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**RUSSIA'S PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN SECURITY
TREATY: ORIGINS AND PROSPECTS**

by

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ORIGINS AND PROSPECTS**

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ABSTRACT

In 2008–2009, Dmitry Medvedev, then the President of Russia, proposed the conclusion of a European Security Treaty (EST) to provide “indivisible security” for nations from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Although this proposal came during a “reset” of Western relations with Russia, NATO governments ultimately rejected it. This thesis analyzes the treaty proposal and assesses Russian motivations for suggesting it. The thesis also explains why NATO governments rejected the EST, a proposal with provisions contrary to Western security interests. The potential for improved security cooperation between Russia and the West has been significantly limited since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012. Russia has annexed Crimea, destabilized eastern Ukraine, and taken other steps intended to discredit, fragment, and undermine the Western-led liberal world order. This thesis considers Western and Russian viewpoints, notably in light of developments since Medvedev proposed an EST. Although Russia has violated key elements of its proposed treaty, the Kremlin has nonetheless pursued the strategic goals it had hoped to achieve through the EST: subversion of NATO’s cohesion and collective defense ability, weakening of the transatlantic link, veto power for Moscow in the European security architecture, and dominion in Russia’s near abroad.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In June 2008 and November 2009, Dmitry Medvedev, then the President of Russia, proposed the creation of a European political structure—a European Security Treaty (EST)—providing “indivisible security” to countries in the Euro-Atlantic region from Vancouver to Vladivostok.¹ Although some European leaders, such as Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, welcomed the Russian overtures, NATO governments (including that of Italy) ultimately rejected this proposal.² The hopes for deepening security cooperation with the Russian Federation after the United States/Russia reset declared by President Obama in 2009 were dashed by the Kremlin’s changing role and behavior following Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012.

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis revisits the EST to determine if Moscow continues to pursue a security architecture design as laid out by former president Medvedev, or if Vladimir Putin has modified or abandoned this model in favor of another strategy. This thesis also explores the following questions: In retrospect, how should the Russian proposal for a European Security Treaty be interpreted? Why did Moscow propose it? What did the Russians expect to achieve? Why did NATO member state governments reject it? Why do the Russians continue to bring it up sometimes?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The relationship of the United States, Canada, and European nations, notably those in the NATO and the European Union, commonly referred to as the West, with the Russian Federation has drastically worsened since Russia made the European Security Treaty (EST) proposal in 2008–2009, culminating with the annexation of Crimea by

¹ Dmitri Medvedev, “Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders,” June 5, 2008, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/320>; and Dmitri Medvedev, “The Draft of the European Security Treaty,” November 29, 2009, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/6152>.

² “Berlusconi Praises Russian Proposal for European Security Pact,” *Interfax : Russia & CIS Diplomatic Panorama*, 2009.

Russia in 2014, continuing Russian military engagement elsewhere in eastern Ukraine, and subsequent sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation by the European Union and the United States.

The EST proposal, its rejection by Western nations, and developments since it was launched indicate three major implications for the European security structure. First, the EST provides the blueprint for the Russian vision of Moscow's preferred security structure and multipolar power distribution in and beyond Europe. Second, the proposal indicates Russia's desire to subordinate all matters concerning security to an organization in which it has veto power—in this case, the United Nations Security Council. This would have the effect of establishing a legal structure to counter the expansion and effectiveness of its Euro-Atlantic adversaries, NATO and the European Union; block humanitarian interventionism and pro-democratic revolutions; and ensure its uncontested sovereignty as a great power. Finally, although Putin's actions following the launching of the proposal violated key provisions of the proposed treaty, Russia has continued to advocate returning to the proposed treaty, has further developed its concept of a "sovereign democracy," and has persisted in its efforts to regain lost influence over other former Soviet republics and former Warsaw Pact Allies.

The proposed EST reflects the objectives and ultimate goals of Russia's foreign policy and the national image it seeks to project. Russia, particularly since Putin's return to the presidency in 2012, has honed a post-Soviet ideology, including a vision of Russia as a "Third Rome" with the mission of protecting European cultural values and offering an alternate world view distinct from the supposedly decadent "values" spread by the West.³ Although Russia appears to acknowledge that NATO enlargement cannot be reversed in the current and foreseeable context, the EST would effectively halt further

³The concept of Russia as the "Third Rome" stems from the letter by the monk Filofei of Pskov to Tsar Vasili III in 1511 asserting that "[t]wo Romes [Rome and Constantinople] have fallen, a third stands, a fourth there shall not be." This concept inspires the philosophy of the neo-Eurasianists who see Russia as having a destiny separate from the West, as an expansive empire defined by a Russian, Slavic, and Orthodox identity.

Richard Sakwa, *Russia Against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 123, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316675885>.

enlargement and prevent NATO from legally taking any steps which Russia perceives as aggressive or threatening to its security.

This thesis provides an analysis of the proposed EST, its reception by NATO nations, and subsequent developments. The objective is to investigate the security architecture desired by the Russian Federation, to determine how the EST aligns to Russia's national strategy and foreign policy, and to point out the limits of security cooperation between the Russian Federation and European and trans-Atlantic powers. Although deeper cooperation in the economic and security realms has been endorsed by the member nations of NATO, the European Union, and the OSCE (including the Russian Federation), the potential for cooperation has been constrained by Russian actions, ongoing sanctions, and opposing values and world views. Considering the Russian view that there is a high potential for a great power war in the European region,⁴ the political and economic independence of former Soviet republics and former Warsaw Pact nations, and the potential undoing of the stability, prosperity, and democratization of Europe provided by NATO and European integration in the European Union, clarifying the intent of Russia's EST proposal is critical to understanding Moscow's global ambitions. Although published work on this topic addresses Russia's purported intentions with the EST, there has surprisingly been little recent work published on the development of EST-related Russian behavior since 2009. In recent years, both Russia and the United States have withdrawn from or suspended compliance with treaties which existentially affect European security. Indeed, the United States' decision in 2018 to withdraw from the so-called Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was taken in response to Russian noncompliance with this treaty.

⁴ Former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stated on 19 March 2016 that "The risk of confrontation with the use of nuclear weapons in Europe is higher than in the 1980s," "Risk of Nuclear War in Europe Growing, Warns Russian Ex-Minister," *Reuters*, March 19, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-idUSKCN0WL0EV>.

There is increasing tension and distrust between Russia and the West due to Russian espionage, assassinations, interference in elections, and military posturing. Reevaluating the EST proposal will, it is hoped, provide a clearer understanding of Russia's design and strategy towards the European Union, NATO, the United States, and the security architecture of Europe in general. Since Putin's return to the presidency, Russia has pursued actions such as the annexation of Ukrainian territory in 2014, and other acts which clearly contradict the provisions of the EST. Revisiting the EST will provide valuable information to determine if Russia continues to pursue a security architecture design as laid out in 2008–2009 by Dmitry Medvedev, then the President, or if Vladimir Putin has subsequently modified or abandoned this model in favor of another strategy.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe became the centerpiece for the transformation of the previously bi-polar communist and capitalist bloc arrangement to a Europe of shared values of democracy, human rights, and free trade. Europe is flanked by two strategic relationships: the Russian Federation to the east, and the enduring ties with Canada and the United States to the west. The period since 1991 has seen significant political, economic, and military developments brought about by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the establishment and expansion of the European Union, the deepening and widening of the European integration project, and increased participation in NATO's collective defense, cooperative security and crisis management arrangements.

The Russian Federation also underwent a transformation through its loss of empire, failed experiments with democratic rule, and transition to a market economy. Russia remains, however, the world's largest nuclear power, a nation which spans one third of the globe, and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. By the time the Russian Federation made the EST proposal, several key events provided crucial insight into Russian intent: the Kosovo War in 1998–1999 and the widespread recognition of Kosovo's independence since 2008, the acceptance of former Warsaw Pact

members and former Soviet republics into NATO and the European Union, the Iraq War, and the Russo-Georgian War. This period also saw the emergence of pro-democratic and anti-authoritarian movements in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus. Economically, the Russian Federation had profited enormously from the elevated oil and gas prices of the mid 2000s and overcame many of the economic hardships it had experienced from the collapse of the Soviet Union through the Yeltsin years (1991-1999).

The Iraq War had also exposed the fissures between the United States and some of its NATO Allies, which joined Russia in condemning United States actions outside of the scope of an additional UN Security Council Resolution specifically authorizing the invasion of Iraq.⁵ Additionally, the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 and the resulting NATO mission to Afghanistan saw Russia in a supportive role, indicating that security cooperation with Russia could in some circumstances yield many important benefits.

There are two main schools of thought regarding the intent of Russia in its EST proposal. Some scholars, such as Bobo Lo, Patrick Nopens, Glenn Diesen and Steve Wood, critically evaluate the EST as an attempt by Russia to create a legal basis subordinate only to the UN Security Council as the final arbiter of disputes.⁶ The EST would require Russian consent to all security-related matters in Europe which Russia deemed a threat to its security, cement its legacy as a victorious power of World War II and world power, legitimize its control within its sphere of influence, and facilitate a derailing of NATO and the trans-Atlantic link, along with a fragmentation of the European nations. The ultimate intent is to create a new “Concert of Europe” in which

⁵ The U.S. Government holds that no additional UNSC Resolution was required to justify the use of force. David S. Yost, “NATO and the Anticipatory Use of Force,” *International Affairs* 83, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 41, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00602.x>.

⁶ Bobo Lo, “Medvedev and the New European Security Architecture,” Centre for European Reform, accessed March 8, 2018, <http://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2009/medvedev-and-new-european-security-architecture>; Patrick Nopens, “A New Security Architecture for Europe? Russian Proposals and Western Reactions Part II. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 10, April 2010,” Policy Paper, April 2010, <http://aei.pitt.edu/14431/>; Glenn Diesen and Steve Wood, “Russia’s Proposal for a New Security System: Confirming Diverse Perspectives,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 66, no. 4 (August 1, 2012): 450–67, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2012.692530>.

Moscow, as the overarching power, would—in the words of Bobo Lo—share a “regional oligarchy with major European continental powers.”⁷

The second school of thought supports Russia’s policy and its presentation. Scholars such as Samuel Layton, Richard Sakwa, and Andrei Tsygankov see this proposed treaty as an effort by Russia to return order and legality in the post-Cold War transition to a multipolar world structure in which state sovereignty must be protected against unilateral military actions, foreign-instigated popular revolutions, regime changes, and humanitarian interventionism, and in which a bloc-free area of collective security would replace existing collective defense alliances.⁸

One of the major pillars of the EST proposal is its premise of international law and subordination to the United Nations Security Council. The legal premise is based on the Helsinki Final Act, a political declaration which the EST proposal lists directly next to the UN Charter. The provisions of the Helsinki Final Act concerning sovereignty are the reason, as Slobodchikoff points out, that this Act is cited by Moscow as the central legal premise in treaties of the Russian Federation with former Soviet republics due to their inherent lack of trust in Moscow’s willingness to respect their territorial sovereignty and integrity, as well as the inviolability of their borders.⁹ Despite the legal basis for action grounded in international law, Lo points out that great powers have not always considered themselves bound by international law, have violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states at will, and have used force as an instrument of foreign policy.¹⁰

⁷ Bobo Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder* (London : Washington, DC: Chatham House ; Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 180.

⁸ Samuel Layton, “Reframing European Security: Russia’s Proposal for a New European Security Architecture,” *International Relations* 28, no. 1 (2014): 25–45, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117813507734>; Sakwa, *Russia Against the Rest*; Andrei P. Tsygankov, *The Strong State in Russia: Development and Crisis* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

⁹ Michael O. Slobodchikoff, *Building Hegemonic Order Russia’s Way: Order, Stability, and Predictability in the Post-Soviet Space* (Lexington Books, 2014), 122.

¹⁰ Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, 71.

Post-Cold War Russia has been no exception to that rule, even at the time the EST proposal was made. Besides its continued military involvement in frozen conflicts such as Transnistria, its intervention in (and recognition of) Georgia's breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia signaled that it did not share the same idea of sovereignty or territorial integrity as did most other countries. The concept of sovereignty takes a central role in the language of the Helsinki Final Act. It is a nearly sacrosanct concept in Russian assertions as to what Moscow claims would be protected through the EST. However, critics of the EST point out that Russia reserves two definitions of sovereignty—one for major powers, and another for smaller nations. The countries which inhabit the space of former Warsaw Pact states or former Soviet republics appear to enjoy a form of “limited sovereignty,” provided they even qualify to be considered sovereign nations at all, as Vladimir Putin's remarks to George W. Bush, then the United States President, about Ukraine make clear.¹¹ Lo argues that it is the Brezhnevian concept of limited sovereignty being applied to the entire former Soviet sphere of influence,¹² particularly to Ukraine, which is seen by Putin as an accidental sovereign state¹³ brought into existence by what Putin has called “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”—the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹⁴ Richard Sakwa argues that the critics have misread Russia's intentions, and that Russia proposed the EST precisely to avoid a return to spheres of influence.¹⁵

The motivations of Russia to propose the EST are addressed by, for example, Samuel Layton, who evaluates the EST as a benign attempt to correct the perceived failure of the post-Cold War security architecture to prevent the wars in Georgia and the

¹¹ In 2008 at the Bucharest NATO summit, Putin reportedly said to then president George W. Bush, “You don't understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state. What is Ukraine? Part of its territories is Eastern Europe, but the greater part is a gift from us.” Nikolas Gvosdev, “Ukraine's Ancient Hatreds,” *The National Interest*, no. 132 (2014): 16–24.

¹² Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, 96.

¹³ Lo, 107.

¹⁴ Andrew Osborn, “Putin: Collapse of the Soviet Union Was ‘catastrophe of the Century’ | The Independent,” sec. April 26, 2005, accessed September 4, 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/putin-collapse-of-the-soviet-union-was-catastrophe-of-the-century-521064.html>.

¹⁵ Sakwa, *Russia Against the Rest*, 263.

Balkans.¹⁶ According to Patrick Nopens, the Russian argument holds that the legally binding nature of the European Union and NATO treaties leaves non-NATO and non-European Union members in a gray zone that deprives them of equal security.¹⁷ Andrei Tsygankov cites Putin's plea for the need to strengthen international law after the Georgia War, and to "move beyond Atlanticism by creating an equal partnership with the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation."¹⁸ This provides some insight into Russia's view of Europe, in that it wants to obtain power parity with the United States and eventually expel that adversary and dominate Europe. Moscow sees a rising need to create a security environment in which Russia can compete more successfully with its United States adversary for the attention of the smaller European powers and nations.

A counterargument is provided by Lo, who states that institutions such as the CSTO and NATO fail to satisfactorily resolve conflicts.¹⁹ International institutions such as the CSTO work in the interest of a great power (in this case, Russia) that is the determining factor for resolving conflicts rather than the international body. The important roles of existing institutions such as the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council in resolving European security conflicts are acknowledged by several authors, including Lo and Kropatcheva, who question the effectiveness of the UN Security Council, where the Russian Federation has a veto that it has not been afraid to apply in support of its own interests.²⁰

¹⁶ Layton, "Reframing European Security: Russia's Proposal for a New European Security Architecture."

