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A Marshall Plan for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century:  
Addressing Climate Change in the Asia-Pacific Through  
Diplomacy, Development, & Defense

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School of Continuing Studies

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MPDM 900-01 – Capstone Spring 2019: Monique Wheeler

Capstone Advisor: Monique Wheeler

Faculty Director: Dr. Tim G. Frazier

LT Adam M. Rollins, USN

Candidate for Master of Professional Studies - Emergency and Disaster Management

Georgetown University School of Continuing Studies

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## Abstract

The inevitable climate challenges facing the Asia-Pacific territory require a massive whole-of-government approach comparable to the Marshall Plan of 1948. While many political leaders have called for such a plan, no policy currently exists for this region or purpose. With nearly eight trillion dollars in trade revenue passing through crucially strategic straits daily, seven of the ten largest militaries in the world (five of which are nuclear capable) operating throughout this territory, and a forecast for nearly exponential population growth, the geopolitical provenance of the United States ties inextricably to this portion of the globe. A document analysis assessing existing diplomatic, developmental, and defensive policies concludes that a modern-day Marshall Plan for the 21<sup>st</sup> century Asia-Pacific is achievable by realigning lines of effort within current frameworks. As long as the United States continues to deny climate change, other nation-state actors within the area will rise to fill the void. The United States must commit to the funding, development, and proliferation of clean and sustainable energy solutions which evolve past current fossil-fuel reliant technologies, and most importantly, be open-source in description and shared with other large polluters throughout the world. Finally, the nations of the Asian-Pacific realm should contemplate a theater-specific treaty organization. As climate change threatens to destabilize the region, a unified force intent on providing stabilization efforts, preventing internal conflict and escalation, and enforcing international law deserves consideration and deliberation.

*Keywords:* Marshall Plan, Climate Change, Asia-Pacific, Diplomacy, Development, Defense

### **Dedication**

This thesis would not have been possible without the help of a number of incredible people:

First, I would like to thank Monique Wheeler, my Capstone Advisor, for her patience and insight while I pursued this thesis. Second, my Program Director, Dr. Tim Frazier, for communicating the intricate and complex science behind climatology in a digestible, entertaining, and intuitive fashion for a layperson such as myself. Third, I would like to thank the peers of my Cohort for their encouragement and unforgettable camaraderie.

Most importantly I would like to thank my incredible family –

To my brilliant wife Charlotte, for her support, tolerance, and reassurance throughout the last two years. I do not know anyone else who would have so eagerly uprooted their life to move across the United States so I could participate in this program. Thank you, and to say I owe you one is an understatement.

Lastly, to my little girls Adeline and Eleanor. Climate change is something that you will have to endure and experience more in your lifetimes than any of us will see in our own. It will be up to future generations like your own to progress forward and affect meaningful change for the wellbeing of the planet. However, at least you will know that your Dad didn't sit idly by. This capstone thesis is truly dedicated to you, and is my humble effort to pave the way forward so we can solve this issue together.

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A Marshall Plan for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Addressing Climate Change in the Asia-Pacific  
Through Diplomacy, Development, & Defense

*“General Marshall will be known as one of those who brought this new era into being. But he would be the first to agree that it is more than the creation of statesmen. It comes from the minds and hearts of all the people. Our peoples are united in their determination to work together to deal with the basic problems of human life.”*

-Harry S Truman, President of the United States, 1945-1953

### **Introduction**

As Europe began the slow process of recovery following the cataclysm of World War II, the economies of the Western world struggled to grow and prosper. The United States, with industrial and financial industries operating at peak performance, understood that without a stable and flourishing Europe, the American economy would inevitably suffer without reliable and credible trading partners (Diebold, W., 1947). Simultaneously, as Communism took root in Eastern Europe and began to spread to the farthest reaches of the globe, the paralysis of the United States to take action to contain this existential threat was plunging the world into further chaos. As nation after nation fell to communist ideologies, the United States was compelled to respond in order to prevent freedom and democracy from becoming a minority ideology in the new Soviet world order.

In 1948, the European Recovery Program, also known as “The Marshall Plan” was passed with a majority vote in the United States Congress (80th Congress, 2004). The Marshall Plan had three independent and equally important objectives for Europe: massive diplomatic initiatives, large-scale development projects, and ground-breaking defensive enterprises. The three pillars of the Marshall Plan were funded by an allocation of fifteen billion dollars over a span of five years from 1948-1953 (United States Department of State Office of the Historian, n.d.). While the true intentions and impacts of the Marshall Plan to the overall recovery of Europe may be up for debate, history shows that Europe began to flourish (Kunz, D., 1997).

Factories reopened, alliances were signed, optimism swelled, Communism receded, and Europe once again thrived (Leffler, M., 1998). These outcomes demonstrate how taking action during a critical time was not only necessary, but intrinsic to the survival of the United States and Western ideals.

Over 70 years after the passing of the Marshall Plan, another silent and nascent threat is growing throughout the world. Global greenhouse gas emissions are growing at an ever-increasing rate, contributing to average global temperatures warming at a level that is unsustainable for the future welfare and stability of humanity. Climate change is an existential hazard that dwarfs the threat of the Soviet Union in magnitude and scope. Warming global temperatures have the potential to contribute to more frequent and extreme weather phenomena, further contributing to social upheaval. Droughts, famine, super-typhoons, and public health crisis will all become more prevalent and severe, inevitably resulting in additional resource scarcity (IPCC, 2014). From freshwater shortages to constricting growing seasons and smaller crop yields, climate-related resource loss is projected to increase while global populations continue to rise (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2015). Resource scarcity has the potential to result in mass human migrations as communities are forced to leave their coastal or rural homelands in order to find relief in urban towns and megacities alike. Following resource scarcity, the mass migration of climate refugees may amplify the possibility of conflict, whether it be through radicalization of the disenfranchised, or nuclear war between nations vying for energy security.

When comparing post-World War II Europe to the post-climate change Asia-Pacific, the similarities in the urgency for action demand consideration. Just as the influence of Communism quickly spread throughout war-ravaged and vulnerable nations, the window to achieve

meaningful progress against climate change is rapidly coming to a close, and the most powerful governments of the world are showing no signs of taking action. Current assessments indicate that the planet has approximately twelve years until the consequences of climate change will be irreversible and uncontrollable (IPCC, 2018). Once the opportunity to act against climate change has passed, the cascading consequences of an ecosystem in peril will inescapably cause chaos, instability, and threaten the security of all nations. Just as the United States was dependent upon Europe for economic opportunities after World War II and throughout the twentieth century, the globally interconnected marketplaces of today rely on the nations of the Asia-Pacific as a labor-force nucleus. As the European Recovery Program was envisioned to preserve and protect Europe from economic and social collapse in 1948, a similar policy of size, importance, and resolve is needed today for the Asia-Pacific realm.

A new Marshall Plan to address climate change for the 21<sup>st</sup> century Asia-Pacific is necessary to preserve the economic prosperity of the United States, maintain the supremacy of influence of the United States throughout the region, and most importantly, reduce the human suffering that climate change will inevitably cause. Numerous politicians, from former Vice Presidents to freshman Representatives in the United States Congress, have repeatedly called for a “New Marshall Plan” to combat climate change. However, these individuals focus on strictly developmental projects such as clean energy initiatives, and policies to reduce carbon footprints. While these efforts play a role in the overall effort against climate change, they are only one part of what the original Marshall Plan encompassed, and a new Marshall Plan requires. The original Marshall Plan relied upon the three pillars of diplomacy, development, and defense; all were equally important and critical to overall success. The scale and scope of a Marshall Plan for the

21<sup>st</sup> century Asia-Pacific, will undoubtedly require developmental objectives, but not at the expense of diplomatic and defensive efforts as well.

While politicians, scientists, and concerned citizens alike have all called for a “new Marshall Plan” to combat climate change, no one has determined what a new plan would look like, how much it would cost, who the stakeholders would be, and how they would all interact. The objective of this thesis is to act as a framework where existing organizations, policies, programs, and agencies can realign to provide unity of effort to address climate change, thus, acting as a new Marshall Plan. Although current partisanship will most likely prohibit the passing of a massive whole-of-government approach of this scale, the threat of climate change pervades. If and when the time comes for when the United States is ready to act against climate change in the Asia-Pacific, this thesis intends to act as a blueprint to facilitate action.

The primary inspiration for this thesis originates from the article “*A Climate-Security Plan for the Asia-Pacific Rebalance: Lessons from the Marshall Plan. The U.S. Asia-Pacific Rebalance, National Security and Climate Change*” by Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell. Published by the American Security Project Center for Climate and Security, the article is the closest iteration of what can specifically be done to create a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific to handle the climate challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This thesis dramatically expands the scope of the article and details specific actions to magnify diplomatic, developmental, and defensive efforts in the Asia-Pacific region.

The research focus of this thesis desires to illustrate three crucial issues:

*1. The creation of a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific to address climate change lacks critical investigation. While numerous agencies and institutions have called on the necessity of such a plan, no plan currently exists to realign current policies, agencies, and frameworks to accomplish this objective.*

*2. The urgency of addressing climate change is rapidly approaching a period in time requiring a commitment to action. By developing a plausible framework for creating, funding, and executing a new Marshall Plan, this thesis hopes to expedite action when the desire for action presents itself.*

*3. Creating a whole-of-government approach to combat climate change in the Asia-Pacific is necessary to reduce human suffering, minimize economic strife, maintain a favorable security posture towards the United States, and achieve the strategic objectives of the United States throughout the region.*

Having a plan in place for a policy of this magnitude cannot be overstated. Due to the slow-moving nature of bureaucracy, when the will to act presents itself, execution cannot be hindered by administrative processes. By developing a framework preemptively, this thesis will expedite and facilitate the creation of a new Marshall Plan and advance climate action for this highly vulnerable region.

