptable level. Beyond the intent to inflict damage with air power,

101. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 424-25. The hedge against sending ground forces prevented the open dissent of allies and the US Congress, and obtained enough political acquiescence to start the air campaign. The administration dedicated significantly more time to assuaging the concerns of others than it did to ensuring a decisive outcome.

102. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 476-77. At the beginning of June, after NATO demonstrated increased resolve to win and the Russians signaled willingness to cooperate, Berger described three primary options to pursue the political objective: 1. NATO ground forces as soon as possible, 2. continue the air campaign and send ground forces after the winter, and 3. arm the KLA.

103. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 444-45.

104. After the conflict, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon described it as "a textbook case of how not to wage war." Quoted in Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 444.

105. Boyer, "General Clark's Battles."

unresolved questions about what to target made it difficult to connect cause with effect.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, no one knew how much increased cost was necessary to convince the adversary. Lack of clear objectives led to a contentious debate between advocates of classic air-power theory and those who preferred gradualism.¹⁰⁷

Policy makers and practitioners were aware of self-imposed limitations, but numerous advisors questioned the ability of the alliance to achieve the objective with them in place. After Clark and each allied nation imposed their preferences for restrictions on the target list, the diminished result reflected little of the critical thought behind its original design.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, the inability of alliance aircraft to positively identify and destroy targets from altitudes above 15,000 feet provided one example of how the emphasis on preventing friendly losses decreased mission effectiveness.¹⁰⁹

Numerous limitations on the air campaign demonstrated potential challenges for operations governed by an alliance. Due to a lack of political will, US policy makers did not control the required ways and means to achieve the objective. They relied instead on regional and international legitimacy provided by participating in a multilateral offensive. Operation Allied Force addressed Serbian aggression, but also

106. Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 384. Shelton describes how the allies still had not committed themselves to the desired target list as late as June 1999.

107. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 176-78. Henriksen describes the contrasting viewpoints. The Joint Force Air Component Commander advocated for immediate bombing with maximum strength, but the politically feasible approach was incrementally increasing the air campaign's intensity.

108. Strongly considering resigning over the matter, the air component commander agreed with one general officer's assessment that "what we are doing is randomly bombing military targets with no coherent strategy." Quoted in Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 451.

109. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 451.

expanded NATO's charter while encouraging European nations to take on increased responsibility for the outcome in Kosovo.

After Conflict—No

The Powell Doctrine requires critical consideration of the desired outcome, but the administration's planning for Kosovo revealed less concern for the outcome than for their participation in the effort. They focused on disposition of friendly forces and NATO's cohesion, but left unresolved the desired effects on Serbia's various capabilities beyond inflicting an undefined amount of damage to coerce Milosevic's settlement. Whereas Powell advocated for common understanding of the desired effect on the enemy, disparate national caveats and varying visions of the air campaign's conduct among senior officers reveal its absence in Kosovo. Additionally, lack of settlement terms and contingency plans at the outset of hostilities further highlight the administration's lack of interest in dictating the conflict's outcome.

The Powell Doctrine also commends a thorough assessment of risks associated with pursuing and achieving the desired result, but planning for Kosovo revealed a mixed assessment for this aspect of the tenet. The administration took extensive measures to mitigate political risks while also acknowledging the conflict's economic implications. They demonstrated less concern for risks to mission accomplishment and the conflict's long-term implications. In short, they discounted the enemy's ability to counter a united NATO, and elevated the importance of stopping the violence above controlling the conflict's associated implications.

The administration fell short of Powell's tenet because they did not enter the conflict with detailed understanding of their intended outcome or sufficient means to address associated risks. In the event, Milosevic's response to the air campaign by ratcheting up violence against the Kosovar Albanians backfired as his move strengthened NATO's resolve.

Even so, a plan assuming three days of bombing took nearly three months instead because it left so many details of the outcome to other nations—both allies and the enemy. Entering the conflict in this manner may have been the administration’s only option to enter it at all, but such a conclusion only reinforces Powell’s purpose for developing his criteria. Table 15 displays results of tenet and indicator analysis.

Table 15. After conflict

Have we critically considered the desired outcome and associated risks?*		<u>N</u>
Desired Outcome	Status of opposition military force	N
	Status of opposition government	N
	Status of opposition infrastructure and population	N
	Position of friendly forces	Y
	Status of relations with coalition members	Y
	Terms of political settlement established	N
	Contingency planning capability established	N
Associated Risks	Mission	N
	Political	Y
	Economic	Y
	Long-term risk	N

Source: Author’s original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell-Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

The administration blamed Milosevic, and ordered US forces to punish him. They wanted to stop the violence, particularly acts committed by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces. However, senior American and NATO officers agreed there had been no discussion of a

long-term vision for the Balkans or the status of Kosovo after the air campaign.¹¹⁰ Critical thought about settlement terms and ways to achieve them did not happen until months after the air campaign started.¹¹¹ Even the offensive itself lacked a plan to address contingencies, such as the mass migration of Kosovar Albanians.¹¹² NATO's indecision prevented thorough planning and effective execution. The paradoxical assessment of Milosevic's lack of resolve better described the alliance itself.¹¹³

NATO's plan omitted specific intentions for the opposition's forces, government, infrastructure, and population.¹¹⁴ As the air campaign continued, lack of connection between military operations and the

110. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 175.

111. The White House articulated its desired results as "Serbs out, NATO in, Albanians back." Quoted in Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 476.

112. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 179. The administration perceived no requirement to plan for contingencies given their expectations for the bombing to last no longer than three days. See also Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 240. The massive migration of Kosovar Albanians surprised the UN High Commissioner for Refugees because NATO's plan had not considered it.

113. The Joint Chiefs remained skeptical of the conflict's results, including concern that a slippery slope could once again lead to tragedy as it had in Vietnam and Somalia. As described by Halberstam, "there was no agreed-upon Plan B." Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 422.

114. Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 371-73. Military planners devised a scheme to minimize collateral damage while targeting different categories of targets, but political guidance did not specify ways to achieve the desired end state beyond Milosevic deciding he had endured enough. Unarticulated objectives resulted in confusion regarding each action's purpose. For example, political ends did not include the dictator's removal from power, but the administration had incited a coup to overthrow him. Coalition aircraft could attack Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces, but could not fly below 15,000 feet. Some political, economic, and utility structures made the target list, but lack of unanimous understanding of their importance to the outcome meant many others did not. The administration claimed their fight was not with the Serbian people, but they offered Serbs no protection during the bombing campaign and allowed their nearly complete removal from Kosovo after the conflict.

political objective resulted in practitioner dissatisfaction and confusion. Lieutenant General Short and the air component wanted to follow an updated version of the strategic bombing campaign used in Operation Desert Storm. General Clark also yearned for increased freedom to attack his opponent, but an unprepared alliance lacked common understanding of the attack's details. Resultant friction caused the air component commander to question his role in waging directionless violence.¹¹⁵

Despite military practitioner frustration, the planning effort did account for political and economic risk. The multilateral approach mitigated economic risk while relying on a decade of American prosperity as a hedge against overextension.¹¹⁶ The administration took extensive measures to control political risk, including participation in the conflict under the umbrella of NATO, not using ground forces, and obtaining Russia's assurance of non-interference.¹¹⁷ Focusing on alliance unity eventually produced results, as Milosevic recognized NATO's strengthening resolve and agreed to terms.¹¹⁸

As much as the administration considered political and economic risks, they did not focus the same attention on risks to the mission. Their decisions to start the air campaign before required resources were in place, describe publicly their intent to avoid using ground forces, and plan for no more than three days of bombing demonstrate the

115. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 451. On two occasions, the air component commander considered resigning his post.

116. "War in Europe: NATO's 1999 War against Serbia over Kosovo, Facts & Figures," *Public Broadcasting Service*, February 2000, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/etc/facts.html>. In the event, Congress appropriated \$12 billion in Fiscal Year 1999 and \$2 billion in Fiscal Year 2000 to cover costs associated with the air campaign and peacekeeping operations thereafter.

117. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 423. The Russian government did not like the idea of Western forces attacking Slavs, but agreed that they would not defend the Serbs or provide them with certain improvements to their air defenses.

118. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 470.

administration's willingness to assume mission risk.¹¹⁹ The restrictive target-selection process and a low-intensity bombing campaign restricted above 15,000 feet also underestimated their enemy's resolve.¹²⁰ Finally, lack of preparation for the massive displacement of Kosovars as the fighting unfolded further reflects a lack of focus on mission risk in the allies' plan.

The mass exodus emphasized the conflict's deep roots and the potential for associated, long-term risks. The administration led NATO into the conflict under the auspices of just-war doctrine, but they exclusively focused on Milosevic over other factors. The decision to leave the province under Belgrade's jurisdiction ensured the continuation of a centuries-old conflict with addition of the West's increased responsibility to adjudicate the violence.¹²¹ An international force of 4,600 people supported by 31 nations still patrols the region to carry out UN Security Council Resolution 1244.¹²² The alliance's continuing presence testifies to the rivalry's potential, as ancient hatred simmers on each side.¹²³ Radicalization related to the conflict may have increased the region's potential to produce extremists interested in carrying out attacks on Western nations.¹²⁴

119. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 425.

120. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 451-52.

121. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 481.

122. "NATO's Role in Kosovo," NATO, Accessed 29 May 2016, <http://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor/about-us/welcome-to-kfor/natos-role-in-kosovo>.

123. United Nations Security Council Official Records, 7693rd Meeting, New York, NY, 16 May 2016.

124. Lavinder, "ISIS in the Balkans." See also Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 299-300. Judah describes how KLA extremists retained their weapons and authority within Kosovo despite agreeing to disband the organization. The recognition of Kosovo's independence by more than half the world's nations further reinforced the potential for violence to produce political victories. The Islamic State's use of violence to establish a caliphate represents a related model.

War's Nature—No

Extremist radicalization and ethnic tension with the potential for violence continue to challenge peaceful relations in Kosovo despite Milosevic's settlement at the end of the conflict and eventual departure from power. The Clinton administration neither solved the underlying causes for unrest nor suggested that Operation Allied Force had the potential to do so. They used military force for the sole purpose of defending a minority population against a campaign of ethnic violence conducted by Serbian forces with the support of the state's government.

In the tenet addressing war's nature, Powell sought to communicate unique consequences that accompany uses of force. Informed by his experience in Vietnam, he believed no amount of advantage in military power could change the nature of war as described by Clausewitz. Engaging in human conflict meant exposing yourself to the potential for negative consequences limited only by thorough planning and preparation to counter the capabilities and imagination of a determined enemy fighting for survival. The former CJCS intentionally designed his criteria to convey the importance of guarding against war's potential regardless of pre-conflict projections for success.

The Clinton administration did not assess the consequences of using force using Powell's perspective. They took extensive measures to guard against the potential for physical losses, but discounted the other indicators used in this study to examine Powell's tenet. NATO's restrictions on the use of force ensured political unity, but served as an obstacle for practitioners attempting to discern the operation's results. Lack of planning beyond the few days projected for Milosevic's capitulation revealed the allies' unpreparedness to overcome unforeseen challenges and the enemy's ability to elongate the conflict. Finally, support for the KLA complicated the allies' relationship with the population by validating the legitimacy of an internationally recognized

terrorist organization. Table 16 displays results of tenet and indicator analysis.

Table 16. War's nature

Have we assessed the consequences of using force?*	<u>N</u>
Uncertainty	N
Unforeseen challenges	N
Relationship with population	N
Physical losses	Y
Potential for escalation/elongation	N

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

The allies' plan included little consideration for the nature of human conflict, including challenges associated with discerning uncertain results.¹²⁵ Decades after the conflict's end, estimates of its

125. Benjamin Buley, *The New American Way of War: Military Culture and the Political Utility of Force* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 80. Buley suggests the administration viewed the Powell Doctrine as reactionary, whereas they wanted to use force proactively to manage risk and shape the environment. The administration viewed military force as simply another tool that could be controlled, measured, and tempered to achieve political objectives. In an age where America's power emerged without equal, this perspective resulted in a cavalier attitude toward force application that considered the enemy's actions largely irrelevant. Corum and Johnson claim, "[Military Operations Other Than War as a construct for using military force] proved useful to the Clinton administration as it deployed U.S. forces around the globe and yet denied that such operations had anything to do with war." James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, *Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists*, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003).

effect on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces and the Serbian population vary widely. Visitors to Belgrade can easily verify destruction of infrastructure, but accurate estimates of subjects ranging from tanks destroyed to casualties exacted remain elusive.¹²⁶ Even the cause or causes of Milosevic's settlement remain hotly contested.¹²⁷ Unlike in Kuwait, where coalition ground forces controlled territory after the conflict, reports of international groups in Kosovo relied on contradictory statements provided by witnesses on each side of the ethnic divide.

Similarly, lack of concern for unforeseen challenges and the enemy's ability to elongate the conflict required significant changes to the allies' level of investment at the outset of the campaign. The allies had not prepared for a mass displacement of civilians, but benefitted in the long term due to the unifying effect it had on NATO resolve. Increasing resolve also benefitted NATO's ability to overcome the challenge of Milosevic's continued resistance. Had the dictator chosen a different strategy, he may have further delayed his departure. Regardless, 78 days of bombing, extensive destruction, and hundreds of thousands displaced stands in sharp contrast to preparations made for only a few days of bombing.

The relationship between the alliance and Kosovo's civilian population also shifted during the operation. For observers on the ground, NATO's decision to use military force against Milosevic meant they had joined forces with the KLA. NATO's coercive air strikes resulting in Serbian collateral damage or civilian deaths further confirmed the connection. The choice to intervene on behalf of one side in the ethnic struggle placed NATO squarely on the side of extremists condemned for terrorism by the international community.¹²⁸ When Milosevic's forces

126. Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 264.

127. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 176-85.

128. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 185. National security analyst Anthony Cordesman pointedly describes how ethnic conflicts rarely have a good or

departed after the air campaign, the Kosovar Albanians pushed out the Serbian civilians.¹²⁹ The dictator's ethnic-cleansing effort abated when he agreed to terms, but violent displacement of Serbian civilians after the air campaign continues to fuel ethnic tension in the region.¹³⁰

Despite the administration's lack of concern for most indicators of this tenet, they did consider the potential for physical losses. The administration and NATO maintained low tolerance for risk to friendly forces to sustain what little public support they had mustered for starting the air campaign. They avoided the politically sensitive discussion of ground forces, and exploited an asymmetric air-power advantage. They also limited friendly forces' exposure to Serbian threats with altitude restrictions and stringent restrictions on target selection.

Constituency—Both

Lack of American interest in the conflict provided motivation for the administration to minimize negative results. Different from the support Colin Powell required in his use-of-force criteria, American sentiment toward Operation Allied Force better resembled ambivalence. The administration, like other NATO countries, feared that friendly losses might turn public ambivalence into public dissent. Powell experienced

bad side, but instead two sides guilty of committing crimes against humanity.

129. "War in Europe." In 1998, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated the number of Kosovar Serbs living in Pristina, Kosovo before the air campaign at 20,000. In February 2000, the total had decreased to 700-800. See also United Nations Security. In 2016, a Serb representative to the UN Security Council estimated Serbia sheltered more than 200,000 people displaced from Kosovo by the Albanian majority.

130. Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge*, 286-96. Judah describes numerous examples of the NATO peacekeeping force's inability to prevent Kosovar Albanians from vengeful acts of retribution when they returned to Kosovo after the conflict.

this dissent firsthand in Vietnam, and wanted to avoid it in future conflicts.

Evaluation of the American people's support for US military operations in Kosovo reveals mixed results. Indicator examination exposes domestic sentiment evenly divided for and against US involvement. Consideration of US involvement in the conflict resulted in a politically charged and contentious debate and resulted in no approval from the nation's congressional representatives. Despite these indicators, no widespread demonstrations resulted from the administration's decision to participate, and the president's approval rating suffered no damage. Overall, American sentiment falls short of a supportive public, but also fails to demonstrate substantial disagreement with the president's decision. Table 17 displays results of tenet and indicator analysis.

Table 17. Constituency

Do the American people support using force?*	<u>B</u>
Polling results	N
Congressional support	N
Public demonstrations	Y
Public approval ratings	Y

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

Poll results reveal that wary Americans increasingly supported US military participation in NATO's air campaign from October 1998 to April 1999, with the country evenly divided at 46 percent favoring and 43

percent opposed as of 21 March 1999.¹³¹ Nevertheless, the vast majority of Americans surveyed after two months of conflict still preferred resolving the dispute using means other than force by a wide margin.¹³² These results suggest few Americans wanted to risk US involvement, but approximately half the population reluctantly accepted the requirement.

Lack of overwhelming support for the mission changed little throughout the campaign, resulting in neither public protests against the conflict nor any discernable effect on the president's public approval rating. Perhaps Clinton's approval rating after Milosevic's settlement best demonstrates the nation's ambivalence.¹³³ Unlike most presidents who oversee a successful military operation, Clinton's domestic popularity remained unchanged after Operation Allied Force.¹³⁴

Lack of congressional approval or disapproval for the use of force further reveals a disinterested public. Months before the offensive, Congress refused the administration's request for 7,500 peacekeepers to

131. Newport, "Support for U.S." Participation in the NATO air campaign reached its peak of popularity approximately three weeks into the air campaign, when 61 percent favored US involvement and 35 percent opposed it. One month later, the country had returned to an even split with 49 percent in favor and 47 percent opposed.

132. Newport, "Support for U.S." The specific question asked was "Say whether you would approve or disapprove if the United States and NATO decided to temporarily suspend the air strikes and attempt to resolve the matter through negotiations and other means." Eighty-two percent approved, with 15 percent disapproving and 3 percent claiming no opinion.

133. "Presidential Approval Ratings--Bill Clinton," Gallup, Inc., <http://www.gallup.com/poll/116584/presidential-approval-ratings-bill-clinton.aspx>.

134. Frank Newport, "Clinton's Job Approval Legacy," *Gallup, Inc.*, 4 January 2001, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/4657/clintons-job-approval-legacy.aspx>. George H. W. Bush's approval ratings soared to 89 percent after Operation Desert Storm and Harry Truman's peaked at 87 percent after World War II. Both presidents saw their approval drop significantly in the months and years thereafter. Clinton's popularity, tied primarily to the US economy, remained at or near 60 percent before, during, and after the conflict in Kosovo.

support Holbrooke's negotiation efforts.¹³⁵ This litmus test may have informed their decision not to wait for congressional approval to start the air campaign. In deliberations after the air campaign started, Congress proved unable to pass a bill authorizing the use of US military forces or restricting them from participation.

Aware that Americans viewed Kosovo with apathy, the administration pursued a course least likely to galvanize public sentiment against military operations. The multilateral approach internationalized responsibility for its conduct, and the president's public statement clarifying his intent to avoid use of ground forces removed the most politically sensitive topic from public consideration. With little perceived at stake, few in the electorate had an incentive to investigate the conflict's roots or status beyond trusting their elected officials to make decisions on their behalf.¹³⁶ Available evidence suggests the American public neither supported nor opposed the administration's decision to use force.

Considering the Tenets

Operation Allied Force represents a detachment from the principles Powell suggested should guide intervention decisions in the post-Cold War era. Similar to their predecessor's impatience with Saddam Hussein's intransigence, the Clinton administration believed Milosevic's continuing heavy-handedness justified a military response. The decision to rely exclusively on air power, subject to restraints imposed by a multinational alliance, marks an evolutionary change to the military's

135. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 424, 42.

136. "Clinton Says U.S." Similar to George H. W. Bush's assessment of the threat posed to other nations in the Middle East by Saddam Hussein, Bill Clinton sought to garner support for the operation by claiming America's interest in Kosovo stemmed in part from the potential for violence to spread, resulting in significantly increased future cost and risk.

role in national strategy. Additionally, Kosovo demonstrated that a president could use military force to accomplish objectives unrelated to national security without a mandate from the electorate.

The administration's use of force was inconsistent with four of the five Powell Doctrine tenets. Inconclusive evidence left undetermined the assessment of the fifth. Examination of the first tenet highlighted military practitioners' lack of common understanding of the political objective, and its questionable importance to the American public and the professional officer corps. Additionally, the use of force did not conform to Powell's requirement for decisive achievement of the objective as it left significant influence over its attainment in the hands of others. When considering the desired outcome and associated risks, the administration focused on sustaining the alliance but entered the conflict without a plan for multiple other indicators of tenet compliance. Finally, planning did not address multiple consequences of using force commensurate with Powell's intent.

Typology

Departure from the Powell Doctrine did not disprove its value, but focus now turns to what influenced deviation from it. The following section examines influence of the study's independent and intervening variables. Five iterations of national-strategy documents and multiple foreign-policy precedents outlined the administration's standing guidance before Operation Allied Force. Discerning a typology also requires analysis of the principal military advisor's role, particularly given the Joint Chiefs' resistance to acting in Kosovo and a caustic civil-military relationship. After examining the relative influence of other advisors, analysis considers the study's two intervening variables: domestic pressure and alternatives to using force. Variable assessments accompany their introduction below, including a table describing coding options.

Standing Guidance—Coded G

Table 18. Variable coding: Standing Guidance

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Consistent with standing guidance	G
Ambiguous, or inconsistent with guidance	A

Source: Author's original work

Policy leading to Operation Allied Force resulted from the administration's experience throughout Clinton's two terms in office. They asserted the importance of America's global influence in their National Security Strategy (NSS) documents, and they believed that earlier intervention could have limited the disasters in Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia.¹³⁷ By the time of the Račak massacre, influential figures within the national-security apparatus had spent extensive time trying to exert control over a disappointing reality in the Balkans.

They decided to use military force in Kosovo consistent with standing guidance in the NSS. Evolution of the administration's guidance suggests two primary trends relevant to the crisis. First, Clinton's national-security team increasingly discarded Weinberger's view that the country should only use force as a last resort and in defense of vital, national interests. The other trend, related to the first, dramatically expanded the capabilities and missions expected of US military forces. Supremely confident in the role of global hegemon, the administration used its position of influence to address myriad hostilities between and within other states' borders.

137. The administration titled its first three documents *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. They labeled the next three *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. They titled their final NSS *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age* in December 2000.

In pursuit of liberation from the notion of force used only as a last resort, the administration sought to alter perceptions of the military's role in American and global society. The first perception they challenged was a holdover from the citizen-soldier model that assumed a normal state of peace punctuated by emergencies requiring temporary mobilization of society. Instead of temporary reactions to repel a threat, the administration established a more permanent role for the military by asserting its potential as a proactive force for good in the post-Cold War era.¹³⁸

They described numerous ways the armed forces could contribute to their vision of an improved global community. Published after early failures in Somalia and Haiti, the 1994 NSS was the first of its kind to contain an entire section dedicated to explaining when and how to employ American military forces. The document deliberately expanded on previous criteria.¹³⁹ In his foreword to the 1995 NSS, Clinton expanded

138. President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, December 1999, 20. As they asserted in their 1999 NSS, the administration maintained their intent to differentiate between the use of decisive force for vital national interests, and limited and selective force for lesser interests. Although the distinction largely reflected the administration's interest in using force to address more foreign-policy problems, Robert DiPrizio argues that using the term national interests to predict uses of force offers little value. DiPrizio states, "One cannot explain past interventions or predict future ones based primarily on the calculations of national interest. Second, interpretation plays a large role in determining if and when soft security concerns are present and when they are important enough to trigger action. This is true, of course, for even so-called vital national interests because, as mentioned earlier, there is no universal definition of the term." Robert C. DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 162. In short, the administration's nearly limitless redefinition of the military's role supported their conclusion that they alone were best suited to determine a situation's suitability to uses of force.

139. See also President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 1994, 10. The administration's policy described selective use of military force in instances where national

the military's role from defender of interests to promoter of values.¹⁴⁰ The 1998 NSS increased the administration's emphasis on values-based intervention.¹⁴¹

The administration also moved away from limiting use of force to a last resort. The 1994 NSS described their belief that early intervention can prevent development of larger, uncontrollable conflicts.¹⁴² The 1995 document described the administration's intent to send forces in support of diplomacy, and to shape the character of the world.¹⁴³ It also asserted their ability to balance interests involved against an operation's costs.¹⁴⁴ Later, the 1997 NSS claimed a requirement to lead other nations

interests not deemed vital to national security are concerned. For instance, they included situations with the potential to result in a large influx of refugees into the US. They also claimed increased interest in using force when doing so could produce long-term benefits. The notion of lasting improvement in another nation derived from using American armed forces represents a significant departure from the deterrence doctrine in place during the Cold War.

140. President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1996, ii.

141. Having used the military to reinstall a government in Haiti, address genocide in Bosnia, and punish terrorists on two different continents, the administration's strategy continued to expand the Pentagon's purview. As opposed to limiting uses of force to those instances where America's interests were threatened, the administration asserted, "in some circumstances our nation may act because our values demand it." President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, October 1998, 5.

142. President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 1994, 21.

143. President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1996, 12-13.

144. President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1996, 13. Richard Betts suggests this determination is impossible because "military strategy does not operate with a single currency of exchange to make goods and prices clear to all parties of a bargain. Unconscious emotions and unclear motives, cognitive problems, and cultural biases prevent strategy from integrating means and ends." Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?," *International Security* 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 22.

responding to common challenges based on reluctance to act forcefully without the United States.¹⁴⁵

To complement their intention to use force earlier, the administration also detailed its attribution of responsibility for myriad missions to the national-security establishment. The 1995 NSS specifically listed humanitarian responses.¹⁴⁶ Highlighting force's role in addressing vital, important, and humanitarian interests, the 1997 NSS added a new section to describe the importance of smaller-scale contingencies.¹⁴⁷ Here, they listed a plethora of missions highlighting the spectrum of conflict below large-scale war.¹⁴⁸ The 1998 NSS added

145. President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, May 1997, Preface, Implementing the Strategy. The 1997 document also pitted policy makers against popular opinion when it challenged Congress to weigh the long-term value of international engagement against the domestic unpopularity of short-term costs. Instead of Powell's insistence on popular support, the administration made clear that they knew better how to invest America's blood and treasure than do the nation's citizens.

146. President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1996, 12.

147. President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, May 1997.

148. The administration listed the following missions under heading of smaller-scale contingencies: all "operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, disaster relief, no-fly zones, reinforcing key allies, limited strikes, and interventions." President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, May 1997. Suggesting these smaller contingencies were the "most frequent challenge for U.S. forces," the administration emphasized the necessity of military capabilities across a "full range of military operations short of major theater warfare." President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, May 1997.

responsibility for failed states.¹⁴⁹ From 1998 to 2000, they increasingly attributed the responsibility for combating terrorism to the military.¹⁵⁰

Beyond general descriptions of their departure from precedent, the administration expressed intent to intervene in Kosovo under the umbrella of NATO in their October 1998 NSS.¹⁵¹ Further emboldened by the results achieved there, the president asserted a more complete detachment from previous restrictions on uses of US military force. He used the 1999 NSS to describe his belief that the interests of America and the world had merged.¹⁵² His assertion implied a role for the US military to defend non-citizens and foreign nations. Published one month before leaving office, Clinton's final NSS touted the value of his preventive-war doctrine.¹⁵³ After considering the administration's standing guidance, examination of the next independent variable

149. President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, October 1998, 7. The document described the administration's intent to intervene in the affairs of states labeled failures wherein they exhibited internal unrest, internally displaced people, human atrocities, or aggression against other states or groups.

150. President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, October 1998, 12, 16. The 1998 NSS described the military's role in delivering justice, and highlighted previous uses of force against terrorist bases in Afghanistan and Sudan. See also President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, December 2000, 17.

151. President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, October 1998, 38.

152. President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, December 1999. The president repeatedly stated that globalization blurs the line between domestic and foreign policy. Based on his own statement, America's national interests and values were increasingly those of the world. Clinton's statement suggests he believed himself capable of speaking on behalf of the world's interests and values.

153. The administration suggested that resolving smaller-scale contingencies can prevent "costlier conflicts that might well threaten U.S. vital interests." President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, December 2000.

investigates the principal military advisor's influence over the decision to use force in Kosovo.

Chairman's Advice—Coded D

Table 19. Variable coding: Chairman's Advice

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Consistent with four or more Powell Doctrine tenets	P
Different than two or more Powell Doctrine tenets	D

Source: Author's original work

Evidence considered suggests the CJCS had no intention to base his advice on the Powell Doctrine. Shelton makes no mention of the doctrine or its tenets in his autobiographical account of his time as CJCS. More specifically, the historical record contains no description of Shelton relying on the doctrine's tenets to advocate for or against the use of force in Kosovo. Conceding the difficulty of proving a negative result, the remainder of this section describes numerous considerations making unlikely Shelton's use of the Powell Doctrine to influence the strategy in Kosovo.

First, evidence in the National Military Strategy (NMS) casts doubt on Shelton's advocacy of Powell Doctrine tenets.¹⁵⁴ Shelton left

154. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States*, 1 January 1992. As CJCS, Powell published the first-ever National Military Strategy document in January 1992. Published one year after Operation Desert Storm, Powell used the document to advocate for a strong military in the post-Cold War era. Additionally, Powell took a large step away from the previous policy of containment to a strategy of decisive force. In addition, his advocacy for clear objectives and adequate resources, his inclusion of decisive force underscored the understanding of armed conflict as a contest of last resort with a clear winner and loser.

unchanged his predecessor's National Military Strategy (NMS) document.¹⁵⁵ Shalikashvili took a large step away from the Powell Doctrine in his 1995 rewrite of the NMS; the 1997 version went even further.¹⁵⁶ Still current throughout the Kosovo crisis, the document suggested early uses of force could ensure peace and provide stability.¹⁵⁷ The NMS also suggested the suitability of US military force to protect and defend the character of the world.¹⁵⁸ Despite the document's departures from Powell's description of force as a last resort and hesitance to use US military force for purposes tangent to national security, Shelton made no changes suggesting he disagreed with its contents.

155. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 83. Some argue Shelton resisted efforts to increase the military's mission flexibility and applications of force outside Powell's limitations, but the historical record does not support this assertion. He left the 1997 NMS in place and lobbied Congress for funding and resources to support expanded uses of force. He resisted Clark's requests for resources in Kosovo on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but did not interfere with the SACEUR's ability to interact directly with the administration. Shelton either personally supported the bombing campaign in Kosovo or considered himself unable to prevent it.

156. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 1995, i, ii, 9, 12, 16. Shalikashvili titled his first version of the NMS *A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement*, using his position to support the Clinton administration's expansion of the military's role in US foreign policy. The CJCS moved away from vital national interests and force as a last resort by advocating earlier uses of military force to shape the environment. He also stepped away from Powell's decisive-force concept to recommend instead necessary and sufficient power used for conflicts in the middle ground between full-scale war and peace. Finally, Shalikashvili embraced flexible uses of the military, including responsibility for assisting nations emerging from conflicts.

157. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 1997.

158. Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 1997, 6, 17. See also Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 335. In his own memoir, Shelton offered no critique of NATO's role changing from responsive military alliance to a proactive political entity promoting stability.

Second, the president did not ask for Shelton's advice on the decision to use force. Administration insiders established their views on the Balkans and Milosevic well before Shelton and Cohen arrived in office. Clinton appointed a CJCS unlikely to challenge the status quo. A career tactician without experience influencing policy, Shelton exemplified the model officer in Huntington's theory of civil-military relations.¹⁵⁹ In contrast with the activism of Powell and Shalikashvili, Shelton avoided policy discussions.¹⁶⁰ As he transitioned to the CJCS post, the administration warned him that his predecessor had strayed too far into their lane.¹⁶¹ Comfortable with the administration and the role they wanted him to play, Shelton focused on lobbying Congress for the resources necessary to carry out their strategy.¹⁶²

Third, Shelton's interpretation of his role within the administration led him to defer representation of the military's position on policy options to Defense Secretary William Cohen. Unlike Powell, Shelton entered the office of the CJCS with no political experience or past relationships with others in administration. In contrast to Powell's occasionally turbulent relationship with Cheney, Shelton and Cohen consistently took the same position. Along with the Joint Chiefs, they both opposed another military

159. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 414-15. Halberstam describes Shelton as an excellent representative of the military's ideals who was also uncomfortable with civil-military and political affairs.

160. Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 373, 426, 78. In his autobiography, Shelton describes a much narrower view of the Goldwater-Nichols Act than that embodied by his predecessors. He rarely worked directly with the president and viewed himself as an advisor or assistant to field commanders working directly under the administration. The role conformed to the legislation's mandate, but better reflected Shelton's comfort zone than the limits of his charter.

161. Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 332.

162. Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 310-26, 36-38, 418-19. Throughout his autobiography, Shelton includes multiple anecdotes describing his admiration for the defense secretary and president. He also offers scathing critiques of others, including John McCain and the Bush administration.

intervention in the Balkans.¹⁶³ As he did in other areas, Shelton deferred to Cohen's representation of the military perspective on Kosovo.

Previously a Republican senator, Cohen was also an outsider in the administration.¹⁶⁴ Whereas Cheney had provided a conduit for Powell to access President Bush, Cohen exerted little influence over the strategy in Kosovo. He argued against the use of force in Kosovo, but no evidence suggests he based his arguments on the tenets of the Powell Doctrine.

Fourth, Shelton did not serve as an intermediary between the field commander and the administration. Instead of working through Shelton to inform debate over Kosovo, Clark went around him to engage with influential members of the administration. Where Powell had gained the trust of Schwarzkopf by acting on his behalf, Shelton's disinterest in Clark's agenda and lack of influence in the administration meant Clark needed to find a different avenue.¹⁶⁵ When the defense secretary and CJCS attempted to restrict his influence, Clark circumvented them by exploiting his relationship with others in the administration.¹⁶⁶ Neither proved capable of controlling Clark's message the way Cheney and Powell had with Norman Schwarzkopf in the Persian Gulf.¹⁶⁷ Shelton's omission

163. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 415-19, 40-42. Prior to his appointment as defense secretary, Cohen opposed expansion of the role of force and much of the administration's policies in the Balkans.

164. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 442-43. Cohen represented the interests of the military institution in heated debates with others in the administration, including Madeleine Albright.

165. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 456. Goldwater-Nichols had increased the field commander's access to political power by removing the service chiefs from the chain of command. Unlike the way George H. W. Bush and Dick Cheney's preference to insert Colin Powell as an intermediary between themselves and all military matters, Clinton and Cohen made no such stipulation. Clark took advantage, and then went elsewhere when the secretary of defense also failed to support his requests.

166. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 436-37.

167. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 441, 54-57, 78. Further illustrating Shelton's lack of influence, Cohen relied on the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not Shelton, to advise him on what decisions to make. In fact, some viewed Ralston as the de facto chairman.

in his memoir of any involvement with the decision to use force in Kosovo offers a suggestive illustration of his lack of influence on the matter.¹⁶⁸

In summary, the historical record offers no evidence to suggest the CJCS maintained any attachment to the tenets of the Powell Doctrine. Regardless, the administration sent strong signals suggesting they did not desire his input on the decision to intervene with military force in Kosovo. Even if they had asked, Shelton's deference on policy matters and agreement with Cohen on the topic of Kosovo meant he did not feel compelled to emphasize his own opinion and rationale to the president. Finally, Shelton's strained relationship with Clark effectively removed him from the ability to influence the relationship between policy and operations in Kosovo. Analysis now turns to the relative influence of other advisors in the Clinton administration.

Relative Advisor Influence—Coded I

Table 20. Variable coding: Relative Advisor Influence

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Disproportionately influential	I
Unremarkable, relative influence	U

Source: Author's original work

Others in the administration wielded substantially more influence than the CJCS over the decision to intervene with military force in Kosovo. Unlike George Bush's leadership role in making the case for

168. Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 370-88. Shelton did include a disparaging critique of Clark's lack of operational prowess—a topic more closely aligned with the chairman's interests. Meanwhile, Clark focused on the political and strategic levels, using the situation in Kosovo and his influence in the administration to push NATO into the conflict.

intervention in the Persian Gulf, Bill Clinton hesitantly arrived at the decision to use force in Kosovo. He sought to appease those in his administration who demanded action and others, along with many in the defense establishment and Congress, who wanted to avoid another Vietnam or Somalia.¹⁶⁹ As he considered options, Sandy Berger, Madeleine Albright, and Wes Clark played key roles in shaping development of the policy.

Even William Cohen's influence far exceeded that of the principal military advisor. With views of the conflict in Kosovo similar to those held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he occasionally argued with Albright until his face turned red. The defense secretary had an impeccable record of achievement and significant experience with national-security matters from his time as a senator, but some in the administration believed he represented the concerns of Congress as much as he did his own.¹⁷⁰

Madeleine Albright served as the administration's staunchest advocate for using force. Her path to the administration had convinced her of the need to stop Milosevic.¹⁷¹ She advocated the World War II paradigm; certain of inevitable tragedy when great powers abdicate their responsibility to confront exploitive, power-hungry regimes. Albright recommended force application as a tool of foreign policy, distinguishing

169. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 86.

170. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 438-43.

171. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 378-80. Born in 1937 Prague, Czechoslovakia to a family deeply involved in politics, Madeleine Albright arrived in America at the age of eleven. Her family barely escaped as the Communist party began its post-World War II rule of a country already disheveled by Nazi influence following implementation of the Munich Agreement. Grateful for the solace afforded them, Albright's family instilled within her a sense of gratitude toward the US and staunch anticommunist beliefs. Her distinctive experience formed within her a faithfulness in the morality of American influence untainted by the country's foray into Vietnam. Halberstam describes how it almost seemed as if she had skipped the entire Vietnam experience. See also Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 75.

uses of force based on just causes from acts of war.¹⁷² She also strained against the restrictions placed on policy by the US experience in Vietnam.¹⁷³

As the crisis unfolded, she declared that the international community had a moral obligation to prevent a repeat of Serbian atrocities committed during the preceding crisis in Bosnia.¹⁷⁴ Convinced of Milosevic's responsibility for violence in the Balkans and that dealing with him required using force, she believed their biggest mistake in Bosnia was responding too slowly.¹⁷⁵ In Kosovo, Albright's perspective gained additional influence from a likeminded position taken by the administration's envoy to Belgrade.¹⁷⁶ The eventual decision to enter into conflict resulted from Albright's advocacy of coercive diplomacy.¹⁷⁷

Clinton's national security advisor also played an important role in the administration similar to that played by Brent Scowcroft under George Bush. Sandy Berger enjoyed a long-standing and personal relationship with Bill Clinton. With unfettered access, he spoke on behalf

172. Madeleine Albright was perhaps the administration's most enthusiastic advocate of coercive diplomacy. Buley, *New American Way*, 80. See also Bacevich, *American Empire*, 48.

173. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 76. Albright believed conducting foreign policy in the post-Cold War era implied a requirement for the US to fuse together aspects of idealism and realism.

174. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 109.

175. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 130-33.

176. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 81, 88, 106-07. Richard Holbrooke had lobbied for air strikes in Bosnia despite what he considered a misapplication of air power in Vietnam. Albright claimed she and Holbrooke spoke with the same voice on policy in Bosnia. Instrumental to deliberations that eventually resulted in the Dayton Accords, Holbrooke wrote a letter to President Clinton in 1996 suggesting US leadership had been fundamental to ending conflict in Bosnia. His opinion convinced Albright of the importance of NATO leading the effort in Kosovo two years later.

177. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 174.

of the president to others in the administration.¹⁷⁸ A pragmatic servant and Clinton's closest advisor, he interpreted policy recommendations from others with keen awareness of Clinton's political position regarding domestic pressures and foreign-policy challenges.¹⁷⁹

As he considered options in Kosovo, Berger received advice from Clinton's cabinet officials and others outside it, including General Wesley Clark.¹⁸⁰ A vestige of Shalikashvili's influence, Clark wielded unprecedented influence in his position as SACEUR.¹⁸¹ He took a proactive role toward policy in the Balkans based on his personal philosophy and experience there.¹⁸² A Pentagon outsider, he argued air power's ability to convince Milosevic despite the views of Cohen and the

178. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 404. Berger was also the only holdover remaining from the original administration, as power brokers from the first term had departed.

179. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 404-09.

180. Boyer, "General Clark's Battles." Clark described how he had personally convinced Clinton's national security advisor to pursue a strategy of diplomacy backed by the threat of force.

181. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 391-94. Clark owed his progression to a fourth star and his assignment as SACEUR to John Shalikashvili. Clark had impressed Shalikashvili while serving as his director of plans on the Joint Staff. He then hand-picked Clark to receive a four-star post as commander of Southern Command, and to take over as SACEUR in place of a predecessor perceived by the Clinton administration as obstructionist regarding enforcement of the Dayton Accords.

182. Halberstam, *War in a Time*, 395-96. In particular, Clark developed extraordinary disdain for the Serbian leader. Convinced Milosevic was solely responsible for perpetuating the ethnic violence, the SACEUR also believed no means other than the use of force could convince him to stop it. See also Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 81-82. Clark became convinced of coercive diplomacy's efficacy during his tenure as the Joint Staff's director for strategic plans and policies. In this capacity, he had travelled throughout Europe with Richard Holbrooke in search of a solution to the crisis in Bosnia. His belief that US air power had wrought the Dayton peace process convinced him the same strategy could persuade Milosevic over Kosovo.

Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁸³ His recommendation for intervention influenced an administration sympathetic to his perspective.¹⁸⁴

The combination of Clark's support for intervention in his role as SACEUR, and Albright's flamboyant advocacy as secretary of state convinced Berger to find the right time. Individually and as a group, their influence over policy in Kosovo exceeded that of the president's other advisors, including the CJCS. The final portion of the case study examines the role of the study's two intervening variables.

Intervening Variables: Coded C and N

Table 21. Variable coding: Competing Alternatives

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Two or more available and feasible	C
Either one or zero alternatives	S

Source: Author's original work

183. Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 83. "His superiors at the Pentagon felt there was no reason to believe that America would play a role there; it wasn't America's fight. He felt differently. 'Kosovo was simply an extension of Bosnia in the mind of Wesley Clark,' Holbrooke said. 'For Clark, Kosovo was the logical next step in his liberal interventionist attitude toward the use of force.'" Quoted in Boyer, "General Clark's Battles." See also Henriksen, *NATO's Gamble*, 137.

184. "The Clinton White House was distracted by domestic political concerns (among them, a Republican Congress, Monica Lewinsky, and impeachment), which amplified Clark's influence." Quoted in Boyer, "General Clark's Battles."

Table 22. Variable coding: Domestic Pressure

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
High pressure for US military intervention	H
Neutral or low pressure for US military intervention	N

Source: Author's original work

As with the other cases considered in this study, numerous factors unique to the circumstances of the conflict affected the decision to intervene militarily. Broadly, the study examines two intervening variables with the potential to affect within-case results. Consideration of competing alternatives examines whether a lack of viable options compelled the administration to choose a use of force. Analysis of domestic pressure investigates the possibility that the administration acted out of a sense of obligation to represent the will of the people they represent. Neither of the intervening variables considered in this study compelled the administration to use force in Kosovo.

The administration considered and dismissed numerous alternatives to using force, but the eventual decision to intervene rested on the assumption that bringing about the desired outcome soon enough required use of US military force. Advocates already wanted to intervene, and the massacre at Račak convinced them of the need to do so as quickly as possible. Alternatives ranged from providing direct support to the Kosovar Albanians to conducting bilateral or multilateral negotiations for a third-party peacekeeping presence. Certainly, limiting involvement to the other instruments of national power offered another option. The administration considered numerous options, any of which had the potential to influence the outcome. When Richard Holbrooke's attempt at negotiating a peaceful solution with Milosevic failed, President Clinton made the decision that he could wait no longer.

Similarly, domestic pressure did not force the administration into a decision for intervention. Instead of carrying out the will of the American people, the administration sent US forces to Kosovo on behalf of a divided nation. Citizens neither clamored for the administration to address the issue, nor protested vehemently the decision to intervene. Evidence reveals the American public wanted the conflict to end.¹⁸⁵ As the air campaign dragged on, Clinton considered the undesirable options of staying the course, escalating to a ground offensive, or withdrawing in failure. The American public's nonchalance after Milosevic agreed to terms further testifies to the lack of a groundswell of domestic support for the operation.

Conclusions

America's use of force in Kosovo represents the typology $G + D + I = M$, where neither intervening variable influenced the outcome (see Table 23).

185. Newport, "Support for U.S." In May 1999, Gallup asked respondents to "Say whether you would approve or disapprove if the United States and NATO decided to temporarily suspend the air strikes and attempt to resolve the matter through negotiations and other means." Eighty-two percent approved, with 15 percent disapproving and three percent claiming no opinion.

Table 23. Coding Kosovo variables

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Assigned code</i>	
	<u><i>P</i></u>	<u><i>K</i></u>
US military force used? ^y	M	M
Consistent with guidance? ^a	G	G
Chairman's advice ^b	P	D
Relative advisor influence ^c	I	I
Competing alternatives ^{x1}	C	C
Domestic pressure ^{x2}	N	N

Source: Author's original work

^y M = military force used; O = other option(s) selected instead of military

^a G = consistent with standing guidance; A = ambiguous or inconsistent

^b P = consistent with four or more Powell Doctrine tenets;

D = advice differs from two or more Powell Doctrine tenets

^c I = disproportionately influential; U = unremarkable, relative influence

^{x1} C = two or more available and feasible; S = single alternative or none

^{x2} H = high; N = neutral or low (public support for military intervention)

Comparison with the previous case reveals three salient distinctions. First, Kosovo's typology duplicates the one found in Desert Storm, with the exception of the chairman's advice. Second, Operation Allied Force did not conform to the stipulations of the Powell Doctrine. Finally, the field commander exerted much greater influence over the strategy chosen in Kosovo than did the nation's principal military advisor.

Contrasting Shelton's role in Kosovo with Powell's in the Persian Gulf underscores Kosovo's typological difference from the previous case. Both men served as the principal military advisor, but each interpreted the job description differently. Shelton did not advise against adherence to Powell's criteria; he simply did not wield any influence over policy. A dedicated officer throughout his career, Shelton pursued the objectives given to him. He adhered to a strict interpretation of Huntington's

normal theory of civil-military relations due to his lack of familiarity with policy matters and the administration's interest in keeping it that way. A marginalized defense secretary and politically connected field commander further reduced his influence.

Neither Shelton's disinterest in politics, nor Powell's advocacy of his criteria prevented the use of force. As reflected in their respective typologies, others in the administration wielded substantially greater influence over the policy choice than did either CJCS. Despite lack of public enthusiasm and available alternatives, both administrations expressed intent to intervene militarily well before giving the final order to commence operations. Still, the application of force in Kosovo hardly represented the one used to remove Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait. Instead of the efficient achievement of a clear objective in the Persian Gulf, an unprepared alliance implemented a muddled theory of victory in Kosovo.¹⁸⁶

186. Gian P. Gentile, *How Effective Is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo*, World of War (New York: New York University Press, 2001). Gentile's analysis of post-conflict surveys designed to assess the effectiveness of strategic bombing campaigns, including Operation Allied Force, highlights the problematic issue of attributing enemy submission solely to American bombing. See also Tami Davis Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 299. As Biddle points out in her analysis of America's interest in strategic bombing, opposing societies can prove tremendously resilient and capable of fighting despite devastating results from an aggressive bombing campaign. The Clinton administration sent Americans to fight in Kosovo because they expected bombing to pressure Milosevic into settling; but numerous bombing campaigns since the advent of air power question their thesis. Air power provides the US an asymmetric advantage on the battlefield, but does not guarantee capitulation. Despite air power's instrumental role in World War II, Vietnam, Operation Desert Storm, and even Bosnia, none of the enemies in these conflicts stopped fighting solely because of a bombing campaign.

The latter use of force did not adhere to Powell's criteria, and dragged on well beyond pre-conflict expectations for the conflict.¹⁸⁷ Specifically appointed by Clinton to avoid a policy obstruction, Shelton accepted his predecessor's departure from the Powell Doctrine. With Shalikashvili's approval, the administration developed several constructs to circumvent Powell's limitations on force application. Under the banners of coercive diplomacy and operations other than war, they codified a role for a large standing force in the post-Cold War era.¹⁸⁸ Even if Shelton privately embraced every one of Powell's tenets, the administration's implementation of policy in Kosovo did not conform to those considered in this study.

No officer wanted to depart from the doctrine more than the SACEUR. General Clark did not just carry out the administration's order; he demanded it. Clark used his influence as SACEUR and elevated access under the Goldwater-Nichols Act as means to influence policy, while Shelton accepted a more limited interpretation of his own role as principal military advisor. Clark leveraged his previous knowledge of Milosevic to great effect with influential members of the administration who expressed a sympathetic perspective.

187. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 105, 212-15. Daalder and O'Hanlon succinctly summarize Kosovo's departure from the Powell Doctrine by describing NATO's lack of commitment, murky objectives, and disregard for unforeseen challenges. They also provide a well-reasoned analysis suggesting Kosovo lends credibility to Powell's criteria. After using the experience of Kosovo to defend the Powell Doctrine, they argue against the strategic benefit of rigid adherence to a doctrine of decisive force and considering its use only as a last resort. Like Madeleine Albright, they cite potential benefits of discounting these two Powell-Doctrine tenets, but do not consider the enemy's role in determining outcomes or the broader consequences of an ineffectual application of force by the global hegemon.

188. Bacevich suggests the Department of Defense morphed into the "Department of Power Projection." Bacevich, *American Empire*, 127.

The next chapter examines America's first use of force in a new century. The Clinton administration expanded the role of force in US foreign policy after an incredible display of military power in the Persian Gulf. Their successors continued to disconnect uses of force from Powell's tenets during combined air and ground operations in the Middle East. Civil-military fissures aggravated during Clinton's tenure continued to fester under the next administration's dominant defense secretary.



Chapter 6

Afghanistan

Are you going to teach the Politburo? Your only duty is to carry out orders.

-Soviet Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov
Retort to Soviet Chief of General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov, who disagreed with the decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979

Andy Card...was struck that Rumsfeld and the chairman tended to opine in the same voice. It was an echo, and he could not recall an instance when the chairman's advice challenged Rumsfeld's. There were a few times he found himself thinking to himself that it was significant that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs wasn't saying anything. The silence might mean the chairman disagreed but they would never know.

-Bob Woodward
State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III

As President-elect George W. Bush assembled his cabinet, he selected Donald Rumsfeld to take the reins of the defense department much later than normal for two reasons. First, the nation did not know which candidate had won the presidency until multiple recounts eventually led to a December 2000 US Supreme Court decision that settled the race. Second, Rumsfeld was not Bush's first choice for the position. His selection as secretary of defense on 28 December 2000 surprised everyone, including most in the administration.¹

1. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 261-70. Mann details a process whereby Bush, Cheney, and the incoming chief of staff, Andrew Card, determined finalists for cabinet positions. They planned on Rumsfeld taking over as CIA director, but did not have a solution for defense secretary. They eventually switched Rumsfeld to defense based largely on concerns that they needed to balance against Colin Powell's influence as secretary of state.

Rumsfeld rounded out a cabinet informed by five decades of experience in foreign policy and defense matters. A former defense secretary under Gerald Ford, he had influential roles in government dating back to his election as a congressional representative from Illinois in 1962.² Rumsfeld hired Cheney to work for him during his days in the Nixon administration. Bush's primary advisors on foreign policy included these two former defense secretaries, a secretary of state who had been the CJCS, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Bush's NSA, had served on his father's National Security Council.³

The incoming team resolved to assert America's strength in the post-Cold War world. Emphasizing the importance of relations with other great powers, they distanced themselves from smaller states, objectionable regimes, and restrictive treaties.⁴ Bush had campaigned on his assertion that the US military should not police the world, but should instead focus on fighting wars.⁵ He and Rumsfeld pledged to transform what they considered an outdated national-security apparatus still

2. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 5-20, 56-68, 123-26. He had also served as advisor and US ambassador to the UN during the Nixon administration, White House chief of staff and secretary of defense under Gerald Ford, and special envoy to the Middle East during the Reagan administration.

3. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 145-46, 71-72, 204-06, 46. She had also gained a reputation for her interest in great-power politics and notoriety for her extensive knowledge of the Soviet military during the Reagan administration.

4. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 256, 77-89. Mann describes how the administration differentiated its policies toward other nations based on an assessment of their power and morality. They took a hard stance against North Korea's lack of democracy, but a much softer approach to China's communist regime. They also demonstrated a willingness to break from international agreements (e.g. the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol), advancing the previous administration's drift toward unilateralism.

5. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 256. Bush specifically cited Haiti and humanitarian operations as examples of missions unsuited to the military.

oriented to Cold War threats.⁶ The defense secretary's internal efforts initially languished, but an external impetus brought change on 11 September 2001.⁷

Absent since the Soviet Union's demise, an immediate and existential threat to US security arrived once again at 8:45 in the morning. Despite their vast experience with national security and repeated warnings about al Qaeda and terrorism, no one in the administration anticipated 9/11.⁸ Unlike the peer competitors, rogue dictators, and ethnic conflicts they entered office prepared to address, an international and networked organization bound together by religious ideology became their most pressing security concern. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda had their own agenda in the post-Cold War era. The administration addressed the threat within the context of their broader goals for US foreign policy.

The Stage

The terrorists' actions shifted internal debate over national strategy from philosophy to reality. Previously, the administration arbitrated differences between neoconservatives and fiscal conservatives.⁹ Neither wanted US allies to determine the goals and limits of America's national-

6. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 289. Powell and Cheney had taken an active role in preserving US military strength after the Cold War. Rumsfeld now emphasized the role of technology and doctrine to enhance the institution's lethality, mobility, and readiness.

7. Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 289-90. Feaver describes the establishment's initial resistance to the new administration's efforts at transformation. He suggests eight years without discipline under the Clinton administration resulted in senior military leaders openly resisting Rumsfeld's unpopular reforms.

8. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 293.

9. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 290. Military funding represented one example of the tension between the two camps. Neoconservatives desiring a more assertive foreign policy wanted to increase funding for the military, while fiscal conservatives interested in reducing taxes and government spending refused to consider the additional expense.

security interests.¹⁰ The former supported a more aggressive approach to foreign policy, while the latter cited economic concerns when considering the value of increased defense spending.¹¹

Al Qaeda's attack changed the discussion from assessing the military's theoretical value to determining how quickly it could respond. Declaration of a global war on terror introduced an ambitious end state for an international enterprise, but limitations imposed by ways and means challenged development of an effective strategy.¹² The attack on America's homeland obviated continuation of the previous administration's counterterrorism policies.¹³ Bush's advisors had arrived in office intending to refocus the military on combat operations, and assuming potential enemies were other nations.¹⁴ Even recent conflicts in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo assumed the importance of internationally recognized borders. By contrast, this enemy had roots

10. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 297, 305, 13.

11. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 289-90.

12. According to the president, "the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows." George W. Bush, "Remarks from the President of the United States," (Address, Oval Office, The White House, Washington, DC, 11 September 2001). These verbs (defeat, stop, eliminate, destroy) each meant something different to military practitioners trying to discern their mission. See also Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 439-40. The first day after the terrorist attacks, CIA Director George Tenet and FBI Director Bob Mueller asserted al Qaeda's culpability. Mueller also articulated his assumption of the administration's intent to capture the perpetrators and try them in a court of law. The president had other ideas.

13. Already skeptical, the 9/11 attacks only confirmed their disdain for the previous administration's use of cruise missiles to respond after previous terrorist attacks.

14. During the 2000 presidential campaign, Bush criticized his predecessor for conducting "experiments in nation building" and promised to stop "open-ended deployments and unclear military missions." Quoted in Bacevich, *American Empire*, 203, 36.

and connections in nations throughout the world, and more closely resembled an ideological movement than a nation-state.¹⁵

The administration embarked on a worldwide endeavor, but the enemy played a critical role in defining the conflict's character. The Salafists espoused an ideology at odds with America's emphasis on individual liberty and human rights.¹⁶ Instead of gaining political power to foist their ideology on a state's citizens, perpetrators of the 9/11 attack coordinated their efforts in secrecy across borders. No one could say for sure how apprehending Osama bin Laden might affect the likelihood of future attacks; historical precedents for addressing non-state malefactors included pacification and international policing. President Bush invoked the World War II model instead. He framed the problem as a war and resolved to ensure America's safety by sending military forces to fight abroad.¹⁷

The decision to hold states accountable for activities of terrorists within their borders provided the necessary justification for sending

15. Changes in technology had also rendered their tactics more influential. Previous terrorists undoubtedly entertained similarly destructive intentions, but riding a horse into a building could not create the same shock value as that achieved by al Qaeda. Invention of the aircraft made the spectacle and destruction of 9/11 possible. The administration's concern regarding terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction derived from implications of the trend.

16. Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009), 69-83. Jones describes the ideological roots of the movement. In the last century, Bolsheviks and Nazis exterminated millions in pursuit of their ideology; the Salafists appeared to chart a similar course in the twenty-first century.

17. George W. Bush, *Decision Points*, 1st ed. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 133-37. On the day of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush categorized the terrorists' actions as an act of war analogous with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He also resolved to hold states accountable for harboring terrorists. As the president described, his decision provided more options for offensive uses of military force. See also Woodward, *Bush at War*, 37.

American forces abroad. Initial planning for Afghanistan allowed for the possibility that the Taliban could stay in power. When Mullah Omar and his regime failed to cooperate with US demands to apprehend Osama bin Laden, the administration rendered them equally guilty as sponsors of terrorism. Al Qaeda's presence had focused their attention on Afghanistan, but the administration's guilt-by-association model produced a state-based enemy to attack.

Chairman

The CJCS exerted little influence over the strategy. Shelton finished his four-year term during the Bush administration's first eight months. Tense civil-military relations once again characterized the transition period, but in the opposite direction of Powell's parallel experience eight years earlier.¹⁸ Whereas Powell's significant influence over use-of-force decisions frustrated Clinton's cabinet, Rumsfeld's domineering style exasperated senior military officers. Instead of asking Shelton for inputs on policy challenges, Rumsfeld questioned the veracity of every Pentagon operation and process until he had personally approved his own version of it.¹⁹ Shelton and other senior officers

18. Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 401-13. Shelton describes the antagonistic relationship in detail, including his belief that Rumsfeld distrusted him from the beginning as a representation of the previous administration.

19. Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 420-25. Shelton described Rumsfeld's reaction to a no-fly zone response by coalition aircraft patrolling the skies over Iraq. The defense secretary demanded a review of the plan after suggesting the military had intentionally circumvented his control. Shelton's staff reviewed it, left it the same, and then presented it to Rumsfeld (for the third time) with the title "Rumsfeld Auto-Response Matrix." The secretary approved the plan without changes.

discovered they did not have the time or resources available to answer every inquiry and challenge from the new secretary.²⁰

Operation Enduring Freedom began less than a week after Shelton's retirement, and Rumsfeld played a key role in determining his replacement as chairman. The president favored US Navy Admiral Vern Clark, but Rumsfeld did not want to compete with Clark's assertiveness and interpretation of Congress's intent in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.²¹ Shelton had advocated for Clark's selection over Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers based largely on a perception that the admiral was more likely to push back when he disagreed. Myers' non-confrontational style worried Shelton most. The vice chairman received news of his nomination from the defense secretary on 23 August 2001.²²

Whether attributable to Rumsfeld's management style or the chairman's personality, civil-military relations at the end of 2001 hardly

20. Bob Woodward, *State of Denial* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 28-37. Woodward describes Rumsfeld's confrontational style with senior officers and his disinterest in the military's chain of command. He overwhelmed officers at various levels with snowflakes (email inquiries left unsigned and without a seal of office, but from the defense secretary). See also Richard B. Myers and Malcolm McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Frontlines of National Security*, 1st ed. (New York: Threshold, 2009), 134. The CJCS describes the likelihood of the secretary sending 50 or more of these taskings on any given day without any way to predict their arrival or scope of their requirement for information.

21. Woodward, *State of Denial*, 53-69. Woodward detailed the Bush administration's interview process and Clark's relationship with Rumsfeld at length. Shelton and Clark made it clear to Rumsfeld and the president that the admiral intended to provide independent advice if selected. Although he does not state it explicitly, Woodward's account leads the reader to the conclusion that Rumsfeld intervened to prevent Clark's appointment.

22. Myers and McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 145-47. Myers' account describes Rumsfeld's initial statement that the president had decided, but later makes clear that Rumsfeld had picked him. Immediately following his announcement, the defense secretary offered two names from which Myers could express his preference for vice chairman.

resembled the precedent established during Powell's tenure as CJCS at the end of the Cold War.²³ The trend toward reducing CJCS influence accelerated under Rumsfeld's leadership. Whereas the Clinton administration marginalized Shelton's influence over strategy, Rumsfeld reduced Myers' role to little more than that of a DOD staff member.²⁴ The secretary's domineering manner resulted in extensive anxiety.²⁵ The relationship between defense secretary and CJCS all but prevented the president from receiving independent advice from the professional officer corps.²⁶

Administration

Rumsfeld was among the last advisors added to the administration after Bush assembled an experienced team early in his presidential campaign.²⁷ Led by veterans of previous Republican administrations,

23. As evidence of the change in civil-military relations, Mann cited the change in Defense Department representative chosen to interface with the media. Instead of Powell giving the briefing with Cheney standing quietly off to the side, Rumsfeld was now the one at the microphone while Myers looked on. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 196.

24. Woodward, *State of Denial*, 72. Many of the chairman's military counterparts viewed him as Rumsfeld's senior military assistant. Myers described meeting with the secretary to achieve a mind meld, wherein Myers would adapt his perspective to match Rumsfeld's. See also Myers and McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 263.

25. So complete was Myers' frustration with his lack of influence that he was often seen with his head down on the tank conference table and overheard calling Rumsfeld "that son of a bitch," or "that asshole." Quoted in Woodward, *State of Denial*, 74. For Myers' view of the civil-military relationship, see Myers and McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 184. His black-or-white description of the relationship falls far short of Eliot Cohen's discussion of an unequal dialogue. As if channeling Huntington's views, Myers describes the possibility of an officer influencing a political decision as a worst-case scenario.

26. According to Woodward, "strong, forceful military advice was bleached out of the system. The uniformed military was now just staff, its voice a polite whisper." Woodward, *State of Denial*, 74.

27. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 251. He established a foreign-policy team more than two years before the election.

they had extensive experience the candidate touted as critical to his success as president.²⁸ Throughout the campaign, Bush and his advisors said little about terrorism, highlighting instead a traditional approach that emphasized great-power politics while disparaging use of America's armed forces to police the world or conduct nation-building activities.²⁹

Despite his lack of personal experience, George W. Bush's stewardship of US foreign policy after 9/11 reflected his father's style of direct involvement.³⁰ The elder Bush had spent decades in the federal government dealing directly with foreign policy as a congressional representative, ambassador, CIA director, vice president, and president prior to the Persian Gulf conflict. In contrast, George W. Bush entered the office of the presidency having never held an elected or appointed position in the federal government. Still, the instrumental role he assumed in determining America's response to the 9/11 attack exceeded even his father's activism.³¹ The destructive and surprising act of violence affected him deeply; he resolved to deliver justice to the perpetrators and security for the nation.

After 11 September 2001, the president changed the dynamic of his relationship with his advisors. He was no longer the facilitator of expert advice during a time of relative peace; he was now running a war as the commander in chief. The distinction carried significant weight in his administration. The president had appointed three senior advisors

28. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 251-54.

29. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 255-59.

30. Woodward, *State of Denial*, xiv. Bush had less experience governing when he entered the office of the presidency than any of his predecessors since 1913.

31. Even more than his almost daily chairing of NSC meetings in the wake of the 9/11 attack, his immediate decision to frame the problem as a war and his view of himself as the lead planner for the effort had effected policy decisions more than any other combination of inputs.

with a distinctive understanding of war.³² For these men, war—especially war beginning with a devastating attack on the US—meant the world had changed in a specific and distinct way that perhaps only others with their background and experience could understand.

Conflict

Operation Enduring Freedom began less than a month after the 9/11 attacks. US forces worked with numerous tribes and factions to remove the Taliban from power. The combination of air power, special-operations personnel, CIA paramilitary teams, and indigenous forces demonstrated operational effectiveness. Two months after starting their offensive, the coalition removed the Taliban from power.

American and coalition forces achieved another battlefield success using a new operational scheme. Instead of the Persian Gulf conflict's mass or the Balkans' coercion via bombing campaigns, Operation Enduring Freedom used modern technology to bolster the effectiveness of an indigenous ground force.³³ The coalition established air dominance early, and fewer than 500 CIA and Special Operations personnel subsequently benefited from 100 daily combat sorties generated from bases across the globe. The asymmetric advantage allowed an indigenous group of 15,000 ground forces to defeat an enemy more than three times its size for the cost of 12 American lives.³⁴ The CIA's plan had worked;

32. His vice president and department heads of state and defense had assumed responsibility for leading the country's war effort in previous posts. Each had held their former positions during a time when they anticipated an apocalyptic attack by a nuclear-armed superpower.

33. Myers and McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 196. CJCS Richard Myers described US military operations in Afghanistan as evidence of transformation. He considered the equipment innovative, and the strategy and tactics revolutionary.

34. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, xxii, 108.

Donald Rumsfeld had an example to support his transformation initiative.³⁵

Conflict Termination and Results

Translating operational success into strategic benefit proved challenging for three reasons. Coalition forces defeated the Taliban and displaced al Qaeda's forces, but destroyed neither.³⁶ Their enemy forces took sanctuary in nearby Pakistan, regrouped, and unleashed an insurgency.³⁷ The light footprint that demonstrated remarkable effectiveness during the offensive became a liability as the international community and a fledgling national government attempted to maintain security.³⁸ Furthermore, stabilization and reconstruction efforts requirements meant less time and resources available to avenge America's attackers.³⁹

Unfortunately, the administration failed at both efforts. They had not determined a plan for the administration of Afghanistan before the conflict began, and they disagreed about the level of US commitment

35. Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The U.S. And the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York, NY: The Penguin Group, 2008), 97. Rashid describes how results of the conflict in Afghanistan influenced the administration's use of force in Iraq.

36. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 100.

37. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 96-100. Jones also describes the large number of al Qaeda fighters, including Osama bin Laden, that retreated into Pakistan's sanctuary. The administration's plan for the conflict did not include US ground forces requested by the CIA to prevent bin Laden's escape.

38. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, xxviii-xxix, 34-35. Jones argues weak governance and religious ideology led to the insurgency after the Taliban's ouster. He also describes how the Soviets abandoned their effort in Afghanistan in 1986 after failing to pacify the rural areas and defeat the Mujahedeen.

39. Jones describes the Taliban's overthrow as "Janus-faced." Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 108. A stunning victory for unconventional operations in one sense, it also failed to hold accountable those responsible for attacking America.

after taking over the country.⁴⁰ While enemy forces reconstituted across the border, other nations followed the US lead in Afghanistan, precluding provision of resources adequate to maintain security. The lack of personnel, funding, and intelligence resources took the pressure off the Taliban and al Qaeda.⁴¹ The country descended into chaos as the preponderance of US resources and attention flowed into Iraq.⁴²

Fifteen years after the conflict began, defining the strategic benefit derived from US operations in Afghanistan remains problematic. Taliban resilience continues to challenge the central government and Western interests despite a government elected democratically, surge in US

40. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 109-15, 19-24. Jones describes two camps: one argued for taking responsibility for the whole country, and the other supported a much less robust presence with little presence outside Kabul. Inconclusive debate continued until February 2002, when the latter camp prevailed. As the enemy reconstituted in its sanctuary across the border, an international peacekeeping force of 4,000 stayed in the capital with another 8,000 US forces deployed into the country for the sole purpose of hunting members of the Taliban and al Qaeda—among the smallest stabilization forces used since World War II.

41. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 142-50. Jones highlights Rumsfeld's recognition of little progress in the effort to track down the Taliban and al Qaeda. He also highlights the administration's decision to transfer US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Lieutenant General David Barno out of Afghanistan in 2005 as poorly timed changes of key leadership positions during a tenuous period. The biggest issue facing the coalition in Afghanistan derived from external support for the insurgents, especially their sanctuary in Pakistan.

42. By 2007, CJCS Mike Mullen assessed America's ability to support both war efforts by stating, "Our main focus, militarily, in the region and in the world right now is rightly and firmly in Iraq. It is simply a matter of resources, of capacity. In Afghanistan, we do what we can, In Iraq, we do what we must." Quoted in Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 124-33, 64-82, 221. Lack of focus on effective policing and endemic corruption undermined the government's ability to provide security for the population. Much like the Soviet experience two decades prior, the coalition forces began to lose control of the rural areas as the Taliban fomented their insurgency.

forces, and price tag approaching \$1 trillion.⁴³ No one can estimate to what extent, if any, the operation diminished al Qaeda's capacity for carrying out additional attacks.⁴⁴ The organization still exists, along with numerous others who regularly use means of terrorism to pursue their ends.

Evaluating Doctrinal Tenets

The Bush administration wanted to punish the 9/11 mastermind, and decided to include military force in America's response to al Qaeda's hijacking plot. For the cost of four terrorists' lives and a relatively small amount of time and money, the terrorist organization achieved an effect vastly disproportionate to its level of investment. They not only crashed four jets, destroyed or damaged three major landmarks, and killed nearly 3,000 people, but also gained notoriety for their cause by rising to the level of primary opponent in a war with the global hegemon.

Throughout preparation and execution of Operation enduring Freedom, the administration considered this use of force different from others in the past. Sending US forces to Afghanistan with a mission to destroy a non-state actor was a first for the nation, but the rushed response to 9/11 represented the most significant departure from

43. Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11*, Congressional Research Service, RL33110, US Library of Congress, 8 December 2014, 15. In an 8 December 2014 report, the Congressional Research Service projected the cost of the war in Afghanistan at the end of Fiscal Year 2015 at more than \$700 billion and all post-9/11 war funding at \$1.6 trillion.

44. Six years after the Taliban's overthrow, US intelligence community still considered al Qaeda "the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland." Quoted in Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 279. Al Qaeda attacks increased after the 9/11 hijacking plot. The terrorist organization averaged five times as many attacks per year from 2002 to 2006 than it had in the six years leading up to the prolific attack on America.

previous operations.⁴⁵ Even after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (analogous based on its element of surprise, comparable toll of death and destruction, and location on US territory), the US followed a Europe-first strategy after entering the worldwide conflict. The following analysis of Powell's use-of-force principles perhaps best reveals the effect of unverified assumptions made during crisis-action planning in response to an obvious breach of national security.

Purpose—No

The administration's post-9/11 deliberations consistently centered on determining the objective for America's response. President Bush believed America was under attack as they considered options, and wanted to reassert control by transitioning from defense to offense as soon as possible. They considered potential adversaries, prospective partners, and available ways and means as they pursued a suitable response.

Analysis of indicators reveals the administration determined an important, clear, and well understood political objective in Afghanistan. Results of tenet analysis focus narrowly on Operation Enduring Freedom, but examination of each indicator considers its relationship with the broader war on terrorism. Evidence suggests the administration inadequately assessed the relationship between Operation Enduring Freedom and the broader war on terror, but coalition forces clearly understood their objective in Afghanistan. Table 24 depicts the administration's consideration of the Powell Doctrine's first tenet, and its respective indicators.

45. Recent US actions in the Balkans had resulted from years of engagement and turmoil in the region. The 1991 offensive in the Persian Gulf only happened after five months of planning and analysis. Even smaller operations in Panama and Grenada had only taken place after months of preparation.

Table 24. Purpose

Is the political objective important, clear, and understood?*			<u>Y</u>
Important	US national security compromised if not accomplished		Y
	Benefactors' security compromised if not accomplished		Y
	American public agrees		Y
	International community agrees		Y
	Professional officer corps agrees		Y
Clear and understood	American public aware		Y
	Consistent public statements		Y
	Consistent military planning		B
	Consistent military actions		B
	Consistent national instruments of power		Y
	Consistent coalition actions		B

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell-Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

The Bush administration wanted to remove the Taliban from power and disrupt al Qaeda's ability to conduct operations.⁴⁶ As depicted in Table 24, every indicator attests to the objective's importance. They also described a clear, well-understood goal despite evidence suggesting lack of detail regarding the connection between Afghanistan and the broader

46. Upon announcing Operation Enduring Freedom to the American public on 7 October 2001, the president focused more on disrupting terrorist operations than he did on the Taliban. Describing his expectation that al Qaeda forces might try to hide, the president promised "sustained, comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice." George W. Bush, "Presidential Address to the Nation," (Address, Treaty Room, The White House, Washington, DC, 7 October 2001).

war on terror.⁴⁷ Indicators coded with the letter B highlight areas where relevant constituencies understood and pursued the objective, but did not or could not take actions to exploit fully an advantage with the potential to effect the broader war on terror significantly.

As the administration explained the mission, different audiences required varying degrees of detail. The American public understood the president's plan to hold terrorist organizations and their state sponsors accountable.⁴⁸ Multiple government agencies understood the president's interest in using all the instruments of national power. Military planners also understood their role in overthrowing the Taliban government and supporting coalition ground forces. Conversely, lack of clear expectations regarding the pursuit of al Qaeda resulted in military planning and coalition actions inconsistent with the stated objective in the global war on terror.⁴⁹ The relative ease with which enemy forces took sanctuary in Pakistan for years calls into question the administration's determination to capture or kill them.⁵⁰ They set out to disrupt al Qaeda, but left

47. The administration focused more on removing the Taliban from power than they did on killing or capturing terrorists in the country. Their prioritization affected resources devoted to the latter task and a realistic assessment of required coalition support as it related to the broader war on terror.

