Examining Operational Art in Byzantine Campaigns

Abstract

This monograph analyzes historical campaigns through the lens of modern American military doctrine. Using the elements of operational art particularly the concepts of operational reach, center of gravity, and risk it compares the campaigns of Basil II against the Bulgars and Romanus IV against the Seljuk Turks. The study argues Romanus IV failed in his campaign against the Seljuk Turks by imprudently accepting unmitigated operational risk. This gamble led to his capture, the defeat of his army, and the subsequent collapse of the Byzantine Empire from invasion and civil war. In contrast, his predecessor Basil II cultivated his strategic, operational, and tactical capacities in Bulgaria which mitigated the risk of failure. By assuming mitigated risk to create an opportunity, Basil II defeated the Bulgarian field army while preserving his options to continue the campaign. These outcomes should prompt modern operational artists to deeply consider the risk inherent in Large-Scale Combat Operations in a world of reemerging great power competition.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 23, 2019
Accession Number
AD1083695

Entities

People

  • Jeremy S. White

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Army
  • Asymmetric Warfare
  • Boundaries
  • Center Of Gravity
  • Civil War
  • Command And Control
  • Department Of Defense
  • Doctrine
  • Field Army
  • Governments
  • Infantry
  • Instructors
  • Terrain
  • Training
  • Universities
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Fields of Study

  • History

Readers

  • International Relations and European Studies
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies