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**INSTABILITY IN MALI: FORMULATING EFFECTIVE
RESPONSES TO INSURGENCY, TERRORISM, AND
ORGANIZED CRIME**

by

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INSURGENCY, TERRORISM, AND ORGANIZED CRIME**

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ABSTRACT

Security in Mali has worsened in recent decades due to the escalation of the Tuareg insurgency, its connection to terrorist groups, and the military coup in 2012. The crisis in the north of Mali, as the Tuareg insurgency is also known, began in the 1960s, after Mali independence from France. From 1962 to 2012, a series of rebellions occurred in the north of Mali. The 2012 rebellion was the most complex and lethal because it involved foreign combatants and resulted in the invasion of the northern regions by the coalition of Tuareg and terrorist groups following the rout of the Malian army. The crisis has not yet being solved despite the national and international responses, including the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) peacekeeping mission. This thesis seeks to formulate effective responses to the Malian crisis by examining the Tuareg rebellions and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria as case studies. To formulate recommendations responding to the crisis, the thesis analyzes the involved groups and their funding and evaluates the effectiveness and inadequacy of local and international responses applied to the cases. It concludes that the mix of military, political, and economic responses to the crisis reinforced by good governance will produce effective results.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADC	Democratic Alliance for Change
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AFRICOM	African Command
AU	African Union
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb
BDAT	British Defense Advisory Team
BH	Boko Haram
CENTIF	National Cell of Financial Information Processing
CMFPR	Coordination of Patriotic Movements and Forces of the Resistance
COPAM	Coordination of Patriotic Organizations of Mali
CSO	Civilian Society Organization
CTED	Counter Terrorism-Committee Executive Directorate
CTITF	United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EUCAP	European Union Mission to Support the Malian Security Forces' Capabilities
EUTM	European Union Started the European Union Training Mission in Mali
FLM	Macina for the Liberation Front
GATIA	Tuareg Imgad and Allies' Self Defense Group
HCUA	High Council for Azawad Uniqueness
JNIM	Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JTFORO	Joint Task Force Operation to Restore Order
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
MAA	Arab Movement of Azawad
MIST	Military Intelligence Support Team
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MUJAO	Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
MFUA	Movements and Fronts Unified Azawad
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MJFT	Multinational Joint Force Task
NDLEA	National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
PADSL	Supporting Project for Local Development
PAREM	Program for the Socio-economic Reintegration of Ex-combatants
PNUD	United Nations Program for Development
UN	United Nations
UK	United Kingdom
TSCTP	Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
U.S.	United States
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNOCT	United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism

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I. INTRODUCTION

Security in Mali has worsened during the last few decades due to the escalation of the Tuareg insurgency¹ and its connection to terrorist groups, as well as the military coup in 2012.² The crisis in the north of Mali, as the Tuareg insurgency is also known, began in the 1960s, a few years after the country's political independence from France. Stephen Emerson notes that the hard political and socio-economic situation after independence added to the ethnic and racial diversity in Mali, and the government's weak economic investment in the north of the country pushed the Tuareg to resort to violence against the Malian authorities.³

As a result, from 1962 to 2012, a series of rebellions occurred in the North of Mali. Among the Tuareg rebellions, the one in 2012 was the most complex and lethal because it involved the meddling of foreign combatants and resulted in the occupation of the northern regions of Mali by the Tuareg and terrorist groups after the rout of the Malian army. The Tuareg insurgency in Mali reached a crisis level with the return of Tuareg combatants from Libya and the connection of Tuareg insurgents to some regional terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). According to Zoumounou, the ongoing Tuareg insurrection, triggered by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad

¹ Wolfram Lacher, *Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara region* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), <https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahara-region-pub-49360>. "Insurgency" is one of the terms that describes the fight of non-state actors against one state mostly to achieve the betterment of their living conditions or political objectives. The groups of rebels, bandits, secessionists, guerrilla, partisans and even terrorists are sometimes under covered by this definition, depending on the region or country they evolve. The recent history of humanity teaches as that most of the insurgency comes from minorities or regions believing to be disfavored by the central authority.

² Andrew Clark, Pascal James Imperato, and Kathleen M. Baker, "Mali," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Last modified August 16, 2018, 9, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Mali/2012-coup-and-warfare-in-the-north>.

³ Stephen A. Emerson "Desert Insurgency: Lessons from the Third Tuareg Rebellion," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 22, no. 4, (2011): 670, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2011.573406>.

(MNLA), reached the level of armed conflict, which, in addition to challenging Malian security, threatens the stability of the whole Sahel region.⁴

The security situation in Mali degraded even more with the military coup of March 2012, which plunged the country in total chaos. The military's unhappiness with the government's conduct of the crisis in the north led to a revolt in which the defiant junior officers demanded better equipment to fight the insurgency. The mutiny escalated to a coup on March 21, 2012. Gathered around the National Committee for the Recovery of Democracy and Restoration of the State (CNRDRE), the mutinous group, led by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, suspended the constitution and dissolved the government.⁵ This turmoil occasioned severe disorganization in the army, resulting in the occupation of one-third of Malian territory by the insurgent groups. The efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to conduct negotiations between the junta and the political authorities assured the return to democratic order, and the former President of the National Assembly Dionkounda Traoré became acting president on April 14, 2012.

Fighting on several fronts, the task was hard for Dionkounda and his government. Therefore, the administration called for international support. The degradation of the political and security conditions in Mali triggered the involvement of African and European countries, the United Nations, and the United States to support Mali responding to the multi-dimensional crisis. However, despite the presence of the blue helmets under the UN's Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and other international assistance to the Malian security forces since 2012, terrorist groups remain ubiquitous in the country, and the threat of instability and violence persists.

⁴ David Zounmenou, "The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad factor in the Mali crisis," *African Security Review* 22, no. 3 (2013): 167, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10246029.2013.823794>.

⁵ Clark, Imperato, and Baker, "Mali."

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

After its transition to democracy in 1991, Mali was considered a good example of democratization in Africa. Nevertheless, the security issue of 2012 arose a few months before the presidential elections and concerned several fronts: the dissatisfaction of Tuareg insurgents, the involvement of terrorist groups and the corollary of organized crime, and the military's discontent with the government's management of the crisis.

Despite the existence of several studies on the Malian crises, no definite solution to the problem has been reached. In particular, no study has yet studied the interaction of the three branches of the crisis: insurgency, terrorism, and organized crime. Addressing all three will be essential to formulating an effective solution. Based on analytical examination of the evolution of insurgency, terrorism, and organized crime in Mali and Nigeria, this thesis therefore investigates the drivers of national and regional insecurity in Mali to answer the following question: What can the elites, security forces, and civil society organizations do to address the causes of insurgency, terrorism, and organized crime and to improve Mali's precarious security environment?

B. IMPORTANCE

The crisis of 2012 is the most significant insurrection in the modern history of Mali. This thesis contributes to the understanding of the national, regional, and international context of the crisis, which led in 2012 to the regions of Timbuctou, Gao, and Kidal falling under the control of terrorist groups. In addition to the political, economic, and military causes of the crisis, the connection of the insurgents to terrorist groups involved in organized crime renders the 2012 case more complex and difficult to respond.

This thesis is particularly relevant to Malian policy makers because it provides insight into the flaws within the government and security institutions that have weakened the state's authority and enabled the link between the Tuareg insurgents and terrorist groups. The research will provide recommendations responding to the predicament of an insurgency mixed with terrorism and organized crime.

This research is not only pertinent to the bureaucracy of Mali but also to its neighboring countries—Algeria, Burkina Faso, Niger, Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Mauritania—because it provides regional strategies to combat insurgency, terrorism, and organized crime. Since 2005, with the connection of local extremist groups to international terrorist organizations, the Sahel region in Africa has become more exposed to terrorism.⁶ Porous borders, ungoverned zones, and weak security forces facilitate the spread of instability from one country to another. If Mali and Niger are used to facing the Tuareg insurgency, with its connection to terrorist groups, the entire Sahel region is today concerned with instability triggered by insurgency.

This thesis is also highly relevant to U.S. government policy in Africa. After the American counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001, Al Qaeda shifted its operations from the Middle East to Africa by stirring up its cells there. AQIM, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, and other terrorist organizations affiliated with Al Qaeda then spread insecurity all around the continent. Sharing with Mali the common enemy of terrorism, the United States engaged in the war against terror in Mali after the occupation of the North in 2012. Ted Poe, Chairman of the Congressional Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, highlights that as long as Al Qaeda’s affiliates remain in the desert of Mali, the United States should react to bring justice to the families of those callously killed by the terrorists.⁷ Thus, the United States and Mali have a common interest in fighting terrorism, which threatens the promotion of democracy and the respect of human rights to which Americans are highly attached.

Finally, this study is relevant to the broader literature of security and democracy because it makes recommendations that civilian elites and security forces can implement to change the precarious security environment. Referring to the success and failures of the past responses to the crisis in Mali and elsewhere, this paper proposes widely

⁶ Olivier Walther and Denis Retaillé, “Sahara or Sahel? The Fuzzy Geography of Terrorism in West Africa,” (working paper 2010–35, CEPS/INSTEAD, 2010), <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1803996>.

⁷ *The Crisis in Mali: U.S. Interests and the International Response*: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 113th Cong. 1 (2013), 4, <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20130214/100248/HHRG-113-FA00-20130214-SD003.pdf>.

applicable alternatives that blend political, economic, sociological, and military approaches.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The main purpose of this study is to explore the political, social, and economic causes of instability in Mali—and by extension in the Sahel region—and to investigate ways to counter insurgency, terrorism and organized crime. In service of this task, this literature review encompasses three sections: the first addresses issues central to the present research, the second, the nexus of insurgency with terrorism and organized crime, and the third, establishes counter-approaches to these phenomena.

1. Origins of Conflict in Africa

The Malian crisis shares a number of features with other African conflicts, including Nigeria, Senegal, and Somalia; the literature on conflict in Africa more broadly can thus give insight into the causes of the Malian crisis and, therefore, into potential solutions. The British Department for International Development, in its consultative document *The Causes of the Conflict in Africa*, highlights the primary, secondary and tertiary causes of the conflicts in the African continent, stressing inequality, state collapse, economic decline, history, and natural resources wealth as predominant causes of conflict in Africa.⁸ Furthermore, it identifies unemployment, the manipulation of ethnic groups, and the availability of arms among the secondary roots of conflict; the tertiary origins of African conflicts are regional and interlocking conflicts, as well as the wrong emphases in humanitarian assistance and inadequate mediation.⁹

Several researchers support the findings of this document, pointing particularly to state weakness or collapse as a source of conflict, especially because it enables insurgencies and terrorist groups. According to Elizabeth Arsenault and Tricia Bacon, an ungoverned zone is a place that the government fails to control by the patent lack of

⁸ Department for International Development, *The Causes of the Conflict in Africa*, (London: Department for International Development, 2001), webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/conflict-africa.pdf.

⁹ Department for International Development.

state's representatives.¹⁰ According to Robert Feldman, the state's absence contributes to the proliferation of arms with its corollary of aggression and internal conflicts, particularly amid porous borders.¹¹ This chaotic situation is then managed by the same weak authorities, leading to mismanagement and degradation of resources and further facilitating the conversion of ungoverned areas to illicit economic activities.

Ultimately, the ungoverned space forms a haven where terrorist groups and insurgencies can operate without impediment of the police, army, or any other agency of state power and control. For example, Geoffrey Kambere posits that the Al-Shabaab insurgency in Somalia takes great advantage of the porosity of the borders, weak laws and judicial institutions, and the power vacuum created by the long-term absence of a central authority, which allows constant clashes between clans.¹² He highlights that the failure of the government to contain the situation turned into civil war, in this case ending by the splitting of Somalia into zones under control of the state and others under separatist groups (Somaliland and Puntland).¹³ Similarly, according to Faye, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) emerged in the 1980s from the grievances of local populations asking for more attention from the central government, and later becoming a violent insurgency claiming the independence of Casamance (southern province of Senegal).¹⁴

¹⁰ Elizabeth G. Arsenault and Tricia Bacon, "Disaggregating and Defeating Terrorist Safe Havens," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 2 (2015):87, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2014.977605>.

¹¹ Robert L. Feldman, "The Root Causes of Terrorism: Why Parts of Africa Might Never Be at Peace," *Defense & Security Analysis*, 25, no. 4 (2009), <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14751790903416707>.

¹² Geoffrey B. Kambere, "Countering al-Shabaab: A Case to Minimize Transnational Terrorist Threats against Uganda" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 10, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10626>.

¹³ Kambere.

¹⁴ Wagane Faye, "The Casamance Separatism: From Independence Claim to Resource Logic," (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 7, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a451368.pdf>.

2. Nexus of Terrorism and Organized Crime

In addition to understanding the primary causes of conflict in Africa, it is essential to highlight the nexus of insurgencies and organized crime, especially drug trafficking. Irka Kuleshnyk points out that “while it is difficult to establish how widely terrorist groups are involved in the illicit drug trade, or the breadth and nature of cooperation between these two criminal groups, the magnitude of the numbers involved make the relationship worrisome.”¹⁵ That said, the chief of operations at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Michael Braun, does quantify the problem, claiming in 2008 that of the 43 designated terrorist groups in the world, 19 profited from the drug trade.¹⁶ Similarly, in a 2010 report, the U.S. Department of Justice noted that 29 of the top 63 worldwide drug cartels were related to terrorist groups—and several of them were based in developing countries.¹⁷

Thus, it is difficult to separate drug trafficking from terrorism because one intervenes or participates in the commission of the other. Trajan Evans illustrates the relationship between terrorist groups and drug traffickers by highlighting their unity in defending their common interests (territory and trade).¹⁸ Loretta Napoleoni likewise stresses that terrorists are significant non-state groups taking advantage of drug trafficking revenues while seeking to achieve political goals.¹⁹ Tamara Makarenko highlights that the nexus between terrorism and organized crime is currently complex

¹⁵ Irka Kuleshnyk, “Drug Trafficking and the Financing of Terrorism,” UNODC, 2008, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/drug-trafficking-and-the-financing-of-terrorism.html>.

¹⁶ “Exploring the Financial Nexus of Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime: Testimony before The Terrorism and Illicit Finance Subcommittee,” House Financial Services Committee (2018) (statement of Louise Shelley, University Professor and the Omer and Nancy Hirst Chair and Director, Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University), https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/03.20.2018_louise_shelley_testimony.pdf.

¹⁷ John Rollins and Liana Sun Wyler, *Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress*. CRS Report No. R41004 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 3, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf>.

¹⁸ Trajan Evans, “The Link between Terrorism and Drug Trafficking,” *University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law* (blog), November 6, 2017, <https://www.law.utah.edu/the-link-between-terrorism-and-drug-trafficking/>.

¹⁹ Loretta Napoleoni, *Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks*, (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), 65–80.

because of globalization, and persists in spite of the discrepancy between terrorist and trafficking organizations' political and criminal motivations, respectively.²⁰

Moreover, according to Francesco Strazzari, some evidence suggests that AQIM has been involved in the trafficking of cannabis and cocaine by protecting the traffickers in exchange of half the proceeds of drug commerce, which traffickers can pay in cash or in kind (vehicles or weaponry).²¹ At the same time, Louise Shelley emphasizes the involvement of Boko Haram in the smuggling of heroin and cocaine across West Africa.²² In 2013, the term “narco-jihadist” was usually used to refer to the groups involved in the North of Mali, resulting from the evidence on their involvement in drug trafficking. According to the International Crisis Group, the majority of the groups involved in the 2012 crisis in Mali took advantage of drug trafficking, which has increased since the 2000s with the quantity of cannabis and cocaine transiting through the North of Mali, and resulted in frequent clashes between the armed groups.²³ According to Jean-Luc Peduzzi, the large portion of the Moroccan hashish production in 2010 (300 tons) passed through Mali to reach Europe.²⁴

While drug trafficking is part of the revenue supporting terrorist groups, the abduction of foreign citizens also contributes to their cash flow. Adebayo posits that the flourishing business of kidnapping earned West African extremist groups millions of

²⁰ Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism,” *Global Crime* 6, no.1 (2004), 129–145, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1744057042000297025>.

²¹ Strazzari, *The Role of Illicit Trade in the Logic of Armed Group Formation in Northern Mali*; Francesco Strazzari, Azawad and the rights of passage: the role of illicit trade in the logic of armed group formation in northern Mali, (Norwegian Peace Building Resource Center, 2015), https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Strazzari_NOREF_Clingendael_Mali_Azawad_Dec2014.pdf.

²² Louise Shelley, *Exploring the Financial Nexus of Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime*, (The Terrorism and Illicit Finance Subcommittee, House Financial Services Committee March 20, 2018), www.usip.org/files/ressources/tlibans_opuim_1.pdf.

²³ International Crisis Group, *Drug Trafficking, Violence and Politics in Northern Mali Africa*, Report N°267,3-4, December 2018, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/267-drug-trafficking-violence-and-politics-in-northern-mali-english.pdf>.

²⁴ Jean-Luc Peduzzi, *Physiognomie et Enjeux des Trafics dans la Bande Sahélo-Saharienne* [Physiognomy and Stakes of Traffic in the Saharan Region], (IFRI, Paris, 2010), 6, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/peduzzi_physiognomie_et_enjeux_des_trafics.pdf

dollars, which facilitated their domination of the northern regions of Mali.²⁵ Also, Thiola posits that during 2010, in the ungoverned northern zone of Mali, an armed group defeating the legal authority could amass around \$300,000 monthly just for escorting drug convoys from the north of Mali to Niger.²⁶

In addition, according to the Financial Action Task Force, other confirmed sources of funding for terrorist groups in Africa include the extortion of funds from the local population, robbery, kidnapping for ransom, and cattle and other livestock rustling.²⁷ Further, William Lind warns that other activities, including the physical transportation of cash, the trafficking of Rivotril (a pharmaceutical drug), weapons trafficking, the trafficking of luxury cars, human trafficking, oil and cigarette smuggling, piracy, cybercrime, and fraud are also suspected sources of funding for terrorism in Africa.²⁸ Moreover, the FATF reports that terrorist groups provide financial support and weaponry to each other in their respective operations.²⁹ Nevertheless, Makarenko believes that a deficiency of sponsorship leads terrorist groups to engage in organized crime all around the world.³⁰

3. Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency

Finally, resolving an insurgency requires knowing more than just how the group gathers resources; countering an insurgency also requires direct responses. Defining insurgency, David Kilcullen refers to a group of people or an organized movement using

²⁵ Adebayo E. Ayedemy, *Terrorism and transnational security threat in Africa: Global perspective*, (Bloomington: Xlibris Corporation, 2015), Chapter 3, [https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=o_pTCgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT10&dq=Adebayo+E.+Adeyemi,+Terrorism+and+Transnational+Security+Threats+in+West+Africa::+A+Global+Perspective+\(Bloomington:+Xlibris+Corporation,+2015\)&ots=4UnmNmV3H&sig=Bbyg4YewsVxjN7GRhYDo3ryrkNc#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=o_pTCgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT10&dq=Adebayo+E.+Adeyemi,+Terrorism+and+Transnational+Security+Threats+in+West+Africa::+A+Global+Perspective+(Bloomington:+Xlibris+Corporation,+2015)&ots=4UnmNmV3H&sig=Bbyg4YewsVxjN7GRhYDo3ryrkNc#v=onepage&q&f=false)

²⁶ Boris Thiola, “Cocaïne : Révélation sur la poudrière Malienne, *Journal Express*,” May 28, 2015, https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/cocaine-revelations-sur-la-poudriere-malienne_1683121.html.

²⁷ The Financial Action Task Force (FATF): *Terrorism Financing in West and Central Africa*, 1–36, <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Terrorist-Financing-West-Central-Africa.pdf>.

²⁸ The Financial Action Task Force (FATF): *Terrorism Financing in West and Central Africa*.

²⁹ The Financial Action Task Force.

³⁰ Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism,” *Global Crime*, 6:1, (Feb 2004) 129–145.

subversive acts and armed conflict against the state authority to overthrow it.³¹ Kilcullen adds that the insurgents could also be a group of people with ethnic, cultural, or identity grievance, or they could be a political organization trying to undermine the existing authority while looking for power.³² Under both definitions, insurgency directly challenges and undermines the sociopolitical order of the country in which it breaks out.

According to Todd Sandler, countering terrorism needs the participation of all state actors and international organizations.³³ Sandler also stresses that by applying a defensive mechanism, states' targets will be difficult to reach, making terrorist attacks more expensive and consequently hampering their success.³⁴ He maintains that the offensive approach focuses much more on proactivity. Instead of protecting targets by shielding or defensive measures, the proponents of the offensive approach deal with the terrorists by destroying their nests, killing members, and curtailing their funding.³⁵

These approaches can also be combined. Jessica Piombo believes that the United States' counterterrorism initiative is a combination of military, governmental, and societal efforts focusing on the reinforcement of the states' capacity through assistance to the security forces, prevention, and humanitarian actions to guarantee effectiveness in the war against terror.³⁶ In Piombo's view, because the rise of terrorism is the result of state failure in several domains, addressing the flaws of the security, humanitarian and governance sectors are the chosen areas of many partners' actions against terrorism.³⁷ For instance, the U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Somalia and Kenya focuses more on building security forces' capacities. Likewise, the European Capabilities-building

³¹ David Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency: Fighting Back," *Farman Street Media Inc.* (blog), June 2017, <https://fs.blog/2017/06/counterinsurgency/>.

³² Kilcullen.

³³ Todd Sandler, "Terrorism and counterterrorism: an overview," *Oxford Economic Papers*, 67, Issue 1, (January 2015), 12–13, <https://academic.oup.com/oep/article/67/1/1/2913015>.

³⁴ Sandler.

³⁵ Sandler.

³⁶ Jessica R. Piombo, "Terrorism and U.S. Counter-Terrorism Programs in Africa: An Overview Strategic Insights," *Center for Contemporary Conflict* 6, no. 1 (January 2007), 5. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a520353.pdf>.

³⁷ Piombo.

Mission (EUCAP) and the European Training Mission (EUTM) are not only training Mali's military but also strengthening the capacity of civilians to help solve the problem.

D. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES

To address the insurgency in Mali, with its entanglement with terrorism and organized crime, in addition to the national and international approaches to the crisis in Mali, the most effective strategy will be to attack the core problem of bad governance by promoting democracy and addressing the economic and political aspirations of the population, which can stop the escalation of violence.

Good governance is likely to be the most effective strategy because the military responses to the Tuareg insurgency and its affiliated terrorist groups are not resolving the problem, but contributing to its escalation. In the previous cases of Somalia, Nigeria, and Mali, the military responses to the crisis have shown limited results. The military approaches displayed against Al-Shabaab in Somalia displaced the group from Mogadishu but occasioned the spread of its influence to bordering countries (Kenya and Uganda). The same situation happened in Nigeria in 2009, with the radicalization and expansion of Boko Haram in West Africa after the military operation of the Joint Task Force killed the charismatic leader of the group. As in Mali, after the Serval Operation, logistically supported by the United States, the terrorist groups' progress was stopped in Mopti (in the center of Mali), but the Malian population, as well as the international peacekeepers, continue to be targeted by terrorist attacks in the country.