48. For Myers' discussion of the nature of the conflict, see Woodward, *Bush at War*, 220. Multiple members of the administration referred to the war as a new and different kind of fight for America, but they did not explain many details of their assertion presumably due to their classified nature.

49. George W. Bush, "Remarks to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," (Address, United States Capitol, Washington, DC, 20 September 2001). On 20 September 2001, the president described the objective of the broader war on terrorism as eliminating terrorism by destroying it where it grows. He described a lengthy conflict with an element of secrecy preventing Americans from knowing every action taken.

50. Four days after the offensive began, President Bush stated, "it's a broader war. If we don't get UBL [shorthand for Usama or Osama bin Laden, mastermind of the 9/11 plot], it doesn't mean it's a failure." Quoted in Woodward, *Bush at War*, 217-18, 23-24, 29-33, 41, 80-81, 90-

undefined the measure of effectiveness.⁵¹ If they did not kill or capture the terrorists in Afghanistan, the president believed America's global war on terror would ensure their demise elsewhere.⁵²

Unlike others in preceding case studies, al Qaeda's hijacking plot directly affected America's national security. Their brazen actions killed thousands of American citizens, destroyed national landmarks, and used the element of surprise for emphasis. Six days later, President Bush assigned tasks to the administration's principals. He wanted to move

91, 307, 11. George Tenet later interpreted his guidance with regard to Osama bin Laden as kill, capture, or getting him on the run. The administration considered destroying or capturing al Qaeda operatives important, but they also wanted a relatively quick victory in Afghanistan regardless of how many terrorists they killed or took prisoner. They chose not to clarify the objective regarding Operation Enduring Freedom's direct effect on al Qaeda because they did not need to clarify it; they expected the broader anti-terrorist effort to secure the terrorist organization's demise. The administration refused to set the standard high for Afghanistan's direct effect on al Qaeda because they did not expect to achieve a high standard there. The president chose not to prioritize Osama bin Laden over other aspects of combat operations because he expected to deal with the terrorist leader through other efforts broader than the operation focused only on Afghanistan, and on a longer time horizon. Others in the administration disagreed, including the vice president.

51. Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, 91-93. Rashid describes multiple missed opportunities to apprehend top Taliban and al Qaeda leaders, and suggests the US may have permitted the escape of several thousand by approving Musharraf's request for a secretive airlift operation that evacuated an unknown number of people from Kunduz.

52. The assumption likely resulted from the president's dichotomous understanding of simultaneously conducted wars. He envisioned the global war on terror as an endeavor largely conducted by the CIA, while Afghanistan operations included a military component (air power and Special Forces) necessary to overthrow the government. With confidence in the CIA's ability to track down the terrorists no matter their location, he did not commit American resources sufficient to ensure Osama bin Laden's demise during Operation Enduring Freedom. By way of comparison, the force used to depose and apprehend Manuel Noriega in Panama included 40 times the number of personnel in a country one-eighth the size of Afghanistan, and much closer to the US.

forward after giving them an opportunity to present considerations and response options.⁵³ He chose the most aggressive options presented by both the CIA and the military, but considered Afghanistan only one front in a much broader war with a longer timeline. In this case, the benefactors were Americans themselves.

Relevant constituencies granted the president wide discretion. The American public required little justification for a forceful response; al Qaeda members planned the 9/11 scheme, and the Taliban permitted it. The president publicly described his intent to deliver justice on behalf of an angry nation.⁵⁴ European allies expected to support the American response, but did not demonstrate an equivalent level of ambition.⁵⁵ Still,

53. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 97-99, 137, 75-76, 246. George H. W. Bush took an active role in foreign policy, but charged Cheney (who in turn charged Powell) with overseeing Schwarzkopf's planning for the Persian Gulf offensive. Clinton had taken a much less active role in planning than had the elder Bush. George W. Bush's involvement with planning the war on terror stood in stark contrast to both. Instead of establishing a lead agency or individual responsible for developing a plan, he assumed the position himself. Woodward describes Bush's issuance of orders to his principals during the 17 September 2001 meeting and tendency to focus on the tactics to the exclusion of broader considerations. The president assumed this role despite his dearth of experience with planning military or intelligence operations, and his recent arrival into the realm of US foreign policy. He told the American people to go back to their normal lives, but his routine changed dramatically.

54. Operation Enduring Freedom's importance to the American public contrasts with previous case studies. Unlike his predecessors' uses of force to defend foreign groups in the Balkans, Somalia, Haiti, and Kuwait, the president described operations in Afghanistan as a form of self-defense against more attacks. Americans with little knowledge of the purported enemy expected the president to lead a response on their behalf.

55. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 297-306. Despite the president's declaration of a war, neither France nor Germany used the same language. The administration's impatient push for a response, and characterization of the effort as a war, alienated European allies to the extent that French officials concluded the Bush administration no longer

the UN Security Council passed two resolutions supporting a response against terrorists prior to Operation Enduring Freedom.⁵⁶ NATO also invoked Article 5.⁵⁷ Requisite countries granted US aircraft permission to fly over their territory.⁵⁸ Even Russia and Pakistan assisted with US military operations.⁵⁹

The professional officer corps also wanted to counter the terrorists. They had difficulty envisioning a military role in the effort to end global terrorism, but three considerations reduced their skepticism. Most importantly, the administration's decision to include the Taliban as an enemy meant they had a traditional opponent (another country's military

considered relations with Europe its most important strategic consideration.

56. The first, passed on 12 September 2001, called on nations to hold accountable anyone with a hand in the 9/11 attack. The resolution assumed an international response to the attack and called on states "to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring [sic] the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable." United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1368, 12 September 2001. The second, passed on 28 September 2001, invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and provided additional details on specific steps to counter terrorism. The resolution described multiple aspects, including financing, recruiting, early warning, providing safe haven, assisting other nations pursuing terrorists, denying freedom of movement, and sharing information. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373, 28 September 2001.

57. In doing so, America's NATO allies declared "that the attacks on the United States on September 11 were an attack on all NATO countries." Woodward, *Bush at War*.

58. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 183.

59. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 103, 18-19, 29-30. The Russians provided significant intelligence, influence to secure US basing rights in key places, and the offer of supporting US forces with search and rescue operations. The Bush administration, suspicious of the Russians when beginning their tenure, believed the strong signals of support from Russian President Putin signaled a sea change in relations with their former foe. See also Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, 89-90. Pakistan's President Musharraf allowed multiple US military units to stage operations out of Pakistan, including use of air bases and seaports.

forces) and a clear mission (regime change). Second, exclusion of a post-conflict role in nation-building tasks meant they could focus almost exclusively on waging violence. Finally, using the CIA's operations plan meant a relatively small requirement to deploy personnel and resources.⁶⁰ Senior officers embraced the mission's importance, and focused on developing a plan for operations.⁶¹

The administration and planners at every level wanted to accomplish the objective, and needed to understand the definition of success to prescribe requisite ways and means. The chosen method of operations made progress difficult initially, but discerning the relationship between operations in Afghanistan and the broader war on terror proved the greater challenge.⁶² The president expected a lengthy struggle against terrorist organizations; the administration increasingly distinguished success in Afghanistan from success in the war on terror.⁶³

60. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 251. Even in the absence of these three factors, Rumsfeld's increasingly strong grip on the department meant the Joint Chiefs had less of an opportunity to offer a dissenting opinion. In addition to Rumsfeld's erosion of the Joint Chiefs' influence, the geographic combatant commander responsible for planning operations expressed his unwillingness to voice an opinion unless it matched the secretary's perspective. See also Woodward, *State of Denial*, 81-82.

61. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 220. Myers described a new kind of war for US forces while answering reporters' questions in the days following the offensive's start.

62. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 230. Frustration grew initially as the indigenous ground forces, their interests not perfectly aligned with those of the administration, failed to advance at the pace desired by the administration.

63. Expecting the global war on terror to last for years and the war in Afghanistan to end much sooner made sense based on the definition of victory in each. Success in Afghanistan meant overthrowing a weak central government unsupported by the international community, whereas success in the global war on terror implied preventing terrorist organizations from developing the capability to conduct any more attacks. Al Qaeda's widespread network and their support from sources in multiple countries implied Afghanistan's relatively small effect on the broader effort.

The relationship between the two endeavors was closer than they realized. The Bush administration's intent to hold states accountable for supporting terrorist organizations only addressed part of the problem; the goal of eradicating terrorism included an implied task to provide effective governance throughout the world.⁶⁴ A global war on terror meant the provision of global governance—governance that did not support terrorists. By removing the Taliban, the administration's broader objectives required them to ensure Afghanistan's new government did not allow al Qaeda back into the country.

Coalition planning and actions widely missed the mark based on these broader objectives. They lacked capability to prevent enemy forces from escaping, and to pursue them into neighboring Pakistan.⁶⁵ They also lacked the personnel and resources required to provide effective security for post-conflict Afghanistan.⁶⁶ Lack of clarity on the definition of success prevented the administration from planning and executing actions likely to achieve it.⁶⁷

64. International terrorist organizations in the 21st century have demonstrated their ability to find and exploit ungoverned areas in underdeveloped countries. In addition to al Qaeda in rural Afghanistan, examples include Islamic State in western Iraq and Syria; Ansar al-Sharia and others in Libya, and al-Shabaab and others in Somalia. For a complete list of groups labelled Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the US Department of State, see "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," US Department of State: The Office of Website Management, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, Accessed 7 July 2016, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm>.

65. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 315-16.

66. US precedents for administering a state after overthrowing its government existed, but the president had earlier promised not to use US forces for nation-building activities. European allies also demonstrated little zeal for expanding their commitments in the Middle East. National governance also requires the provision of security, but the administration's post-Taliban plan focused exclusively on counterterrorism. They wanted to move on from Afghanistan, but no one provided the resources necessary to protect the population.

67. Powell's questions did not require clairvoyance, but instead a realistic assessment of the political objective necessary to assign means and ways

The administration did leverage the national instruments of power against the enemy in Afghanistan.⁶⁸ They attempted to cut off the terrorists' funding.⁶⁹ The president publicly declared his intention to hold terrorist organizations and their state sponsors accountable.⁷⁰ Powell and others engaged with multiple nations, including Pakistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.⁷¹ The president also authorized new and unprecedented authorities for the CIA to conduct covert operations against terrorists in 80 countries, including Afghanistan.⁷²

Despite employing a range of tools, the principals still had no answers to basic questions about their strategy three weeks after the start of offensive operations.⁷³ As CJCS, Richard Myers described his,

to ends. If the coalition needed to capture or kill the terrorists in Afghanistan, they lacked the resources on the ground to do so. If the terrorists escaped to Pakistan, the administration needed the ability to capture or kill them there. Again, they lacked the ability to do so. If they assumed other nations, including Pakistan, had the political will and ability to capture or kill terrorists taking sanctuary in their nations, the assumption proved false. Al Qaeda and Taliban forces who escaped Afghanistan continue to use Pakistan as a base of operations.

68. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 73, 101. From the beginning, Bush emphasized the importance of using all the instruments of national power. He wanted to pursue the end of terrorism using every available means no matter how long it took. See also Myers and McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 161. The administration had determined to use all instruments of national power to combat terrorism even prior to the 9/11 attack. See also Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 440.

69. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 62, 126, 38.

70. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 96.

71. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 58-61, 65-66, 103, 17-20, 48.

72. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 75-78, 97, 101. Many of the CIA's recommendations involved extensive funding of surrogates in other countries.

73. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 275. They wanted air power to support movement of ground forces, but could not compel the locals to act. If they overthrew the Taliban, they had no plan for follow-on governance. They believed US failure to fill the vacuum left behind by the Soviets a decade earlier had resulted in the Taliban's rise, but did not want to leave US forces behind to conduct nation-building activities. If the

and the entire US government's, inability to define what it meant to win the fight against terrorists.⁷⁴ Time constraints and a new relationship between CIA and DOD forces contributed to their confusion. Unlike previous conflicts where military organizations had planned and executed America's role in using force, DOD forces in Afghanistan supported a scheme developed by the CIA. The construct led to questions about the chain of command and responsibility for oversight of operations.⁷⁵ Reliance on indigenous ground forces increased the challenge of assigning accountability for progress.

The administration had focused on how to conduct operations, but downplayed their significance in the war on terror. It made sense to go to Afghanistan since the Taliban had allowed al Qaeda's forces to train there. Osama Bin Laden's group established training camps in the country after the Soviets left. Attempting to apply lessons from the Soviet experience, the administration made a conscious decision to avoid a substantial military presence in the country. Instead of deploying a large, conventional force, they chose a small footprint that included CIA paramilitary teams, special-operations forces, and US air power.⁷⁶

political objective was eradication of terrorism, the military objective of unseating the Taliban may have been necessary, but it was also insufficient.

74. Myers and McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 164. The chairman assessed planning prior to March 2002 as focused on tactics instead of strategy. After convening a meeting with the Joint Staff directors following Operation Anaconda, the CJCS asked "who in this room thinks we have a strategy to defeat al Qaeda?" Myers and McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 212-13. None of them raised a hand. They later recommended a more concerted effort to thwart the terrorist organization's leaders and those responsible for planning their operations.

75. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 243-47. More than a week after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, Rumsfeld still did not see himself as the lead agency despite Rice's advice that he needed to take charge.

76. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 90-95.

The combination proved potent in the fight against the Taliban, but finding a way to defeat a weaker state's government proved less difficult than defining the operation's significance. Bush pressed the National Security Council and the military to start simultaneous ground and air operations. During an NSC meeting on 25 September 2001, they debated the operation's objective.⁷⁷ The following morning they met again, and once again Rumsfeld raised the issue of the objective by highlighting the lack of available targets and dispersion of the terrorists after US forces began arriving. The president set a timeframe for starting action in five or six days despite the briefed lack of required assets in place, a lack of bases preventing ground forces from staging, and their inability to find a target set worthy of an air campaign.⁷⁸

Operation Enduring Freedom removed the Taliban from power, but failed to hold al Qaeda accountable for its 9/11 plot. Coalition forces demonstrated viability of the CIA's scheme to overthrow the government,

77. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 133. Much as they had considered whom to attack in their initial post-9/11 meetings, they still struggled to define success in Afghanistan. Did victory mean they had captured or killed Osama bin Laden? How could they demonstrate that they had degraded, defeated, or destroyed al Qaeda? Did the Taliban have any options to stay in power? Even as the definition of success in Afghanistan remained illusory, Rumsfeld continued to inquire about beginning military operations in other places.

78. During an NSC meeting on 29 September, Rumsfeld lamented, "the target list cannot impose much damage on the people we want to impose it on." Quoted in Woodward, *Bush at War*, 152-53, 74-75. Woodward describes the state of the strategy eighteen days after the 9/11 attack as "bomb and hope." The president recognized Afghanistan represented a guerrilla campaign more than a conventional fight, but neither he nor his advisors knew for sure who the enemy was, exactly what they wanted to accomplish, or the combined capabilities and limitations of means they planned to employ. See also Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 439-40. Shelton highlighted the military's unsuitability to the task of ending terrorism, likening it to pursuing the end of organized crime, and describing in particular the lack of any targets in Afghanistan likely to affect al Qaeda directly. The short list of available targets in Afghanistan pertained only to the Taliban.

but few could explain the operation's effect on terrorism.⁷⁹ Sixteen of the 22 terrorists on President Bush's personal score card survived US operations in Afghanistan, including Osama bin Laden.⁸⁰ The Taliban fell from power, but al Qaeda suffered no lack of sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan. The coalition achieved its objectives in Afghanistan, but struggled with the next step in the global war on terror.

Commitment—No

Displacing, not apprehending or killing, terrorists linked to the 9/11 plot resulted from means and ways chosen to pursue the administration's objectives. They struggled to determine the best response against a networked and elusive non-state actor.⁸¹

Afghanistan's distant, landlocked location with no traditional allies on its borders further challenged development of a feasible solution. After days spent framing the problem, the CIA briefed a plan to combine their paramilitary teams with US Special Forces and Afghanistan's opposition forces. The plan emphasized economy of force, and substituted money for mass. Instead of deploying a ground force large enough to control the terrain, they bought influence with indigenous forces and supported their ground movement with coalition air power.

The Bush administration wanted Operation Enduring Freedom to succeed, but their choice of ways and means denied them control over the outcome. During his time as CJCS, Powell advocated for decisive force—his phrase for setting up an unfair fight with a prospective enemy.

79. If encroachment of the West into majority Muslim areas in the Middle East motivates some portion of the local population to resist, the increased presence of Western forces in Afghanistan likely served as a catalyst for more terrorism.

80. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 316.

81. Myers and McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 174-75. Myers described the Joint Chiefs struggle to develop a method for using military means against a non-state actor and a failed state.

If they decided to use force, Powell wanted policy makers to commit the resources and personnel necessary to dictate terms of peace. Interested in avoiding protracted conflicts like the one he had experienced in Vietnam, Powell included this tenet to deny enemy influence and guard against unnecessary risk. Table 25 summarizes the Bush administration's consideration of the Powell Doctrine's prescription for decisive force in Afghanistan.

Table 25. Commitment

Will the forces considered decisively achieve the objective?*	<u>N</u>
Practitioners' requests supported	B
Trained, equipped practitioners available	N
Clear objectives established	B
Aware of self-imposed limitations and their effects	N
US policy makers control required means and ways	N

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

As depicted in Table 25, the administration did not commit to decisive achievement of the objective. They supported some of the military's requests for resources and personnel at the tactical level, but set limitations obviating senior officers' influence over operations and strategy. Trained and equipped practitioners existed, but the administration did not commit them to the operation—initially due to their intended scheme, and later due to the operation's lack of priority. They set clear military objectives leading to removal of the Taliban from power, but left unclear the theory of victory linking operations in

Afghanistan with the broader war on terror. Self-imposed limitations with regard to time constraints, coalition building, and post-conflict security requirements effected the outcome in unpredicted ways. Finally, the administration denied themselves control over ways and means necessary to dictate operations tempo, secure post-conflict peace, and pursue the terrorists responsible for 9/11.

This final indicator, lack of control over ways and means, served as the primary cause for the administration's inability to achieve the objective decisively. Their initial decision to rely on indigenous forces resulted in frustration over lack of progress.⁸² Even after overthrowing the Taliban, indecision regarding responsibility for administration of post-conflict Afghanistan left critical tasks in the hands of coalition partners.⁸³ Finally, the president's lack of concern for apprehending key terrorists before they escaped suggested a degree of faith in coalition partners that proved unfounded.⁸⁴

The administration chose a plan requiring other nations to provide key contributions. They needed Afghanistan forces to conduct the ground offensive for two reasons. First, the president did not want to wait for a large buildup of Western forces or the development of a plan for choreographing their actions.⁸⁵ Next, the administration wanted to avoid

82. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 67. Jones describes the lack of resistance to Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Instead of taking the time required to build up a ground force capable of decisively controlling conditions on the ground, President Bush opted to support a loose coalition of Afghanistan tribes and forces with a small US footprint. See also Woodward, *Bush at War*, 230. Tenet described the situation perfectly on the one-month anniversary of the 9/11 attack. The decision to rely on local ground forces meant the outcome hinged on those forces' interests, and not the administration's.

83. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 165, 82.

84. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 321-24.

85. Woodward described Bush's leadership style as bordering on the hurried. In the weeks that followed the 9/11 attacks, the principals met almost daily to forge a strategy. To meet the president's ambitious timeline, Woodward describes an ad hoc planning process where the

a long-term commitment of US forces.⁸⁶ They also needed European allies to provide post-conflict security in Afghanistan because they did not want to use US forces for nation-building activities.⁸⁷ Finally, they needed Pakistan to assist in the apprehension of al Qaeda forces because they chose not to pursue the terrorists across the international border.⁸⁸

Lack of direct control over ways and means did not make achievement of the political objective impossible, but did substantially increase the importance of building and maintaining an effective

principals “were making it up as they went.” Woodward, *Bush at War*, 182, 256. See also Woodward, *Bush at War*, 157-59, 68. Ten days prior to the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, Rumsfeld still had not articulated the military’s plan. The president grew impatient, labeling the unpreparedness unacceptable. Bush consistently exuded resolve to lead a response to the 9/11 attacks, but his concern for timely action outweighed his interest in aligning means and ends. He wanted to sustain the momentum of post-attack resolve by responding quickly despite inherent challenges that included the continued lack of a viable military plan, difficult access to the landlocked and distant nation, and non-state enemy dispersed throughout numerous nations.

86. They believed the Soviet military’s use of a large, conventional force had proven ineffective against the Mujahedeen’s guerrilla tactics. Their desire to avoid using military forces for post-conflict stabilization efforts and the enormous and asymmetric advantage on the battlefield in air power (derived primarily from air dominance, surveillance, and precision weapons) meant a small contingent could produce the desired effect. If they had chosen to leave Afghanistan after overthrowing the Taliban and pushing al Qaeda out of the country, they may have been right. They chose instead to stay, and discovered that a small initial commitment, regardless of asymmetric power advantages, does not guarantee a short-term commitment or operational flexibility. See also Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 117. Jones describes the advice provided by military officials to continue with a small footprint after the Taliban fell from power because they believed a large US presence likely to result in greater popular resistance, they wanted to avoid a role in nation building, and they underestimated the requirement for security.

87. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 192, 237, 41.

88. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 98-108. Jones describes the government of Pakistan’s disinterest in pursuing the Taliban and uneven assistance with apprehending al Qaeda forces. He also describes how members of the terrorist organization enjoyed broad support among the tribes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of northern Pakistan.

coalition. Unfortunately, the administration imposed limitations that undermined its relationships with coalition partners.⁸⁹ Emphasis on a rapid response and avoidance of nation building limited their ability to capitalize on benefits of a broad and focused coalition of nations. Imposition of a time constraint meant US planners had little time or inclination to coordinate operations with allies, and regional actors complied with US demands instead of volunteering support for a common purpose.⁹⁰ The prohibition against nation building by US forces left others responsible for finishing a war they had not started. Finally, the administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003, resisted by multiple allies, created additional tension that undermined cooperation in the broader war on terror.⁹¹

At the operational level, the administration embraced their self-imposed limitations, but did not anticipate their effects. The president wanted to strike quickly; Rumsfeld actually welcomed the time constraint because it precluded the military's traditional method of fighting.⁹² They

89. Whereas the Clinton administration's decision to prioritize its relationship with NATO partners above its desire for operational effectiveness eventually resulted in the political resolve necessary to pressure Milosevic into capitulation, the Bush administration pursued operational results at the expense of its relations with international partners.

90. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 179-80, 237, 60. Woodward describes Rumsfeld's disinterest in participation by allied nations in his operation. He also describes Russia's pressure on its breakaway republics to allow staging of US forces. See also Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 87-89. Jones describes President Musharraf as a realist caught between a superpower's demands and the large portion of Pakistan's population that supported the Taliban. See also Woodward, *Bush at War*, 50-51, 290, 98-99. Woodward makes clear that the indigenous Afghanistan forces joined the fight against the Taliban based on bribery more than common goals.

91. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 243-48.

92. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 135. Frustrated with lack of progress on his transformation initiatives prior to 9/11, Rumsfeld saw an opportunity to use the war in Afghanistan as a catalyst.

intended to support local Afghanistan ground forces with coalition air power against the Taliban's fielded forces.⁹³ Lack of reliable intelligence and the enemy's austerity prevented development of a bombing campaign similar to the ones used in the Balkans or the Persian Gulf.⁹⁴ Air power instead played a key role in the operation's outcome by providing an asymmetric advantage to coalition ground forces advancing on enemy positions.

The operation proved successful in removing the Taliban, but the lack of ground forces resulted in significant consequences. Discerning the number of ground forces required to apprehend bin Laden is difficult even with the benefit of hindsight, but reliance on indigenous forces meant they could only secure as much of the border with Pakistan as money could buy.⁹⁵ The decision to strike quickly with a small footprint, and consequent inability to apprehend retreating enemy forces, provided the Taliban and al Qaeda with the ability to escape and a base from which the Taliban continues to stoke an insurgency in Afghanistan 15 years later.

The sanctuary resulted from a lack of connection between military objectives and political ends. On the one hand, military practitioners

93. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 166, 200, 73. They developed rules of engagement specifically restricting significant collateral damage, and monitored a list of targets off-limits to destruction by coalition air power. They wanted to differentiate the Taliban from the civilian population by minimizing damage to basic infrastructure, religious sites, hospitals, and schools.

94. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 123, 53-54. See also Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 48. See also Myers and McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 187.

95. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 95-98. According to Jones, Taliban and al Qaeda forces escaped into Pakistan en masse. These fighters included key adversaries Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden. Enemy forces escaped despite significant US money funneled into Afghanistan and Pakistan. The money had little effect in the area along the border. Here, the Taliban and al Qaeda enjoyed the support of the population. Jones also counts portions of the Pakistani military among those sheltering enemy forces retreating into Pakistan.

could not have had clearer objectives. The administration expected them to remove the Taliban from power and destroy al Qaeda's base of operations in Afghanistan. Yet in their haste to counter the hijacking plot, the administration did not recognize the importance of apprehending retreating forces to success in the war on terror.⁹⁶ They described Afghanistan as one front in a broader war, but focused on overthrowing the Taliban instead of diminishing al Qaeda.

Afghanistan's relationship with the war on terror should have defined coalition priorities in a broader context. The Powell Doctrine requires commitment to decisive achievement of the objective, but the Bush administration did not pursue it in Afghanistan.⁹⁷ They chose against committing the large number of forces required to prevent bin Laden and a multitude of enemy forces from escaping capture or death. Instead of prioritizing al Qaeda, the administration increasingly focused their use of force on overthrowing the Taliban.⁹⁸

96. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 316. At the end of major combat operations in Afghanistan, 16 of the 22 terrorists on Bush's personal scorecard for the war on terror remained at large and bin Laden had escaped. The president knew he wanted specific terrorists apprehended, but placed his desire into the category of goals for the CIA to accomplish in a long war.

97. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 224. Bush distinguished success in Afghanistan from success against the terrorists. He explicitly stated his intention for Operation Enduring Freedom to get Osama bin Laden moving, instead of keeping him contained within the borders of Afghanistan. See also Myers and McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 180-81. The CJCS believed the president considered al Qaeda's leaders the coalition's primary targets, but did not clarify what this assumption meant to prioritization of effort and resources or personnel required in Afghanistan. The logic that overthrowing the Taliban removed one means of support for al Qaeda made sense, but designing a plan based on the assumed inevitability of the terrorists' escape led to prioritizing achievement of ways over achievement of ends.

98. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 97-100. Jones described the CIA's repeated requests for more ground forces to prevent bin Laden's escape, and the military's inability to respond because they did not have the forces available. See also Department of Defense, *Strategic Guidance for the Campaign against Terrorism*, 3 October 2001. Rumsfeld's guidance on 3

The point here is not to suggest the administration should have predicted bin Laden's escape route or the exact circumstances at the end of the conflict. Given the difficult nature of the task, one million US soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan may not have found him. The issue regards Powell's question for policy makers considering the use of force. Powell wanted commitment in the form of a plan that included well-defined military objectives and more than enough forces to ensure their accomplishment.⁹⁹ Failure to specify clear objectives for post-conflict disposition of al Qaeda forces operating in Afghanistan resulted in a broad gap between ends and means in the effort to hold terrorists accountable for the 9/11 hijacking plot.¹⁰⁰

October described his intent to disrupt, damage, or destroy terrorist organizations and their leaders. The three verbs represent three completely different objectives and fail to define success. The secretary described a lack of al Qaeda targets throughout the planning process, but none of them addressed the implication on their political objectives. The American people went without justice for the 9/11 mastermind until his eventual death nearly a decade later.

99. Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry reinforced the point in retrospect, saying "one of the lessons of NATO's involvement in Afghanistan is the need to fulfill minimal requirements before deploying forces. If minimal requirements are not filled, then perhaps NATO shouldn't go in." Quoted in Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 255. Eikenberry's comments lamented lack of available resources, but also called into question the allies' dedication to a robust planning effort prior to involvement in armed conflict. See also Woodward, *Bush at War*, 166. Woodward describes a gap in planning stemming from an unpracticed relationship between CIA and military forces. At the level of policy, a bifurcated approach (one relying on the CIA's war on terror to find and eradicate terrorists, and the other relying on military force to overthrow state sponsors) meant they needed no requirement for a military objective to kill or capture every terrorist operating within the borders of Afghanistan. Stating such an objective would have required substantial time and forces--options considered undesirable by the administration. Instead, the president believed the CIA would simply find the terrorists later wherever they went.

100. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 175, 215. The administration consistently referred to a long war required to eradicate terrorism, and viewed Afghanistan as only the first step. For this reason, and their lack of

The administration's paradigm for waging a global war on terror precluded availability of trained and equipped practitioners. In Bush's bifurcated strategy to attack hosts and parasites, he delineated the CIA's role as primarily addressing the parasites (terrorists) and the military's role as handling the hosts (state sponsors).¹⁰¹ To achieve their objectives, each agency required means exceeding inherent capabilities. In Afghanistan, the CIA required a significant increase in available ground forces to apprehend retreating terrorists. The military also required more ground forces to prevent a post-conflict insurgency, as well as interagency assistance with administration of state affairs.¹⁰²

Substantial numbers of US ground forces existed, but the administration's choices precluded their availability for use.¹⁰³ The president did not place the use of coalition ground forces off limits; he agreed to an operational scheme that did not require them, and a

precise information on bin Laden's location, they did not make him an objective. Their pragmatic approach to the conflict meant defining objectives they knew they could accomplish. As his advisors raised obstacles to success, Bush consistently spoke of managing expectations and needing a victory as he pushed them hard to start the offensive. His exasperation with waiting reflects earnest interest in striking back, but the push to start operations within weeks of 9/11 stands in stark contrast to his father's willingness to wait. The elder Bush waited (albeit still impatiently) five months for Powell and Schwarzkopf to get hundreds of thousands of US forces into Saudi Arabia.

101. On 11 October 2001, the president wanted to reframe the war on terror and its relationship with conflict in Afghanistan, saying, "we're going to go after the hosts and the parasites. It's a broader war. If we don't get UBL, it doesn't mean failure." Quoted in Woodward, *Bush at War*, 227-28.

102. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 110-33. Jones details the administration's decision to under-resource Afghanistan, suggesting that it was a key reason for the development of an insurgency that eventually demanded substantial increases in American blood and treasure.

103. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 275. See also Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, 99. In addition to CIA frustration at the lack of US forces available to block al Qaeda's escape, Rashid describes instances where General Franks had forces available, but did not use them.

timeline precluding their ability to arrive in time for the conflict's start.¹⁰⁴ Additionally, the president had campaigned on not using military forces for nation-building activities so the administration did not include a significant increase of ground forces in plans for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Finally, the subsequent decision to invade Iraq precluded availability of substantial numbers of trained, equipped practitioners for Afghanistan regardless of the assessed requirement.

They set limitations precluding the necessity for senior officers to request more resources. First, the administration tasked them with supporting the CIA scheme of operations. Military leaders and the administration counted on the CIA to forecast accurately the capabilities and resources required to execute their plan.¹⁰⁵ Second, the administration did not assign them responsibility for post-conflict population security. Planners needed only develop offensive operations in

104. The CJCS approved of the plan developed by US Central Command in conjunction with the CIA, but General Franks chafed at the Joint Chiefs' questioning his intention to use "new and mostly unproven war-fighting concepts." Myers and McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 174-75. See also Woodward, *Bush at War*, 201. The defense department deployed 12,000 people into the theater by the time hostilities began. This enemy was different, but the number still paled in comparison to the massive force assembled to remove Iraq's military from Kuwait. The total number of US personnel was a paltry six percent of the force used in the Persian Gulf conflict.

105. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 118, 47-64, 73-95. The administration did support practitioners' requests when those requests supported the concept of operations developed by the CIA and coordinated with the DOD. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) represented one example of meeting the practitioners' requests. Despite Bush's frustration with delaying America's response further, the administration waited for required CSAR forces to arrive in theater before starting the offensive. In reality, the limited number of US ground forces involved meant military practitioners made few requests. See also Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 91. The administration also met many of the CIA's requests, most of which focused on the requirement for money to pay the indigenous forces for services rendered.

support of the CIA's plan. Finally, the administration did not want their recommendations. As described by General Shelton, Donald Rumsfeld already knew the answers he wanted.¹⁰⁶

The Taliban's fall from power further undermined the Joint Chiefs' influence over national security decision-making. The Afghanistan people had elected a new government, the country initially experienced few security issues, and the international community engaged in a process of reintegrating Afghanistan.¹⁰⁷ The administration believed results vindicated their small-footprint approach.¹⁰⁸ Despite evidence of a developing insurgency, the administration focused the efforts of a small contingent of combat forces on counterterrorism.¹⁰⁹ By the time they recognized the magnitude of the building problem in Afghanistan, another insurgency in Iraq required the bulk of US attention, personnel, and resources.

In Afghanistan, the administration did not commit the forces required to achieve decisively their objective. They chose a scheme of

106. Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 402-03, 26-27. Shelton laboriously describes the defense secretary's reduction of the Joint Chiefs' influence over strategy, and resultant isolation of General Franks from the service components.

107. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 136-42.

108. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 131-33, 62. Jones describes how they chose a small footprint as an attempt to avoid making the same mistakes made by the Soviets during their failed conflict two decades prior. He argues the Soviet problem was not that they had used a heavy footprint, but that they failed to gain and maintain support from the local population throughout the country. Instead of using a different approach, the western coalition used a similar one by focusing on the central government and national military forces instead of developing a well-trained police presence able to maintain security throughout larger portions of the country. See also Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 123, 43-45. As the administration turned its attention to Iraq, they touted Afghanistan as a success.

109. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 141-42. Jones describes how the administration's refusal to use US forces for nation-building activities provided the insurgents with a two-year head start.

operations that denied them ability to apprehend retreating enemy forces. Incomplete or ineffective coordination with partners required by their plan, in particular Pakistan, left gaps in coverage resulting in an enemy sanctuary. Despite the appearance of victory in December 2001, Taliban and al Qaeda forces reconstituted and began turning Afghanistan's population against its new government and the western nations propping it up. After choosing not to commit available forces initially, the administration lost the option later as their decision to use force in a different country resulted in another protracted conflict—one they considered more important to win.

After Conflict—No

For Colin Powell, winning meant the ability to set terms of the peace following conflict. He wanted policy makers to envision their plan for the future, informed by potential pitfalls inherent in human conflict. Based on the administration's stated objectives, the terms of peace in post-conflict Afghanistan needed to account for the conflict's two primary purposes. First, the administration needed a plan for Afghanistan's government after the Taliban. Second, the outcome had to ensure removal of Afghanistan from the list of nations supporting the activities of international terrorist organizations.

Operation Enduring Freedom may have officially ended in 2014, but the mission of US forces in Afghanistan did not. That Afghanistan has long-since overtaken Vietnam as the longest conflict in US history does not necessarily imply the administration failed to consider the outcome.¹¹⁰ Powell asserted ambitious tenets, but none required perfect

110. The US conflict in Afghanistan started in October 2001 and continues today (nearly 15 years). US involvement in Vietnam started in the 1950s, but this comparison considers the start of the conflict as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in August 1964 with an end date of April 1975—the day the North Vietnamese overran the US embassy in Saigon (nearly 11 years).

assumptions. Furthermore, Bush described his expectation of a long war on many occasions. However, the Powell Doctrine does require thoughtful consideration of details describing the administration's intended post-conflict circumstances, and mitigation of threats to their realization. Table 26 provides an overview of the Bush administration's planning for post-conflict Afghanistan.

Table 26. After conflict

Have we critically considered the desired outcome and associated risks?*		<u>N</u>
Desired Outcome	Status of opposition military force	N
	Status of opposition government	Y
	Status of opposition infrastructure and population	Y
	Position of friendly forces	N
	Status of relations with coalition members	N
	Terms of political settlement established	Y
	Contingency planning capability established	B
Associated Risks	Mission	N
	Political	Y
	Economic	N
	Long-term risk	N

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

The administration spent little time considering the details of stabilization and reconstruction.¹¹¹ They wanted the government ousted

111. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 191-95. Four days before the start of their planned offensive, the administration began to discuss the post-conflict

with minimal damage to the country's infrastructure and population, but they left unconsidered their plan for retreating enemy forces.¹¹² They also underestimated the importance of coalition partners, especially given the small-footprint approach that discounted the significance of US ground forces.¹¹³ The DOD had a contingency plan to send more US forces for the fight against the Taliban if required, but did not respond to CIA requests for assistance in time to block the enemy forces' retreat.¹¹⁴ They did consider political risks and other aspects of risks to the mission, discounting associated economic and long-term risks of a protracted conflict.

The administration considered aspects of post-conflict Afghanistan, but assessment of two indicators underscores their failure to meet the Powell Doctrine's standard for post-conflict planning. First, lack of consideration for the disposition of enemy forces left a large number of Taliban and al Qaeda loyalists with the ability to escape the conflict.¹¹⁵

effort to stabilize Afghanistan during a principals meeting on Wednesday, 3 October. The following day, no one had an answer when the president asked who was responsible for the country's administration after deposing the Taliban.

112. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 233. Even after fighting on the ground had begun, they could not agree on the conflict's purpose, objectives, or priorities. Perhaps due to the untested method they chose for using military force, the administration focused intently on coordinating integration of DOD and CIA actions. They planned to kill or capture resisting fighters on the battlefield, but did not have enough western forces to prevent their escape. See also Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 93-95. Jones describes the escape of numerous forces and significant enemy leadership figures near Tora Bora and the Shah-i-kot Valley.

113. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 179-80. Pre-conflict coordination focused on buying loyalty of local Afghanistan forces to join the fight against the Taliban. Traditional allies wanted to support the operation, but Rumsfeld made little effort to include them because he did not want to lose control over the effort.

114. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 97.

115. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 314. Instead of the buildup of forces and large footprint that characterized the coalition's overwhelming force in the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict, a much smaller coalition overthrew the

The administration paid their surrogate ground force to remove the Taliban from power, not to prevent them from escaping capture.¹¹⁶ Second, the choice of a small footprint incurred a mission risk in the fight against the Taliban and the effort to eradicate terrorism.¹¹⁷ They made planning allowances to accept increased risk of collateral damage if high-value targets of opportunity presented themselves, but did not consider more US ground forces critical to achievement of their political ends.¹¹⁸

Despite their lack of regard for mission risk, they did account for multiple indicators associated with post-conflict planning. They made clear their intentions for Afghanistan's government and worked with the international community to determine terms of the political settlement

Taliban 102 days after 9/11 by combining 426 CIA and military ground forces with the local Afghanistan opposition group and American air power. They could not stop massive numbers of enemy forces from retreating into neighboring Pakistan as they pushed remnants out of strongholds in Afghanistan.

116. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 252-81. The administration grew frustrated with a lack of progress on the ground when they could not convince the loose coalition of ground forces they had assembled from the local population to begin the offensive. The ground force eventually began to make progress, but proved incapable of preventing the escape of enemy forces into Pakistan.

117. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 88, 135. As the principals considered options, Secretary Rumsfeld's first inclination included changing the military's approach to fighting wars. The defense secretary considered the state of military planning obsolete and suggested a requirement to develop a new mindset unlike other conventional efforts. He resolved to use the upcoming Afghanistan operation as a way to gain traction at the Pentagon with his transformation initiative. He wanted to prove the viability of an operational scheme different from the ones for which the military had prepared. Jones quoted a member of the administration's critique of the small footprint with the words "we seized defeat from the jaws of victory." Quoted in Jones, *In the Graveyard*, xxvii-xxviii. The small footprint expelled the Taliban, but could not secure the peace afterward.

118. For planning allowances, see Woodward, *Bush at War*, 166.

after removing the Taliban.¹¹⁹ They also went to great lengths to separate the population from the enemy.¹²⁰ Finally, they accounted for political risk by taking action against the perpetrators of the 9/11 hijacking plot on behalf of a population desiring justice for their actions.¹²¹

America wanted to avenge the terrorists' actions, but the administration's rush to start the conflict left unaddressed numerous other indicators of Powell's post-conflict planning tenet. Their plan for the disposition of friendly forces reflected lack of concern for the large gap between means and ends.¹²² They could have accounted for the

119. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 136-42.

120. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 222, 72, 79. In addition to a restricted target list designed to prevent collateral damage by coalition aircraft, the administration planned for the distribution of significant aid to the Afghanistan population.

121. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 206-07, 337-38. The president's senior political advisor, Karl Rove, kept him informed regarding political impacts of the terrorist attack and America's response. Bush believed he needed to demonstrate that he was taking action on behalf of the American people to seek justice for the attacks. He later lamented the expectation of a manhunt for Osama bin Laden (likely due to the difficulty of the task) and suggested concern over the terrorist organization's capacity to stage another attack despite the coalition's efforts. After serving two terms, Bush's replacement campaigned on his predecessor's mismanagement of the war in Afghanistan, vowing to conduct a complete review of US policy to improve the situation there. As the campaign continues into a fifth US presidential term, scant evidence suggests any amount of effort in Afghanistan has hindered the capacity of international terrorist organizations.

122. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 110-15. Powell wanted a plan to secure the country after the Taliban's departure, but Rumsfeld wanted the president to honor his campaign promise not to use US forces for nation building. Rumsfeld won the argument, and they turned responsibility for security over to an international force lacking responsibility for starting the conflict. The peacekeepers retreated to the cities and left large areas exposed to the insurgents' influence. See also Woodward, *Bush at War*, 220, 37. Rumsfeld continued to claim no responsibility for post-conflict Afghanistan during a press conference in 9 October 2001. Three days later, the president echoed his sentiments during an NSC meeting. The president wanted to hand off responsibility to the UN after overthrowing the Taliban

deficiency with coalition support, but did not identify their inability to secure the population as a shortfall in the plan.¹²³ Furthermore, they lacked a robust contingency-planning capability to respond when acts of violence began to increase.¹²⁴

The administration also failed to account for economic and long-term risks of entering into the conflict. The president signed new authorities and spoke of a long war, but did not develop economic measures required to pay the substantial cost of lengthy conflicts in two different countries.¹²⁵ In addition to a major recession at the end of his second term, deficit spending for operations in Afghanistan added another burden on a strained US economy. Additionally, the continuation of deadly attacks by international terrorist organizations calls into question the war's effect on long-term risk. The administration

123. Myers and McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 174. Shortly before taking over as CJCS, Richard Myers understood the mission as overthrowing the Taliban and destroying al Qaeda, but also noted the administration's lack of interest in post-conflict planning. Instead of developing a plan for ensuring Afghanistan's transition to civilian control, he expressed hope that other entities (NGOs, international organizations, other nations) might take responsibility for the country, allowing US forces to leave.

124. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 145-50. Jones makes a compelling case that the administration stopped focusing on Afghanistan at the exact wrong time as they turned their attention to Iraq. See also Woodward, *Bush at War*, 254. Woodward suggests the administration relied on local forces to avoid Americanizing the war. Rumsfeld did establish a capability to plan for contingencies at the outset of the conflict. In case the Northern Alliance proved unable to overthrow the Taliban, the secretary developed a plan to send as many as 50,000 US ground forces. After the Taliban's departure, he focused the bulk of planning and resources on the conflict in Iraq.

125. Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, 97. Rashid suggests the large infusion of cash from the CIA, estimated between \$70 million and \$100 million, produced the initial success against the Taliban. The amount was significant, but pales in comparison to the cost of fighting the insurgency for more than a decade. Furthermore, the administration did not know how much of the money used to bribe local forces in the initial offensive landed in the hands of insurgents later in the conflict.

embarked on a mission to eradicate terrorism, but stimulated a violent and deadly insurgency resulting in thousands of deaths. The conflict's effect on terror attacks and organizations responsible for planning them remains unclear.

Overall, three major considerations suggest the Bush administration did not critically consider their desired outcome or associated risks. First, they failed to define the relationship between post-conflict Afghanistan and the broader war on terror. Second, too few resources dedicated to denying enemy forces' escape reflected a lack of concern for their potential to affect progress in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Finally, coalition ineffectiveness reflected the administration's tendency to discount the requirement for assistance from other nations to successful achievement of common goals in the ambitious war on terror.

War's Nature—No

They wanted to succeed in Afghanistan, but seemed to confuse their interest in the conflict's character with their ability to alter war's fundamental nature. The Powell Doctrine challenges administrations to consider applicability of lessons captured throughout the long history of human conflict. Understanding the consequences of using force can help policy makers guard against mistakes made by predecessors. In contrast, President Bush and his administration insisted the war in Afghanistan differed from previous conflicts.¹²⁶

The Bush administration underestimated the importance of two attributes of war considered critical by theorists throughout history: knowledge of the enemy, and the relationship between assessment and planning. They quickly removed the Taliban government, but

126. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 220. Even the CJCS claimed originality during a press conference on 9 October 2001.

underestimated the deposed fighters' ability to influence the conflict's outcome. A resurgent Taliban revealed the critical distinction between winning a battle and winning a war. It took the administration years to understand the difference because they also underestimated the importance of adjusting their plan based on candid assessments. Their plan in Afghanistan proved neither thorough nor effective because planners were not equipped with the information and resources necessary to adjust means and ways.¹²⁷ Table 27 highlights results of assessing the Bush administration's consideration of consequences associated with using force and associated indicators.

Table 27. War's nature

Have we assessed the consequences of using force?*	<u>N</u>
Uncertainty	N
Unforeseen challenges	N
Relationship with population	B
Physical losses	Y
Potential for escalation/elongation	N

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

The administration considered some aspects of consequences associated with using force, but believed they could overcome them based on obvious advantages. They gained an appreciation for uncertainty in their initial planning effort, but quickly discounted its

127. Lack of presence in the rural areas denied them information about the Taliban's influence. Even after discerning their progress, planners lacked resources to prevent a large-scale insurgency.

importance after overthrowing the Taliban. They reaped the benefits of distinguishing their enemy from the population in the immediate aftermath of the offensive, but failure to protect Afghanistan's citizens from Taliban influence thereafter contributed to development of a lengthy and lethal insurgency. They acknowledged the likelihood of casualties on the eve of war, but lack of concern for the enemy's ability to prolong the conflict significantly increased the toll of killed and injured.

The primary reason the administration inaccurately assessed the consequences of using force stems from underestimating the potential for unforeseen challenges to elongate the conflict. Despite lack of control over operations tempo, their initial plan to substitute money for ground forces produced results. Buoyed by early results, the administration underestimated the effect of Pakistan's internal divisions on their ability to apprehend terrorists who had fled the conflict. Most significantly, they underestimated their enemy's ability to engender popular support by exploiting gaps in security.¹²⁸

The administration had not prepared for the possibility of elongated or escalating conflict after overthrowing the Taliban. They absolved US military forces of responsibility for security and, in the parlance of military operations, committed the reserve to a different fight.¹²⁹ The administration believed they had won in Afghanistan, and wanted to move on to the next government on the list for regime change. They handed off responsibility for stabilizing Afghanistan to the United

128. Money could only buy temporary and conditional allegiance from local forces. Making Afghanistan autonomously inhospitable to terrorists for the long term presented a much steeper mountain to climb than the infusion of cash.

129. The president and his secretary of defense both abhorred the notion of nation building. Instead of focusing their effort on the 9/11 perpetrators taking sanctuary in Pakistan, they turned their attention to overthrowing the government of Iraq.

Nations and refused to consider the idea of US military forces providing security for the population.¹³⁰

Significant uncertainty during initial planning should have served as a warning sign.¹³¹ Current intelligence suffered from a lack of US focus on the area following the Soviet Union's failed attempt to exert influence and a subsequent civil war. The administration fought to make up for their intelligence deficit by relying on non-traditional allies to provide access and information.¹³² They also set a precedent for future tactics by exploiting imagery provided by cameras mounted on remotely piloted aircraft. The humility and candor that motivated their quest to mitigate uncertainty during the initial offensive faded after the Taliban's retreat to Pakistan. Instead of maintaining vigilance to counteract a determined enemy, they sent the most experienced to Iraq, left security to other entities, and refused to acknowledge the growing insurgency until it controlled substantial portions of the population.¹³³

Despite underestimating the potential for a protracted conflict, the president and his administration understood the potential for physical losses in Afghanistan. The initial plan for the offensive minimized exposure of US ground forces due to the small numbers involved, but the president openly acknowledged his intention to put people at risk in

130. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 112-15.

131. They lacked intelligence allowing them to develop targets for an air campaign and requiring Russian assistance for terrain study. The administration and Western forces had little depth of understanding regarding fault lines in the region's complex human terrain and its tapestry of religious, tribal, and ethnic groups. Furthermore, they lacked a traditional ally with recent and intimate knowledge of contemporary power structures and relationships in the country.

132. Russia's unprecedented assistance convinced the administration the Cold War had truly ended as they provided maps of Afghanistan and influence over nation on its borders.

133. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 142. Jones documents how US commanders prohibited subordinates from describing their work in Afghanistan as counterinsurgency.

pursuit of his goal.¹³⁴ Powell's efforts to minimize casualties in Panama and the Persian Gulf contrast with operations in Afghanistan in that Powell wanted to protect his forces by over-delivering force. The small number of casualties sustained during the effort to overthrow the Taliban discredited Powell's conservative planning, but the rapidly rising death toll resulting from US forces' inability to secure the population thereafter supported his argument for decisive force to win not just the battle, but to win the peace.

The administration resolved to distinguish the regime in Afghanistan from the country's population. Afghanistan's amalgam of tribes and ethnicities and its weak central government implied a significant role for discriminating weapons and restrictive rules of engagement designed to prevent collateral damage.¹³⁵ The effort engendered a modicum of support from the population initially, denying al Qaeda and the Taliban popular support for a short amount of time. Unfortunately, the emphasis on a relationship with the population did not continue after the conflict. Lack of attention paid to securing the population exposed Afghanistan's citizens to a corrupt police force and the constant threat of coercion by increasingly brazen Taliban forces staging operations from Pakistan.¹³⁶ As violence increased, the population lost faith in their government and its Western supporters.

134. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 98. See also Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 108. The initial offensive resulted in twelve US personnel killed in action. Of course, US forces suffered many more killed and wounded during the follow-on insurgency.

135. Myers and McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 180. Myers described the administration's emphasis on minimizing collateral damage, using force discriminately, and supporting the population with assistance simultaneously.

136. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 163-76. Jones describes the effect of widespread police corruption and the Taliban's establishment of an alternative government structure that slowly turned the population against Afghanistan's central government.

The insurgency boiled over, but the administration found itself hamstrung by events in Iraq and a contentious relationship with traditional allies. The enemy exercised influence over the outcome after escaping to Pakistan. They reconstituted with support from external donors and local sympathizers. Additionally, failure to conduct thorough and effective planning after deposing the Taliban prevented an honest assessment of the situation as the insurgents increased their base of support. Lack of focus on the nature of the problem contributed to the administration's failure to secure the population in Afghanistan and apprehend those responsible for 9/11.

Constituency—Yes

The American people expected their president to deliver justice for the victims of the hijacking plot. President Bush's swift response in the form of a military offensive supported his public assertions that he planned to meet their expectations. Of all the case studies presented, Operation Enduring Freedom offers the clearest example of the American people's support for an administration's decision to use force. Table 28 provides the results of assessing Powell's final tenet concerning popular support.

Table 28. Constituency

Do the American people support using force?*	<u>Y</u>
Polling results	Y
Congressional support	Y
Public demonstrations	Y
Public approval ratings	Y

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

Every indicator supports the self-evident conclusion that the American people supported Bush's use of force in Afghanistan. They expected the endeavor to deliver justice to the perpetrators of the 9/11 plot. President Bush's approval rating increased from 55 percent to 90 percent in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.¹³⁷ He detected the palpable emotion of rescue workers in New York asking him to exact revenge on their behalf.¹³⁸ He benefited from the support of a public fearful of another attack and interested in defeating the threat. Their trust in his resolve and ability to meet their expectations in turn strengthened his own resolve to carry out his plan—one he described as a secretive effort sparing no expense in pursuit of defeating terrorist organizations across the globe.¹³⁹

The president enjoyed broad support for his retaliatory offensive. A Gallup poll conducted in mid-October 2001 revealed 80 percent of Americans approved of the president's decision to use US ground forces

137. Woodward, *State of Denial*, 81.

138. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 69-70, 145.

139. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 108-09.

in Afghanistan, with only 18 percent opposed to the conflict.¹⁴⁰ The US Congress also authorized the president to use any means he believed required to hold the perpetrators of the 9/11 plot accountable.¹⁴¹ No significant demonstrations took place for or against the war, primarily because support for the conflict was not a contentious issue in the US.

Considering the Tenets

As the coalition offensive began on 7 October 2001, practitioners carried out the orders of an administration interested in delivering justice. Less than a month had passed since al Qaeda operatives hijacked four aircraft in US airspace and crashed them intentionally. Convinced of his predecessor's ineffective uses of missile strikes to respond after previous terrorist attacks, Bush escalated the nation's response to declaration of a war. His administration came up with the best solution they could devise to meet the president's requirements for a timely response aimed at preventing another act of terrorism in the future.

Their plan was inconsistent with the majority of the Powell Doctrine's requirements. They pursued an important, clear, and well-understood objective with the support of the American people for their

140. David W. Moore, "Eight of 10 Americans Support Ground War in Afghanistan," *Gallup, Inc.*, 1 November 2001, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/5029/eight-americans-support-ground-war-afghanistan.aspx>.

141. Passed by a joint resolution, the law stated, "the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." Joint Resolution Authorizing Use of United States Armed Forces against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched against the United States, Public Law 107-40, 107th Congr., 1st sess., (18 September 2001).

use of force. Nevertheless, they intentionally chose not to send a force capable of achieving the objective decisively. Their plan included deposing the Taliban and killing or capturing terrorists, but lacked critical consideration of the connection between results and risks in Afghanistan and those in the broader war on terror. Finally, they failed to account for war's nature in that they discounted the ability of a determined enemy to influence the conflict's outcome. They also failed to conduct candid assessments of the situation on the ground to update their use of means and ways, or alter their ends.

Several factors resulted in the administration's lack of adherence to the Powell Doctrine tenets. The first was a challenging time constraint. The president demanded a quick reaction to the hijacking plot using military force despite a lack of military plans and little precedent for using military force to eradicate a non-state actor. The second explanation resulted from the decision to use military forces in support of a CIA scheme of operations. Practitioners overcame significant obstacles at lower levels, but the untested relationship called into question responsibility for planning and executing the operation. The third reason was an unbalanced civil-military relationship. Donald Rumsfeld's predominant influence and motives determined the strategy in Afghanistan more than consideration of Powell's tenets.

Typology

Having described the administration's lack of adherence to the Powell Doctrine's tenets, the remainder of the case study examines influence over the administration's use of force. Variables below examine who influenced choices as the administration considered options to retaliate after 9/11. Specifically, this portion of the analysis assesses the administration's standing guidance, consistency of CJCS advice with the Powell Doctrine, and relative influence of other advisors. After addressing these independent variables, focus turns to the role played by competing

alternatives and domestic pressure as intervening variables with the potential to effect the administration's choice of a response to the terrorist attack on US territory. Tables explaining coding options immediately follow variable introduction and assessment.

Standing Guidance—Coded A

Table 29. Variable coding: Standing Guidance

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Consistent with standing guidance	G
Ambiguous, or inconsistent with guidance	A

Source: Author's original work

Terrorism made its first appearance in US national security strategy during the George H.W. Bush administration. In his 1990 NSS, the president underscored the threat from terrorists and their state sponsors.¹⁴² After ignoring the topic in its 1991 NSS to focus instead on consoling an international community in the wake of the Persian Gulf conflict, the administration once again underscored the threat from terrorism in its 1993 document. However, it stopped short of threatening the use of military force against states sponsoring terrorist organizations.¹⁴³

The Clinton administration consistently highlighted the threat from terrorism throughout its NSS documents. Their final NSS emphasized the importance of employing all instruments of national power to combat

142. President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, 1990, 6.

143. The 1993 NSS threatened "international isolation and economic repercussions" for "states that practice or actively support terrorism." President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, January 1993, 3, 18.

terrorism, including the use of military force as a response to attacks. The strategy also highlighted the threat presented by terrorists or rogue regimes gaining access to weapons of mass destruction.¹⁴⁴ Nine months before the 9/11 attack, the document also described an urgent diplomatic effort to address a threat to the United States facilitated by the Taliban's provision of a sanctuary to Osama bin Laden and his terrorist organization in Afghanistan.¹⁴⁵

Despite their awareness of a threat posed by al Qaeda, the Bush administration focused on addressing it through relationships with states and territories.¹⁴⁶ Five days after the World Trade Center fell, Cheney clarified the administration's intent to hold nations accountable for support they provided to terrorists.¹⁴⁷ The lack of guidance regarding how to do so became more obvious after Operation Enduring Freedom, as the administration struggled to discern the next step in the war on terror.¹⁴⁸

Instead of starting their tenure with a new plan to counter terrorism, the administration developed one during the five months following 9/11. On 3 October 2001, Donald Rumsfeld issued a guidance memorandum to the defense department that provided a template for a global campaign.¹⁴⁹ Combining a desire for retribution with fears of WMD

144. President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, December 2000.

145. President of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, December 2000.

146. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 293. Mann suggests they fell back on their experience with national security from earlier decades, and that their nearly exclusive focus on national power led to their surprise on 9/11.

147. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 303.

148. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 309-10.

149. Department of Defense, *Strategic Guidance for the Campaign against Terrorism*, 3 October 2001. The declassified memorandum describes ambitious goals, including defeating terrorists and their state supporters, and establishing a global anti-terrorist environment. The portion of Rumsfeld's guidance that addressed state supporters included no limits

use held over from the Cold War, their policy migrated from retaliation against al Qaeda to pre-emptively attacking rogue states seeking or in possession of WMD.¹⁵⁰ The war on terror rendered defunct old policies emphasizing deterrence and internationalism, emphasizing instead ambitious, offensive operations against malefactor regimes threatening America.¹⁵¹

Chairman's Advice—Coded D

Table 30. Variable coding: Chairman's Advice

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Consistent with four or more Powell Doctrine tenets	P
Different than two or more Powell Doctrine tenets	D

Source: Author's original work

on the number of targeted states, and described intent to destroy the capacity of their militaries. The guidance described a lengthy conflict and cited specific examples of terrorist organizations (al Qaeda, etc.) and states (Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.), but intentionally depicted an open-ended list of possible targets without providing a definition of terrorist or terrorism. The ambitious goals, vague description of the enemy, and open-ended commitment virtually guaranteed inability to define or achieve an end state. The document included one reference to humanitarian operations, but articulated no vision for post-conflict planning (transition to civil authorities, reconstruction, nation building, etc.).

150. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 318.

151. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 327-31. The administration's first NSS, released in the year following Operation Enduring Freedom, underscored three themes defining their vision for America's foreign policy: preemptive (and unilateral, if required) attacks against potential threats, maintenance of a preeminent US military force, and the desire for other nations to embrace the principles of American democracy. See also Woodward, *Bush at War*, 6, 141. The president also authorized the CIA teams to pursue a mission of assassination by executive order on 19 September 2001—a mission previously dismissed as illegal.

Bush's post-attack ambition began to meet with reality during a National Security Council meeting at Camp David four days after 9/11. In contrast to Desert Storm, no off-the-shelf plan was available to use as a starting point for planning.¹⁵² Shelton presented three military options for an attack in Afghanistan, ranging from standoff missile strikes to a ground attack relying heavily on special operations forces.¹⁵³ The group discarded the first two options as undesirable continuations of the previous administration's counterterrorism efforts.¹⁵⁴ As they attempted to frame the problem, differences of opinion rendered consensus unattainable.¹⁵⁵

Despite the military's role in the conflict, senior military leaders retained little influence over US strategy before and throughout the conflict. The relationship between the administration, the CJCS, and the

152. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 25, 50, 80. The military's lack of a strategy to fight terrorists, and time required to develop one, frustrated the president.

153. Myers and McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon*, 165-66. Myers specifically cited the chairman's avoidance of making any statements others could construe as setting policy.

154. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 78-101. During the administration's first strategy session following the 9/11 attacks, they made clear their disdain for the previous administration's policy of responding to terrorist actions with missile strikes. Shelton's first two options fell into this category. Only his third option included ground forces, and emphasized special operations over conventional forces. Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Bush all emphasized the importance of using ground forces. The president considered some of Shelton's presentation lackluster and expressed interest in responding to the attack quickly.

155. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 74-91. In particular, they struggled with the scope of their response, mulling options ranging from narrowly focusing on al Qaeda to a broader effort targeting other enemies. In particular, some advisors advocated for conducting offensive operations in Iraq due to Saddam Hussein's continued defiance of UN sanctions and demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass destruction. They all agreed Iraq presented a threat, but acknowledged the unpopularity of responding to al Qaeda's attack with an offensive against Iraq. The president decided to focus first on addressing the threat based in Afghanistan.

combatant commander evolved once again.¹⁵⁶ Unlike Powell's role in the Persian Gulf and Clark's in Kosovo, neither the CJCS nor the combatant commander achieved a similar degree of influence in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁷ The defense secretary usurped their advisory role. The plan's emphasis on non-traditional forces further modulated perceptions of responsibility for operations.¹⁵⁸ Both Rumsfeld and the CIA director presumed they supported the other's management of operations long after the conflict began.¹⁵⁹

156. Woodward bookends the transition with his description of Powell's influence as an intermediary between the administration and Schwarzkopf during the Persian Gulf conflict, and Myers' nearly complete irrelevance during planning for the 2003 offensive in Iraq. Underscoring his proximity to political power in the executive branch, Franks openly referred to the Joint Chiefs as "Title Ten Motherfuckers." Quoted in Woodward, *State of Denial*, 81-83.

157. With neither Shelton nor Myers afforded a significant role in the planning process, Gen Tommy Franks' influence also appeared marginalized as the commander of United States Central Command. When Bush asked for his thoughts during a meeting after hostilities had begun, the general told Bush "I think exactly what my secretary thinks, what he's ever thought, what he will ever think, or whatever he thought he might think." Quoted in Woodward, *Bush at War*. Franks and his staff kept an informal link to Powell similar to the one Clark had with Albright and Berger, but Powell's strained relationship with Rumsfeld and Bush reduced the connection's significance.

158. Operations in Afghanistan relied heavily on CIA paramilitary teams and indigenous forces aligned with the Northern Alliance. Even US military participation emphasized special operations forces over institutional forces of the individual services.

159. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 242-47.

Relative Advisor Influence—Coded I

Table 31. Variable coding: Relative Advisor Influence

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Disproportionately influential	I
Unremarkable, relative influence	U

Source: Author's original work

George W. Bush's cabinet wanted to distinguish their foreign policy from that determined by the preceding administration. Whereas the elder Bush had tolerated Colin Powell's influence over strategy in Panama and the Persian Gulf, his son's administration no longer required assistance.¹⁶⁰ They had invested in military dominance, and now they wanted a return. From the beginning, Bush had tasked his defense secretary to challenge the military's conventional wisdom.¹⁶¹ Given Bush's guidance and their familiarity with the national security establishment, the administration marginalized the influence of senior military leaders.¹⁶²

Aside from President Bush, four senior members of his administration played instrumental roles in the determination of foreign policy. Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, and Condoleezza Rice each had a far

160. Woodward, *State of Denial*, 72.

161. After announcing Rumsfeld's appointment, Bush stated that he wanted his defense secretary "to challenge the status quo inside the Pentagon." Quoted in Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 270.

162. O'Sullivan summarized the effect of this relationship when he described how few Bush administration officials had wartime experience but thought military intervention was the solution to every problem. O'Sullivan's description focused primarily on Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice. Although Powell had wartime experience, the other two marginalized his opinions. Based on his close relationship with Rumsfeld and his cool relationship with Powell, Cheney normally supported the former and marginalized the latter. O'Sullivan, *Colin Powell*, 170.

greater effect on policy than the CJCS. For different reasons, Cheney and Rice influenced the administration's foreign policy the most. Cheney wielded enormous influence due to his extensive experience in government and Bush's trust in his judgment.

Rice did not have the political experience of Cheney, but she asserted influence over policy due to her close relationship with the president and Bush's consideration of her as his top foreign-policy advisor.¹⁶³ She also operated at the nexus of the president's foreign-policy team and his department heads. Bush had placed her in charge of assembling his foreign-policy team early in his campaign, and entrusted her with revising and publishing the administration's landmark NSS in 2002.¹⁶⁴ She played the role of tiebreaker when Powell and Rumsfeld disagreed, as they regularly did.¹⁶⁵

Regarding foreign policy in the wake of the 9/11 disaster, Donald Rumsfeld played two important roles. First, he continued his dominance over the Joint Chiefs, usurping their advisory role to the president.¹⁶⁶ Unlike Powell's inclusion as an intermediary between Cheney and Schwarzkopf, Rumsfeld also excluded the chairman and delivered his orders directly to Franks.¹⁶⁷ Second, he contested Powell's influence, increasing the advisory power of Cheney and Rice.¹⁶⁸

163. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 315. See also Woodward, *Bush at War*, 30, 33-34. Bush did not consult Cheney, Rumsfeld, or Powell before announcing his post-9/11 decision to attack states who sponsored terrorists. He did consult Rice, who the president considered part of his family.

164. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 251-52.

165. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 315.

166. Woodward, *Bush at War*.

167. Woodward, *Bush at War*. Remembering his own role in the Persian Gulf, Powell expressed his frustration that Shelton wielded no influence over opinions expressed by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz.

168. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 350-51, 65-67. Mann describes Powell's role within the Bush administration as an enigma. He represented the closest approximation of a counterpoint to their tendency toward using military force, yet even he had little experience outside the defense

Prior to Bush's inauguration, Donald Rumsfeld discussed his perspective on the role of force in national strategy with the president. The incoming defense secretary illustrated his view that the previous administration's response to an attack had been an initial retreat followed by the use of a low-risk, standoff weapon that did not risk American lives. In contrast, Rumsfeld intended a more proactive and complete use of the military; Bush gave the impression that he agreed.¹⁶⁹ Following Bush's announcement of his new secretary of defense, Rumsfeld described his intention to confront proactively the establishment in the Pentagon with authority.¹⁷⁰ Shelton had exerted minimal influence over the Clinton administration's strategy in the Balkans; Bush's defense secretary attempted to reduce the power of the Joint Chiefs even further.¹⁷¹

The new defense secretary questioned every aspect of business as usual, including the role of the CJCS.¹⁷² Rumsfeld believed the chairman and his staff added an unnecessary and inefficient layer of

department. Powell did not argue against the use of force, but instead maintained a difference of opinion regarding how to use it. In the wake of 9/11, the voices of Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice, and the Republican Party's establishment combined to drown out Powell's concerns as an impatient president wanted to respond with action.

169. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 19-20. Rumsfeld's deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, agreed with his boss's assessment. He believed the Clinton administration's uses of force had accomplished little because they failed to go far enough. Bacevich goes further, suggesting "for Wolfowitz, the ideology of national security served as a sort of surrogate religion. He was a true believer, harboring no doubts about history's purpose and America's assigned role in accomplishing that purpose." Quoted in Bacevich, *The Limits of Power*, 115-16.

170. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 270.

171. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 289-91. Mann describes how Rumsfeld's confrontational style initially alienated so many people that some speculated Bush intended to replace him less than a year after his appointment. The 9/11 attacks shifted the focus.

172. Woodward, *Bush at War*, 23-24.

bureaucracy.¹⁷³ The defense secretary emphasized his position in the chain of command, suggesting that the CJCS should not advise the president directly, but only through him.¹⁷⁴ The chairman described an atmosphere of mistrust wherein Rumsfeld attempted to subvert the will of Congress by reducing the chairman's influence as the nation's principal military advisor.¹⁷⁵

Rumsfeld and Cheney shared similar views on the use of military force, and their collective opinion carried significant political weight in the administration. The vice president played a central role in the administration's decisions from the beginning.¹⁷⁶ His direct involvement with choosing personnel determined the administration's majority opinion, and limited the influence of Colin Powell.¹⁷⁷ These personnel decisions pitted the state department and defense department against

173. Woodward, *State of Denial*, 38. During a meeting in the tank, he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff they provided no value and suggested the Joint Staff was worthless. See also Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 407-09.

174. Woodward, *State of Denial*, 17-43. Woodward describes multiple examples of Rumsfeld's attempts to assert control over military influence. He bombarded multiple offices with challenges to standard processes via emails known as snowflakes. He wanted the National Military Command Center to notify him of significant events instead of calling the CJCS.

175. Shelton, Levinson, and McConnell, *Without Hesitation*, 426-27, 78-79, 82-83. Shelton described how Rumsfeld's interest in political power motivated him to reduce the influence of the Joint Chiefs. Instead of working through the CJCS as an intermediary between himself and the field commander the way Cheney had with Powell, Rumsfeld excluded Myers and the service chiefs from influencing operations.

176. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 252-53, 61. Mann describes Bush's selection of Cheney as vice president as the single most important decision affecting the administration's future policy choices. In addition to his vast experience in foreign policy, Cheney exerted his influence over all aspects of the administration. Cheney was one of three people Bush consulted as he considered key appointments prior to his inauguration.

177. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 273-74. Mann suggests the foreign-policy perspectives of those Bush appointed to office foretold a central role for US military power given their vast experience in the defense department and dearth of it in the realm of diplomacy.

one another, creating the requirement for the vice president to resolve disputes.¹⁷⁸ Cheney even appointed his own, separate foreign-policy staff that became a powerful entity apart from either department.¹⁷⁹ The vice president rendered extensive influence over the administration's policy in response to the 9/11 attacks.¹⁸⁰

By contrast, Colin Powell was never an insider in the Bush administration. Nevertheless, his opinion carried significant weight politically.¹⁸¹ As demonstrated by Bush's choice of Powell to deliver the speech condemning Iraq's WMD program at the United Nations, the administration understood and exploited Powell's political capital for their benefit where possible. Others sought to limit his influence over foreign policy.¹⁸² Regarding the strategy in Afghanistan, Powell's already marginalized opinion carried even less weight when the president chose a plan devised by the CIA using very few US ground forces.

178. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 274-75. Mann describes the antagonistic relationship between not only Rumsfeld and Powell, but also Wolfowitz and Armitage, their respective deputies. These personnel choices meant harmony within each department and friction between departments as both principal and deputy in each institution shared similar views.

179. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 276.

180. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 294-303, 69-70. Mann describes Cheney as possibly the most powerful vice president in US history. He was omnipresent during post-9/11 deliberations, and as the final authority between conflicting viewpoints asserted by the state department and defense department in the wake of the attack.

181. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 254.

182. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 264-66. The new administration worried that Powell might use his political influence to contest them in areas where they disagreed. Powell was not a neoconservative, and Cheney still remembered his attempt to dissuade the elder Bush from using force in the Persian Gulf.

Intervening Variables: Coded C and N

Table 32. Variable coding: Competing Alternatives

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Two or more available and feasible	C
Either one or zero alternatives	S

Source: Author's original work

Table 33. Variable coding: Domestic Pressure

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
High pressure for US military intervention	H
Neutral or low pressure for US military intervention	N

Source: Author's original work

The president could have chosen an alternative to the CIA's plan. He had decided on a military response in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack, but knew few details of the perpetrator's elaborate plot at the time. Shelton had offered two alternatives.¹⁸³ Of the options presented to him, Bush considered the CIA's plan the most attractive based on its ability to happen relatively quickly, inclusion of ground forces, and lack of political liability created by the commitment of a large force.

The president believed he had a mandate after 9/11. Regardless, the administration faced no external pressure from groups demonstrating for or against operations in Afghanistan. The nation

183. The president referred to the Clinton administration's responses to terrorist attacks as pounding sand—pointless wastes of expensive weapons producing little more effect than a hole in the desert where they hit.

patiently awaited the response as they fixed damaged buildings and erected memorials. America demonstrated relatively persistent resolve to seek justice for the horrific act of suicide terrorism that killed nearly 3,000 of citizens. No demonstrations or protests pressured the president to invade Afghanistan. If the president determined military force provided the best opportunity to deliver justice, the American people wanted him to use it.

Conclusions

Operation Enduring Freedom perhaps best exemplifies an excellent answer to a problem of questionable importance. Despite the shock and horror produced by al Qaeda's 9/11 hijacking plot, the Bush administration suffered from no external restrictions on its ability to define the problem in the attack's aftermath. The international community volunteered assistance and support, while Americans demonstrated patient resolve. Instead of analyzing the nature of the threat, the nearly immediate decision to use military force and the rush to take action eventually led to a narrow focus on overthrowing the Taliban. Removing them from power allowed the administration to claim a victory, but failed to produce a measurable result in the broader effort to address a growing threat. Table 34 illustrates the combination of variables resulting in the administration's use of force in Afghanistan.

Table 34. Coding Afghanistan variables

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Assigned code</i>		
	<u><i>P</i></u>	<u><i>K</i></u>	<u><i>A</i></u>
US military force used? ^y	M	M	M
Consistent with guidance? ^a	G	G	A
Chairman's advice ^b	P	D	D
Relative advisor influence ^c	I	I	I
Competing alternatives ^{x1}	C	C	C
Domestic pressure ^{x2}	N	N	N

Source: Author's original work

^y M = military force used; O = other option(s) selected instead of military

^a G = consistent with standing guidance; A = ambiguous or inconsistent

^b P = consistent with four or more Powell Doctrine tenets;

D = advice differs from two or more Powell Doctrine tenets

^c I = disproportionately influential; U = unremarkable, relative influence

^{x1} C = two or more available and feasible; S = single alternative or none

^{x2} H = high; N = neutral or low (public support for military intervention)

The decision to use force in Afghanistan represents the typology A + D + I = M, where intervening variables *x1* and *x2* (coded C and N respectively) once again did not affect the outcome. This case represents a combination of variables inconsistent with Huntington's and Cohen's theories of civil-military relations. Both theorists advocated for senior officers to provide their best military advice. Given the absence of standing guidance pre-determining a response to the 9/11 hijacking plot, the president should have received expert military advice to assist his decision-making.