¹⁷ Nopens, "A New Security Architecture for Europe?"

¹⁸ Andrei P. Tsygankov, *The Strong State in Russia: Development and Crisis* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 146.

¹⁹ Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, 80; Lo, "Medvedev and the New European Security Architecture," 6.

²⁰ Elena Kropatcheva, "Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Security: A 'Forum' for Dialog or a 'Battlefield' of Interests?," *European Security* 21, no. 3 (2012): 370–94, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2011.640323>; Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, 74.

Recent statements by both Russian President Putin and his foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, along with the creation and promotion of the Eurasian Economic Union, show the Russian desires are for a Europe in which Russia and its Eurasian Economic Union would cooperate with a European Union free from United States or NATO influence.²¹ The Russian area of interest would extend to those nations that share part of the political, cultural, or linguistic legacies of the former Soviet Union or Russia itself. Russia professes a conviction that it has a primary responsibility to protect Russian citizens regardless of where they are. This growing and expanding concept appears contrary to Russia's commitment to sovereignty and the inviolability of borders, a contradiction which only aggravates the mistrust concerning Russian intentions. Russia would prefer, of course, an economic zone from Lisbon to Vladivostok with the Eurasian Economic Union serving as a co-equal and eventual successor to the European Union.²² The United States, Canada, and the other NATO Allies could be unwelcome obstacles to this arrangement. At a minimum, Lo argues, Russia seeks a Finlandization-plus arrangement, in which Russia would maintain political and economic dominance and alignment more than any other country over countries in the "Russian world," excluding the Baltic States.²³

The elimination of "dividing lines" brought about by the continued existence of NATO, with new nations joining or seeking pathways to accession to the Alliance, remains the utmost priority of the Russian Federation to achieve, and this goal takes a central role in the EST. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has repeatedly stated that attempts to continue NATO enlargement represent the "efforts of a US-led group of western states to preserve their dominance in all areas in the hope of continuing their wellbeing and prosperity at the expense of others" and to consolidate "the dividing lines

²¹ "Meeting with German Business Community Representatives • President of Russia," accessed April 19, 2019, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59016>; "Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Remarks and Answers to Media Questions at the Munich Security Conference, Munich, February 16, 2019," accessed April 19, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/3520272.

²² Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, 181.

²³ Lo, 103.

in Europe and loosening the architecture of European security.”²⁴ The prevailing Russian view is that nations in the area of the former Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact are coaxed into European Union and NATO membership through association agreements, membership action plans, and dubious Western diplomatic pressures designed to take them out of the Russian orbit. The Russians do not seem to recognize that these nations actively seek out association with (and membership in) these Euro-Atlantic organizations. In the case of Ukraine, Putin warned George W. Bush, then the United States president, in 2008 that attempts to take Ukraine out of the Russian orbit by extending a membership action plan for NATO would result in its extinction as a state and a potential Russian seizure of Crimea and the rest of eastern Ukraine.²⁵

Russia’s proposal for a European Security Treaty serves as a compilation and expression of the Russian view, which fundamentally opposes that of Western Europe and its transatlantic Allies. The divergences of these viewpoints extend to political, economic, values, security, and sovereignty issues. The rejection of the proposed treaty by European Union and NATO nations highlights the differences regarding a desirable European security architecture. Since 2008, when Russia launched the proposal, the relationship between Russia and the West has worsened, with global implications for security and economic stability. The proposed EST and Russian behavior since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012 illustrate the areas of friction which pose the largest threats to peace, stability, and economic prosperity not only in Europe, but also in Africa, the Americas, and Asia. More importantly this thesis investigates the prospects for future cooperation and coexistence with the Russian Federation and the elements required for an acceptable security structure in Europe.

²⁴ “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Interviewed by Bulgarian Journal International Relations, Moscow, March 2, 2018,” accessed August 28, 2018, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3105914.

²⁵ Gvosdev, “Ukraine’s Ancient Hatreds,” 18.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS

The proposed EST carried with it several implications and indications regarding Russian grand strategy and Moscow's vision of Russia's place in the world's power structure. One of the key elements is the desire to return to the Westphalian concept of sovereignty²⁶ and to a European balance of power somewhat akin to the historic "Concert of Europe."²⁷

Like the historic "Concert of Europe," it might be argued, the EST vision would effectively create a multipolar security architecture consisting of (a) the Russian Federation, (b) France and Germany (under the construct of the European Union), and (c) the transatlantic powers consisting of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. Each of these three poles is adequately represented as a part of the permanent membership in the UNSC, which would be the ultimate arbiter in disputes, as per the preamble and Article 9 of the EST.²⁸ The preamble of the EST emphasizes the "role of the UN Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security." Article 9 of the EST indicates that the suggested treaty "shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for maintaining international peace and security." Smaller powers

²⁶ Following the Treaties of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648 Austria, Russia, Prussia, England, France, and the United Provinces (now known as the Netherlands) would become part of a core group of states which would rule the world until the early 1800s. The Westphalian system introduced the concept of the territorial integrity of states which had be respected by others as "legally equal and sovereign participants in an international system." State sovereignty preserved the right of states to determine their own domestic policies, free from external pressure and with full jurisdiction within their own borders, while simultaneously creating the standard of noninterference in the affairs of other states.

Karen A. Mingst and Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft, *Essentials of International Relations*, Seventh edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2017), 23–24.

²⁷ Following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 and the establishment of peace by the Congress of Vienna, the five great powers of Europe—Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia—known as the Concert of Europe, ushered in a period of relative peace in the international political system. For Austria, Prussia, and Russia in particular, this vision entailed grand alliances with the collective intent to preserve absolutist rule and prevent popular revolutions. The major powers began consolidating the smaller states around them into single contiguous territorial states, always considering, at least in principle, the interests and the impact on the balance of power for other major powers around them.

Mingst and Arreguín-Toft, 28–30.

²⁸ Dmitri Medvedev, "The Draft of the European Security Treaty," November 29, 2009, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/6152>.

and remaining countries would enjoy “limited sovereignty” and could choose to align with a great power or attempt to remain neutral. According to Articles 1 and 2 of the EST, collective defense agreements and security cooperation would have to respect the interests of the other powers and could not theoretically come at the expense of another power’s “security” or disadvantage it in any other way.²⁹ Additionally, Articles 4 and 5 of the EST, which call for working through the “depository” of the EST to convene conferences or consultations between parties which, in the opinion of the depository “might be interested in such consultations,” could be used to effectively limit the participation in negotiations between the great powers.³⁰

Another indication of Moscow’s intentions is the development in Russia of a post-Communist ideology which seeks to serve as a statist counter model to the West’s concept of a liberal democracy. This ideology endeavors to reserve for Russia the responsibility to preserve the sovereignty of nations whose incumbent governments face the threat of an allegedly Western-induced and Western-financed “color revolution,” to counter humanitarian interventions or non-UNSC approved military interventions such as the 2003 war in Iraq, and to protect traditional European values from supposed Western moral decay.

The proposed treaty would also have had a tremendous impact on the existing security architecture, particularly the transatlantic relationship and NATO. Despite assurances by NATO and its Allies to the contrary, Russia sees NATO as an existential threat to its sovereignty and regards its continued existence as a continuation of the “bloc thinking” of the Cold War. The EST would have allowed Russia to legally stop not only NATO’s further enlargement, but also to disrupt a wide array of actions by NATO and non-NATO treaty partners alike that Moscow considered threatening.

²⁹ Medvedev.

³⁰ Medvedev.

Additionally, the thesis investigates why the Russian EST proposal continues to be brought up by the Russian government, particularly in light of recent Russian actions and threats in Ukraine, the Baltic region, and the Balkans. Russia envisages a multi-polar, post-transatlantic Europe dominated by Moscow. It appears that future collaboration with the Russian Federation is possible in certain areas such as fighting crime or in anti-terrorism efforts. However, with the increasing size of Russian Zapad exercises, Russia's refusal to resolve frozen conflicts (particularly the current crisis in Ukraine), and the enduring resolve by European Union nations to continue the sanctions against Russia, increase their military expenditures, and enhance their force postures in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, the potential for cooperation with Moscow appears limited.

Another critical component to the EST proposal is the applicability of international relations theory, particularly realist or structuralist, as well as neoliberal theory, to describe the causal logic of the proposal. Realist theory, as expounded by Kenneth Waltz, assumes that states are unitary rational actors that primarily work to ensure their own security in an anarchic system, in which competition among the major powers in the international system is normal.³¹ Ultimately, strong states seek universal domination in the self-help system. According to Waltz, states achieve this position of dominance through internal efforts to increase their military and economic strength, as well as through external efforts to strengthen their own alliances while weakening the alliances of others.³²

The smaller powers and countries which make up Europe would have to choose to balance, buck pass, or bandwagon with respect to the great powers which dominate this area—Russia and the United States. With Russia's inherent pressure to dominate its historic sphere of influence, particularly taken together with its weakened ability to do so during the Yeltsin years, the Baltic and Visegrad states decided to balance against Russia

³¹ Charles L Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 54, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539079>.

³² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, Ill.: Waveland Press, 2010), 210.

in favor of the United States.³³ Other states, namely many of the mid-level powers in Western Europe such as France, Germany, and Italy, endeavored to enjoy the peace dividends and sought to benefit from economic interactions with Russia while continuing to rely on the United States to bear a large part of the costs of European defense through the United States nuclear shield and Europe-based military forces.

Despite improvements in Russia's military capabilities under Putin, Moscow has not been in a position to effectively counter the United States, but it could pursue policies which would make the European nations reconsider the costs of balancing against Russia. The primary way to accomplish this was to demonstrate that the existing security structure provided by the United States and its NATO Allies was not credible to guarantee the security, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of smaller powers outside the Atlantic Alliance. This was accomplished not only by maintaining "frozen conflicts" throughout Europe³⁴ and conducting the war with Georgia and subsequent recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence, but also through economic, military, and political pressure. Through the EST proposal Moscow attempted to persuade the mid-level powers in Europe that collective buck passing would benefit them more than bearing a greater share of the economic, military, and security costs of balancing against Russia, while simultaneously removing barriers for Russia to reassert itself over those nations that it saw as comprising its sphere of influence. Realism contends that international organizations serve the powers which sponsor them, and that when the organizations no longer serve their national interests, they are abandoned or their regimes are ignored.³⁵ Realist theorist Kenneth Waltz echoes contemporary Russian thinking in

³³ The Baltic States consist of the countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. "Baltic States | History, Map, People, Languages, & Facts," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed April 19, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Baltic-states>; Webra International Kft, "The Visegrad Group: The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia | About the Visegrad Group," text, August 15, 2006, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/about>.

³⁴ Russia continues to maintain a military presence in the post-Soviet space, keeping alive so-called "frozen conflicts" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria. These precedents reinforce Russia's apparent opinion that it can intervene in the affairs of its neighbors to protect Russian interests and to promote itself as a responsible regional actor.

Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, 89.

³⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000): 26, <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228800560372>.

holding that NATO's post-Cold War function is to maintain and increase United States influence over European foreign policy and military strategy.³⁶ This leads to the hypothesis that Russia proposed the EST in a bid to create a security environment based on collective security, rather than collective defense, in which it could dominate other states militarily and economically in its traditional sphere of influence by neutralizing NATO, which it sees as an international organization serving United States power interests.³⁷

Additionally, the neutralization of NATO would encourage the mid-level states in Western Europe to focus on expanding economic relations with Russia and to buck pass the security competition on to the United States and the United Kingdom. The timing of the EST suggestion by Russia, following the United States-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and before the Russian August 2008 invasion of Georgia, suggests the hypothesis that Russia wanted to illustrate to Western Europe that a return to a multipolar power distribution was the only way to escape the ineffectiveness of international institutions to constrain great powers, including the great powers which may sponsor them.³⁸ The Russians view international institutions as ineffective in constraining major powers and firmly believe that the only effective way to constrain a major power is by action undertaken by a contending major power that has the strength to coerce or compel.

Neoliberal institutionalism, according to Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, contends that international institutions improve cooperation and prevent security competition by establishing transparency and norms for behavior and reducing mistrust in the interactions between nations.³⁹ Although states assume initial risks to their security,

³⁶ Waltz, 20.

³⁷ Collective defense is distinguished from collective security. Whereas in collective defense allied nations commit to a mutual defense pledge (i.e., an attack on one is an attack on all), in collective security states seek to eliminate the need for alliances by pledging to cooperate in maintaining peace and deterring and punishing (should deterrence fail) any aggressors. David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998).

³⁸ John Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1995): 5–49, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539078>.

³⁹ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

continued interactions may in some circumstances reduce this inherent mistrust and collectively benefit all through increased economic interdependence. With the European Union serving as an excellent example of how this looks in practice, coupled with the advances made in Europe through a shared set of values, including democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, Russia presented its EST as the optimal path to reduce friction caused by the security competition and to build trust and mutual prosperity through expanding and deepening economic and cultural cooperation and ties.

The timing of the EST proposal appears to have come at a moment that Moscow saw as opportune to show the West that the neoliberal institutionalist model was not adequate to restrain great powers such as the United States. As realist scholar Jack Snyder pointed out in 2004, the United States, although advocating respect for the liberal model, had deviated from the supposed restraints provided by international institutionalism and international order by pulling out of the International Criminal Court Statute, refusing to sign the Kyoto protocols, and invading Iraq.⁴⁰ Russia's intent for the EST appears to have been to convince Western European nations of the need to establish a multipolar security structure which would be able to effectively restrain what Moscow regarded as U.S. hegemonic impulses. Economic interactions appear still to motivate many of the mid-level powers in Europe, and this implies that increasing integration between Russia and Europe both politically and economically would reduce mistrust and increase the possibilities to cooperate in the security realm.

The overarching hypothesis is that Moscow sought via the EST to achieve the objectives of current and past Russian grand strategy, namely (1) the dissolution of NATO and the European Union, (2) severance of the transatlantic bridge, (3) the removal of liberal and humanitarian considerations from international relations, and (4) the legal protection of Russian privilege in the area of the former Soviet empire. The EST was a diplomatic attempt by Medvedev to achieve the same ends that Putin now attempts to achieve through more assertive, destructive, and destabilizing means.

⁴⁰ Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, no. 145 (2004): 58, <https://doi.org/10.2307/4152944>.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis is based on a qualitative historical study and analysis. It benefits from research work done by experts in this field. The primary documents include not only the unofficial English translation of the EST proposed by President Dmitri Medvedev, but also official as well as unofficial statements made by his successor, President Vladimir Putin, and the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov. Additional sources include works of scholarship, published interviews, news articles, and similar basic documents.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis provides an analysis of Russia's EST proposal. Chapter II discusses Russia's proposed EST, examines its implications, and considers arguments for and against the proposal. Chapter III presents the Russian arguments for the EST and discusses significant events and changes in Russian foreign policy since the proposal was first made in 2008–2009. Chapter IV considers the positions of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in response to the proposal, discusses the pertinent reasons for their rejection of the EST proposal, and reviews significant events since the proposal which shaped their current policies. Chapter V presents conclusions regarding Russia's continuing efforts to undermine NATO and the European Union and to enhance the Kremlin's overall power position.

