Strategy and Doctrine: Confusion at a Level of War
Abstract
Strategy has been an important aspect of military operations since its conception. However, while strategy's importance has remained consistent, understanding of its utilization remains debated. Strategy originated as the cleverness of the general but the increasing scope and complexity of war necessitated its expanse beyond the battlefield and into the highest offices of national and military authority. Yet, rather than maintaining strategy as a conceptual tool, the theoretical discourse bifurcated strategy into its cognitive function and a characterization as a "level of war." To cope with this bifurcation doctrine synthesized these competing conceptions into the existing military hierarchy and bureaucratic structure, resulting in a confused and incomplete representation of strategy beyond guidance from national leadership. Consequently, by placing strategy at the highest levels of government, doctrine divorced military strategy from a guiding logic for operational art and removed strategic discourse from US Army doctrine. To better understand strategy and its relevance to the military practitioner, this monograph explores the theoretical evolution of strategy to distill continuities and determine strategy's nature. This paper also analyzes strategy's representation in doctrine with an emphasis on how strategy informs operational art. Finally, this monograph will present an alternate perspective of strategy and discuss potential changes for holistic representation in doctrine and broader utility across all echelons of the force.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 23, 2019
- Accession Number
- AD1083678
Entities
People
- Jeb K. Townsend
Organizations
- School of Advanced Military Studies