The considerable human and economic resources invested in responding to the African crisis through counterterrorism efforts, as well as humanitarian and peacekeeping, merit serious reflection on prevention. Williams notes that in countering terrorism, political solutions like prevention should come before the offensive and defensive solutions.³⁸ Prevention reduces the number of sympathizers, producing a tangible effect with less effort. Thus, preventive methods can divert the hopeless from

³⁸ Cindy Williams, "Paying for the War on Terrorism: U.S. Security Choices since 9/11, Real Homeland Security," (presentation, ECAAR Panel on "ASSA Meetings, San Diego, California, January 5, 2004), 3, <https://worldpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/williams.pdf>.

joining the insurgents, because many of their partisans believe they can receive from the groups the comfort and security that the state has failed to provide them.

Economically, cutting the funding of the insurgent groups weakens their operability. Insurgent and terrorist groups are non-state actors, and their subsistence results from illegal activities. By establishing mechanisms that target the funding of an insurgency, every single country will succeed in decreasing the scourge of instability without bloodshed. It is commonplace that acquiring weapons and retaining combatants requires financial support. Shutting off the tap providing cash flow is therefore an important step in the fight against insurgency.

Thus, attacking the core problem of power distribution by the promotion of democracy and addressing the political and economic aspirations of the population can stop the escalation of violence. Military, political, and economic responses must be simultaneously implemented to deal with insurgency. For instance, by addressing some political and economic grievances of the population of Casamance, Senegal succeeded to downgrade three decades of crisis with the Movement of Democratic Force of Casamance (MFDC), which sought the independence of the Southern region from Senegal. In addition, the relative peace observed during the implementation of the peace agreements between the insurgent groups and the government of Mali in 1991 and 1996 revealed the importance of addressing insurgents' political and economic grievances.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

The foundation of this research is the literature on countering insurgency, terrorism, and organized crime, which is instrumental to analyzing the multi-dimensional crisis Mali has experienced since 2012. This thesis evaluates the causes of that crisis—i.e., the Tuareg insurgency and its connection to terrorist groups, as well as their funding—and the national and international responses to the situation. The failure of national and international responses to the Boko Haram case in Nigeria contributes to our understanding of the Malian situation. As such, this thesis will use Boko Haram in Nigeria as case study. This comparison is particularly instructive, as the similarities and uniformities of the Boko Haram insurgency with that of the Tuareg of Mali help to

maximize our knowledge on insurgency in West Africa and measure the success of the counter-insurgency approaches in the region. This comparison serves as the basis for policy recommendations.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

The remainder of this thesis is organized into four chapters: Chapter II focuses on the Tuareg insurgency in Mali from 1960 to 2012, particularly on its connection with terrorist groups and organized crime, and the responses of the successive governments in Mali and by the international community. Chapter III examines the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria, from its initiation to its escalation through its motives, grievances, and funding, as well as the responses against the group. Chapter IV seeks to answer the research questions and test the hypotheses. Particularly, drawing from the two case studies, this chapter aims to highlight the relationship between insurgency, terrorism, and transnational organized crime and the effects of this interconnected threat on the stability of Mali and Nigeria. Chapter V proposes recommendations to respond to instability in Mali and offers conclusion.

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II. INSURGENCY-TERRORISM NEXUS AND RESPONSES

A former French colony, Mali became independent in 1960 and since then has experienced several insurgent movements, mainly in the northern part of the country. The Tuareg insurgencies in the first years of independence were neutralized by the military, and the government of Mali started serious negotiations with the insurgents in the 1990s. The Tuareg were dissatisfied, however, with how these negotiations addressed their grievances relating to the improvement of the region and the living conditions of the population. Meanwhile the downfall of Muammar Kaddafi led to the 2012 crisis, with the Tuareg combatants returning from Libya and reaching Mali with their military equipment to join the insurgent group of MNLA. The MNLA insurgents then mixed with terrorist groups and took control of the northern regions. The ensuing violations of human rights and the threat to Mali's territorial integrity caused by this nexus of insurgents and terrorist groups raised concerns among the national and international communities. Mali has used political, economic, and military approaches to respond to the crisis, which did not achieve tangible successes, thus leading to the sequential Tuareg rebellions.

This chapter encompasses four sections. The first section analyzes the grievances and modus operandi of the Tuareg insurgency and its connection to terrorist groups, which is important for understanding the dimension of the crisis in 2012. The second section focuses on these same issues with respect to the groups (insurgent and terrorist) involved in the 2012 crisis, composed of both secessionist and religiously motivated groups. The third section of this chapter studies the funding of the groups, which provides insight into possible mechanisms that can prevent the groups from receiving support as a way to weaken and counter them. The last section will scrutinize the national and international responses that the Malian government and partner countries have implemented to counter the crisis.

A. TUAREG INSURGENCY AND ITS CONNECTION TO TERRORIST GROUPS

The Tuareg are an ethnic group in Mali living primarily in the northern regions. Among the nomadic, pastoral, and desert peoples living in North Africa, Tuaregs are known as “Blue Men of the Desert” because of the indigo dye used in their traditional clothing. According to Alexander and Lebovich, in 2012, the Tuareg population was estimated at around 1.5 million people, dispersed across Algeria, Mali, Niger, Libya, Algeria, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania; the largest concentration, numbering 50,000, live in Mali.³⁹ The Tuaregs form less than 10 percent of the Malian population and are mostly Muslim; they are ethnically related to the Berbers.⁴⁰ Well-adapted to the severe temperature of the desert, Tuaregs speak Tamasheq. According to Salomon, the Tuareg are the dominant ethnic group in the north of Mali, a region that includes Gao, Timbuctou, and Kidal, and the majority practice pastoral nomadism.⁴¹

Tuareg society encompasses tribes and clans, strictly organized by class, including the nobles, the freemen, and the slaves. In the traditional Tuareg culture, the nobility and the freemen depend on slaves for physical labor and are supposed to take care of the slaves and their families. In the past, they levied taxes on farmers living along the Niger River for exploiting land the Tuareg believed to be theirs. This situation continued until the arrival of white people during colonization in 1892, and further until independence in 1960.

³⁹ Alexander Thurston and Andrew Lebovich. *A Handbook on Mali's 2012–2013 Crisis*, Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa, (2013), 9, <https://buffett.northwestern.edu/documents/working-papers/ISITA-13-001-Thurston-Lebovich.pdf>.

⁴⁰ Kalifa Keita, “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 9, no. 3, (1998):105-108, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592319808423221>. Berbers are the descendants of the pre-Arab inhabitants of North Africa. Their population is scattered across Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania. They speak various Amazigh languages belonging to the Afro-Asiatic family related to Ancient Egyptian. Tamasheq is a variety of Tuareg languages spoken by Tuareg people mainly in Timbuctou and Kidal in Mali.

⁴¹ Hussein Solomon Mali: West Africa's Afghanistan, *The RUSI Journal*, 158, no. 1(2013), 11, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2013.774635> To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/030>

The Tuareg insurgency in the north of Mali took a decisive negative turn in 2012. During the fourth rebellion,⁴² when national and international opinions focused on reestablishing constitutional order after the military coup of March 21, 2011, the insurgent groups came to an agreement with some violent extremist organizations to fulfill their goals. The terrorist groups such as AQIM and MUJAO, along with MNLA and Ansar Dine, conducted the killing of many soldiers, civilians, and the displacement of thousands of others. The coalition of insurgent and terrorist groups routed the Malian army and took control of the northern regions in 2012. However, the parties were not unified in their aims: MNLA sought the independence of Azawad, while Ansar Dine, AQIM, and MUJAO desired the creation of an Islamic State in Mali.

B. PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS: GRIEVANCES AND MODUS OPERANDI

MNLA in its essence is a secessionist group, while Ansar Dine and allies as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA or MUJAO) are extremist Islamic groups. According to Morten et al., the state's failure to provide the basic needs to the population enabled terrorist groups to conquer slowly but surely in the north of Mali, seducing and building the confidence of the local population before the implementation of Sharia by AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO.⁴³ The marriage between the MNLA and its allies did not last long amid their divergent political and religious goals. According to Arieff, MNLA ultimately became a

⁴² In the first and second rebellions (1960s and 1990s), the insurgents called for [?] the development of the Northern regions and the betterment of people's living conditions. The secessionist claims surrounding Azawad started in the third insurgency of 2006. The Malian government's promises to address the grievances of the insurgents in peace agreements ended the second and third rebellion before the blowout of the complex uprising of 2012. See Kalifa Keita, "Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali," 102–128, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592319808423221>, and Stephanie Pezard, Michael Shurkin, *Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreement, Local Conflict, and the Prospect for a Durable Settlement*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR892/RAND_RR892.pdf.

⁴³ Morten Bøås and Liv Elin Torheim, "The Trouble in Mali—Corruption, Collusion, Resistance," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 7 (August 2013): 1279–92, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.824647>.

victim of its former allies when it evicted from the conquered territories shared by AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine.⁴⁴

The objective of MNLA was the creation of Azawad independent state while AQIM and allies targeted the creation of an Islamic States in the north of Mali. Notwithstanding that divergence, the involved groups all together implemented asymmetric warfare, blending terrorist methods in their operations. Thus, the groups in addition to their connection to organized crime often carry out surprise gunmen attacks, suicide bombing and killing through improvised explosive devises across the continent. According to Boeke, both the jihadist groups (AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO) and MNLA used violence to affect the targeted people and trigger responses, but the former stressed the implementation of its religious ideology versus MNLA's political ambitions.⁴⁵

1. National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)

Tuareg insurgents and combatants from Libya created the National Movement for the Independence of Azawad in October 2011, initially under the leadership of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. Bahanga died in 2011 near Kidal in conditions not yet elucidated and was replaced by Bilal Ag Cherif. The primary goal of the MNLA was secession from Mali and the creation of an independent secular state called Azawad.⁴⁶

The MNLA has both political and military branches. Part of the political wing of MNLA was based in Paris, with the mission of diffusing the group's secessionist ideology across the world. Backed by the French, Mossa Ag Attaher, the spokesman and political representative of MNLA in Europe, benefited from access to the French media

⁴⁴ Alexis Arieff, and Johnson Kelly, *Crisis in Mali*, CRS Report no. R42664, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2013), 3, http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/ordbog/mord/mali_2013.pdf.

⁴⁵ Sergei Boeke, "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, Insurgency, or Organized Crime?," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 5 (2016): 920, <https://doi.org/1080/09592318.2016.1208280>.

⁴⁶ Azawad is the territory between Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger of the regions of Gao, Timbuctou, kidal and part of Mopti, which equals to 65 % of Malian territory, https://www.google.com/search?rlz=1C1GCEA_en&q=map+of+Azawad&tbn=isch&source=univ&sa=X&ved=2ahUKewjT2KuPiZngAhUTCDQIHRAqDdsQsAR6BAGEEAE&cshid=1548973891800055&biw=1920&bih=920#imgc=I8r7rR7sAPrHcM.

to spread propaganda against the government of Mali. For instance, after the occupation of the three counties of the North, MNLA declared the independence of Azawad on April 6, 2012. France 24 and several other European media outlets released this declaration.⁴⁷ Azawad's independence declaration had no effect because ignored by foreign governments and automatically refuted by Ansar Dine. According to Omar Hamaha, chief of Ansar Dine's army, their group did not recognize MNLA's declaration of independence because their goal was the expansion of Sharia in the entire country of Mali and not fulfilling political motives.⁴⁸

The MNLA also has a military branch. Amid the Malian military mutiny and coup in March 2012, some 1,600 Tuaregs in the Malian army deserted to join the MNLA movement.⁴⁹ This defection in the army to the benefit of the insurgency helped consolidate the military branch of the MNLA, which engaged in an ongoing battle against the Malian army to free the north from Malian authority. Nevertheless, this branch of MNLA, despite including members of the principal ethnic groups in the north of Mali (Songhai, Arab, Fula and Tuareg), was weak compared to the religiously-motivated groups in the north; as result, those groups took control of the northern region, leaving MNLA with no territory of its own. Concerning the size of the military branch of MNLA, sources differ widely on the number of combatants estimated between 1,000 and 10,000. On one hand, Hama Ag Sid'Ahmed, spokesperson of MNLA, posited in 2015 that the Azawad national army had more than 3,000 combatants, comprising combatants from MNLA, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), and the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA).⁵⁰ On the other hand, Mohamed Ag Najem, the chief of the military

⁴⁷ "Proclamation de l'Indépendance de l'Azawad" [Azawad's Independence Proclamation], YouTube, video, 5:55, April 6, 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u-lkOHuUG4E>.

⁴⁸ "Tuaregs Claim 'Independence' from Mali," *Al Jazeera*, last modified April 20, 2012, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/20124644412359539.html?xif=>.

⁴⁹ Susanna D. Wing, Mali: Politics of a crisis, *African Affairs* 112, no. 448, (July 2013), 476–485, <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adt037>.

⁵⁰ *Le Point Afrique*, Mali - MNLA: "Pas de Liens entre les Touaregs et les Terroristes [No Connection between Tuaregs and Terrorists]," June 10, 2015, http://afrique.lepoint.fr/actualites/hama-ag-sid-ahmed-mnla-les-gens-du-nord-ne-se-sont-jamais-sentis-maliens-10-06-2015-1935250_2365.php.

branch, believes that its army is majority Tuareg and counts about 10,000 combatants.⁵¹ In any case, the weakness of MNLA's military branch was displayed after its clash with Ansar Dine in 2012, resulting from its expulsion from the occupied regions by AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine for the application of Sharia.

2. Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

AQIM is a terrorist organization, which comes from the Salafist Group for Preaching, and Combats (GSPC) based in Algeria. Created in 1998, the GSPC signed allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2006 and became AQIM. Founded by Abdelmalek Droukdel, AQIM operates and intends to spread Sharia in West Africa. In 2013, an estimated 1,000 combatants divided into five brigades composed the group.⁵² AQIM is today the greatest transnational threat in North and West Africa due to its growth and diversity of combatants.⁵³ According to Matei, since 1992, the successive governments of Mali focused on responding to internal threats, which severely weakened the army's capacities, allowed AQIM, and its affiliates to take control of the north in 2012.⁵⁴ With its Islamic, expansionist ideology, AQIM played an important role in the Malian crisis of 2012 by invading the northern region with combatants and backing Ansar Dine against MNLA in their different clashes. AQIM mostly operated in the region of Timbuktu, considered in Mali to be a holy land and internationally recognized as a UNESCO cultural heritage site. The destruction of religious symbols, such as mausoleums, and the strict application of Sharia law marked the presence of AQIM in Timbuktu. According to

⁵¹ Arnault Juvre, "Forces et Groupes Armés au Mali: qui est qui? [Milestones Forces and armed groups in Mali: who is who?]," *Repères*, March 2016, doi: 20160318-echiquier-malien-groupes-armes-azawad-aqmi-fama_.

⁵² Juvre.

⁵³ Andre Le Sage, "The evolving threat of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb." *Institute for National Strategic Studies* SF no.268, (2011):1, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/134649/SF%20268%20Le%20Sage.pdf>.

⁵⁴ Cristiana Matei, "The Case of Mali," in *Security Forces in African States: Case Assessment*, ed. Paul Shemella and Nicholas Tomb (New York: Cambria Press, 2017), 106.

Martin, AQIM's tenure in Timbuktu was detrimental not only to the culture but to the population, which was subject to amputations, stoning, lashes, and forced marriage.⁵⁵

Following the guidelines of Al Qaeda, its mentor organization, AQIM's objectives encompass the elimination of Western influence—mainly French and American—from North and West African countries and the installation of fundamentalist regimes and Sharia law. According to West Point's Combatting Terrorism Center, AQIM aims to overthrow the governments of Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia—all of which it considers to be apostate—and install in their place a fundamentalist regime ruled by Islamic law.⁵⁶ The threat is still present in Mali; despite frequent divisions, the group remains powerful. In 2015, the Malian General Directorate of States Security (DGSE) reported that due to the multiple divisions within the group, AQIM has around 200 combatants of three brigades in the Sahara.⁵⁷ The announcement in 2017 of the creation of Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), resulting from the fusion of AQIM, Ansar al-Dine and al-Mourabitoun, further denotes AQIM's capacity to resurrect itself in pursuit of its ideology to expand Sharia in West Africa.⁵⁸

3. Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa MOJWA (MUJAO)

Internal problems relating to leadership and ideology led to the division of AQIM in September 2011; MUJAO formed as one of the successors to AQIM. Founded by Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou, it was involved in the Malian crisis of 2012, with 500 to 1,000 combatants divided into four sections.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Gaasholt Ole Martin. "Northern Mali 2012: The Short-lived Triumph of Irredentism," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 35, no. 2 (2013): 85–86, <https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/Legacy/sitefiles/file/46/1322/08gaasholtp6891.pdf>.

⁵⁶ Geoff D. Porter, AQIM's Objectives in North Africa, CTC Sentinel 4, no. 2, (Feb. 2011), <https://ctc.usma.edu/aqims-objectives-in-north-africa/>.

⁵⁷ Arnaud Juvre, "Forces et Groupes Armés au Mali: qui est qui?" "[Milestones Forces and Armed Groups in Mali: who is who?].

⁵⁸ Counter Extremism Project, "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)," 3, https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/threat_pdf/Al-Qaeda%20in%20the%20Islamic%20Maghreb%20%28AQIM%29-11102018.pdf.

⁵⁹ Juvre.

This group identified itself as a regional movement focused on spreading Islam in West Africa, rather than taking a global Islamic view.⁶⁰ Profiting from the disorder in the region in 2012, MUJAO concentrated on recruiting more combatants, even from the south, to consolidate its position. According to Martin, MUJAO in 2012 became very strong in its religious propaganda, implementing Sharia in the north of Mali and subsequently expelling the MNLA from Gao for not sharing its religious agenda.⁶¹

Also, in 2012, MUJAO took over most of the armaments that MNLA acquired from the barracks abandoned by the military deserters, allowing the group not only to control the region of Gao but to extend its power to the center of the country toward the region of Mopti. According to *State for Worldview*, in late 2012, MUJAO extended its control over neighboring cities from its position in Gao, including two principal towns of Mopti, Douentza, and Tininkoun.⁶² The progression of the terrorist group continued to the town of Konan, located at 30 minutes from the chief town of Mopti, before the French Serval operation stopped it on January 11, 2013.

4. ANSAR DINE

Ansar Dine is originally a Malian-based, religiously motivated group. Maintaining a relationship with AQIM and MUJAO—and sharing the same motivation of spreading Sharia—Ansar Dine enabled the involvement of these groups in the occupation of the northern regions of Mali in 2012.

Iyad Ag Agaly, the former rebel leader who played an essential role in the 1992 and 1996 peace agreements between the Malian government and the Tuareg rebel groups, created Ansar Dine, the “defender of the faith,”⁶³ in December 2011. The creation of Ansar Dine occurred a few months after the nomination of Bilal Ag Cherif as the lead of

⁶⁰ Mapping Militant Organization: Movement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) [Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa], Stanford University, Aug. 2016, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/631>.

⁶¹ Martin, 85.

⁶² “Jihadist Groups Active in Northern Mali,” Stratfor, accessed November 15, 2018, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/jihadist-groups-active-northern-mali>.

⁶³ John Pike, “Ansar Al Din (Defenders of the Faith),” GlobalSecurity.org, last modified March 3, 2017, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ansar-al-din.htm>.

MNLA in 2011. In response to the selection of Cherif and the primarily political motivations of MNLA, Ag Agaly created Ansar Dine, an Islamic group oriented to the spread of Sharia throughout Mali, to compete with MNLA. Aware of its military weakness, since its inception Ansar Dine was closer to AQIM, from which it received substantial support. According to Martin, the cozy relations between Ansar Dine and AQIM—including shared conquered territory between the two groups—created frustrations among MNLA’s members competing with Ansar Dine.⁶⁴ As in the case of MNLA, part of the arsenal of Ansar Dine as well as combatants came from Libya.

Ansar Dine succeeded in applying Sharia in Kidal in 2012. For example, Martin writes that in Kidal, a couple was stoned to death in 2013 because of adultery, and others received lashes for misconduct; additionally, smoking, drinking alcohol, listening to music and playing collective sports were banned.⁶⁵ The complicity with AQIM allowed Ansar Dine to strengthen its position and build a strong army, and continues to threaten the stability of Mali. In 2015, Ansar Dine claimed some attacks in the south of Mali and sent its members to conquer Cote d’Ivoire and other countries in the region.⁶⁶

C. FUNDING OF THE INVOLVED GROUPS

The socio-political situation in Mali, coupled with the country’s geography, has made the northern regions more vulnerable to illegal activities such as human, drug, and cigarette trafficking, as well as kidnapping for ransom. MNLA, AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine have been actively involved in these types of illegal activities in order to sustain their revolutionary movement, making use of Mali’s porous borders with Mauritania, Algeria, and Niger. Though Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal are well known for their secular trade and arts activities, in the 2000s, smuggling affected commerce and changed the nature and the quality of people involved in the trade. Thus, in addition to donations coming from rogue countries, the terrorist groups in the north of Mali have engaged in drug trafficking, smuggling, and kidnapping to finance their activities.

⁶⁴ Martin, 77–79.

⁶⁵ Martin, 85.

⁶⁶ Juvre.

1. Illicit Trade

One way the insurgent and terrorist groups in northern Mali have funded themselves is through illicit trade, either by participating directly or by offering protection to others in the business, so to speak. According to Bakrania, AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO developed partnerships in illicit trade, and their combatants mutually support the accomplishment of the activity.⁶⁷ Laremont notes that the traffic of cocaine, hashish, and counterfeit tobacco are part of AQIM's revenue through the dealers' protection against perception of certain amount of money.⁶⁸ Since 2012, a flourishing illegal trade network prevails in the controlled zones in the north of Mali for the wealth of the parties.

The actors based in the north of Mali took advantage of the new dynamics of international cocaine smuggling to gain a role in its trade. Because the terrorist groups controlled the region, they took advantage of drug trafficking by facilitating the trade of cocaine from South America to Europe through the Sahara Desert. The example of "Air Cocaine" in 2009 at Kidal is illustrative. This airplane, containing ten tons of cocaine, was easily discharged and dispatched in the desert of Mali. Not only did security forces fail to seize the drug before it crossed the boundaries of Mali, but also the investigations into it failed to achieve any successful results.

Luca Raineri and Francesco Strazzari believe that Mali is one of the transit countries most afflicted by cocaine streams in West Africa; they highlight the significant quantity of drugs routed by 4x4 vehicles across the Sahara desert after the landing of "Air Cocaine."⁶⁹ According to UNODC, the growth of drug trafficking West Africa is directly linked to terrorism, with a significant involvement of AQIM in cocaine and cannabis

⁶⁷ Shivit Bakrania, *Conflict Drivers, International Responses and the Outlook for Peace in Mali: A Literature Review* (GSDRC Issues Paper), Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2013, <http://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/IP14.pdf>.