Instead of seeking it out, the Bush administration discouraged it. The primary justification for coding the chairman's variable in this case study stems from his lack of opportunity to question the administration's

plan.¹⁸⁴ No one in the administration asked for a CJCS critique of the plan. After all, they had chosen a scheme of operations developed by the CIA. Both Shelton and Myers faded into the background as the president declared war and influential members of the administration debated the details of its execution.

Informed by their perceived victory over the Taliban, the Bush administration released their first NSS nearly a year after 9/11.¹⁸⁵ They continued to focus on the importance of defeating terrorism. Consistent with earlier statements made by the president, the document outlined a strategy to hold states accountable for terrorists operating within their borders.¹⁸⁶ The document claimed America's responsibility to safeguard and improve the world, while also underscoring the importance of increasing the range of US military options available to policy makers.

Unfortunately, the conflict in Afghanistan became global in a way the administration did not predict. Instead of uniting the world to reduce terrorism, Taliban sympathizers in multiple countries united to support an insurgency against Western forces.¹⁸⁷ The decision not to pursue

184. The historical record makes no mention of Shelton or Myers challenging the plan in any way, much less challenging it based on the tenets of the Powell Doctrine.

185. Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 316. After viewing a draft submitted by one of Powell's senior aides, Rice ordered a complete rewrite to create a more dramatic break with what she considered outdated ideas of national security.

186. In his cover letter, the president stated, "America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists." President of the United States, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002. The strategy also introduced the term rogue states and declared preemptive strikes necessary due to the unlikelihood of deterrence protecting the United States from weapons of destruction wielded by terrorists.

187. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 256-78, 91. Efforts to trace support for the Taliban's efforts implicated funding sources from multiple countries in the Middle East. Jones describes a network of individuals, charities, nongovernmental organizations, and institutions interested in financing the efforts of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

enemy forces into Pakistan provided them with time to garner support and strength from around the globe.¹⁸⁸ The most influential in the administration chose to stray from the Powell Doctrine, but the results of their decision suggest caution. Continuation of a long and bloody fight for control in Afghanistan, along with the proliferation of international terrorist organizations and their deadly attacks, calls into question the value of America's investment of blood and treasure.

Questions about results in Afghanistan did not prevent the next administration from pursuing another regime change nearly a decade later. The final case study examines the Obama administration's use of force to overthrow Libya's government in 2011. Air power once again played a key role supporting the movement of surrogate forces on the ground, and the results once again emphasized challenges associated with forcibly replacing another state's government.

188. Jones, *In the Graveyard*, 310-11, 23. Jones highlights the irony of America providing substantial funding to Pakistan even as prominent officials and institutions in the country's government supported the Taliban and other militants who attacked US forces. It took until 2008 for President Bush to authorize US forces to conduct operations in Pakistan without their permission. If not global, the scope of combat operations that began in Afghanistan had at least become regional.

Chapter 7

Libya

The maiming and killing of men and the destruction of human shelters and other installations, however necessary it may be for other reasons, cannot in itself make a positive contribution to any democratic purpose. The destructive process of war must always be accompanied by, or made subsidiary to, a different sort of undertaking aimed at widening the horizons and changing the motives of men and should never be thought of in itself as a proper vehicle for hopes and enthusiasms and dreams of world improvement.

-George Kennan
American Diplomacy

So we actually executed this plan as well as I could have expected: we got a UN mandate, we built a coalition, it cost us \$1 billion—which, when it comes to military operations, is very cheap. We averted large-scale civilian casualties, we prevented what almost surely would have been a prolonged and bloody civil conflict. And despite all that, Libya is a mess.

-Barack Obama

Barack Obama entered office in January 2009 intent on altering the country's course internationally and domestically. Both areas required immediate attention. Domestically, the economy had entered into a severe recession following the collapse of the housing market. Internationally, the administration inherited counterinsurgency operations in two different Middle East countries. They established a timetable for withdrawing combat forces from Iraq under the moniker of a responsible drawdown.¹ By contrast, they continued in Afghanistan,

1. He had campaigned on the illegitimacy of America's actions in Iraq and the requirement to address the real problem posed by extremists in the Middle East, Obama promised to bring American forces home from Iraq as soon as possible while refocusing the military on Afghanistan.

eventually surging US forces to consolidate gains and stabilize the country.²

A year after the president announced a timeline for surging and then removing US ground forces in Afghanistan, another crisis limited his ability to refocus America's foreign policy on a different region. Eventually spreading to 22 different areas throughout the Middle East, mass protests known as the Arab Spring challenged the authority of ruling regimes with violent demonstrations. The demonstrations began in December 2010 and raged for nearly two years—dates approximating the Afghanistan surge. Tens of thousands died, with political results ranging from government concessions to regime change or civil war.

The Arab Spring arrived in Libya in February 2011. Muammar Qaddafi and his regime considered their options as overthrown governments in Tunisia and Egypt, Libya's neighbors on its east and west borders, clarified the stakes involved.³ Rebel forces quickly took control of Benghazi, Libya's second largest city, undermining Qaddafi's

After securing the Democratic nomination, Obama included his position on Iraq in his victory speech by stating, "we must be as careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting in. But start leaving we must. It's time for Iraqis to take responsibility for their future." Quoted in Ricks, *Gamble: General David Petraeus*, 292. See also Barack Obama, "Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq," (Address, Camp Lejeune, NC, 27 February 2009). In an address at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina in February 2009, Obama announced the completion of his administration's comprehensive review of Iraq policy that resulted in his determination to remove all combat brigades from the country by 31 August 2010. During this same speech, he also introduced his intended review of the policy in Afghanistan.

2. Obama, "Responsibly Ending the War." During a speech made at West Point in December 2009, the president announced his intention to send 30,000 additional ground forces to Afghanistan and the implementation of an 18-month timetable for beginning their withdrawal.

3. Christopher S. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 25. By the time virtual revolution turned physical in Libya on 17 February 2011, Tunisia and Egypt had already overthrown their governments.

legitimacy in the country's east. Instead of staunching the uprising, Qaddafi's heavy-handed response to the protest had the opposite effect.⁴ The dictator ratcheted up his rhetoric as well, promising to remain in power and rid the country of those responsible for the protests.⁵ As the situation spiraled out of control, numerous officials in the Libyan government defected and Western nations hastily evacuated their citizens.⁶

As rebel numbers increased and Qaddafi remained intransigent, international pressure for intervention built. The UN, European Union, and individual countries passed measures sanctioning the regime for its violent response.⁷ Formation of the National Transitional Council (NTC), an umbrella organization under which revolutionaries operated in local groups, suggested increased potential for a post-Qaddafi government capable of representing Libya's diverse population.⁸ By early March, political leaders in France and Britain advocated for a no-fly zone and air

4. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 26-27. The protests spread across the country. By 20 February 2011, rebel forces also controlled Baida and Tobruk, with rebel losses estimated at 200 dead and 900 injured. Qaddafi's deployment of military forces resulted in hundreds more dead or wounded.

5. "Qaddafi stated that he would show 'no mercy' to his opponents in Benghazi, and that his forces would go 'door to door' to find and kill dissidents." SFRC Press Office and Brooke Buchanan, "Kerry, McCain Introduce Libya Resolution," news release, 21 June 2011, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/kerry-mccain-introduce-libya-resolution>. In a televised speech, Qaddafi promised to "cleanse Libya house to house." Quoted in Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 27.

6. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 27-29. Libyan defectors included the country's ambassadors, military officers, and the regime's diplomatic corps. Many US embassy staff members and their families left personal possessions behind during their hasty exit.

7. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 30.

8. The NTC's 30 members "included a heterogeneous mix of regime defectors, representatives of key tribes, former prisoners, human rights activists, lawyers, intellectuals, and others." Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 32.

strikes despite opposition from other world powers, including the US and Germany.⁹

The American perspective changed quickly, tipping the balance in favor of intervention. Most in the administration recommended against military action in Libya, but three mid-March events convinced the president to side with the minority opinion.¹⁰ First, Qaddafi's forces began to take back territory previously lost to the rebels.¹¹ Second, other states in the region vowed to not only endorse military action, but also participate in it.¹² In particular, Arab leaders in the region convinced

9. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 34-42. Chivvis describes possible reasons for the sense of urgency demonstrated by French President Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Cameron, including domestic political considerations and concern over association with failed policy in another former North African colony. Besides the US and Germany, Turkey, Poland, and others NATO members also opposed military action in Libya.

10. Robert Michael Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 518. Immediately preceding the president's decision to intervene, Vice President Joe Biden, CJCS Michael Mullen, NSA Tom Donilon, White House Chief of Staff William Daley, and Deputy National Security Advisors John Brennan and Denis McDonough all opposed US military action in Libya. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice, White House National Security Staff Senior Director Samantha Power, and Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes argued for it.

11. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 53. As the regime began its reversal of the protestors' progress, external observers worried Qaddafi's actions might match the ruthlessness of his earlier rhetoric. See also Gates, *Duty: Memoirs Of*, 518. Secretary of Defense Gates objected to involving the US military, but believed Qaddafi's mid-March success at reversing the rebels' progress moved the debate in favor of those in the administration who supported intervention.

12. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs Of*, 517. The Arab League requested international approval of a no-fly zone, protection for Libyan citizens and legitimacy for the NTC. See also Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 53-57. Qaddafi's forces left behind a gruesome trail of destruction as they began pushing rebel forces back. Chivvis describes Arab League support for military action against one of its own members as unprecedented, and attributes the aberration to widespread disdain for Qaddafi. Some in the Obama administration saw an opportunity to improve US standing in the Middle East by siding with the majority opinion there.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of their commitment to military intervention.¹³ Finally, the NTC's representative to foreign governments convinced Secretary Clinton of the organization's legitimacy and potential as a successor to Qaddafi's regime.¹⁴

Administration advocates eventually convinced the president of the necessity for action. Instead of opposing the French and British positions or remaining neutral, Obama tasked Susan Rice to lobby the UN Security Council for international approval of military intervention.¹⁵ Resolution 1973, passed on 17 March 2011, authorized the use of force to protect civilians, while also prohibiting an occupation of the country with ground forces.¹⁶ French aircraft entered Libyan airspace to start the air campaign on 19 March 2011.

13. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 56. Clinton initially objected to US military involvement, but eventually played a key role in convincing the president to intervene. Arab support for action against the Libyan regime, along with persuasive engagements with NTC leadership, went a long way toward changing Clinton's opinion of the situation's suitability to using force.

14. Jo Becker and Scott Shane, "Hillary Clinton, 'Smart Power' and a Dictator's Fall," *New York Times*, 27 February 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/hillary-clinton-libya.html>. Becker and Shane described Clinton's pivotal meeting on 14 March 2011 with Dr. Mahmoud Jibril, representative to foreign governments for the NTC. Jibril convinced Clinton, and in turn, Clinton helped persuade President Obama, of the NTC's interest in representative government and institution building.

15. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 59.

16. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs Of*, 519. Gates referred to Rice's efforts to pass the resolution as nearly a miracle, as she convinced Russia, China, Germany, India, and Brazil to abstain while the remaining members of the council voted in favor. See also Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 63. Chivvis suggested support for the resolution provided by non-permanent members of the Security Council, critical to passing the resolution, stemmed from the UN's earlier passage of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.

The Stage

Operation Odyssey Dawn began after Qaddafi had ruled Libya for more than 40 years. The decision to create a nation-state of Libya was the least bad alternative for the country's citizens in the aftermath of World War II.¹⁷ A coup led by Qaddafi overthrew the Senussi monarchy 18 years following the country's founding.¹⁸ After consolidating his gains, the dictator established a reputation as an unpredictable opportunist with the potential to threaten Western interests.¹⁹ If other nations chafed at Qaddafi's alarming tactics, many of Libya's own citizens endured the brunt of his efforts to maintain power. The country's institutions operated in name only as he controlled decisions through a shadow government designed to prevent consolidation of power outside his grasp.²⁰ Consistently ranked at or near the bottom of worldwide rankings for democracy, the regime proactively targeted opposition groups using oppressive tactics.²¹ By 2011, Qaddafi's reputation as a ruthless tyrant preceded him domestically and internationally as he threatened extermination of the Arab Spring protestors.

Despite his history of opposition to Western ideals, Qaddafi had recently taken several steps toward reconciliation with Europe and the US. He abandoned pursuit of nuclear weapons in 2003, and the US

17. Dirk J. Vandewalle, *A History of Modern Libya*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 40.

18. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 21.

19. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*. Libya possesses extensive energy resources desired by Europe, and Qaddafi sponsored violent extremists and terrorists with a foreign policy aimed at undermining Western interests in the region. President Reagan authorized a punitive air strike against Libya in 1986 following a bombing plot in Berlin resulting in more than 200 dead. Qaddafi also attempted to develop nuclear weapons and authorized the deadly destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988.

20. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 22.

21. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 23. The International Criminal Court described Qaddafi's use of law-enforcement agencies to arrest, torture, and remove altogether citizens suspected of opposing the regime.

removed Libya from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. By 2009, America had normalized diplomatic relations with Libya, and established bilateral agreements on trade and security issues. Qaddafi also signed several agreements with European nations during and after highly publicized visits to several capitals.²² In particular, he signed the Libyan-Italian Friendship Treaty in 2008 to quell concerns over the number of people departing Libya for Europe.²³ Libya's relationship with the West appeared transformed until Qaddafi's reaction to the 2011 demonstrations reminded the world of his reputation for violent oppression.

Chairman

As Arab Spring protests continued to spread, the Obama administration struggled to determine an effective approach. A tenuous relationship between Western democracies and the Middle Eastern autocrats on whom they relied to provide regional stability faced a crisis of conscience as protestors proclaimed desire for freedom and representation. Notions of intervention enjoyed little allure for officials in

22. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 22-23.

23. Mattia Toaldo, "Migrations through and from Libya: A Mediterranean Challenge," *Istituto Affari Internazionali*, May 2015, <http://www.osce.org/networks/166526?download=true>. The treaty provided guidelines for the two countries to cooperate in three areas: marine patrols of the Mediterranean, security along Libya's southern border, and immigration policy mediation with the European Union. Western leaders considered the potential for Qaddafi's heavy-handed response to Arab Spring protestors to result in a massive number of refugees seeking asylum in Europe as justification for intervention. Their intervention forced him out of power, but did not prevent the feared migration increase. What had been tens of thousands of migrants annually from Libya before Qaddafi's ouster became hundreds of thousands annually thereafter as Libyans and other migrants living in the country sought refuge from the ensuing violence. The average number of less than 40,000 Libyan refugees seeking to escape via the Mediterranean Sea each year in the twenty-first century increased to 120,000 arriving in Sicily alone in 2014.

the defense department who continued to oversee operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Neither the secretary of defense, nor the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated for the start of another operation in Libya.

In addition, neither enjoyed the influence of political insiders in the administration.²⁴ Obama kept Gates at his post after the election due to his reputation for apolitical pragmatism and experience with the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.²⁵ The president met with CJCS Mike Mullen days after winning the election, but had several months to consider a reappointment.²⁶ Mullen stayed on, but his relationship with the administration became strained as he developed a reputation for

24. President Obama inherited both from the previous administration. He made a conscious decision to keep Gates as the secretary of defense due primarily to his familiarity with the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Mullen's continuation as the CJCS stemmed from a somewhat different cause. Bush had also appointed Mullen, but Obama had the option of reappointing him in 2009. By statute, chairmen serve two-year terms. They traditionally stay on for two terms, and can only exceed six years of service (four years if they previously served as vice chairman) in time of war. George Bush's decision not to reappoint Marine General Pete Pace as part of his attempt to reinvigorate US operations in Iraq by bringing in new leadership changed the traditional offset between presidential terms and CJCS terms. Pace served the shortest term as chairman in more than 40 years. His relatively quick departure meant Obama could return the CJCS turnover to the more traditional four-year term by keeping Mullen at the post for the president's first three years in office.

25. Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars*, 1st Simon & Schuster hardcover ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 18-24. The first president to keep the preceding administration's defense secretary in more than 60 years, Obama made the choice based on his pragmatic assessment of the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq. Regardless of Gates' political views, Obama believed Gates had performed admirably despite difficult circumstances, maintained the respect of Congress and the military, and shared his goals for both conflicts (drawing down in Iraq and succeeding in Afghanistan).

26. Woodward, *Obama's Wars*, 32-34. In their initial meeting, Mullen distanced himself from the Bush administration's decisions in Afghanistan, and suggested the previous administration had ignored the conflict.

delivering messages not altogether consistent with the president's sentiments.²⁷ In particular, the president had grown frustrated with Mullen's role during the Afghanistan strategy review.²⁸

By the time the Arab Spring arrived, the president anticipated arrival of replacements at the defense department. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen were near the end of their respective terms. Gates departed in June 2011, well before Qaddafi's demise. US Army General Martin Dempsey replaced Mullen three months later. The two offices enjoyed a closer relationship than the one fostered under Rumsfeld's leadership, but neither enjoyed a significant degree of influence inside the Obama administration.

Administration

The president made an effort to avoid appointing people to senior positions based on political or personal affiliation with him or his campaign. In addition to the holdover of Gates and Mullen from the Bush administration, Hillary Clinton assumed the position of secretary of state after competing as the president's archrival during the Democratic Party's nomination process. Furthermore, the president selected his national security advisor, Marine General James Jones, in part because

27. Woodward, *Obama's Wars*, 172-74, 96-97. During his confirmation hearing in September 2009, Mullen made statements regarding his advice on the strategy review for operations in Afghanistan that Obama disliked. He had not decided what he wanted to do yet, but Mullen's comments placed him in a position where he had either to agree or disagree with the chairman's recommendation. Later, the chairman's close relationship with General Stanley McChrystal further caused concern at the White House after McChrystal delivered a speech suggesting the proper course in Afghanistan before the president had decided on a course of action.

28. Woodward, *Obama's Wars*, 271, 78, 313. Woodward described the strategy review as a contest between the commander in chief and the professional officer corps.

they had no preceding relationship.²⁹ All three provided experience, but none wielded the influence of a close relationship with him.

Obama received counsel on national security matters from many others with whom he enjoyed a closer relationship. His earliest experiences making decisions on foreign policy had produced scars that caused him to question the interests of his advisors.³⁰ His skepticism of the national-security establishment became a hallmark of his foreign policy.³¹ Instead of placing exclusive trust in the opinions of his senior appointees, he considers them alongside perspectives expressed by junior advisors whose judgment he valued.³²

29. Woodward, *Obama's Wars*, 36-39. The president wanted Jones to serve as national security advisor to balance against the Pentagon's influence. Obama considered his lack of a relationship with Jones an asset because it prevented others from viewing his NSA as merely an extension of him.

30. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs Of*, 325, 50. Gates describes the president's frustration with military advisors and congressional representatives as he considered decisions in Iraq and Afghanistan during his first two years in office.

31. Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine," *The Atlantic*, April 2016, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>. Goldberg describes how the president eventually became a foreign-policy fatalist in the Middle East.

32. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs Of*, 287-97. Gates, who considered himself an outsider, described the roles played by various members of the administration. He highlighted the president's close relationship with junior advisors and deputies, including Jones's deputy Tom Donilon and presidential counselors Valerie Jarrett and David Axelrod. See also David Samuels, "The Aspiring Novelist Who Became Obama's Foreign-Policy Guru: How Ben Rhodes Rewrote the Rules of Diplomacy for the Digital Age," *The New York Times Magazine*, 5 May 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/magazine/the-aspiring-novelist-who-became-obamas-foreign-policy-guru.html?_r=0. Samuels describes the significant, policy influence of Ben Rhodes, the president's deputy national security advisor for strategic communications, despite his dearth of experience in national security and foreign policy prior to taking his post in the administration. CIA Director Leon Panetta believed the president used the name recognition of the principals to ensure a US departure from Iraq, but aligned himself with the interests of junior aides in pursuit of other foreign-policy objectives.

The Arab Spring provides a case in point. The president elected to disregard the nearly unanimous opinion of his senior advisors on how to react to the demonstrations in Egypt in favor of opinions voiced by Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes, US Homeland Security Advisor John Brennan, and National Security Advisor to the Vice President Antony Blinken.³³ Similarly, US Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice and National Security Council Special Assistant Samantha Power pushed hardest for US intervention in Libya while the vice president, national security advisor, secretary of defense, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised against it. Hillary Clinton's change of opinion tipped the balance in favor of using force.³⁴

The process and results of the president's decisions up until Operation Odyssey Dawn reveal multiple aspects of his decision-making style as commander in chief. First, he harbored a deep mistrust of the national-security establishment, reinforced by his experiences in handling multiple crises.³⁵ Second, perhaps in part because of the former

33. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs Of*, 504-06. Gates describes the caution urged by Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, CJCS Mullen, Deputy NSA Donilon, and himself.

34. "A strong faction within the national-security team—Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Susan Rice, who was then the ambassador to the United Nations, along with Samantha Power, Ben Rhodes, and Antony Blinken, who was then Biden's national-security adviser—lobbied hard to protect Benghazi, and prevailed." Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine." See also Gates, *Duty: Memoirs Of*, 511, 18. Gates describes how the majority of the president's advisors, and nearly all of his most senior advisors, urged caution in Libya. Specifically, Biden, Donilon, White House Chief of Staff William Daley, Mullen, McDonough, Brennan, and the secretary of defense opposed US military intervention. Obama described his decision to use force as a 51-49 decision.

35. In his 2016 expose detailing the president's views on US foreign policy, Jeffrey Goldberg describes how the president "generally believes that the Washington foreign-policy establishment, which he secretly disdains, makes a fetish of 'credibility'—particularly the sort of credibility purchased with force." According to Goldberg, "Libya proved to him

point, he entertained a large advisory core, and attributed little value to the position of the person advising.³⁶ As opposed to the tight group of senior advisors George H. W. Bush trusted to influence his biggest decisions, President Obama preferred to cast a wide net in search of perspectives most closely aligned with his own. Finally, he has demonstrated a willingness to use force, but has also sought to avoid protracted conflicts while minimizing the size, capabilities, and commitments of US contingents.³⁷

[President Obama] that the Middle East was best avoided.” Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine.” During his interview with Goldberg, the president described his pride in deciding to break with the Washington foreign-policy establishment’s playbook when he decided against military intervention in Syria in 2013. Goldberg assessed that Obama’s nearly eight years as president resulted in his resentment of demanding allies, over-zealous senior military officers, and the representation of narrowly focused interest groups by the labyrinth of Washington’s think tanks. Goldberg contrasts Obama’s aloofness with his predecessor’s strategy of engagement in the Middle East, concluding that Obama’s instincts tell him America’s most pressing interest with regard to the Middle East, informed by the disappointment in Libya, is to keep America (especially America’s military) as far away from Middle East politics as possible.

36. This statement attributes no cause to the president’s decisions to buy into the perspectives of his advisors given his mixed record of influencers and decisions made for and against using force. The broader point in the context of this research regards President Obama’s deep-seated skepticism when receiving advice from his primary advisors, including the CJCS—the nation’s principal military advisor.

37. The lengthy and high-profile debate over how many US ground forces to send to Afghanistan, and the announcement of their withdrawal timeline before they departed, provides one example of the president’s attempt to limit the use of force. For restrictions placed on US forces in Libya, see Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 65. Here, the president not only restricted ground forces, but also the use of multiple air force capabilities while announcing at the conflict’s outset the abbreviated time period of US forces leading the effort. The president’s extensive restrictions placed on the operations of US forces reflect a philosophy diametrically opposed to the Powell Doctrine’s call for overwhelming force used to achieve an objective decisively.

Conflict

The president and his administration faced a conflict of interest in Libya. They did not want another commitment in the Middle East, but they also found it difficult to remain on the sidelines as demonstrators proclaimed their interest in freedom and democratic values.³⁸ Furthermore, they also supported the UN's position regarding the international community's responsibility to protect civilians threatened by their national government.³⁹ As Qaddafi's forces approached Benghazi, and a multitude of countries expressed concern regarding the tyrant's intentions, the president needed to act quickly if he was going to act at all.⁴⁰

President Obama chose intervention, and US forces quickly joined a coalition of nations seeking to prevent a gruesome abuse of power by the Libyan regime. What began as defense of Libya's population continued as a supporting effort for a growing number of resistance fighters armed by foreign weapons suppliers, supplemented by coalition air power, and augmented by other nation's special-operations forces.⁴¹

38. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 504-07. Gates described the concern of multiple White House staffers with ensuring the administration was on the right side of history as the Arab Spring protests began to spread rapidly. In particular, he voiced concern that inexperienced members of the administration lacked an appreciation for implications of idealistic, foreign-policy decisions.

39. After describing the administration's secondary considerations, Chivvis concludes, "ultimately it was the imminent threat Qaddafi's forces posed to the civilian population of Benghazi combined with the emergence of a military option that could save thousands of imperiled lives that led to intervention." Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 68.

40. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 67. By the time coalition members decided to intervene, concern over the potential for a mass-casualty attack by Qaddafi's forces had grown so great that they only gave the dictator a matter of hours to declare a cease-fire and reverse the advance of his forces moving toward Benghazi.

41. Qatar played a key role in supplying the rebels with weapons, sending "20 thousand tons of weapons in at least eighteen separate arms shipments to specific rebel leaders, along with tens of millions of dollars

The conflict that began with French aircraft flying protection missions on 19 March 2011 continued until Qaddafi's summary execution by rebel forces on 20 October 2011.

Instead of US forces taking the lead of coalition operations as they had during Operation Desert Storm, President Obama limited their participation in multiple ways. First, he ruled out the use of US ground forces. Second, he restricted the use of US forces by limiting their use to an initial attack on Libya's air defenses followed by a reduced effort restricted to supplementing the broader coalition with only those capabilities unique to the US.⁴² After initially degrading Libya's ability to defend itself, US forces maintained a preeminent role until their transition to support of NATO's Operation Unified Protector from 31 March 2011 through 31 October 2011.⁴³

in aid, as well as at least twelve ammunition shipments, via Sudan. Thirteen of the weapons shipments went directly to rebel leaders including the former jihadist Belhaj, bypassing the NTC, to its consternation. Qatar also trained the rebels in the use of the weapons it supplied. There were more than 100 Qatari advisors operating from Benghazi, Zintan, and eventually Tripoli, according to Qatari officials. These advisors were a key link between NATO and the rebel forces, especially when it came to collecting information about potential targets on the ground." Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 155, 58. Some questioned the insertion of French and British Special Forces given the UN Security Council Resolution's prohibition against an occupying ground force. 42. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 65. These capabilities emphasized many of the operation's supporting efforts (e.g. ISR, air refueling, and logistics support).

43. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 83-89. During the first nine days of Operation Odyssey Dawn, the US dropped 455 precision-guided munitions compared with 147 dropped by the rest of the coalition. US forces also flew 75-100 percent of all coalition air refueling, aerial surveillance, and electronic warfare missions. US Airmen flew more missions than the combined number flown by other nations in the coalition. The effort caused Qaddafi's forces to retreat, decimated the regime's ability to provide air defense, and reduced the combat effectiveness of its ground forces. By the end of the first week, rebel forces had advanced outside Benghazi and retaken the next town on their way to Tripoli.

Rebel forces made significant progress initially, but the conflict reached a stalemate shortly after the transition to Operation Unified Protector.⁴⁴ On 4 April 2011, President Obama withdrew fighter aircraft in accordance with his intent to limit US participation.⁴⁵ He also withdrew close-air-support aircraft as the operation transitioned to a NATO-led effort.⁴⁶ Numerous other limitations hampered the coalition's ability to generate sorties, resulting in diminished support for opposition ground forces.⁴⁷

The reduced effort provided time and space for Qaddafi and increased political pressure on the coalition. In one example, Norway succumbed to domestic demands for ending involvement by removing their strike aircraft in August.⁴⁸ Secretary Gates expressed publicly his frustration at the lack of support from NATO nations that threatened the air campaign's effectiveness.⁴⁹ After an extended stalemate, the dissidents produced rapid results in the middle of August. Rebel forces

44. The city of Misrata lies along the Libyan coast 213 kilometers east of Tripoli, and 814 kilometers west of Benghazi.

45. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 104.

46. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 111.

47. Robert Gates lamented the ineffective effort to sustain operations tempo by describing, "the spectacle of an air operations center designed to handle more than 300 sorties a day struggling to launch about 150." Quoted in Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 110-16, 34-35. Chivvis describes a plethora of causes for the requirement shortfalls ranging from political caveats of participating nations to the speed with which the operation began and the exhaustion of multiple nations' war-fighting resources.

48. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 135-36. The Norwegians had performed admirably, filling a key role in the overall prosecution of attacks against the regime.

49. In a speech delivered 10 June 2011 in Belgium, Gates stated, "it has become painfully clear that shortcomings—in capability and will—have the potential to jeopardize the alliance's ability to conduct an integrated, effective and sustained air-sea campaign." Quoted in Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 136. Although all of NATO's members had voted to conduct the mission, less than 50 percent took an active role, and only one third flew strike sorties.

took the regime's capital city of Tripoli on 22 August 2011.⁵⁰ Coalition support continued as they focused attention on the final bastions of Qaddafi's power. Finally, NATO aircraft, including a US Predator, found and attacked Qaddafi's convoy as it fled Sirte. Rebel fighters then converged on the position, brutally beating the dictator before shooting him in the head.⁵¹

In a matter of months, interpretation of the international community's responsibility to protect had evolved from establishing a no-fly zone for the protection of civilians, to a demand for regime change, and the eventual execution of Libya's ruler without a trial. The administration's limitations on the use of US forces compelled other coalition nations to consider their role as a stakeholder in Western security interests. As they had in Kosovo and Afghanistan, NATO's operations in Libya once again demonstrated the ability of air power to support a resistance movement while placing pressure on a ruling regime. The question that remained unanswered was to what end.

Conflict Termination and Results

This time Western intervention in a Middle Eastern state did not result in a long-term US occupation with a large ground force. Unfortunately, heady aspirations of a democracy at the operation's outset met with a cold reality. As it had in Iraq, a small footprint of ground forces after overthrowing the regime eventually led to an extended conflict.

The administration began post-conflict planning early in the operation's design. In March, Deputy National Security Advisor Tom Donilon established a planning group to consider potential strategies for

50. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 160-62.

51. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 167-68.

Libya after the conflict.⁵² Despite availability of lessons learned from post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the effort in Libya differed due to the restriction against US ground forces. The Pentagon also conducted a June exercise to examine post-conflict planning considerations, but coalition and rebel lack of interest in a follow-on, Western presence reduced potential resources and options.⁵³ A meeting of coalition members on 1 September confirmed that neither NATO nor the UN planned to send a peacekeeping force to maintain security after the conflict.⁵⁴

Initial euphoria after Qaddafi's death gave way to an uneasy peace as communities across the country considered their next step. The country's reconstruction suffered from three primary and interrelated challenges preventing a successful transition of power. First, the NTC proved unable to consolidate gains required to establish legitimacy as the nation's central government.⁵⁵ Second, lack of an effective arbitration mechanism between Libya's diverse regions, tribes, and ethnic groups resulted in local communities and militias establishing their own security and local governance.⁵⁶ Finally, a large number of weapons found their

52. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 49, 143-44. Led by White House Senior Director for Strategic Planning, Derek Chollet, the group incorporated the influence of US Ambassador to Libya, Gene Cretz. The task force worked directly with a post-conflict group comprised of 70 members aligned with Libya's rebel forces. Liaison with the rebels provided valuable insight to the team, but questionable benefit for the execution of post-conflict operations.

53. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 144-46.

54. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 164.

55. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 169. Chivvis attributes the ineffectiveness to a lack of connection between the rebels and the NTC, which consisted mainly of immigrants and former regime members who had little in common with those doing the fighting.

56. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 170-71. The country's lack of well-functioning institutions under the regime, and rampant fear of retribution against anyone associated with the previous government, meant small organizations emerged in communities throughout the country to address societal issues.

way into the hands of violent extremists in the region who then filled the power vacuum created by Qaddafi's demise.⁵⁷

Relative stability began to unravel as interest groups within Libya's borders staked conflicting claims. By January 2012, the transition government replaced Dr. Jibril with a new prime minister as tensions grew between rival factions. Reporting from the US State Department detailed significant friction between Islamists and secularists as well as among the various militias representing rival communities. Jibril's replacement predicted civil war in six months if he could not disarm the militias and address their demands effectively.⁵⁸

Despite the potential for disastrous consequences, the international community proclaimed no responsibility to protect Libyans from civil war the same way they protected them against Qaddafi's oppression. The Obama administration established stringent guidelines that severely restrained US assistance.⁵⁹ European nations promised to take the lead for post-conflict planning and assistance, and the President Obama wanted to avoid another long-term commitment.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the NTC regularly refused outside assistance despite the country's downward spiral. Despite a successful election in July 2012 and a peaceful transition of power to the General National Congress thereafter, massive weapons proliferation, human trafficking, and internal competition between competing Islamist groups became commonplace.⁶¹

57. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 171-73.

58. Scott Shane and Jo Becker, "A New Libya, with 'Very Little Time Left'," *New York Times*, 27 February 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/us/politics/libya-isis-hillary-clinton.html?r=0&_r=0.

59. Shane and Becker, "New Libya." The US could only help if the Libyan government requested assistance, the US was the only country able to provide a unique capability, and Libya paid for the assistance. Meeting all three restrictions proved nearly impossible.

60. Shane and Becker, "New Libya."

61. Shane and Becker, "New Libya."

By 2014, the situation in Libya had devolved into chaos. Islamists had taken control of the government, causing secularists to form a separate and competing government in the East.⁶² Qaddafi's record had been deplorable, but human suffering increased after his execution.⁶³ The refugee problem caused by Qaddafi's removal and the subsequent fracturing of Libya's society placed a significant burden on European states and the entire region.⁶⁴ Although Libya posed no threat to the US before NATO intervention removed Qaddafi from power, a failed state after his demise provided an opportunity for multiple terrorist organizations to expand their influence. The number of Islamic State fighters has nearly doubled since 2015.⁶⁵ The crisis also destabilized the

62. Alan J. Kuperman, "Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well-Meaning Intervention Ended in Failure," *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 2 (March/April 2015).

63. Kuperman, "Obama's Libya Debacle." Kuperman lists numerous offenses, including reprisal killings, the expulsion of 30,000 residents from their town before burning or looting their residences and businesses, the abuse of conflict-related detainees, widespread attacks on journalists, and dire economic effects caused by the reduction of Libya's oil production in the wake of the conflict.

64. Roberta Pinotti, "Italy's Defense Minister: Instability in Libya Exacerbates Refugee Crisis," *DefenseNews*, 4 January 2016, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commentary/2015/12/13/italys-defense-minister-instability-libya-exacerbates-refugee-crisis/76685152/>. See also Kuperman, "Obama's Libya Debacle." At the beginning of 2015, the UN estimated that the ongoing conflict displaced approximately 400,000 Libyans from their homes and caused the departure of 100,000 from the country.

65. "U.S. military officials estimated the group's strength at approximately 3,500 fighters in late 2015, but in early 2016, senior U.S. officials estimated that figure had grown to as many as 6,000, among a much larger community of Libyan Salafi-jihadist activists and militia members." Christopher M. Blanchard, *Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service, RL33142, US Library of Congress, 4 March 2016, 7.

entire region as arms and fighters from Libya fueled conflicts in other countries.⁶⁶

Evaluating Doctrinal Tenets

The administration's approach in Libya once again produced an operational success of questionable, strategic value to America. NATO's efforts removed a despot with a reputation for ruthless oppression. For Libya's people, the intervention replaced the tyranny of an authoritarian with the tyranny of constant conflict and a failed state. For US allies in Europe, the massive outpouring of refugees has tested the capacity of multiple nations still struggling to overcome the effects of an economic crisis. Additionally, the power vacuum created by Qaddafi's ouster allowed the Islamic State and other terror groups to expand their influence.

The administration wanted to break from the model in Afghanistan and Iraq by avoiding a long-term presence, but the strategy they chose denied them control over the conflict's aftermath. Instead of differing from the Bush administration, they emphasized footprint reduction even more. Just as Bush and Rumsfeld had denied the possibility of a large US ground force in Afghanistan, Obama did the same in Libya, while also curtailing availability of US air power. Neither approach demonstrated the ability to liberate an oppressed society without significant investment in blood and treasure.