This thesis aims to illustrate the need for and to develop a potential framework that realigns current diplomatic, developmental, and defensive policies towards resisting climate change in the Asia-Pacific. This thesis investigates the following research questions:

*1. What mechanisms and programs are already in place to assist in diplomacy, development, and defense in the Asia-Pacific region?*

*2. By realigning the frameworks of these programs, how can streamlining unity of effort and financial assistance maximize a whole-of-government approach?*

*3. How should the burden of addressing the financial requirements for climate change mitigations and adaptations be equitably divided between all stakeholders throughout the region?*

The original Marshall Plan placed equal importance on diplomacy, development, and defense.

This thesis will continue those themes by accomplishing the following three objectives:

*1. Identify diplomatic mechanisms that the United States Department of State can utilize to maintain influence and partiality throughout the region.*

*2. Explore developmental funding sources and identify how their frameworks may be intertwined to expeditiously and efficiently allocate funds to mitigate, adapt, and resist climate change.*

*3. Determine if current United States Department of Defense strategic guidance for the Asia-Pacific overlaps and shares commonality with what a new Marshall Plan to fight climate change in the region would require.*

In order to sustain American leadership in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States requires a 21<sup>st</sup>-century foreign policy initiative on the scale of the Marshall Plan that promotes diplomatic, developmental, and defensive efforts to combat climate change. While the poorest and smallest nations of the world will undoubtedly pay the highest price, climate change impacts the providences of all countries. Only by ascending to a position of leadership on the issue of climate change will the United States lead this critically strategic, yet highly vulnerable region through future instability.



*“It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health to the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is not directed against any country, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Any government that is willing to assist in recovery will find full cooperation on the part of the United States of America.”*

-George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, 1950-1951

### **Literature Review**

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a broad consensus exists in academia who agree that the consequences of climate change will negatively impact the globe in an unpredictable manner (IPCC, 2014). These researchers believe that rising sea levels, warming ocean temperatures, changing currents, migrating fish stocks, and increases in marine acidification and salinity all have the potential to disrupt the current global economic and geopolitical status quo. (Lee, 2015). Current literature points to the Asia-Pacific, which spans from the Indian Ocean to the farthest eastern Pacific Islands, as the most vulnerable territory in the world and one that already experiences the impacts of a changing climate (Sawhney, P. & M. Perkins, 2015). Seven out of ten of the largest militaries in the world reside in a region where five nuclear powers are vying for control in this resource-rich environment (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015). According to the Center for Climate Security (2015), over 80 percent of global commerce transits Asia-Pacific straits, and over eight trillion dollars in commercial trade pass through these waters daily. Senior military officials, including former United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Commanders, emphasize how this portion of the globe will serve as the geopolitical focal point and epicenter throughout the 21<sup>st</sup> century and beyond (Locklear III, S., 2015). The United States will undoubtedly maintain a presence and play a critical role in providing stability within this region; however, the need for an all-encompassing strategic plan that follows a whole-of-government approach to combat climate change urgently requires development. Climate experts agree that without an actionable plan to combat climate

change the United States risks losing the supremacy of influence that has been relied upon for the last 70 years to other rising powers (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015).

This literature review will provide justification for a modern version of the Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific region by comparing the historical context of the European Recovery Program in post-war Europe to the modern challenges facing a post-climate change Asia-Pacific. By providing an in-depth analysis of the current climate challenges facing the Asia-Pacific, and following the diplomacy, development, and defense framework provided by the original Marshall Plan, this literature review will show that the rationalization for a new plan for the 21<sup>st</sup> century is essential and grounded in precedence.

### **Historical Context**

In the aftermath of World War II, as Europe struggled to emerge from the ashes of catastrophic war while simultaneously resisting the rise of Communism and the Soviet Union, the United States recognized that without a stable, secure, and prosperous Europe, global economic growth would remain stagnant (Diebold Jr, W., 1947). In order to incentivize economic progress, develop cooperative security relationships, and counter the growing Soviet influence, the United States acknowledged the need for a massive whole-of-government foreign policy (Clayton, W.C., 1963, pg. 497). In 1948, Congress took action by passing the Marshall Plan with bipartisan approval. Also known as the European Recovery Program (ERP), the Marshall Plan would invest 15 billion dollars, equating to over 100 billion dollars in 2019, into economic stimulus programs to encourage European economies to rapidly grow (Dornbusch, R., Nölling, W., & Layard, R., 1993). Historians today remain divided over the effectiveness of the Marshall Plan and continue to debate the impact of American influence on post-war Europe. Some academics argue that the ERP acted exclusively as the primary mechanism that allowed

Europe to flourish in the post-war years (Kunz, D., 1997). Others contend that economic revival had already begun, and the Marshall Plan merely accelerated imminent economic growth (Dornbusch, R. et al., 1993). However, putting the specifics of these arguments aside, an overwhelming majority of historians, economists, and academics agree that the Marshall Plan laid the framework for what went on to become the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Kugler, L., 1990), two of the most influential organizations in the European Union today.

Additionally, numerous scholars believe that a primary objective of the Marshall Plan not only intended to provide economic stimulus but to counter growing Soviet aggression and prevent internal nation-state conflict (Leffler, M., 1998). While the actual impact of the Marshall Plan remains up for interpretation, European countries saw industrial production rates climb from a low of 87 percent of the pre-war level to 135 percent of the pre-war level in only four years; an astronomical growth rate in the years immediately following a globally destructive war (Eichengreen, B., 2010). Aside from purely economic metrics, the Marshall Plan signified the intent of the United States to establish a long-term commitment to the region. The Asia-Pacific region requires a robust and undeviating plan that shows a long-term commitment to remain engaged to combat the emerging existential threats the a changing climate presents.


Although world geopolitics and have changed since 1948, the lessons learned from the Marshall Plan can unquestionably play a role today in facing the uncertainty surrounding the Asia-Pacific expanse in regards to a changing climate. A massive whole-of-government approach to a policy designed to prevent internal conflict, alleviate economic and environmental disaster, pave the foundation for a coalition of military alliances, and resist the influence and impact of climate change certainly echo with the same themes and intent of the Marshall Plan

from years ago. Therefore, the Marshall Plan should serve as an inspiring guideline for what the United States accomplishes when the whole-of-government unifies in effort; and should be revisited for lessons, policies, and strategies that can also be applied to fighting climate change in the Asia-Pacific realm today.

### **A New Context for a New Plan**

While post-war Europe before the Marshall Plan acts as a juxtaposition to the Asia-Pacific realm of today, Asia-Pacific economies continue to cultivate vigorous financial and societal growth (International Monetary Fund, 2018). According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) (2013), urbanization among Asia-Pacific countries are resulting in some of the fastest growing megacities in the world and show no signs of abating. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports that growing middle classes will for the first time in generations have excess income to invest in non-critical goods and services. This growing population of over two billion people represents 66 percent of the total global middle-class growth projected to occur by the year 2030 (OECD, 2012). Commercial shipping through critically strategic straits continues to increase and currently exceeds two-way trade revenues of over eight trillion dollars per day (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015). Hydrocarbon exploration and mining are accelerating to quench the energy demands of billions of people living in coastal communities (Chen, S., 2008). Finally, military buildups on contested islands are further exacerbating tensions in the region due to exclusive economic zone encroachment (Amer, R., 2014). While all of these socioeconomic variables are challenging to manage exclusively, they are inferior to the consequences climate change will have on these growing nations.


Conversely to mid-20<sup>th</sup> century Europe where the threat of encroaching Communism became more apparent than the nascent consequences of a changing climate, the effects of climate change have the potential to morph the geography for centuries into the future. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific assesses that rising sea levels are existential threats to coastal populations and a multitude of island nations (*see Figure 1*) (Kondocho, B., & Howe, B., 2014), creating some of the first climate refugees of the modern era (Farbotko, C., & Lazrus, H., 2012).



*Figure 1.* Asia-Pacific coastal cities and accompanying percentages of urban populations in low elevation coastal zones (LECZ) (Fuchs, R. J., 2010).

Furthermore, climatologists agree that warming ocean temperatures are impacting the seasonal monsoon winds, causing the frequency and severity of monsoons, typhoons, and super-typhoons to increase (Kothawale, D. R., Munot, A. A., & Borgaonkar, H. P., 2007). Increasing marine acidification and salination are bleaching coral ecosystems that have previously survived for millions of years, impacting native flora and fauna habitats, as well as the people who depend

on them (Anthony, K. R., Kline, D. I., Diaz-Pulido, G., Dove, S., & Hoegh-Guldberg, O., 2008). In addition to overharvesting to feed the growing coastal populations (*see Figure 2*), climate change disrupts the yearly migration patterns of pelagic fish species such a tuna, pushing migration patterns further and further north (Rijnsdorp, A. D., Peck, M. A., Engelhard, G. H., Mollmann, C., & Pinnegar, J. K., 2009). Fishing rights disputes are causing friction for the fisheries industries in the Asia-Pacific, as fish stocks reside more and more in contested territories (Pomeroy, R. et al., 2007). The current consensus in academia believes that the culmination of these environmental factors will lead to eventual resource scarcity (Nordas, R., & Gleditsch, N. P., 2007). The American Security Project’s “Global Security and Defense Index for Climate Change” agrees with this assessment and adds that instability from resource loss has the potential to cause conflict among nation-states throughout this highly-charged and strategic region (Masys, A. J., 2018).