⁶⁸ Ricardo René Larémont, "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Sahel," *African Security* 4, no. 4 (2011): 249, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2011.628630>.

⁶⁹ Luca Raineri and Francesco Strazzari, "State, Secession, and Jihad: The Micro Political Economy of Conflict in Northern Mali," *African Security* 8, no. 4 (2015): 253–54, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2015.1100501>.

distribution.⁷⁰ From 2014 to 2018, about 26 tons of cannabis, 42 kg of methamphetamines, 13 kg of heroin, and 9 kg of cocaine have been seized by the counter-narcotic agencies of Mali.⁷¹ A large quantity of hard drugs used in Mali comes from South America, while cannabis is produced by Burkina Faso and Ghana. All the terrorist groups are to some extent involved in drug trafficking in the north by direct involvement in or supporting the dealers.

In addition, cigarette smuggling is well developed in the region. This activity generates an important amount of money. As with drug traffickers, armed groups to whom they regularly pay tax protect cigarette smugglers. The cigarette smuggling in the region is mainly focused on the Marlboro brand and is controlled by Abu Khaled Belmokhtar, also known as Mister Marlboro, an AQIM supporter.⁷² Cigarette smuggling led by Mister Marlboro is not only destabilizing West African countries by financing terrorism, but also threatening the European economy through the flow of cigarettes from Algeria to France, thus demanding collective counter efforts.⁷³ From 2012 to 2016, smuggled cigarettes coming from Algeria to France increased by 300%.⁷⁴

2. Kidnapping for Ransom

The insurgent and terrorist groups in the northern crisis of Mali have also used kidnapping as a way to raise funds. Selective kidnapping of western NGO workers has granted them thousands of dollars per person. Laremont believes that AQIM has received

⁷⁰ UNODC West and Central Africa, “Mali Seizes Drugs and Arrests Traffickers and Drug Lords,” <https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/2017-07-10-mali-drug-seizures.html>.

⁷¹ Amadou B. Niang, “Mali: Saisie De Drogue Au Mali De 2014 à Juin 2018 [Drug Seizure in Mali from 2014 to 2018]”, *Mali Actu*, last modified January 19, 2019, <https://maliactu.net/mali-saisie-de-drogue-au-mali-de-2014-a-juin-2018-pres-de-26-tonnes-de-cannabis-42-kg-de-methamphetamine-13-kg-dheroine-9-kg-de-cocaine/>.

⁷² Born June 1, 1972, also known as the one-eyed, Nelson, the uncatchable, or mister Marlboro is an Algerian leader of the group Al-Murabitoun, former military commander of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, smuggler and weapons dealer. He was twice convicted and sentenced to death by the Algerian courts for terrorism and murder. He maintained a good relationship with Ansar dine and MUJUWA.

⁷³ Tomáš Zdechovský, “France’s Failure to Tackle Cigarette Smuggling Threatens Europe’s Safety-View,” *Euro News*, November 19, 2018, <https://www.euronews.com/2018/11/19/france-s-failure-to-tackle-cigarette-smuggling-threatens-europe-s-safety-view>.

⁷⁴ Zdechovský.

\$60 million–\$175 million from ransom after the negotiation of the release of Europeans engaged in humanitarian efforts or research on the crisis in the region.⁷⁵ Moreover, according to a CSS *Analysis in Security Policy*, AQIM has received in 2011 an average of U.S. \$5.4 million in ransom per hostage.⁷⁶ This example magnifies how kidnapping for ransom is essential to AQIM’s funding, if not its primary source of funding.

Furthermore, kidnapping for ransom has become the springboard for the other groups. Most of the terrorist groups evolving in the north of Mali take advantage of this activity, which is an easy way to collect considerable amounts of money. This activity not only sustains the basic needs of the combatants, including recruitment and training, but also ensures that the groups can acquire weapons. According to Lacher, from 2008, kidnapping for ransom has brought in \$65 million to AQIM, MUJAO, and connected intermediaries.⁷⁷

3. Human Trafficking

The insurgent and terrorist groups in the north of Mali have further diversified, raising funds by embracing human trafficking as part of their activities. Amid crisis and economic misery, immigration has become the easiest way for many sub-Saharan people to escape their plight, even if the modalities of this escape often are illegal. Molenaar and Janssen highlight that the smugglers in connection with the local population are running the human smuggling industry, which earns them a considerable amount of money.⁷⁸ Also, Laremont posits that, in addition to drug trafficking and kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking is part of AQIM and the Tuaregs’ activities toward the Mediterranean

⁷⁵ Larémont, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Sahel, African Security.”

⁷⁶ “Kidnapping for Ransom as a Source of Terrorism Funding,” *CSS Analysis in Security Policy No. 141*, October 2013, <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSS-Analysis-141-EN.pdf>.

⁷⁷ Wolfram Lacher, *Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012), 9, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahara-region-pub-49360>.

⁷⁸ Fransje Molenaar and Floor El Kamouni-Janssen, *Turning the Tide the Politics of Irregular Migration in the Sahel and Libya*, Clingendael, 23, https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2017/turning_the_tide/.

through Tripoli and Algeria, from which those seeking illegal migration embark with traffickers; they are often ill-treated, and their relatives are obliged to pay for their release even if most of them do not reach Europe.⁷⁹ The insecurity in the region, notably in Algeria, Libya, and Niger, makes the activity easier to undertake through the route of Agadez in the desert and via the Mediterranean from Libya. The ease with which the smugglers can travel across the Sahara with fewer impediments from security forces, as well as the openness of Libya to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea render this activity more profitable to its different players.

Mali is a zone of transit and a destination of human trafficking. From 2000 to 2007, 203 boys and 66 girls were trafficked abroad as reported by Malian officials.⁸⁰ According to the U.S. Department of State, Mali is deploying many efforts to respond to human trafficking, which concerns not only children and women but also adults generally, as highlighted by the official report in 2012, which revealed 32 cases involving 63 defendants.⁸¹ Many migrants have died in the desert because of the hard conditions of transport and others have been sold as slaves in Mauritania or Libya. Smith mentions that Gao is the safest stop of the candidates for immigration from the Sahara Desert to the Mediterranean, where he emphasizes the inhuman conditions of transport, which has only a 10 percent success rate to reach Europe.⁸² Likely, children and women are often victims of the same fate. Many of them have become sex slaves in exchange for the fees of the trip or exchange for their life because the executioner does not hesitate to attack their lives in case of disobedience.

⁷⁹ Larémont.

⁸⁰ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Global Report on Human Trafficking*, February 2009, 102, https://www.unodc.org/documents/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf.

⁸¹ U.S. Department of State, *Mali: 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report*, <https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2018/282703.htm>.

⁸² Alex Duval Smith, "Inside Mali's Human-trafficking Underworld in Gao," BBC Africa, last modified April 21, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32359142>.

4. Donations

Finally, the groups raise money through donations they receive from wealthy Muslims and organizations. Among the five principles of Islam, charity, also known as Zakat, occupies the fourth place. According to Lewis, Zakat is part of the tenets of Islam and extolled by the Quran, compelling every Muslim to redistribute 2.5 percent of their annual wealth to the needy in order to alleviate poverty in Islamic societies.⁸³ The groups receiving these donations are mostly presented as the defenders of Islam, preaching the good news of the Quran or promoting Quranic schools; however, some of them embrace terrorist activities. According to the CRU Report, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Libya, and Kuwait through Islamic NGOs took advantage of the weakness of Mali's efforts to promote education in the north to multiply madrasas schooling that often ends in radicalization.⁸⁴

In addition, some wealthy Muslims purposely support terrorist groups because they believe they are doing jihad, which compels all good Muslims to engage their body and wealth to support the religion against nonbelievers. Lewitt notes that the International Islamic Relief Organizations (IIRO) is the one the most prominent charity groups based in Saudi Arabia, with a strong link to Al Qaeda, and is suspected to have connections with fifty other terrorism-funding organizations around the world.⁸⁵ Thus, terrorist organizations in the Sahel regions benefit from a large amount of money distributed yearly from rich Muslim countries as donation or individuals as Zakat.⁸⁶ Also, the CRU Report highlights the increase of Saudi Arabian and Pakistani clerics in the region, leading to the conversion of many Tuareg to Wahhabism and the radicalization of Iyad

⁸³ Mervyn K. Lewis, "Islam and Accounting," *Accounting Forum* 25, no. 2 (2001): 118, <https://kantakji.com/media/2882/e123.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Grégory Chauzal and Thibault V. Damme, *The Roots of Mali's Conflict: Moving beyond the 2012 Crisis*, CRU Report 2005 (Clingendael, Nederland Institute of International Relations), 22–24, https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2015/the_roots_of_malis_conflict/1_the_failed_path_to_national_unity/.

⁸⁵ Mathew Levitt, *Charitable Organizations and Terrorist Financing: A War on Terror Status-Check*, (The Washington Institute, 2004), <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/charitable-organizations-and-terrorist-financing-a-war-on-terror-status-che>.

⁸⁶ Zakat: one of the pillars of Islam which is mandatory for all wealthy Muslims and consists of giving or distributing yearly 2.5% of their wealth to the poor or needy.

Ag Agaly, for which people questioned the exact motivations of religious NGOs in the north of the country.⁸⁷

D. RESPONSES TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TERRORIST AND INSURGENT GROUPS

The Tuareg insurgency has prompted the Malian authorities to undertake several responses to contain the situation. In addition, Mali's international partners, from Europe to the United States and the United Nations, have contributed strategies, resources, and manpower to rein in the threats in Mali's north. The military, diplomatic and economic approaches in the peace agreements and development projects were ineffective at ending the conflict in the north of Mali, and later necessitated the international community's engagement in the process. However, regarding the national and international responses, significant changes occurred in the settlement of the crisis, but many other efforts need to be undertaken for the stability of the whole country.

1. National Level

To respond to the successive Tuareg insurgencies, the government of Mali has implemented several methodologies. Typically, peace agreements are often followed by several months of calmness before the rise of a new insurgency.

Military operations ended the first insurgency of 1960s, after which Mali preferred negotiation to deal with the Tuareg insurgencies. From 1990 to 1996, the second rebellion, led by Iyad Ag Agaly, attacked military positions, the state's buildings and civilians. Because the leading cause of the second insurrection was related to demands for better living conditions, the insurgents reached an agreement with the government after several negotiation rounds led by Algeria and Libya. In 1991, the Tamanrasset agreement was signed and followed by the National Conference, which was concluded by the signing of the National Pact on April 11, 1992. Later, in 1996, during a ceremony named *Flame de la Paix*, the rebels were disarmed and their guns burned in

⁸⁷ Chauzal and Damme, 22–24.

front of many witnesses to symbolize the end of the rebellion.⁸⁸ Late in 1996, when the government was implementing the last agreement, the Tuareg took up arms against the nation, but organized under the Democratic Alliance for Change (ADC), during the first mandate of Alpha Oumar Konaré, the first President democratically elected in Mali. Once again, the leaders of Bamako chose to negotiate with the group. The negotiations began first in Algeria and finalized in Sebha, Libya in 2009.⁸⁹ Again, the insurgent groups did not care about the agreement and rebelled against the state, and another round of negotiations was opened.

Finally, in the late 2000s, the Tuareg insurgency in the north of Mali has taken a decisive turn. From living conditions grievances, the group shifted its demands towards secessionism. One year after the creation of the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad in October 2011, the fourth rebellion broke out just a few months before presidential elections. The situation worsened, with many soldiers killed by insurgents, spurring the military to ask for adequate equipment to counter the danger. Not fulfilling these requests resulted in a demonstration by military spouses at Kati and Bamako. Finally, on March 21, 2012, soldiers mutinying at Kati led to a military coup later in the evening. Taking advantage of this situation, when national and international opinions focused on how to reestablish constitutional order, the MNLA made an agreement with some violent extremist groups to take control of the north of Mali. While the MNLA sought the independence of Azawad, its allies dreamed of the creation of an Islamic State, as illustrated by the application of Sharia during the occupation.

2. International Responses

The international community in 2012 reacted to the Malian crisis, which had reached a multidimensional level. Several individual countries and organizations have been involved, including France, the United States, African Union, ECOWAS, the G5 Sahel, the European Union, and the United Nations.

⁸⁸ John Pike, "Tuareg - Mali - 1990–1996," GlobalSecurity.org, last modified May 4, 2012, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/tuareg-mali-1990.htm>

⁸⁹ Pike.

a. France

The Republic of France has been playing a tremendous role in the current crisis in Mali since the request for military intervention by the interim President Dionkounda Traore to his counterpart François Hollande. France's reaction came at the right time because one day before its military intervention, the terrorist groups attacked the town of Konan in the region of Mopti, which is less than 700 km from Bamako, the capital city of Mali. Dan Stigall notes that France took advantages of its forces already deployed in Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger and Chad to engage in quick and decisive strikes to stop the jihadists' progression toward the capital and to help Mali to regain confidence in the future of the fight against the insurgent groups.⁹⁰ Similarly, Boeke notes that the jihadists groups, after having evicted and defeated the Malian army in their progress toward the center of Mali, were surprised on January 13, 2012 by the French military intervention.⁹¹

The French counter-terrorist intervention in Mali, named Operation Serval (2012-2014), was successful because it stopped the terrorist groups in the north of Mali. Jean Christophe Notin mentions that the success of Serval started with the engagement of the Special Forces and the quality of intelligence enabling them to operate in the steep terrain with less collateral damage.⁹² After the strikes on the jihadist columns in Konan, which created severe damage and disorder in the terrorist groups, Operation Serval continued to fight the terrorist groups into their last confinement in the regions of Gao, Timbuctou, and Kidal by the end of March 2013. Stigall notes that the French military operation, in addition to killing many of the terrorist combatants including Ahmed El Telemsi, the creator of MUJAO, in 2014, it weakened the logistical and operational capacity of the terrorist groups by destroying their bases and dismantling drug trafficking networks, the

⁹⁰ Dan E. Stigall, "The French Military Intervention in Mali, Counter-Terrorism, and the Law of Armed Conflict," *Military Law Review* 223, no.1 (Jan. 2015): 13, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292401372>.

⁹¹ Sergei Boeke, "Transitioning from Military Interventions to long-term Counter-Terrorism Policy: The Case of Mali (2013–2016)," *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Studies*, (April 2016): 16, <https://doi.org/19165/2016.1.09>.

⁹² Jean Christophe Notin, *La Guerre de la France au Mali* (Paris: Edition Tallandier, 2014), 169–172.

primary funding of the groups.⁹³ While many witnesses believe that Operation Serval allowed Mali to recover one-third of its territory, other people are questioning the legality and the duration of the French army presence in the country. Referring to the involvement of West African soldiers in the war of Algeria, World War I and II alongside France, we can conclude that the two countries are historically linked, and France's commitment through Operation Serval was a type of recognition toward Mali.

At the end of Operation Serval, another French operation took over the fight against the terrorist menace in the Sahel region. The ongoing Barkhane contingent, composed of 3,000 soldiers, aims to enhance the counterterrorism efforts of Mali and other Sahel countries. The French Ministry of Defense posits that Operation Barkhane targets the capacity building of the recipient countries to defuse and defeat the current terrorist threat and prevent the settlement of new groups.⁹⁴

b. The United States

The United States' involvement in the Malian crisis was crucial, starting with its backing of Operation Serval and continuing through the implementation of diplomatic, economic and military responses to the crisis. According to Olsen, the United States backed Operation Serval by supplying aerial support as well as refueling aircraft and troop transport from African countries to Mali.⁹⁵ He also highlights United States' engagement in policymaking and the fight against terrorism through the State Department, the Pentagon, States Department, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).⁹⁶ The United States' presence in Mali through its agents seeks to achieve the pillars of its foreign

⁹³ Stigall, "The French Military Intervention in Mali, Counter-terrorism, and the Law of Armed Conflict," 14.

⁹⁴ Maxime H.A. Larivé, "Welcome to France's New War on Terror in Africa: Operation Barkhane," *The National Interest*, August 7, 2014, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-frances-new-war-terror-africa-operation-barkhane-11029>.

⁹⁵ Gorm Rye Olsen, "Fighting terrorism in Africa by proxy: the USA and the European Union in Somali and Mali," *European Security* 22, no.3 (2014): 290 to 94, <https://doi.org/1080/09662839.2014.884074>.

⁹⁶ Olsen, 290–94.

policy toward Africa, which drastically changed after September 11, 2001, by focusing on the promotion of democracy, the provision of an essential mechanism for economic development and assistance for peace and security. According to Olsten, the nature of the United States' assistance will not only prevent the deployment of U.S. troops on the ground, but also build the Malian force's capabilities through training and counseling so that they can themselves meet the challenges, as one way to bring African solutions to African problems.⁹⁷ The Security Governance Initiative (SGI) was initiated by President Obama during the United States' African Leader's Summit in August 2014 to give new vision to the security environment in Africa. Currently, the United States and Mali, with other recipient countries of SGI, are working together to develop the security sector's readiness to face the security challenges by being more accountable to civilians.

Also, the involvement of the U.S. has also been valuable when it helped the deployment of French troops, information collection methods, and the paramount effort it has been implementing through AFRICOM. In the single year of 2014, AFRICOM has organized ten exercises, 55 operations and 400 seminars with 49 African countries and the building of drone's surveillance bases in Djibouti, Niger, Kenya Burkina Faso, and Seychelles.⁹⁸

c. African Union (AU)

As a regional umbrella organization, the African Union was slow in taking action for several reasons, including its leadership conflicts and the difficulties in coming up with sound and possible decisions. During the AU's Peace and Security Council of the 315th meeting at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 23, 2012, Chairman Jean Ping invited the junta to a quick constitutional return and promised the sending of a commission to evaluate what is occurring in Bamako.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Olsen, 291.

⁹⁸ Les Vraies Raisons de la Guerre au Mali, YouTube vidéo, 57:06, produced by ARTE France 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8SQ7uOJ9tg>.

⁹⁹ African Union, "Communique of the Peace and Security Council 315th Meeting, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 23 March 2012," <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-comm-mali-23-03-2012-eng.pdf>

AU mostly relied on ECOWAS by backing the actions undertaken by ECOWAS during its 365th meeting and affirming its total backing to Alassane Ouattara and his mediators for their work in the settlement of the Malian crisis. Therefore, Lecocq et al. believe that the AU was less effective in Mali's mediation process because the organization faced internal challenges as well as leadership conflicts, which hampered its effectiveness.¹⁰⁰ The AU, instead of being a leader in the conflict was playing the secondary role.

d. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

After the military coup of 2012 and the invasion of three regions of the north, the regional community through the Economic Community of West African States engaged in the crisis resolution through several steps. Worrying about the return of constitutional order, it displayed many attempts to coerce the junta to renounce to the power. One ECOWAS measures was the imposition of an economic embargo on Mali forbidding any goods coming in and out. According to Lecocq et al., ECOWAS was so concerned by the crisis it hastily taught about the deployment of military force in Bamako to secure civilian power and even propose the nomination of Cheick Modibo Diarra as Prime Minister.¹⁰¹ Later, ECOWAS's involvement became necessary between not only the junta and the civilian power but also between Mali and the insurgent groups after the French intervention to kick out the nexus Salafist groups. Despite the return to constitutional order in April 2012, the chief of the junta Amadou Haya Sanogo continued to influence the state's power, if not menace it.¹⁰² For example, regarding the government of Dionkounda Traore, as Lecocq et al. note, "In mid-December, Captain Sanogo's men arrested Diarra, and he was forced to resign."¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Baz Lecocq et al., "One Hippopotamus and Eight Blind Analysts: a Multivocal Analysis of the 2012 Political Crisis in the Divided Republic of Mali," *Review of African Political Economy* 40, no. 137(June 2013): 354, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2013.799063>.

¹⁰¹ Lecocq et al., 354.

¹⁰² Lecocq et al., 347.

¹⁰³ Lecocq et al., 348.

Furthermore, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, president of Cote d'Ivoire and chairman of ECOWAS, appointed Blaise Compaoré, president of Burkina Faso, to lead the mediation between the Malian parties. The negotiation plot also opened the door to the creation of many other organizations wanting to take advantage of it. Boutellis and Zahar highlight that in June 2013, as a prelude to the presidential and parliamentary elections, the Malian protagonists met at Ouagadougou and settled the initial peace agreement, further finalized in Algeria.¹⁰⁴ In addition, to take advantage of the process conducted by ECOWAS, other groups or associations gathering northern inhabitants including Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) and the self-defense militia the Coordination of Patriotic Movements and Forces of the Resistance (CMFPR) were created in accordance with their ethnicity and grievances.

After the presidential elections in Mali in 2013, which culminated with the election of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, ECOWAS continued to be involved in the process of mediation to end the conflict in Mali. The latter round of peace negotiations took place in Algeria. Therefore, based on the size of the groups involved in the negotiations, it was hard and grueling at first, but they eventually reached agreement on some points. The most problematic point was the unity of Mali. According to Boutellis and Zahar, the Algerian-led mediation was so complex not only because of the parties involved but also because of the points of divergence, it took at least one year and went through five phases before reaching an agreement.¹⁰⁵ Thus, the mediation of ECOWAS was central in the Mali crisis. The inter-Malian dialogues began by off-siding the junta and finally ended through a peace agreement pre-signed in Alger and finalized at Bamako on May 15, 2015.

On the other hand, the Malian population was divided into proponents and opponents of ECOWAS's involvement in the crisis. The proponents of the junta believed

¹⁰⁴ Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joelle Zahar, *A Process in Search of Peace: Lessons from the Inter-Malian Agreement* (New York, NY: International Peace Institute (IPI), 2017), 10–11, <https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/IPI-Rpt-Inter-Malian-Agreement.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵ Boutellis and Zahar, 13–20.

that ECOWAS's conduct was no more than meddling in Mali's internal affairs. The most energetic political party to support the junta was the party of African Solidarity for Democracy and Independence (SADI), which in connection with other civil society organizations created the Popular Movement of March 22, 2012 (MP 22). Also, the Coordination of Patriotic Organizations of Mali (COPAM) created after the military coup, and composed associations advocated its membership to the junta and derecognized the transitory government of Dionkounda Traore. Thus, Bleck et al., argue that the junta followers, disappointed by the ATT's regime because they considered it non-democratic and defended the military coup as a way to rebuild democracy.¹⁰⁶ The junta backer's illustrated their defiance of the transitory president and his government by several attempts to sabotage the government's actions as well as the efforts of ECOWAS. According to Lecocq et al., on May 21, 2012, after a march organized by the supporters of the junta, helped by the military, they broke the presidential palace security barriers and beat the president to death.¹⁰⁷ At the same time, many of the political parties among which ADEMA, MPR, CNID, URD were backing ECOWAS and the transitory government despite military retaliation.

e. The G5 Sahel

Aware of the complexity of the situation in Mali, and the increase of terrorism and organized crime in the Sahel, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad decided to gather and create a regional cross-borders joint force dedicated to fighting against their common adversaries in the Sahel. According to Tull, the European Union is committed to supporting the G5 Sahel in its mission but prefers capability building with quick results rather than equipping a regional military force with a mission that could be diverted in the long run.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, during the first years of G5 Sahel under Malian

¹⁰⁶ Jaimie Bleck, Abdoulaye Dembelé, and Sidiki Guindo, "Malian Crisis and the Lingering Problem of Good Governance," *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 5, no. 1 (2016), <https://stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.457>.

