



Human Capital Needs for the Department of Defense Operational Contract Support Planning and Integration Workforce

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Preface

In recent U.S. conflicts, operational contractors have accounted for more than half of U.S. forces on the ground. To ensure the readiness, availability, and effectiveness of these contractors, operational contract support (OCS) capabilities must be integrated into the total force and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) planning activities. OCS planning and integration (P&I) personnel within DoD are required to fulfill this function, integrating contractors into the total force and into DoD processes. Specifically, OCS P&I personnel are to perform OCS “contract support integration” tasks as defined in joint doctrine. This entails the coordination and synchronization of contracted support, executed in a designated operational area in support of the joint force, through such activities as collaborating with boards, centers, cells, and working groups; conducting assessments and providing recommendations, identifying contract requirements, and managing information.

Yet, OCS P&I activities to date have not been sufficient to meet doctrinal and policy requirements. To remedy this shortcoming, a number of legislative and policy measures over the past decade have recommended that DoD identify OCS P&I workforce manpower requirements and improve OCS planning and execution. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the DoD components, to determine “the operational contract support requirements of the armed forces and [recommend] the resources required to improve and enhance operational contract support for the armed forces and planning for such operational contract support.”

To assist in making this determination, the Operational Contract Support Division of the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (J4), asked the RAND Corporation to assess the total force staffing needs of the OCS P&I workforce across the defense enterprise. This report presents the results of that analysis and should be of interest to policymakers who are concerned with limiting waste, fraud, and abuse in operational contracting; DoD and military officials seeking better integration of OCS activities across the defense enterprise; and scholars and researchers who study issues related to OCS and military contracting writ large.

This research was sponsored by the Operational Contract Support and Services Division of the Joint Staff (J4) and conducted within the Forces and Resources Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on the RAND Forces and Resources Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/frp or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page).

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Summary

The United States relies on contractors to fill support roles in theaters of conflict to an extent that is unprecedented in modern history. For the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), contractors act as force multipliers, providing both military and political flexibility. They provide supplies and perform a variety of other functions, including security (personal security details, convoy security, and static site security), logistical support, weapon and equipment upkeep and maintenance, intelligence, communication, transportation, construction, engineering, and base support operations and maintenance. As of July 2016, there were 42,694 contractors working on DoD contracts in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. Of these contractors, 2,485 were in Iraq, compared with approximately 5,000 U.S. troops on the ground there. Meanwhile, 26,435 were in Afghanistan, compared with 8,400 U.S. troops.¹

While the overall number of contractors deployed to the U.S. military's main theaters of operation has decreased in recent years with the troop drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD continues to use contracted functions and supplies, and it is anticipated to do so for decades to come.

¹ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support, "Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility," July 2016; Josh Rogin, "Obama's Generals Want More U.S. Troops in Iraq," *Washington Post*, June 22, 2016; Associated Press, "A Timeline of U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan Since 2001," *Military Times*, July 6, 2016.

As important as it is to ensure that these operational contract support (OCS) capabilities are available when needed for operations, oversight and planning for OCS activities is decentralized, making it difficult to determine manpower and training requirements for these activities. Congress has recognized the need for an OCS human capital strategy in numerous legislative measures over the past decade. For example,

- Section 854 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, which required DoD to establish training requirements for contingency contracting and program management personnel in its acquisition workforce
- Section 849 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008, which required DoD to establish contingency contracting and OCS training requirements for personnel outside its acquisition workforce
- Section 820 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2012, which required a review of DoD's manpower and contractor support
- Section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013, which directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with the DoD components, to determine "the operational contract support requirements of the armed forces and [recommend] the resources required to improve and enhance operational contract support for the armed forces and planning for such operational contract support"
- Title 10, Section 2330, of the U.S. Code, which requires DoD to identify critical skills and competencies needed to procure contract services and to develop a comprehensive strategy for recruiting, training, and deploying employees to meet the requirements for such skills and competencies.²

² Public Law 109-364, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, April 4, 2006; Public Law 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, January 28, 2008; Public Law 112-81, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, December 31, 2011; Public Law 112-239, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, January 3, 2012, Section 845, para. (b)(F); U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 2330, para. a.1.B.

In line with these congressional directives, defense leadership has directed that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff determine manpower requirements to improve OCS planning and execution. For instance, a 2011 Secretary of Defense memorandum directed the Chairman to “characterize the OCS capability requirement,” and capability gap 3 of the 2011 Joint Requirements Oversight Council–approved *Initial Capabilities Document for Operational Contract Support* stated that “DoD lacks a human strategy—recruit, train, track, and retain—for all OCS functions, which encumbers deployment and staffing for the Joint Force and complicates execution of OCS and compliance with legislation and regulation.”³ Gap 3 in the current *Operational Contract Support Action Plan* states, “DoD lacks a holistic strategy to identify, validate, resource, and staff total force manpower requirements for OCS planning and integration functions, with a focus on the training, recruitment, and retention of organic military and civilian workforce requirements.”⁴

Study Objectives and Approach

In light of the statutory and policy requirements and history surrounding OCS integration, the Operational Contract Support Division (OCSD) of the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (J4), asked RAND in late 2015 to assess the human capital needs of the OCS planning and integration (P&I) workforce across the defense enterprise. Accordingly, the objectives of this study were as follows:

1. Map out the population of “core” OCS P&I personnel across the total force, and devise appropriate position descriptions (PDs) for these OCS P&I personnel.

³ Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Strategic and Operational Planning for OCS and Workforce Mix,” memorandum, January 24, 2011; Joint Requirements Oversight Council, *Initial Capabilities Document for Operational Contract Support*, version 1.0, July 19, 2011, p. 9.

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Operational Contract Support Action Plan, FY 2017–FY 2020*, Washington, D.C., September 22, 2016. Not available to the general public.

2. Define the training requirements for both the core OCS P&I workforce and the “non-core” OCS P&I workforce (i.e., DoD employees with some level of OCS P&I responsibilities but whose positions are not specified as OCS positions).
3. Estimate the staffing requirements for core OCS P&I personnel at a specified set of U.S. defense organizations.

OCSD requested that RAND focus primarily on the contract support integration piece of OCS in Phase 0 steady-state operations. Therefore, the subject of this study was the subset of the OCS workforce that engages primarily in contract support integration tasks. Because these individuals typically engage in planning or integration activities, we refer to this population throughout this report as the *OCS P&I workforce*. We should note that OCSD requested that RAND focus on the “core” OCS P&I workforce—that is, individuals working in a full-time or nearly full-time capacity on OCS P&I activities—but to develop training recommendations for the non-core workforce as well. The organizations for which RAND was asked to assess staffing needs and training requirements were as follows:

- Joint Staff (J4)
- geographic combatant commands (GCCs)
- service component commands (SCCs)
- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support
- joint task forces (JTFs)
- military services (U.S. Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics [G-4], U.S. Navy Office of the Director for Material Readiness and Logistics [N4], and the Air Force Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, Logistics, and Force Protection [A4] only)
- Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)/Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO).

To meet the study's objectives, we drew on a range of information sources and research methods, including the following:

- A *gap analysis* of OCS P&I activities required in doctrine versus those actually performed in practice, which relied on three major data sources: (1) a comprehensive review of policy, doctrinal, and academic documents; (2) semistructured interviews with 119 DoD stakeholders from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, the Joint Staff, the Fourth Estate, the GCCs, functional combatant commands, and several service component commands, including U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Army Africa, Pacific Fleet, Marine Forces Pacific, Marine Forces Europe and Africa, Pacific Air Forces, and the Air Force Installation Contracting Agency–Pacific; and (3) an analysis of a large set of existing PDs for positions related to OCS P&I.
- *Mathematical modeling of staffing estimates* based on the results of a survey of the organizations of interest, our interview data, and our literature review. This modeling process helped clarify the tasks of OCS P&I personnel and the amount of time required to perform each task.
- A *training analysis* incorporating an examination of existing training courses and training content, interview data, and application of the OCS Learning Framework in the context of existing military and civilian training models across the defense enterprise.⁵

⁵ As discussed in the body of this report, our methodology also included an analysis of sample scenarios to assess demand for various OCS P&I skill sets under different types of operations. Rather than the expected variation in demand for these skill sets across different scenarios, our interview data indicated that the need for specific skill sets would most likely remain steady across operational scenarios while demand for the *number* of OCS personnel overall would fluctuate with the size and pace of the operation. We therefore opted to focus on human capital needs for the OCS planning and integration workforce in Phase 0 steady-state operations, highlighting that the most important variables driving shifts in demand for this workforce are likely to be the size and pace of Phase 1–5 operations.

Summary of Findings and Recommendations

The Composition of the OCS P&I Workforce Spans All Elements of the Total Force

Our analysis showed that the current OCS P&I workforce is composed primarily of military, civilian, and contractor personnel with contracting, acquisition, logistics, and program management backgrounds. Our interviewees recommended that the OCS P&I workforce continue to be composed of a total force mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel, though contractors in these roles should be monitored to ensure that they focus on nonrecurring tasks and tasks that are not inherently governmental.

Some Doctrinally Mandated OCS P&I Tasks Are Not Being Done

A gap analysis based on findings from our literature review, interviews, and PD analysis found that most of the tasks outlined in doctrine are being done in practice. However, we discovered a total of 58 gaps across the organizations of interest in this study—some of them significant. The degree and scope of these gaps varied by organization, with the GCCs and service headquarters appearing to fall short of meeting their doctrinal OCS responsibilities to the greatest degree, mainly in the areas of OCS planning, analysis, and management. Reasons for these gaps could include staffing shortfalls, a lack of knowledge about OCS and low priority given to OCS P&I responsibilities in the overall force, or a lack of training in the skills necessary to perform OCS P&I tasks. We found that understaffing of OCS P&I capabilities was a challenge across the force, and this could impede organizations' ability to meet their OCS-related doctrinal responsibilities. Furthermore, organizations across DoD require greater understanding of both core and non-core OCS tasks if they participate in planning and monitoring activities that relate to government contractors.⁶

We therefore recommend that DoD bring existing staffing levels for the OCS P&I workforce in line with the staffing estimates described

⁶ Note that the lack of a gap between policy and practice does not necessarily mean that a task is being performed well, to its full extent, or by the appropriate people; likewise, some identified gaps could represent cases in which policy has not caught up to practice.

in this report to ensure that OCS P&I-related doctrinal responsibilities are met. While this may not require extensive wholesale growth across the OCS P&I workforce, it will likely at least require some realignment of OCS personnel across various organizations. Along these lines, it is critical to note that the staffing estimates reported here should be considered full-time equivalents (FTEs) in the truest sense; that is, that they are not numbers of “bodies,” per se, but are the additive sum of the total manpower effort needed across the organizations of interest. For instance, an estimate of 1.5 FTEs of OCS P&I manpower needed in one office could be fulfilled by one full-time person and one half-time person, or it could be fulfilled by three people each working on OCS for half of their portfolio. While one ideal way of ensuring the completion of all the OCS P&I tasks outlined in existing guidance would be to add dedicated OCS manpower, our recommendations do acknowledge and are sensitive to existing resource and manning constraints. They are intended to provide flexibility in terms of how such staffing levels might be achieved.

Training Is Needed to Promote Greater Integration of the OCS P&I Workforce

Training is necessary to close gaps in knowledge and skills, and the Joint OCS Learning Framework offers a holistic approach to expanding OCS-related training for DoD personnel. Because it aligns so well with training models across the force, it should be the foundation on which DoD builds its OCS readiness and promotes knowledge and skill development in OCS-relevant activities. DoD must make a decision regarding when and where OCS P&I training will be conducted, and whom such training efforts will target. This research attempts to highlight several critical considerations for DoD as it makes these decisions, offering two distinct training models as potential options.

Despite a clear need for OCS-relevant training and education, very few professional military education courses for core OCS personnel provide instruction on any element of OCS. Although a variety of classroom and online courses are available to military, civilian, and, to a lesser extent, contractor personnel, these courses focus primarily on the operational level. Collective training also occurs routinely across

the services, with a focus on crisis action planning, estimating contract support activities, contracting support structures, and conducting staff-assisted visits. This type of training typically takes the form of exercises, with an academic portion and a practical application of the instruction.

In the current resource-constrained environment, recent reductions at GCC and SCC headquarters, and the likelihood that additional billets will not be available to increase OCS-specific manpower, training the current workforce is one of the simplest solutions to increase OCS knowledge across the force. To address the lack of training in the current force, we explored two broad framework categories that DoD should consider pursuing—possibly in concert with each other—to train the OCS P&I workforce. The choice of model will likely be informed largely by resource and manpower constraints.

The first training model would create a long-term, institutionalized OCS P&I capability by offering a basic level of instruction on OCS P&I at initial entry into the military. As officer and selected enlisted personnel progress in their careers, they would be exposed to more advanced OCS P&I concepts and techniques. Because OCS P&I would be incorporated into the professional military education curriculum, this model would facilitate training of both core and non-core OCS P&I personnel.

Second, an expeditionary training model emphasizing mobile training teams could be a relatively cost-effective way to reach large numbers of personnel with OCS P&I-relevant training. Ideally, this expeditionary training model would include a one-week course for non-core OCS P&I personnel and a “train-the-trainer” course for core OCS P&I personnel, who could then train non-core OCS P&I personnel on their staffs in OCS equities; a senior leader course in OCS P&I as it applies to military operations with a focus on reducing fraud, waste, and abuse in contracting; and online courses designed to address specific needs. This model very closely resembles the current model for training the total force in OCS equities.

There Are Several Potential Human Capital Strategies for the OCS P&I Workforce

DoD could pursue any of several alternative strategies to strengthen its OCS P&I workforce. Based on our literature review, interview discussions, and PD analysis, we devised six recommended position types reflecting both the OCS P&I work currently being done in practice and the doctrinally mandated tasks that are not being done in practice at this time:

1. OCS manager/senior OCS integrator
2. OCS planner/integrator
3. OCS analyst
4. OCS trainer
5. OCS knowledge management specialist
6. OCS policy development specialist.

We also created an OCS generalist position that combined the most significant aspects of the OCS manager, OCS planner, and OCS analyst PDs. This position would increase flexibility when resources are constrained, substituting for these more specialized stand-alone positions.

Keeping in mind these position types—which are described in more detail in Appendix B of this report—we devised five potential alternative courses of action for DoD’s OCS human capital strategy moving forward, shown in Table S.1.

