An Examination of Force Ratios
Abstract
The US Army is currently undergoing a transition from focusing on counter insurgency operations to large scale combat operations. As it undergoes this transition, the organization should reflect on its current doctrine and the use of heuristics such as force ratios. Therefore, the primary research question asks whether force ratios and quantitative models are valid tools for commanders and planners going forward. The underlying thesis of this study argues that force ratios are invalid and their continued use may develop unwanted mental constraints. By understanding the origins of force ratios and their evolutions, this study identifies a complete lack of consensus about the applicability of force ratios at various levels of war as well as challenges with common planning tools often associated with force ratios.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 23, 2019
- Accession Number
- AD1083211
Entities
People
- Joshua T. Christian
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College