¹⁰⁷ Lecocq et al., 347.

¹⁰⁸ Denis M. Tull, "Mali, the G5 and Security Sector Assistance: Political Obstacles to Effective Cooperation (SWP Comments, 52/2017)," German Institute for International and Security Affairs, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C52_tll.pdf.

leadership, the headquarters of the organization located in the fifth region of Mali, vanished in terrorist attack claim by Al Qaeda. According to France 24, a car bombing at the headquarters of G5 Sahel on June 29, 2018, killed five people, two soldiers and one civilian along with the two terrorists.¹⁰⁹ However, the terrorist attack against the headquarters did not stop the joint force actions; on the contrary, it motivated the countries to be more engaged in the fight. The perspicacity of the heads of states composing the G5 Sahel is now paying off because they changed the location of the headquarters and became more present in the field. Long accused of being in association with terrorist groups, the Qatar government joined the groups funding the establishment of the G5 Sahel's capacity by donating twenty four armored vehicles to the organization on December 2018, to support them fighting against terrorism and organized crime. In the same period, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) also promised to support G5 Sahel up to \$150 million.¹¹⁰

f. The European Union (EU)

The multi-dimensional crisis of 2012, with its corollary of the army failure and the loss of one-third of the Malian territory, led Europeans foreign ministers to meet on the case. On December 10, 2012, a crisis management concept in Mali endorsed by the EU foreign ministers concluded on the urgent necessity of establishing a training mission in Mali with the deployment of 200 instructors along with assistance and protection personnel during 15 months in Bamako for 12.3 million euros.¹¹¹ The European Union started the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) in 2013, and the European Union Mission to support the Malian Security Forces' Capabilities (EUCAP) in 2014.

EUTM was adopted based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2071 (2012) on Articles 42 and 43, through which the Council adopted Decision 2013–34

¹⁰⁹ “Headquarters of G5 Sahel anti-terror force attacked in central Mali,” *France 24*, video 1:08, June 30, 2018, <https://www.france24.com/en/20180629-attack-mali-g5-sahel-military-base>.

¹¹⁰ “Armed Forces of Mali receives 24 Storm APCs donated by Qatar,” *Army Technology*, January 3, 2019, <https://www.army-technology.com/news/armed-forces-mali-storm-apcs-qatar/>.

¹¹¹ Council of the European Union, “Press Release from the 3209th Council Meeting on Foreign Affairs, press release PRESSE 516 PR CO 72,” 10 December 10, 2012, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134152.pdf.

establishing the European Union training mission in Mali.³³ The first purpose of EUTM as noted in the resolution was to offer military assistance and training to the Malian armed forces, restore its military capability and enable them to conduct operations to recover the territorial integrity of the country.

In addition to the military training mission, the European Union, aware of the complexity of the threat, decided to set another mission to support the military already engaged in Mali. EUCAP Sahel Mali is the name of the mission created by Decision 2014/219 / CFSP on April 15, 2014 CSDP of the European Council. The objectives of this mission are to improve the rule of law by reinforcing the units' capacity in their daily job in coordination with MINUSMA and assist the reform of the security sector.¹¹² Through these organizations, the European Union magnifies its positive support to the Malian Defense and Security forces in their sovereign missions to meet the current insecurity challenges by training and providing equipment.

g. The United Nations (UN)

The United Nations have engaged in a timely manner to counter the terrorist invasion of Mali. In this connection, Stigall notes that the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2071 of October 12, 2012, and Resolution 2085 of December 20, 2012, requested the members to undertake all diplomatic and military efforts to help build the Malian security forces' capabilities.¹¹³ Thus, they can recover the totality of the territory and fight AQIM and its affiliate in the country, and the coordination of actions to rebuild state authority to rule the entire country. To achieve this mission, the U.N. deployed the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) composed of representatives of 21 African countries for one year. Because of the complexity of the situation, and the incapacity of AFISMA to deal with the challenges, in July 2013, the United Nations deployed international peacekeepers to Mali as part of the

¹¹² Official Journal of European Union, "Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP of 15 April 2014," <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0219&from=EN>.

¹¹³ Stigall, "The French Military Intervention in Mali," 12.

Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission. This mission superseded the earlier AFISMA in the number of soldiers, logistics and purposes to stabilize the country.

MINUSMA, since its inception, became the target of terrorist groups, and it is considered today to be one of the most dangerous peacekeeping missions of the United Nations. According to Kevin Sief, from 2014 to 2017, the peacekeeping mission of Mali has registered 118 deaths, placing MINUSMA among the deadliest U.N. missions in the world.¹¹⁴ Likewise, Boeke highlights that in 2015, MINUSMA counted a number of casualties never before recorded in any U.N. peacekeeping missions.¹¹⁵ The ubiquity of terrorism in the country that uses asymmetric methods to kill the maximum number of people is a challenge that MINUSMA and Malian authorities are facing. This situation led citizens to question the necessity of the peacekeeping mission in Mali. While some believe in the necessity of the mission, others think that MINUSMA is needless because it is unable to prevent terrorist attacks and provide stability despite the robustness of its mandate, the 13,289 troops and 1,920 police personnel deployed in Mali.¹¹⁶ Thus, some people believe that the building of the Malian security forces' capacities can be a good rampart of the stability of the country. Carvalho and Kumalo note that an alternative of the population's distrust on MINUSMA's goals should start with the building of the police forces' ability by providing training and necessary logistics for their mission instead of scattering efforts trying to perform everything jointly.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Kevin Sief, "The World's Most Dangerous U.N. Mission: The al-Qaeda Threat in Mali Presents a New Challenge to U.N. Peacekeepers," *Washington Post*, last modified February 17, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/02/17/the-worlds-deadliest-u-n-peacekeeping-mission/?utm_term=.98766e785532.

¹¹⁵ Boeke, "Transitioning from Military Interventions to Long-term Counter-terrorism Policy: The Case of Mali," 18.

¹¹⁶ "Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, Adopting Resolution 2423 (2018)," June 28, 2018, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13400.doc.htm>.

¹¹⁷ Gustavo de Cavalho and Liezelle Kumano, "Building the Capacity of the Malian Police: Why MINUSMA Needs to Think out of the Box," *Institute for Security Studies, Policy Brief 69* (October 2014), <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/184734/PolBrief69.pdf>.

E. CONCLUSION

To respond to the northern crisis, the Malian government implemented several peace agreements without success. At the turning point in 2012, ECOWAS played an essential role by its representatives, who managed everything necessary to persuade the junta to return to constitutional order, to establish a peace agreement and the reinforcing of the security forces' abilities. France's intervention not only saves Mali to collapse but also amplified its hegemony in Africa. Even though France's military intervention was salutary, it was criticized for supporting the political branch of MNLA, which is based in Paris and used international communication channels for propaganda. Also, the failure of Operation Serval to deal with Ansar Dine of Iyad Ag Agaly and the stopping of Malian troops from entering Kidal has sparked many interrogations. The United Nations also followed suit of its predecessor in settling the crisis when its security council adopted the resolution on the peacekeeping mission in Mali. Moreover, the United States through AFRICOM, USAID and other branches is deploying utmost military, diplomatic, and economic efforts for the stability of the Sahel region.

However, despite the paramount efforts and strategies implemented to stop the bloodshed resulting from instability, Mali is continuing to experience the dictate of insurgent and terrorist groups. On January 20, 2019, Malian Army Day, 10 UN peacekeepers were killed and 20 others injured in a terrorist attack targeting the camp at Aguelhok in the region of Kidal.¹¹⁸ Thus, insurgent and terrorist groups are the major obstacles to Malian stability, which response necessarily passes through the fulfillment of the entire population's socio-economic aspirations. Despite the tremendous effort already deployed, the country is still staggering and need more aid and assistance to counter the insurgency, terrorism and organized crime. For the goal of national reconciliation, it is essential for the Malian government to start with an inclusive development approach, which will challenge the power of violent groups who receive citizens' support.

¹¹⁸ "Ten UN Peacekeepers Killed in a Terrorist Attack in Northern Mali," UN News, January 20, 2019, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1030892>

III. THE CASE STUDY OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA

Like Mali, Nigeria is experiencing a social movement led by Boko Haram, the current moniker of an Islamic organization in Nigeria. Examining the case of Nigeria can therefore give insight into possible approaches to effectively combat the ongoing crisis in Mali. Originally an insurgent group against Nigeria's federal government and Western education, Boko Haram in 2000s, the group over time transformed and adopted deadly methods. Advocating the strict respect of the principles of the Holy Koran, Boko Haram radicalized and adopted a terrorist posture. The group increased its lethal actions in the last years of the charismatic leader Mohamed Yusuf and became more brutal and ubiquitous in Nigeria when Abubakar Shekau took control after the extrajudicial killing of Mohamed Yusuf.

This chapter will study the origins of Boko Haram from its initiation as an insurgent group to its current scale as a terrorist organization dedicated to the spread of Islamic law inside and around Nigeria. The chapter will continue by describing the grievances and modus operandi of Boko Haram, such as its targeting of Western education as sinful and its anger with the Nigerian government and its representatives for promoting what the group opposes. A section will also examine the funding of Boko Haram, as well as the national and international responses implemented against it. Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates that the fight against Boko Haram has not yet been successful as the group continues to grow by expanding to bordering countries.

A. BACKGROUND OF BOKO HARAM (BH)

Boko Haram, also known as Jama'atu Ahl As-Sunna Li d'awati Wal Jihad, or the Group Devoted to the Spreading of the Prophet Mohamad's Instructions and Jihad, is recognized as one of the most complex and lethal insurgencies in the history of Nigeria.¹¹⁹ Although Nigerian governments experienced several rebellions in the recent

¹¹⁹ Umar Aminu Mohammed, "Nigeria and the Boko Haram Sect: Adopting a Better Strategy for Resolving the Crisis," (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 18–27, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/34755>.

past including the Niger Delta militancy, Boko Haram is well-known for its influence and the unprecedented level of brutality it has carried out in the country. Nigeria with its population of 119,000,000¹²⁰ is divided into hundreds of ethnic groups, dominated by the Hausa, Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo, and sharing the religions of Islam and Christianity.¹²¹ Sect-like at the beginning, BH believes that the implementation of Sharia can help fight against depravity and corruption in Nigerian society.

Most scholars agree that Muhammad Yusuf established a religious sect between 1970 and 2009, and several changes took place before it became BH.¹²² Predominantly composed of Kanuri ethnic group members,¹²³ BH quickly reached national and international notoriety owing to the lethal nature of its actions and the ends it was seeking. BH radicalized over time by rebelling against the perceived wrongdoing of the government and clashing with Christians. In June 2009, after security agents detained several members of BH while riding motorbikes without a helmet in a convoy to bury a member who died in car accident, the group began to protest fiercely against the law. According to Friedman, the incident of the funeral procession was followed by protests from BH, which were militarily defused and resulted in the killing 700 people, among them Mohammed Yusuf, as well as the arrest of several combatants and the seizure of important bomb-making materials.¹²⁴

¹²⁰ "Nigeria Population" (LIVE), Worldometers, accessed on March 14, 2019, <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population/>.

¹²¹ Rotimi Suberu, "Federalism in Africa: The Nigerian Experience in Comparative Perspective," *Ethno Politics* 8, no. 1 (2009): 67–86, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449050902738846>.

¹²² Roman Loimeier, "Boko Haram: The development of a militant religious movement in Nigeria." *Africa Spectrum* 47, no. 2/3 (2012): 148, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23350455.pdf>. Abdulkareem Mohamed and Mohamed Haruna posit that Boko Haram was created between roughly 2000 and 2004 by Aminu Tashen-Ilimi in the village of Kannama in the state of Yobe in Nigeria. Abdulkareem Mohamed and Mohamed Haruna, *Paradox of Boko Haram* (Abuja, Nigeria: Moving Image Limited, 2010), 27–60.

¹²³ Zacharias P. Pieri and Jacob Zenn, "The Boko Haram Paradox: Ethnicity, Religion, and Historical Memory in Pursuit of a Caliphate," *African Security* 9, no. 1 (2016): 66–88, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2016.1132906>. The Kanuri people are an African ethnic group living largely in the lands of the former Kanem and Bornu Empires in Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon. The term Kanuri generally includes several subgroups and dialect groups, the largest of which is living in Nigeria (6,980,000 in 2013).

¹²⁴ Uri Friedman, "The Bike-Helmet Law That Helped Trigger an Insurgency in Nigeria: On Unintended Consequences, and Boko Haram's Murky Origins May 2014," *The Atlantic*, last modified May 22, 2014, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/05/the-bike-helmet-law-that-triggered-an-insurgency-in-nigeria/371301/>.

Mostly active in the northeast part of Nigeria where it was created and held bases, BH has stretched its impact into the nearby states including Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Boko Haram's actions in the region, as well as the Nigerian police counterinsurgency from 2009 and 2014, killed more than 7,000 people and displaced more than 3 million.¹²⁵ After the extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf by Nigerian police, Abubakar Shekau took control of the group. Boko Haram became more lethal than before and a great menace to the Nigerian government, which accordingly took many initiatives to counter it. Likewise, Boko Haram deployed strategies to defeat the Nigerian army by recruiting more combatants and killing as many soldiers as possible to defy the Nigerian state.

B. BOKO HARAM'S GRIEVANCES AND MODUS OPERANDI

BH targets Western education as sinful and aims for the rigorous application of Sharia in Nigeria and abroad. The group is implementing several terrorist methods to attain its objectives, including suicide bombings and sporadic shooting attacks and kidnapping targeting not only Nigeria, but also its bordering countries.

1. Grievances

Boko Haram primarily targets Western education, an effort controversial in the religious circle because many Muslims believe that Western education does not harm the ethical practice of the religion, and Boko Haram has failed to cite any passage of the Holy Koran that stipulates that Western education is sinful. Loimeier highlights that Boko Haram's contempt for Western education is based on criticisms written by Abubakar Abdallah, a Saudi Arabian Wahhabi scholar, depicting Western education as the source of all kinds of diversions and impediments to Muslim fulfillment.¹²⁶ By contrast, according to Umar Aminu Mohamed, it is unfair to treat a Muslim as an infidel only for accepting Western education.¹²⁷ Moreover, the attacks against European

¹²⁵ Virginia Comolli, *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency* (London, United Kingdom: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2015), 1, 2.

¹²⁶ Loimeier, "Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria," 149.

¹²⁷ Mohammed, "Nigeria and the Boko Haram Sect," 23.

education as sinful is not reflected in the behavior of Boko Haram's leaders, who demonstrated the opposite of what they claimed in their daily preaching. Muhammed concludes that, contrary to the vision of the sect against Western education and way of life, Yusuf, the leader of Boko Haram, led a Western-like lifestyle with luxurious cars, paying for the services of doctors and attorneys and even sending his child to Western schools.¹²⁸ In any case, despite its failure to convince the sizeable Muslim community of its reasons for attacking Western education, Boko Haram has never stopped promoting grievances against the West.

The killing of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 quickly shifted Boko Haram's motivations from targeting Western education to revenge killings against politicians, the military and the police, whom they considered responsible for the killing of their leader. According to Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, Boko Haram's revenge killing became the third step of its reorganization.¹²⁹ Boko Haram's hatred of Western education then reached the worldwide concern in 2014, with the abduction of 200 schoolgirls in the state of Borno. Agbiboa and Maiangwa believe that the abduction of the 200 girls of Chibok was the reply to the coercive methods used by Nigerian security forces to pressure Boko Haram leaders to the negotiation table by detaining over 100 wives and children of the sect leaders.¹³⁰

Moreover, Boko Haram has been animated by the creation of an Islamic Caliphate in which Sharia will be the overriding law. Abu Qaqa, the representative of Boko Haram in 2012, mentioned that the group was disappointed by the Nigerian leaders and promised to fight until the establishment of Sharia law in Nigeria and beyond.¹³¹ Clearly stated,

¹²⁸ Mohammed, 19.

¹²⁹ Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, "Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria," *West African Politics and Society*, series, no. 2 (2014): 10, <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/23853/ASC-075287668-3441-01.pdf?sequence=2-#page=19>.

¹³⁰ Daniel Agbiboa and Benjamin Maiangwa, "Why Boko Haram Kidnaps Women and Young Girls in North-Eastern Nigeria," *Conflict Trends* 2014, no. 3 (2014): 51–56, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/266798115_WHY_BOKO_HARAM_KIDNAPS_WOMEN_AND_YOUNG_GIRLS_IN_NORTH-EASTERN_NIGERIA.

¹³¹ Monica Mark, "Boko Haram Vows to Fight until Nigeria Establishes Sharia Law," *The Guardian*, last modified December 1, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/27/boko-haram-nigeria-sharia-law>.

the implementation of Sharia in Nigeria is one of the ultimate goals of Boko Haram. Thus, Boko Haram multiplied its attacks in the northern part of Nigeria to increase its domination and to conquer vast territories with no regard to other religious groups. According to Mohamed, the idea of an Islamic Caliphate darkened the vision of Boko Haram, which disregarded the established Islamic order and disrespected the religious leaders they considered to be corrupted and who favored Western culture in the country.¹³² He continues by arguing that the aim of establishing an Islamic state in Nigeria led Boko Haram to target most of the northern and central regions of the country, with endless consequences on the population. However, BH's aim of the creation an Islamic Caliphate was influenced by external proponents like Al Qaeda and ISIS, who believe in using this channel to reach their expansionist and ideological objectives.

2. Modus Operandi

Spreading violence is the operation model of BH. The starting point of this model was the killing of the former leader Yusuf. According to Comolli, the shared affinities of Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in 2010 was the beginning of its “internationalization” by scattering its influence throughout Nigeria’s border countries—Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and beyond in Mali—by its involvement in recruiting combatants and in operations for other terrorist groups.¹³³ According to Africano Abassa, BH has between 10,000 to 20,000 followers with a great range of young (7 to 30 years) including members from Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia and Sudan.¹³⁴

Jihad is the name given to the fight of Boko Haram against all the unbelievers around the world. Suranjan Weeraratne posits that Boko Haram had reached an astonishing level in the 2011 when it increased its numbers of attacks by diversifying its targets and locations from single police stations to the most prominent administrative buildings, undergoing a significant change in operations, as if to demonstrate its maturity

¹³² Mohammed, 24.

¹³³ Comolli, 50–1.

¹³⁴ Africano Abassa, “Ungoverned Spaces and the Survival of Terrorist Groups in Africa: A Case Study of the Lord’s Resistance Army,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 57, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36739877.pdf>.

and devotion in the fight.¹³⁵ By attacking the administrative buildings and other public places, Boko Haram defies the Nigerian government and demonstrates by the brutality of its operations how far it is willing to go. Likewise, Shekau never hesitates in his propaganda videos to warn the Nigerian president and sometimes Westerners of the group's commitment, and to communicate his belief that the fight will hurt the unfaithful everywhere in the world. The intro of a video released by Boko Haram on March 17, 2011 praised Abubakar Shekau as a hero terrifying the unbelievers around the world; in his speech, Shekau invited every Christian to convert to Islam, and he referred to European and American leaders by name, reminding them that the jihad is against them and their followers.¹³⁶ This drastic change mainly happened following BH's open connection to Al Qaeda, from which it received significant training and equipment. Thus, Jacob Zenn declares that after receiving significant bits of help from AQIM, Boko Haram conquered about 12,000 square miles in the northeastern part of Nigeria from 2013 to 2014—an area the size of the state of Maryland in the United States—and openly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.¹³⁷ To achieve its goals, Boko Haram excels in suicide bombings and sporadic gunmen attacks. Abassa in 2015 highlights that BH influenced not only the majority of the northern states of Nigeria (Borno, Adamawa, Kaduna, Bauchi, Yobe, and Kano), but also gained access to the biggest cities of Nigeria like Lagos and Abuja, when it was carrying out attacks, bombings and kidnappings, as well as in the bordering countries of Cameroon, Niger, and Chad.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ Suranjan Weeraratne, "Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 29, no. 4 (March 2015): 612, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1005742>.

¹³⁶ "Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau: 'Kill, Kill, Kill!'" *The New York Times*, video, 1:13, May 5, 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sLAKoJYTlFA>.

¹³⁷ Jacob Zenn, "Boko Haram's Conquest for the Caliphate: How Al Qaeda Helped Islamic State Acquire Territory," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, March 2018, 1–5, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1442141>.

¹³⁸ Abassa, "Ungoverned Spaces and the Survival of Terrorist Groups in Africa: A Case Study of the Lord's Resistance Army," 58.

3. Suicide Bombing

Suicide bombing occupied an important place in BH operations when Malam Abubakar Shekau became the leader of Boko Haram in 2009. He focused the fight on revenge against the perpetrators of the killing of his late mentor. Comolli notes that Shekau is more violent, never hesitating to use asymmetric methods, and always has the last word despite the thirty elders composing Boko Haram's decision-making council.¹³⁹ Just after Shekau took command, the group employed a different approach more dominated by cruelty and the multiplication of attacks on national targets. According to *The Guardian*, Boko Haram has multiplied its efforts in a series of attacks on police stations, churches, and prisons in the northeastern part of Nigeria from 2009 to 2012, killing around 700 people and freeing 721 others from prisons.¹⁴⁰

To perform the killing of many people at once, Boko Haram received training and external support to concoct more lethal weapons, as shown in its recent suicide attacks. In August 26, 2011, BH attacked the United Nations compound in Abuja; the car bomb killed twenty-three people and injured more than seventy-five others. According to Walker, the attack on the UN installations in Abuja indicated that Boko Haram is receiving external help, as it was performed with explosives that BH has never used before. He continues that it is difficult to report the exact number of people wounded and killed by the group after the series of attacks, with suicide cars shifting to the use of girl suicide bombers targeting schools and churches as well as markets.¹⁴¹ Kriel highlights that the car suicide bombings became less successful after the multiplication of police control in public areas, leading BH to turn to girls to carry out 244 of the 388 suicide bombings.¹⁴² Kriel also analyses the targets of the total bombings from 2011 to 2017, which were directed at striking the government administration at 52 percent, and more

¹³⁹ Comolli, 60–61.

¹⁴⁰ "Boko Haram Attacks? Timeline," *The Guardian*, September 25, 2012, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/25/boko-haram-timeline-nigeria>.

¹⁴¹ Walker, "What Is Boko Haram?," 4–6.