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II. RUSSIA'S PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY

Shortly after the August 2008 Georgia crisis had crushed the West's understanding of the post-Cold War security order, the Russian Federation's President, Dmitry Medvedev, proclaimed that the current security structure had failed, and repeated Russia's June 2008 proposal for a European Security Treaty (EST) which would—Medvedev said—provide indivisible security in a multi-polar structure from Vancouver to Vladivostok.⁴¹ The treaty proposal was noted in a joint statement at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conference in Corfu, but European countries were generally not inclined to sign this treaty.

This chapter examines the foundation of the EST in the context of post-Cold War security arrangements; the essence of the proposed EST; and its deficiencies, implications, and prospects. The Russian EST was intended to legally protect Russia's domain, prevent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union enlargement, and institute a multipolar security order based solely on military capabilities. Furthermore, the EST's unclear language, designed to undermine the existing collective defense arrangements of NATO Europe, and Russian actions before and after making the proposal caused the EST's rejection and soured future prospects for a similar arrangement.

A. FOUNDATIONS OF THE PROPOSAL AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The European security structure has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991. New organizations have been created, previously existing organizations have altered their responsibilities, and others have been dissolved. The Russian proposal for an EST endeavored to partially recreate the bipolar order of Europe as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, with spheres of influence between 'the Russian World,' as the Russians sometimes call it, and the West, and to make NATO and the

⁴¹ Diesen and Wood, "Russia's Proposal for a New Security System," 450.

CSTO subservient to the OSCE and to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The EST would have enabled Russia (a) to stop the erosion of its influence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union through the European integration project and (b) to halt the enlargement of NATO's membership and missions.

The world at the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 saw a still vibrant Soviet Union and its satellite states operating in a bi-polar power structure with the United States and Canada and their European Allies. This Act was the cornerstone achievement of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the predecessor of the OSCE. The decline and eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union into fifteen successor states contributed to the increase in the number of parties to this agreement.

This Act is mentioned habitually by Russia, as the largest successor state of the Soviet Union, as a significant document that serves as a blue-print for its security relations with the "West."⁴² The Helsinki Final Act is considered to be composed of three "baskets:" political and military security (including de facto recognition of certain World War II territorial changes); economic, trade, and scientific cooperation; and human rights, freedom of emigration and cultural exchanges.⁴³ The key elements of the security basket of the Act include the recognition of the sovereignty of all participating states, a pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, recognition of the inviolability of frontiers, and recognition of the territorial integrity of the participating States.⁴⁴ The Act also includes pledges that states would not intervene in the domestic affairs of other participating states, and

⁴² "Address by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the Opening of the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference, Vienna, June 23, 2009—Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)—The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation," accessed March 7, 2018, http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/rso/osce/-/asset_publisher/bzhxR3zkq2H5/content/id/288306.

⁴³ Lo, "Medvedev and the New European Security Architecture," 3.

⁴⁴ "Helsinki Final Act | OSCE," 4–5, accessed March 8, 2018, <https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act>.

acknowledges the principles of universal human rights and freedoms, as well as equality amongst peoples and their right to determine their future without outside pressures.⁴⁵

Although the Helsinki Final Act was not legally binding under international law as a treaty,⁴⁶ according to former German Bundespräsident Richard von Weizsäcker, it was politically significant in two ways. First, it satisfied Soviet desires for a renunciation of the threat of force or use of force, and it served as a recognition of the post-World War II territorial status quo. Second, the Western powers were able to secure a trans-European standard for the recognition of human and minority rights—the foundation for later struggles for freedom in the Warsaw Pact nations.⁴⁷ The recognition of the territorial post-war territorial status quo into a Western and a Soviet world continues to frame the Russian mindset and contributed to both the wording and the contents of the proposed EST in 2008–2009. However, the “third basket” concerning recognition of human rights and the rule of law proved to be the most compromising to the Soviet Union and later Russia, and the Russian-proposed EST was a clear attempt to divorce these concepts from a legally binding security accord. Based on Russian behavior since 1991, one must consider whether Russia considers non-signatories to the 1975 Act that gained their independence afterwards as included by the spirit of the Act.

The CSCE accomplished the Helsinki Final Act’s intent “to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice, and cooperation.”⁴⁸ This organization had the purpose of serving as a forum for dialog and compromise between the participating states.⁴⁹ Elena Kropatcheva, a prolific writer on OSCE topics,

⁴⁵ “Helsinki Final Act | OSCE,” 6–7.

⁴⁶ Martin Dixon, *Textbook on International Law*, 7. ed (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), 51.

⁴⁷ Richard von Weizsäcker, *Vier Zeiten: Erinnerungen* (Pantheon Verlag, 2010), sec. “Gipfelkonferenz der KSZE in Helsinki; noch einmal Polen Verträge.”

⁴⁸ “Helsinki Final Act | OSCE,” 2.

⁴⁹ Kropatcheva, “Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Security: A ‘Forum’ for Dialog or a ‘Battlefield’ of Interests?,” 370.

finds that the Soviet Union supported the CSCE as a means of drawing European countries towards Russia and confirming the territorial recognition.⁵⁰

Shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990 and enthusiastically supported the CSCE as a sign of willingness for European integration. Russia hoped that the organization would replace NATO in the European security structure, and Moscow also had unrealistic expectations about the CSCE's ability to help it realize its foreign policy aspirations.⁵¹ However, the Russian vision of the OSCE transforming into an "open collective security system, based on legal commitments,"⁵² could not come to fruition for two reasons. NATO European countries could not accept the replacement of NATO as the overarching means of collective defense, and European values necessitated readiness for future humanitarian interventions in European countries to prevent genocides and ethnic violence. Additionally, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the integration of many former Warsaw Pact countries into the European Union and NATO has made the OSCE a Western-dominated organization.⁵³

The inability of Russia to use the OSCE's forum as a mechanism to advance its interests has reduced Russian interest in it, and has decreased Moscow's confidence in the future importance of the OSCE. Additionally, the OSCE's condemnation of rigged elections in Eastern European countries, as well as its role in the "color revolutions" in the early 2000s shaped Russia's perception of the OSCE's transformation into a "vulgar instrument"⁵⁴ for the West. Russia has chosen when to observe or violate the agreements

⁵⁰ Elena Kropatcheva, "The Evolution of Russia's OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 2015, 9, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2014.1001823>.

⁵¹ Kropatcheva, 10.

⁵² "Address by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the Opening of the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference, Vienna, June 23, 2009—Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)—The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation."

⁵³ Kropatcheva, "Russia and the Role of the OSCE in European Security: A 'Forum' for Dialog or a 'Battlefield' of Interests?" 373.

⁵⁴ Vladimir Putin, "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy," President of Russia, accessed March 20, 2018, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>.

reached in this forum, for example, by blocking OSCE observers in Georgia or through its continued military presence in Transnistria.⁵⁵ The proposed EST would have served as a remedy for Russia to equal the balance in determining European security arrangements. Contrary to Russian expectations, the OSCE has not incorporated or replaced NATO, despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

Russia continues to see NATO as a threat to its security due to NATO's enlargement and participation in non-Article-5 missions. Moreover, Russia sees the organization as a tool of the United States to maintain dominance in Europe. NATO continues to serve as an organization under chapter VII (Article 51) of the UN Charter. It encompasses Canada, the United States, and European countries, and it is tasked with collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.⁵⁶ In its 1991 Strategic Concept NATO stated that its purpose was to ensure "the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states," to thereby contribute to peace and stability, that it was "purely defensive in purpose," and that its weapons were reserved solely for self-defense.⁵⁷ However, to the chagrin of the Russians, the Alliance has also assumed collective security duties in crisis management in Europe and beyond, outside of the OSCE area (in Afghanistan, for example), while welcoming former Warsaw Pact nations into its fold.

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, as well as the Baltic states, Romania and others sought NATO membership as a means to further their integration into European institutions, but primarily to enjoy a credible defense and protection against feared Russian aggression.⁵⁸ Yet, Russia still largely considers these nations as part of its sphere of influence with privileged interests, even though they are now NATO or

⁵⁵ "To Have and to Hold: Putin's Quest for Control in the Former Soviet Empire," AEI, March 13, 2018, 9, <http://www.aei.org/spotlight/to-have-and-to-hold/>.

⁵⁶ Mihail Negulescu, "NATO versus CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) Strategy," 2014, 7-8.

⁵⁷ "NATO—Official Text: The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (1991), 07-Nov.-1991," para. 36, accessed March 20, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm.

⁵⁸ Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 122.

European Union member countries.⁵⁹ This is complicated by the fact that some of those countries have a significant number of ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, and Russian citizens, a circumstance which could expose them, as well as former Warsaw Pact nations, to Russian interventionism to protect “Russians,” wherever they may be.⁶⁰

Although NATO has often stated that it does not view Russia as an adversary, most prominently in the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in 1997,⁶¹ Russia considers NATO a threat due to its enlargement and interventionist non-Article 5 actions. The NATO air strikes in 1999 during the Kosovo conflict signaled the beginning of Russian concerns about NATO interventionism and (some Russians asserted) the Alliance’s departure from the principles of territorial integrity articulated in the Helsinki Final Act.⁶² Conversely, NATO’s firm commitment to a “community of shared values based on freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law”⁶³ is compatible with the values propagated by the European Union,⁶⁴ and this makes NATO both the strategically and ideologically compatible choice of defense for 27 countries in Europe. The proposed EST would have legally subordinated NATO to the treaty, and this would have given Russia both a voice and a veto on all pertinent issues affecting the security and defense of Europe.

⁵⁹ “To Have and to Hold,” 19.

⁶⁰ “To Have and to Hold,” 19.

⁶¹ NATO, “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation Signed in Paris, France,” NATO, accessed March 20, 2018, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm.

⁶² Kropatcheva, “The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis,” 11.

⁶³ NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. “NATO—Official Text: Active Engagement, Modern Defence—Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 19-Nov.-2010,” accessed September 8, 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm.

⁶⁴ The European Union’s fundamental values are respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.

“EU,” accessed May 11, 2018, <http://europa.europa.eu/en/values-and-objectives/values/>.

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the inability of the OSCE to become the dominant security framework of Europe, Russia conceived the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which was formed in 1992–1994 from some participants in the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Former United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called the CSTO a “pitiful attempt to re-create a Warsaw Pact-like structure.”⁶⁵ This construct, however, could not keep its original membership, with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan withdrawing from the treaty in 1999.

CSTO member nations have been shaped by staunch anti-interventionism, as demonstrated by the organization’s non-response to Kyrgyzstan’s interethnic crisis in 2010.⁶⁶ This limits Moscow’s ability to use the organization to further its foreign policy goals, particularly with respect to obtaining recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the annexation of Crimea, and Russian policies concerning the current Ukrainian crisis.⁶⁷ Russia’s interventionism is also increasing the concern of CSTO member states for their own sovereignty. As Kropatcheva remarks, the CSTO was an important tool for Russia in promoting the EST to the OSCE states. The CSTO states, although skeptical, supported the proposal, because they were generally dissatisfied with the current security arrangements in Europe and Eurasia on a broader scale, and thereby successfully prevented the perception of the Russian proposal to be solely in Moscow’s interest.⁶⁸ The CSTO’s charter dedicates itself to “a formation of the fair, democratic world order based on conventional principles of international law,”⁶⁹ but omits any

⁶⁵ Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington*, 1st ed. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), 578.

⁶⁶ Kropatcheva, “The Evolution of Russia’s OSCE Policy: From the Promises of the Helsinki Final Act to the Ukrainian Crisis,” 1526.

⁶⁷ Kropatcheva, 1538.

⁶⁸ Kropatcheva, 1536.

⁶⁹ “Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Dated October 7, 2002,” accessed March 20, 2018, http://www.odkb-csto.org/documents/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=1896.

language pertaining to individual liberty, human rights, the rule of law and democratic values—integral elements to both NATO⁷⁰ and the European Union.⁷¹

Russia’s realist perception of security as consisting solely of military power and influence is reflected in the wording of the proposed EST, and therefore did not garner much support from the European Union countries. The European Union has not only enshrined respect for the principles of democratic stability, international humanitarian law and the rule of law, along with support for human rights, as a membership requirement through the so-called Copenhagen criteria, but also has made their furtherance a part of the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy as far back as 2009.⁷² Unlike Russia, which views the European security architecture largely in a “hard security” sense of military capabilities, the European Union supports a more holistic concept of security, encompassing its multilateral approach of democratic governance and humanitarian values-based norms, functioning market economies and economic interdependence, as well as developing an ability to respond to threats.⁷³ The European Union considers energy security, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and climate change as major global threats and challenges to its security—topics left unaddressed in the EST proposal.⁷⁴

Russia appears to see states as legitimate actors and prefers bilateral dealings, as is evident with its habit of nesting bilateral treaties within multilateral agreements,⁷⁵ as

⁷⁰ NATO, “Warsaw Summit Communiqué—Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8–9 July 2016,” NATO, accessed March 20, 2018, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.

⁷¹ European Communities (EC), *Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts* (Luxembourg : Lanham, Md: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities ; Bernan Associates [distributor], 1997).

⁷² High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs Policy to the European Parliament, “Annual Report from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Parliament on the Main Aspects and Basic Choices of the CFSP,” June 2010, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2009_annualreport_en.pdf.

⁷³ Tom Casier and DeBardeleben, eds., *EU-Russia Relations in Crisis: Understanding Diverging Perceptions* (New York, NY: Routledge, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 166–67.

⁷⁴ “2009_annualreport_en.Pdf,” 7–12, accessed March 20, 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2009_annualreport_en.pdf.

⁷⁵ Slobodchikoff, *Building Hegemonic Order Russia’s Way*.

well as its limited participation in the NATO-Russia Council and with the European Union.⁷⁶ Its statist position was also visible at the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, when the Soviet Union opposed the European Communities' signing of the document.⁷⁷

Russia sees regional international organizations as constructs to serve the interests of great powers. This explains why Russia has chosen to create them, has resisted joining pre-existing ones, and has perceived the European Union's enlargement and values-norming as a tool of the United States and the West to contain and isolate Russia. Russia has not only regarded with hostility the European Union's engagement and values norming into "its sphere" through programs such as the Eastern Partnership, but also has conceived the Eurasian Economic Union to cement its political and economic hold on its remaining partners—and to counter the European Union.

B. THE PROPOSED EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of fifteen states on former Soviet territory, Russia, as the largest successor country, saw its influence diminish in many parts of the former Soviet Union, as well as in organizations such as the OSCE. It retains, however, its seat as a UNSC member with veto power. The various articles of the EST resonate with the Russian aims to subordinate the existing European defense and security architecture under a legal structure in which Moscow could object to any proposed security-related step or exercise its veto power. Additionally, Russia's EST was also intended to stop NATO and European Union military interventionist actions outside of UNSC Resolutions, such as in Syria and Libya.⁷⁸

In his speech in Evian, France, in 2008, President Medvedev outlined the core features of the Treaty as being "legally binding," "guarantee uniform interpretation and implementation," "guarantee equal security," confirming that "no state or international

⁷⁶ Casier and DeBardeleben, *EU-Russia Relations in Crisis: Understanding Diverging Perceptions*, 163.