The first potential human capital strategy would be to maintain the OCS P&I workforce at the current manning, organizational, and training levels, continuing the current practice of ad hoc manning and filling of OCS P&I positions. This would entail maintaining JCASO at its current level of manning, and keeping it under the auspices of DLA.⁷ Training offerings would continue to consist of a combination

⁷ JCASO is located in DLA’s Directorate of Logistics Operations (J3) and is led by a Senior Executive Service civilian. It consists of an Operations Division, Program Integration Division, and Expeditionary Contract Division. It has a mission to provide an OCS joint strategic enabling capability to the GCCs and U.S. Special Operations Command through planning, joint training, and initial OCS mission support to the joint force commander to help

Table S.1
Summary of Alternatives to Remedy OCS Capability Gaps

Possible Alternative	Manning	Organizational	Training	Additional Manpower	Benefits and Risks
Steady state	Ad hoc manning and filling of joint manning requirements	JCASO owns GCC planners and expeditionary capability (mission support teams)	Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course (JOPEC), mobile training teams, and Joint Knowledge Online, Defense Acquisition University, and Army Logistics University current courses	Maintain current OCS branch chief, planner, and PDs with OCS equities	No major changes to service force structure but this does not meet the requirements for OCS characterization.
Fully integrated	Divide OCS requirements among other staff organizations (J-codes)	JCASO and positions used to offset GCC and SCC requirements are eliminated	JOPEC institutionalized in service schools; OCS parenthetical skill identifier established to recognize OCS training	No unique OCS PDs; add manpower	OCS capabilities added to the services, but additional training and institutionalization are required
OCS specialization	Create unique civilian and military OCS occupational codes	JCASO expeditionary capability moved to the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command; OCS planners reassigned to GCCs	Training on multilevel requirements generation moved to service schools; JOPEC institutionalized and JOPEC II added	Create unique OCS PDs (OCS generalist or six OCS PD types); add manpower	Establishes core OCS expertise but requires manpower

Table S.1—Continued

Possible Alternative	Manning	Organizational	Training	Additional Manpower	Benefits and Risks
Hybrid approach	Create OCS parenthetical skill identifier to track OCS-trained personnel	JCASO expeditionary capability moved to the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command; OCS planners reassigned to GCCs	Develop tiered training solution to fully institutionalize the capability across the total force	Create six unique OCS PDs to enable targeted training for OCS skill sets; add manpower	Identifies OCS experts but requires manpower and institutionalization
Hybrid approach that maintains JCASO	Create OCS parenthetical skill identifier to track OCS-trained personnel	JCASO owns GCC planners and expeditionary capability (mission support teams)	Develop tiered training solution to fully institutionalize the capability across the total force	Create six unique OCS PDs to enable targeted training for OCS skill sets; add manpower	Identifies OCS experts but requires manpower and institutionalization

of JOPEC, mobile training teams, and various contracting courses offered through the Defense Acquisition University and the Army Logistics University, in addition to several online courses hosted on Joint Knowledge Online. Formal OCS-relevant position types would continue to be limited to OCS planners and an OCS branch chief, with other position types containing OCS equities but not explicitly titled as such. Due to the aforementioned gaps in mandated OCS P&I work that exist under the current status quo system, we do not recommend continuation of this approach unless additional steps are taken to bolster OCS P&I manpower across the force.

A second potential strategy would entail the complete institutionalization of OCS P&I across the force (the “fully integrated” alternative shown in Table S.1). Given existing resource constraints, this option appears to be less likely than several others at present, but could be a viable option in the future.

A third potential strategy would involve creating an entirely new career field for OCS, a change that would be advantageous in creating the potential to institutionalize these activities across the force to some degree (though not to the degree seen in the second strategy). It could also help better facilitate planning and systematize training. Such an approach would require a considerable investment of resources and personnel and thus considerable leadership buy-in. It may also pose challenges in attracting top talent to these positions: Because specialization to this degree necessarily entails some opportunity cost, it is less likely that individuals who choose this career field could specialize in other fields as well. This type of model could make it difficult to attract the best and brightest to the OCS P&I workforce.

A fourth potential strategy, creating an OCS qualification designer, would bridge the gap between a completely separate OCS P&I occupational code/specialty and the current ad hoc approach. This approach would have many of the same advantages as creating a sep-

ensure that the combatant command has an organizational program management approach to OCS in accordance with the law. Our interview data revealed numerous shortcomings associated with the JCASO model, as well as conflicting views on whether it was the best possible option given current constraints.

arate occupational code or specialty, and it would potentially create more of an incentive for individuals across the total force to seek out OCS P&I training opportunities (without a major opportunity cost). However, the necessary investment would be higher than under the current ad hoc system.

In both the third and fourth alternative strategies, OCS planners would be reassigned from JCASO directly to the GCCs, JCASO would be moved from DLA to the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, and JCASO would retain an expeditionary capability focused on mobile support teams and limited expeditionary training. The advantage of such a model is that it would increase available OCS P&I manpower to meet the staffing requirements associated with either the third or fourth alternative strategies, somewhat relieving the overall resource strain on DoD of having to implement one of these strategies. Furthermore, it would streamline command and control over the OCS planners at the GCCs and situate JCASO more clearly as filling an expeditionary role under ownership of an organization responsible for expeditionary operations. The primary risk associated with this aspect of the third and fourth strategies considered here is the possibility that the OCS planners could be reassigned to non-OCS P&I tasks if they fall under direct control of the GCC commander. However, these two approaches involve training individuals in OCS P&I at all levels across the force, increasing the likelihood that more commanders will come to appreciate the operational and logistical significance of OCS. Indeed, strong adherence to this approach might offer the best chance that commanders would benefit from OCS, appreciate its criticality as an operational function, and protect OCS P&I capabilities under their command. Another potential means of addressing this risk would be to assign a lead service (such as the Department of the Army) to advocate for OCS P&I manpower.

Finally, a fifth potential strategy is the same as the fourth strategy—it involves creating an OCS qualification designator—but it would leave JCASO intact in its current state and under DLA ownership, at least in the near term. The advantage of this strategy is that it could be implemented in stages, allowing an extensive percentage of existing JCASO planners to act as trainers and to remain in GCC

planning roles until sufficient numbers of additional core staff were trained and qualified for OCS P&I positions. A disadvantage is that it would not resolve the command-and-control issues faced by current JCASO planners embedded at the GCCs (whereby they are answerable not only to the command but also to DLA/JCASO and are often dual-tasked). Furthermore, the existing JCASO workforce would also be required to undergo additional training to effectively train new OCS P&I core personnel to the standards of a qualification designator.

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Abbreviations

AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
ALU	Army Logistics University
AOR	area of responsibility
cASM	Contingency Acquisition Support Model
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJCSN	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff notice
COP	community of practice
D&S	Dollars and Sense
DAU	Defense Acquisition University
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DMDC	Defense Manpower Data Center
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DoDD	U.S. Department of Defense directive
DoDI	U.S. Department of Defense instruction
FASCLASS	Fully Automated System for Classification

FTE	full-time equivalent
GCC	geographic combatant command
IT	information technology
JAMMS	Joint Asset Movement Management System
JCASO	Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office
JCCS	Joint Contingency Contracting System
JECC	Joint Enabling Capabilities Command
JFC	joint forces commander
JKO	Joint Knowledge Online
JMVP	Joint Manpower Validation Process
JOPEC	Joint OCS Planning and Execution Course
JP	joint publication
JPME	joint professional military education
JTF	joint task force
KM	knowledge management
KSAs	knowledge, skills, and abilities
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MST	mission support team
MTT	mobile training team
NEC	Navy Enlisted Classification
OCS	operational contract support
OCSD	Operational Contract Support Division (formerly Operational Contract Support and Service Division)

OCSIC	operational contract support integration cell
OCSJX	Operational Contract Support Joint Exercise
ODASD(PS)	Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support
OMI	OCS mission integrator
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
P&I	planning and integration
PD	position description
PME	professional military education
SCC	service component command
SI	skill identifier
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SOP	standard operating procedure
SPOT	Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker
TBC	theater business clearance
TOPSS	Total Operational Picture Support System
TTPs	tactics, techniques, and procedures
USAFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USNORTHCOM	U.S. Northern Command

USPACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
WISN	Workload Indicators of Staffing Need

Introduction

As of July 2016, there were 42,694 contractors working on U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) contracts in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). Of these contractors, 2,485 were in Iraq, compared with approximately 5,000 U.S. troops on the ground there. Meanwhile, 26,435 were in Afghanistan, compared with 8,400 U.S. troops.¹ Indeed, since 2003, contractors working for DoD have frequently outnumbered U.S. troops on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan.² In doing so, they act as a force multiplier providing the United States with both military and political flexibility. The overall numbers of contractors deployed to the U.S. military's main theaters of operation have decreased in recent years with the troop drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the continued utilization of contracted functions and supplies foreshadows their continued use for decades to come, as explored further in Chapter Two.

Along with this extensive employment of contractors in recent years has come increased scrutiny and visibility of the risks, such as waste, fraud, and abuse, as well as the unforeseen strategic, operational,

¹ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support, "Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility," July 2016; Josh Rogin, "Obama's Generals Want More U.S. Troops in Iraq," *Washington Post*, June 22, 2016; Associated Press, "A Timeline of U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan Since 2001," *Military Times*, July 6, 2016.

² Molly Dunigan, *Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies' Impact on Military Effectiveness*, Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2011, p. 1; Micah Zenko, "The New Unknown Soldiers of Afghanistan and Iraq," *Foreign Policy*, May 29, 2015.

and tactical consequences of injecting contract funds into theaters of operation. According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, at least \$31 billion—and possibly as much as \$60 billion—was lost to contract waste and fraud in U.S. contingency operations in those two theaters by 2011.³ Beyond this loss of funds due to waste, fraud, and abuse, there are also potential operational implications—both positive and negative—associated with awarding contract funds to local entities in theater. Similarly, the choice to forgo using local sources for contracted supplies and services in favor of foreign sources has potential first-, second-, and third-order effects at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.⁴ Whereas proper planning for the use of contract funds holds the potential to improve military effectiveness and support the commander's overarching objectives, failure to plan for and recognize the potential downstream effects of contracting in theater can lead to a decrease in overall military effectiveness, as discussed further in Chapter Two.

In an effort to alleviate the risks associated with the utilization of contractors to support the military in theater, U.S. policy and joint doctrine grew to encompass detailed planning guidance and a vision for integrating operational contractors and contracting activities fully into defense activities. What had formerly been referred to as “contingency contracting” took on the new name “operational contract support” (OCS), defined as the process of obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations. Previous conceptions of contingency contracting were fairly vaguely focused on the process of acquiring goods or services for theater support purposes via contract mechanisms.⁵ OCS, however, is much more clearly delineated in doctrine. It is defined as encompassing three main

³ Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, *Transforming Wartime Contracting*, Arlington, Va., August 2011, p. 5

⁴ Air Force Installation Contracting Agency, “Operational Contract Support (OCS) Effects Primer: The Importance of 2nd and 3rd Order Effects,” undated.

⁵ Statute defines *contingency contracting* as “all stages of the process of acquiring property or services by the Department of Defense during a contingency operation” (10 U.S.C. 2333).

categories of supporting functions for DoD personnel through all phases (Phases 0–5) of an operation:

- *Contract support integration:* The coordination and synchronization of contracted support executed in a designated operational area in support of the joint force.
- *Contracting support:* The execution of contracting authority and coordination of contracting actions in support of joint force operations.
- *Contractor management:* The oversight and integration of contractor personnel and associated equipment providing support to the joint force in a designated operational area.⁶

These three categories of OCS supporting functions are intended to assist DoD in ensuring more deliberate and careful contemplation of the use of contracts in theater. As stated in joint doctrine:

Effective and efficient OCS execution requires a programmatic approach by the JFC [joint forces commander]. This JFC-centric approach requires commanders and staffs to fully consider cost, performance, schedule, and contract oversight requirements as well as many other contract support-related matters (e.g., risk of contractor failure to perform, civil-military impact, operations security) across the joint force, to include United States Government departments and agencies and key multinational partners. The three overall supporting functions [contracting support integration, contracting support, and contractor management] and associated tasks help to characterize OCS.⁷

Yet, DoD has faced challenges in both institutionalizing this doctrinal conception of OCS throughout the defense workforce and in meeting the goals laid out in this and related OCS doctrine and policy. Indeed, OCS planning and integration (P&I) workforce

⁶ Joint Publication (JP) 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2014, p. I-3.

⁷ JP 4-10, 2014, p. ix.

activities—defined in JP 4-10 as including the ability to *plan*, *orchestrate*, and *synchronize* the provision of contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management—tend to be compartmentalized and pursued by various offices in an uncoordinated and insufficient manner, as illustrated in later chapters of this report.⁸ It has therefore been difficult, to date, to clearly establish manpower requirements for this capability.

Congress, noting the potential downstream effects of operational contracting and the challenges related to successfully planning for and integrating OCS into DoD activities, has recognized the need for an OCS human capital strategy. Over the past decade, congressional directives have mandated the establishment of training requirements for contingency contracting and program management personnel in the acquisition workforce, the establishment of contingency contracting and OCS training requirements for personnel outside the acquisition workforce, a review of manpower and contractor support, and a determination of OCS requirements and recommended resources to improve OCS.⁹ Additionally, DoD is directed by law to identify the critical skills and competencies needed to carry out the procurement of contract services, and to develop a comprehensive strategy for recruiting, training, and deploying employees to meet the requirements for such skills and competencies.¹⁰ Most recently, Section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, amended

⁸ JP 4-10, 2014. One reason frequently cited in our interviews for the lack of coordination on OCS efforts across DoD was that the OCS terminology itself is not appropriate for OCS-related activities, not adequately descriptive, and not easily understood by relevant parties. Indeed, numerous interviewees stated that personnel often think OCS stands for Officer Candidate School and do not understand the nuances of contract management, support, and integration. While it was outside of the scope of this study to explore options for different terminology, we highlight this point as an issue warranting serious consideration by OCS stakeholders.

⁹ Public Law 109-364, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, April 4, 2006, Section 854; Public Law 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, January 28, 2008, Section 802; Public Law 112-81, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, December 31, 2011, Section 820; Public Law 112-239, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, January 3, 2012, Section 845.

¹⁰ 10 U.S.C. 2330, para. a.1.B.

Title 10, Section 153, of the U.S. Code to make the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for, in consultation with the DoD components, “determining the OCS requirements of the armed forces and recommending the resources required to improve and enhance OCS for the armed forces and planning for such OCS.”¹¹

Accordingly, defense leadership has directed that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff determine OCS P&I workforce manpower requirements to improve OCS planning and execution. For instance, a 2011 Secretary of Defense memorandum directed the Chairman to “characterize the OCS capability requirement,” and capability gap 3 of the 2011 Joint Requirements Oversight Council–approved *Initial Capabilities Document for Operational Contract Support* stated that “DoD lacks a human strategy—recruit, train, track, and retain—for all OCS functions, which encumbers deployment and staffing for the Joint Force and complicates execution of OCS and compliance with legislation and regulation.”¹² Gap 3 in the current *Operational Contract Support Action Plan* states, “DoD lacks a holistic strategy to identify, validate, resource, and staff total force manpower requirements for OCS P&I functions, with a focus on the training, recruitment, and retention of organic military and civilian workforce requirements.”¹³

Objectives and Approach of This Study

In light of these statutory and policy requirements and the history surrounding OCS integration, the Operational Contract Support Division (OCSD) of the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate (J4) asked RAND in late 2015 to assess the human capital needs of the OCS P&I work-

¹¹ See Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Strategic and Operational Planning for OCS and Workforce Mix,” memorandum, January 24, 2011; Joint Requirements Oversight Council, *Initial Capabilities Document for Operational Contract Support*, version 1.0, July 19, 2011; Public Law 112-239, 2012.