Furthermore, results in both countries suffered from neglect of post-conflict security requirements. President Obama wanted a relatively

66. Michael Flynn, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency in the fall of 2012, suggested the agency had not seen such significant weapons proliferation since the Vietnam War. According to Shane, "the weapons that had made it so hard to stabilize Libya began turning up in Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Mali, Niger, Chad, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Egypt and Gaza, often in the hands of terrorists, insurgents or criminals." Shane and Becker, "New Libya."

cheap, short-term use of force. Instead, cost and duration continue to increase as US aircraft have returned to Libya to conduct operations against terrorists who arrived after Qaddafi's removal.⁶⁷ The following analysis examines consistency of the Obama administration's use of force with Powell Doctrine principals.

Purpose—No

The administration's consideration of its political objective in Libya failed to meet the Powell Doctrine's standard for importance and clarity. A coalition of nations once again overthrew the government of a sovereign nation; this time by applying the third pillar of the UN's recently operationalized strategy for the international community's responsibility to protect.⁶⁸ Allies' hesitance to commit, the administration's opaque descriptions of the objective, and key stakeholders' inconsistent support for the conflict call into question the mission's importance. Varied interpretations and applications of UN Security Council Resolution 1793 in Libya emphasize the objective's lack of clarity. Table 35 summarizes results of analyzing the administration's objective in Libya.

67. Lucas Tomlinson and The Associated Press, "Obama Approves 30-Day Airstrike Mission against ISIS in Libya," *Fox News*, 2 August 2016, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/08/02/us-air-power-revealed-in-fight-against-isis-in-libya.html>. On 2 August 2016, President Obama authorized a 30-day mission for US forces to strike Islamic State terrorists in Libya.

68. United Nations General Assembly, "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General," Report no. 09-20610, 12 January 2009. In 2009, the UN's secretary-general released his interpretation of the strategy to hold state governments accountable for their responsibility to protect their populations from "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" in a report to the general assembly. The strategy described the following three pillars: 1. the protection responsibilities of the state, 2. international assistance and capacity building, and 3. timely and decisive response.

Table 35. Purpose

Is the political objective important, clear, and understood?*		<u>N</u>
Important	US national security compromised if not accomplished	N
	Benefactors' security compromised if not accomplished	Y
	American public agrees	N
	International community agrees	Y
	Professional officer corps agrees	N
Clear and understood	American public aware	N
	Consistent public statements	N
	Consistent military planning	N
	Consistent military actions	N
	Consistent national instruments of power	Y
	Consistent coalition actions	B

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

The objective's lack of importance to US constituencies may have further contributed to disparities between the administration's public statements and its use of force against the regime in Libya. Qaddafi's regime did not threaten US national security interests. Neither the American public nor the US military supported entering the conflict. The sole benefactors of US support were Libya's opposition forces and other nations' political leaders seeking to benefit from establishing a hard line against the regime. The administration supported military efforts by coordinating them with national instruments of power, but unclear descriptions of the objective eroded scant support for the intervention, and led to inconsistent planning and actions by the coalition.

Stakes involved varied widely among each of the conflict's participants. A small number of European governments and the regime's internal opponents attributed the greatest significance to the conflict's outcome. Qaddafi's government and outside observers doubtless recognized a legitimate threat to his grip on power as the Arab Spring arrived in February 2011.⁶⁹ While widespread, the protests posed no threat to US national security. Neither the American public nor its professional officer corps considered the use of force as important to US interests in Libya.⁷⁰ Qaddafi's rhetoric, if acted upon, directly threatened Libya's dissidents, and indirectly threatened security interests across the Mediterranean Sea. European leaders hoped to prevent additional stress on their fragile economies from an influx of refugees and lack of access to Libya's natural resources.

Passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 and NATO's responsibility for conduct of the conflict represented the international community's belief in the conflict's importance. US allies in Europe, France in particular, lobbied for the use of military force to prevent an abuse of power by Qaddafi's regime.⁷¹ Initially disinterested another

69. The Arab Spring was a widespread uprising that threatened established governments in nations throughout the Middle East and North Africa. When protests began in Libya on 27 February 2011, revolutionary demonstrations had already engulfed four of the six nations sharing its borders (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan). Governments of Tunisia and Egypt had already been overthrown before the violence spread to Libya.

70. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 43. For lack of military support for intervention and consideration of US interests in Libya, see Gates, *Duty: Memoirs Of*, 518-21.

71. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 34-37. French President Sarkozy was the first Western leader to call for military action against Libya and recognize the NTC as the legitimate government of Libya. Together with British Prime Minister Cameron, Sarkozy played a major role in putting together a coalition willing to intervene. Chivvis suggests the two leaders' motivation to take a hard line against Qaddafi may have derived, in part, from political pressure in their home countries questioning their national-security and foreign-policy positions.

military operation on top of the lengthy conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration eventually played a key role in garnering the international legitimacy that justified using military force in Libya. The UN's assumption of responsibility to protect against abuses of national power, and nearly universal abhorrence of the Qaddafi regime by other state governments, facilitated international support for using force.⁷²

The UN resolution provided international legitimacy, but did not define the desired result beyond protection of civilians from abuse of government power.⁷³ The goal was prevention of atrocities, but opinions about the appropriate application of force in Libya varied widely among state governments.⁷⁴ Those in support of using force disagreed regarding implementation of the UN resolution. The Obama administration's public explanation of US intentions did little to clarify the definition of success.⁷⁵ Military planners struggled to reconcile differences between

72. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 3-4. The intervention included personnel, ships, and aircraft contributed by 19 different nations.

73. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973, 17 March 2011. UNSCR 1793 authorized all necessary measures to protect civilians and a no-fly zone, but prohibited an occupation force. See also United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1970, 26 February 2011. The authorization built on UNSCR 1970's authorization for an arms embargo, asset freeze, sanctions committee, by-name travel ban, and referral of Qaddafi to the International Criminal Court.

74. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 38-42. Chivvis describes widely varied views among NATO's members, ranging from Germany's opposition to the push for action from France and Britain. President Obama assured Sarkozy and Cameron that he supported pursuit of Qaddafi's removal from power at the beginning of March. Nevertheless, the official US position described only the much more limited objective of a humanitarian intervention to defend Libyan civilians against abuses of power by the regime.

75. According to the president, "oftentimes when you get critics of our Syria policy, one of the things that they'll point out is 'You called for Assad to go, but you didn't force him to go. You did not invade.' And the notion is that if you weren't going to overthrow the regime, you shouldn't have said anything. That's a weird argument to me, the notion that if we use our moral authority to say 'This is a brutal regime, and this is not how a leader should treat his people,' once you do that, you are obliged

authorized targets and public statements made by the administration.⁷⁶ Confusion over the objective also contributed to waning support for the operation among the American people.⁷⁷

Coalition members and American allies also added to the lack of clarity. Most considered removal of the regime politically unpalatable, but no other outcome provided a definable, suitable end state for a successful operation. Furthermore, coalition members placed significant national caveats and limitations on their participation in the conflict.⁷⁸ Despite the prohibition against ground forces, France and the United Kingdom inserted special operations forces that played a key role in Qaddafi's eventual ouster. Russia and the Arab League, itself considered a critical supporter of intervention at the conflict's outset, protested a use of force that exceeded the UN's authorization to protect civilians.

The administration took multiple steps to put pressure on Qaddafi despite the president's claims that the military's objective did not include regime change. They worked with the international community to ensure coordination of national instruments of power against Qaddafi, including economic penalties, information operations, and diplomatic pressure. A missile strike and surveillance provided by a US drone led to the dictator's apprehension and execution by opposition forces.

to invade the country and install a government you prefer." Quoted in Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine." These comments, made by the president in 2016 regarding the situation in Syria, reflect the president's experience in Libya. He had also called for Qaddafi to step down and had used US military force to support opposition forces on the ground, but he explicitly stated that US military forces did not have regime change as an objective. See also Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 116-17.

76. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 116-17.

77. Jeffrey M. Jones, "Americans Shift to More Negative View of Libya Military Action," *Gallup, Inc.*, 24 June 2011, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/148196/americans-shift-negative-view-libya-military-action.aspx>.

78. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 110-16. Chivvis describes numerous national caveats and resultant capability shortfalls.

Commitment—No

The political objective's lack of importance and clarity challenges assessment of the administration's commitment to achieve it. Assessing decisive achievement of the objective in Libya requires a nuanced approach accounting for the administration's potential goals for the operation. Consideration of this tenet examines the administration's commitment of US forces to achieve three different objectives: population protection, regime change, and demonstration of US commitment to NATO.

Despite difficulty discerning with confidence the administration's goal for US military forces in Libya, comparing the use of force against possible objectives suggests lack of interest in decisive achievement of any of them. Restrictions on participation of US forces provide the primary evidence for assessing this tenet. The administration was aware of effects associated with its self-imposed limitations, but remained committed to minimizing its military contribution to the conflict. Unclear military objectives also contribute to the tenet's negative assessment. Examining support of practitioners' requests and availability of trained, equipped forces yielded mixed results. Table 36 summarizes assessment of the Obama administration's commitment to decisive achievement of the objective in Libya.

Table 36. Commitment

Will the forces considered decisively achieve the objective?*	<u>N</u>
Practitioners' requests supported	B
Trained, equipped practitioners available	B
Clear objectives established	N
Aware of self-imposed limitations and their effects	Y
US policy makers control required means and ways	N

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

President Obama specifically chose to restrict the use of US forces for the conflict in Libya. As Operation Odyssey Dawn began, his removal of US combat forces from Iraq had begun in earnest and he sought to implement a timetable for a similar exit from Afghanistan. The administration wanted to reduce US military presence in the Middle East; they did not want to commit more forces there. Nevertheless, the Arab Spring provided an opportunity to confront Qaddafi, and traditional US allies' interest in intervention spurred the administration to find a viable solution. The president compromised by setting limits on the extent of US involvement.

The administration limited its control over ways and means to meet multiple objectives. Compared with France and England, the US had voiced little interest in a military intervention. The Qaddafi regime's political isolation and meager defenses also reduced apprehension about its potential to inflict significant losses on the coalition. The Obama administration viewed the conflict as an opportunity to revitalize the role and participation of European nations in NATO. Instead of exerting

control over ways and means, they limited US involvement by emphasizing the leadership of other nations, restricting availability of US forces, and providing only those military capabilities other coalition partners could not.⁷⁹ The administration did not pursue decisive achievement of an objective in Libya, but instead supported allies' intervention plans.

For multiple reasons, practitioners also struggled to determine the exact role of coalition military forces. Varied interests of coalition partners, disparate interpretations of the mandate established by UN Security Council Resolution 1973, and a disconnect between the National Transitional Council and rebel forces fighting on the ground challenged military planners attempting to discern their objectives. Although the international coalition conducted the operation under the auspices of population protection, claiming success in the endeavor was tantamount to proving a negative. President Obama's public statements regarding the ends sought in Libya called into question the operation's limits, and the coalition's theory of victory.⁸⁰

The administration wanted to emphasize international condemnation of the Qaddafi regime by supporting the contributions of coalition members. The lead-from-behind approach relinquished

79. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 65. President Obama supported the coalition, but stipulated a specific role for US forces that limited US involvement to only those capabilities unique to the US. The administration described its primary goal as setting conditions for international cooperation, not decisively overthrowing Qaddafi or defending Libya's population.

80. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 116-17. Chivvis sites unclear guidance as one reason the coalition experienced difficulty accomplishing its mission. President Obama had called for Qaddafi's ouster before the campaign began, but also made clear in a speech on 28 March 2016 that the military's objective was not regime change. These disparities, and the fact that UN Security Council Resolution 1973 had only called for protection of the population, challenged military planners to develop an operational plan consistent with political guidance.

substantial control over the operation to other nations in the coalition.⁸¹ Concurrent operations in Afghanistan added to NATO's burden and increased the challenge for political leaders recommending intervention in Libya. At various times throughout the conflict, coalition operations suffered from a lack of fighter and tanker aircraft, ISR and CAS capability, munitions, and personnel.⁸² UN Security Council Resolution 1973 also prevented exploitation of the land domain due to its prohibition against occupation by a foreign force.

The administration's approach in Libya, especially its decision to limit availability of means, reveals a lack of interest in decisive achievement of potential objectives. If they sought regime change, self-imposed restrictions on availability of US forces slowed its achievement. If the primary objective was population protection, the slow fight exposed civilians and combatants on both sides to increased risk. Finally, if the administration primarily sought to revitalize participation by other nations in NATO, investigation uncovered no evidence suggesting their limitations on the availability of US forces accomplished the goal.⁸³

81. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 134-36. The approach emphasized the primacy of the international coalition's caveats and restrictions over operational effectiveness. As an example, the Norwegian Air Force performed with distinction early in the campaign, but withdrew from the conflict for political reasons. Robert Gates criticized the inconsistent contributions of alliance partners on 10 June 2016. The defense secretary cited shortfalls in capability and political will that called into question NATO's ability to sustain an effective campaign in Libya.

82. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 110-22. Chivvis sites a mixture of obstacles to availability of forces, including technical, financial, and political limitations of coalition partners. As has often been the case in 21st-century conflicts, many considered ISR shortfalls the most critical due to the requirement for minimal collateral damage. Chivvis describes the operation's "unusually strict" limitations that drove significant requirements for collection platforms, specific munitions, and personnel trained to analyze available intelligence.

83. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 66. America's role in Libya operationalized the administration's intent to let other nation's lead international coalitions that included US forces.

Restrictions placed on the participation of US forces extended the conflict's duration and reduced the allies' influence over post-conflict developments.⁸⁴

After Conflict—Yes

Despite their perceived need for a quick intervention to prevent Qaddafi's threatened massacre, the administration did consider their desired outcome in Libya. Unfortunately, they lacked the control necessary to verify assumptions made about the distribution of power after the dictator's departure from power. Table 37 summarizes the administration's consideration of the conflict's outcomes and risks associated with their pursuit.



84. Kuperman, "Obama's Libya Debacle." Kuperman cites evidence suggesting the Qaddafi regime's anti-protest actions avoided targeting civilians and approached the point of culmination when the coalition intervened at Benghazi. The administration chose an even smaller commitment of forces than had their predecessors in Afghanistan. Air power once again proved effective at supporting a ground force's offensive (even an especially weak ground force with limited training, experience, resources, and common interests) against a stronger ground force, but the decision to limit forces available had broader consequences. The conflict's duration extended until indigenous forces developed greater capacity to conduct operations, and lack of control by Western ground forces after the regime's demise eventually accentuated societal fault lines. No longer unified by their opposition to Qaddafi, various tribes and sects competed for power and control. Civil war continues today, with the addition of multiple violent extremist organizations.

Table 37. After conflict

Have we critically considered the desired outcome and associated risks?*		<u>Y</u>
Desired Outcome	Status of opposition military force	N
	Status of opposition government	Y
	Status of opposition infrastructure and population	Y
	Position of friendly forces	Y
	Status of relations with coalition members	Y
	Terms of political settlement established	B
	Contingency planning capability established	B
Associated Risks	Mission	N
	Political	Y
	Economic	Y
	Long-term risk	N

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

Results of assessing associated indicators reveal mixed results, but problems in post-Qaddafi Libya stemmed less from the administration's failure to consider desired outcomes than from their underestimation of associated risks. Except for the status of the regime's military forces, they considered at least a portion of every indicator pointing to consideration of a desired outcome. They also considered portions of associated risks. Unfortunately, failure to mitigate risks associated with the expected transition of power to the NTC resulted in a power vacuum that eventually led to a failed state.

The return of US warplanes to Libya in 2016 reflects the conflict's disappointing results after Western leaders held out hope for positive

change resulting from the Arab Spring.⁸⁵ The administration interpreted the protests as a revolt against authoritarianism akin to America's own heritage, and vowed to support the movement.⁸⁶ Despite recent changes that had resulted in Libya's closer alignment with the West, the international community had long considered Qaddafi a pariah.⁸⁷ As protests spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa, advocates in the administration convinced the president of the importance of a timely intervention to prevent the regime from committing a massacre.⁸⁸

The coalition's theory of victory assumed Western presence had more potential to cause problems than solve them after the downfall of

85. Tomlinson and Associated Press, "Obama Approves 30-Day." In August 2016, President Obama authorized air strikes in Libya to combat Islamic State terrorist group fighters who established a presence in Libya after the fall of Qaddafi's regime. Since 2000, various factions of the group have killed more people in Libya than any other terrorist organization. See also Becker and Shane, "Hillary Clinton." Defense experts estimated the number of Islamic State militants in Libya between 5,000 and 6,500 in February 2016.

86. Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine." The president likened the protests to the Boston Tea Party and Rosa Parks' stand against discrimination. See also Ryan Lizza, "The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama's Foreign Policy," *The New Yorker*, 2 May 2011, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist>.

87. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 22-23. Qaddafi gave up his nuclear program in 2003. The US and Europe removed Libya from its list of state sponsors of terrorism in the same year. The US and Libya normalized diplomatic relations in 2009, and established bilateral agreements in 2009 and 2010. Despite the positive trajectory of Qaddafi's relationship with the West, the country remained at or near the bottom of worldwide rankings for democracy.

88. Lizza, "The Consequentialist." Lizza describes the influence of Samantha Power's advocacy of intervention to prevent mass atrocities similar to Rwanda's. He also describes the administration's debate over intervention in Libya as the first time Hillary Clinton broke from Robert Gates' position. See also Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 50-51. Chivvis describes Susan Rice's influential advocacy for intervention as US ambassador to the United Nations. See also Gates, *Duty: Memoirs Of*, 519. The president later described the decision to intervene as a 51-49 decision.

Qaddafi's regime.⁸⁹ The president wanted Qaddafi's regime removed from power, but did not want him removed by friendly ground forces. The administration emphasized precision strikes to avoid damage to infrastructure and local civilians. Arrival of the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the political face of the revolution convinced the administration of the potential for a post-conflict government.

President Obama and his team expected to work through the NTC to determine the political settlement after the conflict.⁹⁰ Obama's opaque announcement leaving unresolved the mechanism by which he expected Qaddafi removed from power did at least make clear a post-conflict requirement for a new government. At the operational level, it took a month after the conflict started to understand the extent to which the coalition could target the regime's forces.⁹¹ If the administration wanted the dictator out of power, their intentions regarding the regime's military

89. Lizza, "The Consequentialist." Instead of Powell's concern for minimizing the duration of conflict with overwhelming force, Obama desired nuanced and limited military force to assist the political movement in Libya.

90. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 32-33. Chivvis describes the West's rapid change from resisting intervention to advocating it (made possible, in part, by formation of the NTC). The NTC boasted a pro-Western perspective, and desired recognition as the rightful government of Libya. Western leaders saw promise for a post-Qaddafi political solution, but understood little of the complex relationship between the council and the rebels engaged in the fight against Qaddafi's forces. See also Becker and Shane, "Hillary Clinton." Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, considered by Robert Gates to have broken the administration's impasse as an advocate of intervention, believed western-educated NTC leaders' claims that they could bring democracy and representative government to Libya after Qaddafi's departure.

91. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 117. Military planners did not know how to interpret their mandate to protect the population. After they asked for clarification, NATO's political leaders agreed on 14 April 2011 that the coalition could target any of the regime's forces at any time and place as long as some portion of them threatened the population somewhere.

forces after the conflict remained unclear.⁹² The Obama administration kept relations with coalition members as the operation's top priority, and emphasized minimal destruction of infrastructure and non-combatants.⁹³

The coalition maintained a robust capability for contingency planning during the conflict, but not after Qaddafi's demise. The large number of nations, NATO's capacity for command and control, and a streamlined process for operational planning informed by previous interventions provided the coalition with flexibility during the conflict. As other crises demanded attention following Qaddafi's execution, effort previously dedicated to protecting Libya's civilians shifted to these other crises. The intervention resulting in Qaddafi's removal, then subsequent abandonment of responsibility for Libya's security, led to a failed state and the spread of international terrorist organizations. The promise of Libya's revolution met with the reality of violent extremist organizations, societal and regional fault lines, and weapons proliferation.

If the NTC had proven capable of controlling the country's various factions, operations in Libya may have instead represented a strategic victory for Western interests in North Africa. Lack of attention paid to mission risk erased the possibility of an effective and representative government liberating the Libyan people from Qaddafi's oppressive

92. Lack of a specific objective beyond protecting the population left unclear the intent of coalition operations against Qaddafi's forces. Military planners did not know if they should develop plans to defeat, destroy, neutralize, disarm, or coopt regime forces. After 14 April, planners knew they could target Qaddafi's military, but the question remained to what end.

93. Control measures included the prohibition against ground forces, use of duplicative US capabilities, and extensive restrictions against collateral damage made possible by modern ISR capabilities and precision weapons. The control measures placated concerns of tentative coalition members, but also restricted progress toward the conflict's conclusion.

regime.⁹⁴ Protection of the population justified the coalition's response, but failure to maintain security perhaps resulted in a worse fate.⁹⁵ The risks threatening security of the population extended far beyond Qaddafi's oppression.⁹⁶ Lack of governance further opened the country to exploitation by multiple violent extremist organizations threatening US objectives in other conflicts.⁹⁷

Post-conflict developments highlight the ineffectiveness of control measures emplaced by the coalition. President Obama's multiple demands for Qaddafi's departure, and coincident restriction preventing US forces from securing it, opened the coalition to risks associated with the rebels taking measures into their own hands. Qaddafi's summary execution, filmed and televised around the world, hardly represented the kind of democratic reform sought by the US and its allies.⁹⁸ Even Saddam Hussein stood trial for his crimes.

94. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 164. Chivvis details the decision to leave the responsibility for post-conflict security to the Libyans.

95. The administration chose a strategy to distinguish their actions from the mistakes predecessors had made in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ironically, they inadvertently committed the same, basic error. Lack of security after overthrowing regimes in all three nations led to catastrophe. Each conflict was unique, but the substantial investment of personnel and financial resources into countries with defeated regimes after World War II (Japan and Germany specifically) stand in stark contrast to post-conflict investment in the Middle East.

96. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 164.

97. State failure presented mission risk to Western objectives in Libya as well as objectives in the region (e.g. stability in Europe and other Middle Eastern nations) and in the broader fight against international terrorist organizations.

98. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 167-68. Chivvis describes the US role in Qaddafi's demise. See also Derek Chollet, Ben Fishman, and Alan J. Kuperman, "Who Lost Libya? Obama's Intervention in Retrospect," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2015,

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2015-04-20/who-lost-libya>. Alan Kuperman goes further than suggesting the administration failed to account for risks associated with allowing others to control Qaddafi's fate. He claims the administration engaged in the conflict under a false premise of protecting the population, intentionally exceeded

The administration focused more intently on aspects of political and economic risks, but also underestimated how an unsuccessful power transition could undermine results in both areas. They understood the potential for Qaddafi's heavy-handed response to undermine Europe's continued recovery from economic crisis—a recovery many believed that Obama required in order to win reelection.⁹⁹ They also made an effort to control costs to the US by emphasizing the role of other nations in operations, choosing not to send ground forces, and providing little assistance with post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization.¹⁰⁰

Attention paid to political and economic risk in the near term, however, ignored the intervention's long-term risks. Instead of protecting the population, removing Qaddafi from power resulted in massive carnage and a European migration crisis.¹⁰¹ President Obama considered the intervention a failure, but blamed it on a lack of responsibility for the outcome taken by European nations and Libya's internal dynamics.¹⁰² Beyond Libya's lack of effective governance and role in international terrorism, its use as a hub in the trafficking of humans has caused significant turmoil in Europe.¹⁰³

the international mandate for the intervention, and rejected multiple settlement offers from the regime leading to Qaddafi's summary execution. He offers Hillary Clinton's exclamation of joy at the US role in the dictator's death as evidence.

99. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 31. European leaders feared the deleterious economic effect of a massive migration from Libya across the Mediterranean Sea.

100. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 176-77. Chivvis described the relatively low cost of operations to the US. He labeled the conflict in Libya as a cheap intervention. In his conclusion, he argued the benefit of low-cost interventions for future US and Western uses of force.

101. Kuperman, "Obama's Libya Debacle." See also Pinotti, "Italy's Defense Minister."

102. Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine." Goldberg writes that the president privately refers to the intervention's results as a shit show of internal chaos and a haven for international terrorism.

103. Pinotti, "Italy's Defense Minister." Pinotti described the massive migration problem stemming from Libya, claiming the solution requires

The failed state did not result from lack of a desired outcome, but results did suffer from underestimation of risks associated with intervening. The administration made reasonable assumptions about the potential for the Arab Spring and the National Transitional Council to usher in a brighter future. However, lack of effective risk-mitigation measures associated with removing an authoritarian regime after 40 years in power allowed a fragile, post-conflict peace to devolve into civil war.¹⁰⁴ Libya's post-intervention reality highlights the true meaning of responsibility in the UN's purported responsibility to protect a state's population from its government.

War's Nature—No

The Powell Doctrine incorporates a sense of responsibility for protection by asking policy makers to consider the consequences of using force. Powell highlighted war's potential for death and destruction when he challenged decision makers to consider the long history of human conflict and the relatively common disparity between their predecessors' justification for starting a war and its conclusion.¹⁰⁵ In Libya, a coalition of nations chose intervention by force to protect the population from its government. Protection extended to elimination as opposition forces eventually executed Gadhafi. From a fractious civil war to the provision of sanctuary for violent extremist organizations, Libya's post-Gadhafi

an effective central government. Most believe the migration crisis, fed in part by Libya, played a key role in Britain's recent vote to secede from the European Union. Governments in other European countries face pressure to resolve the ongoing crisis as well.

104. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 185. Chivvis describes the lack of coalition coordination and consideration of risks evident in Libyan society. He concludes coalition members did too little too late to prevent the country from descending into chaos.

105. Consideration of the contrast led to Robert E. Lee's famous statement after Confederate forces repelled a Union charge during the Battle of Fredericksburg. He concluded that war's tragic reality is a good thing in that it prevents the more frequent choice for human conflict.

reality reveals that the threat to the population extended far beyond the dictator's demise.

Evaluation of indicators examining the administration's consideration of consequences associated with using force in Libya produced mixed results, but reveal that the administration discounted the conflict's potential to result in a less desirable outcome. They addressed physical losses, but neglected critical attributes of the relationship with Libya's population and the capacity to address unforeseen challenges. The primary evidence resulting in the overall tenet's negative assessment derives from the administration's lack of concern for the ability of other participants to elongate the conflict. Table 38 displays results of indicator and tenet analysis.

Table 38. War's nature

Have we assessed the consequences of using force?*	<u>N</u>
Uncertainty	B
Unforeseen challenges	B
Relationship with population	B
Physical losses	Y
Potential for escalation/elongation	N

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

The administration underestimated the potential for internal and external interest groups to shape the conflict's results. Within the administration, advocates of intervention emphasized their potential to

deliver justice on behalf of a defenseless population.¹⁰⁶ They initially assisted the rebels with mitigating the conflict's uncertainty, but discounted the effort's importance after Qaddafi's demise. Convinced of America's role as champion of the UN's responsibility to protect, they believed international unity reduced the potential for unforeseen challenges similar to those faced recently in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁰⁷

They lacked intimate understanding of the population and threats to its security, but results of indicator analysis produced mixed results overall. In addition to the administration's concern for minimizing collateral damage, their interactions with NTC representatives and interest in the responsibility to protect suggest they attempted to consider this indicator.¹⁰⁸ With better access to intelligence or additional time to pursue it, the administration could have more accurately assessed and addressed the multiple threats to security in Libya.

In the event, Qaddafi's demise represented less the end of responsibility to protect than it did the beginning. They remained committed to support for rebel forces until Qaddafi's demise on 20 October 2011, but then left the fractured society to provide its own

106. Dissenters highlighted numerous reasons to avoid conflict, including the potential for unintended consequences. Nevertheless, the president believed he could control the magnitude of unintended consequences by placing limits on the use of force. Nearly unanimous international condemnation of the regime and the threat of another Rwanda tipped the scales in favor of intervention. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 46-47. Chivvis describes six different arguments against entering into the conflict made by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as the administration considered its options. One of his points, informed by recent conflicts in the Middle East, highlighted the potential for a conflict in Libya to have unintended, complex consequences in the country and region making the situation less manageable.

107. The administration's majority convinced President Obama of the need for military force to prevent the Qaddafi regime's abuse of government power. Their rationale pitted Qaddafi's unjust intentions against their own concept of justice on behalf of Libya's population.

108. Notably, the coalition made a conscious decision to honor the NTC's request for no foreign ground forces after Qaddafi's demise.

security after a massive influx of weapons into the country during the conflict. Too little attention given to the NTC's legitimacy undermined the transition government's ability to maintain security. Furthermore, lack of functioning institutions meant the oppression of a dictator gave way to the tyranny of chaos and the expansion of terrorist organizations interested in filling the power vacuum with their own version of control.

Similarly, case-study evidence revealed mixed results regarding the administration's concern for consequences associated with uncertainty and unforeseen challenges. Lack of a ground force exacerbated the coalition's inability to assess conditions on the ground. Additionally, the administration's limitations on involvement of US forces intentionally reduced US influence. Still, US policy used ISR platforms and engagements with representatives of the rebel forces to mitigate uncertainty. Attention to the importance of political unity among coalition members also mitigated the potential for unforeseen challenges resulting from the conflict's unclear results over the five-month period preceding the fall of the capital in August 2011. The administration's efforts to mitigate uncertainty and unforeseen challenges once again dissipated after Qaddafi's demise.

Awareness of consequences associated with physical losses informed US policy throughout the duration of the conflict. The administration severely limited their assumed risk based in large part on a sense of pragmatism. They chose to intervene in Libya despite ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and a slow recovery from economic recession in Europe and the US. Exclusion of US ground forces and emphasis on coalition partners' responsibility to contribute limited the potential for physical losses. Additionally, the decision not to leave behind a peacekeeping force after the conflict represented an effort to reduce costs while avoiding political consequences resulting from

Western occupation of another Middle East country.¹⁰⁹ The administration's emphasis on limiting physical losses resulted in only one aircraft lost and no US casualties during the conflict.¹¹⁰

Constituency—No

The administration avoided repercussions of limited domestic support by reducing the potential for US casualties, emphasizing America's minor role supporting a broad-based international coalition, and curtailing expectations with opaque objectives. They did not choose their strategy based on domestic pressure for intervention. At best, the majority of the president's political party supported the use of force due to their general support for the administration's policies. Unlike the George H. W. Bush administration's approach in the Persian Gulf, the administration acted in Libya without lobbying the American people to support the effort. Table 39 describes results of assessing the administration's consideration of US public support for the use of force in Libya.

109. Shane and Becker, "New Libya." Shane and Becker describe the chaotic scene in post-conflict Libya, underscoring the lack of a plan for securing the population and the NTC's inability to fulfill its promised role due to its lack of control over the country's disparate factions.

110. One F-15E crashed after experiencing a malfunction, and the coalition recovered both aircrew members.

Table 39. Constituency

Do the American people support using force?*	<u>N</u>
Polling results	N
Congressional support	N
Public demonstrations	B
Public approval ratings	N

Source: Author's original work

*Results of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

The American public supported the Qaddafi regime no more than the rest of the international community. The dictator's long history of terrorism and human-rights abuses ensured the US suffered no delusions about the regime's nature. Qaddafi's recent efforts to align himself more closely with Western interests had done little to overcome suspicions of ulterior motives based on his interest in maintaining power. Still, his recent decision to abandon Libya's nuclear weapons program and establishment of diplomatic relations with the US provided little justification for regime change. The Arab Spring changed the administration's calculus because it suggested Libya's own population was willing to fight for reform—an ingredient missing from preceding US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Still, the president had campaigned on his plan to end US conflicts in the Middle East. The American public had struggled for a decade in Afghanistan with little to show for the effort. Polling conducted by the Pew Research Center shortly before the conflict began revealed less than one third of Americans supported military assistance for the rebels.¹¹¹

111. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 43.

Gallup Polling results at the beginning of the conflict revealed mixed results under the most optimistic interpretations, with 47 percent approving military actions against Libya, 37 percent disapproving, and 16 percent offering neither opinion.¹¹² Support dropped as the crisis continued, with the percentage of people approving and disapproving essentially swapping positions since the March 2011 poll.¹¹³

The administration also made little effort to secure support for intervention from the US Congress. President Obama did not request congressional authorization to use military force before intervening in Libya.¹¹⁴ On 15 June, the administration released a position paper expressing its belief that the nature of the hostilities did not require congressional authorization.¹¹⁵ On 24 June, the House of Representatives considered and voted down both a measure to authorize Libya operations and one to limit the administration's flexibility to use

112. Jeffrey M. Jones, "Americans Approve of Military Action against Libya," *Gallup, Inc.*, 22 March 2011, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/146738/americans-approve-military-action-against-libya.aspx>. Jones concludes Americans approved of military action despite 53 percent of Americans disapproving or claiming neither approval nor disapproval. Even Jones's optimistic interpretation includes the caveat that US support for military action in Libya was lower than it had been for other operations recently undertaken by preceding administrations.

113. Jones, "Americans Shift to More." In a 22 June 2011 poll, 39 percent of Americans approved of military actions against Libya, while 46 percent disapproved, and 15 percent offered neither opinion. Jones further describes how only democrats essentially maintained the same opinion on the matter in June as they had in March. Support among independents (those disapproving increased from 44 percent to 52 percent) and republicans dwindled substantially (those disapproving increased from 31 percent to 47 percent).

114. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 37-38. Senior congressmen on both sides of the aisle had lobbied for intervention before hostilities began, but the administration did not request congressional authorization for the use of American forces in Libya.

115. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 140-41.

force.¹¹⁶ Lack of a clear majority suggests the US Congress neither supported nor disapproved of the administration's decision to use force in Libya.¹¹⁷

Two more indicators highlight America's overall apathy regarding the use of force. First, domestic opinion did not result in large demonstrations for or against involvement despite months of fighting. Additionally, the president's approval ratings suggest results in Libya meant little to the American public. President Obama's approval ratings decreased slightly during the conflict, reaching a low point in October 2011, the same month Libya's rebel forces executed Qaddafi.¹¹⁸ The decrease in Obama's approval ratings is too slight to suggest overall discontent with the intervention in Libya, particularly considering the multitude of issues affecting public sentiment. More revealing of public apathy, however, is the lack of a bump in the president's ratings after the conflict.¹¹⁹ Compared with significant increases in approval ratings following the conflicts overseen by preceding administrations, the lack of improvement in Obama's ratings suggests Americans did not consider the intervention's results an important issue.

The administration neither enjoyed nor requested the support of the American public for its decision to intervene in Libya. Polling results directly addressing popular support and apathy demonstrated by Congress and the American public suggests little connection between

116. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 142.

117. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 143. Chivvis concludes the administration's initial lack of consultation with Congress unnecessarily politicized the use of force and made it more difficult to sustain support for the operation later in the conflict.

118. Jeffrey M. Jones, "Obama Job Approval Average Slides to New Low in 11th Quarter," *Gallup, Inc.*, 21 October 2011, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/150230/obama-job-approval-average-slides-new-low-11th-quarter.aspx>.

119. "Presidential Approval Ratings--Barack Obama," *Gallup, Inc.*, 7 August 2016, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/116479/barack-obama-presidential-job-approval.aspx>.

domestic opinion and the decision to use force. Counterfactual developments like significant US losses or a more direct connection between actions taken by the regime and US national security certainly had the potential to change public opinion. Instead, no US losses, a relatively cheap intervention, and lack of a perceived connection with national security insulated the administration's decision to intervene from the influence of public scrutiny.

Considering the Tenets

The rationale for conflict was different in Libya, but the characteristics of the intervention shared several similarities with the Bush administration's use of force in Afghanistan. Unlike the justification of responding to an attack on the US, supporters of intervention in Libya based their argument on the belief that nations have a moral responsibility to protect a population from its own government.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, both administrations relied heavily on air power, considered protection of the population paramount to success, and required a rapid deployment and execution timeline.¹²¹ Details of the respective operations differed, but both administrations emphasized their limitations on the use of force with a light footprint during the fight and the follow-on reconstruction.

Also similar to Afghanistan, the use of force in Libya did not conform to the requirements of the Powell Doctrine. Some constituencies

120. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 50-51. Susan Rice felt personal responsibility for the Clinton administration's decision not to stop the massacre in Rwanda and advocated for the UN's decision to adopt its Responsibility to Protect doctrine. In 2003, Samantha Rice won a Pulitzer Prize for a book on genocide. She was a staunch supporter of intervening with force to prevent another massacre in Libya.

121. Whereas George W. Bush considered a rapid retaliation crucial to defending the nation from another attack, supporters of intervention in the Obama administration believed they had little time before Qaddafi began his extermination in Benghazi.

considered achieving a political objective important in Libya, but the administration failed to articulate clearly their objective for the use of force.¹²² President Obama implemented extensive measures specifically designed to prevent decisive achievement of the objective. Lack of concern for the ability of other actors to prolong or escalate the conflict revealed a coincident lack of appreciation for the nature of human conflict. Finally, the administration neither requested nor received domestic approval for intervention, choosing instead a course unlikely to endure public scrutiny.