⁷⁷ Casier and DeBardeleben, 164.

⁷⁸ Diesen and Wood, "Russia's Proposal for a New Security System," 463.

organization can have exclusive rights to maintain peace in Europe,” and establishing key parameters for arms control and military construction.⁷⁹

The November 2009 proposal consists of a preamble and 14 articles. The preamble lists the principles of the treaty, most notably the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Charter for European Security, and reaffirms the role of the UNSC as primarily responsible for international peace and security.⁸⁰ The subordination of all-encompassing security aspects to the UNSC would significantly hinder unilateral and multilateral military actions without authorization via a UNSC resolution, such as certain actions in Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, and Syria.

Article 1 confirms the principles of “indivisible, equal, and undiminished security as the basis of cooperation.” Any and all actions with regard to security measures, whether unilateral, multilateral, or in a group or alliance must show “due regard” for the security interests of all other parties.⁸¹ This means that if any party perceives a threat or an injury to its security interests, that proposed or previously taken measure would violate this treaty.

In that spirit, Article 2 prohibits participation in, support of, or initiation of any action “affecting significantly [the] security” of other signatories, places responsibility on a member of an alliance to compel compliance of the alliance to not affect “significantly [the] security” of another party in its actions, and prohibits the use of a nation’s territory by itself or others to prepare or carry out armed attacks or any other actions “affecting significantly [the] security” of any other treaty member.⁸² This article would effectively split existing alliances and security arrangements based on the objection of any party citing security concerns. Actions such as multi-national military maneuvers, logistics sharing, multi-national basing in the European Union, and participating in collective

⁷⁹ “Dmitry Medvedev Addressed the World Policy Conference in Evian,” President of Russia, accessed April 21, 2019, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/1659>.

⁸⁰ Medvedev, “The Draft of the European Security Treaty,” para. preamble.

⁸¹ Medvedev, para. 1.

⁸² Medvedev, para. 2.

security actions under NATO auspices could be in violation of this treaty, should any party object.

Article 3 sets measures for creating a forum for diplomatic and information exchanges regarding actions which could affect a party's security, with the intent of increasing mutual trust and transparency between parties. A party would be enabled to request "provide information about any significant legislative, administrative, or organizational measures taken by that other Party, which, in the opinion of the Requesting Party, might affect its security."⁸³

The EST establishes a grievance and dispute-resolution procedure outlined in paragraphs 4 through 8. Based on the gravity of the issue, settlement forums range from consultations among the parties to a conference of the parties, culminating in an extraordinary conference of the parties if consultations fail to resolve the issue. The conference of the parties would require the attendance of at least two thirds of the treaty parties and could make binding decisions based on the consensus of the attendees. The articles, however, do not address how conflicts would actually be resolved in these conferences, and would allow Russia to incessantly convene meetings and conferences in response to actions it did not approve.⁸⁴

Article 7 prescribes for immediate actions in response to an armed attack on any party. Any party, if approved by the attacked party, is able to render assistance until the UNSC has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. This article is problematic in several ways. For one, it does not provide for collective defense, as it does not mandate support of all parties to the attacked parties, but rather stipulates that Allies are entitled to support fellow allies. This article also does not address instances in which the UNSC is not able to take action, if a veto is imposed by

⁸³ Medvedev, para. 3.

⁸⁴ Sally McNamara, "Russia's Proposed New European Security Treaty: A Non-Starter for the U.S. and Europe" (Washington, D.C: The Heritage Foundation, 2010), 3, <https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/russias-proposed-new-european-security-treaty-non-starter-the-us-and-europe>.

one of its five permanent members or if a permanent UNSC member is the attacking party.

The rights of the attacked party are outlined in Article 8, and afford it or another party an option to request an extraordinary conference through the Depository, which may, once convened, invite third parties or international organizations to the conference and make a binding decision by a unanimous vote by four fifths of the conference attendees. The treaty does not address whether an invited party gets a vote in the decision making.

In Article 9, the central role of the UNSC is reiterated as the entity primarily responsible for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. This article calls for the compatibility of current and future treaties with this treaty and guarantees the neutrality of any party. Article 10 opens the treaty to countries from Vancouver to Vladivostok, as well as to the European Union, the OSCE, the CSTO, NATO, and the CIS, for signature. This article demonstrates the Russian affinity for the practice of nesting bilateral treaties within multinational regimes, as explored by Slobodchikoff.⁸⁵ Articles 11 through 13 provide information on instituting this treaty, and Article 14 provides for any party to withdraw from this treaty if it deems its “supreme interests” are endangered.

C. DEFICIENCIES, IMPLICATIONS, AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS

The treaty verbiage, in addition to the issues pointed out above within the articles, proved problematic for Western nations to accept because it subjected existing defense and security agreements to the UNSC, and would have hamstrung the ability of NATO and European Union defense initiatives to perform their functions. Moreover, the treaty failed to create any resemblance of a security structure. Unclear and subjective terms such as “significantly affecting security,” “shall be entitled to,” “a violation or threat of violation,” and “supreme interests” open the treaty up to unenforceability, abuse, and flexible interpretation. Collectively, the provisions ensure that the treaty could be used by

⁸⁵ Slobodchikoff, *Building Hegemonic Order Russia's Way*.

any party to block any other party's actions, whether they be domestic, economic, or military decisions, simply based on a perception of harm or risk for its own interests. The UNSC had been unable to prevent or satisfactorily resolve previous crises, as Russia had vetoed various resolutions in 2009 and in the decade before, in cases such as Georgia, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, and Cyprus.⁸⁶ Some of these cases had been important to the European Union countries, and, coupled with Russia's continued violation of existing treaties, such as through its continued presence in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, Russia's credibility and intent were in question. This mistrust was proven well-founded several years later with Russia's annexation of the Crimea and actions in Ukraine which violated nearly every principle in the EST. This also calls into question what Russia's intent with the EST truly was.

Post-Cold War Russia did not have legal or legitimate means to protect what it considered its sphere of influence against the decisions by independent countries to seek membership in the European Union and protection by the collective defense structure provided by NATO. Russians see NATO as an instrument of the United States to dominate Europe and take advantage of the Russian impotence following the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the intent to isolate and contain Russia. Unequivocally, Russia sees NATO as a threat to its security and NATO enlargement as an act of aggression towards Russia.⁸⁷ The humanitarian interventionism and normative influence of the European Union were seen by Russians to have sparked the "color revolutions" across the former Soviet Union and began (in Russian eyes) to pose a threat to the Russian state's survival. Although the treaty was focused on aspects of "hard security," involving military capabilities, it did identify legislative, administrative, and organizational measures as affecting security. With the adoption of the Treaty, Russia would have opened opportunities to restrict the actions of EST parties in all these fields. This would have significantly hampered cooperation and collaboration in areas of defense, economics, and law. It would have affected the operation of international organizations

⁸⁶ Joëlle Sciboz, "Research Guides: Security Council—Quick Links: Vetoes," research starter, accessed March 21, 2018, <http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto>.

⁸⁷ Layton, "Reframing European Security: Russia's Proposal for a New European Security Architecture," 28.

such as NATO, the European Union, and the Court of Justice of the European Union. Most importantly, it would have effectively dissolved the transatlantic bonds between the United States and the European Union which have served as a confirmation of shared values, norms, and commitments.

Russian actions since proposing the Treaty have harmed future prospects of security cooperation with other European countries due to Russian violations of key principles of Moscow's proposal, Russia's failure to resolve lingering frozen conflicts with European countries, Moscow's domestic political interference in Western countries, and Russian involvement in Ukraine and Syria. The acts most damaging to future cooperation have been the Russian armed annexation of the Crimea and Russia's continued destabilization of eastern Ukraine, which have only served to reinforce the importance of the collective defense mission of NATO.

The Ukraine conflict was a direct consequence of Russian aggression in response to what Moscow regarded as an economic and political European Union incursion into its sphere of influence. Russia's creation of the Eurasian European Union sought to integrate the CIS states further into its economic and political fold, while the European Union's programs in its eastern security neighborhood posed a direct threat to Russian efforts.⁸⁸ After the Euro-Maidan brought about the removal of President Viktor Yanukovich through the Ukrainian legislature, Putin took action by seizing the Crimea, initiating an invasion of Ukraine, and mobilizing a secessionist movement in Luhansk and Donetsk.⁸⁹

Rather than bringing the matter to the UNSC, Putin obtained permission from the Russian Duma for an armed invasion of Ukraine, allegedly to protect Russian lives.⁹⁰ Putin also justified his actions by claiming that all existing treaties with Ukraine were void, due to the "revolution" which had replaced its sovereign and legitimate

⁸⁸ Roy Allison, "Russian 'Deniable' Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules," *International Affairs* 90, no. 6 (November 1, 2014): 1526, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12170>.

⁸⁹ Allison, "Russian 'Deniable' Intervention in Ukraine."

⁹⁰ "Russian Parliament Approves Use of Troops in Ukraine—The Washington Post," accessed March 22, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russian-parliament-approves-use-of-troops-in-crimea/2014/03/01/d1775f70-a151-11e3-a050-dc3322a94fa7_story.html?utm_term=.1b0fd61988a7.

government.⁹¹ These actions not only violated the proposed EST, but also all of the documents and principles the EST relied on as its foundation. The negative effects of the shoot-down of a Malaysian Airlines flight by a Russian BUK missile from separatist territory, which resulted in the loss of 298 lives,⁹² were further worsened by Russian denials, faked alternative accounts, and refusals to cooperate with the investigation.

Russia's lack of cooperation with respect to Syria has also complicated its relationship with European powers, owing to its armed support for Assad. Several allegations of chemical weapons use by the Syrian government against its own people and continued Russian military support and Russian veto's in the UNSC in support of the Assad regime in Syria have further tarnished Moscow's reputation and eroded prospects for security cooperation.⁹³

D. CONCLUSION

The Russian historically based security threat perception was amplified after the Cold War by the Baltic countries seeking European Union integration and NATO protection because their choices affected what Russia saw as its sphere of influence and deprived it of its "entitlement" to a buffer zone. Through the EST, Russia sought to impose a legal structure which would allow it to counter its further erosion of power and influence, reestablish influence lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union, render NATO's collective defense structure ineffective, and preclude NATO and European Union interventionist measures. However, the lack of Russian credibility due to Moscow's past noncompliance with agreements, history of transnational aggression, and obstructionist actions in international organizations precluded serious consideration of the EST. Future security cooperation with Russia will only be possible through the resolution of the Russian-sponsored frozen conflicts, a non-adversarial relationship with NATO, and

⁹¹ Allison, "Russian 'Deniable' Intervention in Ukraine," 1262.

⁹² Andrew Roth, "Dutch Probe: Missile Brought from Russia Downed Malaysia Airlines Plane over Ukraine (Posted 2016-09-28 11:39:00): The Finding Amounted to a Virtual Indictment of Moscow, Which Dismissed It.," *The Washington Post*; Washington, D.C., September 28, 2016, sec. FOREIGN, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1824229754/abstract/739D743D08484B0APQ/1>.

⁹³ "Russia's Poisonous Client; Chemical Weapons in Syria," *The Economist*; London, April 8, 2017.

further steps towards democratic reform, human rights, and adherence to existing treaties and international law.

III. THE RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE OF THE EST PROPOSAL

This chapter explores how Russia's legacy of the Soviet empire and transition to the Russian Federation shaped Moscow's foreign policy, perception of the European security architecture, national sovereignty, and international relations, which influenced its proposal for a European Security Treaty (EST). Also, this chapter demonstrates how key events before and after the 2008–2009 presentation of the proposal, as well as the implications of the proposed treaty, led to the rejection of the EST by European Union and NATO governments. This chapter shows how the EST proposal serves as a blueprint of Moscow's vision of the future of Europe's security architecture; its behavior to other nations—particularly the United States—and NATO and the European Union; and why it continues to be brought up regularly by Russian officials in pursuit of pursuing their foreign policy objectives. This chapter follows the development of Russian foreign policy from Russia's post-Soviet transition through the Putin-Medvedev era to the present and provides an assessment of future security cooperation with Russia.

A. RUSSIA'S TRANSITION FROM A SOVIET EMPIRE INTO A POST-COLD WAR EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE.

The formation of Russian foreign policy and the vision of the European security architecture up to the proposal of the treaty were shaped by key Soviet-era agreements and treaties, but also through the collapse of the Soviet empire and the establishment of the Russian Federation. Russia perceived an expanding Western-based political, economic, and military union defined by shared liberal values and concluded that this trend—coupled with what Moscow saw as United States hegemony—required a response. The enlargement of NATO and the European Union; NATO and European Union crisis management and humanitarian interventionism; and pro-democratic political changes in areas of the former Soviet empire caused Russia to advocate the model proposed in the EST. After regaining some military and economic vigor, Russia felt determined to push the EST through. President Medvedev was not the first Russian leader to bring up the concept of a European Security Pact. In 1955, at the Geneva Summit conference, Nikita Khrushchev, then the General Secretary of the USSR, Nikita

Khrushchev suggested a European security pact, the reunification of Germany, and a phased nuclear disarmament, which ultimately failed to materialize due to the Soviet refusal to allow for the “open sky” and on-site verifiable arms control agreements demanded by the United States⁹⁴

The signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 during the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe brought forth a document which had a significant impact on shaping foreign policy between the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact Allies and the nations in NATO. Although this document did not have the legal standing of a treaty,⁹⁵ it would shape the motivations and intent of the EST proposal. References to this Act would also take a central role in bilateral and multilateral treaties later made between the Russian Federation and its mistrusting neighboring states that sought to legally protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁹⁶ In view of Russian behavior towards its former Soviet neighbors, one must consider whether their status as non-signatories of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act (because they were then Soviet republics under Moscow’s rule) helps to explain Russia’s disregard for their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

As mentioned previously, the Helsinki Final Act is divided into three “baskets” consisting of political and military matters (including de facto recognition of certain World War II territorial changes); economic, trade and scientific co-operation; and human rights, freedom of emigration and cultural exchanges.⁹⁷ The key tenets of this Act are the recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention in internal affairs, and human rights. This Act continues to be important to the Russian Federation because it serves as an enduring confirmation of its sovereign world-power status, and as a rival to NATO and the European Union, commonly referred to as the West. Additionally, the Act cements its status as a victorious power of the Second World War, which is complemented by its role as a permanent member nation of the United Nations Security

⁹⁴ Erik P. Hoffmann, “Soviet Foreign Policy Aims and Accomplishments from Lenin to Brezhnev,” *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 36, no. 4 (1987): 20–21, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1173830>.

⁹⁵ Dixon, *Textbook on International Law*, 57.

⁹⁶ Slobodchikoff, *Building Hegemonic Order Russia’s Way*, 123.

⁹⁷ Lo, “Medvedev and the New European Security Architecture,” 3.

Council. The humanitarian basket of the Act did its part to encourage liberal activism in the Communist bloc, which often resulted in brutal crackdowns and which ultimately contributed to bring about the process for German reunification and the end of the Communist regimes in Europe.

The Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, or Two-plus-Four Treaty, provided for the re-unification of the two separated German republics, the integration of the united Germany in the existing European security architecture, and the status of foreign forces within Germany. The treaty delineated not only the integration of the united Germany into NATO and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the former German Democratic Republic, but also forbade Germany from allowing foreign troops to garrison or deploy nuclear weapons carriers in the same area—that is, the territory of the former German Democratic Republic.⁹⁸ That aspect of the treaty forms the focal point of Russia’s recurring narrative that it was betrayed by the West regarding the eastward enlargement of NATO. Remarkably, NATO’s potential enlargement into the Warsaw Pact area was not a topic during the treaty negotiations in 1990, because the Soviet collapse had not yet started at that time.⁹⁹ The narrative that Russia was betrayed and humiliated by the West, which sought to intrude into Russia’s backyard, swallow up nations of the former Soviet empire, and encircle the Russian Federation significantly shaped Russian strategic concerns and helped to lead it to formulate plans to counter that perceived threat. Along with the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, this response also eventually took the shape of the EST proposal.

The twenty years following the dissolution of the USSR saw promising attempts of increased integration of Russia into Europe’s economic and security architecture, but these attempts failed to make progress due to early discord brought about by NATO actions in the former Yugoslavia, unresolved frozen conflicts, several pro-democratic

⁹⁸ “German-American Relations—Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (Two plus Four),” accessed August 30, 2018, <https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/2plusfour8994e.htm>.

⁹⁹ Michael Rühle, “NATO Enlargement and Russia: Discerning Fact from Fiction,” *American Foreign Policy Interests* 36, no. 4 (July 1, 2014): 234–39, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2014.947879>.

revolutions, NATO and European Union enlargement, and the Iraq War. Additionally, there was significant opposition by former Communists in Russian politics to pursuing an integration with Europe. Boris Yeltsin had begrudgingly sought to come to terms with a surviving NATO, agreeing to join NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1994 and concluding the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997.¹⁰⁰ Glenn Diesen points out that both of these agreements were attempts by the West to alleviate concerns and resistance by Russia towards an expanding NATO, with Yeltsin agreeing to sign them only because he felt that was the best deal Russia could get at that time.¹⁰¹ Although the agreements were intended to improve relations with Russia through increased transparency, cooperation, and communication, they were not enough to overcome the deep-seated Russian distrust of NATO and Russia's fundamental resistance to abandoning its identity as a superpower and integrating into a NATO-centered security architecture.¹⁰²

In Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, initial cooperation between Russia and NATO was wrecked by NATO's bombing campaigns, resulting in a Russian withdrawal and suspension of several areas of cooperation. The Kosovo experience demonstrated to Russia that it could not deter NATO from using force and doing so in the absence of a specific UNSC resolution. This realization probably reinforced Russia's desire to subordinate all legal use of force to the UNSC in the EST. Additionally, justifying military action through a humanitarian intervention or the "responsibility to protect" would become enshrined in Russia's "compatriot policy" and would remain its staple explanation for later Russian actions in Georgia and Ukraine, and in justifying its continued presence in Georgia and Transnistria.¹⁰³ One must note that this Russian definition of the "responsibility to protect," unlike the United States and Western

¹⁰⁰ David S. Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act* (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 33.

¹⁰¹ Glenn Diesen, *EU and NATO Relations with Russia : After the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2015), 145.

¹⁰² Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act*, 219.

¹⁰³ Vasile Rotaru, "Forced Attraction?: How Russia Is Instrumentalizing Its Soft Power Sources in the 'Near Abroad,'" *Problems of Post-Communism* 65, no. 1 (2018): 43, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2016.1276400>.

European interpretation, was only applicable to Russian interests, rather than being universally applied to any individual or group whose human rights had been violated.

B. FORMATION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE PUTIN-MEDVEDEV ERA AND THE NATURE OF THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY

When Putin assumed power as acting president in 1999, the Russian Federation's foreign policy still pursued a path of developing economic and political ties with the West as the most effective way to protect Russia's interests.¹⁰⁴ Russia was still recovering from the devastating effects of Yeltsin's "shock therapy," but with the spiking gas and oil prices in the mid-2000s, Russia had experienced unprecedented growth shortly before the EST was presented in 2008–2009, putting it back to a level of economic strength not seen since 1990.¹⁰⁵ With the ascent of Medvedev to the presidency in 2008, the United States and many other Western nations felt that Russia would again pursue a path to liberal democracy and that a reset of relations with Russia was possible.¹⁰⁶ As Medvedev's presidency progressed, it became clear that Putin continued to retain influence over national decisions and the initially hopeful optimism became more cautious and pragmatic.

With the proposed EST, Russia would have been able to effectively take legal steps against military, political, and security cooperation of states within the former Soviet space with the West, citing it as a threat to Russia's security. Few developments have affected Russian thinking more than the "color revolutions" of the early 2000s in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and in Ukraine, which brought leaders to power who sought to move their nations out of the Russian orbit. Russia continues to perceive pro-democratic revolutions as United States-conceived, funded, and guided operations to encircle Russia,¹⁰⁷ install pro-Western governments and isolate the Russian Federation both

¹⁰⁴ Stephen K. Wegren, ed., *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*, Sixth edition (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 240.

¹⁰⁵ Wegren, 233.

¹⁰⁶ Wegren, 234.

¹⁰⁷ Tsygankov, *The Strong State in Russia*, 147.

politically and economically.¹⁰⁸ These pro-democracy revolutions typically ushered in governments that desired political and economic integration with the European Union, rather than with Russia. With increasing Russian pressure and assertiveness, these states became increasingly wary of Moscow's threat to their national sovereignty and territorial integrity. They also sought to sign association agreements with the European Union, as a path towards eventual membership, and to seek increased security cooperation with NATO, or even work towards a membership action plan for NATO. Although Russia initially did not consider the European Union's outreach threatening, this started to change in the mid-2000s, particularly after the European Union developed the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which became the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in 2009, and which threatened to put a United States-aligned Europe directly on Russia's borders.¹⁰⁹

The 11 September 2001 attacks increased security cooperation between Russia and the West, but Russian hopes that the West would finally reach an appreciation for Russian struggles against terrorism in Chechnya did not materialize. Russia's growing reservations about the NATO operations in Afghanistan, along with resentment and hostility to NATO basing issues in the Central Asian countries, contributed to the failure to improve relations fundamentally. The United States also had been able to outmaneuver Russian veto power in the UNSC by forming a "coalition of the willing" to oust Saddam Hussein, which revealed to the Russian Federation once again that it had no effective tools—diplomatic or military—to stop unilateral actions by the United States. Additionally, the United States withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and NATO enlargement signaled to Russia that it was not an equal partner in the relationship, that its security interests did not matter, and that it was not considered threatening any longer and therefore was undeserving of attention.¹¹⁰ Finally, the United States' announcement of a plan to place a missile defense shield in Europe, after it had

¹⁰⁸ Rotaru, "Forced Attraction?: How Russia Is Instrumentalizing Its Soft Power Sources in the 'Near Abroad.'"

¹⁰⁹ Wegren, *Putin's Russia*, 260.

¹¹⁰ Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russophobia Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign Policy*, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2009), 118, <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230620957>.

withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, irked Russia and elicited its suspension of compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty in 2007.¹¹¹ According to Andrei Tsygankov, Russia saw three primary dangers stemming from Washington's strategy of global regime changes: a potential revolution within Russia itself, encirclement by pro-American regimes in the former Soviet space, and a growing radicalization of Islam fueled by the United States' global war on terrorism.¹¹²

Russia had recovered to a point where it decided that it could risk taking unilateral action against Georgia in 2008, sending not only a clear message to its domestic audience that it would no longer be bullied, but also to the West, which scrambled to find an adequate response to this unprecedented use of force by post-Soviet Russia. The fragility of peace and security in Europe became painfully evident to European nations. Kimberly Martin attributes this new Russian assertiveness to the lack of a credible deterrent from the West, and documents Russia's multiple breaches of sovereignty by taking over Abkhazia and South Ossetia which could only have been stopped by the United States deploying troops for "humanitarian reasons" to Georgia to show Russia that a line had been drawn.¹¹³

With many nations in NATO still at odds with the United States invasion of Iraq, some expressed the judgment that NATO and the European Union had perhaps enlarged their membership too quickly. Russia, represented by the enthusiastic and "Western-sympathetic" Medvedev, sought to appear genuinely interested in taking a step towards the West by suggesting a new security architecture for Europe. However, Russia's actions in Georgia in 2008 clearly violated many of the principles contained in the EST proposal, particularly with respect to not violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states through the use of force or the threat of force. Russia's intrusion deep into Georgia, along with its recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence, robbed

¹¹¹ Tsygankov, *The Strong State in Russia*, 148.

¹¹² Tsygankov, 147–48.

¹¹³ Kimberly Marten, "Informal Political Networks and Putin's Foreign Policy: The Examples of Iran and Syria," *Problems of Post-Communism* 62, no. 2 (2015): 75–76, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2015.1010896>.

Moscow's proposal of all credibility. However, Russia showcased the Georgia conflict as proof that NATO was unable to ensure security in Europe, and that Europe therefore needed a new security architecture.¹¹⁴

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia, as the largest successor country, saw its previously guaranteed influence diminish not only in the newly independent countries, but also in international organizations such as the CSCE/OSCE. Russia remains a permanent UNSC member with veto power. The various articles of the EST back up the Russian intent to exploit that position by subordinating the existing European defense and security architecture under the UNSC, where it exercises veto power. Russia's proposed EST would enable it to halt NATO and European Union military interventionist actions outside of UNSC Resolutions, such as in Kosovo, Syria, and Libya.¹¹⁵ In 2008, then President Medvedev presented the proposed treaty as legally binding, having uniform interpretation and implementation, guaranteeing all parties equal security, confirming that no state or international organization had exclusive rights to maintain peace in Europe, and establishing key parameters for arms control and military construction.¹¹⁶

The EST would preclude NATO or European Union actions in military and security matters to which Russia objected. It could easily be widened to include political, economic, or ideological actions which Russia perceived as "significantly affecting [the] security"¹¹⁷ of the Russian Federation. Parties may, depending on the nature and severity of the issue, consult amongst each other, call for a conference of parties, and finally request an extraordinary conference to resolve the issue if the previous consultations have failed. Decisions are binding based on a consensus by at least two-thirds of the treaty

¹¹⁴ "The Rise and Fall of Medvedev's European Security Treaty," The German Marshall Fund of the United States, May 29, 2012, <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/rise-and-fall-medvedev%E2%80%99s-european-security-treaty>.

¹¹⁵ Diesen and Wood, "Russia's Proposal for a New Security System," 463.

¹¹⁶ Andrei Zagorski, "The Russian Proposal for a Treaty on European Security: From the Medvedev Initiative to the Corfu Process," in *OSCE Yearbook 2009* (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2010), 45–46.

¹¹⁷ Medvedev, "The Draft of the European Security Treaty."

parties voting on the matter. As mentioned before, the EST does not provide a conflict resolution process, but it would allow Russia to continuously convene meetings about trifling matters to hinder security cooperation of European nations, particularly with their transatlantic NATO Allies.

The inability of Allies to take swift action could become problematic, especially when considering Article 7 of the EST, which requires parties to the treaty to render assistance to another treaty member which comes under attack until the UNSC can take measures to restore and maintain international peace and security. Unlike the collective defense provided through NATO, the EST does not provide for mandatory collective defense, but rather stipulates that Allies are entitled to support. During a time of crisis, particularly one sparked by Russian aggression, treaty parties would have ample incentive to “buck pass” or “defect” and avoid the economic, military, and potentially human costs of countering Russia, rather than being required to respond to existing collective defense treaties.

The most significant EST issues include its devastating effect on the ability of NATO to provide for the collective defense of its members, the effective dissolution of the transatlantic bonds with the United States and Canada, and its inherent effect of giving Russia a means to interject and potentially veto measures taken by European nations to ensure their security. A critical requirement for NATO, and arguably for any collective defense organization, is unfettered cooperation and the ability to move personnel, forces, goods, and other strategic assets through member territories. Article 2 requires that all “decisions taken in the framework of such alliances, coalitions or organizations do not affect significantly security of any Party or Parties to the Treaty,” making NATO actions conditional to Russian approval. Article 2 also dissolves the transatlantic bond of Europe with Canada and the United States by its prohibition of “the use of its territory” and the “use [of] the territory of any other Party with the purpose of preparing or carrying out an armed attack against any other Party or Parties to the

Treaty or any other actions affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.”¹¹⁸

The Russian preference for a modernized concert of great powers, which would regulate politics and international relations between them outside of regional alliances or collective defense agreements, is not only embodied in the EST, but also often cited by Russian officials. In the words of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, the “new polycentric world arrangement” arises through the “consolidation of new centres of economic power and related political influence. Guided by their own national interests they are confidently assuming their part of the responsibility for maintaining security and stability at different levels.”¹¹⁹ Russia’s vision in the EST would result in a bloc-free area of collective security, replacing the existing collective defense alliances which are exclusive and come at the expense of other nations’ security. The EST reflects the Russian interpretation of multilateralism, in that it places the fate of smaller nations into the hands of decisions reached by great powers. This situation is reminiscent of the times when Poland suffered multiple partitions of its territory—without being able to resist them. This concept of multilateralism is not politically or economically compatible with that of the European Union nations or their transatlantic Allies.

Russia’s actions before announcing the proposal harmed its credibility with European nations and eroded the amount of trust necessary to accept the proposal. Russia’s violations of existing treaties through its continued military presence in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria; past withholding of natural gas during the colder winter months as a coercive tool in its foreign policy; and flagrant unilateral violation of Georgian sovereignty outside of a UNSC resolution in the Russia-Georgia war destroyed European trust. Russia’s behavior since launching the treaty proposal has only confirmed European nations’ fear and distrust of Russia’s intent with the EST.

¹¹⁸ Medvedev, para. 2.

¹¹⁹ “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Interviewed by Bulgarian Journal International Relations, Moscow, March 2, 2018.”

C. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE PROPOSAL AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION

Russian foreign policy since announcing the EST proposal in 2008–2009, particularly since the return of Putin to the presidency in 2012, has increased in its assertiveness and aggression, as well as in its defiance of international law. Significant economic, military, and political events since 2008 have further alienated Russia from the Euro-Atlantic community and have severely limited prospects for future cooperation.

Issues surrounding energy security, missile defense, and the support of many Western nations for actions in Libya and the second wave of Putin’s feared “color revolutions” in the Middle East have hardened the Russian perception of the European Union and NATO as security threats.

The importance of reliable access to energy for the European Union is growing. The European Union has to import more than half the energy it consumes. Russian gas disputes with Ukraine have on multiple occasions left Western Europe out in the cold in the middle of winter. The Russian tactic of using threats to shut off oil and gas supplies in order to extract concessions has proven effective ever since Boris Yeltsin used it in an attempt to obtain the entire Black Sea Fleet from Ukraine in 1993.¹²⁰ Although this Russian attempt ultimately did not prove successful, by 1995 Ukrainian oil and gas infrastructure was entirely in the hands of Gazprom. Russia used this commodity as a means of extortion with Ukraine most notably in 2005–2006 after Gazprom raised gas prices,¹²¹ in 2007–2008¹²² and again in 2008–2009¹²³ citing unpaid Ukrainian debts. The mid-winter shutdown of 2009 caused irreparable damage to the European Union’s

¹²⁰ “Russia and Ukraine Strike Black Sea Fleet Deal-Or Not,” *Arms Control Today*; *Washington* 23, no. 8 (October 1993): 17.