¹² Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011; Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 2011.

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Operational Contract Support Action Plan, FY 2017–FY 2020*, Washington, D.C., September 22, 2016. Not available to the general public.

force across the defense enterprise.¹⁴ Accordingly, the objectives of this study were as follows:

1. Map out the population of “core” OCS P&I personnel across the total force, and devise appropriate position descriptions (PDs) for these OCS P&I personnel.
2. Define the training requirements for both the core OCS P&I workforce and the “non-core” OCS P&I workforce (i.e., DoD employees with some level of OCS P&I responsibilities but whose positions are not specified as OCS positions).
3. Estimate the staffing requirements for core OCS P&I personnel at a specified set of U.S. defense organizations.

OCSD requested that RAND focus primarily on the “contract support integration” piece of OCS in Phase 0 steady-state operations. Therefore, the subset of the entire OCS workforce that is primarily engaged in contract support integration tasks was the subject of this study. Because these individuals are typically engaged in planning or integration activities, we refer to this population throughout this report as the *OCS P&I workforce*. It should be noted that OCSD requested that RAND focus on the “core” OCS P&I workforce—that is, individuals working in a full-time or nearly full-time capacity on OCS P&I activities—but develop training recommendations for the non-core workforce as well. The organizations for which RAND was asked to assess staffing needs and training requirements were as follows:

- Joint Staff (J4)
- geographic combatant commands (GCCs)
- service component commands (SCCs)
- Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support (ODASD[PS])
- joint task forces (JTFs)

¹⁴ OCSD was known as the Operational Contract Support and Services Division at the time this research commenced. The organization’s name changed in 2016.

- military services (U.S. Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics [G-4], U.S. Navy Office of the Director for Material Readiness and Logistics [N4], and Air Force Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, Logistics, and Force Protection [A4] only)
- Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)/Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO).

Because one of the key objectives of this study is the development of staffing estimates that may affect manpower requests, it is pertinent to note that any permanent addition to defense manpower of any kind will need to go through either a service or joint manpower validation process or board.¹⁵ In aiming to determine the OCS P&I staffing requirements across a number of defense organizations, this study has been scoped to act as an input into manpower validation processes and provide the necessary information detailing OCS P&I staffing and manpower requirements. The JMVP is the only validation process that actually resources additional manpower requirements, so we focused primarily on creating inputs to feed into that process.¹⁶

¹⁵ Interview with Joint Manpower Validation Process (JMVP) personnel, March 2016.

¹⁶ Interview with JMVP personnel, March 2016. The Joint Manpower Program is designed to ensure that joint activities have the minimum manpower with the appropriate skills and experience to carry out assigned missions, tasks, and functions. There are several processes that the Joint Staff and the services use to resource staffing requirements, the most prominent of which is JMVP. JMVP is DoD's overarching manpower process and is governed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1001.01B, with further clarification provided by the *Joint Manpower Validation Process Guide*. See CJCSI 1001.01B, *Joint Manpower and Personnel Program*, October 7, 2014, Enclosure B; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Manpower Validation Process Guide*, Washington, D.C., March 31, 2011.

JMVP operates on a yearly cycle and is used by the Joint Staff and combatant commands to request permanent manpower increases. In addition to JMVP, each service has its own manpower validation process to adjudicate new manpower requests. Each service also has policy and guidance that governs the validation process. Because the services are currently operating in a resource-constrained environment, all requirements and authorizations across various segments of the total force are being carefully scrutinized, and most organizations assess the potential trade-offs when new requirements are requested. For more detail on service validation processes, see U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, "Concept Plan Guidance," memorandum, March 31, 2010; Marine Corps Order 5311.1D, *Total Force Structure Process (TFSP)*, February 26, 2009; OPNAV Instruc-

Study Approach

The objective of defining staffing and training requirements for a nascent capability is a challenging one, as it does not lend itself easily to the use of existing defense manpower modeling methods.¹⁷ In an effort to bring rigor to this analysis in spite of these challenges, we chose to adopt a multifaceted methodology that involved triangulating a number of distinct methods and data sources, including the following:¹⁸

tion 1000.16L, *Navy Total Force Manpower Policies and Procedures*, June 2015; Air Force Instruction 38-301, *Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment Program*, November 20, 2009; and Air Force Instruction 64-102, *Operational Contracting Program*, July 25, 2005.

¹⁷ Many military manpower models are designed to assess future force sufficiency based on current force structure and levels. Future needs are known ahead of time, and modeling allows an assessment of whether the current force will meet those needs. Examples of such models include RAND's Total Blue Force Line, Military Career Model, and Total Force Flow Model, as well as various models developed by the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency (see U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, *Manpower Model Development Methodology*, June 2008). Service members' progress through their careers is marked by very specific milestones, so it is easy to predict and project the future force structure based on its current state. Such models were not appropriate for this study because it did not track individuals over the course of their careers, nor are future needs known for the OCS P&I workforce.

To determine current staffing levels, it is necessary to know an organization's workload, as well as the work-hours necessary to meet various workload components (see Albert A. Robbert, Lisa M. Harrington, Tara L. Terry, and H. G. Massey, *Air Force Manpower Requirements and Component Mix: A Focus on Agile Combat Support*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-617-AF, 2014). This requires collecting large amounts of data across these dimensions, which can be problematic in emerging institutions. For a new enterprise or nascent capability, such as OCS, similar organizations may be used as benchmarks for initial estimates of workload or staffing needs. However, the OCS P&I workforce does not have the infrastructure in place to collect the necessary data, and it does not closely resemble another workforce, making it impossible to extrapolate baseline staffing needs in this manner.

¹⁸ This process is defined as follows:

Methodological triangulation involves using more than one kind of method to study a phenomenon. It has been found to be beneficial in providing confirmation of findings, more comprehensive data, increased validity and enhanced understanding of studied phenomena. As data are drawn from multiple sources, it broadens the researcher's insight into the different issues underlying the phenomena being studied. (Abir K. Bekhet and Jaclene A. Zauszniewski, "Methodological Triangulation: An Approach to Understanding Data," *Nurse Researcher*, Vol. 20, No. 2, November 2012, p. 40)

- literature review
- semistructured interviews
- large- n PD analysis
- task-time survey data
- various weighting schemes to enable staffing estimate calculations
- training analysis
- scenario analysis.

We describe these methods in greater detail, along with how and why they were employed, in the sections that follow.

Gap Analysis to Inform Position Descriptions and Staffing Requirements

To map out the population of core OCS P&I personnel across the total force and to devise appropriate PDs and staffing estimates for these OCS P&I personnel, we employed a multistage approach that drew on a variety of data sources. In employing this approach, we ultimately sought to perform a gap analysis, highlighting gaps between OCS P&I tasks being completed and those mandated in policy and doctrine.

First, we endeavored to capture the entire universe of OCS P&I activities that should theoretically be occurring, as mandated in policy and doctrine. To do so, we performed an extensive literature review of more than 110 scholarly, policy, and doctrinal documents. We then focused specifically on the subset of doctrinal and policy documents (totaling approximately 45) specifically delineating OCS P&I-related responsibilities for the organizations of interest and created a spreadsheet—or map—listing all the responsibilities by organization. After eliminating redundancies across the listed responsibilities, we performed a mini-Delphi exercise in which a team of three researchers separately coded each responsibility on the spreadsheet into one of

See also Mary Anne Lauri, “Triangulation of Data Analysis Techniques,” *Papers on Social Representations*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2011, and Nancy Carter, Denise Bryant-Lukosius, Alba DiCenso, Jennifer Blythe, and Alan J. Neville, “The Use of Triangulation in Qualitative Research,” *Oncology Nursing Forum*, Vol. 41, No. 5, September 2014.

several categories of activities.¹⁹ We performed multiple iterations of this coding exercise, resulting in a comprehensive picture of the mix and variety of OCS P&I-related responsibilities of each organization of interest, as well as the relative importance of certain types of responsibilities to some organizations relative to others—at least as specified in doctrine. The methods employed in this exercise and its findings are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three.

We then sought to identify which OCS P&I activities were already occurring in practice, and the characteristics of the population engaged in such activities. To do so, we employed two approaches: semistructured interviews and an analysis of a large sample of existing PDs.

We interviewed a total of 119 individuals from 50 different offices across DoD. Interviewees represented multiple directorates under the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military services, the Joint Staff, the Fourth Estate, each of the GCCs (USCENTCOM, U.S. Southern Command [USSOUTHCOM], U.S. European Command [USEUCOM], U.S. Africa Command [USAFRICOM], U.S. Pacific Command [USPACOM], and U.S. Northern Command [USNORTHCOM]), functional combatant commands (U.S. Special Operations Command [USSOCOM] and U.S. Transportation Command), and several SCCs, including U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Army Africa, Pacific Fleet, Marine Forces Pacific, Marine Forces Europe and Africa, Pacific Air Forces, and the Air Force Installa-

¹⁹ The Delphi method is a structured communication technique that RAND originally developed in the 1950s as a systematic, interactive forecasting method relying on a panel of experts. Delphi is based on the principle that forecasts (or decisions) from a structured group of individuals are more accurate than those from unstructured groups. When this technique is adapted for face-to-face meetings, it is called mini-Delphi or Estimate-Talk-Estimate. There is not a single Delphi methodology; the applications are diverse. In general, there is agreement that the Delphi method at its most basic is an expert survey in two or more “rounds.” In the second and later rounds of the survey, the results of the previous round are given as feedback, and the experts answer under the influence of their colleagues’ opinions. Thus, the Delphi method is a relatively strongly structured group communication process. (See Kerstin Cuhls, “Delphi Method,” in Kerstin Cuhls, ed., *Delphi Surveys: Teaching Material for UNIDO Foresight Seminars*, Vienna, Austria: United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2005).

tion Contracting Agency–Pacific.²⁰ Table 1.1 shows the composition of our interview sample, by organization. We processed information from our interviews using qualitative coding software to identify trends and aggregate statistics. These data ultimately informed all aspects of this study and the findings reported herein.

To supplement the information gleaned from our interviews on the current activities of the OCS P&I workforce, we collected data from an open-source PD database, the Army’s Fully Automated System for Classification (FASCLASS).²¹ At the time of this analysis, fewer than 70 PDs explicitly included the phrase “operational contract support.” Using keyword searches for terms extracted from our literature review of roles and responsibilities, we collected more than 20,000 additional PDs that did not explicitly mention “operational contract support” but nonetheless included possible OCS tasks. We used a combination of machine-learning or “text-scraping” approaches and human coding to identify a subset of 164 PDs that were related to OCS and within the scope of this study; that is, they specifically addressed the contract support integration aspects of OCS. We then conducted multiple analyses of this sample of PDs to identify various demographic characteristics of the OCS P&I workforce and the types of tasks that this workforce performs in practice—or, at least, the tasks that have been written into the formal PDs.

²⁰ Interviews are attributed anonymously throughout this report in compliance with the U.S. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (also known as the Common Rule). Organizational affiliation is included in citations to give a sense of the interviewee’s background and experience, but we should note that interviewees were not asked to represent their organizations in a confidential way. While they were asked to respond based on their professional experiences, they were, in all cases, speaking for themselves rather than for their organizations in an official capacity.

²¹ FASCLASS is a web-based system containing information on more than 300,000 civilian positions, mostly in the Army but also in some joint organizations. Each PD includes the position title, grade, Office of Personnel Management (OPM) occupational series, and a detailed description of duties, as well as regulatory and legal information related to mandatory financial disclosures, Fair Labor Standards Act exemptions, required clearances, and so forth. The position duties section of the PD typically has multiple parts describing the major duties of the position, knowledge required, supervisory controls, the nature of professional contacts the incumbent will make, and more.

Table 1.1
Composition of Interview Sample, by Organization

Organization	% of Interview Sample
GCCs	23
SCCs	17
Joint Staff (J4, OCSD)	13
U.S. Air Force	6
JCASO	4
Joint Staff (J7)	4
Sub-unified commands	4
ODASD(PS)	3
Air Force Installation Contracting Agency	2
DLA	2
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition and Procurement	2
U.S. Army	2
U.S. Navy	2
U.S. Transportation Command	2
Army Expeditionary Contracting Command	1
Army Logistics University (ALU)	1
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)	1
Defense Acquisition University (DAU)	1
Defense Contract Management Agency	1
DoD Office of the Chief Management Officer	1
Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC)	1
Joint Staff (J1)	1
Joint Staff (J4)	1
JTFs	1
Not available	1
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement	1
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness	1
U.S. Army contracting support brigades	1
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	1

The PDs provided a useful, if incomplete, picture of the work that civilians are performing throughout the Army and in some joint organizations.²² Although this data source is not complete or necessarily representative of the entire OCS P&I workforce, we nonetheless gained valuable insights into the current OCS workforce by examining what is, or has been, required OCS work. We confirmed and refined these insights by triangulating the PD analysis results with the other methods employed in this study. These methods and our related findings are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four.

Comparing the information gleaned through the literature review, interviews, and PD analysis, we were able to better understand those OCS P&I activities that are required, those that are being completed, and those that are not being completed. We then categorized necessary OCS tasks into position types and created PDs for each. We further used the gap analysis to inform our calculation of staffing estimates, as elaborated next.

Staffing Estimate Calculation Methodology

The initial inspiration for developing a method for estimating OCS personnel staffing was the Workload Indicators of Staffing Need (WISN) method promoted by the World Health Organization to determine staffing needs in hospitals.²³ The WISN method is used to calculate staffing needs for various types of positions in a medical facility and takes four factors into account: available working time, work-

²² We say the picture is “incomplete” because the PD against which a civilian was hired may not match the duties he or she is performing today. If that person has actually changed jobs, there should be a PD for the new position, but if his or her duties have simply changed over time within the same position, that would not necessarily be reflected in the PD. It can be challenging to identify the organization or agency with which the position is affiliated; this must be inferred from the location of the civilian personnel center responsible for the PD and from information in the position duties section. A limitation of using FASCLASS in isolation is that it does not include PDs for most DoD, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps civilians, nor does it include any military positions. However, among the services, the Army performs the bulk of OCS activities, and the FASCLASS PD sample does include some PDs for GCC civilians doing OCS work.

²³ World Health Organization, *Workload Indicators of Staffing Need User's Manual*, Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization Press, 2010.

load components, activity standards, and activity statistics. We chose this method because it can be used to model manpower needs based on a breakdown of tasks across a workforce and the number of people completing each task; both are data points that were available to at least some extent for the nascent OCS P&I workforce. Key factors in staffing calculations under the WISN method are an individual's available working time and annual workload.