Pre-conflict promises of a limited conflict required to uphold international standards of justice appeared much different in hindsight than they did before the fight began. Moral concerns for protection from an abuse of power led to the use of force in February 2011, but the conflict paved the way for a summary execution, devastating civil war, European migration crisis, and expanded terrorist operations.¹²³ NATO and its coalition partners produced an operational victory over the Qaddafi regime, but President Obama admits to the mission's disastrous results that unfolded in the subsequent months and years post conflict.¹²⁴

122. Considering the direct role played by US forces in Qaddafi's capture, and the dictator's televised murder shortly thereafter, the justification for conflict provided by UN Security Council Resolution clearly had little to do with NATO operations months after pushing the regime's forces back from Benghazi. The decision to stop the operation less than two weeks later Qaddafi's death, and Secretary Clinton's public exclamation of joy that he had died, made clear the purpose for using force.

123. Kuperman, "Obama's Libya Debacle." Kuperman describes in detail a multitude of indicators suggesting the Libyans plight has worsened since Qaddafi's demise.

124. The president blames the failure on multiple causes, but privately refers to results of the mission in Libya as a "shit show." Quoted in Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine." His decision not to enforce a red line he established in Syria over the use of chemical weapons in 2013 reveals how his skepticism about uses of force has only grown after the Libya experience.

Typology

The administration chose an approach inconsistent with the Powell Doctrine's requirements. The following section examines influences on President Obama's choice of strategy, specifically focusing on the principal military advisor's relative influence. Specifically, this portion considers the administration's standing guidance, consistency of CJCS advice with the Powell Doctrine, and relative influence of other advisors. After analyzing these independent variables, consideration of influences also examines the role played by competing alternatives and domestic pressure as intervening variables with the potential to affect the administration's choice of strategy.

Standing Guidance—Coded A

Table 40. Variable coding: Standing Guidance

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Consistent with standing guidance	G
Ambiguous, or inconsistent with guidance	A

Source: Author's original work

The rapidly developing situation in Libya forced a quick decision on strategy precisely because it did not fit neatly into a response plan already considered or approved by the administration. Unlike application of the Carter Doctrine in the Persian Gulf, the Obama administration had no preconceived course of action. Instead, advocates for using force relied on their perspective on *jus ad bellum*, believing the UN's doctrine claiming the responsibility to protect, and the participation of numerous

nations within a broad coalition, provided a solid foundation for the decision to use force.¹²⁵

The administration had already endorsed both ideas in their 2010 National Security Strategy. President Obama's initial NSS emphasized the first-order importance of multilateralism and deference to internationally accepted norms throughout the document.¹²⁶ Additionally, the administration specifically endorsed the UN's assumption of a responsibility to protect.¹²⁷ The document also described

125. Damon Linker, "Will Pope Francis Dump the Just War Doctrine?," *TheWeek.com*, 19 April 2016, <http://theweek.com/articles/619107/pope-francis-dump-just-war-doctrine>. Linker suggests that rather than acting as a restraint on the use of force, Just War theory has instead accelerated government decisions to start conflicts.

126. President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010, 7, 17. The document specifically listed respect for universal values and stronger cooperation with other nations as two of four enduring national interests. The administration added these interests to a list of four, co-equal interests including US security and US economic prosperity. The president has consistently described his adherence to the notion that multilateralism provides greater legitimacy for US actions. In a 2016 interview, Obama explained, "one of the reasons I am so focused on taking action multilaterally where our direct interests are not at stake is that multilateralism regulates hubris." Quoted in Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine."

127. In a section addressing cooperation on global challenges, the administration states, "the United States and all member states of the U.N. have endorsed the concept of the 'Responsibility to Protect.' In so doing, we have recognized that the primary responsibility for preventing genocide and mass atrocity rests with sovereign governments, but that this responsibility passes to the broader international community when sovereign governments themselves commit genocide or mass atrocities, or when they prove unable or unwilling to take necessary action to prevent or respond to such crimes inside their borders. The United States is committed to working with our allies, and to strengthening our own internal capabilities, in order to ensure that the United States and the international community are proactively engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities and genocide." President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010, 48.

the intention to use force in order to address humanitarian crises.¹²⁸ Despite the connection of these philosophical ideas with events in Libya, the NSS provided little detail on how to apply them.

Similarly, other strategy documents provided little guidance on which to base a decision for intervention. The 2008 NDS emphasized integrating within the broader framework of the international political system and deterring conflict, but not regime change or defense of a population from its national government.¹²⁹ The secretary's 105-page Quadrennial Defense Review Report in 2010 likewise omitted any mention of the kind of mission conducted in Libya one year later.¹³⁰ The chairman's 2011 NMS, published weeks before the outbreak of violent protests in Libya, did not highlight Libya or a US military role in preventing national-government oppression.¹³¹

128. President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, May 2010, 22. The document's excerpt on using force reflected the same ideas spelled out in the NSS's of previous administrations. Of note, the administration emphasized using force as a last resort, calculating risks and costs, considering intended and unintended consequences, and working within international coalitions to the maximum extent possible while reserving the right to act unilaterally.

129. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, June 2008. The strategy described tailored approaches to deter specific actors in their specific situations, and highlighted the importance of nesting military actions within a broader strategy to prevent other governments from resorting to hostile acts.

130. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2010, 15. The report highlighted eight different missions for which to prepare US forces: 1. Defeating Al Qaeda and its allies, 2. Supporting responses to US disasters, 3. Defeating inter-state aggression, 4. Addressing weapons of mass destruction, 5. Assisting fragile states threatened by terrorists or insurgents, 6. Protecting US citizens, 7. Cyberspace operations, and 8. Preventing human suffering after a mass atrocity or natural disaster. None described a mission to prevent other governments from committing mass atrocities, or to remove a state's government from power.

131. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2011: Redefining America's Military Leadership*, 8 February 2011, 4, 11. In a section specifically addressing

Chairman's Advice—Coded D

Table 41. Variable coding: Chairman's Advice

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Consistent with four or more Powell Doctrine tenets	P
Different than two or more Powell Doctrine tenets	D

Source: Author's original work

Without standing guidance in US policy, the administration based its decision to use force on a nascent assessment of the situation on the ground and an application of preventive war intended to operationalize the responsibility to protect. President Obama met with his advisors multiple times to consider options, taking an active role in leading the discussion.¹³² He pushed for a more robust use of military force when initially presented with options to address the crisis.¹³³ The president eventually made the decision to intervene contingent on a stronger UN resolution—a resolution considered likely to pass.¹³⁴ The president

Africa, the strategy described a broader effort to reduce threats to civilians from non-state actors, but made no mention of a mission related to the responsibility to protect or the removal of a regime from power. The strategy listed four objectives: countering violent extremism, deterring and defeating aggression, strengthening international and regional security, and shaping the future. The strategy explained defeating aggression, the objective most closely related to operations conducted in Libya, little further than providing a broad description of the military's role in providing advice to policy makers considering the use of force.

132. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 57. Chivvis describes the president's active role in keeping the topic on his agenda, pushing for more information, placing Samantha Power in a key advisory position, and including the option of military force in deliberations.

133. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 58-59.

134. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 59.

believed international action required, and that coordinating it required US leadership.¹³⁵

President Obama chose military intervention despite DOD opposition, including CJCS Mullen's recommendation to avoid using force. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made multiple public and private statements that clearly articulated his opposition to a US intervention.¹³⁶ Gates, near the end of his term and frustrated with his exclusion from White House discussions about military options, verbally restricted his department from answering questions on the topic from the president's staff.¹³⁷ CJCS Mullen also advised against using force throughout the administration's deliberations, including a final up-or-

135. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs Of*, 518. Gates suggests a combination of Qaddafi's threats, the Arab League's support for intervention, and the pressure from traditional allies in Europe for NATO to act pushed the president to choose his course of action.

136. Chivvis, *Toppling Qaddafi*, 18. In late February, Gates told his audience at West Point that the idea of a US defense secretary recommending use of another US land force in the Middle East or Africa sounded to him like lunacy. See also Gates, *Duty: Memoirs Of*, 512. As Gates attending meetings considering options in Libya, he attempted to put recommendations for intervention in context by suggesting he oversee completion of the ongoing wars in the Middle East before starting another one. See also David Martin, "Gates: Libyans No-Fly Zone Means Attacking Libya," *CBS News*, 2 March 2011, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/gates-libyan-no-fly-zone-means-attacking-libya/>. Gates attempted to convince Congress of the ill-advised idea of a no-fly zone over Libya by describing associated and significant requirements, the reality of a no-fly zone as an act of war, and the question of what a no-fly zone could accomplish.

137. With comments analogous to Colin Powell's expressions of frustration with Madeleine Albright, Gates described his exasperation with advisors in the White House. According to the defense secretary, "I had four months left to serve, and I was running out of patience on multiple fronts, but most of all with people blithely talking about the use of military force as though it were some kind of video game." Gates, *Duty: Memoirs Of*, 512, 15.

down vote by the president's advisors during a principals meeting on 17 March.¹³⁸

Discerning consistency of the chairman's advice with the Powell Doctrine is more challenging in the Libya case for several reasons. First, Admiral Mullen has not published a first-hand account describing his advice, his representation of the positions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or his opportunities to engage directly with the president on the topic.¹³⁹ Second, neither the president nor his key advisors have written detailed explanations of the professional officer corps' advice on the matter or the president's consideration of it.¹⁴⁰ Finally, Robert Gates published a memoir describing his perception of the event, but his leadership style makes unlikely the possibility that Mullen simply offered an opinion given to him by the secretary of defense. Despite research limitations primarily caused by the lack of time's passage, myriad evidence suggests the unlikelihood that the chairman advised the president based on Powell Doctrine tenets.

President Obama did not consider the CJCS his principal advisor when considering the decision to use force in Libya. The president considered Mullen part of the establishment he believed responsible for previous errors in foreign policy.¹⁴¹ Additionally, the lengthy review of US

138. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs Of*, 511-18. Gates described Mullen's advice as coincident with his own. The CJCS urged against using military force in advisory meetings with the president and during congressional testimony before the operation began.

139. His account of events leading to the intervention in Libya may eventually emerge, but its absence at the time of this writing stands in contrast to available accounts from previous chairmen that informed the preceding cases.

140. Contributing factors include the fact that the operation took place only five years ago, President Obama recently completed his second term, and the situation on the ground in Libya remains dismal.

141. Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine." President Obama believed the Pentagon had attempted to force his hand during the Afghanistan strategy review.

policy in Afghanistan had brought to the fore additional tension between the president and the CJCS that further reinforced Mullen's status as an administration outsider. Finally, Mullen's confirmation hearing little more than a year before the Libya debate had hardened the administration's perception of Mullen as a potential liability.

Mullen had also gone on record questioning the administration's justification for entering the conflict. During congressional testimony on 2 March 2010, he and Secretary Gates stated they had no reason to believe Qaddafi had used air power to fire on protestors.¹⁴² The statements made clear that intervening on humanitarian grounds meant the presumption of consistency between Qaddafi's words and his actions. Obama disagreed with the chairman about the use of force in Libya, and remained suspicious of opinions offered by anyone in the establishment.

Even if Obama had offered Mullen the opportunity to provide advice outside of group discussions, other statements made by the chairman suggest he did not subscribe to the Powell Doctrine's tenets. Mullen described his perspective on the use of force during a speech at Kansas State University in March 2010. Specifically addressing operations in Afghanistan, the chairman advocated against Powell's prescription for using force as a last resort and overwhelming force to achieve the objective decisively.¹⁴³ Mullen may have had several reasons

142. Gates, *Duty: Memoirs Of*, 512-13. Both men also described reasons they disagreed with implementation of a no-fly zone over Libya during a press conference the day prior.

143. Mullen reinforced the foundation of General McChrystal's strategy in Afghanistan by highlighting three principles guiding the use of force: 1. "military power should not—maybe cannot—be the last resort of the state," 2. "force should be applied in a precise and principled way," and 3. "policy and strategy should constantly struggle with one another." Adm Michael Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Landon Lecture Series," (Address., Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, 3 March 2010). Regarding his second principle, Mullen distanced himself from the concept of overwhelming force to emphasize the importance of using the proper force in a manner that protects the population from its negative

for disagreeing with the notion of a military intervention, but his public statements underscore the unlikelihood those reasons derived from his concern for Powell Doctrine tenets.

Relative Advisor Influence—Coded I

Table 42. Variable coding: Relative Advisor Influence

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Disproportionately influential	I
Unremarkable, relative influence	U

Source: Author's original work

The president's dismissal of the chairman's opinion on an intervention in Libya reflected a skeptical view of the book answer that had only grown since his inauguration.¹⁴⁴ He had spent his first months in office distancing himself from those who wanted a deeper commitment to Iraq's security.¹⁴⁵ He also emerged from the Afghanistan strategy review feeling as though the establishment advice he had received left him with few real choices. Libya provided the president his first opportunity to establish his own policy in the face of a security dilemma.

effects. Along the lines of Eliot Cohen's theory, the chairman's third principle highlights the importance of an iterative discussion between policy-makers and military strategists that seeks continuing advantage instead of rigidly adhering to a strategy that promises a decisive victory.

144. Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine." Obama spoke at length of his frustration with the US foreign-policy establishment during his interview with Goldberg. He specifically described the existence of a Washington playbook they expected him to follow when addressing crises, and his lack of confidence in its usefulness in situations where America's vital national interests are not threatened.

145. Obama decided not to push for a bilateral security agreement with Iraq despite the objection of many advisors. He also spent several months convincing the DOD that he fully intended to reduce the number of US combat forces in Iraq to zero by his established deadline.

He considered the decision a difficult choice, but intentionally diminished the DOD's influence and proved attentive to the advice of less senior advisors. Secretary Clinton's last-minute support put the decision for intervention over the top.

Obama agreed with the supporters of intervention inside his administration, but several other influences shaped his choice of strategy. British, French, and Arab League support for military action stimulated the president's intrinsic interest in multilateralism. Senior legislators also pressed the president to take action. Qaddafi's rapid advance against the rebels also placed the president in a position where he had little time and little information to make a decision. Dr. Jibril had convinced Secretary Clinton of the NTC's intentions and capability, but a dearth of verifiable intelligence on the ground prevented the administration from knowing either with certainty.¹⁴⁶

Intervening Variables: Coded C and N

Table 43. Variable coding: Competing Alternatives

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
Two or more available and feasible	C
Either one or zero alternatives	S

Source: Author's original work

146. After Qaddafi gave up his nuclear program in 2003, the Bush administration shifted US intelligence collection to higher priorities in the Middle East. The lack of attention on Libya continued during the Obama administration.

Table 44. Variable coding: Domestic Pressure

<i>If assessed</i>	<i>Then Coded</i>
High pressure for US military intervention	H
Neutral or low pressure for US military intervention	N

Source: Author's original work

Despite the lack of information, advisors provided the president with multiple options from which to choose a course of action. Unlike feeling cornered as he had in previous deliberations on foreign policy, the president chose forums, advisors, and principles that allowed him to investigate the arguments and determine his own course. When presented with options he believed incapable of causing the desired effect, he personally disapproved them and requested a more robust use of force. In Libya, he pursued a course governed by his primary considerations: protection of the population, instigation of a multilateral effort, and lack of sole or even primary responsibility for the outcome.

Similarly, the president did not choose to intervene in Libya because of domestic pressure demanding US involvement. He freely admitted that the crisis did not directly threaten the country's national-security interests. Common wisdom at the time suggested the country's overall mood was war-weariness after a decade spent struggling to see progress in two other Middle East countries. Additionally, the short timeline from the beginning of the crisis on 17 February and the beginning of Operation Odyssey Dawn on 7 March left the public with little time to gather facts and offer an informed opinion. The administration, pressed for time, made little effort to raise public awareness of the situation before deciding to use force.

Conclusions

Military intervention in Libya represented a departure from the administration's overall goal to decrease the focus of US foreign policy on the Middle East.¹⁴⁷ President Obama noted resistance from the national security establishment, but elected to invoke the responsibility-to-protect doctrine recently adopted by the United Nations. The doctrine allowed for the possibility of international intervention in sovereign states to prevent a crime against humanity, but offered little guidance on how to adjudicate a situation's potential. It also omitted the consideration of use-of-force principles useful for guiding the actions of nations who intervene.

Since 2011, US involvement in the Middle East has grown while the president has become less likely to entertain recommendations for military intervention in other areas.¹⁴⁸ The plan to leave Iraq and Afghanistan has morphed into a much different reality as the unpredicted Arab Spring and rapid growth of the Islamic State terrorist organization commanded attention.¹⁴⁹ Ongoing security challenges and the desire to avoid another failed state have thwarted the administration's attempt to remove US forces from Afghanistan. The Libya case once again demonstrates challenges associated with obtaining

147. Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine." Goldberg describes the president's experience in Libya as the turning point that soured his perspective on the potential for progress in the Middle East.

148. Betz, *Carnage and Connectivity*, 89. At a December 2015 National Security Council meeting, the president announced a restriction against any proposals for military action that did not originate from the defense secretary.

149. Goldberg describes the contrast between Obama's skepticism about the use of force with his demonstrated willingness to use it. "This is one of the larger ironies of the Obama presidency: He has relentlessly questioned the efficacy of force, but he has also become the most successful terrorist-hunter in the history of the presidency, one who will hand to his successor a set of tools an accomplished assassin would envy." Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine."

strategic benefit from a use of force despite clear advantages in every aspect of the operation.

The president's decision to apply the responsibility to protect in Libya forced the administration to consider pragmatic questions about how to do so based solely on their limited knowledge of the situation. They had no standing guidance or available plan to guide their decisions. Other advisors proved more influential than the president's principal military advisor. CJCS Mullen offered his disapproval of establishing a no-fly zone publicly, but his lack of influence in the administration rendered unlikely the possibility that he might use Powell Doctrine tenets to defend his position. President Obama and vocal supporters of intervention within his administration opted to use force despite availability of myriad alternatives and lack of public outcry for action. Table 45 displays the combination of variables resulting in the decision to use force.




Table 45. Coding Libya variables

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Assigned code</i>			
	<u>P</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>L</u>
US military force used? ^y	M	M	M	M
Consistent with guidance? ^a	G	G	A	A
Chairman's advice ^b	P	D	D	D
Relative advisor influence ^c	I	I	I	I
Competing alternatives ^{x1}	C	C	C	C
Domestic pressure ^{x2}	N	N	N	N

Source: Author's original work

^y M = military force used; O = other option(s) selected instead of military

^a G = consistent with standing guidance; A = ambiguous or inconsistent

^b P = consistent with four or more Powell Doctrine tenets;

D = advice differs from two or more Powell Doctrine tenets

^c I = disproportionately influential; U = unremarkable, relative influence

^{x1} C = two or more available and feasible; S = single alternative or none

^{x2} H = high; N = neutral or low (public support for military intervention)

The choice for intervention in Libya once again represents the typology A + D + I = M, where intervening variables *x1* and *x2* (coded C and N respectively) did not affect the outcome. Despite significant changes in personalities, political parties, and public mood, the typology matches that observed in the preceding case study. Instead of the secretary of defense minimizing the influence of the CJCS, the president himself chose a course of action inconsistent with the opinion of his principal military advisor.

Post-conflict results in Afghanistan and Libya also bear significant resemblance despite differences in approach. Both countries struggle with security concerns as rival tribes, ethnic groups, and religious perspectives undermine the development of unified principles required for an effective central government. Immature institutions increase the burden on the entire system, and violent extremists exploit societal fault

lines and ungoverned spaces in pursuit of their broader objectives. Both the light footprint of Western forces used in post-conflict Afghanistan and the non-existent footprint used in Libya produced disappointing results: insurgency in the former, and civil war in the latter. US forces continue to conduct counter-terrorism missions in both countries. The following chapter uses these results, and those of the typologies associated with each case study, to examine the evolution of America's use-of-force doctrine since the end of the Cold War.



Chapter 8

Deciding to Use Force

There are problems in this world that we will not be able to solve, depths into which it will not be useful or effective for us to plunge, dilemmas in other regions of the globe that will have to find their solution without our involvement.

-George Kennan
American Diplomacy

The professional officer corps' primary responsibility is managing the military instrument of power to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. Its operational effectiveness notwithstanding, military power's value to the republic stems from its ability to deliver strategic benefits.¹ Instead of obvious benefits, post-Cold War military offensives have produced costly commitments of US resources in other regions.² Furthermore, the targets of these operations pose a negligible threat to the nation, while greater challenges remain unscathed.³ This study examines America's process for assigning military force to foreign-

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1. In the post-Cold War era, the US military has demonstrated remarkable efficiency defeating hostile forces and removing other nations' governments from power. Despite clear and successful results on the battlefield, assessing strategic results is more difficult. Did toppling Saddam Hussein remove an existential threat and preserve the nation's access to oil, or did it motivate terrorists and encourage Iran's belligerence? Did removing Milosevic's army prevent human atrocities or place the US on the side of extremists responsible for them? If these operations produced both results, did winning the fight produce a strategic benefit? If so, was it worth the cost?
 2. For example, American forces still assist with peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and continue to struggle against the Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan, yet neither issue directly affects US national security.
 3. Examples of greater challenges include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the state sponsors responsible for funding these threats.

policy dilemmas. In particular, it considers whether military advice informs policy maker choice in these dilemmas.

Case-study evidence suggests it does not. First, presidents have demonstrated little interest in the professional advice of the CJCS when considering a decision to use force. More broadly, administrations have established a record of overcoming or ignoring resistance to their intended uses of force whether it comes from the professional officer corps, Congress, or the American public. Second, administrations do not reference an established set of principles designed to ensure a prospective use of force produces a strategic benefit for the nation.⁴ Instead, a familiar heuristic from a bygone era guides the decision.⁵

In the post-Cold War era, the executive branch effectively declares war on behalf of the American people and in lieu of the Senate.

4. This finding is of course less significant if presidents used force to defend American people or territory from an attack. Of the four cases examined, none resulted from such a requirement. Post-Cold War administrations instead used military force to pursue a foreign-policy objective; in each case, they used it with an eye toward overthrowing another nation's government. The closest example to a use of force for national defense is Operation Enduring Freedom. Even in this case, the attacker better resembled an international criminal element than it did a military opponent. The Bush administration described the operation's purpose to defend against an attack on the nation. See chapter six of this study for a description of the choice to prioritize the use of military force for overthrowing the Taliban government rather than destroying or defeating al Qaeda. US forces remain engaged in conflict in Afghanistan 16 years later despite the fact that the nation of Afghanistan did not attack America.

5. Following the World War II paradigm, administrations assert their responsibility to defeat an opposing state's government abroad to stop its unacceptable behavior and prevent it from metastasizing into a greater threat to America's national security. Unlike Congress's declaration of war following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, administrations substitute other causes to justify offensives. Reasons for using force in the examined cases included repelling an invasion of a different state, stopping ethnic violence, eradicating terrorism, and preventing human-rights abuses. See chapters four through seven for detailed explanations of each decision.

Presidents use force to remove the governments of other nations from power. US offensives do not result from an attack on the US, but instead the executive's interest in achieving a foreign-policy objective.⁶ Resultant military operations consistently achieve their operational objectives, but also produce undesirable and unpredicted consequences.

Administrations' lack of interest in the professional officer corps' advice is likely to persist for three reasons.⁷ First, US policy does not describe a role or requirement for military advice to influence the decision-making process. Second, civil-military relations theory and precedent discourage the professional officer corps' participation in the decision. Finally, Congress does not provide an effective check on the executive's power over matters of national strategy. This study demonstrates the result of these factors and highlights opportunities for change.

How Use-of-Force Decisions Get Made

Examination of the decision-making process considered the influence of standing guidance, CJCS advice, and other advisors' recommendations. Case-study analysis also used the Powell Doctrine as a standard to examine the influence of established principles on the use of force. Furthermore, the study's two intervening variables (available alternatives and domestic pressure for action) controlled for external influences with the potential to limit a president's freedom to choose.

6. This is true even of the Afghanistan case, where the military focused on removing the Taliban even when doing so diminished their ability to kill or capture the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 plot.

7. All three reasons assume the nation maintains a significant advantage over its opponents in military size, spending, technology, training, and research. Even if an adversary developed roughly equivalent economic power, it would require decades to develop the force structure, equipment, and training required to compete with US conventional forces. America's nuclear deterrent further reduces a prospective enemy's interest in testing US military strength with a conventional attack.

Results show that neither the intervening variables nor standing guidance affected decisions to use force. Often, presidents did not arrive at the decision to use force because the nation demanded it. Similarly, their decisions did not result from an imminent threat to the republic that left them with no other choice than a military response. Additionally, presidents elected to use force regardless of the availability or contents of standing guidance related to their foreign-policy dilemmas.⁸

Evidence reveals two, primary conclusions with the potential to inform policy development. First, in the post-Cold War time period, military advice has not influenced America's decisions to use force. Second, post-Cold War uses of force have not conformed to an established set of principles intended to produce strategic benefits for the nation.

Military Advice does not Influence Decisions to Use Force

The study's results show that presidents do not seek professional advice at precisely the moment one expects it to matter most.⁹ Perhaps no case better exemplifies this point than the subjugation of the officer corps' voice during planning and execution of operations in Afghanistan.

8. George H. W. Bush considered recently updated guidance describing US interests in the Persian Gulf region with precedent dating back to the Carter administration. Bill Clinton chose to attack the Serbs after nearly eight years in office spent considering the problem and a previous military intervention in Bosnia. Availability of standing guidance did not influence either president's decision to use force. Conversely, absence of preceding guidance played no discernable role in the decisions to invade Afghanistan and Libya.

9. Beyond the lack of influence exerted by chairmen, the Kosovo and Libya cases suggest positional power matters less than the power of an established relationship with the president. In these cases, the defense secretary joined the CJCS in disagreement with the decision to use force, but others in the administration with a closer relationship to the president exerted more influence. Similarly, both Bush administrations demonstrated the significance of a pre-existing relationship with the president.

Ten years later, Defense Secretary Gates amplified Chairman Mullen's hesitance to use force in Libya. The argument once again proved unpersuasive.

The chairman's advice did not affect decisions to use force in any case, regardless of its consistency with the Powell Doctrine.¹⁰ To the contrary, President Clinton's replacement of Colin Powell with someone more sympathetic to his foreign policy underscores an executive's ability to shape outcomes by exercising control over who advises. In cases where presidents differentiated between advice provided by military and civilian advisors, they did so for the explicit purpose of disagreeing with the chairman's recommendation or disregarding it altogether.¹¹ Whether administrations marginalized, replaced, or disregarded the chairman's advice, the nation's principal military advisor did not influence their decision-making process.

Instead, in every case, one or more civilian advisors exerted the most influence.¹² These advisors used their positions to advocate for the

10. This discovery highlights a requirement to consider application of Cohen's unequal dialogue. Whereas Cohen examined the civil-military relationship during active wars, case-study evidence underscores the need to consider the value and application of professional military advice when the nation is not at war.

11. George H. W. Bush made clear that he intended to start the offensive in Kuwait despite Powell's argument that alternative methods needed more time to succeed. The Clinton administration spent years overcoming Powell's stubborn resistance to using force in the Balkans, and Bill Clinton did not seek General Shelton's advice regarding the merits of engaging in human conflict. George W. Bush wanted a military response before ever discussing the idea with General Myers. Donald Rumsfeld's grip on influence in the Bush administration further diminished the ability of the CJCS to provide independent advice. Finally, Barrack Obama disregarded the advice of Admiral Mullen when he decided to invade Libya.

12. Brent Scowcroft used his influence as Bush's close friend to escalate the president's anti-Saddam rhetoric and lobby for using force to remove the regime from power. Madeleine Albright's personal experience with government abuses of power motivated her to pressure the Clinton administration for intervention in Kosovo with persistence and passion.

use of force. In each case, the president previously appointed the advocate to an advisory post.¹³ In the last three cases examined, the most influential advisor had no record of military service.

Presidents Subjectively Assess the Suitability of Force

Results also demonstrated administrations' lack of regard for use-of-force principles. When they elect to use force, case-study results reveal that presidents use it in a manner inconsistent with the Powell Doctrine's tenets.¹⁴ In addition to administrations' indifference with regard to Powell's principles, analysis offered little evidence of agreement on a suitable substitute. In particular, the lack of concern for consequences and risks associated with using force reveals a failure to account for unique attributes of the military instrument.¹⁵ Resultant

Donald Rumsfeld exploited his close relationship with Dick Cheney to use Afghanistan as a proving ground for his previously unpopular efforts at defense reform. Samantha Power used President Obama's interest in her expertise on genocide to push for the intervention in Libya.

13. Of note, only one of the four advocates for using force had previously served in the military. Brent Scowcroft retired from military service at the rank of lieutenant general.

14. The coalition offensive conducted to expel Iraq's military from Kuwait in 1991 demonstrated a use of force consistent with three of five tenets. Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barrack Obama subsequently used military force in a manner even less consistent with Powell's provisions. In each case, administration advocates invoked unique and subjective criteria to justify the use of force. Three of four case studies demonstrated evidence of interest in securing domestic support from the American people. Two administrations also set important and clear political objectives. Only one case demonstrated critical consideration of the conflict's outcome, and none after the Gulf War revealed an attempt to achieve the objective decisively. Finally, the study revealed an overall lack of concern for consequences associated with the use of force.

15. As highlighted earlier, this point does not rest on any assumption that an administration discounted the importance of their analysis or intended anything but the best possible outcome. Instead, it reflects a fundamental lack of appreciation for strategy and the rigor required to develop it. Of the four cases, only the Libya case included compelling evidence of consideration for achievement of a broader objective. No

gaps in problem framing highlight inconsistency not only with the Powell Doctrine, but also with any replacement for it.

Powell considered his questions for policy makers necessary but insufficient to determine the suitability of military force to a foreign-policy challenge. He fully expected the commander in chief to make the final decision, but advocated for his tenets to ensure consideration of first-order concerns.¹⁶ Examined cases suggest post-Cold War presidents consider neither use-of-force principles nor the chairman's advice necessary, much less sufficient, to inform use-of-force decisions.

The Executive Branch Declares Wars

Results of the study also provide insight into the execution of war powers in the post-Cold War era. The Constitution's division of power remains unchanged, but the executive branch's interpretation of its authority has evolved.¹⁷ Cases examined in this study show that

cases contained evidence of concern over negative consequences associated with uses of force. George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton used some version of a Hitler analogy to justify their operations, and Barrack Obama similarly viewed his decision as the right thing to do based on Qaddafi's potential to abuse power. George W. Bush initially tied his operation to a broader counter-terrorism objective, but lost sight of the connection as the conflict unfolded. Each could have benefited from the connective tissue offered by a use-of-force doctrine linking their choice for a military operation with their broader policy objectives.

16. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 25 March 2013, ix, 37. Powell's concept for the role of his questions stemmed from doctrine's role in military operations. According to the joint force's capstone planning document, "the purpose of joint doctrine is to enhance the operational effectiveness of joint forces by providing fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces toward a common objective," and "these fundamental principles represent what is taught, believed, and advocated as what works best to achieve national objectives." Powell developed his questions for policy makers to enhance strategic effectiveness.

17. For instance, the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads meant the potential for America's nuclear annihilation

presidents exercise remarkable flexibility over decisions to send the all-volunteer force into conflict.¹⁸ The legislative branch is still responsible for declaring war, but exerts substantially less influence over decisions to use military force than that wielded by the president's inner circle. With the exception of the Afghanistan case study, Congress better resembled a hesitant or neutral third party than a vested authority on use-of-force decisions.¹⁹

Congress attempted to assert its authority over decisions to use force in the War Powers Resolution of 1973, but case-study evidence reveals the legislation's ineffectiveness.²⁰ Post-Cold War administrations

well before Congress could adjudicate the merits of declaring war on the attacker. Presidents, in their role as commander in chief, assumed responsibility for making split-second decisions deemed necessary to preserve the republic. None of the examined cases included an opponent requiring an immediate response to defend US personnel or territory.

18. Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine." This is not to say presidents make decisions in a vacuum. Barrack Obama spoke of the establishment's extraordinary influence as he considered using force in Syria. As described in chapter two, an enormous national-security apparatus with institutional interests tied directly to the application of military force continuously exerts pressure on actors and shapes interpretation of world events. Using a court-of-law analogy wherein proponents for using force represent the prosecution and those opposed represent the defense, the former is a well-funded team of litigators representing multiple US organizations invested in taking action while the defense must necessarily argue that other means can resolve the matter. This exact analogy played itself out during the Clinton administration's consideration of a way forward in Kosovo. Leading the prosecution, Secretary of State Albright questioned the intrinsic purpose of a US military unless it is engaged in conflict. Colin Powell vehemently disagreed but could offer no viable alternatives to resolve the ethnic violence.

19. Congress did not declare war in any case, neither approved nor rejected the uses of force in Kosovo and Libya, and required extensive persuasion from the administration to support the Persian Gulf conflict.

20. War Powers Resolution, H. J. Res. 542, Public Law 93-148, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., (7 November 1973). The act describes three conditions under which presidents can introduce US forces into conflict: 1. Congress has declared a war, 2. Congress has authorized a use of force,

have demonstrated their ability to engage US forces in conflict without congressional authorization. Presidents have also used their power to coax an authorization for using force from a reluctant Congress.²¹ No matter the degree of resistance, every case demonstrated the executive's ability to overcome it.²²

Evidence also revealed implications of the executive's authority to appoint influential advisors. Presidents have the ability to handpick their closest advisors. Unsurprisingly, the most influential often arrive at their posts because of a pre-existing relationship with the president or other insiders in the administration.²³ Congress holds confirmation hearings for top cabinet positions, but two of the four use-of-force advocates highlighted in this study occupied positions outside the purview of

or 3. an attack on US territory or its armed forces has resulted in a national emergency.

21. The George H. W. Bush administration exerted extensive effort to garner enough votes for authorization of a US offensive. A reluctant Congress eventually authorized it by a narrow margin. Furthermore, President Bush told his counterpart in Saudi Arabia that Congress does not have "the power or right to tie the president's hands." Quoted in House, *Memorandum: Telephone Conversation with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia*, 31 December 1990. The president's statement offers insight into the executive's perspective on war powers.

22. The trend revealed across post-Cold War cases suggests a transformation of administrations' expectations for military force. Throughout the Cold War, presidents relied on a force-in-being to deter the Soviet Union and contain its role in spreading communism. When administrations resorted to force application, they usually applied it indirectly, using limited means and ends in pursuit of broader Cold War objectives. The context informing America's use-of-force decisions changed dramatically when the Cold War thawed at the end of the twentieth century. George H. W. Bush used overwhelming force to achieve limited ends in defense of the international order. Subsequently, Bill Clinton used calibrated force for limited ends in defense of a foreign population. George W. Bush and Barack Obama used calibrated force for unlimited ends. Despite substantially different rationales for engaging in conflict, Bush and Obama pursued an unconditional surrender.

23. Brent Scowcroft's close relationship with George H. W. Bush and Donald Rumsfeld's history as Dick Cheney's prior boss illustrate the point.

congressional oversight.²⁴ Additionally, the CJCS occupies the only principal advisory position that requires any military service.

Why Do Presidents Enter Conflicts Without Military Advice?

Changing the system used to evaluate use-of-force decisions requires an understanding of factors contributing to its current form. Two factors present in examined cases shed light on the context used by administrations to inform their choice of the military instrument. First, presidents perceive little potential for direct or costly retaliation by their opponents or the international community.²⁵ Second, World War II logic remains pervasive in America's decisions to use force.²⁶ In each case, presidents invoked this familiar heuristic to justify entry into conflict.

When administrations assess their substantial advantage in relative power and an opposing government's political isolation, they do not perceive a requirement for professional advice.²⁷ Presidents

24. Brent Scowcroft did not require congressional confirmation as George H. W. Bush's national security advisor. Samantha Power also occupied an NSC position in the Obama administration outside the purview of Congress.

25. In other words, the barrier of entry is relatively low for US presidents considering the use of force against a militarily inferior and politically isolated opponent. Post-Cold War administrations have also railed against evil policies carried out by regimes in North Korea, Iran, and Russia. Nevertheless, these nations' military capabilities and geopolitical context raise the barrier of entry for engaging them with a military offensive.

26. Specifically, presidents assert the requirement to conduct military offensives abroad against evil governments (Hussein in Iraq, Milosevic in Serbia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Qaddafi in Libya). The analogy breaks down quickly when one considers that Japan actually did attack the US and was a member of a powerful alliance engaged in a mature conflict against US allies.

27. Administrations argue they require autonomy over the use of military power despite the fact that they do not perceive a credible threat from their opponents. Some argue they need this flexibility due to the requirement for timely action. The Obama administration made this argument when choosing to use force in Libya without congressional

questioned neither of these realities in examined cases.²⁸ Certain of their opponent's defeat, administrations spend little time on questions of strategy and focus instead on details of their operations.