¹²¹ Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” 2006, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2006-03-01/ensuring-energy-security>.

¹²² “Gazprom Cuts Ukraine Gas Supply,” March 3, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7274380.stm>.

¹²³ Tom Parfitt and Moscow, “International: Gas Dispute: Jitters across EU as Russia Cuts Ukraine Fuel Supply: U.S. and European Leaders Urge Rapid End to Row between Kiev and Moscow,” *The Guardian*; *London (UK)*, January 2, 2009, sec. Guardian International Pages, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/244342288/abstract/BF27F5EB098B4C71PQ/1>.

confidence in Russia as a reliable energy supplier.¹²⁴ In 2010, after Moscow's gas price manipulations helped aid Putin-supported Viktor Yanukovich to return as Ukraine's president, the Kremlin organized a scheme that finally achieved what Yeltsin could not pull off—the long-term lease of the Black Sea Fleet harbors of the Crimea to the Russian Federation.¹²⁵ This was largely achieved by again using Russian gas supplies as a means of coercion. Russia negotiated an extension to the lease of the Crimean bases by agreeing to lower gas prices in return in April 2010,¹²⁶ only to use these same bases in 2014 to annex the Crimea.¹²⁷ The threats posed to the European Union's energy security by these disputes and Moscow's coercive tactics caused the European Union to develop its Energy Security Strategy in 2014 in response.¹²⁸ This strategy recognizes and seeks to mitigate the threat that Russian coercive use of energy policy poses to the security of the European Union and its partners.

Another long-standing issue is Russia's ardent opposition to NATO efforts to install a European missile defense shield to protect its members from potential nuclear strikes from Iran and North Korea. Particularly after the United States withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, Russia argued that "the global missile defence system was being created to encircle Russia and then China," according to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.¹²⁹ In 2010 Russia suggested establishing a single joint missile defense system with NATO for Europe and Russia, which would have given Russia a veto on the command and control function of missile defense—something obviously unacceptable to the United States, the European Union (although the European Union collectively

¹²⁴ F. Stephen Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics," *Journal of International Affairs; New York* 63, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 33–X.

¹²⁵ "Kharkiv Sellout—Apr. 22, 2010," KyivPost, accessed May 1, 2019, <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/editorial/kharkiv-sellout-64760.html>.

¹²⁶ "Kharkiv Sellout—Apr. 22, 2010."

¹²⁷ James Marson and Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen, "World News: Ukraine Fleet Deal Expands Russia's Regional Reach," *Wall Street Journal, Eastern Edition; New York, N.Y.*, April 22, 2010.

¹²⁸ "Energy Security Strategy—Energy—European Commission," Energy, accessed September 8, 2018, </energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/energy-security-strategy>.

¹²⁹ "Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Remarks and Answers to Questions at the Terra Scientia on Klyazma River National Educational Youth Forum, Vladimir Region, July 30, 2018," accessed September 9, 2018, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3308052.

generally refrains from openly discussing missile defense), and NATO.¹³⁰ This topic continues to play a key role for Russia, which argues that the missile defense system is actually a ploy to render its strategic nuclear capability useless¹³¹ and make Russia vulnerable to a nuclear attack.

The diverging viewpoints are not limited solely to the strategic nuclear realm. The opinions on international stability and security also conflict, as the developments in the Arab Spring as well as in Libya and Syria demonstrated.

The Arab Spring revolutions, as Bobo Lo points out, started as liberal middle-class popular movements but were high-jacked by Islamists who installed failing and unstable states—a point gladly exploited by Moscow in its arguments against humanitarian or values-based interventionism.¹³² Moscow cites the instability caused by regime change as a selling point for its argument that regime stability is a lesser risk for destabilization than a popular democratic revolution. This motivation may help to explain Moscow's support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and reflects Putin's significant level of fear of similar anti-authoritarian movements in Russia. The events surrounding the Arab Spring, the ouster of Ghaddafi, and subsequent stream of refugees are mentioned by Lavrov as “a situation inherited from the absolutely adventurist and irresponsible policy that was conducted by the North Atlantic Alliance.”¹³³ This demonstrates the different viewpoints about the concept of security between the Russian Federation, which sees a strong state as the best method for maintaining security, and that of NATO and the European Union, who see a democratic form of government defined by human rights, the rule of law, and a functioning economy as a sounder foundation for peace, security, and prosperity.

¹³⁰ Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, 175.

¹³¹ “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Interview to Vietnamese and Japanese Media, Moscow, March 16, 2018,” accessed September 9, 2018, http://www.mid.ru/posledniye_dobavlnenniye/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQUMdqBY/content/id/3126672.

¹³² Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, 94.

¹³³ “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Interview with Italian Media, Moscow, December 9, 2015,” accessed September 8, 2018, http://www.mid.ru/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/1968020.

The European Union's effort to enhance stability and prosperity through "European values" expressed in association agreements and its Eastern Partnership outreach have irked Russia and hardened its attempts to counter the European Union with its Eurasian Economic Union. Russia's use of trade policies as political means of coercion to counter the European Union's efforts towards economic interdependence through its Eastern Partnership program have not only pushed nations in the post-Soviet space towards Europe, but also have led Moscow to essentially declare the European Union a competitor and threat.¹³⁴ In Russia's narrative, the European Union and NATO are implicated as "staging the coup" in Ukraine with "the connivance of Brussels and Washington."¹³⁵ Although Russia continuously proclaims its vision of a polycentric world order, it appears to have little respect, if not open contempt, for the European Union's vision of democratic multilateralism.¹³⁶ The European Union is often portrayed by Moscow as a willing tool of the United States-dominated NATO, infiltrating the Russian world with the "Eastern Partnership Programme to force post-Soviet countries to make an unnatural choice between 'us' and 'them,' in accordance with the logic of the zero sum game."¹³⁷ Russia sees itself in the role of a hegemonic parent for countries in its sphere, and as co-decision maker for these countries' interactions with others—as in the case of the association agreement between the European Union and Ukraine. According to Lavrov, after Ukraine initially hesitated to disclose the contents of the association agreement to Russia, Russia discovered that the agreement would disadvantage it and other CIS states economically. Moscow insisted that Russia, Ukraine, and the European Union sit down and modify the agreement, in response to which the European Commission was—in Lavrov's words—"categorical and arrogant in its refusal

¹³⁴ Rotaru, "Forced Attraction?: How Russia Is Instrumentalizing Its Soft Power Sources in the 'Near Abroad,'" 46.

¹³⁵ "Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Interviewed by Bulgarian Journal International Relations, Moscow, March 2, 2018."

¹³⁶ Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, 194.

¹³⁷ "Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Remarks at the Opening of the Potsdam Meetings, Moscow, November 8, 2016," accessed September 9, 2018, http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2514850.

to discuss.”¹³⁸ In view of the efforts by the European Union to widen economic cooperation with Ukraine and applaud the pro-democracy struggle of its people, Russia felt that it had to react.

After the Euro-Maidan movement in Ukraine ousted President Viktor Yanukovich, Russia seized the Crimea and began its subterfuge invasion of eastern Ukraine. According to Lavrov, after the “seizure of power by ultranationalist forces in an armed anti-constitutional coup,” the new government threatened Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, forcing Russia to “defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and its constitution” and to save “the Crimean people who faced the threat of annihilation.”¹³⁹ In other words, Russia claimed that it was defending Ukraine’s territorial integrity while it annexed part of Ukraine (Crimea).

This Russian action, besides violating several bilateral agreements between Ukraine and Russia, also violated the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and multilateral agreements such as the Budapest Memorandum.¹⁴⁰ Most importantly, Russia’s behavior validated the apprehensions and justified the lack of trust which had led to the refusal of NATO and European Union nations to accept the EST, as Russia had violated most of the provisions it had included in its proposal. In its aggression in Ukraine, Russia had committed nearly all the acts that it had sought to preclude with its EST: the use of force to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation, interference in the domestic affairs of a nation, and unilateral actions without an authorizing UNSC resolution. European nations, Canada, and the United States imposed punitive sanctions on Russia in response to its aggression towards Ukraine.

Relations were further complicated by the shoot-down of a Malaysian Airlines airliner in eastern Ukraine by a BUK missile system smuggled in from Russia which caused the deaths of 298 people, of whom most were citizens of the Netherlands.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Questions at the Terra Scientia on Klyazma River National Educational Youth Forum, Vladimir Region, July 30, 2018.”

¹³⁹ “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Interview with Italian Media, Moscow, December 9, 2015.”

¹⁴⁰ Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine.”

¹⁴¹ Roth, “Dutch Probe.”

Subsequent Russian denials and fabrications concerning the shoot down only further damaged Russia's credibility and reputation.

The Minsk I and II agreements also demonstrated Russia's lack of sincerity in resolving the Ukraine Crisis in that it continued to support the separatist regions with arms, personnel, and materiel, while simultaneously refusing to negotiate with Ukraine and insisting that the negotiations must be directly held with the separatist regions.

Persistent Russian lies and Soviet-style "maskirovka" have also reduced the collective trust of European Union and NATO governments in the veracity of Russian official statements, because the lies told by Russian government officials about the "little green men" in Ukraine, the Malaysia Airlines shootdown, the use of chemical weapons by Assad's regime in Syria, interference in the 2016 United States elections, support for anti-European Union and anti-NATO populist movements in Europe, and the Novichok poisonings in the U.K.

The Kremlin also works diligently to portray Russia as a major contributor to peace and stability,¹⁴² particularly if it can use events to paint the United States as a bully and destabilizer. This became evident through Russia's role in seemingly persuading Syrian President Assad to give up his chemical weapons after an alleged chemical attack which placed then United States President Barack Obama in a conundrum regarding his "Red Line" towards chemical weapons use. Russia's continued support for the Syrian regime's survival is meant to broadcast to Europe that in contrast to the refugee streams and increasing instability brought about by pro-democratic interventions and United States-instigated regime changes, Russia acts to preserve dictatorial governments and thus acts as a stabilizing factor.

This continues to be brought up by Russia in conjunction with its EST proposal, telling major European powers that they can either choose to continue to oppose cooperation with Russia and face continued instability, migrant flows, and an increasingly hostile Russia; or that they can cut themselves off from their transatlantic

¹⁴² "Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Interviewed by Bulgarian Journal International Relations, Moscow, March 2, 2018."

leash and cooperate with an ideologically distinct Russia economically, respecting each other's spheres of influence and enjoying Russian assurances of security. Following Putin's return to the presidency in 2012, he immediately faulted his predecessor for any perceived foreign policy shortcomings, as for example the Russian abstention to the United Nations Security Council Resolution regarding the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya,¹⁴³ strengthened authoritarian structures, and visibly departed from the vision laid out in the EST proposal. Russia has continued to perfect its attempts to achieve what it hoped to achieve through the EST—the dissolution of NATO, the fragmentation of the European Union, and the severance of the transatlantic bond.

D. CONCLUSION

Russia's proposal for the EST was part of its effort to reestablish and cement the Russian Federation's status as the dominating superpower in Europe. Russia sought to reestablish parity with—and to contend with—the United States with the overall goal of replacing a Europe led by the United States with a multipolar construct dominated by Russia. After recovering from a phase of economic decline, loss of empire and influence,¹⁴⁴ during and following the Yeltsin years, Russia found the appropriate time to reassert itself. The proposed EST sought to dissolve not only the transatlantic defense bond to the United States brought by NATO, but also to give Russia a legal standing to object to—and halt—any actions by the United States or other Western countries that would negatively affect Russian national interests.

Russia's actions in Ukraine have revealed Russia's understanding of sovereignty and its desire for a polycentric world order for what it really is: a revamped "Concert of Europe" in which the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations are determined by the "centres of economic and financial power, enhancing their political leverage along the way."¹⁴⁵ With the United States, Canada, and the U.K. divorced from Europe and the

¹⁴³ Lo, *Russia and the New World Disorder*, 9.

¹⁴⁴ "Boris Yeltsin's Legacy," 14, accessed July 14, 2018, <http://personal.utulsa.edu/~robert-donaldson/yeltsin.htm>.

¹⁴⁵ "Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Remarks and Answers to Questions at the Terra Scientia on Klyazma River National Educational Youth Forum, Vladimir Region, July 30, 2018."

NATO construct neutralized, Russia would be able to recapture the influence it had lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and potentially could work towards creating an economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

Russia intends with its continued destabilization efforts across Europe to visibly demonstrate the inability of NATO to secure Europe and prevent Russia's interference. Russia's present and past behavior towards nations in its near abroad, its unequivocal opposition to the liberal democratic values propagated by both European Union and NATO countries, and its deep resentment of its loss of parity with the United States, as well as its perceptions of United States hegemony suggest the intent of Russia's foreign policy goals and of the EST. These goals were to coerce the European Union into accepting prevailing Russian interests and to divorce itself from the United States and NATO. Thereby Russia could regain strategic parity with the United States and compete more effectively with the United States for European nations' allegiance.

Russia's efforts to sell the EST to the world ultimately failed. Its continuing aggressive and destabilizing actions achieved its increased isolation and shattered its reputation and credibility. This has constrained cooperation with the United States and Europe even in areas of common interest, such as security, crisis management, and anti-terrorism.

The following chapter revisits the presentation and content of the EST proposal and determines why France, Germany, and the United Kingdom chose not to accept it. It examines the post-Soviet interactions of these countries with the Russian Federation, as well as past and persisting conflicts and differences, which have affected and continue to affect relations and cooperation with Moscow.

IV. THE EUROPEAN RECEPTION OF THE EST PROPOSAL

When Russian President Medvedev proposed a comprehensive European Security Treaty (EST) in 2008 and 2009, many European nations awaited with hope the details of the Russian proposal. The Russian military intervention in Georgia in 2008 had rattled the tranquil estimates of European stability and security. By the time Russia presented the draft treaty on the Kremlin's website in November 2009, reality had set back in.

The NATO and European Union powers rejected the proposed EST due to diverging comprehensions of security, the history of bilateral relations with Russia, and Russian behavior which contradicted the aims and spirit of the EST. The leading European powers, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, desire a secure and stable Europe, as well as economic and political cooperation with the Russian Federation (Russia), but remain resolute in supporting the universal values embodied in the Copenhagen criteria of the European Union¹⁴⁶ and the collective defense structure provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

This chapter focuses on those provisions of the EST which were unsatisfactory to these three leading European powers; assess the impact on their bilateral relations with Russia; and determine the prospects for future security cooperation with Russia by assessing developments since the Corfu Process was agreed on at the OSCE meeting on 2 December 2009.¹⁴⁷

A. EUROPEAN RESERVATIONS REGARDING THE PROPOSAL

The Russia-Georgia crisis in 2008 had shocked Europe, and Russia hoped to capitalize on European anxiety. The EST was intended as a legally binding framework to reestablish a multipolar Europe, and it would have allowed Russia to reassert its sphere of influence over those parts of Europe formerly in the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact.

¹⁴⁶ "Accession Criteria—European Commission," accessed March 7, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.