To adapt the WISN method for the purposes of this study and to simplify our calculations, we devised a task/time survey to collect data on OCS-related tasks at various organizations. Our goal was to develop an estimate of the annual workload of an organization and to determine the annual level of effort for the various tasks described in our PDs. We sent the survey our interviewees via email, asking them to describe the OCS-related tasks they performed, to estimate the amount of time spent on each task annually, and to indicate the number of individuals performing each task. Due to the survey's 61-percent response rate and variability in the response rates across organizations of interest, we opted to use a modified version of the WISN method based on the task/time survey data for the staffing estimates for two organizations of interest: the Joint Staff (J4) and ODASD(PS). We adapted the WISN method because (1) OCS is a nascent capability that does not have established categories and standards of work, and (2) there are no accurate figures on workloads for the individual organizations. To adapt the method, we calculated staffing estimates for other organizations using various weighting schemes, incorporating the gap analysis and associated data sources described earlier. For more detail on the staffing estimate calculation methodology and weighting schemes employed in this study, see Appendix B.

Training Analysis

The training analysis incorporated several of the other analytical methods used in this report. It also leveraged the OCS Learning Framework, a holistic approach to OCS institutionalization and training across DoD, to ensure that recommendations from this report could be easily adapted and used by the services as they align their professional

military education (PME) curricula to expand OCS capability within the force for both the core and non-core workforces.

We began the training analysis by using multiple policy and training documents to understand how training and education are typically conducted across DoD. We looked at PME and civilian education, individual and collective training, and best practices. Then, we inspected current service-specific course catalogs that offered OCS-specific contracting and logistics courses to identify where OCS instruction was offered and what topics were covered. We compared current courses with historical course offerings to identify training gaps, augmenting this review with input from interviews. We then compared our assessment of training gaps to the staffing requirements gap analysis described earlier to identify where training was sufficient and where it was lacking. This led us to identify several areas in both the core and non-core workforces where OCS P&I instruction appeared to be lacking. We then examined the Operational Contract Support Joint Exercise (OCSJX) for opportunities to train OCS P&I in a collective environment.

As a final step, we categorized training options into two different training models—one focused on institutionalizing training across the force and one focused on expeditionary training options. We highlight the benefits and constraints of each.

Scenario Analysis

While this research focused primarily on identifying the human capital needs for the OCS P&I workforce in Phase 0 steady-state operations, we also wanted to determine the extent to which capability needs would vary across Phase 1–5 operations. To this end, we used historical data and current U.S. military strategy documents to develop several potential future mission scenarios in which the Joint Staff might have to coordinate OCS across elements of the defense workforce. In an attempt to provide broad visibility into the potential range of feasible OCS P&I staffing requirements, we chose scenarios that varied in terms of the aspects of the OCS P&I workforce most likely to be called upon for support. We then incorporated questions regarding distinct scenarios' needs for OCS P&I capabilities into our interview protocol,

with the aim of identifying the variables that would be most critical for OCS planners to account for when contemplating capability needs across different operational scenarios in Phases 1–5.

Our initial expectation was that human capital needs for the OCS P&I workforce—in terms of both the numbers and skill sets of personnel needed—would vary across these scenarios. However, our data collected did not support this initial hypothesis. Indeed, our interviews indicated that there may be some additional need for OCS skill sets, such as for logisticians and engineers in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations. However, such variation would most likely affect the need for contract support generally rather than the need for OCS P&I personnel specifically. The need for OCS P&I personnel performing contract support integration tasks appeared to remain steady across scenarios. In contrast, most interviewees felt that the most likely determinant of variation in OCS P&I staffing needs would be the size or tempo of a particular phase of a given operation.²⁴

Although we had initially developed detailed scenarios—including land-based and maritime major combat operation variants, irregular warfare, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations—through which to view potential OCS human capital needs across different phases of operations, our interview analysis led us conclude that applying detailed scenarios to OCS human capital needs in Phases 1–5 would yield neither viable nor useful results. As a result, the analyses in this report are pertinent to OCS human capital needs in current steady-state, Phase 0 operations, and we highlight for defense officials and policymakers that the number of personnel needed in non-steady-state operations will likely vary with the size and pace of the operation in question. It appears, however, that the range of required OCS P&I skill sets will likely remain fairly constant across all types and phases of any operational scenario. These skill sets are captured in the PDs in Appendix B.

²⁴ Interview with a Joint Staff official, January 2016; interview with U.S. Army Expeditionary Contracting Command personnel, March 2016; interview with a U.S. Army official, March 2016.

Organization of This Report

The remainder of this report begins with a historical overview and analysis in Chapter Two situating DoD's current OCS P&I activities in the modern history of operational contracting and illustrating the persistent, ongoing strategic significance of both OCS and OCS P&I activities in military conflicts now and in the foreseeable future. Chapter Three describes our extensive academic, policy, and doctrinal literature review (the details of which are presented in Appendix A) to map out the universe of doctrinally mandated OCS P&I activities across a number of organizations of interest. Compared with Chapter Three's assessment of OCS P&I activities that should be carried out in theory, Chapter Four describes our findings regarding OCS P&I activities in practice, highlighting the composition of the OCS P&I workforce, the diffusion of activities across the workforce, and current levels and modes of training for the workforce. Chapter Four then assesses gaps between OCS P&I activities that should theoretically be occurring (as mandated in doctrine) and those that are actually occurring in practice and assesses the significance of those gaps. Chapters Five and Six each focus on different means of closing these gaps, with a specific emphasis, respectively, on training solutions and potential models for organizing the OCS P&I workforce, including staffing estimates. In concluding the report, Chapter Seven builds on the analysis in previous chapters to assess the overall human capital needs of the OCS P&I workforce and provides recommendations to ensure that OCS contract support integration capabilities are adequately staffed with trained personnel and that they are appropriately integrated to meet defense requirements over the long term.

The History and Strategic Significance of Operational Contract Support

To understand the significance of the need for a well-defined OCS human capital strategy, it is critical to situate DoD's current OCS activities in historical context, as well as to consider the likelihood that DoD's reliance on OCS capabilities will continue into the foreseeable future. Moreover, it is necessary to understand the potential strategic, operational, and tactical implications of successfully integrating OCS into operations, as well as the potential military implications of failing to integrate it properly. This chapter explores these issues in depth. It first provides a historical overview of military contracting, then presents an informed projection of future potential uses of OCS to support U.S. military aims. In doing so, it argues that OCS has enduring relevance for the U.S. military for the foreseeable future. We conclude with a discussion of the potential positive and negative effects of OCS on U.S. military activities, highlighting the importance of having sufficient numbers of adequately trained DoD personnel to plan and integrate OCS, enhancing its potential to positively affect military effectiveness writ large.

The Enduring Relevance of OCS to the U.S. Military

Throughout the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. government hired vast numbers of contractors to support military operations. Indeed, at certain points in each theater, contractors working on DoD contracts outnumbered U.S. troops, with 155,826 DoD contractors operating alongside 152,275 U.S. troops in Iraq in 2008 and

94,413 contractors operating alongside 91,600 U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2010.¹

However, contractors work for a variety of entities other than DoD, including the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, other U.S. government agencies, foreign governments, nongovernmental agencies, and commercial interests. The figures presented here do not take into account the number of non-DoD contractors employed in Iraq and Afghanistan during the time frames in question. Therefore, the ratio of contractors supporting coalition forces was likely quite a bit higher at the height of these conflicts.² Contractors provide supplies and perform a variety of functions, including security (personal security details, convoy security, and static site security), logistical support, weapon and equipment upkeep and maintenance, intelligence, communications, transportation, construction, engineering, and base support operations and maintenance.³

Such heavy U.S. reliance on private contractors for support of military operations over the past decade and a half is indicative of a ballooning private military industry that began in earnest in the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. U.S. use of contractors to perform a variety of wartime tasks is not a new phenomenon: The United States has a long history of using military contractors, dating back to the granting of letters of marque

¹ Sie Cheou-Kang Center for International Security and Diplomacy, University of Denver, *Private Security Monitor*, online database.

² That non-DoD contractors are commonly not counted in published U.S. government data on the use of contracted support in Iraq and Afghanistan highlights the difficulty in quantifying the scope of the industry's operations globally and in support of the U.S. government. A multitude of entities employs a multitude of contracting firms in locations around the world, and there is no centralized body that tracks numbers and types of contractors. Because DoD is one of the only sources of reliable contractor numbers, at least in areas where it operates, we cite DoD data here to give some idea of U.S. contracting trends over time and contractor numbers in different locations. Thus, these data are incomplete and omit the significant numbers of contractors working for clients other than DoD in various theaters of operation.

³ Moshe Schwartz and Joyprada Swain, *Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 13, 2011, p. 16.

and reprisal for privateers in the American Revolution and including substantial contracting in the U.S. Civil War, the First and Second World Wars, the Vietnam War, and the Balkans conflicts of the mid-1990s.⁴ And that predecessor of modern-day military contracting—mercenarism—has been found in historical texts dating back to the army of King Shulgi of Ur, circa 2094–2047 BCE.⁵ Yet, the extent of U.S. reliance on contractors in theaters of conflict over the past 15 years has been unprecedented in modern history. Moreover, as noted in Chapter One, significant numbers of contractors remain in both Iraq and Afghanistan, despite—or, in some cases, because of—the U.S. troop drawdowns in both theaters.

DoD's Use of Operational Contractor Support

The Iraq and Afghanistan cases are harbingers of the future and not anomalies. There are several deep forces and incentives in the current environment that guarantee that the U.S. military will heavily utilize OCS in future conflict scenarios.

First, firm force-structure limits on the U.S. military preclude the United States from fighting major conflicts solely with uniformed personnel. As of November 2016, U.S. Army active component end strength was 470,465.⁶ This number was up slightly from projections that the Army's active component would decline to roughly 450,000 personnel in 2016, with decreases in the reserve component as well.⁷

⁴ Alexander T. Tabarrok, "The Rise, Fall, and Rise Again of Privateers," *Independent Review*, Vol. 11, No. 4, Spring 2007; U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Office, "Contingency Contracting Throughout U.S. History," web page, last updated November 3, 2015; Sourcewatch, "History of Private Military Companies," last updated November 17, 2006; Deborah C. Kidwell, *Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies*, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005. On the Balkans support contract, see Congressional Budget Office, *Logistics Support for Deployed Military Forces*, Washington, D.C., October 2005.

⁵ Peter W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003, pp. 20, 33.

⁶ Dan Lamothe, "Trump Promises 'Great Rebuilding of the Armed Forces' While Signing Executive Order at the Pentagon," *Washington Post*, January 27, 2017.

⁷ Jim Tice, "Army Shrinks to Smallest Level Since Before World War II," *Army Times*, May 7, 2016. At the time of this writing, it was unclear whether the new administration

These troop decreases are especially challenging in that they are occurring when the country's closest NATO allies, such as the UK, France, and Germany, have cut their defense budgets and force structures and thus are quite limited in the kind of support that they could provide to the United States in future conflict scenarios.⁸

Second, there are new operational factors that demand a large OCS presence in future conflicts. For example, the increased risk of major combat operations brings with it the prospect of widespread heavy damage to ground combat vehicles and helicopters on a scale not seen in Iraq or Afghanistan in the past decade. The rapid repair capability for these vehicles now lies almost exclusively in the contractor force because of cuts to reserve component combat support activities.⁹

Another example can be found in the world of prepositioning. Today's increased U.S. Army and Air Force dependence on prepositioned stocks around the world requires high levels of contractor support early on in a contingency because the equipment and weapons prepositioned abroad do not always match the equipment and weapons at a unit's home station in the continental United States. Contractor personnel would be the only people available who could quickly familiarize a military unit arriving in theater during a fast-breaking contingency with the nuances and intricacies of the equipment at the prepositioning site, such as upgraded electronic warfare and communications systems on an F-16 aircraft model or a modified targeting system for the main gun on a certain version of the M1 Abrams tank.

would increase U.S. Army end strength to 540,000. Even if approved, the increase in end strength would take time to implement, and a reliance on contracted support would continue.

⁸ On the UK, see Laura Hughes, "Defence Cuts Mean Military May Not Have the Personnel to Operate New Equipment," *Telegraph*, October 19, 2015. On France, see Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, "World Armies: France," last updated October 10, 2016; French Ministry of Defence, *White Paper: Defence and National Security 2013, Twelve Key Points*, Paris, 2013; and French Ministry of Defence, *French White Paper: Defence and National Security 2013*, Paris, 2013. On Germany, see Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, "World Armies: Germany," last updated October 10, 2016, and Vince Chadwick and Cynthia Kroet, "Germany Plans Military Expansion After Decades of Downsizing," *Politico*, May 10, 2016.

⁹ Interview with a RAND expert on U.S. Army expeditionary logistics force structure and trends, January 18, 2016. See also Marjorie Censer, "Military Equipment Repair Contracts Take on Increasing Importance," *Washington Post*, September 13, 2010.

Third, there is great administrative flexibility and agility associated with deployed contractors.¹⁰ Contractors can be hired quickly in response to highly specific support requirements (e.g., a sudden spike in demand for Russian linguists), and they can also be terminated quickly when a conflict ends or winds down. This eliminates the recruiting, training, retention, and separation processes and paperwork that are required for uniformed personnel. It also greatly reduces the burden on the personnel branches of the four services. Contractors can be surged rapidly and seamlessly into almost any theater in the world, and they can be extracted from any theater just as easily when a U.S. intervention concludes or moves into another phase that has new support requirements.

Another facet of this flexibility and agility has to do with institutional memory. If necessary, certain highly skilled contractors can be kept in a theater for long periods (i.e., more than one year). Thus, a small number of long-service, skilled contractors can supplement the institutional memory of the U.S. military in certain functional areas in a given theater, serving as a critical source of expertise for unit commanders and staffs who rotate in and out of theater on one-year tours. For example, long-service contractors working in intelligence analyst billets can tutor brigade-level commanders and staffs on the strengths and weaknesses of certain pieces of intelligence fusion software; this kind of detailed technical knowledge can be gained only over a long term of service in the same geographic area during combat or presence operations against the same enemy (e.g., operations against ISIS in the Ramadi/Fallujah region of Iraq's Anbar province).

Finally, contractors offer political flexibility and maneuvering space to U.S. political leaders. Large numbers of contractors can be added to a small military force in such a way that the local combatant command develops a large *de facto* military presence in that theater. At the same time, political leaders can publicly claim that the United States is maintaining only a "small military footprint" in the area in question.

¹⁰ T. X. Hammes, "Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic Impact," *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 60, First Quarter 2011, p. 27.

Another point of political flexibility is that contractors can be used to quietly establish small outposts of U.S. presence in very peripheral areas of the world where new threats might be emerging. These are areas that are mostly “off of the radar” of the American public and members of Congress. For example, the United States has quietly established drone bases in remote parts of sub-Saharan Africa (such as Burkina Faso) to monitor the growth of radical Islamist groups and factions that could pose a threat to U.S. partner governments in the area.¹¹ These remote outposts are usually manned by contractors on a permanent basis, with small teams of U.S. special operations forces personnel visiting every couple of months to assure the local authorities that the U.S. government is fully supporting the operations of a given outpost.¹²

In sum, OCS is a key aspect of U.S. military operations and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, indicating a pervasive and ongoing need for OCS enablers to integrate OCS with military and defense operations. This is especially critical due to the potential risks that OCS brings to any operation, as well as the potential for OCS to achieve often-unrealized benefits (or to incur unanticipated costs) in manipulating incentive structures when contract funds support operations in a given theater. Such potential risks and benefits are explored further in the sections that follow.