¹⁴² Robyn Kriel, "Boko Haram Favors Women, Children as Bombers: Study reveals," CNN, August 11, 2017, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/10/africa/boko-haram-women-children-suicide-bombers/index.html>.

than 40 percent directed at other secular and non-government targets.¹⁴³ These massive operations have led Nigeria and its partners to fight against the group with the same energy as they currently employ against ISIS and Al Shabaab.

a. Sporadic Shooting Attacks

Also, sporadic shooting attacks are one of the illustrative strategies of BH to increase its domination on the population and acquire territory. According to Wilson, in 2017, BH committed 109 attacks in Nigeria, thirty-two in Cameroon, two in Chad, and seven in Niger.¹⁴⁴ Unlike other religions in which the clergy convince people by teaching and spreading the principles of their religion, Boko Haram' combatants implement sporadic attacks to draw the attention of authorities, and persuade people to join them.

According to Oladunjoye and Omemu, every aspect of life in the northern part of Nigeria is affected by Boko Haram's presence, creating less interest from investors and a diminishing school attendance in favor of madrasas.¹⁴⁵ The authors note an insignificant variance between male and female school attendance but believe that the sect is contributing to transforming millions of children into street beggars and creating a real gap of development between the north and the south, which is under the government's protection.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, Joda and Olowoselu highlight, with a list of gunmen raids and attacks from 2011 to 2015 on schools and education administrations that BH's insurgency caused girls' school attendance in the north of Nigeria to significantly drop.¹⁴⁷ They believe that the fear of girls being killed or kidnapped, the trauma of previous attacks

¹⁴³ Kriel.

¹⁴⁴ Marc Wilson, "Nigeria's Boko Haram's attacks in number—as lethal as ever," BBC, last modified January 25, 2018, http://world-africa-42735414_

¹⁴⁵ Patrick Oladunjoye and Felix Omemu, "Effect of Boko Haram on School Attendance in Northern Nigeria," *British Journal of Education* 1, no. 2 (December 2013): 1–9, <http://www.eajournals.org/wp-content/uploads/Effect-of-Boko-Haram-on-School-Attendance-in-Northern-Nigeria.pdf>.

¹⁴⁶ Oladunjoye and Omemu, 1–9.

¹⁴⁷ Fatimata M. Joda and Abdurashied Olowoselu, "Effects of insurgency on girl's education in North Eastern Nigeria," *European Journal of Education and Development Psychology* 3, no. 1 (March 2015): 44–50, <http://www.eajournals.org/wp-content/uploads/Effects-of-Insurgency-on-Girls-Education-in-North-Eastern-Nigeria.pdf>.

they experienced, and the closing of many schools are the principal factors behind the decline in girls' school attendance.¹⁴⁸

The shooting and suicide attacks strategies applied by Boko Haram enable the sect to control at some level most of the northern regions of Nigeria. Thus, citizens are obliged to deal with the group or fly to another town more secure for them, and those who fail to migrate will be captured by the group. Zen highlights that Boko Haram achieved several victories in the north of Nigeria by mostly freeing the locality from military presence, and Abubakar Shakau even renamed some of the conquest towns, such as Dar al-Islam (home of Muslims) and Dar al Hikma (house of wisdom and knowledge, home where sciences are taught) respectively for Gwoza and Mubi and declared them part of the Islamic State.¹⁴⁹ On one hand, the gunmen attacks enabled Boko Haram to control significant land, mainly in the north. On another hand, the attacks occasioned the displacement and the dispossession of many other people's properties.

4. Kidnapping

In addition to suicide bombing and sporadic attacks, kidnapping is part of BH operations' procedures. There are several ideas behind BH's kidnapping, including the enlargement of the group and the satisfaction of the sexual needs of the combatants. On one hand, Abassa mentions that amongst the girls kidnapped by BH, several were forced to marry the combatants, while others were used as fighters or sold as slaves.¹⁵⁰ On the other hand, on April 15, 2018, BBC NEWS revealed that among the 276 Chibok schoolgirls abducted in 2014 by BH, 112 were not released, but according to the source, only 15 of these 112 remain alive, leading to a serious investigation about what happened to the girls.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ Joda and Olowoselu, 44–50.

¹⁴⁹ Zenn, "Boko Haram's Conquest for the Caliphate," 20.

¹⁵⁰ Abassa, 61.

¹⁵¹ "Many Chibok Girls Dead, Claims Journalist," BBC News, last modified April 15, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43767490>.

Also, children constitute a great range of BH haram fighters, with many having been kidnapped and brainwashed. Not weighing the consequences of their membership and hoping for better life after their death, these children are committed to the group and execute any order coming from the leaders. Abassa notes that in 2014, BH abducted a large number of boys in the village of Madagali and Adamawa after murdering those who resisted.¹⁵² According to UNICEF, in 2016, about 2,000 children were fighting for BH; among those, several were used as suicide bombers, as in the Maiduguri market attacks, where the two bombers were between seven and eight years old.¹⁵³

C. FUNDING

Whatever the size of a terrorist group, to ensure its survival, it needs financial means to recruit new combatants and complete its activities. Terrence McCoy highlights that the extreme poverty of northern Nigeria does not prevent Boko Haram from owning an ostensibly unlimited quantity of heavy weaponry, vehicles, bombs, and ammunition use to create havoc on the population. In 2009, Boko Haram became economically powerful by receiving support from Al Qaeda through its regional branch of AQIM and multiplying its fund-collecting strategies. Thus, a BH spokesman in 2011 announced that the organization was aligned with Al-Qaeda, which would supply every type of support they required.¹⁵⁴ Clear pieces of evidence confirm that Al Qaeda supports Boko Haram by providing funding, building the fighters' capacity, and logistics, as well as counsel.¹⁵⁵ In addition to support from affiliate terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, Boko Haram's funds also come from charity and donations, hostages for ransom, and illicit trade.

¹⁵² Abassa, 61.

¹⁵³ Ed Adamczyk, "Boko Haram Recruited 2,000 Child Soldiers in 2016: UNICEF," UPI, last modified February 21, 2017, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2017/02/21/Boko-Haram-recruited-2000-child-soldiers-in-2016-UNICEF/8831487689926/.

¹⁵⁴ Terrence McCoy, "Paying for terrorism: Where does Boko Haram gets its money from?" *The Independent*, Last modified June 6, 2014, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/paying-for-terrorism-where-does-boko-haram-gets-its-money-from-9503948.html>.

¹⁵⁵ Jacob Zenn, "Boko Haram's al-Qaeda Affiliation: A Response to Five Myths about Boko Haram," *Lawfare*, (blog), February 1, 2018, <http://boko-harams-al-qaeda-affiliation-response-five-myths-about-boko-haram>.

1. Illicit Trade

In addition to the fundraising methods already mentioned, Boko Haram has also engaged in many types of illicit trade, including human trafficking, drugs, and weapons. As with influential terrorist organization like ISIS, Hamas, FARC, Hezbollah, and the Taliban, illicit trade supports BH's activities. Doubtless BH's main income results from illicit trade, as indicated by its acquisitions and combatants. Khashim Shettima, Governor of Borno, in his speech at an official meeting, described BH's responsibility for major cattle-rustling in the region.¹⁵⁶ According to the Nigerian Central Bank, Boko Haram robbed 30 banks in 2011;¹⁵⁷ Shettima believes since the Nigerian security forces' efforts have prevented bank looting, BH group has gone back to the ordinary methods of stealing cattle to finance its activities.¹⁵⁸ Moreover, Ahmadu Suleiman, chairman of Kaduna cattle breeders association, posits that there is a clear connection between cattle-rustling and Boko Haram, mainly in the northern regions of Nigeria, where 7,000 cattle vanished between 2013 and 2014, while the Governor of Katsina, Aminu Bello Massari, announced the recapture of more than 30,000 cattle from the rustlers since the Military Joint Force Task started operations against the threat of BH in 2011.¹⁵⁹

Besides cattle-rustling, Nigerian reports have implicated Boko Haram in weapons trafficking. Onuoha believes that Boko Haram is exploiting the porous borders Nigeria has with Benin, Chad, and Cameroon with 1,499 illegal entries to the country, as well as through the proliferation of arms from Libya after the fall of Khaddaffi, in order to

¹⁵⁶ Ndahi Marama, "Boko Haram Now Sells Stolen Cattle to Fund Terror," Vanguard News, last modified March 5, 2016, www.vanguardngr.com/2016/03/boko-haram-now-sells-stolen-cattle-to-fund-terror/.

¹⁵⁷ Robert Crowley and Henry Wilkinson. "Boko Haram: a new threat in West Africa," in *Conflict over Resources and Terrorism: Two Facets of Insecurity*, ed. Marie Trémolières (OECD 2013), 107, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/conflict-over-resources-and-terrorism_9789264190283-en.

¹⁵⁸ Marama.

¹⁵⁹ Azeez Olaniyan and Aliyu Yahaya, "Cows, Bandits, and Violent Conflicts: Understanding Cattle Rustling in Northern Nigeria," *Africa Spectrum* 51, no. 3 (2016): 94, <http://journals.gigahamburg.de/index.php/afsp/article/view/2387/1321>.

smuggle weapons into the Sahel with the complicity of AQIM and MUJWA.¹⁶⁰ Additionally, Camolli notes that Boko Haram is likely using women in weapons smuggling because they are likely to evade security searching and more likely to benefit from the largesse of the security forces.¹⁶¹ In 2012, as reported by the Financial Task Force, two members of Boko Haram were arrested at the Burkina Faso-Niger borders as they transported weapons, ammunitions, and the amount of \$13,500, after which police investigations disclosed that the seized materials came from a Burkina Faso arms dealer.¹⁶²

In the broadening of its economic activities, Boko Haram's involvement in drug trafficking is not negligible. Considering the notorious terrorist organizations involved in the triangular drug trafficking between South America, West Africa, and Europe, including Al Qaeda, FARC, and Hezbollah, and their affinities to BH, one can infer the group's participation in this activity.¹⁶³ Also, the United Nations General Secretary, Ban Ki-moon, in his speech on Ministerial Conference on Drug in 2015, corroborates the idea of BH's implication in drug trafficking in West Africa.¹⁶⁴ Therefore, through this extensive network Boko Haram has established in Africa and around the world through its connections with other organizations, and according to revelations from interrogations, the group has diverse fund-raising methods that allow it to amass millions of dollars per year.

2. Hostages for Ransom

Boko Haram is also skilled in hostage-taking, which is one of the group's primary funding strategies. The kidnapping of overseas citizens conveys plentiful cash to bear the

¹⁶⁰ Freedom C. Onuoha, "Porous Borders and Boko Haram's Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria," Al Jazeera Center for Studies, last modified September 20, 2013, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/09/201398104245877469.html>.

¹⁶¹ Comolli, 83.

¹⁶² *Terrorist Financing in West Africa* (Paris: Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 2013), 23–24, <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/tf-in-west-africa.pdf>.

¹⁶³ Financial Action Task Force, 26–7.

¹⁶⁴ "Illicit Drug Trafficking Fuels Terrorism, Undermines Development, Says Secretary-General in Message to Ministerial Conference," United Nations: Meeting Coverage and Press Releases, last modified April 23, 2015, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sgsm16694.doc.htm>.

group's expenses, while the abduction of local citizens not only grants money but serves as a catalyst for pressure against the government. Callimachi posits that Al Qaeda and its direct affiliates, including Boko Haram, have acquired more than \$125 million from ransoms since 2008.¹⁶⁵ Additionally, from April 2013 to April 2014, Boko Haram has executed a series of extraordinary kidnappings, from local ordinary citizens to foreign personalities. The abduction of the family of Tangui Moulin Fournier, a French citizen working in GDF, a French gas company in Cameroon, brought Boko Haram an estimated \$3.14 million in April 2013.¹⁶⁶ In the same year, the kidnapping of Shettima Ali Monguno, the former Nigerian Minister of petroleum and chief of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), was another opportunity for Boko Haram to amass millions of dollars. Also, in 2014, the kidnapping of the Cameroonian Deputy Prime Minister's wife and family of Kolofata's leader resulted in the disbursement of \$600,000 and the release of 30 Boko Haram's militants imprisoned in Cameroon.¹⁶⁷

Beyond individual abduction, Boko Haram demonstrated its talent in group abduction, such as the abductions in Chibok in 2014.¹⁶⁸ McCoy confirms that the kidnapping of 200 schoolgirls of Chibok was the most large-scale plan ever executed by Boko Haram.¹⁶⁹ This portrayal of Boko Haram's activities, as well as kidnapping for ransom, is sufficient to understand how far Boko Haram is willing to go in order to satisfy its aims.

3. Charity/ Donations

Charity and donations from organizations and people sharing the same religious ideology also play a significant part in Boko Haram's funding. McCoy argues that Bin

¹⁶⁵ Rukmini Callimachi, "Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror," *The New York Times*, last modified July 29, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe-becomes-al-qaedas-patron.html>.

¹⁶⁶ Jacob Zenn, "Boko Haram: Recruitment, financing, and arms trafficking in the Lake Chad region," *CTC Sentinel* 7, no. 10 (October 2014): 8, <https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2014/10/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss102.pdf>.

¹⁶⁷ Zenn, "Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region," 8.

¹⁶⁸ McCoy, "Paying for terrorism: Where does Boko Haram gets its money from?"

¹⁶⁹ McCoy.

Laden sent \$3 million to BH as contribution to upgrade the activities of the group after the killing of BH's charismatic leader Mohammad Yusuf in 2009.¹⁷⁰ By financing other terrorist groups, Al Qaeda hoped to resurrect itself after the U.S military intervened against terror in the Middle East. In addition to Al Qaeda, Boko Haram is weaving a deep relationship with AQIM. Camolli notes that, as released in the media, Nigerian intelligence reported to the Nigerian president in 2012 that Boko Haram had received \$40 million from AQIM.¹⁷¹

In addition to backing by specific terrorist groups, BH also receives regular contributions from its members. Besides the microfinance operation established by Mohammed Yusuf benefitting Boko Haram's members in the 2000s, the group received a daily contribution of 100 Naira, or \$0.80, from the majority of its thousands of members.¹⁷² Camolli points to the great contributions of some political figures of the Borno state such as Buju Foi, Mohamed Ali Ndume and Saidu Pindar, who were suspected of using their personal and public funds to finance Boko Haram.¹⁷³ Likewise, Forest, in *Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria*, presents an exhaustive list of people suspected of financing Boko Haram from 2010 to 2013; among those, some have been killed and others arrested and prisoned.¹⁷⁴ Regarding Boko Haram's funding, Weber notes that the noncombatant groups is well funded, and the U.K. Al Muntada Trust Fund and the Muslim community in Saudi Arabia are suspected of providing cash flow to the group.¹⁷⁵ It is clear from the money-raising efforts of Boko Haram that the

¹⁷⁰ Terrence McCoy, "This Is How Boko Haram Funds Its Evil," *Washington Post*, last modified June 6, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/06/this-is-how-boko-haram-funds-its-evil/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a30cd422a4a8.

¹⁷¹ Comolli, 81.

¹⁷² Comolli, 78.

¹⁷³ Comolli, 78–9.

¹⁷⁴ James J.F. Forest, *Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria*, Joint Special Operations University Report 12–5 (Florida: Joint Special Operations University, 2012), 71, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a591800.pdf>.

¹⁷⁵ Peter Weber, "Who's financing Boko Haram?" *The Week*, last modified May 12, 2014, <https://theweek.com/articles/447032/whos-financing-boko-haram>.

group is well funded by people or associations sharing its ideology or state representatives seeking to preserve stability against retaliation in their constituency.

D. NIGERIAN AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO BH

Due to BH's size and lethality, resolution of the BH crisis is a considerable challenge compared to any other counterinsurgency effort. Since the inception of the religious movement, the government of Nigeria has implemented several tactics. Even if the Nigerian government predominately uses a repressive method, it has also implemented some incentive approaches to contain the group. The main counter efforts of the government have focused on military efforts, as evidenced by the extrajudicial killing of Mohamed Yusuf. The military responses were counterproductive, as we noted the drastic shift in Boko Haram' operations after the killing of its leader in 2009. The following sections examine the different responses of the Nigerian government and the contributions of the international partners to defeat Boko Haram.

1. Nigerian Government Responses

Given how Boko Haram has emerged and evolved, it is important to address how the Nigerian government and security forces are dealing with the group. Following the magnitude and nature of the threat, the Nigerian government has tested many methods to deal with BH. In addition to physical security improvement measures, noticeable reform in the security forces, BH triggered the creation of the office advising the president on terrorism matters. In general, to response to BH, the Nigerian government has implemented two principal methods: the hard and the soft.

a. Hard Approaches

The Nigerian government has quickly responded to BH by relying on the draconian methods of military operations. The Nigerian government since 2009 has been using real military methods to counter BH. One of the first strong countermeasures was the intervention of security forces in Bauchi in 2009. This operation was achieved by the capture of Mohamed Yusuf and other members and the seizure of important offensive materials. According to Solomon, the intervention in the Bauchi state resulted in four

days of insurrection of BH members against the security forces, resulting in the killing of 700 people and thousands injured.¹⁷⁶ The approach of the government to respond to BH by violence affected many innocent people who were just at the wrong place at the wrong moment. The government's actions through the killing of innocent people alienated many people, leading them to sympathize with BH.

Also, a consequence of the Bauchi operation was the growing insecurity not only in the state of Bauchi but in many other states. Wary about the escalation of insecurity all around the country, the government set up a new machine devoted to defusing BH. The Joint Task Force Operation to Restore Order (JTFORO) was created in 2011 with the aim of addressing the threat of BH. Agbiboa notes that the Joint Task Force, with a troop of 8,000 people, did not succeed in their mission, although some noticeable results were achieved.¹⁷⁷ He says that the ongoing operation perpetrated many human rights abuses and summary executions instead of conducting operations in accordance with intelligence collection.¹⁷⁸ Likewise, Camolli highlights that the operations of the JTF were tarnished by many human rights abuses and illegal killings, thereby severely damaging the credibility of the operation and motivating other people to join BH.¹⁷⁹ Following the numerous complaints about the JTF ORO and its ineffectiveness at addressing the BH scourge, it was replaced by the newly created 7th Infantry Division in August 2013.

Finally, the military response to BH was not only an occasion to increase the army budget for more equipment procurement but also a unique occasion to join several branches of the army and police together for the same cause. In 2014, 20 percent (\$5.949 billion) of the Nigerian budget was allocated to defense.¹⁸⁰ According to Camolli, inefficiency and inaccurate intelligence caused the failure of the JTF ORO, composed of

¹⁷⁶ Hussein Solomon, "Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria," *The RUSI Journal* 157, no. 4 (2012): 9, Doi: 03071847.2012.714183.

¹⁷⁷ Daniel E. Agbiboa, "Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 37, no. 1 (2013): 60–1, doi: 10.1080/1057610x.2014.853602.

¹⁷⁸ Agbiboa "Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria," 60–1.

¹⁷⁹ Comolli, 109.

¹⁸⁰ IISS, *The Military Balance* 2014, 415.

the Nigerian Air Force, the Army's 21st armored brigade and the Counterterrorism unit, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the State Security Service (SSS), and the Police Forces.¹⁸¹ In the same register, Camolli notes that following the endless but ineffective track of JTF on the leaders of BH, the government decided to grant a reward of \$139,692,118 for the head of Shekau and \$27, 938, 000 for those of fourteen other leaders of the group.¹⁸² The composition of the JTF and the considerable amount of money devoted to the death of BH leaders suffice to highlight the commitment of the Nigerian government to use all the available drastic measures to crush BH.

Also, in addition to the listed methods, many other systematic approaches were taken to counter the insurgency of BH. In tandem with the police forces and the JTF, check points, search cordons, protection of strategic points, and armed military patrol have been initiated. However, comparing the engagement of Nigerian security forces and their relationship with intelligence, it is hard to assume a genuine collaboration between them. Cognizant of the role of intelligence in counterterrorism, Nigeria has a long way to go in defeating terrorism.

b. The Soft Approaches

In addition to the military responses, from time to time, the Nigerian government has implemented an appeasement strategy in the fight against BH to persuade the insurgents to stop violence, mainly when the tough approach has shown its incapacity to end the crisis. Among the numerous ways, the Federal government, as well as local administrations, have undertaken a series of negotiations and the granting of substantial economic incentive to the members of BH. For instance, after the killing of Mohamed Yusuf in the police custody in 2009, the former governor of Borno supposedly paid the amount of \$520,000 to appease the anger of the group.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Camolli, 113.

¹⁸² Camolli, 114.

¹⁸³ Iro Aghedo and Oarhe Osumah, "The Boko Haram Uprising: How Should Nigeria Respond?" *Third World Quarterly* 33, no. 5 (2012): 853–869, doi: 10.1080/01436597.2012.674701.

Furthermore, the federal government has made many concessions to reach a consensus with BH, including negotiations and amnesty proposals to its members. Surprisingly, in 2013, after the failure of the military armada to deal with BH, the Nigerian government openly started dialogue with the group. Unfortunately, the dialogue did not reach a consensus because the conditions posed by BH were too harsh for the government to accept. Camolli notes that the requirements of BH in the dialogue included the trial of the policeman responsible for the killing of Abubakar Yusuf, the granting of compensation to the victims' families, the release without trial of all the BH members imprisoned, and the withdrawal of the JTF in their bastion.¹⁸⁴ Later, Shekau concluded that the nonfulfillment of BH's grievances and the continuing of the JTF operations implies the government's will not to negotiate.

Once again in April 2013, the government proved its good faith to deal with BH by the creation of the Amnesty Commission. According to the presidential statement, the Commission was tasked to study the practicability of amnesty for and the disarmament and reinsertion of BH's members into Nigerian society within three months.¹⁸⁵ In response to the amnesty proposed by President Goodluck Jonathan, Shekau ironically responded in an audio statement that it is for BH to grant its pardon to the government of Nigeria and not the reverse because they have not committed any action deserving amnesty.¹⁸⁶ Despite the inclusion of some respectable religious figures in the amnesty committee, Shekau once again rejected the overture made by the legal authorities.

Always in the logic of negotiation, on May 2014, the federal government of Nigeria has established a committee tasked with recounting the grievances of BH and proposing solutions that can secure the north of the country. The tasks of the committee also failed because of the absence of interlocutors. Shekau released a statement saying that there is no negotiation between them and any representative of the Nigerian state.

¹⁸⁴ Camolli, 116.

¹⁸⁵ Alex Thurston, "Amnesty for Boko Haram: Lessons from the Past," Social Science Research Council, last modified May 20, 2013, <http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2013/05/20/amnesty-for-boko-haram-lessons-from-the-past/>.

¹⁸⁶ "Nigeria Militants Reject Amnesty," BBC News, last modified April 11, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22105476>.

The response of Shekau to the committee's invitation as highlighted by Camolli denotes the unwillingness and categorical refusal of Shekau to negotiate with the government.¹⁸⁷

The general idea coming from the carrot and stick methods implemented by the government shows its commitment to respond to the crisis. Despite the draconian approaches implemented with its corollary of extrajudicial killing and human rights abuses, BH is ubiquitous in the country. However, the different proposals made by the state denotes its good faith to peacefully end the crisis while the refusal of BH to accept none of the government's propositions implies its predisposition not to negotiate, which means it must be treated as it deserves in the long run.