¹⁴⁷ "Ministerial Declaration on the OSCE Corfu Process: Reconfirm-Review-Reinvigorate Security and Co-Operation from Vancouver to Vladivostok | OSCE," accessed March 8, 2018, <https://www.osce.org/cio/40689>.

The leading European powers did not accept Russia's draft EST because of its subjective language; its focus on "hard" security (that is, military) vice the holistic European concept of security; and its subordination of existing alliances and security arrangements to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC); and Russia's failure to honor previous agreements.

The draft treaty was markedly defined by unclear language and dubious terminology. The EST states that cooperation rests on the principles of indivisible, equal, and undiminished security.¹⁴⁸ Article 1 puts this further into context by specifying that alliances or other international arrangements must consider the security interests of all other countries party to the treaty. Article 2 dictates that security measures cannot come at the expense of the security of another treaty party, and prohibits the use of a treaty party's territory by other parties in a way which would affect the security of other treaty parties.¹⁴⁹ This would prohibit inter-military cooperation between NATO countries, for example, if Russia perceived its security threatened, and also could significantly limit future European Union security and defense agreements for like reasons. For France and Germany, which were and are interested in strengthening the European Union's security posture and deepening military integration within the European Union, these articles alone posed a significant challenge to the concept of the European integration project.

The EST, although modeled in some ways after the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, excluded language pertaining to human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to the equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The Helsinki Final Act addressed not only security questions, but also economic and scientific co-operation, and (most importantly) commitments to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.¹⁵⁰ The "Corfu Process" joint declaration contained language pertaining to all three areas included in the Helsinki Final Act, reaffirming the commitment to all of its principles,

¹⁴⁸ "The Draft of the European Security Treaty • President of Russia," President of Russia, accessed March 8, 2018, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/6152>.

¹⁴⁹ "The Draft of the European Security Treaty • President of Russia," President of Russia, accessed March 8, 2018, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/6152>.

¹⁵⁰ "Helsinki Final Act | OSCE."

including those concerning hard security.¹⁵¹ Particularly for the European Union's core countries, economic cooperation and common values incorporating the rule of law and respect for human rights were non-negotiable components of achieving a lasting and secure peace in Europe and were integral elements of their comprehension of security. The European Union's internal security structure is based on protecting what it considers the "four freedoms"—that is, free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital.¹⁵² With the draft EST devoid of those elements so critical to the European Union's concept of security, the proposed treaty was not acceptable.

The EST also proposed a decision-making logic tied to consensus and subordinated the role of maintaining international peace and security to the UNSC.¹⁵³ Owing to the subjectivity of the first three articles of the Russian proposal, Russia could block any member's efforts to pursue security cooperation with another country, or within an alliance, citing a perceived threat to its own security interests.

The collective experience of Soviet and later Russian actions with regard to Moscow's veto choices in the United Nations Security Council ruled out European acquiescence to the proposed treaty. As a permanent member of the UNSC with veto power, Russia can prevent the approval of resolutions which would challenge its interests. The requirement for consensus among the P5 gives Russia a veto on any security-related initiatives. Moscow's extensive history of using its status as a permanent UN Security Council member to veto resolutions which were important to European powers and supported by a majority of countries shut out European support for the EST proposal.

The Russian unwillingness to honor existing agreements also hurt the EST's credibility. Russia maintains frozen conflicts, such as the stalemate in Transnistria. Although Russia had promised at the OSCE meeting in Istanbul in 1999 to remove its troops from Moldova, Russian troops were still there a decade later and remain there

¹⁵¹ Nopens, "A New Security Architecture for Europe?," 3.

¹⁵² Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, 4th ed (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 530.

¹⁵³ "The Draft of the European Security Treaty • President of Russia."

today.¹⁵⁴ These experiences with Moscow would negatively influence the bilateral relationships of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany with Russia.

B. BILATERAL RELATIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE, AND GERMANY WITH RUSSIA

Although British, French, and German bilateral approaches have differed with respect to Russia since the end of the Cold War, none of these three powers supported the Russian EST proposal. Although each country had its own reasons, collectively the reasons for rejecting the proposal were distrust of Russia, the EST's omission of democratic values and the rule of law, and the EST's probable harm to existing security arrangements. Perhaps the most resolute European defender of a European security and defense structure based on NATO has been the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom-Russia relationship has a history of adversity and competition, as well as cooperation. There were periods of security cooperation, such as during the Napoleonic Wars, the Boxer Rebellion, and the two World Wars. However, these periods were the exception, rather than the norm. Both nations had expansionist tendencies and competing interests which pitted them against each other, such as during the "Great Game" in Central Asia in the 19th Century and more recently, during the Cold War. Additionally, both countries were great powers in the past, and desire to remain so in the future.¹⁵⁵ Following the Cold War, the United Kingdom entered a path of economic and political engagement with Russia, but the Kosovo Crisis, the Iraq War, the murders of Alexander Litvinenko and other defectors in Britain,¹⁵⁶ and extradition disputes have marred the relationship.

Maxine David describes the post-Cold War bilateral relationship as affected by a mix of values and interests, the role of leadership, and external pressures. Following the

¹⁵⁴ "To Have and to Hold," 9.

¹⁵⁵ Maxine David, "A Less than Special Relationship: The UK's Russia Experience," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 19, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 201–12, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2011.580908>.

¹⁵⁶ "Russia/United Kingdom: Russian, British Foreign Ministers to Discuss Bilateral Ties," *Asia News Monitor; Bangkok*, November 2, 2009, sec. General News, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1238988951/abstract/99C49300AC83460FPQ/1>.

dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom endeavored to assist Russia in reforming its market economy and building a democratic and stable society. This involved significant high-level and departmental-level diplomatic exchanges and an increase in British economic developmental assistance alongside that offered through the European Union.¹⁵⁷ However, Russia failed to make the necessary reforms and provide adequate protection of foreign investors, discouraging foreign direct investments into its economy. Additionally, many of the non-governmental organizations sent by the United Kingdom to Russia to help develop its economy and institutions were suspected and accused of internal meddling and spying by Russia. Subsequent steps by Russia to curtail the roles and functions of British NGOs complicated their relationship.

The United Kingdom's special relations with the United States and Poland have contributed to putting its interests in opposition to Russia's security concerns. Consistently for the past 70 years, the United Kingdom has placed European security and defense firmly integrated into the structure of NATO. Douglas Hurd, then the British foreign secretary, stated in 1991, "NATO and WEU have performed the job of defence with success for over 40 years," and added that "European defence, though it must become increasingly self-sufficient, will continue to depend on the Alliance."¹⁵⁸ Considering the United Kingdom's unshakable allegiance to the defense and security posture provided by NATO, London would not endorse a Russian proposal which could have severely limited the autonomous decision-making ability of the NATO.

As outlined in its 2015 National Security Strategy, the United Kingdom anticipates the continued unpredictability of Russian behavior, and recognizes the possibility that Russia may act aggressively against NATO members.¹⁵⁹ The Russian Foreign Ministry has described the relationship as "never stable or predictable," due to the United Kingdom providing for its own "higher national interests" and for its "playing

¹⁵⁷ David, "A Less than Special Relationship."

¹⁵⁸ Douglas Hurd (February 19, 1991). Douglas Hurd gave a speech at the Churchill Memorial Conference on 19 February 1991 in Luxembourg where he made the quoted statements.

¹⁵⁹ "National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015—GOV.UK," accessed February 28, 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015>.

along with Washington.”¹⁶⁰ Continued attempts by the United Kingdom to engage Russia economically have failed to establish any substantial ties of economic interdependence, and the United Kingdom’s prevailing fixed stance against a non-NATO integrated security structure make it clear that London would not support the EST, nor approve a comparable security arrangement outside NATO in the future.

France and Germany, although vocally supportive of discussing the Russian proposal, also did not want to abandon the security structure provided by NATO. Overall, the bilateral relationship between the United Kingdom and Russia has not been as beneficial to Russia as Russia’s relationships with France and Germany.

Although France has invested significantly in the Russian Federation and has enjoyed good relations with Moscow, France’s self-perception as a great power, its status as a permanent member of the UNSC, and its role as a founding member of NATO and the European Union were among the factors leading it to reject the EST. France’s bilateral ties with Russia were re-established on 7 February 1992 through an agreement which recognized the Russian Federation as the successor of the Soviet Union in certain respects, and which serves as the legal basis for bilateral cooperation between the two countries.¹⁶¹ Trade and diplomatic exchanges have been intensive, with France becoming the largest source of Foreign Direct Investment to Russia after Germany at the end of 2016.¹⁶² The French perception of Russia as a threat to security also differs from that of other European Union members. As Glenn Diesen points out, this became evident through the sale of three Mistral-class assault ships to Russia.¹⁶³ This deal was not cancelled until 2014, despite protests by Eastern European NATO members and even

¹⁶⁰ “UK,” accessed March 3, 2018, <http://www.mid.ru/maps/gb?currentpage=main-country>.

¹⁶¹ “France,” accessed March 3, 2018, <http://www.mid.ru/maps/fr>.

¹⁶² “France and Russia,” France Diplomatie :: Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, accessed March 3, 2018, <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/russia/france-and-russia/>.

¹⁶³ “EU and NATO Relations with Russia | After the Collapse of the Soviet Union | Taylor & Francis Group,” 158, accessed March 3, 2018, <https://www.taylorfrancis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/books/9781317140535>.

after the Russian actions in Ukraine and in Crimea.¹⁶⁴ Additionally, this also indicated France's willingness to align its bilateral relations independently, and without necessarily consulting with its European Union and NATO partners.

This shows France's self-awareness as a regional power—further solidified through its status as a nuclear weapons state and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This was apparent in France's willingness to lead European Union security operations outside of (and without) NATO support, such as Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2003.¹⁶⁵ Additionally, France has historically been apprehensive about—and countered—any attempts by the United States to assert “too much” control over NATO. Sharing at times Russia's preference for a multi-polar power distribution, France has also embraced the role of an interlocutor between Russia and other European powers and the United States. France, under the leadership of Nicolas Sarkozy, assumed this role in the Georgia-Russia conflict in 2008, appearing to some to play the United States against Russia in favor of France's interests.¹⁶⁶

France, as a founding member of NATO, remains committed to the alliance, despite its intermittent apprehensions about United States dominance. In the absence of a credible existing European defense posture, France would not accept the Russian EST proposal, knowing that it would neuter NATO's ability to assure collective defense. Nicolas Sarkozy, then the French president, stated in 2008 that a European security arrangement must be NATO-based, and that Russia should work within the existing structures, such as the NATO-Russia Council and the European Union's European Security and Defense Policy.¹⁶⁷ Considering the recent actions of Russia in Ukraine, as well as France's advocacy of continuing European Union economic sanctions against Russia, France is unlikely to support an independent European security framework with

¹⁶⁴ “France's Mistral Sale to Russia- a Deal with the Devil?,” *Progressive Digital Media Defense (Incl. Airforce, Army, Navy and Homeland Security) News*; London, August 1, 2014, <https://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1551367056/abstract/3B37C8839B1D4B49PQ/1>.

¹⁶⁵ David S. Yost, *NATO and International Organizations* (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2007), 80, <http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=25>.

¹⁶⁶ Diesen and Wood, “Russia's Proposal for a New Security System,” 458.

¹⁶⁷ Lo, “Medvedev and the New European Security Architecture,” 4.

Russia and outside NATO and the European Union in the future. Franco-Russian economic cooperation has continued, only mildly abated. Despite the economic sanctions in place, bilateral relations, particularly in the energy sector, as well as diplomatic exchanges with Russia continue. This reality is reflected also in the bilateral relations of Germany with Russia.

Germany is a major investor in Russia, and Berlin is interested in improving relations, especially through trade in the energy sector. However, Russia's rejection of the shared democratic norms and values which have defined post-war Germany, and the value Germany places in the protection through NATO's nuclear umbrella made it unwilling to sacrifice its security position by supporting the Russian proposal for an EST. Germany's citizenry was split throughout the Cold War between the opposing worldviews of the United States and the Soviet Union. Many in Germany acknowledge the Russian participation and sacrifice, without which Germany would have not been liberated from the National Socialist terror regime in 1945 or reunified through the Two-Plus-Four Agreement in 1990. The collective consciousness of Germany's "historical responsibility" shapes German domestic and foreign policy with regard to opposing militarism, wars of aggression and expansion, and ethnic genocide. Because of this legacy, Germany will probably remain committed to humanitarian interventions to prevent genocide and pursue initiatives which support both nuclear and conventional disarmament. John Duffield asserts that Germany follows a political culture based on multilateralism and antimilitarism, expressed through its support for European security institutions, an aversion to independent military action, and a requirement for NATO or European Union consensus for Germany to participate in multilateral actions.¹⁶⁸

Germany's policy of building bilateral ties with Russia both economically and politically is a continuation of West Germany's Ostpolitik policy towards the Soviet

¹⁶⁸ John S. Duffield, "Political Culture and State Behavior: Why Germany Confounds Neorealism.(Statistical Data Included)," *International Organization* 53, no. 4 (1999): 791, <https://doi.org/10.1162/002081899551066>.

Union.¹⁶⁹ Germany's approach considers that economic interdependence and cultivating shared norms and values constitute the most coherent approach to preventing war and ensuring peace. Germany's belief in what it considers to be universal values center on respect for international law, the rejection of war, and multilateralism.¹⁷⁰ Despite the sanctions imposed in response to the Russian annexation of the Crimea and Russian involvement in the Ukraine conflict, Germany continues to engage Russia both economically and diplomatically through, for example, the Nord Stream 2 energy project.¹⁷¹ Marco Siddi argues that Germany has revised its Ostpolitik in response to the Ukraine crisis by adding a normative values component to the preexisting components of diplomatic and economic engagements. This validates Germany's perception of security encompassing more than the military "hard security" aspects. German traditions hold that peace and security are brought about through shared values and economic interdependence.

Just as with the United Kingdom and France, the Ukraine crisis has contributed to strengthening Germany's commitment to rely on NATO not only to support its mission of collective defense, but also to deter Russian aggression against European countries in the future.¹⁷² Considering the history of Germany's bilateral relations with Russia, the divergence in values, as well as the reliance and commitment to NATO, the likelihood that Germany and France would agree to join a security architecture outside or independent of NATO, particularly outside of its nuclear umbrella, remains poor. In this respect, the projected departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union will not make Franco-German collaboration with Russia to build a security structure in Europe outside of NATO any more likely.

¹⁶⁹ Marco Siddi, "German Foreign Policy towards Russia in the Aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis: A New Ostpolitik?," *Europe-Asia Studies* 68, no. 4 (2016): 665–66, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1173879>.

¹⁷⁰ Siddi, 675.

¹⁷¹ Siddi, 674.

¹⁷² Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, *The Framework Nations Concept: Germany's Contribution to a Capable European Defence*, vol. 52/2014, 2014, 2.

C. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE CORFU AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

Positive Russian-European relations have long been desired by the most influential European powers (Britain, France, and Germany) and the European Union, not only for the potentiality of interdependence with trade and energy resources, but also as a means to achieve a more secure and peaceful Europe. As seen by the bilateral financial commitments with Russia, European powers see security as inseparably tied to economic interdependence and a norm of values which respect human rights, democratic processes, and the rule of law. The joint declaration of the “Corfu Process” satisfied both Russia and the great European powers by addressing issues concerning the principles of comprehensive and indivisible security, while also re-strengthening the commitment to all the principles outlined in the Helsinki Final Act, as embodied in the OSCE.¹⁷³ The process, however, was not enough to transform the OSCE into an organization which could adequately manage and resolve European security concerns, nor could it reconcile the fundamentally different world views of the European powers and Russia. The European Union continued on its course of European integration and becoming an ever-closer Union, while Russia followed its realist approach of pursuing great power status, attempting to recreate spheres of influence, and building its own institutions for economic and security cooperation.

Events following the Corfu Process have served to further aggravate the ideological and economic divide between the differing multilateral visions of Russia and the European powers. Russia’s formation of the Eurasian Economic Union, Russia’s suspension of compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty in 2007, and, most significantly, the annexation of the Crimea, gas disputes and Russian actions to destabilize eastern Ukraine have drastically worsened Russia’s relations with the European powers, effectively torpedoing the prospects of a future EST, at least along the lines proposed by Russia in 2008–2009.

¹⁷³ Ian Cliff, “The Corfu Process—What Was It All About?,” in *OSCE Yearbook 2011* (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2012), 69.

The European powers see the European Union as a legal and normative actor¹⁷⁴ operating to integrate European countries into a stronger international society.¹⁷⁵ European liberal norms and values, as expressed in the Copenhagen admission criteria, are what the European powers seek to spread into neighboring countries, and the European Union has acted as a “normative hegemon.”¹⁷⁶ The primary means for achieving this expansion include both trade and cooperation agreements, such as those embodied by the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. The entire approach of the European Union countries pursues a path of economic interdependence and neoliberal institutionalism, as the bedrock of ensuring lasting peace and stability in Europe. According to Michael Slobodchikoff, assistant professor at Troy University, Russia conceived the Eurasian Customs Union in order to develop a regional security structure which could counter the European Union’s attempts to draw states from the former Soviet Union into joining the European Union and NATO.¹⁷⁷ Many critics see the Eurasian Economic Union as an attempt to revive the Soviet Union, and took steps to encourage Ukraine to associate with the European Union, instead of the Eurasian Economic Union.¹⁷⁸ The Russian annexation of the Crimea and the Russian intervention in Ukraine destroyed European illusions about the European Union’s vision of European peace and stability, and fundamentally changed the European Union’s hopes for a future common security and defense structure with Russia. The Russia Federation justified its intervention by using abstract concepts such as the “responsibility to protect” Russian speakers and Russian military personnel in Ukraine, by making claims of having been invited to intervene by the person Moscow deemed the legitimate Ukrainian president,

¹⁷⁴ Casier and DeBardeleben, *EU-Russia Relations in Crisis: Understanding Diverging Perceptions*, 206.

¹⁷⁵ “European Security Strategy—A Secure Europe in a Better World—Consilium,” accessed March 10, 2018, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/european-security-strategy-secure-europe-better-world/>.

¹⁷⁶ Hiski Haukkala, “The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 9 (2008): 1601–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130802362342>.

¹⁷⁷ Slobodchikoff, *Building Hegemonic Order Russia’s Way*, 90.

¹⁷⁸ Slobodchikoff, 92.

and by asserting that all existing treaties with Ukraine were invalidated by the “Ukrainian Revolution,”¹⁷⁹

When the crisis in Ukraine began in 2013–2014, France and Germany were motivated to act as European leaders in attempting to work out a European solution to the crisis. These attempts resulted in the French/German-brokered Minsk and Minsk-2 agreements, working within the constraints of the OSCE.¹⁸⁰ France and Germany engaged with Ukraine and Russia in a format called the “Normandy Four.” The proposed roadmap to peace sought to achieve a demilitarization of the Donbas, constitutional reform, the withdrawal of all “foreign armed formations,” the disbandment of “illegal groups,” and the resumption of socio-economic ties between Ukraine and the contested areas.¹⁸¹

However, this agreed roadmap brought with it additional conflict between the European brokers and Russia, notably as to the sequencing of the various points. Russia insisted that Ukraine had not lived up to the agreement by not resuming pension payments, as well as other social concessions, and had not reformed its constitution to grant independence and autonomy to the Donbas regions.¹⁸² Ukraine insisted that it could not take these steps when there remained foreign combatants and armed groups in the Donbas, and it did not have control of its sovereign borders. Russia further frustrated European powers by claiming it had no influence over the Donbas regions and was not a party to the conflict, despite its continued support of the militants.¹⁸³ The conflict has devolved into yet another frozen conflict involving Russia, much to the continued chagrin of NATO and European Union countries. Russia’s behavior has crushed the European vision of a free, peaceful, and prosperous Europe.

¹⁷⁹ Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine.”

¹⁸⁰ Richard Sakwa, *Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands* (London New York: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 256.

¹⁸¹ Sakwa, 256.

¹⁸² Sakwa, 256.

¹⁸³ Sakwa, 256.

Russia's violations of international law and existing treaties with Ukraine had not only contradicted the very security principles Russia had claimed to uphold in its proposed European Security Treaty, but also undermined longstanding pillars of European security such as those articulated in the Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE, and the Budapest Memorandum. Russia's self-justifications in violating both bilateral and multilateral treaties signaled to the NATO and European Union powers that any future agreements with Russia could not be reliable and were subject to Russian interpretation.

The United States under the Clinton Administration had not ruled out the membership of Russia in a common security alliance,¹⁸⁴ or even in NATO.¹⁸⁵ Although European powers desired an improved relationship with Russia both politically and economically, they resisted the integration of Russia into the existing economic and collective defense structures. According to David Yost, NATO and European concerns in the mid-to-late 1990s about possible Russian NATO membership can be summarized in three points. First, Russian membership would transform the collective defense alliance into an ineffective Kantian or Wilsonian collective security regime for the Euro-Atlantic region.¹⁸⁶ Secondly, European member countries could find themselves subordinated to a Russian-American power condominium.¹⁸⁷ Finally, Russian integration would overstretch the alliance by assuming defense responsibilities against Asian competitors and emerging adversaries.¹⁸⁸ Although some European politicians, such as German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, supported Russian integration into the existing NATO structure in 2009,¹⁸⁹ he clearly rejected the idea of a new security treaty with Russia outside of that structure. While France and Germany support in principle a more multi-

¹⁸⁴ William J. Clinton, "Transcript of President Clinton's News Conference: Final Edition," *The Washington Post*; *Washington, D.C.*, March 8, 1997, sec. A SECTION, 3.

¹⁸⁵ James M. Goldgeier, "NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision," *The Washington Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (March 1, 1998): 97, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01636609809550295>.

¹⁸⁶ Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 149.

¹⁸⁷ Yost, 149.

¹⁸⁸ Yost, 149.

¹⁸⁹ Joschka Fischer, "Joschka Fischer: Why Not Include Russia in a Reinvigorated Nato," *the Guardian*, January 11, 2009, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jan/11/russia-eu>.

polar power structure, they remain committed to the universal values enshrined in the European Union, and the collective defense structure provided by NATO.

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated that the Russian EST proposal's vagueness; exclusion of democratic values, human rights, and economic cooperation; and effective undermining of the existing European security structure precluded any favorable consideration by NATO and European Union countries. The commitment to democratic ideals and existing security arrangements derived directly from the values enshrined in European institutions, as well as through bilateral and collective with the Russian Federation. Russia's actions since the EST proposal was launched in 2008–2009 have further cemented European powers' commitment to NATO as the sole effective provider for European collective defense, and as the ultimate security guarantor for the European integration project. The committed European view remains that security is defined by a synergic combination of economic interdependence and democratic rule of law, as well as through hard security measures. Although France and Germany continue to promote increased trade with Russia, this does not signal acquiescence to Russia's actions, but rather demonstrates their support for a multi-faceted security structure which is a hybrid of hard power and economic engagement. The European Union's strategy, as outlined in the European Defense Action Plan of 2016, evidently seeks closer integration and greater contributions to NATO,¹⁹⁰ which make any future security arrangement with Russia outside of, or above, the NATO-centered security structure extremely unlikely.

¹⁹⁰ "EUGS at 1—EU Global Strategy—European Commission," EU Global Strategy, 3, accessed March 19, 2018, /globalstrategy/en/vision-action.

V. CONCLUSION: PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE

The Russian Federation's status in the European security architecture remains complex. As the largest successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia continues to struggle to define its identity in the Euro-Atlantic region encompassed by the territory of the states participating in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Following the failed economic experiments of the Yeltsin era (1991-1999), Russia has been unable to prevent the alignment of many of its former satellite states with NATO and the European Union, and to counteract humanitarian interventionism and pro-democratic anti-authoritarian revolutions.

These developments have affected the Russian Federation's ability to maintain the unilateral power projection capabilities of the Soviet Union. These experiences, coupled with the perceived loss of parity with the United States,¹⁹¹ the continuing cohesion and enlargement of the European Union and NATO, and the development of a post-Soviet identity have driven Russia's actions and efforts in Europe. In order to return the Russian Federation to Moscow's perception of its rightful standing among world powers, Putin has sought to widen and extend the primacy of Russia's position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to advance Russia's strategic aims, discredit and dissolve the ideological threat posed by the European Union and NATO, and effectively spoil their efforts to further European integration and maintain collective defense. The Russian European Security Treaty (EST) proposal was made to achieve precisely the goal of creating a legal basis, anchored in the UN Security Council, to enable Moscow to insert Russia as the overarching power in a new European security architecture. This would enable Russia to sever the transatlantic bonds, overcome NATO's collective defense credibility in order to intimidate the nations in its near-abroad, and counteract the threat posed by the West's support for universal liberal values to Russia's authoritarian government.

¹⁹¹ "Boris Yeltsin's Legacy," 14.

The nations which comprise NATO and the European Union are connected by a common bond of liberal democratic values and dedicated to preserving the territorial integrity and political independence of their allies and partners. These countries together form a community defined by respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law.¹⁹² The importance of these values and consequently the threat posed to them by the Russian Federation were recognized despite the Russian proposal. The NATO Allies and European Union partners were unwilling to sacrifice or risk the prosperity brought about the economic and defense cooperation united under the universal liberal values espoused by the European Union and NATO. Nations which had historically been partitioned and swallowed up between the major powers in Europe see the existing European security architecture as a guarantee for their continued independence and security, while the Russian Federation continues to see the same architecture as a threat and encroachment on its sphere of influence.

Russian actions since proposing the EST in 2008 to 2009, including support for anti-European Union and anti-NATO populist groups, meddling in Western elections, assassinations in European nations, combat support to authoritarian regimes, and territorial annexations, have effectively revealed Russian incompatibility with the security model desired by NATO and European Union nations and have reconfirmed their decision to reject the EST. Russian attempts to spoil and interfere with European integration and closer cooperation in Europe seek to hold at risk European security cooperation with the threat of continued destabilization.

While Europe's transatlantic partners (Canada and the United States), along with some of the European Union's eastern European member states, endeavor to counter Russia's hard-power threat by enhancing NATO's military posture and capabilities, nations such as Germany seek to engage Russia economically and hope to elicit Russian treaty compliance and cooperation through economic interdependence. This is evident in the continued determination by Germany to complete the Nord Stream 2 project, despite the concerns and objections of its partners and Allies. This illustrates the fissures in the

¹⁹² "EU."

economic and military alliance of NATO and in the European Union, which might be leveraged by Moscow to weaken the bonds that form the strength of both organizations, the European security architecture, and the values-defined liberal order.

Russia and China have successfully used these fissures to assert their geopolitical preference for multilateralism by following and propagating an illiberal world order model, one in which individual rights and liberties are subordinated to interests of the state.¹⁹³ As a countermodel to the European Union, whose liberal norms may prove difficult and less attractive for certain lesser developed nations to follow, the statist and authoritarian development offer of China and the Russian Federation is often more appealing. Most recently, long-term European Union and G7 member Italy signed on to China's Belt and Road initiative; and a dozen other European Union members have also signed memoranda providing for cooperation with this Chinese initiative.¹⁹⁴ The economic protectionism of the United States under President Donald Trump has additionally caused distress among European Allies and partner nations, particularly with Germany's skeptical reaction to the United States' offer to supply liquid natural gas if it were to abandon the Nord Stream 2 project.¹⁹⁵ Additionally, Russian support in Syria to the regime of Bashir Al Assad and Chinese apprehension about humanitarian interventionism in the UNSC have also illustrated the limits of efforts to intervene against regimes that commit crimes against humanity or that fail to protect their citizens. As NATO's primary focus shifts from crisis management to resilience in defense of its existing political order, infrastructure, and ability to deter and respond to a variety of attacks, its collective defense posture will undoubtedly strengthen as well. Despite the uncertainty caused in some quarters by United States President Trump's statements

¹⁹³ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities*, The Henry I. Stimson Lectures Series (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), sec. 4086.

¹⁹⁴ "Not so Silky; Italy and China.(Italy to Join China's Belt and Road Initiative)," *The Economist* 430, no. 9135 (2019): 45.

¹⁹⁵ Rick Noack, "U.S. Ambassador in Berlin Warns Germans about Russian Gas Pipeline, Triggering Applause Elsewhere.(Richard Grenell)," *Washingtonpost.Com*, 2019.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/01/14/us-ambassador-berlin-warns-germans-over-russian-gas-pipeline-triggering-applause-elsewhere/?utm_term=.9aa43469cda5

concerning the continued relevance of NATO, events appear to have energized cooperation in the organization and elicited stronger commitments to the Alliance.

Russia's participation in the European security architecture, particularly after its actions in Ukraine, its continued destructive and spoiling action across Europe with the intent to reduce the European Union's effectiveness, and its non-participation in the NATO-Russia Council furnish evidence of the realistic limits of this possibility.

In retrospect, Western countries rightly recognized Moscow's proposal for an EST as an attempt to cripple NATO and to dissolve the universal liberal values which have shaped NATO and the European Union and provided the cohesion which has ensured peace in Europe in favor of a security architecture based on military power and an illiberal philosophy. The effectiveness of the collective defense structure provided by NATO ensures security and safety to the allied nations. It serves as a formidable defense against precisely those actions which the Helsinki Final Act sought to preclude: interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and the use of force or threat of force to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations.

If the Russian actions before the EST proposal were enough for Western nations to reject Moscow's overtures, Russian aggression since 2008–2009 has reinforced the correctness of the decision by the Western nations to reject it. Moreover, it has renewed their commitment to the relevance of NATO and their determination to defend the values which have united Europe. NATO and European Union nations wish to have stable, friendly, and prosperous relations with the Russian Federation, but they remain steadfast in their unwillingness to compromise on the universal liberal values which have shaped the identity of the West. Considering that Russia has only become more authoritarian under President Putin, and that the Kremlin has repurposed—albeit clumsily—some of the clandestine and destructive mischief practiced by the Soviet Union, NATO and European Union nations will remain unlikely to degrade their security in favor of a Moscow-designed security cooperation pact that would risk dissolving NATO's transatlantic bonds.

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