A Campaign of Logistics: An Analysis of Basing, Culmination, and Operational Reach at the Pusan Perimeter
Abstract
This monograph analyzes the role of the United States, Republic of Korea (ROK), and Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) during the Pusan Perimeter campaign through the elements of operational art, specifically basing, culmination, and operational reach. Despite the disastrous initial efforts of the United States and ROK armies (ROKA), both forces learned from their mistakes and effectively used basing at the port of Pusan to maintain operational reach and prevent culmination while denying the Korean People's Army's (KPA) ability to do the same. Lieutenant General (LTG) Walton Walker's system of interior lines, enabled by increased logistics support at the port of Pusan, coupled with the Far East Command's (FECOM) annihilation of the KPA's intermediate and rear basing zones rendered the DPRK's lines of communications (LOCs) untenable and unable to support frontline KPA forces, ensuring the KPA's defeat at the Pusan Perimeter. The existential threat and long-term strategic consequences facing the ROK and United States at the Pusan Perimeter has broad operational and strategic implications towards large-scale combat operations (LSCO) and in preserving the principles outlined in the post-WWII international order.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 23, 2019
- Accession Number
- AD1083163
Entities
People
- Craig M. Banner