*Figure 2.* Projected population growth for the Asia-Pacific region from 1950-2050. (United Nations World Urbanization Prospects, 2014).

The United States requires a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific climate change threat to ensure prosperity, commercial success, and defensive cohesion in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) assesses that the current initiatives are lacking in innovation and action, causing frustration among Asia-Pacific nations who look to the United States for leadership and guidance (ADB, 2017). In order to sustain American influence and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States needs a 21<sup>st</sup>-century foreign policy initiative on the scale of the Marshall Plan to combat climate change (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015). By following the diplomacy, development, and defense framework outlined by the Marshall Plan, the United States has an opportunity to capitalize on climate change as a mechanism to strengthen current alliances, promote security cooperation with non-alliance states, provide stability throughout an economically critical region, and most importantly, create a ready and willing coalition to combat the changing climate.

### **Pillar I: Diplomacy**

In order for the United States to succeed diplomatically in the Asia-Pacific, current alliances with partner nations require further maintenance and enrichment (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015). The United States should be engaging with countries who are not official allies since the success of this wide-ranging climate change policy will not succeed without full unity of effort among all regional stakeholders (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015). Climate change can stand as a common threat to all nations and can serve as a unifier to countries who previously may have harbored animosity to the United States (Holland, A., 2015). Fortunately, numerous robust diplomatic mechanisms already exist which will aid the United States in climate change diplomacy efforts (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015).

At the 44<sup>th</sup> Pacific Islands Forum in 2013, the Majuro Declaration was created to elicit specific pledges for greenhouse gas emission reductions (Majuro Declaration, 2013). The Majuro Declaration intends to highlight firm, global political commitments to the Pacific region, to accelerate the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and to provide a voice for the Smaller Islands States Leaders (Mulalap, C., 2015). Leaders throughout the Asia-Pacific region recognize the need to improve national policy mechanisms to facilitate climate change financing (Majuro Declaration, 2013). Additionally, the Majuro Declaration seeks to simplify current financial, technological, and diplomatic efforts to channel financial resources to the issues seen as having the greatest relevance to the countries most at risk (Majuro Declaration, 2013). While the Majuro Declaration advocates for forward-leaning action to unify global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the statement fails to emphasize the need for bi-lateral enterprises between the largest polluter-states in the world: the United States, China, and India. While the Majuro Declaration remains an essential document in fostering a commitment to reduce global greenhouse gases, the countries that have signed and ratified the Majuro Declaration are some of the smallest polluters on the planet, and therefore will have the smallest impact on reducing greenhouse gas accumulation. Bi-lateral or multi-lateral partnerships between the largest polluters in the region require consideration in addition to the Majuro Declaration in order to stop the advancement and potentially reverse the effects of climate change.

In addition to the Majuro Declaration, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) established the Kyoto Protocol as a diplomatic device that attempts to curtail greenhouse gas emissions. One of the most insightful aspects of the Kyoto Protocol acknowledges the varying degrees of economic development and how different countries each have unique capabilities in the fight against climate change (UNFCCC, 2008). National capacity

remains an important aspect that should be contemplated in a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific, considering the varying degrees of economic and industrial development throughout the region. However, like the original Marshall Plan, the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol continues to invite debate. Some researchers believe that the Kyoto Protocol has been ineffective in having any measurable effect in reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Almer, C., & Winkler, R., 2017). Conversely, numerous academics agree that while the greenhouse gas emission goals set forth in the Kyoto Protocol have fallen short, the main contribution of this legislation was in taking the groundbreaking step to bring worldwide awareness to the threat of climate change; the idea that this milestone policy exists in and of itself is a success (Manne, A. S., & Richels, R. G., 1999). Nonetheless, the failure to set binding greenhouse gas targets for all members who adopt and ratify this agreement, not exclusively developed nations, is the primary shortfall of the Kyoto Protocol. The failure of the United States to ratify this agreement does not set the leadership example that a new Marshall Plan demands.

Formal diplomatic tools such as the Majuro Declaration and the Kyoto Protocol can undoubtedly serve as a solid foundation for a new Asia-Pacific Marshall Plan, but in addition to these formal pathways unconventional diplomatic steps necessitate consideration. The Center for New American Security recommends engaging with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Council to correlate climate change mitigation efforts directly with economic growth (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015). The primary objective of APEC continues to promote innovative and sustainable economic prosperity to the nations of the Asia-Pacific, and the impact that climate change will have on economic progress remains impossible to ignore. Researchers agree that by leveraging the power of APEC member-states and focusing their attention on

climate change as a significant barrier to economic surplus, a powerful new apparatus can be utilized (Business Asia, 2008).

Lastly, a significant component of American-led diplomatic efforts in the Asia-Pacific will be the continued participation in humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions. The Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends project shows that military-led aid missions often have short-term impacts on public perceptions of the United States (Wike, R., 2015). A long-term disaster risk reduction program focused on climate change that has continuous engagement from the United States as well as all regional partners remains urgently needed. Researchers from the Center for Climate and Security agree that the diplomatic benefits from an established disaster risk reduction program in the Asia-Pacific could reap the rewards far into the future, and improve relations with non-allied nations to a higher degree than infrequent humanitarian aid or disaster response missions (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015).

## **Pillar II: Development**

Although diplomacy will play a critical role in the creation and execution of a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific, diplomacy without an equal effort towards development will fail to make any lasting impact on the region. The current literature suggests that climate change development strategies are unsuccessful due to the limited accessibility to reliable financial resources from first-world countries (Carroll, T., 2014). Intermediary financial support from organizations such as the World Bank, with reserve funds for countries who are at the highest risk from the consequences of climate change, need to be created and sustained. This financial resource provides an opportunity where the United States can make a lasting impact in both commitment and action.

The Green Climate Fund (GCF), established by the United Nations in 2010, faces criticism and support from both sides of academia. Opponents of the fund point to the fact that the endowment continually fails to raise the necessary capital, while also failing to provide transparent safeguards to prevent social and economic misuse (Kumar, S., 2015). The fund recommends over 100 billion dollars to be in the account by the year 2020; however, as of 2015, the endowment only had custody of 852 million dollars (Kumar, S., 2015). Proponents for the GCF argue that the fund acts as an essential mechanism that works hand-in-hand with the Kyoto Protocol since the primary objective of the GCF facilitates channeling funds into mitigation and adaptation strategies (Markandya, A., Antimiani, A., Costantini, V., Martini, C., Palma, A., & Tommasino, M., 2015). Although the GCF acts as an essential ancillary step with the Kyoto Protocol, the United States should seize the opportunity to progress Asia-Pacific development through unilateral and bilateral interventions.

Since 2011, the United States Agency for International Development Climate Change Adaptation Project Preparation Facility for Asia and the Pacific (USAID ADAPT Project) has funded 36 adaptation projects in 14 countries in the Asia-Pacific (USAID, 2017). The USAID ADAPT Asia-Pacific Final Report states that the United States has utilized over 576 million dollars to the benefit of over one million people throughout the region (USAID, 2017). The Asian-Pacific Adaptation Network (APAN) reports that the funds from USAID ADAPT projects have fulfilled their stated purpose by building technical knowledge, preparing projects for financing, and strengthening regional mitigation frameworks (APAN, 2013). However, several authors also claim that the funds USAID ADAPT projects use may be more beneficial in the development of sustainable, renewable energy sources as opposed to mitigation and adaptation projects (Cooper, R. N., 2012). Since the greenhouse gas emissions from the richest and largest

countries contribute the most to climate change, academics argue that funds of this magnitude should supply efforts to reducing greenhouse gases in the countries most responsible for the climate crisis through the use of technological development (Cooper, R. N., 2012). There remains an opportunity for the United States to not only fund unilateral mitigation and adaptation projects, but to simultaneously transfer developing technologies to climate change partners throughout the region (Zhang, W., & Pan, X., 2016).

High-value development projects on the scale of a new Marshall Plan will require bipartisan support throughout the American government. Fortunately, bipartisanship of this level has recent precedent. The United States Congress established the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 2004 as a foreign aid agency completely separate from USAID (§ Pub. L. 108-199, Div. D, Title VI, 2003). With a budget of nearly 800 million dollars (MCC, 2018), the MCC has the potential to serve as a valuable tool for development in a new Marshall Plan where the scope of the MCC encompasses not just poverty alleviation, but climate change adaptations, mitigations, infrastructure improvements, and energy sustainability projects. However, academics remain highly critical of the selection process for countries to qualify for MCC aid grants. The research suggests that the assessment process for country application into the MCC program undermines the governing principles of the MCC by requiring receiving countries to achieve self-sustaining economic growth (Lebovic, J. H., 2014). Self-sustaining economic growth proves to be counter-intuitive to the threats posed by climate change. Additional critics of the MCC argue that other donor organizations, including USAID, will withhold aid from countries receiving MCC grants since they see MCC funds being used instead of, not in addition to, existing foreign aid assistance (Dornbusch, R., Nölling, W., & Layard, R., 1993). Proponents in academia argue that the MCC deserves admiration because of the mandate that requires

receiving governments to enact ongoing infrastructure maintenance practices and policies to safeguard the four billion dollars in investments the MCC has made to Asia-Pacific countries (Benyishay, A., & Tunstall, R., 2011). While the MCC certainly plays a role in advancing United States national interest by only investing in “good governance” countries, certain aspects of the MCC can apply to a new Marshall Plan; mainly investment upkeep and maintenance practices.

### **Pillar III: Defense**

The United States Department of Defense (DOD), and in particular the United States Navy (USN), already has a significant presence in the Asia-Pacific. In 2011, President Barack Obama announced his intention to shift American defensive priorities from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific. The release of various strategic publications following this announcement further defined the Asia-Pacific rebalance: the *2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States* (NDS), the *2012 Defense Strategic Guidance* (DSG) and the *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR). These cornerstone documents lay out the intent of the United States to “rebalance to the Pacific to preserve peace and stability in the region” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014, & Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011). Although the United States has recently seen conflict in two simultaneous wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, many senior military officials, civilian defensive analysts, and policy-makers welcome this change in strategic objectives (Sutter, R. G., Brown, M. E., Adamson, T. J., Mokizuchi, M. M., & Ollapally, D., 2013). However, numerous scholars and analysts agree that the Pacific rebalance requires execution to be in alignment with national strategic objectives, and not purely for political interests (Lai, D., Troxell, J. F., & Gellert, F. J., 2018).

In addition to the 2018 NDS, the 2014 QDR, and the 2012 DSG, the United States Navy published the *Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*. This document focuses on the importance of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and acknowledges the inextricable linkage between American security and economic prosperity throughout this territory. The document outlines how the United States Navy will expand the scope of Asia-Pacific operations to account for rising trade volumes and economic frictions encountered in this Area of Responsibility (AOR). The *Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* links the strategic interests of the United States with the importance of strengthening cooperation between our regional allies (Department of the Navy, 2015). However, a critical aspect of this document emphasizes the need to develop new partnerships with non-allies, particularly Bangladesh, Brunei, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia (Department of the Navy, 2015). Some academics agree that this long overdue and necessary rebalance, with a focus on naval presence and increasing partner capabilities through strategic relationship-building, should remain at the forefront of theater planning (Conway, J. T., Roughhead, G., & Allen, T. W., 2008). While the literature suggests that the attitudes towards the strategic rebalance are favorable, there remain some shortfalls with this guidance. Researchers agree that specific vulnerabilities remain, such as fleet manning requirements, acquisition priorities, and concrete, actionable guidance on how partnerships with non-allied nations should be cultivated (Moore II, C. C., 2011).

Further criticism of this strategy points to the failure of accounting for social and environmental vulnerabilities that are driving changes throughout the region (Till, G., 2008). While humanitarian aid and disaster relief missions are an essential part of the overall strategy, they should not exclusively be the strategy. The creation of a new Marshall Plan with a resolute focus on developing strategic theater-partnerships through the use of military-to-military (Mil-

Mil) and military-to-civilian (Mil-Civ) bi-lateral programs that revolve around climate change issues can improve these gaps in defense policy.

The increasing frequency of humanitarian disasters throughout the Asia-Pacific point to the dire need to address the causal factors of climate change. However, in the interim, a new Marshall Plan needs to align the military capabilities of the Department of Defense with the response requirements of private organizations operating in the region. The Asia-Pacific Conferences of Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO), with sponsorship from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), publishes regional guidelines for the use of military assets in concert with civilian organizations. Numerous foreign agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) utilize these guidelines to improve efficiency and effectiveness of foreign aid missions within their operating space. The APC-MADRO can serve as a force multiplier alongside the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and build a foundation at which a new Marshall Plan can complement Military-Civilian coordination and cooperation.

The United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Center for Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) advocates for increasing Military-Civilian coordination through the publication of best practices guidelines as well as information sharing guidebooks for mission planning. CFE-DM further emphasizes the close coordination between governments, militaries, and the private sector in order to multiply surge-capacities in times requiring life-saving assistance. Researchers agree that by expanding the scope of direct Mil-Civ and Mil-Mil engagement through USINDOPACOM, host nations can build climate change resilience and adaptations that will prove to be favorable to the strategic interests of the United States (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015).

Although Military-to-Civilian engagement will prove critical to a new Marshall Plan, direct bi-lateral and multi-lateral commitments with senior defense ministers throughout the region will be required. Forums for such collaborations are already in place where a new Marshall Plan could expand. The Shangri-La Dialogue, also known as the Asia Security Summit, provides a forum for discussion on regional security threats attended by defense ministers, civilian policy-makers, and senior military staff. At the 17<sup>th</sup> annual Asia Security Summit in 2018, dozens of defense ministers participated in an open dialogue about the future security risks of climate change. Regional defense ministers and politicians agree that the changing climate results in maritime security issues with cascading consequences that were previously unforeseen (Tebbe, S., 2018). Piracy, and primarily, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing has national security implications and stimulates rising regional tensions (Fetzek, S., 2018).

In addition to the Shangri-La summit, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) conducts the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) annually, providing another opportunity for defense-inspired engagement. Though the ADMM typically strengthens military cooperation through mechanisms like intelligence sharing and joint coordination in the fight against terrorism, the defense meeting offers yet another opportunity for partnership on climate change security issues. The United States Mission to ASEAN pushes for more aggressive and sustained military-to-military coordination in this effort and encourages further political and economic cohesion to advance these relationships (ASEAN, 2017). Policy-makers and researchers agree the ADMM has promise as a vehicle for climate change defense coordination and warrants pursuit by USINDOPACOM to build partnerships and defense resilience (Femia, F., & Werrell, C. E., 2015).

This literature review has shown that the idea of a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific to address climate change has sound historical context and modern reasoning, with academia in support of a wide-ranging policy of this magnitude. Although policy and interagency mechanisms have changed over the last 70 years, the three pillars of the Marshall Plan all have current foundations that this region can utilize. This literature review concludes that diplomatic instruments like the Majuro Declaration, the Kyoto Protocol, and APEC can all contribute to a new master policy. Concurrently, recent conclusions from academia coincide with the idea that development vehicles like the GCF, the MCC, and USAID ADAPT projects can be streamlined and restructured for this policy with only minor adjustments to current frameworks. Finally, in keeping with current strategic guidelines, increasing the scope of USINDOPACOM engagement throughout the region by expanding participation in conferences such as APC-MADRO, the Shangri-La Summit, and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting will advance the strategic interests of the United States within the region while simultaneously showing the commitment that our allies and future-allies desire.



*“The only way human beings can win a war is to prevent it.”*  
-George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, 1950-1951

### **Methodology**

The primary objective of this thesis is to investigate the feasibility and practicality of a new Marshall Plan for the 21<sup>st</sup> century in the Asia-Pacific region to combat the effects of climate change. The researcher wants to learn what mechanisms are currently in place to aid in this effort, and how realigning their frameworks could facilitate passing a substantial government policy of this extent. This research paper will examine the hypothesis by investigating what programs and policies are currently in place to support the original three Marshall Plan pillars: diplomacy, development, and defense. However, the possibility of passing a large-scale government policy on the scale of the original Marshall Plan remains highly unlikely in the political environment of today. A “new Marshall Plan for the 21<sup>st</sup> century” may resemble the original exclusively in terms of unity of effort between government agencies to address an existential threat to the strategic interests of the United States. By aligning current policies and frameworks in preparation for the inevitable effects of a changing climate, when the political desire to fund such an effort presents itself the mechanism to act will already be in place.

### **Research Approach**

Research into a new Marshall Plan addressing climate change in the Asia-Pacific in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will consist of document analysis following the guidance set forth by O’Leary (2014), Creswell (2009), and Bowen (2009). According to Bowen (2009), “document analysis is a form of qualitative research in which documents are interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning around an assessment topic.”