¹¹ Open sources indicate that the United States has drone bases in the following locations in Africa: Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti; Arba Minch Airport, Ethiopia; Ouagadougou Airport, Burkina Faso; Niamey, Niger; Nzara, South Sudan; Entebbe, Uganda; Manda Bay, Kenya; and St. Victoria, Seychelles (see Public Intelligence, “U.S. Drone and Surveillance Flight Bases in Africa,” web page, February 23, 2013). In 2016, DoD announced that it was building a new drone base in Agadez, Niger (Emma Farge, “U.S. Building a \$100M Drone Base in Central Niger,” Reuters, September 30, 2016).

¹² For an example of a heavy contractor presence at one of the U.S. drone bases in Africa, see Craig Whitlock, “U.S. Drone Base in Ethiopia Is Operational,” *Washington Post*, October 27, 2011. There is also evidence that the U.S. Air Force is using contractors to pilot reconnaissance drones at U.S. drone bases overseas (Jeff Schogol, “Contract Jobs for Drone Pilots Are Often Overseas,” *Air Force Times*, April 21, 2015).

The Impact of OCS on Military Operations

Because it is likely to be an enduring element in all U.S. military efforts for the foreseeable future, it is reasonable to assess the unforeseen impact of OCS on military operations. Such effects are most likely to fall into one of three categories: contractor misbehavior or related “incidents”; waste, fraud, and abuse in contracting; and the impact of contract funds on operations. Insufficient OCS P&I manpower or training increases the likelihood that DoD will be unprepared to address or prevent such negative effects.

Contractor Incidents

While there are advantages associated with the use of OCS, there are risks as well. High-profile incidents in which security contractors have killed large numbers of local citizens in theater (such as the 2007 Nisour Square incident) or have been killed, themselves, by insurgents (as in 2004 in Fallujah) draw negative attention to OCS both within the United States and abroad.¹³ While such incidents are rare, they highlight the potentially devastating effect on operational effectiveness when contractors fall outside of the U.S. military chain of command. Similarly, these incidents point to the political risks associated with a decline in U.S. public opinion when contractor use leads to contractor or civilian deaths or has a negative impact on overall military operations.¹⁴

While high-profile incidents, such as Nisour Square or Fallujah, are rare, data from the earlier years of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars indicate that troubling or risky behavior by contractors is not necessarily uncommon. A 2010 RAND report detailed results from a survey of

¹³ In the Nisour Square incident, a Blackwater Worldwide security team providing a personal security detail for U.S. diplomatic personnel opened fire on a crowded intersection in Baghdad, killing 17 Iraqis and wounding numerous others. The contractors were eventually convicted in federal court of murder and manslaughter (Matt Apuzzo, “Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings,” *New York Times*, October 22, 2014).

Four contractors were driving through Fallujah in SUVs when masked gunmen ambushed them with assault rifles. They were killed, and their bodies dragged through the streets. At least two corpses were hung from a bridge (Jeffrey Gettleman, “Enraged Mob in Fallujah Kills 4 American Contractors,” *New York Times*, March 31, 2004).

¹⁴ Dunigan, 2011, chapter 3.

military and U.S. Department of State personnel regarding their experiences interacting with armed security contractor personnel in Iraq. The research team found that neither group believed that armed contractors were “running wild” in Iraq. However, according to military personnel, incidents in which armed contractors behaved in an unnecessarily threatening, arrogant, or belligerent way were not uncommon in Iraq: Twenty percent of military respondents with experience interacting with armed contractors reported having “sometimes” observed such behavior.

In the same survey, 14 percent of military personnel with experience with armed contractors had sometimes witnessed armed contractors instigating direct action or taking unprovoked offensive measures. Similarly, nearly one-quarter of State Department personnel responding to the survey reported that they “sometimes” had to manage the consequences of provoked or unprovoked actions by armed contractors against local citizens.¹⁵

These figures refer specifically to armed contractors who were most likely performing security functions, but the bulk of operational contracting activity is not in the security field.¹⁶ Nonetheless, effective contract support integration is necessary to ensure that such behaviors perpetrated by any type of operational contractor do not have a negative effect on overall military efforts at the tactical, operational, or strategic level.

Waste, Fraud, and Abuse

Other potentially more pervasive risks associated with OCS come in the form of waste, fraud, and abuse, which were prevalent in both

¹⁵ Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q. Burkhart, Megan Zander-Cotugno, Edward O’Connell, and Michael Webber, *Hired Guns: Views About Armed Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-987-SRF, 2010.

¹⁶ As of July 2016, USCENTCOM reported that only 2,802 of the 26,435 contractors operating in Afghanistan (10.6 percent) were security contractors, and less than half that number (1,022) were armed security contractors. This share of security contractors relative to the total number of contractors in theater is slightly lower than in Iraq in 2011, when security contractors accounted for 18 percent of the total DoD contractor force (Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support, 2016; Schwartz and Swain, 2011, p. 16).

the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. According to the Commission on Wartime Contracting, at least \$31 billion, and possibly as much as \$60 billion, had been lost to contract waste and fraud in U.S. contingency operations in the two countries by 2011.¹⁷ The commission estimated that wartime-contracting waste in the conflicts ranged from 10 to 20 percent of the money spent between 2002 and 2011, and fraud accounted for 5–9 percent of these funds.¹⁸ Along these same lines, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) reviewed the \$61 billion reconstruction program in Iraq but encountered incomplete data and recordkeeping.¹⁹ SIGIR nevertheless estimated that at least \$8 billion was wasted in Iraq.²⁰

As an example of how such waste, fraud, and abuse occurs, consider the case in which DoD awarded a \$300 million contract in September 2007 to a contractor to operate and maintain two warehouse and distribution facilities in Iraq. Two years later, the contract had incurred obligations of approximately \$119 million. SIGIR questioned almost 40 percent of these costs. Several overbillings by a subcontractor were especially egregious:

- \$900 for a control switch valued at \$7.05 (a 12,666-percent markup)
- \$80 for a small segment of drainpipe valued at \$1.41 (a 5,574-percent markup)
- \$75 for a different piece of plumbing equipment also valued at \$1.41 (a 5,219-percent markup)
- \$3,000 for a circuit breaker valued at \$94.47 (a 3,076-percent markup)
- \$4,500 for another kind of circuit breaker valued at \$183.30 (a 2,355-percent markup).

¹⁷ Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011, p. 5.

¹⁸ Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011, p. 68.

¹⁹ SIGIR, *Learning from Iraq: A Final Report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction*, March 2013, pp. 55–73.

²⁰ SIGIR, 2013, p. x.

SIGIR further found that there had been questionable competition practices, inappropriate bundling of subcontractor items, and close working relationships—with possible ownership affiliations—between the contractor and subcontractor.²¹

In another case in Iraq, an \$80 million task order was awarded in 2004 to build Khan Bani Sa'ad Prison. In February 2006, three months after the scheduled completion date, the contractor submitted notification that its new projected completion target was September 2008—a 990-day schedule slippage. In June 2006, the U.S. government terminated the contract for “failure to make sufficient progress on the project” and “massive cost overruns.” Three successor contracts were awarded before the project was finally terminated in June 2007. By this time, \$40 million had been spent, and no prison building has been completed to date.²²

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, DoD spent \$486 million to purchase 20 G-222 medium-lift cargo planes for the Afghan Air Force. Due to poor planning, poor oversight, poor contract management, and a lack of critical spare parts, the aircraft could not be kept flightworthy. The program was canceled in March 2013 after experiencing continuous and severe operational difficulties, including a lack of spare parts. Sixteen of the 20 aircraft were sold for scrap metal for six cents a pound, or \$32,000.50.²³

In another case of contracting waste in Afghanistan, the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations spent nearly \$43 million to construct a compressed natural gas automobile filling station in the city of Sheberghan. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction found that building such a station in neighboring Pakistan should cost no more than \$500,000. Yet, to date, DoD has been unable to

²¹ SIGIR, *Poor Government Oversight of Anham and Its Subcontracting Procedures Allowed Questionable Costs to Go Undetected*, audit report, SIGR-11-022, July 30, 2011.

²² SIGIR, *Kahn Bani Sa'ad Correctional Facility, Kahn Bani Sa'ad, Iraq*, project assessment, SIGIR-PA-08-138, July 25, 2008a; SIGIR, *Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc.*, audit report, SIGIR-08-019, July 28, 2008b.

²³ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, April 30, 2016, pp. 13–14.

provide documentation showing why the Sheberghan station ran nearly \$43 million. Furthermore, there is no indication that the task force considered the feasibility of the broader objectives for the station or any of the potentially considerable obstacles to the project's success before construction began.²⁴

This is only a snapshot of the waste, fraud, and abuse that has occurred in the past decade and a half of conflict in both Iraq and Afghanistan. All these cases indicate a need for improved contract oversight, management, and integration of OCS with other aspects of the defense enterprise to ensure that waste, fraud, and abuse in OCS does not derail military objectives.

The Potential to Effect Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Change Through the Deliberate Application of Contract Funds

Just as waste, fraud, and abuse can derail military objectives through the nondeliberate use of contract funds, deliberate use of contract funds in theater holds the potential to effect change—both positively and negatively. Thinking about the use of monetary resources to influence and shape the operational environment has necessarily evolved from the use of the Commander's Emergency Response Program and the “money as a weapon system” model in recent years. Doctrine has been updated and codified in the publication *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Integrated Monetary Shaping Operations*.²⁵ This publication draws on a body of scholarly literature and operational experiences stressing the need to properly coordinate the use of money in an operational environment to achieve positive effects. Put another way, integrated monetary support operations entail the coordinated use of money, goods, or services to support the commander's objectives; they are a means to an end. This publication also cautions that the improper use of money can be counterproductive and even destructive to a com-

²⁴ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *DoD's Compressed Natural Gas Filling Station in Afghanistan: An Ill-Conceived \$43 Million Project*, SIGAR-16-02, October 2015.

²⁵ Army Techniques Publication 3-07.20, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Integrated Monetary Shaping Operations*, April 2013. Not available to the general public.

mander's stated goals.²⁶ While written for a tactical audience, this publication highlights the need for the United States and its allies to use all instruments of national power, including economic, to influence outcomes in line with the strategic framework set forth by the country plan, as executed by the U.S. embassy and in conjunction with the host nation. In this context, integrated monetary support operations are directly related to OCS in multiple ways, particularly the process of planning for and obtaining supplies and services from commercial sources in support of joint operations. In many cases the procurement of goods and services to support joint operations comes from locally sourced contracts.

If OCS is done well, it can be leveraged through integrated monetary support operations to achieve effects in the operating environment: It can provide the contracted goods and services desired by the joint force, successfully augment military personnel, and increase host-nation impact on operational success. These benefits are both direct and indirect, as OCS has first-, second-, and third-order effects across all levels of war and phases of operation. When properly coordinated, OCS can also have far-reaching effects for a host nation, such as boosting employment, funneling money into the local economy, and strengthening partnerships that provide strategic leverage. This dynamic has been witnessed in Phase 0 security cooperation events that leverage law enforcement contracts to train host-nation personnel, improving local security while simultaneously promoting the rule of law.²⁷ In counterinsurgency operations, contracts leveraged through OCS can fully support integrated monetary support operations and be used to reduce violence, change opinions, build political relationships, and demonstrate the benefits of a U.S. presence.²⁸

The consequences of uncoordinated OCS are numerous, well documented, and often focus on the improper use of government funds. While contract waste, fraud, and abuse certainly underscore the need to better coordinate OCS, improperly coordinated contracted support

²⁶ Army Techniques Publication 3-07.20, 2013, p. 1.

²⁷ Air Force Installation Contracting Agency, undated.

²⁸ Air Force Installation Contracting Agency, undated.

can, and often does, drastically affect the operational environment. The insertion of capital can destabilize economies when the effects of such capital are not considered or planned for through all phases of operations.²⁹ History provides examples of insurgencies funneling money from contracted activities and of strained strategic-level relationships as a result of poor or nonexistent OCS planning and vetting across operational phases.³⁰

OCS will certainly be an important part of virtually all U.S. military operations in the foreseeable future, and it is a useful tool in a time of multiplying threats and financial pressures. When properly planned, OCS can provide the joint force commander with “enhanced operational flexibility and a rapid increase in support force capabilities.”³¹ If the U.S. military learns to plan effectively and well in advance for the use of OCS in plausible conflict scenarios, then the advantages of OCS could be amplified and the risks minimized.

To this end, DoD has issued a significant number of policy and doctrinal documents over the past decade and a half that have focused on the management of OCS—some in response to congressionally mandated audits or commissions reporting on OCS-related issues. This policy and doctrinal background is explored in detail in the next chapter, as well as in Appendix A.

²⁹ Air Force Installation Contracting Agency, undated.

³⁰ For example, a 2010 congressional inquiry into a \$2.16 billion transportation contract in Afghanistan discovered that the contractor hired unvetted (Taliban) truck drivers (see, e.g., David Ariosto, “U.S. Trucking Contracts Funded Taliban, Source Says,” CNN, July 26, 2011). And, in the Western Pacific, the Navy lost access to several ports when an investigation led to the discovery of \$20 million in fraudulent contracts and the arrest of several senior Navy personnel. See Craig Whitlock, “‘Fat Leonard’ Scandal Swells; Three More Navy Figures Charged,” *Washington Post*, May 27, 2016.

³¹ JP 4-10, 2014, p. III-11.

Current Thinking on Operational Contract Support Integration Activities

Given the pervasiveness of operational contracting in military operations today and the potential strategic, operational, and tactical risks and benefits associated with such contracting, it is critical that OCS be integrated across the defense enterprise so that military planners can anticipate the potential consequences of contractor use and prepare accordingly. In an effort to scope out the human capital requirements to ensure effective OCS integration, we conducted an extensive review of the relevant literature and devised an initial map of the universe of OCS P&I activities—at least, the OCS P&I activities that *should* be occurring, as mandated by official policy and doctrine. This chapter describes the approach, data sources consulted, and findings of this effort. In doing so, it provides an overview of OCS P&I workforce activities and tasks elucidated in policy and doctrine and identifies the responsible organizations, according to these documents.

We began by reviewing more than 110 documents, the most significant of which are discussed in Appendix A. These sources included formal doctrine, training slides, briefs, reports, and other products provided by OCSD. We then selected the documents with relevant information about roles and responsibilities, which constituted a condensed sample of 45 documents. After further streamlining this collection, we developed a map of roles and responsibilities, discussed next.

Mapping the Universe of OCS Activities in the Literature

Our literature review map highlighted the roles and responsibilities of the agencies and organizations we deemed relevant: the GCCs,

SCCs, JCASO, Joint Staff (specifically, J4), JTFs, ODASD(PS), the services, and various Fourth Estate agencies (Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense [Comptroller], Defense Manpower Data Center [DMDC], the Defense Contract Management Agency, DAU, Defense Finance and Accounting Service, and DLA). We took every task, job, and responsibility from the literature review and inserted them into separate rows on a spreadsheet. We also included information on the organization listed as responsible for each task, as well as the source document detailing this information. The first iteration included 840 rows of tasks. We then reviewed the tasks for each organization, looking to eliminate repetition. Because we included formal doctrine as well as various briefs, memos, and other types of documents, the same task was frequently presented in slightly different ways. We deleted the repetitions, noting the remaining tasks that had been cited in other documents. We also deleted tasks that were decidedly outside the purview of this research. After this exercise, we were left with a more manageable 468 tasks across the organizations of interest.

