The Soviet Union and the United States Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Lessons from Two Separate Approaches

Abstract

The United States and Soviet Union both entered Afghanistan for vastly different reasons, and both nations struggled mightily adjusting their operational approaches to meet the problems encountered. This monograph examines the 40th Army's withdrawal from Afghanistan and discusses issues US planners and commanders are currently experiencing in Afghanistan. The elements of operational art provide a useful tool in examining the operational approach the 40th Army used to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. The 40th Army's planners utilized the elements of operational art to great effect in some situations and ignored them to their peril in other instances. This monograph addresses conceptually how the Soviet's framework can be applied, and when their framework should be avoided by US planners in Afghanistan.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 23, 2019
Accession Number
AD1083591

Entities

People

  • Ian C. Mcleod

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Combat Operations
  • Department Of Defense
  • Foreign Relations
  • Geography
  • Governments
  • Military Science
  • National Security
  • New York
  • Students
  • Terrorism
  • Terrorists
  • Training
  • United States
  • United States Central Command
  • Ussr
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Strategic Security Studies