<i>Research Problem</i>	<i>Research Questions</i>	<i>Research Design</i>
<p>1. The environmental, societal, and economic impacts of climate change in the Asia-Pacific present a substantial threat to the strategic interests of the United States as well as global stability, prosperity, and security. If these consequences continue to progress without action, a significant destabilizing shift in the global status-quo has the potential to change the trajectory of the entire region towards chaos and conflict. Due to the inextricably vast commercial, political, and military interests of the United States with this region, the United States has an obligation to take action against this threat.</p>	<p>1. What mechanisms and programs are already in place to assist in diplomacy, development, and defense in the Asia-Pacific region?</p> <p>2. By realigning the frameworks of these programs, how can streamlining unity of effort and financial assistance maximize a whole-of-government approach?</p> <p>3. How should the burden of addressing the financial requirements for climate change mitigations and adaptations be equitably divided between all stakeholders throughout the region and beyond?</p>	<p>1. A document analysis investigating the realignment of current programs and policies in place to combat climate change will be conducted. By focusing on diplomatic, developmental, and defensive mechanisms to address climate change, this thesis will continue to echo with the themes and intent of the original Marshall Plan. Following each document analysis, the author will present solutions to address gaps and shortfalls within each policy, and how to align their frameworks to maximize a whole-of-government approach.</p>

*Table 1: An overview of the research problem, research questions, and research design.*

In addition to Bowen, Leary (2014) recommends three types of documents to use for document analysis research: public records, personal documents, and physical evidence. Analysis data and material for this study includes texts relevant to discuss the Marshall Plan in a historical context and applications to the current Asia-Pacific region. This thesis will concentrate on examining and analyzing government publications, foundational strategic defensive policies, open-source documents, and reports pertaining to foreign policy in regards to diplomacy, development, and defensive frameworks formerly and currently in use by the United States. Open-source reports regarding the Majuro Declaration, the Kyoto Protocol, and APEC illustrate diplomatic efforts available to the United States Department of State to facilitate climate change engagement with

regional stakeholders. Focusing on developmental financial strategies and funding mechanisms such as the GCF, USAID ADAPT resources, and the MCC reveal development stratagems for the Asia-Pacific region already in position for the United States to utilize. Lastly, a dissection of unclassified foundational defensive policies that outline the “Rebalance to the Pacific” provide insight into defense applications to an Asia-Pacific Marshall Plan to resist climate change. By evaluating the *2011 National Military Strategy of the United States*, the *2012 Defense Strategic Guidance*, the *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*, the *2018 National Defense Strategy*, and the *Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* for relevant contributions to a Marshall Plan for this area of responsibility, this capstone will demonstrate the critical role the United States Department of Defense will play in maintaining influence and stability through the Asia-Pacific territory. By combining the Quadrennial Defense Review with the current National Defense Strategy of the United States in 2017, the Department of Defense displays a proactive approach to streamlining strategic policies. Although as of 2019 the 2014 QDR is no longer strategic guidance, the document still has value, as the objectives of the text have predominantly been left intact in the 2018 National Strategic Guidance directive.

Constructing a whole-of-government framework will allow for elucidation of meaning, development of understanding, and an extraction of gaps in the application of a wide-ranging policy of this magnitude. After completing a background analysis of the principal documents in this thesis, an interpretation of the applicable documents will show correlating methodologies that demonstrate a unity of effort in order to advocate credibility for a new Marshall Plan. By rearranging the lines of effort for diplomacy, development, and defense to streamline means and methods for applications today to resist climate change, this thesis will show the viability and practicality of a new Marshall Plan for the 21<sup>st</sup> century in the Asia-Pacific realm.

**Research Limitations**

An initial research limitation is that no all-encompassing document will provide all of the necessary information on how interagency frameworks overlap and interact within a climatological context. The author will accomplish the objective of this capstone by realigning the identifiable gaps and priorities between all available programs and policies. The presence of biases, both from the sources of publication as well as the agencies responsible for creating diplomatic, developmental, and defensive policies requires acknowledging. Second, although the author of this capstone believes the United States requires a new whole-of-government approach on the scale of the Marshall Plan to preserve stability, prosperity, and the commercial interests of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, the confirmation and conviction bias from the author demands recognizing in order to investigate this hypothesis thoroughly and preserve integrity. The final research limitation relates to time constraints to gather relevant resources, conduct a thorough examination, and publish findings. The author believes the most advantageous way to mitigate these limitations is to focus the document analysis on primary strategic documents pertaining exclusively to United States foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. In the absence of a time constraint, qualitative analysis delving into the second and third-order cascading effects of the economic impacts of climate change in the region would be beneficial for future research.



*“Thanks to the Marshall Plan, the economy of the democratic part of Europe was saved...The success was a striking demonstration of the advantages of cooperation between the United States and Europe, as well as among the countries of Europe themselves.”*

-Paul-Henri Spaak, Prime Minister of Belgium, 1947-1949

### **Document Analysis**

This document analysis will continue to revisit the original themes of the Marshall Plan by focusing on the three foundational pillars in a new climate context: diplomatic tools for addressing climate change, development frameworks for the 21<sup>st</sup> century Asia-Pacific, and defensive strategic guidance for the “Rebalance to the Pacific.” After first identifying the shortfalls of these policies, programs, and documents, this document analysis will then identify ways in which the frameworks of these pillars can be realigned to maximize a whole-of-government approach in an effort to progress climate change mitigations, adaptations, and resilience in the Asia-Pacific region.

### **Pillar 1: Diplomatic Tools for Addressing Climate Change**

#### *The Majuro Declaration*

The Majuro Declaration for climate leadership has been signed and ratified by 15 nations, including Australia and New Zealand. The 12-page declaration delivers to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon an attempt to show solidarity, as well as to sound the alarm highlighting the current impact that climate change is having on Pacific Island nations. The Majuro Declaration is correct to point out the unprecedented social and ecological effects of climate change, particularly the potential for a four-degree centigrade rise by the end of the century (Majuro Declaration, 2013). The objective of the declaration is to establish specific greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for partner nations; however, the most significant greenhouse gas emitters, the United States and China, were in attendance and did not participate in signing the declaration. The frustration of the Island nations who have adopted the Majuro

Declaration is palpable. By failing to endorse specific greenhouse gas emission reduction targets, the United States fails to demonstrate climate leadership to the most vulnerable of nations.

However, paragraph five of the Majuro Declaration offers an opportunity for action that the United States can diplomatically capitalize upon. Majuro Declaration (2013) paragraph five states:

*“We recognize that the necessary energy revolution and economic transformation to low-carbon development is an unprecedented opportunity to enhance our security, protect and ensure sustainability of our natural resources and environment, and to improve our people’s health.”*

Security, natural resource protection, and public health resilience are all issues that the Department of State can proactively engage upon; all without the overlaying guise of climate change mitigations. Although the United States has not agreed to establish specific greenhouse gas emission targets, the transference of technology and sustainability solutions is a diplomatic opportunity Department of State diplomats cannot ignore. By engaging Pacific Island nations with a technology-sharing relationship to protect economic stability, enhance physical security, and improve public health capacity, the United States can continue to remain an influential regional player in the fight against climate change; all without acknowledging climate change exists and thus remaining in line with political agendas of the current Presidential Administration.

The United States should not continue this effort alone. By partnering with China, India, and other significant polluters throughout the region on the basis of technology proliferation for Pacific Island nation climate change mitigations and adaptations, the United States can demonstrate strong diplomatic leadership to address the most urgent issues facing these small nations. Technology transference as a means of

diplomacy aligns with the overarching goals of the original Marshall Plan. By utilizing diplomatic influence with regional partners and stakeholders, the United States will continue to demonstrate authority and influence regardless of the specifics of the issues at hand.

While the ultimate goal of the Majuro Declaration is to herald the dangers of unregulated greenhouse gas emissions to the Small Island Nations, the overwhelming majority of declaration signers are some of the smallest greenhouse gas emitters in the world. If the 15 signatory nations of the declaration were to eliminate their greenhouse gas emissions entirely, the regional and global implications would still be relatively minor. It is for this reason that technology transference to the Pacific Island nations should not exclusively revolve around greenhouse gas elimination, but proactive mitigations and adaptations for environmental security and resilience.

### *The Kyoto Protocol*

To properly analyze the Kyoto Protocol the researcher must begin by asking whether greenhouse gas emission reduction targets are necessary in the first place to achieve a meaningful difference on the global scale. This thought experiment is the root of the issue that the United States has with the Kyoto Protocol, and is the primary reason for not ratifying the mandated reduction targets. A further disagreement between the United States and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the creators of the Kyoto Protocol, revolves around the language of greenhouse gas reduction targets. The Kyoto Protocol mandates, not requests, that the signatory nations meet greenhouse gas emission targets by future deadlines. The United States believes that mandating nations to hit emission targets unfairly penalizes first-

world nations, when developing nations do not have such targets, and in many cases are equally responsible for a significant amount of greenhouse gas emissions. Countries such as China and India, significant contributors to worldwide greenhouse gas emissions, were not held to any requirement to reduce gases in the original version of the Kyoto Protocol. Instead, the Kyoto Protocol merely requests that China and India voluntarily reduce their emissions, with no set target or timeframe.

In the highly competitive global economy of today, the UNFCCC should have foreseen the reluctance of economic powerhouse nations to handicap their economies to reduce emissions to an arbitrary target. Had the UNFCCC tailored the Kyoto Protocol to harness the engineering and scientific capabilities of highly advanced nations like the United States, to incubate developing technologies on behalf of the developing nations of the world, the United States likely would have signed the Kyoto Protocol in this capacity.

However, like the Majuro Declaration, there remains a diplomatic opportunity for the United States to re-engage with the UNFCCC on the Kyoto Protocol. In the Annex for Developing Countries, page nine, paragraph nine, the Kyoto Protocol (2001) states:

*“Capacity building is crucial to developing countries, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. The special circumstances of least developed countries and small island developing States need to be taken into account... Existing national institutions have an important role to play in supporting capacity building activities in developing countries.”*

The United States can fulfill a pivotal role throughout the Asia-Pacific by assisting in capacity building for the most vulnerable nations experiencing climate change. The Kyoto Protocol guidance for existing national institutions to play a role in building capacity in these developing countries is an objective that a modern-day Marshall Plan would immediately address. The Department of State has an opportunity to diplomatically leverage a core strength of the United

States, technological development and industrial production capacity, to transfer technology to these vulnerable nations. In this process, the United States is correct in the assessment that mandating greenhouse gas emission reduction may not be necessary to reduce overall greenhouse emissions. A whole-of-government effort to fund, develop, and proliferate sustainable technologies to developing countries can be the leverage that the United States utilizes to accomplish the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol. Technology proliferation for sustainable and clean technologies, mitigations, and adaptations has the potential to be more effective in curtailing global greenhouse gas emissions; rather than merely setting an arbitrary reduction target many years into the future using existing fossil-fuel-driven technologies. This logic would continue to treat the symptom of climate change, rather than the overall cause. Although the United States would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol within the original intent and guidance of the UNFCCC, this diplomatic partnership going forward would accomplish the overarching goals of the Kyoto Protocol, and therefore should promote sponsorship.