Next, we categorized each task by activity type. We began with multiple activity categories: integration/coordination, planning, logistics, management, operations, analysis, reporting, policy development, training/exercises, oversight, contract support, administration, information technology (IT), contract management and oversight, acquisition/procurement, and budgeting/finance. After devising a set of exclusion and inclusion rules for each activity type, we used the mini-Delphi method discussed in Chapter One: Three project team members reviewed all the tasks separately, each coding the activities into the categories of activity types they deemed appropriate. Many of the tasks were categorized into more than one activity type. During this first round of coding, we again discovered that some of the remaining tasks fell outside of the contract support integration scope of this study. We deleted these tasks, many of which pertained to contract support and oversight or acquisition/procurement.

For the next iteration, we revised the exclusion and inclusion rules, and developed a shorter list of activity types:

- management
- integration/coordination
- analysis/monitoring
- planning
- training/exercises
- policy, doctrine, and guidance development.

Some existing activity types were subsumed into these new categories. For instance, we decided to include reporting under analysis/monitoring. We determined that others, such as contract support and oversight, were out of scope. The research team then conducted another iteration of the mini-Delphi exercise. After coding separately, the three team members came together to discuss and reach consensus on those tasks that they had categorized differently.

During a third iteration of this process, we added a column referring to the need for specialized expertise. The types of specialized expertise that we included were logistics, business analytics, IT, and legal. The team continued to eliminate remaining tasks identified as redundant and out of scope, resulting in 414 rows. This was the final literature review map product on which we based our further analysis, including our analysis of the gaps between doctrine and practice, as discussed in Chapter Four.

Literature Review Findings

As noted, the literature review provided clarification of which tasks are supposed to be carried out by the OCS P&I workforce, according to policy and doctrine, as well as the organization or organizations responsible for each task. In providing a baseline understanding of the universe of OCS P&I actors and related activities, the literature review served as a critical input to other components of this research, including our analysis of gaps between OCS doctrine and practice,

the creation of OCS PDs, and our staffing estimates for the OCS P&I workforce across the organizations of interest.

As a first step to informing these other efforts, we analyzed the literature review map in two ways. First, we mapped out the numbers and types of relevant activities for which each organization was responsible, as shown in Figure 3.1.

Clearly, most contract support integration tasks in the doctrinal and policy literature related to the three activity categories of management, integration/coordination, and planning, but the relative distribution of activities varied by organization. Notably, the GCCs, JCASO, J4, and the SCCs and JTFs take on the bulk of OCS P&I responsibilities, according to doctrine and policy.

Second, we identified the “critical” activities pursued by each organization in question, as outlined in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. This helped us more clearly delineate the respective roles of the various organizations that make up the core OCS P&I workforce and how doctrine envisions the integration and coordination of OCS efforts across these organizations.

Shortcomings Remain in Contract Support Integration Doctrine

The literature review map provided essential information on the scope and scale of OCS P&I responsibilities under the rubric of contract support integration. As such, it served as the basis for multiple methods employed in this study. However, we developed some assumptions that are important to keep in mind. Most importantly, this exercise assumed that current doctrine was the correct baseline. Doctrine in the OCS area is still evolving and is more complete for some organizations and agencies than for others. In addition, it is possible that some doctrine requires revision in light of current practice and OCS realities.

In addition, it is important to note that current doctrine was essentially sufficient at the joint level. Doctrine for the GCCs, the Joint Staff (J4), JTFs, and JCASO was detailed and responsibilities were generally well articulated, particularly in JP 4-10. The doctrine covered all the relevant activity types for each of these organizations, with integration/coordination being the most common. As Chapter Four explains, we still found many gaps between doctrine and practice. With regard to

Figure 3.1
Relative Distribution of OCS P&I Activities, by Organization, as Indicated in Doctrine and Policy




Table 3.1
Critical OCS Tasks Across GCCs, SCCs, Joint Staff (J4), and JTFs

Activity Type	GCCs	SCCs	Joint Staff (J4)	JTFs
Management	Establish boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups to support OCS policies, procedures, and synch requirements; determine common contracted commodities, support and services	Ensure subordinate requiring activities and/ or supported units execute requirements development and contract management requirements Develop appropriate standard operating procedures (SOPs)/ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to plan and execute OCS Enforce JFC-established priorities of support across the joint force, multinational partners, and U.S. government departments and agencies	Interpret Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policies, regulations, and laws in joint doctrine and facilitate OSD efforts to implement OCS-related policy Respond to congressional, U.S. Government Accountability Office, and other audit inquiries	Establish and enforce procedures to ensure contracted support is executed in accordance with overall priorities Establish and run working groups Provide OCS-related advice to commanders and staff

Table 3.1—Continued

Activity Type	GCCs	SCCs	Joint Staff (J4)	JTFs
Integration/ coordination	Coordinate OCS in theater campaign plans, theater security cooperation plans and ambassadors' mission performance plans Work with Joint Staff, FCCs, service components, combat support agencies, and interagency and multinational partners to establish OCS governance requirements and policies Integrate OCS into Joint and GCC-direct exercises	Execute or support GCC-directed planning and requirements determination Coordinate with service headquarters and the J4 commander to resolve OCS problems that cannot be solved at the component level Advise the services and coordinate with combat support agencies on plan assessments	Facilitate communication of operational contract-related matters through routine meetings and communications with the joint community of interest Assist combatant commands in solving problems	Coordinate multinational, interagency, and other operational specific OCS matters/challenges Monitor, integrate, and report OCS matters across the force Integrate OCS matters for a specific operation at the joint operations area level
Analysis/ monitoring	Continual development and refinement of plans	Conduct OCS readiness, lessons learned, and after-action reporting Identify shortfalls and risks in service-related OCS operations and support	Institute OCS readiness reporting by developing universal joint tasks and including OCS-related joint mission-essential tasks as exercise objectives in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed exercises Review and assess OCS capabilities Ensure that lessons learned are captured	Collect, analyze, and share analysis of OCS aspects of the operational environment Conduct readiness, shortfall, mitigation, lessons learned, and after-action reporting

Table 3.1—Continued

Activity Type	GCCs	SCCs	Joint Staff (J4)	JTFs
Planning	Identify capability shortfalls in warfighting functions that require contracted support Ensure contracting and contract oversight capabilities Develop recommendations for lead service for contracting coordination Direct creation on OCS-supported plans, concepts of operations and Annex Ws Establish a contractor management plan and theater requirements to support operations in all phases	Identify and capture all OCS requirements needed to fulfill operational requirements for each phase of the plan Develop contingency plans to ensure continuation of essential contract services Support combatant commanders in developing, refining, and maintaining plans	Ensure that OCS is incorporated into the combatant commander's operations plans Develop an OCS concept of support to identify contracted capabilities and resources, as well as to provide OCS-specific recommendations for course of action development	Lead the OCS P&I effort across primary and special staffs Develop, refine, and recommend OCS-related essential elements of information Incorporate appropriate OCS-related information into operations and contingency plans
Training/exercises	Establish and recommend OCS education and training requirements for personnel on the combatant command staff and their service components and JTFs	Integrate OCS into service component-directed exercises	Establish joint OCS training	

Table 3.1—Continued

Activity Type	GCCs	SCCs	Joint Staff (J4)	JTFs
Policy, doctrine, and guidance development	Develop, publish, and enforce OCS-related regulations, instructions, and directives necessary for the effective use of OCS to support joint operations		Develop and promulgate OCS planning policy, related procedures, and templates Develop joint doctrine for the joint employment of OCS capabilities	Develop and maintain OCS policy and other operational guidance documents

Table 3.2
Critical OCS Tasks Across ODASD(PS), JCASO, Military Departments, and Service Headquarters

Activity Type	ODASD(PS)	JCASO	Military Departments	Service Headquarters (G-4, N4, and A4)
Management	Lead the effort to resource the OCS toolset	Advise combatant commanders on OCS capabilities, risks, opportunities, resources Establish joint concept and common operating picture		
Integration/ coordination	Serve as the DoD focal point for community of practice (COP), community of interest, and efforts to improve OCS program management and oversight	Provide OCS enabling capability as requested Synchronize and integrate OCS between theaters Facilitate coordination and communication among the lead service for contracting, services, defense agencies, whole-of-government partners, and other OCS partners	Provide operational forces that are trained, equipped, and organized to perform OCS functions	Conduct operational assessments
Analysis/ monitoring		Derive OCS best practices from lessons learned and after-action reports		Conduct operational assessments

Table 3.2—Continued

Activity Type	ODASD(PS)	JCASO	Military Departments	Service Headquarters (G-4, N4, and A4)
Planning		Draft, coordinate, and establish Annex Ws Assist in developing joint manning documents and capability requests for forces, and in identifying OCS requirements during peacetime Lead and manage the planning process to transition OCS from lead agency to successor Write appropriate fragmentary orders, memos, and guidance	Ensure that contractor support integration plans and contractor management plans are developed as directed by the supported combatant commander	Write supporting OCS plans and agreements
Training/ exercises	Serve as the DoD lead for the oversight of training and education of personnel identified to support OCS efforts	Provide OCS-related training and staff assistance to headquarters staff and components Develop and synchronize OCS objectives, scenarios and events to train personnel		

Table 3.2—Continued

Activity Type	ODASD(PS)	JCASO	Military Departments	Service Headquarters (G-4, N4, and A4)
Policy, doctrine, and guidance development	Serve as DoD lead to establish and oversee DoD policies for OCS program management		Incorporate OSD and joint OCS policy, as well as joint doctrine, into applicable service policy, doctrine, training, and leader development and education Participate in and, when designated, lead the development of joint OCS-related policy and capability development	

NOTE: G-4 = U.S. Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. N4 = U.S. Navy Office of the Director for Material Readiness and Logistics. A4 = Air Force Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations, Logistics, and Force Protection.

service-level doctrine, the quality and quantity varied considerably and was insufficient in some cases. GCC doctrine was as thorough as that at the joint level.

Service-level doctrine, however, varies widely and until recently was deemed vastly insufficient in some cases. Army has the most mature capability and the doctrine to match. In 2011, it issued Army Regulation 715-9, *Operational Contract Support Planning and Management*, which provides the Army with “policy for planning and managing operational contract support in contingency operations. It specifically addresses contract support integration planning, requirements development, and contractor management in contingency operations.”¹ The same year, the Army promulgated *Operational Contract Support Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, which “provides operational contract support (OCS) ‘how to’ guidance for Army Force commanders and their nonacquisition officer staffs.”² This detailed document offers direction on OCS features, such as planning, requirements determination and development, and contractor management. It also explains how the various organizations and agencies work together and lays out the OCS process for the Army.

The Air Force, which “has a well-trained, experienced, and robust theater support contracting capability,” and the Navy and Marine Corps, which have comparatively limited OCS capabilities, did not issue comprehensive OCS-specific guidance until quite recently.³ Much of the relevant information for the services is actually found in joint doctrine, specifically JP 4-10 and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 4300.01. Yet, improvements have been made in this area, with the services publishing *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and*

¹ Army Regulation 715-9, *Operational Contract Support Planning and Management*, June 20, 2011, p. 1.

² Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 4-10, *Operational Contract Support Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, June 2011, p. iv.

³ JP 4-10, 2014, pp. C2–C4; U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Operational Contract Support: Actions Needed to Enhance the Collection, Integration, and Sharing of Lessons Learned*, Washington, D.C., GAO-15-243, March 2015b, p. 16.

Procedures for Operational Contract Support in February 2016.⁴ Meanwhile, Marine Corps Order 4200.34, *Contingency Contracting Force Program*, was published in September 2016, and the Navy was in final staffing of a Department of the Navy OCS Instruction at the time of writing, with the aim of publication in late 2017.⁵

⁴ Army Techniques Publication 4-10, Marine Corps Reference Publication 4-11H, Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 4-09.1, Air Force Manual 10-409-O, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operational Contract Support*, February 2016.

⁵ Marine Corps Order 4200.34, *Contingency Contracting Force (CCF) Program*, September 2016. Information on the status of the draft Navy OCS Instruction provided by ODASD(PS), June 2017.

Current Operational Contract Support Integration in Practice

We employed several research methods and analytical tools to accurately characterize the current practice of OCS contract support integration across the defense enterprise, as well as remaining gaps between practice and the doctrinal responsibilities for OCS in the relevant literature. In doing so, we uncovered a picture of the challenges facing this nascent capability across all echelons of DoD in terms of institutionalization and acceptance by leadership, as well as standardization and consistency of practices across organizations. This chapter elaborates on these findings, drawing on an extensive body of interview data, DMDC training data, and FASCLASS PDs, and comparing the information from these data sources with the baseline OCS contract support integration responsibilities outlined in our review of the relevant policy and doctrinal literature.

Current Composition of the OCS P&I Workforce

For the purposes of this report, we distinguish between the core OCS P&I workforce—that is, individuals engaged in OCS P&I tasks on a full-time or nearly full-time capacity—and “non-core” OCS enablers, or individuals who do not work directly on OCS P&I tasks but whose work touches on OCS and who therefore need to understand OCS and integrate their efforts with those of the core OCS P&I personnel. Much of this report focuses on the core OCS P&I workforce, though the training recommendations in Chapter Five do extend to the non-

core workforce to some extent as well. However, it is critical to understand both populations.

The Core OCS P&I Workforce

No complete data detailing every individual who performs OCS-related tasks exists, and such data are challenging to collect due to the cross-organization nature of the capability. Indeed, OCS is not simply the responsibility of one or several defense organizations. It is an organic capability envisioned to permeate all aspects of the defense workforce. However, we were able to gain a fairly good sense of the core OCS P&I workforce population by triangulating two methods: extensive interviews and large-*n* PD analysis.

Interviews Provided Insight into the Composition of the Core OCS P&I Workforce


A portion of the sample of defense personnel interviewed for this study—selected in coordination with OCSD to represent all offices with OCS-related doctrinal responsibilities—provides one indication of the identity of the core OCS P&I workforce in terms of its occupational code breakdown. Approximately half of the 119 individuals interviewed were unsure of or did not report their occupational code. However, of the 64 interviewees who did report this information, the majority had a background in contracting, acquisition, or logistics or fell into the “program management” or “miscellaneous” occupational codes. GS-0300, General, Administrative, Clerical, and Office Services, is an occupational group that includes all classes of positions and duties across a broad span of administrative activities.¹ Combined, these series represent 22 percent of the workforce reporting their occupational code and have OCS-related responsibilities that include administration, supervision, and analysis.²

Although these data are based on incomplete reporting by the interview sample, the emphasis on these four types of occupational

¹ For example, GS-0301 (Miscellaneous Administration and Program Series) and GS-0340 (Program Management Series).

² Office of Personnel Management, *Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families*, Washington, D.C., May 2009a.