Apparent suitability of force to a problem only increases when perception of the situation conforms to previous examples that resulted in America's celebrated World War II offensives. Every case included the assignment of blame for a foreign-policy problem on an opposing state's government and subsequent use of a military offensive against the offending regime.²⁹ No forcing function has caused policy makers to

authorization. They argued Qaddafi's potential to commit a mass atrocity required immediate intervention. This idea has merit for defensive missions, but examined cases reveal a much higher probability that presidents will strike before an attack on the US. Planning for the use of force in Afghanistan started after a terrorist attack, but the Bush administration quickly resolved to use its response as an opportunity to spread US influence with military power. US forces remain engaged in the Middle Eastern nation 16 years later despite the fact that it presents no threat to US national security. Attacks on the US did not spur the other three US offensives examined in this study. Others argue that expanding America's influence in regions around the globe requires minimal limits on a president's ability to use the military instrument, but evidence also contradicts this notion. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government demonstrated clearly this idea, as the Bush administration expected a welcome reception and instead inherited a civil war and insurgency. Acts of extreme violence and abuses of human rights followed achievement of US military objectives in every case. Additionally, none of the involved countries emerged from their respective conflicts with well-functioning democracies. After nearly three decades of increased US military involvement in the Middle East, authoritarianism, corruption, extremism, and sectarian violence continue to undermine America's influence there.

28. Saddam Hussein possessed the largest military of any opponent in examined cases, but the devotion of substantial coalition combat power reduced the Bush administration's level of concern over the conflict's outcome. The results were so dramatically in favor of the coalition that subsequent administrations attempt to avoid the perception of abusing their power advantage.

29. This point does not defend regimes targeted in any of the case studies, but instead acknowledges the reality that each case revealed administrations' failures to account for significant factors or root causes

consider an updated role for US military power in the post-Cold War era. Moreover, US policy does not require examination of potential alternatives.

The bottom line then is that post-Cold War administrations perceive no need for military advice, rely on a familiar heuristic to assess force's suitability, and serve under no obligation to investigate further the relationship between chosen means and intended ends. Presidents enter office aware of America's military superiority, yet lack tools capable of weighing the benefits of an operational victory against future costs resulting from their decision to use force. The established process does not include a specific role for professional advice to inform their analysis.³⁰

The Established Pattern Will Continue

The process's foundation has not changed in the post-Cold War era. Neither civil-military relations theory nor US policy has altered the nation's conception of relevant roles and responsibilities. Huntington's model remains pervasive, and the legislation responsible for defining institutional authorities and boundaries predates the Soviet Union's demise.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act did not affect use-of-force decision-making with the independent advice of the professional officer corps. The act changed the roles of senior officers, but did not describe a

leading to the problem at hand. For instance, Qaddafi earned his reputation as a tyrant, but he also maintained order over a fractured, volatile nation capable of disrupting European politics.

30. Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Airpower and Coercion in War*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 329-30. In his study on the use of air power to coerce, Pape highlighted the requirement for social scientists with expertise in a variety of fields to consider alternative means of coercion to military force.

relationship between military advice and decisions to engage in conflict.³¹ Specifically, it did not establish the chairman's responsibility to specify capabilities, limitations, and risks associated with using force to conduct foreign policy.³² The national security advisor, a cabinet position not subject to congressional confirmation, played a more significant role than the CJCS in every case but Libya.³³

Civil-military relations theory also provides little perspective on the nuanced relationship between the professional officer corps and policy makers in the post-Cold War era. In accordance with Huntington's theory, Post-Cold War presidents retain exclusive control over the decision to use force before later tasking the military to conduct operations. In all cases, presidents made clear that they perceive no requirement for military advice to inform their decisions. This finding calls into question the theory's utility and Congress's intent for the chairman's advisory role.

For its part, Congress has not provided an effective check on the power of centralized, decision-making authority in the executive branch. Despite widely varying causes, administrations championed the choice of

31. Separating the position from the operational chain of command and establishing it as the sole, principal advisor made a clear distinction between the role of the CJCS and that of the service chiefs and combatant commanders.

32. This statement applies generally to concepts informing national strategy, and specifically to describing what force can and cannot do about a foreign-policy dilemma. Even Colin Powell, arguably the most influential of the chairmen examined, did not exert the same influence over George H. W. Bush as did other advisors. Brent Scowcroft, Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney, Samantha Power, Ben Rhodes, Susan Rice, and Hillary Clinton all exerted greater influence over their respective presidents' use-of-force decisions than did the CJCS. Moreover, these influential advisors convinced their presidents of military force's suitability to address remarkably different circumstances in each case.

33. Both NSA Tom Donilon and CJCS Mike Mullen proved equally ineffective in their opposition to the use of force in Libya.

military force in each case.³⁴ Results demonstrate the extent of executive power, but do not reveal an overarching strategy to ensure uses of force produce a national benefit.³⁵ Military operations have produced effects, but one can prove neither their provocation of additional threats nor their enhancement of national security.³⁶ Despite the wide variety of symptoms resulting in a choice for military means and failure of operational victories to produce strategic advantage, the legislative branch has not updated the policies responsible for post-Cold War decisions to use force.

34. Tipping points included the invasion of a sovereign state in Kuwait, continuation of an ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo, failure to apprehend terrorists in Afghanistan, and increased potential for an abuse of state power in Libya.

35. Case-study results demonstrated no evidence of consistency with the Powell Doctrine or any other set of principles. Lack of adherence to use-of-force principles challenges the ability of planners to link military means with desired ends. Operations in Libya provide one example of this confusion, as military leaders had difficulty understanding whom they could target, and for what purpose. Similarly, questions about priorities in Afghanistan caused frustration as al Qaeda's leaders slipped into Pakistan while US forces concentrated their efforts on ousting the Taliban. Administrations have chafed against Powell's principles, but none has asserted a suitable substitute beyond situational and subjective analysis of ongoing foreign-policy challenges. Whereas George H. W. Bush stopped short of an overt use of military force to change Iraq's regime, George W. Bush and Barack Obama used force for that very purpose in Afghanistan and Libya. Bill Clinton and Barrack Obama specifically excluded the option of using ground forces in Kosovo, while George H. W. Bush exploited the domains of all three services. George W. Bush considered military force one component of a broader US-led effort to eradicate terrorism, while Barrack Obama relied solely on a restricted use of military force to support the NATO-led operation to protect Libya's citizens.

36. Administrations regularly proclaim that their military operations improved conditions; however, the global security environment contains little evidence to support these assertions. The military wins, but the list of opponents grows. Examples include the expansion of terrorist groups and resurgence of Russia. Interest in the relationship between a record of battlefield dominance and an increasing number of security threats served as one impetus for this research.

Changing Course

The nation's context has changed, and so must the process used to inform applications of military power. Informed by evidence from nearly three decades of operations, changes should clarify the role of military advice and ensure an effective system of checks and balances.

Establishing expectations for strategic success requires updating the Goldwater-Nichols and War Powers Acts, as well as the nation's civil-military relations theory.

This research highlights mixed results from reforms instituted by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.³⁷ Each case demonstrated civilian authority and operational effectiveness, but also revealed strategic deficiency in the nation's application of military power.

Congress should amend the legislation with two revisions focused on improving national strategy. First, an updated version should emphasize the importance of strategy by differentiating it from policy. Goldwater-Nichols describes the need for strategy, but does not establish a structure or process to produce it.³⁸ Improving the process likely

37. The legislation's text describes its intent "to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense, to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands and ensure that the authority of those commanders is fully commensurate with that responsibility, to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning, to provide for more efficient use of defense resources, to improve joint officer management policies, otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes." Department of Defense Reorganization Act.

38. The resolution describes intent "to increase attention to the formulation of strategy." It assigns responsibility for development of national strategy to the executive branch, labels the CJCS as the principal military advisor, and assigns the chairman's first function as

requires a more proactive role for the legislative branch given the current centralization of authority for policy goals, strategy, and operations under the executive.

Second, Congress should provide amplifying guidance on the role of the principal military advisor. Goldwater-Nichols separated the CJCS from the operational chain of command, but did not ensure the influence of professional advice on strategy development.³⁹ Furthermore, it stipulated no requirements for the chairman's advice regarding specific decisions to use force.⁴⁰ America's post-Cold War context requires Congress to define the role of professional advice in determining the suitability of military force to a foreign-policy problem.⁴¹

Like the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the War Powers Act also requires an update to account for America's role in world affairs. In its current version, the act requires only that presidents consult with Congress before introducing military forces into situations with the potential for hostilities.⁴² Furthermore, it allows presidents 48 hours to justify their

"assisting the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces." Department of Defense Reorganization Act.

39. In contrast, theory and policy both establish the requirement for civilian control of the military. Every case revealed disciplined, military personnel carrying out the orders of civilian authority despite the associated risk to their personal safety.

40. The act specifies that the chairman's advisory function is "subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense." Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Additionally, it makes no mention of the chairman's responsibility to advise presidents on the suitability, limitations, or capabilities of force to address a specific problem.

41. The Goldwater-Nichols Act assigns the CJCS with responsibility to oversee contingency planning and provide recommendations on other matters pertaining to military operations. Nevertheless, it does not specify the chairman's responsibility to offer objective military advice about the decision to begin a contingency.

42. The resolution's second section describes Congress's intent. "It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment

decision to engage in hostilities, and 60 days before requiring them to remove forces from unauthorized conflicts.⁴³ The passive approach

of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations. Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.” War Powers Resolution.

43. The act provides presidents time to justify entering into conflict by stating, “in the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced...the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth—(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.” War Powers Resolution. It also permits presidents to fight for two months. “Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.” War Powers Resolution. Finally, the resolution puts responsibility for ceasing conflicts on Congress by requiring a joint resolution of both chambers to override a president’s decision for conflict.

effectively cedes responsibility for use-of-force decisions to the executive branch.⁴⁴

An updated version should describe a proactive role for the legislative branch. The act's description of coordination timelines adds unnecessary confusion to the distinction between roles of each government branch.⁴⁵ The revision should remove all verbiage describing a president's authority to engage in conflict without congressional authorization.⁴⁶ Additionally, Congress should include a requirement to evaluate potential uses of force against an established use-of-force doctrine.

Beyond updated legislation, the study's implications also highlight the importance of revisiting Huntington's theory of civil-military relations. His description of the relationship between civilian authority and the professional officer corps provides a starting point, but requires refinement and depth. To meet the demands of the post-Cold War era, social scientists should further examine the professional officer corps' role.

44. The act describes Congress's role as a consultant (rather than a decision-making authority) for presidents considering the use of force. Additionally, the Libya case study shows how difficult it is for Congress to terminate a conflict in progress, even when they did not authorize it and its duration has extended beyond 60 days.

45. It also opens the door to administrations' arguments for continuing operations due to blood or treasure already expended, and places Congress in a difficult position where it can either make the easy choice to authorize ongoing operations or the difficult choice to cut off funding for US forces engaged in combat.

46. The law already allows the president to act in times of national emergency. This stipulation should remain, although Congress should consider the benefit of amplifying its intent for this authorization. Potential delineations include active defense versus counterattacks, defending US personnel and territory versus defending those of the nation's allies, and distinctions between law enforcement and military activities.

First, an update to Huntington's work should help define the expectation for professional advice. Specifically, theory should clarify the potential for professional advice to inform development of effective strategy and policy. Additionally, it should examine the merits of applying Cohen's nuanced description of an unequal dialogue to scenarios ranging from development of national strategy and use-of-force doctrine to consideration of specific applications of force.

Second, a revision of Huntington's theory should refine the notion of civilian control. None of the examined cases implied any cause for concern regarding the military's professionalism or obedience when ordered into action by civilian authority. Less clear is the distinction between informed decision-making and a process characterized instead by exclusionary deliberation. Without jeopardizing civilian authority, theory can and should highlight options for structures or processes with the potential to ensure effective consideration of professional advice.

Finally, an updated civil-military relations theory should examine alternative decision-making processes based on the nature of the threat. The post-Cold War security environment requires immediate responses to some threats, while extensive deliberation and planning should inform others. Social scientists should examine the costs and benefits associated with variable decision-making processes to strengthen the role of Congress where possible and ensure consideration of professional advice.

For its part, the officer corps must provide career paths to develop practitioners with the skills required to translate policy into strategy. Professional military education should therefore emphasize development of strategic thinkers familiar with the policy-development process. The vast majority of officers will never serve as the CJCS, and officer development will always require experience at the tactical and operational levels of war. Nevertheless, the personnel system must

provide opportunities for a pool of officers to develop skills required to inform policy and translate it into beneficial operations.

Implications

These officers will serve as a critical link between elected officials and military operations, but the preponderance of change must take place outside the military. Many of the recommendations described above include a role for the US Congress and social scientists for two primary reasons. First, the relationship between the executive and the military institution is indeed unequal. Second, the current system permits a substantial lack of accountability for use-of-force decisions. Change literally requires a coequal branch of government armed with critically considered research. When combined with the study's results, these reasons also underscore three implications worthy of additional consideration.

First, case-study evidence implies a relationship between America's relative decline and post-Cold War decisions to use force. While US policy makers expended substantial resources intervening in other nations, America's rivals invested in their own military power and observed the demonstration of US operations and tactics.⁴⁷ Left unchanged, the

47. Cohen, *The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force*, 63-97. Cohen described the decline of relative American power with some detail in his third chapter. Instead of concluding the US should change its approach, he suggested the decline has not been as significant as some argue and that doubling down on the approach will produce better results. See also Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997). McDougall emphasized the dismal results of foreign policy characterized by a concept he labelled Global Meliorism (an attempt to improve other nations and peoples through American intervention). Unlike Cohen's argument that the US should strive to improve upon what it is already doing, McDougall championed the idea of returning to a more limited role for America in the world. He advocated for a leadership role of example and defiance in the face of

nation's decision-making structure has the potential to accelerate America's relative decline. An increasingly dangerous world requires a structure designed to preserve and cultivate the nation's strategic advantages.⁴⁸ Additional research should develop alternative, decision-making structures to ensure consideration of professional advice.

Second, results underscore the need to consider changing the role of force in US foreign policy. Notwithstanding the potential to derive strategic benefits from a capable military, America's uses of force in the post-Cold War era do not resemble an international role consistent with that envisioned by the nation's founders.⁴⁹ Whether intentional or not, post-Cold War military primacy was a choice, not a mandate. In the short term, proactive choice of a different role offers greater potential for motivating necessary changes than simply awaiting the consequences associated with staying the course. More broadly, pursuit of strategic benefits requires a different approach designed to reverse the relative decline of American strength.

Shifting the approach requires accountability for the nation's use-of-force decisions. The study's third implication suggests American citizens possess no effective mechanism to hold elected officials accountable for their decisions to use force. Excepting the earliest days of the Afghanistan conflict, no post-Cold War uses of force enjoyed

tyranny rather than conducting a series of actions designed to bend the populations of other states to America's will.

48. Eliot A. Cohen, *The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force* (New York: Basic Books, 2016). Cohen argues the importance of America maintaining its leading role in international affairs, and suggests an increasingly dangerous world requires a larger US military with more robust and agile oversight to maintain military primacy.

49. America's post-Cold War uses of force have tacitly approved military interventions in other nations' affairs.

widespread, public support.⁵⁰ Post-Cold War presidents have exhibited interest in popular support, but they have also demonstrated the ability to proceed without it. With less than one percent of the population serving in the nation's armed forces and only a handful of legislators with prior military service, the public lacks oversight and understanding of the large-standing, all-volunteer force.⁵¹ Social scientists should explore methods to increase public understanding of US foreign-policy decisions' costs and consequences.

The impetus to change course requires admission of the current system's ineffectiveness. Undoubtedly, the least likely to find fault with today's decision-making structure are its benefactors. As described in chapter two, the list of entities and individuals who benefit from staying the course is lengthy and politically influential. For the time being, they can offer an argument loosely along the same lines as Cohen's, that military primacy is fulfilling its obligations to the nation, and doing so at relatively low cost. As long as the US military remains the strongest on the planet, there is a grain of truth to the notion that overwhelming force offers policy makers a blunt solution to their foreign-policy dilemmas.

Unfortunately, it also offers little hope for resolving intractable problems in and among other nations regardless of America's best intentions or purest morals. Results of case analysis demonstrate with some clarity that in the post-Cold War era a handful of powerful people, some neither elected nor scrutinized by Congress, lobby to send the nation's defenders in pursuit of other nation's interests. As designed,

50. Polling data reveals that support for a president's intended use of force often falls along political-party lines. It also exposes the lack of a connection between use-of-force results and a president's popularity.

51. Andrew J. Bacevich, *Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country*, First Edition. ed., The American Empire Project (New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2013), 28-35. Bacevich described a glamorization of military service that relieves the American public of its obligation to understand and question the details of military activities.

these expeditions have produced little benefit for the citizens who sustain the world's most capable military with their daughters, sons, and tax revenue.⁵² Strategists must consider ample evidence implying that the system responsible for choosing to use force has contributed to the nation's relative decline rather than slowed or prevented it.

National Security: Defining the Next Era

The commodity of strategic thought will remain in high demand as future challenges test the republic's basic assumptions. For more than 200 years, abhorrence for tyranny and defense of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness have unified national sentiment. America's experience at the beginning of the twenty-first century suggests that military power's role in the manifestation of those ideals requires reassessment.

The World War II model has failed to resolve persistent challenges to US interests in the post-Cold War era. Increasingly capable antagonists continue to threaten America and the achievement of its foreign-policy objectives. Additionally, the international community has asserted a moral imperative to act on behalf of oppressed citizens whose governments fail at their most basic responsibilities. The question is how best to intervene.

Neither professional advice nor established principles are likely to change the executive's perspective on intervening with military force. Case studies examined foreign-policy dilemmas faced by four different

52. "For no international bureaucracy, much less a single nation, however powerful and idealistic, can substitute itself for the healthy nationalism of an alien people. Almost everyone agrees, for instance, that Saddam Hussein is bad for his country. But can Americans be better Iraqis than Iraqis themselves, or presume to tell the Chinese how to be better Chinese? If we try, we can only be poorer Americans." McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776*, 220.

post-Cold War administrations with substantial differences in experience, ideology, and intent. When judging the suitability of force, none demonstrated any level of deference to the advice of the nation's principal military advisor. Additionally, resultant uses of force did not conform to the tenets of the Powell Doctrine or those of any discernable substitute.

An all-volunteer force provides US policy makers with flexibility to exploit the nation's advantage in military power. To define the next era, policy makers must consider substantial evidence suggesting that defeating a fielded force or overthrowing a regime does not necessarily enhance security or produce beneficial results. Strategy, not flexibility, has the potential to derive advantage from the capabilities and limitations of the world's strongest military.



Appendix

Coding the Powell Doctrine

This appendix describes criteria used to evaluate consistency with the Powell Doctrine. Colin Powell did not provide criteria useful for evaluating a conflict's consistency with his doctrine any more than he was responsible for naming it after himself.¹ The criteria and their explanations below elaborate on Powell's questions while also articulating a method useful for viewing post-Cold War uses of force through the lens of his doctrine. The criteria's purpose is not to evaluate the doctrine itself, but instead to identify indicators implying consideration of its tenets and to standardize analysis for the purpose of cross-case comparison.

To reveal the Powell Doctrine's influence on use-of-force decisions, preceding chapters described evidence of consistency with five of its tenets (for an explanation of the other four tenets' exclusion, see chapter three). Powell weaved into the tapestry of his namesake doctrine a unique blend of perspectives. Modest roots as an American citizen, a lifetime of military service, extensive policy experience, and an international-relations philosophy rooted in realism all informed his

1. Use of the criteria in this appendix concedes the likelihood that Powell himself may have used other examples to determine the degree to which policy makers had included the tenets of his doctrine in their preparation for using force. Powell articulated his questions to encourage critical thought before sending US military forces to pursue unique and specific foreign-policy objectives. In contrast, this study uses his questions to evaluate previous cases where policy makers chose to use force. More important than exactly replicating Powell's personal use of the doctrine's tenets, selecting criteria capable of examining important aspects of each of his questions allows the researcher to apply a common standard to evaluation of each case. This common standard makes possible the across-case comparison necessary to highlight typologies useful in understanding the Powell Doctrine's influence in the post-Cold War era.

choice of tenets. The chairman's recently elevated role as principal military advisor and an apparent success in the Persian Gulf undergirded his influence. Aware of the potential for others to wield his litmus test like a rigid playbook, the CJCS abhorred the notion of others using his words to stifle critical thought. Instead, Powell espoused his nine-question test to advocate a starting point for consideration of US military power's role when facing a foreign-policy challenge.

Powell advocated the importance of each of his questions when considering the use of force in foreign policy, but did not specify measures suitable to determine their objective or relative weight in the policy-making process. This appendix lists the indicators used to evaluate the consistency of each use-of-force decision with the doctrine's tenets. The preceding chapters provide a narrative description of their application and relevance within each case. After evaluating the individual indicators, each case includes an overall assessment of their corresponding Powell-Doctrine question using the same categories.

Table 46. Assessing the Powell Doctrine: Tenets and Indicators

<i>Tenets (in bold) and their indicators^a</i>		<i>Conflict^b</i>			
		<i>P</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>L</i>
Purpose. Is the political objective important, clear, and understood?		<u>Y</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>N</u>
Important	US national security compromised if not accomplished	N	N	Y	N
	Benefactors' security compromised if not accomplished	Y	Y	Y	Y
	American public agrees	B	N	Y	N
	International community agrees	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Professional officer corps agrees	U	N	Y	N
Clear and understood	American public aware	Y	Y	Y	N
	Consistent public statements	B	N	Y	N
	Consistent military planning	Y	N	B	N
	Consistent military actions	Y	N	B	N
	Consistent national instruments of power	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Consistent coalition actions	Y	N	B	B
Commitment. Will the forces considered decisively achieve the objective?		<u>Y</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>N</u>
Practitioners' requests supported		Y	N	B	B
Trained, equipped practitioners available		Y	Y	N	B
Clear objectives established		Y	N	B	N
Aware of self-imposed limitations and their effects		Y	N	N	Y
US policy makers control required means and ways		B	N	N	N

Table 46 (continued)

		<i>P</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>L</i>
After conflict. Have we critically considered the desired outcome and associated risks?		<u>N</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Y</u>
Desired Outcome	Status of opposition military force	Y	N	N	N
	Status of opposition government	Y	N	Y	Y
	Status of opposition infrastructure and population	Y	N	Y	Y
	Position of friendly forces	Y	Y	N	Y
	Status of relations with coalition members	Y	Y	N	Y
	Terms of political settlement established	N	N	Y	B
	Contingency planning capability established	N	N	B	B
Associated Risks	Mission	Y	N	N	N
	Political	N	Y	Y	Y
	Economic	N	Y	N	Y
	Long-term risk	N	N	N	N
War's nature. Have we assessed the consequences of using force?		<u>N</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>N</u>
	Uncertainty	Y	N	N	B
	Unforeseen challenges	Y	N	N	B
	Relationship with population	N	N	B	B
	Physical losses	Y	Y	Y	Y
	Potential for escalation/elongation	N	N	N	N
Constituency. Do the American people support using force?		<u>Y</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Y</u>	<u>N</u>
	Polling results	Y	N	Y	N
	Congressional support	Y	N	Y	N
	Public demonstrations	Y	Y	Y	B
	Public approval ratings	Y	Y	Y	N

Table 46 (continued)

Source: Author's original work

^aResults of indicator analysis support a positive answer (Y), negative answer (N), even mix of positive and negative evidence (B), or not enough information (U). Codes assigned to superseding Powell-Doctrine questions use the same method after accounting for results of their indicators.

^bColumns P, K, A, and L correspond to the first letter of their respective conflict—Persian Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya).

Assessment of individual indicators and their influence on respective tenets did not derive from a mathematical formula assigning relative weights or requiring conformance with pre-established conditions. Instead, within-case analysis subjects each indicator to a qualitative assessment based on examination of public statements, actual events, and witness accounts. The study intentionally avoids post facto surveys of principal actors to avoid inclusion of additional personal biases in the research. Unintentional omissions of relevant accounts or considerations are solely the author's responsibility.

The study's explanatory power results not from contentious conclusions about little-known facts or counterfactual possibilities, but from comparison of readily observable evidence across multiple cases. For example, each case examines the Powell Doctrine's concern with a military operation's purpose by assessing its connection with US national security (see first indicator under first tenet in Table 46). In the first case, George H. W. Bush implied a potential threat to US national security by comparing Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler. Nevertheless, neither actual events nor the US Congress's authorization to use force explicitly articulated an imminent threat to US security. That nearly 50 percent of Americans did not support America's use of force on the eve of conflict also underscores citizens' lack of concern.

Within-case assessments do not attempt to predict what might have been, or to question the authority and intentions of decision

makers. Instead, they examine available evidence to assess each indicator in consideration of the overall tenet. Despite use of the Hitler analogy by Bush and other heads of state, Iraq's surprise attack on Kuwait hardly resembled Pearl Harbor to John Q. Public and his family living in America. Iraq might well have threatened a US attack in the future, but the evidence clearly demonstrates the administration's primary concern in Kuwait was the increased influence of a despotic dictator and his lack of respect for internationally recognized boundaries. Similarly, the following paragraphs describe criteria and examples of evidence used to evaluate indicators of consistency with five of Powell's questions.

Is the political objective important, clear, and understood?

Powell qualified his concern for the objective with two considerations: its importance and its clarity. Evaluation of this tenet leaves open the possibility for a military operation conducted for an important reason, but executed by practitioners who do not understand the purpose for which they fight. It also underscores the potential for the entire chain of command to understand the purpose while believing its achievement will accomplish little. Neither of these scenarios yields a positive assessment of Powell's first question. To demonstrate consistency with this tenet, practitioners must understand the purpose for fighting and the nation must concede its importance.

To assess the objective's importance, cases examine five indicators. Evaluation of the first two indicators considers the adversary's actions and intentions, US policy statements, congressional resolutions, and policy-maker deliberations. The most significant indicator is the conflict's relationship with US national security, since it pertains directly to the military's traditional and commonly understood role in society. Application of this criterion explicitly limits the definition of national security to physical harm of US citizens or control of national territory.

This indicator does not consider prosperity or values in its assessment of national security. Their exclusion does not imply that policy makers have no role in ensuring access to international trade or upholding human rights. Instead, this indicator intentionally draws a conservative line at US citizens' lives and property to assess a case's relationship with first-order issues of national sovereignty.

Analysis also considers the conflict's relationship with security interests of non-US benefactors. This indicator acknowledges the role of a great power in the international system of states. Foreign-policy precedent established US military commitments in the context of unsettled conflicts (e.g. NATO's Article 5 and the Korean armistice). Additionally, the period between the twentieth century's world wars suggests isolationism does not necessarily result in peace. Examining security implications for non-US benefactors considers the potential of non-intervention to result in lives or territory lost by other nations.

The final three indicators pertain to three different constituencies' assessments of the objective's importance. Foremost among these assessments is the American public's. Evaluation of this indicator relies on national polling, election results, and congressional resolutions. Next, the international community's assessment of the objective's importance, demonstrated by UN resolutions and public statements by influential foreign officials, underscores the case's international legitimacy. Finally, relevant statements made by senior members of the professional officer corps reveal the objective's valuation by the nation's practitioners of military force. This indicator avoids contentious debate regarding the criticism of policy by military members to illuminate instead the potential for lack of conviction in pursuit of the objective.

After examining the objective's importance, assessing its clarity involves analyzing the statements and actions of US policy makers while also determining reception and understanding of the message by their intended audience. This indicator addresses policy statements in the

conflict's narrative, as well as actions taken to support achievement of the objective using other national or coalition instruments of power (including military, economic, information, or diplomatic actions). After evaluating the message sent, assessing the message received includes evidence of public awareness revealed by polling results, congressional debate, and domestic news coverage. The actions of US and friendly forces also reveal the extent to which military practitioners understood their purpose. Where planned or executed operations undermine achievement of the objective, cases examines whether practitioners understood their purpose.

Will the forces considered decisively achieve the objective?

After considering the conflict's purpose, Powell's next question addressed commitment to achieving it. Primarily concerned with political will, this tenet relates to establishment of a theory of victory, dedication of resources to subordinate commanders, and coordination and control of means and ways necessary to achieve the campaign's objectives. Determining this question's answer requires qualitative assessment of public statements, policy guidance, and the nature of ongoing deliberations between and among policy makers and senior officers.

The first two indicators address military forces available to subordinate commanders. Particularly given post-Cold War budget constraints and pursuit of limited objectives, field commanders and policy makers must consider consequences and costs of military operations. One gauge of a policy-maker's commitment to success regards willingness and ability to support requests for forces from military commanders. Assessment of this indicator considers formal and informal discussions among stakeholders to determine whether military commanders received resources they deemed necessary to accomplish their objectives. Additionally, examination of this indicator includes consideration of political will required to train and equip practitioners

suiting to the assigned task. Positive assessments of these indicators do not require unlimited willingness of the policy maker to meet every demand, but consistent or substantial refusal or inability to provide forces or resources requested suggests lack of interest in the outcome or distrust of subordinate commanders. Neither inspires confidence in the ability of force to achieve the objective.

Additionally, assessing commitment includes critical consideration of the theory of victory required to establish clear, subordinate objectives. Broad examples of this indicator include America's Germany-first theory in World War II or the Schlieffen Plan in World War I. Examples at an operational level include Colonel Warden's Five-Ring Theory used to conduct the air campaign in Operation Desert Storm or the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program used to pacify the population during the Vietnam conflict. Assessing this indicator requires examination of the historical narrative for evidence of a theory of victory leading to establishment of clear objectives for subordinate commanders.

The final two indicators bearing on the commitment of policy makers include self-imposed limitations and span of control. Most post-Cold War campaigns have included self-imposed limitations. Examples include President Clinton's promise not to send US ground forces to Kosovo and the diversion of resources to scud hunting during Operation Desert Storm. The question addressed by this indicator concerns whether planners at every level knew the limitations and yet still projected the ability to achieve assigned objectives in spite of them.

Finally, evaluating the commitment of US policy makers includes an assessment of their span of control. Specifically, did US policy makers control the means and ways required to execute their theory of victory? For instance, if defeat of North Vietnam required an effectual and motivated South Vietnamese army, US policy makers did not exert control over the required ways and means necessary to achieve desired

results. This indicator does not preclude the possibility of victory, but instead points to the lack of commitment by US policy makers to ensure decisive achievement of the objective.

**Have we critically considered
the desired outcome and associated risks?**

After evaluating commitment, the study's cases address post-conflict planning and contingency-response capability. Powell's interest in this question stemmed from a desire to connect military operations with political consequences. Given America's lack of desire for long-term military campaigns, Powell desired common understanding of the conditions required to transition from military to civilian control. He also wanted to determine the agency responsible for the situation after military intervention. Through this tenet, he sought to ensure policy makers had examined the nuances of their policy choice, and that they had accounted for associated risks.

To evaluate a case's consistency with Powell's post-conflict question, analysis of indicators includes examination of policy-maker intentions, the conflict's character, and its results. Beyond encouraging critical thought, Powell sought to ensure preparedness for the expected and unexpected results of the conflict. Answering Powell's question requires establishing policy makers' expectations for the outcome of using force, and assessing whether their plan accounted for post-conflict challenges.

The study's first three of seven indicators used to examine policy-maker expectations address the opposition, including its status of military forces and their government, and its infrastructure and population. Consideration of military forces includes assessing desired reduction of the opposition's ability to project power, and its control over territory and population centers. Plans for the opposition's government include the intended degree of control over regime replacement (e.g. post-

World War II Germany vs. Afghanistan in 2001) or desired concessions if leaving it in place (e.g. post-World War II Japan and Iraq in 1991). Consideration of the desired outcome also includes determination of intent toward the opposition's society. As exemplified in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict, international perceptions of *jus in bello* can substantially alter associated costs and benefits. This study uses damage to infrastructure and civilian deaths as an indicator of the intended outcome for the opposition's society.

The next four indicators address expectations for coalition members and the political outcome. First, desired results of the military offensive include control of territory, planned attrition, and expected monetary cost of operations. Next, status of coalition-member relations includes potential for disenfranchisement or resistance to changes in level of investment or theory of victory. Finally, each case examines policy-maker intent and preparation for the political outcome. The first evaluates development of post-conflict terms and their adequacy as determined by regional, international, and domestic sentiment. The second examines preparation and capacity for contingencies resulting from the conflict.

After investigating details of the desired outcome, the next four indicators study policy-maker consideration of risk. Risk criteria address areas where the plan failed to account for actual results due to inaccurate assumptions or a lack of capacity. Mission risk evaluates barriers to achieving the conflict's objective, including lack of military forces or required resources. Political risk identifies reactions from various constituencies, including regional, international, domestic, or institutional consequences. Economic risk examines resultant consequences for the US and world economy. Finally, long-term risk considers the conflict's immediate results within the context of future developments in the country and region.

Have we assessed the consequences of using force?

After examining risks associated with the desired outcome, each case evaluates preparation to address consequences of using force regardless of the objective. Powell incorporated this tenet to prepare himself and others for the inevitable consequences of human conflict. Here, he relied on his own experiences with combat and his study of war's extensive history. To answer the fourth question, this analysis borrows from Clausewitz's writings to examine enduring factors responsible for affecting war's outcome. Given the topic's complexity, selection of only five indicators reflects author preference while also limiting analysis to facilitate comparison across cases.

The first two indicators used to examine Powell's question concern the related, but distinct concepts of uncertainty and unforeseen challenges.² Uncertainty regards difficulties in determining the relationship between cause and effect. Examples from previous conflicts include determining effectiveness of Eighth Air Force's strategic-bombing campaign on Germany's war-making apparatus during World War II, or the effect of Paul Bremer's de-Ba'athification policy in Iraq in 2003. Measuring the indicator requires interpretation of the policy-maker's preparation for, and demonstrated ability to mitigate, uncertainties as they revealed themselves in the course of the conflict.

Addressing the role of unforeseen challenges in each case examines the policy-maker's preparation for overcoming setbacks and

2. Clausewitz, *On War*, 113-21. As used in this study, uncertainty and unforeseen challenges relate closely to difficulties in war described by Clausewitz in his first book. Uncertainty regards the Prussian theorist's description of interpreting information during conflict. Clausewitz wrote, "this difficulty of *accurate recognition* constitutes one of the most serious sources of friction in war, by making things appear entirely different from what one had expected." Regarding unforeseen challenges, Clausewitz describes the concept of friction in war by stating, "everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult." He also suggests friction distinguishes war in reality from war on paper.

difficulties inherent in human conflict. A policy based solely on the all-too-common belief that a war will be short before it begins provides a good example of a likely negative assessment for this indicator. Colin Powell's description of decisive force in his 1992 National Military Strategy provides a noteworthy counterpoint. Powell wanted the policy makers and the entire chain of command to over-prepare as a hedge against unforeseen challenges in the upcoming conflict. Examination of this indicator requires characterization of planning iterations between levels of command in preparation for the conflict. Additionally, policy-maker responses to setbacks and challenges reflect their preparation for this consequence of using force.

After examining preparation to overcome uncertainty and unforeseen challenges, the next indicator considers planning for consequences of using force as they regard the opposition's society. Related to Clausewitz's contention that the first and most consequential step the commander must take before war is to establish its type, this indicator considers the policy-maker's expectations and planning for the reaction of the opposing population.³ Donald Rumsfeld's assumption that Iraq's citizens would welcome the US as a liberator provides one example of incorrectly assessing the relationship. Evaluation of this criterion compares pre-conflict planning and expectations with the opposing population's reaction in the event.

The final two indicators used to address Powell's interest in planning for war's consequences include physical losses and the

3. Clausewitz, *On War*, 80. Clausewitz understood that the result of a war is never final due to the enemy's potential to continue fighting. He therefore considered the policy maker responsible for understanding the nature of human conflict. Clausewitz states, "the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." Clausewitz, *On War*, 88.

potential for escalation or elongation of conflict. Evaluating preparation for physical losses compares pre-conflict planning for numbers of killed or injured friendly forces with those actually sustained in the event. Potential for escalation or elongation examines policy-maker preparation for the enemy to exert influence over the outcome. Neville Chamberlain's belief that the 1938 Munich Agreement meant peace for Europe provides one example of incorrectly assessing the enemy's influence over the outcome. This criterion specifically considers whether and how US policy makers prepared for hostile enemy responses to the terms they set after achieving the objective.

Do the American people support using force?

The final four indicators examine evidence of the American people's support for using force in each case. Where available, multiple polls conducted over time demonstrate trends in the domestic popularity of policy-makers' intent to use force. This indicator also uses congressional hearings, debate, and resolutions as a proxy for America's popular support. Widespread, public demonstrations for or against using force and a president's approval ratings also provide insight into the overall interpretation of domestic sentiment.

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