*The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC)*

A number of the most economically powerful nations in the world are members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC), including the United States and China. The forum of Pacific-Rim members has the potential to be a unique diplomatic tool to leverage in a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific.




Figure 3. Members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, 2019)

Although the primary objective of APEC is to promote free trade throughout the Asia-Pacific realm, climate change poses a significant barrier to the ease of commerce throughout these oceans and waterways. The Department of State must consider capitalizing on the climate challenges facing APEC members, by facilitating a dialogue between member nations and American institutions. An interchange that focuses on how businesses are adapting to climate challenges, as well as developing and adopting new sustainable technologies is a topic worthy of discussing and pursuing. A whole-of-government approach, with the Department of Commerce as a leading agency, should focus on financial and banking services in the Asia-Pacific, and investigate how climate change is affecting business markets around the region. The mission statement for APEC (2019) states:

*“We are united in our drive to build a dynamic and harmonious Asia-Pacific community by championing free and open trade and investment, promoting and accelerating regional economic integration, encouraging economic and technical*

*cooperation, enhancing human security, and facilitating a favorable and sustainable business environment. Our initiatives turn policy goals into concrete results and agreements into tangible benefits.”*

Climate change distinctly poses a threat to nearly all of the stated objectives in the APEC mission statement, especially regarding efforts for facilitation of favorable and sustainable business environments. A United States-sponsored dialogue on the business impacts of climate change could demonstrate how the United States is willing to work as an agent of change to alleviate the economic burden that climate change will have on APEC member-nations. A proactive discussion on laws and regulations that necessitate consideration should be a foundational topic worth debating in this venue as well. By acting as a banking and financial leader in assisting with climate-related economic impacts, the United States can develop an environmental business design framework to mitigate the inevitable impact a changing climate will have throughout APEC territories.

The extent at which the influence of climate change will have on the economic progress and development of the emerging economies throughout the Asia-Pacific remains imprecise at this time. However, the awareness that the barrier climate change poses to industrialized and non-industrialized nations to economic surplus is a variable worth planning for and mitigating. With the interconnected nature of global marketplaces today, and trillions of dollars of trade revenues passing through the Asia-Pacific region, unpredictability, conflict, and volatility in this critical expanse will undoubtedly have cascading economic consequences throughout the financial markets of the world. However, like the original Marshall Plan of 1948, if the United States demonstrates a willingness to act as the stabilizing force throughout this uncertain time, economic surplus may still be possible for the APEC member-nations; even in the midst of an unpredictable and changing climate.

*Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief (HADR) Missions*

Although irregular in occurrence and scale, military humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR) missions are a diplomatic tool that will continue to play a substantial role in the Asia-Pacific region; particularly as climate change increases the severity and frequency of large-scale weather phenomena. By continuing to participate in disaster response missions for allies and non-allies alike, the Department of State and Department of Defense employs a valuable apparatus to positively influence public perception of the United States. While the improvements in public perception may be temporary, the State Department has an opportunity to translate a short-term HADR mission into a long-term disaster risk reduction (DRR) program. A new Marshall Plan for the 21<sup>st</sup> century Asia-Pacific would address this overlap in diplomacy and development. By creating a long-term disaster risk reduction program that tailors itself to the individual needs of the countries at risk, the United States can demonstrate a long-term desire to continue engaging with host-nations on climate change issues. Disaster risk reduction programs, when implemented immediately following participation in humanitarian aid and disaster relief missions, can utilize the momentum from recent engagements with the United States. Disaster risk reduction programs focusing on long-term mitigations and adaptations, instead of disaster response missions, will provide a higher return-on-investment for the United States in the long-term.

**Pillar II: Development Frameworks for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Asia-Pacific***The Green Climate Fund*

Diplomatic strategies and development frameworks provide an approach to resisting climate change; however, without proper funding mechanisms to facilitate meaningful


development, change will not progress. The GCF offers a vehicle for development that with minor readjusting could parlay effectively into the framework of a new Marshall Plan. The primary shortfall of the GCF is the lack of oversight to prevent social and economic misuse, as well as the fact that the fund currently holds only four percent of the necessary funds to mitigate climate change in the Asia-Pacific region (ADB, 2018). Part of the hesitancy for countries to contribute to the GCF may revolve around the ambiguity regarding funds allocation. Common questions surrounding loan and grant access, distribution priorities, and appropriation to non-Kyoto Protocol members necessitate addressing.

The original Marshall Plan provides guidance on how to navigate the allocation and distribution dilemma. The original Marshall Plan distributed funds on a per capita basis. The United States simply divided the total aid package value by the number of citizens in western Europe and transferred the applicable amount to European countries as necessary. The only exception to the per-capita allocation was the United Kingdom, who received more than a per-capita share due to the high-cost of wartime development and impending bankruptcy.

The per-capita allocation strategy outlined by the original Marshall Plan is a viable solution for GCF allotments for climate change mitigations and adaptations. As the original Marshall Plan did not allocate funds to all of Europe, the GCF for the Asia-Pacific should only distribute funds to members who have signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, as the United States is not the only greenhouse gas emitter in the world, all countries in the Asia-Pacific, including the United States, should contribute to the GCF to the degree that corresponds to their contribution to cumulative global greenhouse gas emissions (*see Figure 4*). According to the Asia Development Bank (ADB), nearly 40 billion dollars are required to mitigate the impacts of climate change in the Asia-Pacific region. While this amount is substantial and unrealistic for

the United States to contribute exclusively, countries should supply the fund in proportion with their current greenhouse gas emission levels. Under this guidance, the United States would only be responsible for contributing 16 percent of the funds required by the ADB, which equates to approximately 6.4 billion dollars per year. This number is substantially less than the original annual amount the United States contributed to rebuilding western Europe after World War II. To put this contribution amount into context further, the 6.4 billion dollar GCF contribution is equal to slightly under two percent of the total Department of Defense budget for fiscal year 2020. In addition to the United States, China would be responsible for contributing six billion dollars, followed by Russia (2.4 billion), Indonesia (1.6 billion), India (1.6 billion), Japan (1.2 billion), Canada (800 million), and the rest of the region would contribute the residual funds between the remaining 50 members of the region.

#### Cumulative GHG Emissions 1990–2011 (% of World Total)



*Figure 4.* Largest cumulative greenhouse gas emitters between 1990 and 2011. (World Resources Institute, 2019).

In addition to supplying the treasuries of the GCF, requiring countries to contribute to the GCF on a cumulative emissions basis acts as a motivating factor for countries to reduce their cumulative greenhouse gas emissions.

Distribution of funds, as well as security mechanisms to prevent misuse and abuse, can be monitored by an oversight commission representative of all members who contribute to the GCF. This commission should be independent of the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the UNFCCC. Each member-nation should have one representative to act as an independent custodian to ensure quality assurance and monitor for fraud, waste, and abuse within the fund. Furthermore, this commission would differentiate between the countries with the greatest need (most likely dependent on population), as well as most urgent need (which countries are facing urgent and existential threats to climate change first, such as Kiribati), and allocate funds as necessary.

#### *The USAID Climate Change Adaptation Project*

While multi-national mitigation and adaptation efforts through endowments like the GCF play an important role in resisting climate change in the Asia-Pacific, the United States should continue to take part in bilateral projects through USAID. Using USAID Climate Change Adaptation Project Preparation Facilities for Asia and the Pacific (ADAPT) projects to complement the GCF creates an opportunity for diplomacy to overlap with development opportunities throughout the region. Although the United States should focus on the obligatory contributions to the GCF, funding USAID ADAPT projects in addition to the GCF can provide the United States with more control and leverage over specific development projects for partner nations in the territory. Working closely with the Asian-Pacific Adaptation Network (APAN), USAID can directly inject funding for development projects into areas where GCF funding may be lacking or unavailable. This type of bilateral action against climate change can enable a new

Marshall Plan to augment current financial developmental frameworks, instead of exclusively bearing the majority of the monetary burden.

Allowing further control of development funds will allow the United States to focus on mitigation or adaptation projects that USAID and the Department of State believe to be most beneficial for the strategic interests on the United States in the region. By partnering with APAN, the United States can utilize sources with first-hand domestic and native knowledge of communities that require urgent assistance. By leveraging this relationship, USAID can make noticeable progress on developing relationships and associations with countries that are currently uncertain of the benefits that partnering with the United States will provide. By allowing local populations to dictate the most critical needs for their communities, USAID will earn valuable rapport with societies throughout the Asia-Pacific. The targeting of these high-impact ADAPT projects will show that the United States has a long-term interest in the region, and will alleviate a chronic issue that is brought up by Asia-Pacific nations; that the United States does not have an enduring commitment to the overall well-being of their countries.