Figure 4.1
Breakdown of Interviewees' Occupational Codes (n = 64)



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codes is supported by an analysis of the occupational codes in the Army's FASCLASS database for OCS positions related to contract support integration, as described later.

PD Analysis Provided Additional Information and Confirmation of the Core OCS P&I Workforce

As discussed briefly in Chapter One, FASCLASS is a web-based system that contains information on more than 300,000 civilian positions, mostly in the Army but also in some joint organizations. The PDs provide a useful, if incomplete, picture of the work that civilians are performing throughout the Army and in some joint organizations.

At the time of this analysis, there were fewer than 70 PDs that explicitly included the phrase "operational contract support." Of these, more than a quarter were located in Department of the Army headquarters, principally the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement. Representation among the Army's SCCs and the GCCs was very uneven: U.S. Army Africa/Southern Euro-

pean Task Force had four PDs that explicitly listed OCS among their duties, and USAFRICOM had six more, while many GCCs and Army SCCs had none. In addition to positions with the SCCs, most of the Army's contracting support brigades had one or two. The brigades are geographically based and are generally aligned with an Army SCC. For example, the 414th Contracting Support Brigade is based in Vicenza, Italy, and has a mission to provide OCS support to U.S. Army Africa and U.S. Army Garrison Vicenza.³ General Business and Industry (series 1101) was by far the most common occupational series among the FASCLASS PDs explicitly mentioning OCS; the 1101 series accounted for more than a third of such PDs.

Of course, there may be many PDs related to OCS that do not mention OCS explicitly but contain closely related language, such as "contingency contracting," or mention a task closely related to OCS, such as writing an Annex W (the annex for operational plans that delineates OCS responsibilities). There are also PDs with less specific language, such as "host-nation laws" or "contracting capability," that might also address some aspect of OCS. Using keyword searches based on terms extracted from the roles-and-responsibilities literature review, we collected around 20,000 more PDs that did not explicitly mention "operational contract support" but might include OCS tasks nonetheless. With a typical PD being several pages long, we could not read every document and instead had to rely on some computer automation and machine learning to narrow down the number of positions we reviewed.

Two members of the team rated 200 individual sentences, extracted from a sample of PDs, as being either OCS-related or not. Using this as a training set, we used an algorithm known as a support vector machine to read hundreds of thousands of sentences from the 20,000 PDs we collected and score them as being either OCS-related or not. We then reviewed the PDs with the highest percentage of sentences scored by the algorithm as being OCS-related to see if the position did in fact appear to be OCS-related on the whole. We concluded that this approach was reasonable but generated a large number of false

³ U.S. Army Expeditionary Contracting Command, "About ECC," web page, undated.

positives, so we conducted a second round of human scoring, this time of the candidate positions predicted by the support vector machine, and used those to find other PDs very similar to them. In the end, we identified 140 more positions in FASCLASS that did not contain the exact phrase “operational contract support” but read as though they were OCS-related. As a final cut, we eliminated 27 program management office and program executive office positions because they were outside the scope of our study and an additional 18 that were identical. With the original 69 PDs that contained the phrase “operational contract support,” we were left with 164 civilian positions out of roughly the 314,000 in FASCLASS that appeared to be OCS-related and were within the scope of this study.

Among those 164 positions, Contracting (series 1102) accounted for more than a quarter, followed closely by Miscellaneous Administration and Program (series 0301) and then General Business and Industry (series 1101). These three occupational series accounted for more than two-thirds of all positions. The 1101-series positions tended to be somewhat more senior than the others, as shown in Table 4.1.

Across organizations, Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army (mostly the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement), accounts for more than 30 percent of all positions, with Army Contracting Command, Expeditionary Contracting Command, and their eight contracting support brigades accounting for another 25 percent. As noted earlier, the distribution of positions across the GCCs and Army SCCs was very uneven, with U.S. Army Africa/Southern European Task Force and USAFRICOM accounting for 11 positions while several other GCCs and SCCs had none. We offer the caveat that it was not always clear which organization owned a given position, and, in some cases, a PD may have been standardized for use across a command, with subordinate organizations given authority to modify it (with command approval).

This depiction of the workforce may or may not be representative of the entire core workforce, but it nonetheless provides an informative snapshot of the type of OCS-related work being done and the types of people engaged in pursuing that work. It also indicates that positions related to contract support integration are often coded as miscellaneous

Table 4.1
OCS Organization, by Occupational Series

Pay Category	Occupational Series																			Total
	0132	0201	0301	0303	0340	0341	0343	0346	0505	0560	0905	1035	1101	1102	1701	1910	2101	2210		
NK-02				1															1	
YB-02				1															1	
NH-02			4										1						5	
GS-11			1									1							2	
YA-02			3					1						1					5	
GS-12			5				2	3					5	3					18	
NH-03		1	9			1		2					3	1				1	18	
GG-13	1																		1	
GS-13			8					6					3	22		3	1		43	
GS-14			2		1			2			8		3			2			18	
YA-03			3				1						2	2					8	
NH-04		1	2		1		3	1	1	1			11	12					33	
GS-15								1			1		3	1	1				7	
YC-03													2	1					3	
AD-00			1																1	
Total	1	2	38	2	2	1	6	16	1	1	9	1	33	43	1	5	1	1	164	

NOTE: The first column indicates the schedule for monetary compensation. The first two letters refer to the type of pay schedule; the numbers represent the grade of the employee. For example, a "GS" indicates the General Schedule pay scale; "YB" indicates the technician/support pay schedule.

administration and program management, contracting, general business and industry, or logistics management occupations. Because there is no designated occupational group or occupational series for OCS, and because many of the responsibilities relating to OCS require skills that are not captured in another group or series, these series appear to be a viable fit for civilian positions that involve OCS-related work.

Implications of These Findings for the Core OCS P&I Workforce

Through our interviews and PD analysis, we were able to accurately map the core OCS P&I workforce with a fairly high level of fidelity. However, there is still a large amount of confusion across OSD, the services, and JTF commanders as to what OCS is and who does it. This begs the question of what can be done to raise the relevance of OCS to a level that will allow its concepts to permeate DoD. Training and education can do a great deal to inform the force of the importance of OCS, but there are inherent risks in maintaining such a small pool of “OCS professionals.” Indeed, there is an active debate within the OCS community about which occupational specialties are best suited to contract support integration tasks. The bulk of core OCS personnel have acquisition, logistics, and contracting backgrounds, which limits the exposure that other branches have to OCS.


The Non-Core OCS P&I Workforce

While the core OCS workforce is responsible for accomplishing the bulk of OCS contract support integration tasks, this is not the only group of personnel identified to contribute to OCS P&I functions. By its very nature, OCS is a coordinating function that has a cross-functional responsibility; as such, multiple personnel have OCS equities. Non-core OCS personnel are located at multiple levels within DoD and the services, and they have responsibilities in the institutional and operational forces. The largest group of non-core OCS personnel can be found in several staffs across the services, including most of the primary and special staff sections at the GCCs and SCCs, as well as service staffs and personnel staffing JTFs. Non-core OCS personnel are required to perform a multitude of tasks in support of the OCS integration cell (OCSIC) and in service to their commanders.

Figure 4.2 shows these activities and accompanying doctrinal responsibilities as defined by JP 4-10.

At the tactical level, units that generate requirements also have a part to play in the non-core OCS workforce. As requirements are generated at this level, these units must be aware of the possible use of a contract to source a requirement and understand the requirements-generation process. In the institutional force, personnel at various service schoolhouses and DAU, as well as PME instructors, all have a role to play in educating the force on OCS equities. The non-core OCS

Figure 4.2
The OCS “Wheel of Enlightenment”



SOURCE: Adapted from documentation provided by Joint Staff, J4, OCSD.

NOTE: The proportion of effort dedicated to a particular organization and task fluctuates based on the volume or importance of the contracted support. Interagency organizations include the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group and the Civil-Military Operations Center.

workforce is both large and diverse. It encompasses many personnel throughout DoD. At the time of writing, many of the identified groups of personnel were unaware of their OCS responsibilities.

Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office

JCASO was established in 2008 in response to Title 10, Section 2333, of the U.S. Code, which required DoD to identify a deployable cadre of experts with the appropriate tools, authorities, and trained personnel to support the GCCs and JTFs through planning, joint training, and initial OCS mission support.⁴ JCASO is located in DLA's Directorate of Logistics Operations (J3) and is led by Senior Executive Service civilian. Comprised of an Operations Division, Program Integration Division, and Expeditionary Contract Division, JCASO's mission is to provide an OCS joint strategic enabling capability to the GCCs and USSOCOM through planning, joint training, and initial OCS mission support to the JFC to help ensure that the combatant command has an organizational program management approach to OCS in accordance with law.⁵

The Operations Division provides each GCC and USSOCOM with two planners each, and provides the sub-unified commands of U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan with one planner each. These personnel form the bulk (not the entirety) of OCS planning capability at these commands, and are responsible for conducting deliberate planning and participating in joint exercises. The JCASO planners embedded within these commands are, in practice, given tasks and responsibilities by three different entities: the office and command that they support, DLA, and the Joint Staff (OCSD). Currently, JCASO pays for these positions but does not provide direct oversight to planners. Instead, the GCC, USSOCOM, or the sub-unified command at which the planners are embedded provides guidance and direction on their day-to-day activities. Furthermore, OCSD routinely requires

⁴ Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, *Concept of Operations (CONOPS)*, May 23, 2016.

⁵ Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, 2016.

information from the embedded JCASO planners, adding additional requirements and responsibilities.⁶

JCASO's Expeditionary Contracting Division consists of procurement and contracting officers with experience in OCS. They provide contracting experience and augment mission support teams (MSTs) to assist with analysis of the operational environment, Joint Requirements Review Board and Joint Contract Support Board implementation, and can provide temporary contracting support when needed.

Meanwhile, JCASO's Program Integration Division works at the strategic level to institutionalize, advance, and mature OCS across DoD. It is involved in such activities as

- participating in OCS governance
- writing scenarios for joint exercises and participating in the Joint Exercise Control Group
- reviewing and documenting lessons learned
- conducting OCS research and analytics for process improvements
- preparing changes to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy and providing joint solutions to policymakers
- facilitating OCS integration with interagency and host-nation partners
- developing and conducting external and internal OCS training and education
- augmenting MSTs with subject-matter expert support for contingency and humanitarian assistance operations
- supporting joint exercises
- JTF training.⁷

⁶ Numerous interviewees referred to the convoluted command relationship of JCASO planners embedded at the GCCs (interview with an Army Expeditionary Contracting Command official, March 15, 2016; interview with a Joint Staff official, January 21, 2016; interview with a DLA Pacific official, May 20, 2016; interview with Joint Staff personnel, April 7, 2016; interview with a U.S. Pacific Fleet official, May 19, 2016; interview with a JCASO planner embedded at a GCC, June 9, 2016; interview with a DLA official at USEUCOM, June 8, 2016; interview with a USPACOM official, May 16, 2016; interview with two JCASO planners embedded at a GCC, June 7, 2016).

⁷ Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, 2016.


As currently staffed, JCASO is comprised of approximately 51 personnel. The bulk of its full-time military personnel are grade O-4 or above, and the bulk of its full-time civilian personnel are GS-14 or above (see Figure 4.3). The reserve component of the organization comprises 19 military officers (O-4 to O-6). DLA provides and resources 20 additional in-house personnel to JCASO who cannot be repurposed to perform other functions outside of DLA.

Current Training of the OCS P&I Workforce

OCS training and education is centered on JOPEC, Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) courses, and several courses taught at DAU and the ALU. As of this writing, there were no dedicated OCS courses during PME; because of this, the military services' exposure to the topic was limited. For example, some services were more likely than others to send their personnel to training. While these courses were offered to all the services, the preponderance of students attending them were from the Army and were either civilians or field-grade officers (O-4 to O-6). Examining the past few years of attendance at JOPEC, the most thorough and advanced course on OCS, yields some important insights into the current OCS workforce. As Figure 4.4 illustrates, JOPEC routinely draws students from all the services and other DoD agencies, but the Army sent more than twice as many students to the course than any other organization in FYs 2013–2015. More than 100 of these attendees were from various military units. The SCCs, JTFs, and the combatant commands also sent personnel to the course, indicating that these organizations recognized a need for trained OCS personnel.


Figure 4.5 shows the grade or rank of personnel who attended JOPEC. During the same period, FY 2013–FY 2015, civilians accounted for the highest percentage of personnel to attend the course (31 percent). These personnel were almost equally from the military services (units), combatant commands, and SCCs. However, field-grade officers, O-4 to O-5, made up the bulk of attendees. A relatively small number of O-3s, enlisted, and contracted personnel attended the

Figure 4.3
JCASO Organizational Chart



SOURCE: Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, "Organizational Chart," June 12, 2017.

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Figure 4.4**Military Service Attendance at the Joint Operational Planning and Execution Course (FYs 2013–2015)**


SOURCE: Data from Defense Manpower Data Center.

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course. Course attendance during this period was relatively ad hoc, for several reasons. For example, depending on the course location, some units have an advantage in sending personnel to the course for funding, travel, and other administrative reasons (e.g., they are geographically closer to the course location, the home unit is in the midst of a relatively quiet period in terms of other training requirements). Some services and commands place a greater emphasis on OCS than others; consequently, they allow more of their personnel to attend the course. If a unit will be required to fill an OCSIC for an upcoming deployment, it is much more likely to request slots in the course.

Figure 4.5

Total Force Breakdown of Attendees at the Joint Operational Planning and Execution Course (FYs 2013–2015)



SOURCE: Data from Defense Manpower Data Center.

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Gaps Between Activities in OCS P&I Guidance and OCS P&I Activities in Practice

Identifying Gaps Between Doctrine and Practice

The purpose of the gap analysis was to identify where doctrine, practice, and PDs do not align. We relied on four main sources of information: the literature review map, survey responses, interview data, and PDs. The literature review map acted as our baseline, and we continuously scrubbed and edited it throughout the process (as discussed in Chapter Three). The map contained not only doctrine but also other types of documents on roles and responsibilities. For the purposes of the gap analysis, we focused on the formal doctrinal documents captured in our literature review: JP 4-10, CJCSN 4130.01, the draft CJCSM 4301.01, U.S. Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3020.41, and U.S. Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3020.49.⁸ In using the literature review map for the gap analysis, we also deleted some tasks that were very general, administrative in nature, or redundant. For example, tasks that described the essence of the job but not a specific duty were eliminated. This undertaking helped improve the utility of our literature review map.