2. International Responses

The Nigerian crisis arouses the interest not only of countries directly affected by its evolution, but also the attention of countries whose interests are not directly threatened. On the one hand, the bordering countries of Nigeria, including Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, to prevent their territory from being held by BH, decided to create a regional Joint Task Force. On the other hand, countries including the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, seized the opportunity to join because of the connection of BH with other international terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda.

BH was no longer the concern of Nigeria alone when it reached an international dimension. BH's expansion to neighboring countries instigated several regional and international approaches. One of the most significant regional achievements was the deployment of the Multinational Joint Force Task (MJFT) in March 2015 by the African Union. Composed of 10,000 troops, the MJFT is mandated to restore security in the basin of the Lake Chad zone affected by BH.¹⁸⁸ According to Ray, the results of the MJFT were impressive because it permitted, after ten months, the recovery of all the territory

¹⁸⁷ Camolli, 116–7.

¹⁸⁸ "Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram," The Africa-EU Partnership, accessed March 27, 2019, https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/apf_factsheet_-_mnjtf.pdf

occupied by BH except Borno.¹⁸⁹ Camolli points out some challenges between the Nigerian forces and the other countries composing the MNJFT include mistrust, lack of resources, deficiency in cooperation, disproportionate troop training levels between different countries, and public opinion of the populations facing retaliation by BH in response to the MNJTF's activities.¹⁹⁰

However, the results of the national and regional approaches indicate the use of military force as an ineffective response to the BH insurgency. This approach sees BH only through the lens of security issues, which is the reason why hard approaches failed to respond to core roots of the insurgency, including the socio-political and economic betterment of the northern regions of Nigeria. Indeed, the military approaches are brutal and inappropriate for the case of BH, especially since the joint force operation has embraced a transnational dimension and continues to carry out the deadliest operations in Nigeria and bordering countries.

a. The United States

The several revelations of BH's connection to international terrorist groups and the attack on the UN compound in Abuja, as well as the kidnapping of foreign and national citizens, in addition to the massive abduction the girls of Chibok, drew the attention of the United States. According to the Heritage Foundation, vis-à-vis the strong economic, military, and diplomatic relations established between the United States and Nigeria in the 2000s, the rise of BH was unquestionably a severe threat to the United States' interests.¹⁹¹ For that reason, the United States has implemented some approaches intended to restore security in Nigeria.

¹⁸⁹ Nivedita Ray, "Growing Threat of Terrorism in Africa: The Case of Boko Haram," Indian Council of World Affairs, ICWA, last modified February 2016, <https://icwa.in/pdfs/IB/2014/GrowingThreatofTerrorisminAfricaIB20022016.pdf>

¹⁹⁰ Virginia Comolli, "The Regional Problem of Boko Haram," *Survival* 57, no. 4 (2015): 111–113, doi: 10.1080/00396338.2015.1068560.

¹⁹¹ Patrick Meehan, "Boko Haram: An Overlooked Threat to U.S. Security," The Heritage Foundation, last modified July 24, 2012, <http://www.heritage.org/terrorism/report/boko-haram-overlooked-threat-us-security>.

One of the U.S initiatives against terror in Africa was the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The TSCTP is a joint task force program seeking to defeat terrorism and thwart violent extremism in West and North Africa by building countries' capabilities and underpinning cooperation between West and North Africa.¹⁹² As a mechanism, the TSCTP focuses on diplomacy, military capacity building, and economic development with the involvement the local governments, law enforcement, and justice, as well as sensitizing civilians to the danger of joining terror groups.¹⁹³ To attain these efforts, the TSCTP relies on the State Department, including the Pentagon, USAID, and the Department of Justice.¹⁹⁴ Thus, in order to test the acquisition and teach other strategies to the concerned army of TSCTP, an exercise called Flintlock is organized annually. According to Warner, Flintlock is a brilliant counterterrorism maneuver organized each year by the African Command (AFRICOM) with the participation of African, U.S, and European troops.

In addition to military cooperation, the United States is establishing legal mechanisms that can stop BH's funding. Several U.S. agencies, including the Department of Justice, are engaged in Nigeria to improve the level of law enforcement services. Warner posits that the U.S. is intervening in several domains in Nigeria in their efforts to cut terrorism funding. The Military Intelligence Support Team (MIST), and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) cooperate with the police and the army to provide accurate information by involving the population in the collection.¹⁹⁵ In addition to building military capabilities, law enforcement, and the intelligence capacity in Nigeria, Ray assumes that many Nigerian soldiers are sent to the U.S to receive counterterrorism training.¹⁹⁶ Likewise, because of the human rights violations released

¹⁹² "Programs and Initiatives," U.S. Department of State, accessed March 27, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#TSCTP>.

¹⁹³ Lesley A. Warner, *The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership: Building Partner Capacity to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Complex Operations, 2014), 1–11, <https://lesleyannewarner.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/tsctp-building-partner-capacity-to-counter-terrorism-and-violent-extremism2.pdf>.

¹⁹⁴ Warner, 1–11.

¹⁹⁵ Warner, 1–11

¹⁹⁶ Ray, "Growing Threat of Terrorism in Africa: The Case of Boko Haram," 15.

against the JTF ORO, U.S. Special Forces trained the 72 counterterrorism battalion of Nigerian in the United States and continuing this training via by the 3rd Special Forces Group.¹⁹⁷

On the same note, in mid-2013, because of the increase of terrorist attacks in Nigeria and other countries of the continent, the U.S., deeply concerned with the situation, decided to put a bounty on the head of Abubakar Shekau and other terrorist leaders in Africa. Thus, the State Department through its justice program promised the amount \$7 million out of \$23 million for information leading to the capture of Abubakar Shekau (BH), \$5 million for Mokhtar Belmokhtar (Al-Qaeda) and Yahya Al-Hammam (AQIM), and \$3 million for Malik Abdel Karim (AQIM) and Oumar Ould Hamaha (MUJAO).¹⁹⁸

b. The United Kingdom

A former British colony, Nigeria has always been economically and politically tied to the UK, and the UK's cooperation focuses on military technical assistance and advising. With about 500,000 Nigerian migrants in the U.K., the killing of Private Lee Rigby in August 2013 by two British Muslims of Nigerian origin drew the attention of UK authorities, which since then have become more concerned with the ongoing terrorist crisis in Nigeria even if no connections have been established between the murder and BH.¹⁹⁹

The UK, in response to the insecurity in Nigeria, signed in 2013 a five-year cooperation agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), on fighting terrorism and on maritime piracy in the Niger Delta. According to Lowe, the MOU is a bilateral pact between the UK and Nigeria to fight against terrorism and maritime

¹⁹⁷ Camolli, 144.

¹⁹⁸ Chuka W. Aniemeka, "U.S. Puts \$ 7 m bounty on Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau," Online Nigeria, last modified March 6, 2013, <https://news2.onlinenigeria.com/headline/290462-us-puts-7m-bounty-on-b%E2%80%99haram-leader,-shekau>.

¹⁹⁹ John Campbell, "The UK Stance on Boko Haram," Council on Foreign Relations, last modified May 19, 2014, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/uk-stance-boko-haram>.

insecurity mainly in the Niger Delta where oil smuggling is a daily problem.²⁰⁰ According to Olusola Obada, Minister of Nigerian Defense, the MOU is set at the right moment because it can help to defuse BH's cruelty and reduce oil smuggling, which is causing an important economic loss to the state.²⁰¹ Also on August 2018, new life was given to the U.K.-Nigeria cooperation by the visit of UK Prime Minister Theresa May. The Nigeria Economy website highlights that the latest visit of the UK prime minister to Nigeria was a great opportunity to reinforce the economic cooperation on the eve of Brexit and to set the blueprint of fructuous military cooperation for a country decimated by terrorism, banditry, and illegal trade.²⁰²

Also, the UK is very present in Nigerian military training. The Staff College and the Army Command institutions are sponsored by the UK which provides funding and military facilities. Also, the UK regularly delivers training in Nigeria and hosts several Nigerian officers at the British Defense Academy. According to Watts, since 2015, The UK has trained more than 30,000 Nigerian troops on counterterrorism strategies.²⁰³

The UK also intervenes in the social and economic field in Nigeria. Believing that too many military responses have been implemented, the UK is proposing that the Nigerian government develop approaches responding to the social and economic aspirations of the citizens. According to Camolli, the British Defense Advisory Team (BDAT) is established in Nigeria for the technological and organizational betterment of the army to manage not only peacekeeping but also to deliver their daily tasks blamelessly.²⁰⁴ Camolli also mentions that the Nigerian government has neglected the

²⁰⁰ Mark Lowe, "Nigeria, UK Sign MoU on Security," *The Maritime Security Review* (March 2013), <http://www.marsecreview.com/2013/03/15640/>. The original article at this address has since been attributed to a different author and possibly altered.

²⁰¹ Lowe.

²⁰² "Nigeria and the Latest MOUs with Nations: UK, Germany and China," Nigeria Economy, last modified September 6, 2018, <https://www.proshareng.com/news/Nigeria%20Economy/Nigeria-and-the-Latest-MOUs-with-Nations--UK--Germany-and-China/41732>.

²⁰³ Joe Watts, "UK to Train Nigerian Army to Fight Boko Haram Under New Security Partnership," *The Independent*, last modified August 30, 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/uk-train-nigerian-army-boko-haram-security-partnership-theresa-may-a8513641.htm>

²⁰⁴ Camolli, 148.

social and economic branches of counterinsurgency and that the Nigerian security forces' abuses of the population led the British to emphasize the carrot rather than stick.²⁰⁵

c. Canada

Canada began its actions in Nigeria by designating BH as a terrorist organization in December 2013. According to Steven Blaney, British Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, listing BH among international terrorist groups will help to fight against its members and supporters, and to interrupt its funding.²⁰⁶ The Canadian response to BH targets the humanitarian approaches and the consolidation of Nigerian security forces' capabilities.

Because Nigeria is experiencing one of the hardest times of its existence, regarding the secular partnership between Nigeria and Canada, the latter is evolving in the humanitarian sector to reduce the pain of the population affected by the BH. As Boko Haram has occasioned the displacement of thousands of people from the northern region of Nigeria, Canada's involvement in supplying shelters and food is determinant. According to the High Commission of Canada in Nigeria, Canadian development and assistance in Nigeria reached the amount of \$110 million during 2016–17, with a supplementary sum of \$27 million devoted to humanitarian projects in 2018.²⁰⁷ Similarly, in 2017 Canada hosted 10,000 Nigerian students as another way to frame the future with people bright enough to find an answer to the situation plaguing Nigeria.²⁰⁸

In strengthening the security forces' capability, the designation of BH as an international terrorist group was followed by several measures to help Nigeria in the fight against terror. The Canadian Minister of International Development, during a visit to Lagos, expressed his country's readiness to accompany Nigeria in the fight against

²⁰⁵ "The UK Stance on Boko Haram."

²⁰⁶ "Terrorism & Security Report: America's," 361Security, last modified January 16, 2014, <https://www.361security.com/analysis/terrorist-and-security-report-americas2>.

²⁰⁷ "Canada - Nigeria Relations," GAC, High Commission of Canada in Nigeria, last modified December 6, 2018, https://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/nigeria/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada_nigeria.aspx?lang=eng

²⁰⁸ "Canada - Nigeria Relations."

terrorism.²⁰⁹ Also it is important to note the significant involvement of Canada in the capacity building of the Sahel countries in counterterrorism efforts. According to the High Commission of Canada in Nigeria, the Canadian support of peace and security not only in Nigeria is perceptible through the Global Partnership Program (GPP) and the Counter-Terrorism Capability Building.²¹⁰ The former program focuses on biosecurity to counter BH in the use of weapons of massive destruction, and the latter targets law enforcement efforts in investigations, border security, and deterrence of violence in Nigeria.²¹¹

d. United Nations

The UN has not stayed away from the events in Nigeria; it is taking important measures to support the country in its fight against terrorism. According to BH, the UN is a global oppressor of Muslim devotees, and its proponents posits that as long as Nigeria continues to work with the UN against terrorism, they will fight against the unbelievers.²¹² The spectacular abduction of the Chibok girls was followed by the addition of BH to the list of terrorist organizations facing UN financial sanctions and arms bans as defined by the first paragraph of UN Security Council Resolution 2083 of December 2012.²¹³

The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), established in 2005, has been engaged in Nigeria as BH's cruelty increased from day to day. The CTITF in Nigeria works with three branches.²¹⁴ The Integrated Assistance for

²⁰⁹ Segun Adebawale, "Canada to Assist Nigeria in Fighting Terrorism- Minister," *Eagle*, last modified May 7, 2014, <https://theeagleonline.com.ng/canada-to-assist-nigeria-in-fighting-terrorism-minister>.

²¹⁰ "Canada - Nigeria Relations."

²¹¹ "Canada - Nigeria Relations."

²¹² "Nigerian Bombers Blame U.N. for 'Oppression' of Muslims," CNN, last modified August 31, 2011, <http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/08/31/nigeria.bombing/index.html>.

²¹³ "Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee Adds Boko Haram to Its Sanctions List," Welcome to the United Nations, last modified May 22, 2014, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11410.doc.htm>.

²¹⁴ "CTITF Launches Counter-Terrorism Projects in Nigeria" *UN Counter -Terrorism Implementation Task Force CTITF*, 5, (January–May 2012), <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism.ctitf/files/the-beam-vol5.pdf>

Counter-Terrorism (I-ACT) supports the Nigerian government by addressing the specific needs of the country in countering terrorism, but also by promoting the UN global counterterrorism approaches with the implication of UNESCO responding to some root causes of the phenomenon and Interpol focusing on teamwork.²¹⁵ According to Alao et al., the lack of interagency cooperation resulting from rivalry among Nigerian forces is detrimental to the country's stability, and should be addressed by severe measures against elements hampering the process with oversight on all the parties.²¹⁶

Also, the UN Security Council since 2014 has clearly condemned extremist violence and requested all its members to disable any activities leading to the perpetration of terrorist activities in their own country, as well as foreign countries.²¹⁷ Thus, the UN Counter Terrorism Committee with other partners is working along with Nigeria and neighboring countries to repeal terrorism. In the light of the conference held on April 13 to 15, 2018, in Ndjamena, Chad, the UN Counter Terrorism-Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) along with UNODC, UNDP, and IOM, the African Union (AU) and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) gathered to come up with regional approaches against BH and its affiliates. Additionally, the participation of the Nigerian delegation led by Admiral Yamunu Musa to the UN High-level Conference on Terrorism in New York, June 28–9, 2018, followed by the visit of Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), with other counterterrorism experts in Nigeria one month later, denote the engagement of the UN to assist Nigerian efforts in defeating BH.

The international approaches against BH in Nigeria have not yet met its goal of the eradication of the group. Despite the efforts of CTITF, MOU, TSCTP, and MJFT, BH is still looming to threaten the stability of Nigeria and the Sahel region. Instead of producing positive effects, the recognition of BH as international terrorist organization

²¹⁵ “CTITF Launches Counter-Terrorism Projects in Nigeria.”

²¹⁶ David Oladimeji Alao et al., “Nigeria Custom Service, Inter-Agency Cooperation and National Security,” *International Journal of Advanced Research* 6, no. 12 (2018): 1186–1194, doi: 10.21474/ijar01/8251.

²¹⁷ SC/11580, United Nations (2014), <https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11580.doc.htm>
S/RES/2396 (2017), United Nations, [https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2396\(2017\)](https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2396(2017)).

was a sort of publicity for the group seeking international recognition, and the sanctions and embargo seem to produce fewer effects on the operability of the group. The situation in Nigeria, therefore, appears to be headed in the same direction as that of Mali. The counterterrorism approaches, peacekeeping, and humanitarian efforts have not yet reached their goal of the eradication of terrorism and the establishment of peace and security in both Mali and Nigeria. According to *The Washington Post*, with the engagement of thousands of blue helmets, it is now one of the deadliest peacekeeping mission in the history of the organization.²¹⁸

E. CONCLUSION

BH as a security threat in late 2000 drew the attention of the national government and international countries. Nigerian counterterrorism measures in 2009 led to the killing of Mohamed Yusuf, resulting in a severe transformation in the group. Moreover, the U.S. designation of BH as an international terrorist group on November 2013 and the new dispositions undertaken by the UK against terrorism have fueled the hatred of the sect against national and international targets. Thus, BH has become more organized and equipped for its destructive efforts toward Nigeria, West Africa, as well as Western countries.

BH is funded by criminal activities. In addition to providing severe measures against global terrorism funding, as seen in the UN Resolution 2178 (2014), 2349 (2017), and 2396 (2017), every country should be committed to implementing the laws and conventions for global effect. In addition, BH must be treated as a global threat because isolated efforts to some extent may slow down the scourge but cannot stop it. The fight against BH necessitates a blend of efforts not only militarily but also economically and politically. As long as terrorist groups have sympathizers, its eradication will be tricky. New approaches should be implemented to divert terrorist groups' followers by offering economic and political incentives that respond to their aspirations, because addressing the political and economic causes of insurgency is the starting point to defeating it.

²¹⁸ Sief, "The World's Most Dangerous U.N. Mission The al-Qaeda Threat in Mali Presents a New Challenge to U.N. Peacekeepers."

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IV. ASSESSING COUNTER INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM IN MALI AND NIGERIA

This chapter assesses the success and failure of the approaches employed in Mali and Nigeria to countering insurgency, terrorism, and organized crime. It breaks these efforts down into three main categories: the first section studies the strength and weakness of military approaches by examining the efforts of the Malian security forces, the Serval/Barkhane operations, and MINUSMA, as well as the MNJTF and LCBC in Nigeria. The second section analyses the political solutions to the crisis through Malian peace agreements and the dialogue and amnesty committees of the Nigerian government by comparing the previous and current security contexts, assessing success and failure. The third section concerns the economic responses to the crisis applied in both the Malian and Nigerian cases; this section details the positive outcomes of these responses and the impediment of the economic efforts to alleviate the crisis. In Mali, the responses to the crisis registered some noticeable political and economic successes although they failed to reach a definite peace. Nigeria focused mainly on the military responses, resulting in short term success and the escalation of BH's activities. Overall, the analysis demonstrates that good governance can shape and facilitate the attainment of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism objectives.

A. MILITARY RESPONSE

Mali and Nigeria both resorted to a military response to insurgency. Military responses in Mali have been effective insofar as they replied at a critical period to the coalition of insurgent and terrorist groups in their ambition of creating an independent or Islamic state in Mali. In Nigeria, the military responses achieved short-term success by weakening BH operational capabilities. While military responses in military operations in Mali and Nigeria interrupted the terrorists' momentum at the operational level, however, they have not accomplished the ultimate goal of defusing terrorism and the establishing of peace and security in either country. By this measure, the military responses in Mali and Nigeria have not been successful, as they have led to the escalation of violence, as

well as the strengthening of the remaining groups and the creation of others, which threaten stability and fight back against the military response.

1. Advantages of Military Responses

Operation Serval, the 2013 military intervention in Mali by international partners was a success, as it occurred when the existence of the state was endangered and helped wrest the occupied territories from the jihadist groups. Taking advantage of the pre-deployed troops in Africa and good intelligence, Serval in coordination with AFISMA conducted a successful operation. The air attacks blocked the Jihadist columns while the ground forces secured the critical sites and defused the terrorists in their stampede. Bratton also praises the military operation, which eased the return of 200,000 Malians from the refugee camps of Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Niger, while families across the South hosted another 350,000 displaced compatriots.²¹⁹

Serval provided a glimmer of hope to the Malians, who regained confidence in the return of peace and security and started to settle into the mechanisms and modalities of the intra-Malian peace process. In Mali, the Serval operation burnished the image of the security forces tarnished by the defeats at Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. The operation reduced the maneuver of the insurgent groups and facilitated the return of this administration and the end of that executions and human right abuses. Serval also saved many lives. Boeke and Schuurman argue that Operation Serval was successful because it cleared the regions from terrorists and destructive weapons.²²⁰ Likewise, Maj. General Olivier Tramond and Lt. Col. Philippe Seigneur argue that the coordination between air and ground forces was the secret of Serval's success.²²¹

²¹⁹ Michael Bratton, "Violence, Displacement and Democracy in Post-conflict Societies: Evidence from Mali." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 34, no. 4 (2016), 444, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2016.1269880>.

²²⁰ Sergei Boeke & Bart Schuurman, "Operation 'Serval': A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38, no. 6 (2015): 813–16, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2015.1045494.

²²¹ Olivier Tramond and Philippe Seigneur, *Early Lessons from France's Operation Serval in Mali*, Army, (June 2013), https://www.ousa.org/sites/default/files/Tramond_June2013.pdf.

In Nigeria, the ultimate military success against BH traces back to the first months of the JTF in 2009. This operation, conducted by a multi-disciplinary team, inflicted a severe loss on the BH, including the arrest and killing of several combatants. The joint force also foiled terrorist attacks at their inception, as evidenced by the number of explosive preparation materials seized in the house of the groups' leaders. Elkaim writes that, following the death of Mohamed Yusuf and the killing and imprisonment of several financial backers by the joint force operations in 2009, many people believed that BH could not survive.²²² Also, Onapajo argues that Buhari administration's strategy against BH emphasized military cooperation and the restructuration of the local military.²²³ He highlights the positive results of this approach since 2015 through the MNJTF, LCBC and the multiple consultations the president has undertaken to engage the world powers' military to support him against BH.²²⁴

According to Onuoha, from July 16, 2012, to August 4, 2013, the military Joint Task Force captured heavy weapons from BH. The seizure included twelve AK47 rifles and thirty magazines, two G3 rifles and 10×4 40mm bombs, three RPG tubes, and 85 rounds of special ammunition, including eight RPGs, 10 rocket bombs, 10 rocket chargers, one G-3 rifle and magazine, five RPG, three FMC magazine, fourteen IEDs and several rounds of ammunition.²²⁵ The seizure of such an arsenal decreased significantly the destructive power of BH. Likewise, Hathorn and Abbott highlight the complexity of the war against BH by referring to its military weapons acquisition and proposed the reduction of that weapons supply as part of the solution.²²⁶

²²² Zachary Elkaim, *Boko Haram: The Rise, Success, and Continued Efficacy of the Insurgency in Nigeria* (International Institute for Counter Terrorism, 2012), 13, <https://www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/ICTWPS%20-%20Zachary%20Elkaim%20-%205.pdf>.

²²³ Hakeem Onapajo, "Has Nigeria Defeated Boko Haram? An Appraisal of the Counter-Terrorism Approach under the Buhari Administration," *Strategic Analysis* 41, no. 1 (2016): 67, <https://doi.org/10.80/09700161.2016.1249177>.

²²⁴ Onapajo, 67.

²²⁵ Freedom C. Onuoha, *Porous Borders and Boko Haram's Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria* (Aljazeera Center for Studies, 2013), 7 http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2013/9/8/20139810737330580Porous%20Borders_bokoharam.pdf.