Although researchers in parts of academia believe that spending USAID ADAPT funds on developing sustainable technologies that address the root cause of climate change is more beneficial, the reality is that the long timeframes for development and proliferation will most likely eclipse the time available to the countries experiencing the consequences of climate change today. Even technologies that may require only five to ten years to develop may prove to be too long for countries currently experiencing rising sea levels, coastal erosion, and food insecurity. By funding projects that build climate resilience, as well as financing the urgent needs of Asia-Pacific nations today, USAID can augment the mitigation frameworks of those host nations requesting assistance, allowing them to channel funding for their mitigation and

adaptation strategies to combat climate change concurrently with the United States. Facilitating the funding of projects host-nations identify as being the most critical, or addressing the most urgent needs of the host populations, the United States can fill a financial void that can have the highest impact on public perceptions as well as preserve cultural heritage, ecological habitats, and natural resources before inaction eliminates these native income sources completely.

### *The Millennium Challenge Corporation*

USAID ADAPT projects contribute significantly to the development pillar of a new Marshall Plan for the 21<sup>st</sup> century Asia-Pacific. However, USAID ADAPT projects lack the sort of intrinsic motivation that non-allied nations may need to adopt meaningful changes that are in line with the views, ideals, and foreign policies of the United States. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) offers that intrinsic motivation, by awarding further financial assistance to countries that the United States finds are in “good governance.” Although the MCC does not define the term “good governance,” the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) (2019) defines good governance as having:

*“...eight major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society.”*

While the MCC utilizes good governance (*see Figure 5*) as a determining criterion to distribute financial assistance for development projects, the idea of holding nations to a “good governance” standard is ambiguous and potentially unrealistic for some nations to maintain. Some of the challenges facing developing nations are endemic in the “good governance” definition, particularly being effective, efficient, inclusive, and transparent. The MCC framework should undergo restructuring to accommodate the specific and unique needs of

developing countries in the Asia-Pacific on a case-by-case basis. Many countries may struggle with transparency, while others may find being effective and efficient challenging due to infrastructure limitations. These conditions alone should not preclude Asia-Pacific nations from MCC funds.



*Figure 5. The eight principles of good governance.  
(UNESCAP, 2019)*

Achieving self-sustaining economic growth for these countries, another requirement from the MCC, is a second pervasive challenge developing countries encounter throughout the region. One application for the MCC in a 21<sup>st</sup> century Marshall Plan, in addition to development projects, is to augment developing nations obligatory contributions to the GCF. This could alleviate part of the burden of GCF contributions for smaller nations, allowing for funding of sustainable and clean technology adaptations with domestic and indigenous funding. If a developing country cannot contribute their full amount to the GCF, the MCC could lend assistance on an annual basis if necessary. The MCC maintains a budget of over 800 million dollars (MCC, 2018), which can considerably aid developing-nation contributions to the GCF. By using the MCC in this effort, MCC grants could allow nations to address climate challenges in their way, with their funds, and on their timelines.

Another critique of the MCC is that other aid organizations, including USAID and non-governmental organizations, may withhold aid to developing nations if they are already receiving MCC grants. By utilizing MCC funding to augment GCF contributions, other funding, grant, or development sources would have the transparency that they desire to ensure there is no duplication of effort. However, in addition to GCF assistance, when direct development programs are necessary in place of or in addition to GCF assistance, the MCC can continue to sponsor and facilitate responsible maintenance and investment upkeep programs for climate change mitigation projects. These maintenance programs are often a secondary notion in the details of large-scale development projects, and by adding longevity to existing or future development ventures, the MCC can continue to serve as a useful tool for a Marshall Plan of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **Pillar III: Defensive Strategic Guidance for the “Rebalance to the Pacific”**

#### *The Department of Defense*

Under a new Marshall Plan for the 21<sup>st</sup> century Asia-Pacific, the Department of Defense will continue to have a stabilizing and supportive role throughout the region. Recent strategic policy guidance calls for a significant restructuring and strengthening of military forces in preparation for a more robust and visible presence in crucial Asia-Pacific territories. Increasing patrols to promote freedom of the seas and enforcing international law will continue to be a foundational mission-set under a new Marshall Plan. Operations such as monitoring vital shipping straits and patrolling contested exclusive economic zone territories will demonstrate to regional partners the commitment of the United States to ensure the prosperity and security of their nations. Failing to accomplish these objectives will result in potentially dramatic

implications for U.S. foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. The 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States (2018) pointedly states:

*“The costs of not implementing this strategy are clear. Failure to meet our defense objectives will result in decreasing U.S. global influence, eroding cohesion among allies and partners, and reduced access to markets that will contribute to a decline in our prosperity and standard of living.”*

By implementing a new Marshall Plan that leverages military power in a relationship-building capacity, the United States can resist the hegemony that other regional powers strive for, and preserve the global preeminence of American fighting forces. The National Defense Strategy also lists priorities that are necessary in order to ensure the accomplishment of strategic objectives, and the foremost priority resides in the Pacific. The Defense Strategy (2018) states:

*“We will strengthen our alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains. With key countries in the region, we will bring together bilateral and multilateral security relationships to preserve the free and open international system.”*

The guidance set forth by the National Defense Strategy in regards to the Asia-Pacific is directly in line with the objectives that a new Marshall Plan would strive for in the Asia-Pacific area of responsibility. The emphasis on expanding partnerships with allies and non-allies is a cornerstone objective that a new Marshall Plan should be built. The impacts from climate change have the potential to strain and test even the strongest of relationships, and by proactively engaging with partner nations the United States can mitigate these stressors.

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance is the document that most directly connects and addresses the complex nature of the difficult challenges facing the region. In addition to common challenges, the Defense Strategic Guidance calls for an “expanding of networks of cooperation with emerging partners (DSG, 2012),” in order to sustain and protect the growth of the region. The challenges facing climate change can serve as an anchor to establish the

cohesion that the Department of Defense desires in the Asia-Pacific. Nations such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, who are currently in a non-ally status, are in critically strategic regions of the Asia-Pacific territory. The single point of commonality that eclipses the political differences between these nations is the belief that climate change will have destabilizing effects within their regions. By sponsoring, coordinating, and executing bilateral and multilateral engagements with these nations to address climate change, the Department of Defense has a valuable opportunity to demonstrate how a cohesive unity of effort benefits all parties.

*The Department of the Navy*

While all agencies within the Department of Defense will be engaging with the Asia-Pacific region in a new Marshall Plan, the United States Navy is the service branch that will most visibly participate with partner nations to address climate change. The United States Navy fully grasps the security implications for the region, and the Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower is the document that most directly links the security of the Asia-Pacific with the economic prosperity of the United States. A new Marshall Plan would rely upon naval assets to gain access to and maintain a presence in the vast region that is the Asia-Pacific. The ocean domain provides the means to project influence most effectively and demonstrates a shared medium between all of the countries bordering the Indian and Pacific oceans.

However, the most crucial aspect of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower directive is the importance of direct bilateral engagements with China. The growing Chinese naval presence throughout the Asia-Pacific presents an opportunity that a Marshall Plan to combat climate change can expand upon. China demonstrates the ability to participate as a partner in the region by contributing to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, deploying a hospital ship to developing nations in the region, as well as partaking in multinational exercises. By

partnering with a rising power such as China, the United States can reduce the potential for miscalculation, escalation, deter aggression, and promote stability; all in addition to taking the highly visible step of putting political issues aside to address the social and environmental challenges throughout the region. Large-scale multi-national exercises such as Pacific Partnership, Cobra Gold, and Rim-of-the-Pacific (RIMPAC) provide direct opportunities for these engagements to occur. Bilateral engagements of this kind will prove to be critical to the success of a new Marshall Plan in the Asia-Pacific.

*The United States Indo-Pacific Command & Civil-to-Military Engagement*

The increasing frequency and severity of natural meteorological phenomena that the Asia-Pacific region is likely to experience due to a changing climate will inextricably require the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) to have a larger operational footprint in the territory. The emergent crisis climate change presents to all regional stakeholders will require the Department of Defense to partner with civilian organizations to assist in mitigation and adaptation strategies. A new Marshall Plan for the 21<sup>st</sup> century Asia-Pacific will realign the strategic objectives and capabilities of the military, with the response requirements of civilian organizations operating in the region. An overlapping framework involving climate change mitigations and adaptations built in partnership with USAID for the Asia-Pacific can act as a force-multiplier in the fight against climate change. In addition to USAID, USINDOPACOM can utilize in-house civilian departments, such as the Center for Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) to proactively coordinate with foreign agencies and non-governmental organizations. By sending representatives to partake in the Asia-Pacific Conferences of Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations (APC-MADRO), USINDOPACOM can exhibit the presence and commitment to regional civilian partners that

demonstrates a long-term pledge to address a threat that has the potential to destabilize nations throughout the region.

*Military-to-Military Engagement Through The Shangri-La Dialogue & ASEAN*

Direct multi-lateral commitments with nations throughout the Asia-Pacific will prove to be a foundational step in a new Marshall Plan for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Similar in the way in which the original Marshall Plan led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (*see Figure 6*), a coalition of military alliances throughout the Asia-Pacific territory could complement current and future stabilization efforts by the Department of Defense. As the effects of climate change continue to morph the Asia-Pacific area-of-responsibility in unpredictable and volatile ways, a Pacific-Asian Treaty Organization (PATO), could be a force multiplier to address these transformations (*see Figure 7*). If the United States takes proactive steps to form a Pacific-Asian Treaty Organization, the Department of Defense is more likely to cultivate an alliance that aligns with the foreign policies and strategic objectives of the United States.



*Figure 6. Current members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.*  
 (Peter, 2014, NATO Member Countries, Retrieved from  
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29030744>)

While the primary objective of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of the member-nations within the treaty through political or military means, PATO could not only fulfill these same obligations in the Asia-Pacific, but also form a robust response, recovery, mitigation, and preparedness mechanism that supports the humanitarian aid and disaster relief requirements of the future. By focusing on communications interoperability, cohesive logistics support, and integrating command-and-control networks, PATO would simultaneously address the growing military requirements within the region, as well as strengthen the resiliency of the member-nations in regards to climate change.

To develop a treaty alliance that aligns with the strategic objectives of the United States, initial Pacific-Asian Treaty Organization membership would include critically strategic nations who currently maintain close diplomatic ties with the United States. These core nations would

include Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, India, Thailand, Singapore, New Zealand, South Africa, and Taiwan. As the PATO alliance coalesces, the United States and PATO core members should engage with neighboring countries throughout the region to pledge membership to develop a unified and stabilizing coalition throughout the region. Countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Oman, and the African nations of Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Madagascar are all critical to the long-term success of such an alliance. By pursuing these equally-important countries, which historically may have held animosity towards the United States, shows a long-term commitment to the region to prepare for and resist climate change. This engagement will show that the United States has an obligation to the region that eclipses political and ideological differences. While diplomatic engagement will undoubtedly play a role in the formation of a treaty alliance in the Asia-Pacific, the most accessible and immediate means is through a multitude of defensive devices.

The Shangri-La Summit is an ideal venue to propose such an alliance. Military-to-Military partnerships have the potential to further advance strategic as well as economic relationships. Approaching partner and future-partner nations at the annual Asian Security Summit will utilize the forum in a way which investigates the practicality and feasibility of a treaty of this kind. The forum is ideal for initial engagement due to the fact that the audience is not just defense ministers, but also politicians, senior military staff, and civilian policy-makers.



*Figure 7. Perspective Pacific-Asian Treaty Organization (PATO) nations. (Rollins, 2019, PATO Member Countries, Retrieved from mapchart.net)*

While the ultimate goal of a new Marshall Plan in the Asia-Pacific is to combat climate change, a preliminary step to accomplishing this objective likely requires the development of a military relationship first. A united and capable military alliance can easily transition from accomplishing a military objective to organizing against an environmental threat. Many Asia-Pacific nations already view climate change as an equally hostile foe, on par with historical ideological disagreements between regional neighbors. These nations also foresee the linkage between climate change and maritime security, and time is of the essence in developing an alliance to mitigate these impending issues.

Following the Shangri-La Summit, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) is an avenue that is ripe for Mil-Mil engagement. While an initial proposal for a Pacific-Asian Treaty Organization should occur at the Asian Security Summit, the ADMM is a logical continuation to such a proposition. At the ADMM, Defense Ministers throughout the Asia-Pacific can fine-tune specific aspects of Mil-Mil engagement at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The core members of PATO can rely upon the existing NATO framework for

legal and operational authorities while tailoring the alliance to the specific challenges of the Asia-Pacific theater. The United States can encourage and foster this alliance by continuing to invite member-nation militaries to participate in regional military exercises, partaking in military personnel exchange programs, and continuing to strive towards seamless interoperability between military assets. By sponsoring and promoting a regional alliance of this scale, the United States will continue to maintain the supremacy of influence throughout the region, while simultaneously addressing the challenges climate change poses to this globally critical territory.



*“I believe that, in years to come, we shall look back upon this undertaking as the dividing line between the old era of world affairs and the new - the dividing line between the old era of national suspicion, economic hostility, and isolationism, and the new era of mutual cooperation to increase the prosperity of people throughout the world.”*

-Harry S Truman, President of the United States, 1945-1953

### **Conclusion**

While an initial comparison between post-World War II Europe and the post-climate change Asia-Pacific of the 21<sup>st</sup> century may seem incongruous, the parallels between these former and current existential threats required investigation. This thesis aimed to illustrate and tailor the pillars of diplomacy, development, and defense in the original Marshall Plan to a new climate-focused context in the present day. This thesis provides the historical context of the Marshall Plan and illustrates how the policy was successful in maneuvering the United States and the rest of Western Europe through the uncertainty following a massive global conflict. The success of the original Marshall Plan in traversing regional and global insecurity was worthy of investigation for lessons and insights that can be carried forward to today. The amplifying effects of a changing climate only aggravate the complex sociopolitical, and economic vulnerabilities endemic to the Asia-Pacific territory. While the world looks to the nations surrounding the Indian Ocean, and those of South and Southeast Asia as the manufacturing and future economic nuclei of the globe, the threats posed by climate change will inevitably challenge this region with instability and uncertainty. The social and economic providence of the United States links invariably to this territory, and without a robust plan to develop adaptations, mitigations, and progress climate change resilience, the United States will inextricable suffer alongside this vulnerable region when the worst effects of climate change occur.

This thesis has demonstrated and focused attention on three critical issues pertaining to climate change in the Asia-Pacific:

- 1. While numerous agencies and institutions have called upon the creation of a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific, no executable framework previously existed. This thesis addresses that deficit by outlining current diplomatic, developmental, and defensive policies and frameworks that can be best realigned and utilized in the creation of a new Marshall Plan for 21st-century climate threats.*
- 2. By outlining a plausible and equitable framework for funding allocations for climate-related mitigation and adaptation expenses, this thesis expedites the creation of a new Marshall Plan for the Asia-Pacific by preemptively planning for such a requirement.*
- 3. This thesis has clarified how a whole-of-government approach to combat climate change will reduce human suffering, minimize global environmental strife, and maintain a favorable bearing towards the United States, all while simultaneously achieving critical strategic objectives within the region.*

This thesis successfully satisfied the desired research objectives by identifying viable diplomatic mechanisms that the United States Department of State can utilize through the creation of a new Marshall Plan. By participating in the Majuro Declaration, contributing to the Kyoto Protocol in a means acceptable to the current Administration as well as partner nations, and leveraging the member-states of APEC to remove the climate change-induced barriers to economic surplus, the United States can maintain a position of influence throughout the region.

In addition to diplomatic tools, by realigning GCF contributions and appointing an oversight committee to prevent misuse and abuse, the United States can address many of the apprehensions that surrounding nations have in terms of GCF contributions. However, the United States should contribute an equitable amount to the fund that is coincident to cumulative greenhouse gas emission levels; all in addition to current USAID ADAPT and MCC funding allocations.

The Department of Defense is proactively realigning current strategic guidance through the National Defense Strategy as well as the Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower.

The strategic guidance directed for the Asia-Pacific directly overlaps with the desired objectives of a new Marshall Plan, sharing commonality with regional partners in the effort to resist climate change. Venues such as the Asian Security Summit, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, and APC-MADRO further contribute towards partner engagement, where the creation of a Pacific-Asian Treaty Organization can be presented, discussed and shaped to meet the emerging security needs of the region.



*“Churchill's words won the war; Marshall's words won the peace.”*  
-Dirk Stikker, Foreign Minister of The Netherlands, 1948-1952

### **Contributions, Recommendations, & Future Research**

This thesis contributes to the literature regarding climate change and the Asia-Pacific region by outlining constructive and actionable efforts, policies, and frameworks that can be realigned to achieve a whole-of-government effort in the fight against climate change. By identifying limitations, shortfalls, and gaps in currently existing diplomatic, developmental, and defensive apparatuses, this thesis has offered solutions that allow an avenue for forward progress on climate change policy.

Upon the completion of this document analysis, this thesis offers the following recommendations and future research topics to continue the advancement of climate change efforts for the Asia-Pacific region in the 21<sup>st</sup> century:

- 1. The United States must assume a position of leadership on climate change policy. As long as the United States continues to omit or deny the impending impacts of climate change, other nation-state actors within the region will rise to fill the void. The resulting diplomatic, economic, and socio-political climate will not be favorable to the strategic interests of the United States.*
- 2. The United States must commit to the funding, development, and proliferation of clean and sustainable energy solutions. These solutions must evolve past current fossil-fuel reliant technologies, and most importantly, be open-source in description and shared with other large polluters in the world, specifically China and India.*
- 3. In following with the collective defense objectives of NATO, the Asia-Pacific realm should contemplate a theater-specific treaty organization of their own. As climate change threatens to destabilize the region, a unified force intent on providing stabilization efforts, preventing conflict escalation, and enforcing international law needs to be considered and implemented.*



## List of Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADMM	Association of Southeast Asian Nations Defense Ministers Meeting
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APAN	Asian-Pacific Adaptation Network
APC-MADRO	Asia-Pacific Conferences of Military Assistance to Disaster Relief Operations
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CFE-DM	United States Indo-Pacific Command Center for Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance
DOD	Department of Defense
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DSG	Defense Strategic Guidance
ERP	European Recovery Program
GCF	Green Climate Fund
HADR	Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	National Defense Strategy of the United States
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PATO	Pacific-Asian Treaty Organization
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RIMPAC	Rim-of-the-Pacific
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID ADAPT	United States Agency for International Development Climate Change Adaptation Project Preparation Facility for Asia and the Pacific
USINDOPACOM	United States Indo-Pacific Command
USN	United States Navy



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