²²⁶ Steve Hathorn and Chris Abbott, "Intelligence Brief: Reducing the Supply of Weapons to Boko Haram," *Open Briefing* (blog), November 10, 2016, <https://www.openbriefing.org/publications/intelligence-briefings/reducing-the-supply-of-weapons-to-boko-haram/>.

2. Inadequacy of Military Responses

In Mali, in the longer term, the military response created numerous security problems. The ultimate result of the French military intervention was the multiplication and geographical expansion of terrorist attacks. According to Wing, France's military operation in the north of Mali was followed by terrorist attacks in the center of the country targeting French expatriates, hence the terrorists' choice of the Radisson Blu in Bamako and hotel Byblos in Sevare.²²⁷ In addition, the escalation of violence resulting from the military response through successive terrorist attacks against MINUSMA and the destruction of G5 Sahel HQ in Mopti exemplify the coalition between the terrorist groups and their hate for the military response of the crisis.

Another consequence of the military operation in Mali was the creation of new insurgent and terrorist groups—some that wanted to take advantage of the peace agreement, others that aimed to continue the jihadist fight of the defused groups. In a prelude to the peace agreement after the military operation of 2013, several movements emerged in the north of Mali. According to Boutellis and Zahar, the defeat of the terrorist groups in north of Mali in 2013 led to the formation of new groups or associations. In this regard, the Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) and the self-defense militia the Coordination of Patriotic Movements and Forces of the Resistance (CMFPR) were shaped according to ethnicity and grievances and included in the peace process.²²⁸ In addition, the Front for the Liberation of Macina (FLM) emerged in Mali after the rout of the major terrorist groups in 2013. Amadou Kouffa created the FLM, mainly composed of the Fulani people and those who were religiously oriented; the group is considered as the takeover of the defeated terrorist groups and constitutes one of the most significant security threats the country is facing today. According to Wing, the FLM's goals include the rebuilding of the empire of

²²⁷ Susanna D. Wing, "Five things you should know about Friday's terrorist attack in Mali," *The Washington Post*, November 21, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/21/five-things-you-should-know-about-fridays-terrorist-attack-in-mali/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.cd8edf45487f.

²²⁸ Boutellis and Zahar, *A Process in Search of Peace: Lessons from the Inter-Malian Agreement*, 10–11.

Macina in the region of Segou, and it has a strong connection with Ansar Dine.²²⁹ Since 2015, the FLM along with the remaining forces of MUJAO has participated in several terrorist attacks including that against the Radisson Blu in Bamako and Byblos in Mopti.²³⁰ Finally, the related direct consequence of the military responses is the restructuration of the terrorist groups, which combined their efforts in a coalition to respond to the state and its partners. According to Weiss, the creation of Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) on March 2, 2017, was a regrouping of Ansar Dine, AQIM, Al Mourabitoun, and FLM in one single denomination and leadership, therefore constituting a severe menace for the stability of West Africa.²³¹

A final problem with the military response in Mali is that it has often taken the form of proxy wars, and the loss of control of the surrogate forces creates more security issues. In the rebellion of 1991 and 1996 Ganda Koy and Ganda Izo,²³² auto defense organizations were used by the government against Tuareg rebels. On August 14, 2014, the Self Defense Group of Imgad Tuareg and allies was created (GATIA). This group also has the support of the Malian government to fight the insurgency.²³³ According to Andreas Krieg, the substitution of military interventions by surrogate or proxy war to ensure “deniability, legitimacy, urgency, cost, and capability” has shown little positive

²²⁹ Susanna D. Wing, “Mali’s Enduring Crisis,” *Current History* 116 (May 2017): 193

²³⁰ Jouvre, “Forces et Groupes Armés au Mali: qui est qui? [Milestones Forces and Armed Groups in Mali: who is who?]”

²³¹ Caleb S. Weiss, “Analysis: Merger of Al Qaeda Groups Threatens security in West Africa,” *FDD’s Long War Journal* (March 2017), <https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/03/analysis-merger-of-al-qaeda-groups-threatens-security-in-west-africa.php>.

²³² Dario Cristiani and Riccardo Fabiani, “From Dysfunctionality to Disaggregation and Back? The Malian Crisis, Local Players and European Interests,” *Istituto Affari Internazionali, IAI Working Papers* 13, no. 8 (March 2013): 11–12, <http://iaitestnew.asw.bz/sites/default/files/iaiw1308.pdf>;

Ganda Koy, Ganda Izo, and GATIA are pro-government auto defense Arab, Songhai, and Tuaregs militia that were raised after the rebellion and asked for the support of the Malian states to help defuse the crisis.

²³³ Andrew M. Gregor, “GATIA: A Profile of Northern Mali’s Pro-Government Tuareg and Arab Militia,” *Terrorism Monitor* 13, no. 7 (April 2015): 6–7, <https://jamestown.org/program/gatia-a-profile-of-northern-malis-pro-government-tuareg-and-arab-militia/>.

outcomes in practice.²³⁴ The backing groups, because of the deficiency of control and oversight of the patrons, can not only undermine the stability of a situation by deviating from the assigned objectives, but also threaten the long-term interests of the supporters by following their own agenda. Even if it is hard to link state support to traditional hunters against the Fulani, the ongoing situation in the region of Mopti, resulting in the massacre of more than 130 people in the village of Ogossagou, reveals how dangerous a proxy war is.²³⁵ In the same vein, the extraordinary council of ministers of March 24, 2019, dissolved the traditional Dogon hunters' Association (Dan Nan Ambassagou), and was followed by the replacement of the general chief of staff of the army, the air force chief of staff of and army.²³⁶

Such failure of the military counterinsurgency response occasioned the five peace agreements between the insurgents and the government from 1991 to 2015. At each of the peace agreements, both government and insurgents noted the failure of military responses but did not hesitate to resort to arms when other approaches failed.

Military responses have been both inadequate and excessive in the case of Nigeria; the local and international counterinsurgency methods also led to the radicalization of BH in Nigeria and the spread of violence across its borders. The killing of innocent people and abuses of the population likely contributed to change the mind of some people to adhere to the ideology of BH, from which they believe they will receive more safety and favor. Healy argues that the military responses to terrorism in Africa always worsen the situation.²³⁷ She believes that the military crackdown on BH in 2009 resulted in a sequence of uncontrolled and inhuman acts from the security forces against

²³⁴ Andreas Krieg, "Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East," *International Affairs* 92, no. 1 (2016): 97–113. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1468-2346.12506>.

²³⁵ "Mali attack: More than 130 Fulani villagers killed 24 March 201," *BBC News*, last modified March 24, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47680836>.

²³⁶ Mamadou Dolo, "Communiqué du Conseil des Ministres du 24 Mars 2019 [Ministers' Council Press Release on March 24, 219]," *Voix De Bamako*, last modified March 25, 2019, <https://voixdebamako.com/communique-du-conseil-des-ministres-du-24-mars-2019/>.

²³⁷ Hazel Healey, "Can peacebuilders end the war with Boko Haram?" *New Internationalist*, September 2018, <https://newint.org/features/2018/09/01/boko-haram-peace-nigeria>.

citizens so that the elders of Maiduguri pleaded with the president to withdraw the JTF, which they believed to have killed more of their people than BH.²³⁸ Likewise, Pérouse de Montclos claims that concordant sources in Nigeria revealed that the Nigerian army and police committed numerous atrocities and violation of human rights.²³⁹ For instance, 20,000 people were imprisoned based on suspicions of their support to BH in 2014, and the security forces killed 16,133 others from June 2006 and March 2016.²⁴⁰ Thus, a range of BH combatants join or are recruited in response to those people who are martyred and deceived by the Nigerian military and security forces, both of which are considered more aggressive than BH.

Adibe highlights that the hard power used against BH led to the escalation of the groups' violence despite the government's praises of its own success.²⁴¹ Comparing the result of the hard power and the list of BH's victims, the outcome is far from being positive.²⁴² Adibe indicates that from 2010 to 2015, the group has killed an estimated 15,000 to one million people and displaced another 3.3 million.²⁴³

B. POLITICAL RESPONSE

In addition to military responses, both Mali and Nigeria have also included political responses in their counterinsurgency measure. The political approaches produced significant results in Mali, which negotiated with insurgents and accepted significant concessions for peace and stability in the country. In Nigeria, the government and BH failed to reach an agreement of cease-fire as a prerequisite to negotiation.

²³⁸ Healey.

²³⁹ Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, "A Sectarian Jihad in Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 5 (2016): 882–84, <https://doi.org/1080/09592318.2016.1208286>.

²⁴⁰ Pérouse de Montclos, "A Sectarian Jihad in Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram,"

²⁴¹ Jidefor Adibe, "Re-evaluating the Boko Haram Conflict," Brookings Africa in Focus (blog), July 29, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/02/29/re-evaluating-the-boko-haram-conflict/>.

²⁴² Adibe.

²⁴³ Adibe.

1. Advantage of Political Responses

Since the second rebellion in Mali, the government and its partners to stem the cyclic rebellion in the north of Mali have undertaken several political measures. The peace agreement of 1991, 1992, 2014, and 2015 contain a series of political measures the government has applied to meet the threat. In the same vein, the Nigerian government, seeking the political ending of the crisis, concocted several political measures since the rise of BH. The measures comprised of negotiation with BH and an amnesty proposition to its members. In general, these political responses have resulted in the settlement of the major Tuareg insurgency in Mali through peace agreements, while Nigeria failed to conduct negotiations with BH.

One virtue of political responses in the case of Mali has been peace agreements. The failure of the military solutions and the counterinsurgency methods applied during decades by the dictatorship regime of Moussa Traore led in 1991 to a new approach blending political, economic, and military efforts. In 1992, the government of Mali started to implement political solutions to face the Tuareg rebellion. The first peace agreement between the Tuareg belligerents and the government of Mali was called the National pact. Article 1 and 2 of the Decree N/ 92-121/P-CTSP/ of April 11, 1992 dedicated a particular status to the regions of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal (6, 7, and 8th regions) of Mali, called Azawad by the insurgents, to symbolize the end of hostilities, and provided for the settlement of any questions resulting from the conflict.²⁴⁴ The treaty also solved a crucial employment concern of the Tuaregs as it granted the reintegration of insurgents into the army, police, and custom services.²⁴⁵ The integration of rebels in army and the para-military forces was not only a quick response to the crisis, but also provided personnel for the security of the territory.

Another benefit of the political responses of the crisis of the north of Mali has been the decentralization of administration, which partially answered the Tuaregs' representation concern. The special status granted to the northern regions enabled the

²⁴⁴ "Pacte National [National Pact]," UN Peacemaker, accessed April 3, 2019, 285, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ML_920411_PacteNationalGouvMaliAzawad.pdf.

²⁴⁵ "Pacte National [National Pact]," 285.

residents to decide the fate of their regions by empowering local representatives and increasing the number of their seats in the parliament. The third title of the Decree N/ 92–121/P-CTSP/ April 11, 1992, on the particular status of the northern regions defines the organization, functioning, and the competences of the local, regional and inter-regional assemblies, stressing the power transfer to the local elites in affairs’ management.²⁴⁶

Finally, the political approach implemented diplomatic tools in the management of the Malian crisis. ECOWAS played a tremendous role in the return of Mali to normalcy and paved the way for inter-Malian negotiation. After the series of condemnation of the military coup, ECOWAS under the direction of AU quickly stood for the return of peace and security in Mali. Pressuring the junta to pass the power to the president of the National Assembly, its efforts resulted in the organization of a presidential election and the starting of the Algiers peace agreement process. Boutellis and Zahar highlight the participation of ECOWAS through its emissaries from Bamako and Ouagadougou to Algiers between the government of Bamako and the insurgents through the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement of 2013, and the final Algiers Agreement of 2015.²⁴⁷ In the same vein Lecocq et al., praise the straightforward stance of ECOWAS to coerce the junta to transfer the power to civilians and its diplomatic efforts, which facilitated the resolution of the crisis through the president of Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso.²⁴⁸

In Nigeria, although the government attempted political approaches to respond to the crisis of BH, it did not succeed in negotiating with BH. The failure of the military response to defuse BH has led the Nigerian government from 2013 to consider political response by negotiation. After the debacle of the JFT’s operations, the Nigerian government accepted negotiations with BH. This approach could have reached a positive outcome if BH had not posed hardline conditions to the government. The resolution of

²⁴⁶ “Pacte National [National Pact],” 291–98.

²⁴⁷ Boutellis and Zahar, *A Process in Search of Peace: Lessons from the Inter-Malian Agreement*, 10–20.

²⁴⁸ Baz Lecocq et al., “One Hippopotamus and Eight Blind Analysts: A Multivocal Analysis of the 2012 Political Crisis in the Divided Republic of Mali,” 47–54.

many conflicts starts with the negotiation process, as noted in the case of Mali, and BH was unlikely ready to negotiate with the government. On one hand, the conditions posed by BH for the dialogue were hard enough for the Nigerian state, as it included the trial of the police officers and military making up the JTF, the release without trial of BH members, as well as financial compensation to the families of victims, and the withdrawal of the JTF from the region.²⁴⁹ On the other hand, the government's disrespectful refusal to stop the military operations finally ended the opportunity to reach a political solution.

The Nigerian government also proposed amnesty of BH members as part of the solution. Despite the perpetration of cruelty and the number of BH victims, the federal government of Nigeria has decided to grant amnesty to its members in its way of finding a tangible solution to the crisis. On April 23, 2014, President Goodluck Jonathan installed the Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the north of Nigeria. This commission was tasked to study the conditions of the amnesty, the disarmament and the reinsertion of BH members. However, this commission failed by the manifest refusal of BH to adhere to the idea. Shekau argues that BH has no reason to accept the pardon of the Nigerian state because his group is the victim of the government and that the amnesty should come from BH to the unfaithful Nigerian institutions.²⁵⁰ Finally, in May 2014, the Nigerian government established another committee tasked with inventorying BH's grievances and proposing durable solutions. As the previous attempt to find political solutions to the crisis, the later approaches consisted of negotiation between the government and BH represented by Sheikh Abdul Azeez Ibn Adam to register the grievances and to come up with solutions. After a public release of information about BH readiness to accept a cease fire and negotiate the conditions to the peaceful resolution of the crisis, Shekau appeared on video to deny all the allegations,

²⁴⁹ Camolli, 116.

²⁵⁰ "Nigeria Militants Reject Amnesty," *BBC News*, last modified April 11, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22105476>.

firmly maintaining that Abdul Azeez had never been appointed by BH; as a consequence, there is no dialogue between his group and the government.²⁵¹

2 Inadequacy of Political Responses

In Mali, the political approaches in responding to the crisis has created a severe security challenge, and the proliferation of groups on the eve of the peace agreement complicated the situation. In the Nigerian case, the political responses by the government and partners implemented to deal with BH inadvertently worked as publicity for the group as it sought international recognition.

The integration of insurgents in the army is one of the inadequacies of the political response to the Malian crisis, as the trained soldiers often join the insurgents against the state of Mali. The seventh point of the third title of the Decree N/ 92–121/P-CTSP/ April 11, 1992 requested the effective integration of all the fighters of Movements and Fronts Unified Azawad (MFUA) in the different corps of Mali.²⁵² According to *Peace Accord Matrix*, from 1992 to 1996 about 2,800 Tuareg combatants integrated into Malian's army units.²⁵³ The former rebels integrated into the army and trained to be consequential support for security—until they betrayed the nation at the first opportunity by attacking its institutions. It is likely that a large portion of the integrated and reintegrated military from the Tuareg combatant groups took part in the latest rebellions. Instead of learning lessons from the past, the government of Mali is still implementing the same approach as stipulated by the current Algiers peace agreement. The 2012 army deserters reintegrated into the army with a financial advantage, a situation that fuels the indignation of other ethnic groups.

Another flaw of the political response to the Tuareg rebellion in Mali was the reduction of military presence in the north, which severely weakened Mali's control over the region. One of the clauses of the peace agreement of 1992 required the reduction of

²⁵¹ Camolli, 117.

²⁵² "Pacte National [National Pact]," 285.

²⁵³ "*Military Reform: National Pact*, Peace Accords Matrix: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies University of Notre Dame, (Indiana USA 2015), <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/military-reform-national-pact>.

military presence in the strategic towns of the north.²⁵⁴ The implementation of the protocol of 1992 led to a drastic diminution of the military presence, resulting in the transformation of some barracks to schools and recreational centers. Knowing the immensity and the security challenges from the region, the progressive military withdrawal facilitated the settlement of terrorist organizations and organized criminals. The first took advantage of the state's absence to consolidate its relationship with the population and spread extremist ideology across the region. The second, increased from 1990 to 2000 with the type of traffickers resorting to military weapons to transport merchandise.²⁵⁵

Moreover, in 2014, the political approach to the crisis occasioned the proliferation of associations and groups seeking to take advantage of the negotiation, which complicated the negotiation process. Apart from the terrorist groups, the principal participants in the 2012 crisis were MNLA and Ansar Dine. Since the opening of the first round of negotiation between the government of Mali and the insurgents, additional groups emerged in the north, demanding their inclusion in the peace process. Boutellis and Zahar argue that the increase in the number of the participants in the negotiation thwarts the process, which extended to five rounds and was tainted by a series of clashes between groups.²⁵⁶ They highlight that the preliminary peace agreement of Ouagadougou registered only two armed groups: MNLA and the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) created in 2013 from a splinter of Ansar Dine, while the Algiers peace agreement included the participation of a few other groups regrouped under the coordination of Azawad and the Platform.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ "Pacte National [National Pact]," 288.

²⁵⁵ International Crisis Group, *Drug Trafficking, Violence and Politics in Northern Mali* 267 (Africa 2018), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/267-narcotrafic-violence-et-politique-au-nord-du-mali>.

²⁵⁶ Boutellis and Zahar, *A Process in Search of Peace: Lessons from the Inter-Malian Agreement*, 10–20.

²⁵⁷ Boutellis and Zahar, 12.

Lastly, the exclusion of the terrorist groups—Ansar Dine, AQIM, MUJAO—from the peace process of 2013–2015 led to an increase in terrorist attacks not only in the northern regions, but also in the center of Mali. This political mistake is still undermining the security of Mali. Such recent events as the attack on the military barrack of Dioura in the region of Segou and the massacre in the village of Ogossagou in the region of Mopti demonstrates the terrorist group’s persistence in Mali.²⁵⁸

In Nigeria, the political stance of the government and its international partners against BH in the 2000s has contributed to the internationalization of the group by increasing its operability capabilities across Africa.²⁵⁹ The recognition of BH as an international terrorist organization by the United States, the UN, and Canada, followed by the sanctions of the UN against its members and their belongings produced the opposite effect expected. Long ignored by the great powers, the act of the U.S. mainly comforted BH, which henceforth considered itself as an international threat. Salifu discusses that the blacklisting of BH as an Al-Qaeda affiliate and the following measures taken by the UN Security Council did not affect the group. On the contrary, UN measures granted BH international recognition, leading to cooperation with other organizations, such as AQIM, and the strengthening of its capabilities to carry out more lethal operations against strategic symbols, including schools, markets and administrative buildings.²⁶⁰ Shekau even described the UN, the United States and the Nigerian government as unfaithful and

The Coordination of Azawad created on November 2013 is composed of NLA, HCUA, and the coordination of Azawad Arab Movement (MAA). The Platform was created on June 14, 2013 and composed with the Coordination of Patriotic Movements and Forces of the Resistance (CMFPR), the MAA-Platform, and the Coalition of the People for Azawad (CPA), which split from the MNLA on March 18, 2013.

²⁵⁸ “Au Moins 21 Soldats Tués lors de l’Attaque d’un Camp Militaire par des Présumés Jihadistes au Mali [At Least 21 Soldiers Killed on the Attack of Military Camp by Alleged Jihadists in Mali],” *France 24*, Video, 1:21. March 18, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5NBeCQURGA>.

²⁵⁹ Camolli, 85–92.

²⁶⁰ Ojone F. Salifu, “United Nation Approaches to Global Terrorism: A Case Study of Boko Haram,” (master’s thesis, VID Specialized University, Norway, Stavanger, 2017), 59–60, <https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2455619/MGS-320-Salifu.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

sustained that BH will continue to react as long as the coalition of unbelievers will continue to work for its elimination.²⁶¹

In addition, the failure of negotiation between BH and Nigerian officials by refusing BH's conditions exposed the country and its neighbors to multiples terrorist activities. In the beginning, Bohari's government was likely ready to fulfill the majority of BH grievance sine qua non for the negotiations.²⁶² The shift of the situation in late 2013 by the Nigerian players, promising negotiation and at the same time crushing the group, created a situation of severe mistrust for BH of the government. The promises of negotiation paired with the continued military operation led to BH declining all types of dialogue with the government.²⁶³ In sum, the failure of the political approach in Nigeria encouraged BH to diversify and intensify their terrorist attacks in Nigeria and beyond as one way to confirm its international terrorist status. According to Felter, from 2011, BH has been responsible of the death of about 37,000 people.²⁶⁴ Knowing that the best solution of this case would be to pass through negotiation, the Nigerian government played the wrong card by failing to agree with BH. To date, the lethal force of BH remains despite the government's supposed reconquering of its territories and the Nigerian forces' victory.

C. ECONOMIC RESPONSE

Mali has also implemented economic measures in the resolution of the cyclic Tuareg insurgency. The economic responses not only provide mechanisms for the development of the Northern regions, as well as individual wealth, but also caused the diversion of a significant amount of money for personal interests and the realization of poor quality infrastructure. Nigeria, by contrast, has not been able to implement any

²⁶¹ "Nigeria Militants Reject Amnesty," *BBC News*, last modified April 11, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22105476>.

²⁶² Camolli, 115–126.

²⁶³ Camolli.

²⁶⁴ Claire Felter, "Nigeria's Battle with Boko Haram," Council on Foreign Relations, last modified August 8, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/nigerias-battle-boko-haram>.

sustained economic approaches, primarily because of the failures in the political response.

1. Advantages of Economic Responses

The economic measures contained in the peace agreements between the government of Mali and the insurgents contributed to the development of the northern regions and the social reinsertion of many combatants. Among these economic measures, the special development provision for the northern regions and the allocation of funds to insurgents to start small business were the main thrusts.

In the peace agreement of 1991, Title III on the role and missions of the local and regional assembly, granted an important place to the economic, social, and cultural development of the north.²⁶⁵ The failure of the integral implementation of the 1991 peace agreement led to the rebellion and the peace agreement of 1996, which mainly focused on the economic development of the region of Kidal.²⁶⁶ As in the previous peace agreements, in the latest peace agreement of June 2015, a particular emphasis was on the development of the northern region to solve its economic difficulties. According to Boubou Cissé, former Minister of Economy and Finance, Mali is planning to spend €3.35 billion for the development of the northern regions; this project is meant to improve global governance and social development, including access to basic social services, the economic development and infrastructures.²⁶⁷ According to Pezard and Shurkin, to attain peace in the north of Mali, the government has engaged in serious economic development

²⁶⁵ “Pacte National [National Pact],” 292.

²⁶⁶ “Accord d’Alger pour la Restauration de la Paix, de la Sécurité et du Développement de la Région de Kidal, [Algiers Agreement for the Restoration of Peace, Security and Development in the Kidal Region],” UN peacemaker, 3–4, accessed April 3, 2019, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ML_060704_Accord%20d%27Alger.pdf.

²⁶⁷ Baba Ahmed, “Mali: 3, 35 Milliards Euros Promis pour le Développement des Régions du Nord [Mali: € 3.35 Billion Promised for the Development of Northern Regions],” *Jeune Afrique*, last modified 9, 2018, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/460953/economie/mali-335-milliards-deuros-promis-pour-le-developpement-des-regions-du-nord/>.

projects aimed to fill the economic gap between the south and the north, which is disfavored by the difficult climatic situation.²⁶⁸

Although the peace agreements did not resolve the Tuareg insurgency, the economic approaches still have some positive effects. For one, the peace agreements of the 1990s enabled the government to balance the economic disparity between the south and the north, which not only created job opportunities, but also enabled the northern regional assembly to decide what was good for the development of the regions.²⁶⁹ The implementation of subsequent economic efforts in the north of Mali resulted in a peaceful period between 1991 and 2012, which allowed the government to implement the clauses of the agreement from which both parties took advantage. If the insurgents benefited from the financial outcomes of the peace agreements, the government has enjoyed the peacetime and boosted its reputation as a site of good democracy in the international realm. According to Freedom House, the democratic alternation of power and the political rights and civil liberty in Mali in 2011 positioned the country among the good examples of democratic and free countries of Africa.²⁷⁰

The economic response in the Malian crisis also provided a special development program and special tax waiver for the Northern regions, which incentivized third parties to further various government projects. The promise of these projects had short-term effects on reducing violence in the northern regions. The National Pact of 1991 recommended that the Malian government not only to provides necessary funds for development projects managed by regional assemblies, but also suggested the provision of inducements to local and international investors. This approach generated new opportunities to the local inhabitants and provided basic necessary structures crucial for their daily life. The Supporting Project for Local Development (PADL) co-funded by

²⁶⁸ Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin, *Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for Durable Settlement*, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2015), 12–15, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR892/RAND_RR892.pdf.

²⁶⁹“Accord d’Alger pour la Restauration de la Paix, de la Sécurité et du Développement de la Région de Kidal, [Algiers Agreement for the Restoration of Peace, Security and Development in the Kidal Region].

²⁷⁰ Mali,” Freedom House, last modified July 31, 2013, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/mali>.

Mali and partners, which was operating in fifteen communes of the Ansongo, Gao, and Bourem, realized from 1997 to 2004, included around 937 projects in education, agriculture, tourism, fish farming, water supply, livestock, health, and silting for a total amount of \$3,986,463.²⁷¹ The regional and local development tax in the northern regions of Mali is currently less than \$2 per adult, with exemption for women with three children, the elderly, students, the sick and the disabled.²⁷²

As a result, cognizant of the wealth behind these national efforts, a few groups in the north decided to defend their interests by standing alongside the government and refused to continue their association with rebel group. Pezard and Shurkin argue that 1,900 insurgents benefited from the government financial support to start small businesses.²⁷³ Boilley argues that the Support Program for the Socio-economic Reintegration of Ex-combatants (PAREM) in collaboration with PNUD distributed the amount of \$5,093,378 to individuals to start new business, and the CAR-Nord program granted \$314,091 to groups or associations for their reinsertion after the peace agreement of 1996.²⁷⁴

The government of Nigeria, by contrast, barely implemented economic approaches to deal with the case of BH. According to the several attempts of Nigeria officials helped by influential political and religious leaders, they failed to conduct negotiations between BH and the government.²⁷⁵ The counterinsurgency methods based on military operations the government and its partners adopted since the launch of BH curtailed all opportunity of dialogue between the parties, nullifying the implementation of economic responses. At most, some isolated cases of Nigerian officials bribing BH in

²⁷¹ Marie J. Demante, "Crise, Developpement Local et Decentralization dans la Region de Gao (Mali) [Crisis, Local Development, and Decentralization in the Region of Gao (Mali)]," *Afrique Contemporaine*, no. 3 (2005): 195–215, <https://doi.org/3917/afco.215.0195>.

²⁷² Demante.

²⁷³ Pezard and Shurkin, *Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for Durable Settlement*, 15.

²⁷⁴ Pierre Boilley, *Mali: Stabilité du Nord-Mali: des Responsabilités Partagées [Mali: Stability of North-Mali: Shared Responsibilities]*, (UK: UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, 1999), 10–11, <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6a6c710.pdf>.

²⁷⁵ Kieran E. Uchegara, "Peace Talks Initiatives between the Boko Haram and Nigerian Government," *International Journal of Business and Social Science* 5, no. 6(1) (May 2014): 136, http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_5_No_6_1_May_2014/16.pdf.

exchange for their regions' safety from attacks have been reported.²⁷⁶ In contrast to Mali, however, the Nigerian government has implemented efforts countering the financing of terrorism, which significantly dropped the amount of cattle rustling and bank robbery,²⁷⁷ and the Terrorism Act of 2011 made the task of the law enforcement easier, with clear definitions of terrorism infringements and the perpetrators' punishment.²⁷⁸

2. Inadequacy of Economic Responses

Since 1991, the Malian government has been investing enormous amount of money in the development of the northern regions, but comparing the spending and the result on the field, several negative results are noticeable. The economic responses have registered only short-term results due to the insecurity of the regions, the diversion of the fund and the execution of the development projects by unqualified and underequipped enterprises realizing poor quality of infrastructures.

One shortcoming in Mali is that economic measures were implemented in an insecure environment, which further led to the destruction of the acquisitions. As opposed to the south, where projects such school construction, irrigation, livestock, gardening, and small business can last forever; the insecure environment of the north has led to the everlasting reconstruction of the region.²⁷⁹ This state of affairs very likely not only to discourage local investors from commencing new activities, but also threatens to prevent international businessmen from risking their money and life in uncertain affairs. The absence of foreign investment in the northern regions of Mali makes the task of the government more complicated to develop the vast desert regions of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. Gaëlle Le Roux in 2011 argues that Ansar Dine forbids the presence of NGOs in the north of the country where the population crucially need aid after the damage of

²⁷⁶ Uchehara, 136.

²⁷⁷ Marama.

²⁷⁸ "Terrorism (Prevention) Act," Centre for Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2011, <http://lawnigeria.com/LawsoftheFederation/Terrorism-%28Prevention%29-Act,-2011.html>.

²⁷⁹ Francesca Bastagli and Camilla Toulmin, *Mali: Economic Factors behind the Crisis* (Belgium: European Union, 2014), 35–36, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/433754/EXPO-DEVE_ET\(2014\)433754_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/433754/EXPO-DEVE_ET(2014)433754_EN.pdf).

harvests and food stocks, the destruction and looting of banks, schools, hospitals and businesses, and the absence of running water and electricity in some areas.²⁸⁰ Likewise, in the 2012 crisis in Mali more than 200 educational facilities have been destroyed, occupied or looted by armed groups.²⁸¹ Fatoumata Maiga also posits that in 2012, armed groups in the north of Mali committed the destruction of social infrastructure including schools, health centers, and women's cooperatives.²⁸²

The second inadequacy in Mali's economic responses has been the diversion of funds. With the weak state presence in the north, and the empowerment of the local authorities, resources dedicated to the development of the region have been diverted. These circumstances suggest that not only does the state have weak control over the persons in charge of the execution of the projects, but also on those responsible for supervising their execution. Title III of the Peace Agreement of 1996 mentions that while the state provides funds for the development of the northern regions, the execution and supervision of the projects is the responsibility of the regional assembly.²⁸³ Caramel notes that since 2012, Mali has received more than \$1 billion in international aid a year for a poorly visible result in the field, mainly regarding the northern crisis, which is spreading toward the south, and officials are unable to provide satisfactory answers on the use of resources.²⁸⁴ The most striking example is the diversion of the funds for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants after the 1990 rebellion by the Tuareg Ifoghas to obtain the loyalty of the population and consolidate their power

²⁸⁰ Gaëlle Le. Roux, "Le Nord du Mali en proie à une Grave Crise Alimentaire [Mali's North in Prey to Serious Food Crisis]," France 24, last modified June 26, 2012, <https://www.france24.com/fr/20120626-mali-nord-rebellion-crise-alimentaire-secheresse-combats-pillages-recoltes-eau-electricite-tombouctou-kidal-gao>.

²⁸¹ "Analyse de la Situation Humanitaire 2014[Humanitarian situation Analysis]," Global Education Cluster Mali 2013, 2, accessed April 10, 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Narratif_HNO_Cluster_Education_Mali.pdf.

²⁸² Mégane Ghorbani, "Mali: la Consolidation de la Paix ne Peut se Faire sans les Femmes [Mali: No Peace Consolidation without Women]," AWID, last modified August 5, 2015, <https://www.awid.org/fr/news-and-analysis/mali-la-consolidation-de-la-paix-ne-peut-se-faire-sans-les-femmes>.

²⁸³ Pacte National [National Pact], 295.

²⁸⁴ Laurence Caramel, "l'Aide Financière au Mali à l' Epreuve de la Guerre et de la Corruption [Financial Assistance in Mali to the Trial of War and Corruption]," Le Monde.fr, last modified July 26, 2018, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/07/26/l-aide-financiere-au-mali-a-l-epreuve-de-la-guerre-et-de-la-corruption_5336120_3212.html.

on their rivals Tuareg Imghad.²⁸⁵ In the same manner, the eruption of a new rebellion disrupts the continuation of ongoing development activities, which is a good opportunity for its executors to misuse the remaining fund and materials on the pretext that attacks on the office have sabotaged the projects.

The one other flaw of the economic response in the Malian crisis concerns the quality of the enterprises engaged in the reconstruction of the region to execute poor quality works. The promotion of local enterprises could be more profitable for the community if the projects executed could last for a while. Unfortunately, due to the local development contract between the state and the regions, large parts of the contracts on building infrastructures and roads are carried out by local businesses.²⁸⁶ Demante confirms that the realization of investments by local companies in order to promote regional economic growth has some consequences in the quality of the work offered by companies insufficiently trained and equipped. She maintains that in the case of projects financed by PADSL, the executed works were of average quality and 25 percent of them would roughly require major repairs.²⁸⁷ As a result, since the 1990s, Mali has been playing a ping-pong game of construction and reconstruction of the north.

D. CONCLUSION

The study of the implemented responses to the secular Tuareg crisis in Mali and the BH crisis in Nigeria provide important positive results and negative effects of the military, political, and economic approaches. To some extent, counterinsurgency is necessary depending on the nature of the nature and the size of group, as well as its connection to the population. However, the overuse of the military solution can easily shift the insurgent group to undertake new objectives through the escalation of violence and radicalization. Hard counterinsurgency methods lead to the commission of numerous human rights violations and the killing of innocent people, therefore increasing the rank

²⁸⁵ “Analyse: Le Problème de l’Aide au Mali [Analyse: Aid Problem in Mali],” Relief Web, accessed April 11, 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/analyse-le-probl%C3%A8me-de-laide-au-mali>.

²⁸⁶ “Accord d’Alger pour la Restauration de la Paix, de la Sécurité et du Développement de la Région de Kidal, [Algiers Agreement for the Restoration of Peace, Security and Development in the Kidal Region].

²⁸⁷ Demante, “Crise, Développement Local et Décentralization dans la Région de Gao (Mali).

of insurgents. In addition, the political approach has shown important benefits as it allows the parties to open a dialogue and agree on potential responses to the crisis and its implementation modalities. On the other hand, the nonfulfillment of the political promise often compromises the entire peace process, while ceding too much can make it difficult to retain control of a region and to make good on promises to the population. Finally, economic distress and the lack of opportunity triggers the majority of the crisis, which require effective responses in the peace processes. Based on this analysis, the case studies of Mali and Nigeria reveal that responding to insurgency require the blend of military, political and economic approaches because focusing too much on one method will be ineffective and can give rise to other problems.

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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This study reveals that the crisis in Mali has several military, political, and economic causes, triggered by imbalanced governance. The analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the military, political, and economic approaches discussed in chapter four indicates that none of them alone is sufficient to solve the crisis. At the same time, they achieved some positive results. A mix of approaches is therefore vital to creating new dynamics to fix the inadequacies of past experiences. This final chapter therefore recommends strategic measures to respond to the crisis highlighting good governance, which will improve the effectiveness of the elites, the armed and security forces, and the civil society organization to responding to the crisis.

A. ELITES

As the armed and security forces request significant changes to attain expected results in the Malian case, so do the elites, who should combine the promotion of comprehensive development programs, youth education and employment, in order to enable to the armed and security forces to achieve their mission, and support mechanisms fighting against corruption. Therefore, Malian elites should:

- Establish the National Security Council. As a strategic security and defense coordination tool, the NSC will response to the majority of the challenges encounter by the security and defense forces in their daily tasks. Bruneau et al., argue that the NSC has the role of informing and lightening the decisions of the executive, promote interagency cooperation, provide national defense plan and it execution, and promote its agenda through international cooperation.²⁸⁸ Thus, the enactment of the NSC will provide new roles and responsibilities converging to produce effective coordination in forces use, as well as intelligence sharing. In

²⁸⁸ Thomas C. Bruneau, Florina Cristiana Matei, Sak Sakoda, “National Security Councils: Their Potential Functions in Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” *Defense & Security Analysis* 25, no. 3(2009): 257–8, DOI: 10.1080/14751790903201406.

addition, the NSC national security strategy will not only provide defense plan for the whole country, but also devises strategies to the specific case of Tuareg.

- Provide comprehensive development programs for all regions. As the decentralization of power in previous peace agreements, creating a period of peace registered remarkable results, it is essential for elites to strengthen these achievements by consistently providing necessary resources and facilitating all of the regions' economic independence so that they can undertake necessary activities for their growth. For that, priority should be given to the development of the transport infrastructures and an increase of the energy supply. The development of these sectors will not only facilitate the transport of goods from the producer to the consumers in the vast land mass of the country, but also ease the development of the agro-industry, which would create more opportunities and hope for better life among the population. Moreover, inclusive development should include the betterment of the quality of services that administrations are providing. The concept of the concentration of state administrative power in Bamako, which results in the mistrust and frustration of some regions feeling disadvantaged, will reduce if local services meet their expectations.
- Promote youth education and employment. The increase in the number of graduating youth would decrease insurgents' potential followers. As some of the terrorist combatants are recruited among students from French-Arabic and Madrasa schools, elites should encourage and promote the integration of these students by the creation of a curriculum enabling them to join the job market. Because many combatants join the insurgent and terrorist groups because they lack opportunity, the promotion of education would enable many young people to attain an acceptable level of education that can grant them job opportunities. In this way, elites will

reduce the number of youth susceptible to being enrolled in the campaigns against the nation.

- Budget for the new generation of equipment and consequent training to the forces. The military and security forces will not be able to succeed against the insurgency nexus of terrorism and organized crime without a useful update of their knowledge and materials. With new threats as hybrid, asymmetric and information warfare, to leverage innovation and supersede the enemy, Malian elites should invest in security forces' operability. Providing essential equipment to the Joint Army Task Forces (GTIA), Special Anti-Terrorism Forces (FORSAT), and the Central Narcotic Agency (OCS), created for this circumstance, in addition to the remaining forces, would grant the military the possibility to reply effectively to the current enemy, as well as its funding. Thus, with adequate capability, armed and security forces will stress prevention by containing insurgents rather than intervention. Therefore, subsequent measures should accompany such new structures as the Specialized Judicial Pole against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crimes and the National Cell of Financial Information Processing (CENTIF). These structures with clear visibility of their attributes and the allocation of resources would perform what the precedent services failed to achieve.
- Provide mechanisms enabling effective results against corruption. Previous attempts to provide economic relief to areas susceptible to insurgency were undermined by corruption, therefore eroding the peace. The strict implementation of laws and conventions and the enactment of anti-corruption measures proposed by the different anti-corruption structures will have positive effects. Despite the five anti-corruption bodies in Mali, the country occupies the rank of (116 out of 176 in the

world).²⁸⁹ Malian elites, by underscoring transparency in the management of states' affairs and respecting the separation of the executive and judicial branch by stopping interference in judicial affairs, will ensure the independence of the judicial system and the chance to enable anti-corruption brigades to perform impeccable investigations. However, the rigorous application of law without social status distinction should begin with law enforcement, public finances, and social services.

B. ARMED AND SECURITY FORCES

The complexity of the Malian crisis requires diversified military solutions encompassing the reform of the intelligence services, innovation in military capabilities, the development of the civil-military relationships, as well as regional and international cooperation. Armed and security forces, to attain effective responses to the Malian crisis should take the following actions:

- Build a comprehensive intelligence agency. The failure of the counterinsurgency and terrorism in Nigeria was largely caused by ineffectiveness in intelligence collection and the sharing of data between the defense and security forces. The Malian intelligence apparatus displays some of the same problems as Nigeria's. Solving this issue requires the creation of a central agency at the presidency level responsible for the coordination of the entire intelligence services and the promotion of civilian intelligence. The central agency would not only oversee the individual services but also reduce the misuse of intelligence to crack down on political opponents instead focusing on the independent collection and analysis of information necessary for the internal and external security of the country. The promotion of civilian intelligence by formalizing and providing incentives to involve them inside the defense and security forces would facilitate the collection of intelligence on

²⁸⁹ "Mali Corruption Rank," Trading Economics, April 25, 2019, <https://tradingeconomics.com/mali/corruption-rank>.

enemies embedded on the population. This approach would also facilitated the sharing of intelligence between armed and security forces and enforce dissemination with limit access to vital intelligence.

- Modernize the countering strategy according to the threat. The asymmetric and terrorist methods used by insurgents demand that the security forces must innovate and implement new warfare styles. The development of technology today offers countless opportunities to the Malian forces to expand their techniques and strategies. To attain this objective, the use of unmanned devices in intelligence collection will produce effective results with utmost discretion within an acceptable timeframe in any steep terrain, which is inexpensive compared to regular spying. Also, the use of drones, armored vehicles, and robots would not only guarantee the precision of the strikes on targets, fewer casualties, and unwanted civilian deaths, but also increase security forces' sustainability and reduce the logistics footprint.
- Promote civil-military cooperation. Given the weakness of the Malian security forces as identified in Chapter 2, cooperation can be a strong rampart against terrorist groups. From the Malian standpoint, because the enemies are embedded in the population, the security forces would take advantage of the civil-military cooperation by providing incentives to civilians—in particular, giving them official status as employees of the security forces to report every suspect and suspicious conduct encountered. Cooperation would then ease the arrest of criminals before they proceed, preserving and protecting civilians from being targeted. Even with the latest generation of military technology, it will be difficult for the army to end a terrorist insurgency without the involvement of the population through strategic communication.
- Strengthen regional and international cooperation. As an insurgency, terrorism and organized crimes are transnational threats, therefore the coordination of efforts could decrease the operability of the criminal

actors. NATO's interoperability policy defines Joint Forces Operations as "the ability for allies to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives."²⁹⁰ With a common adversary, unified cooperation is less demanding—and often more effective—than when each country deals with the problem on its own. To attain this objective, starting from lessons learned, the regional military cooperation through sharing experiences will strengthen the capability of members to work on the case. On the one hand, even if Mali has limited resources to afford the latest generation of military technology, it can take advantage of international partners' strengths to deter and fight the enemy while improving its security forces' capabilities. On the other hand, the implementation of a joint operations' strategy can contribute to defeating the terrorism scourge. Bordered by seven countries that have an interest in containing the crisis, the combination of military efforts can drive a lasting outcome.

C. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

Civil society is the barometer of the powers conferred to the military, executive, legislative, and judicial branch. By promoting good governance oversight, civil society compels state bureaucracy accountability. Civil society organizations, the media, and non-governmental organizations enact this process. Therefore, civil society should:

- Oversee and report the daily activity of armed and security forces and prompt state reaction against any misconduct and violation of the established rules. As the case of Nigeria especially shows, abuses by the military is a challenge. Therefore, strengthening civilian control and oversight over the armed and security forces would decrease the number of human rights abuses in military operations. Currently, state government branches do not have strong control over the military and likely tolerate

²⁹⁰ "Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 6, 2017, https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/topics_84112.htm.

some of its misconduct. This complicity from the executive, legislative and the judicial branches in controlling the military can be filled if the Civil Society Organizations effectively play their role. As a counterweight and with a different approach, civil society would guarantee the effectiveness of control by overseeing elites. To reach the goal of sound oversight, civil society should be organized in a single healthy body producing more powerful impacts rather than conducting several parallel movements that are easy to divert.

- Foster internal and external oversight through the release of accurate information on elites' management of the state's affairs. The workability of civil organization oversight necessitates cooperation with the media. By sharing the daily activities of the bureaucracy with the population, the media would trigger internal oversight by providing information on important state decisions to citizens, who will react when collective interests are threatened. External oversight will be conducted by the cooperation of local and international media. Private domestic media companies sharing information with media abroad would help the international community to take action sooner rather than later. To attain effectiveness, media will take advantage of the new technologies of information that are cheap and accessible to the majority of the population. Effectiveness will also require the government to implement legal framework promoting free press.
- Solicit the help of international NGOs and the media in their actions. Like the media, NGOs can play a significant role by strengthening institutions and empowering the local oversight apparatus. The cooperation between the NGOs and the local CSOs will reinforce the ability of people to hold civil servants and politicians accountable for their actions. To reach the ultimate goal and avoid the scattering of efforts, NGOs should form a joint group. Therefore, the group will identify the needs of the CSOs.

Regarding the competence of each organization, NGOs can provide training, seminars, and information to strengthen their capacity to implement effective control of the actions of governing elites. In addition, the international NGOs will prompt oversight and change by reporting any governance issues to their respective countries.

D. CONCLUSION

Overall, this research highlights the complexity of the nexus of insurgency terrorism and organized crime. As the majority of the insurgents' grievances result from governance issues. One of the best solutions to the current crisis in Mali should start from good governance. The promotion of good governance in Mali will be a significant step in resolving the northern crisis, which is developing toward the south. The government, by playing its role of providing necessary and basic needs for the population and promoting inclusive development for the entire country, will create the conditions of stability. The military, elites, and the CSOs should stand together to exercise their authority as requested in democracy. Additionally, the military should be educated to face the new threats with the necessary expertise and equipment, while avoiding human rights abuses in their daily tasks and accepting civilian control, as well as the coordination of the intelligence services and the promotion of civilians in this activity. For their part, the elites should grant the armed and security forces the necessary equipment for their mission, provide the judicial branch significant support not only to fight against corruption but also enable the mechanism to control the whole law enforcement apparatus. For civil society, regarding the crucial role it occupies in framing the aforementioned measures, it is necessary to grant them necessary knowledge to contribute to the success of its mission. For the effectiveness of the CSOs, it is vital to distance it from politicians' manipulation, which would hamper its watchdog mission. Finally, the combination of effective military, political, and economic reaction, with a significant regional and international cooperation will help Mali to response to the lingering crisis undermining its stability.

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