After cleaning the literature review map, we cross-referenced each doctrinal task with our survey and interview data to determine whether any of our interviewees mentioned completing the task of interest. In this first round, we looked only at interview and task/time survey data from individuals in the organization that had been identified as “responsible” for the task in the relevant doctrinal and policy documents. For example, JP 4-10 states that the Joint Staff is responsible for “[ensuring that] OCS-related lessons learned are captured and entered into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System,” so we looked only

⁸ JP 4-10, 2014; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice (CJCSN) 4130.01, *Guidance for Combatant Commander Employment of Operational Contract Support Enabler—Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office*, December 20, 2011; CJCSM 4301.01, *Planning Operational Contract Support*, draft, October 23, 2015; DoDI 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support*, December 20, 2011; DoDD 3020.49, *Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution*, March 24, 2009.

at the task/time survey and interview responses from individuals at the Joint Staff to determine whether any of them indicated that their job included this task.⁹ We were relatively flexible in interpreting the responses, because the way people describe their day-to-day job responsibilities on a survey is different from how these responsibilities would be described in formal doctrine.¹⁰ We refer to the gaps we found in this iteration as tier 1 gaps. Across the organizations of interest, we found 58 such gaps. The GCCs had the highest number of tier 1 gaps, but they also had the most doctrinal tasks by a large margin. We also found many tier 1 gaps in the services. The Joint Staff had only one tier 1 gap out of 20 doctrinal tasks. The most common types of tier 1 gaps, across all the organizations, were in integration/coordination and planning, followed closely by analysis/monitoring. We found no policy development gaps, but there were very few policy development tasks in the doctrine to begin with. We also found several gaps that we categorized as mixed. These were tasks that did not clearly fall into one of the six categories—integration/coordination, planning, analysis/monitoring, management, training/exercises, or policy development—but instead fall into two or more categories. Figure 4.6 shows our tier 1 gap findings, which we used as inputs to the mathematical models to calculate the staffing estimates in Chapter Six.¹¹ We describe our methodology in greater detail in Appendix B of this report.

After completing our analysis of the tier 1 gaps, we examined whether an individual in *any* organization reported that any of the remaining doctrinal gaps had been completed as part of his or her job.


⁹ JP 4-10, 2014, p. II-6.

¹⁰ An important caveat for this aspect of the gap analysis is that we did not receive the same amount of data from all agencies and organizations. For example, we received many more responses from individuals at the Joint Staff than the services. To overcome this problem, we reviewed the gaps iteratively and omitted activities that we were certain were being performed in practice from the list of gaps.

¹¹ We used tier 1 gaps as an input to our staffing estimate calculations to help ensure that our staffing estimates represented the staffing needs of each organization to meet its *own* doctrinal requirements. We nonetheless went on to calculate tier 2 and tier 3 gaps because the findings illustrate the extent to which certain doctrinal tasks are picked up by organizations other than those to which they are assigned.

Figure 4.6

Tier 1 Guidance Implementation Gaps, by Organization and Activity Type



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Our interest here was simply to determine whether the tasks were being done at all. For example, we looked across our tier 1 GCC gaps to check for responses from individuals in any organization who reported completing those tasks as part of their jobs. After doing this for each organization, we were able to reduce our gap list from 58 tasks to 41. We refer to these gaps as tier 2 gaps. Aside from the Joint Staff and the services, all organizations saw a decline in the number of gaps from tier 1 to tier 2, indicating that a substantial portion of OCS contract support integration–related doctrinal responsibilities were being completed by an entity other than the organization cited as responsible in policy and doctrine. The Joint Staff still had one gap and the services still had eight gaps after the tier 2 identification process. Planning was the most prevalent activity among the tier 2 gaps. Interestingly, there was very little movement in management, but gaps in analysis/monitoring decreased significantly between tiers 1 and 2, indicating that other organizations may be filling in for those that are doctrinally responsible for this function.

Finally, we took these remaining 41 gaps and examined whether any of them could be found in the collection of 164 PDs pulled from the FASCLASS database, as discussed earlier. After conducting this final analysis, only 18 gaps remained across all organizations of interest.¹² We refer to these as tier 3 gaps. The most dramatic decrease in gaps between tiers 2 and 3 were seen within the GCCs and the services. The GCCs saw a decrease in gaps of about one-third from tier 1 to tier 2 but a larger decrease in gaps of approximately two-thirds from tier 2 to tier 3. The number of gaps in the services did not decrease from tier 1 to tier 2 but decreased 62 percent moving from tier 2 to tier 3. As was the case with tier 2 gaps, planning was the most prevalent activity for which we uncovered tier 3 gaps, followed by management

¹² Again, we must caveat this finding with a reminder that the sample of FASCLASS PDs was limited primarily to Army civilians and is therefore not necessarily representative of the entire workforce. While it is possible that our analysis overestimated tier 3 gaps across organizations by not capturing existing military or contractor personnel or any personnel in the Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force, our use of multiple methods to triangulate the gap analysis make such overestimation unlikely. This is particularly so because the Army is the service most engaged in OCS planning and integration activities, by a large margin.

and then integration/coordination. The respective definitions of tier 1, tier 2, and tier 3 gaps are presented in Figure 4.7.

In analyzing these gaps across organizations and activity types, it becomes clear that the greatest gaps between OCS P&I tasks required in doctrine and those actually performed in practice appear, on average, to be in the areas of analysis/monitoring, planning, and management. This gap analysis highlights the types of additional positions and capabilities most needed in the OCS P&I workforce and the extent to which various organizations need each capability, as shown in Figure 4.8.

Implications of Gaps Between Doctrine and Practice

The gap analysis outlined here demonstrates that most of the tasks in doctrine are being performed in practice—but very possibly *not* by the appropriate organization. It also helps highlight the areas in which practice does not match doctrine. This may imply that practice has not yet caught up to doctrine, or that doctrine should be revised to better reflect what is being done in practice. The gap analysis is useful for

Figure 4.7
Gap Analysis Codification Scheme





Figure 4.8
Guidance Implementation Gaps, by Organization and Activity Type



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elucidating potential problems, but it does not necessarily provide a solution. Furthermore, just because our analysis shows that a gap does not exist, we do not know whether the task is being performed fully or partially, well or poorly, or by the appropriate people. Additionally, our gap analysis was based on limited and inconsistent data. We did not collect data from all individuals performing OCS-related tasks at all organizations, and our data were unevenly distributed across the organizations. In some cases, we had a great deal of detailed information from an organization, but in others, we had very little. It would be extremely beneficial to have data that were more evenly distributed across the various organizations of interest, as well as more detailed information from such organizations, to develop a clearer picture of what is and is not being done in practice and by whom.

Closing Gaps: Training

Our findings indicate that the total force needs training and education to fulfill its statutory obligations with regard to OCS. Ultimately, it is up to DoD to make decisions regarding who should receive such training and when and where it will be conducted. In an effort to assist this decisionmaking and illuminate relevant considerations for DoD, this chapter describes the OCS Learning Framework, a holistic approach to institutionalizing OCS across the force. It also provides a description of the current OCS courses offered, recommends potential courses to be created to fill current learning gaps in OCS knowledge, and outlines two models that could be used to frame OCS training across the military and civilian workforces. The material presented here draws extensively on interview data collected over the course of the study, as well as an exhaustive review of existing and previous training course material.¹

The OCS Learning Framework

The Joint OCS Learning Framework is a holistic approach for the institutionalization and training of DoD personnel in OCS. It is in

¹ Throughout the writing of this document, the OCS training and education environment has continued to change. The services are currently responsible for providing training recommendations specific to their force, and the Marine Corps has already institutionalized several elements of OCS learning: it has created an OCS occupational series, developed an OCS training path for officers and noncommissioned officers, and provided resources to source the creation and dedicated billet structure necessary to increase OCS knowledge.

line with the Joint Learning Continuum and service models for professional education and the Joint Training System, and it is the foundation on which the services can build OCS readiness and capability.² Several documents guide the framework, including the National Defense Authorization Acts for 2007, 2008, and 2013; the DODD/DODI 3020 series; the CJCSI 3500 series; JP 4-10, *Operational Contracting Support*; Army Techniques Publication 4-10, Marine Corps Reference Publication 4-11H, Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 4-09.1, Air Force Manual 10-409, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operational Contract Support*; and CJCSI 1800.01E, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*.³ The framework comprises five elements: education, individual training, collective training for staff and units, collective training for exercises, and lessons learned. At the base of the framework are four Universal Joint Tasks that underpin OCS learning:

- ST 4.8, Conduct Operational Contract Support
- ST 4.5.1, Perform Contract Support Integration
- OP 4.5.1.3, Perform Contracting Support
- ST 4.5.2, Perform Contractor Management.⁴

Using this framework should increase the OCS knowledge base across the total force, but should be particularly helpful for the services as they align their professional military education curricula and as they look to develop, track, assess, and expand the OCS capability within their force. For the civilian and contracted workforce, employment is contingent upon already possessing the skill sets necessary to complete

² The Joint Learning Continuum is a coordinated progression of integrated and disciplined learning processes and vents to prepare DoD personnel to specified joint performance standards. This continuum of professional learning instills habits of mind, skills, abilities, and values through education, training, self-development, and experience. See CJCSN 3500.01, *2015–2018 Chairman's Joint Training Guidance*, October 30, 2014.

³ Operational Contract Support (OCS) Education and Training Working Group/Summit, briefing slides, September 8, 2016, slide 3.

⁴ Joint Staff, J-4, *Joint OCS Training and Assessment Guide*, Version 1.0, August 2015c, pp. 1–7. Not available to the general public.

the work. However, additional training may be required to perform OCS duties. The section “Individual Training” later in this chapter describes the possibilities of training both civilians and contractors in OCS equities.

Training is necessary to increase knowledge across all levels of war—tactical, operational, and strategic—and to expand the general understanding of what OCS is, as it is a concept that has not yet totally permeated the force. Both core and non-core OCS personnel require staff elements to understand and participate in planning and monitoring activities that relate to government contractors. At the tactical level, staff elements are primarily responsible for requirements development, contracting officer’s representative functions, and government furnished support to contractor personnel. Operational staff elements need to understand OCS terminology, as well as the capabilities, opportunities, and challenges that the use of contractors presents to a military operation. Senior leaders, or those operating at the strategic level, need to understand how OCS equities can influence policy, doctrine, and other institutional activities.⁵

The content of this chapter is based on numerous interviews with key OCS experts across the institutional and operational force, our analysis of policy and training documents, and an inspection of service-level course catalogs offering OCS-specific courses in contracting and logistics. The analysis and recommendations aim to inform ongoing efforts to improve and institutionalize OCS across the force.

Education

In May 2015, CJCSI 1800.01E, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, was published.⁶ This document detailed 11 OCS learning areas that need to be trained across the range of PME, primarily at the O-4 grade in service schools, and identified training requirements up through general officer/flag officer levels. The *OCS Curriculum Development Guide* takes the general guidance from CJCSI

⁵ Operational Contract Support (OCS) Education and Training Working Group/Summit, 2016, slide 5.

⁶ CJCSI 1800.01E, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, May 29, 2015.

1800.01E and places it into a more formal framework, which is then used to develop individual teaching points, classes, and points of instruction. Yet, to date, very few courses for core OCS personnel in the PME system provide instruction on any element of OCS. Further, educational opportunities for non-core personnel and DoD civilians are also lacking. As the non-core OCS workforce needs generalized military training on OCS, such as what an OCSIC does, how it functions, and how other elements of a staff contribute to OCS, this training should also be institutionalized throughout the force.⁷ To address the lack of currently available training, the J4's Education and Training Working Group updates the OCS learning framework, categorizes and updates training options and venues, and works with the services to increase OCS education and training across the force. Figure 5.1 shows estimates from the working group regarding the extent to which non-core OCS personnel believe additional training is needed. According to our interviewees, the total force believes that training for non-core personnel at all levels is needed, including for senior leaders.

Moreover, the military needs to have a force that understands the strengths and limitations of contracted labor. Early exposure of young officers to these topics will help to institutionalize a basic understanding of OCS. One interviewee stated that there are certain aspects of OCS that need to be taught to all military personnel:

I attended JOPEC and I did the JKO OCS courses. . . . I highly recommend that a class on OCS should be put in the staff [non-commissioned officer] academy and company officer PME. . . . This will build generational experience.⁸


Individual Training

Individual training is currently provided through a variety of courses for core and non-core military and civilian OCS personnel. Training

⁷ Interview with U.S. Forces–Afghanistan personnel, April 6, 2016.

⁸ Interview with Marine Forces Pacific personnel, May 19, 2016.

Figure 5.1
Elements of the Non-Core OCS P&I Workforce
That Would Benefit from OCS Training



SOURCE: Derived from Operational Contract Support (OCS) Education and Training Working Group/Summit, 2016.

NOTE: GO = general officer. FO = flag officer.

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options can be found in a combination of online and in-person venues. Currently, the most prominent classes for OCS at the operational level are the J4-led JOPEC, several JKO courses, and DAU courses related to contracting, all of which are available to military and civilian personnel. Contracted personnel are able to attend some courses but not all. At the tactical level, ALU teaches a class for contracting officer's representatives that has elements of OCS instruction. As most military personnel will not receive any education related to OCS in their first few years in the military, individual training opportunities are going to be the beginning point for most officers' baseline of OCS knowledge. As with PME, individual training is substantially different between core and non-core OCS personnel. For the non-core OCS personnel, training would be focused on integration, how contractors support the

force, and the necessary inputs for the creation of plans as they relate to contractors, specifically Annex Ws.

At the time of writing, the OCS Education and Training Working Group had sent out a call for the military services to share information on the education and training courses they were offering. Once received, this information will allow for a comprehensive assessment of gaps and redundancies and facilitate necessary adjustments to the OCS learning framework. According to the plans of the OCS Education and Training Working Group/Summit, courses will then be developed using appropriate policy, doctrine, OCS process maps, and the Joint OCS Training and Assessments Guide. From there, joint training content and courses for OCS personnel can be developed in accordance with applicable laws, interagency authorities, resources, and funding mechanisms.

Collective Training

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff annual training guidance and the Joint OCS Training and Assessments Guide (version 1.0) steer collective training for OCS. Such collective training takes place routinely throughout the services, and there are many ways in which collective training can incorporate OCS into command battle rhythms. Typical activities identified as collective training tasks include participating on crisis action operational planning teams, estimating contract support activities, delineating contracting support structures (such as the lead service for contracting or lead service for contracting coordination), and staff-assisted visits. To fully benefit from OCS expertise, staff must be trained in how to provide the necessary information to the OCSIC after undergoing individual training in OCS. Exercises are the most likely place for this more advanced training to occur. Service-specific, joint, and multinational exercises afford opportunities to dramatically increase OCS exposure. Exercises are traditionally broken down into two phases: an academic portion and event execution. The academic portion lasts for several days and includes classes and instruction that can focus on OCS. During the actual exercise event, personnel receive training in OCS issues across various changes to the scenario made to the master scenario event list by the staff running the exercise. To

date, there have been few exercises with OCS content in their training objectives. However, this is the main training objective of the OCSJX series, discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, which has been conducted since 2014. Other joint exercise programs have had some OCS components, but they have been limited in scope and scale.

Lessons Learned

Incorporating feedback into OCS activities is the final, most critical, element of the OCS Learning Framework. According to CJCSI 3150.25F, *Joint Lessons Learned Program*, “Its primary objective is to enhance joint force readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy.”⁹ The Joint Lessons Learned Information System COP was established to continue improving OCS training, education, and execution. The website is the repository for OCS lessons learned across the joint force and contains information relevant to all the services. The site includes best practices, observations, and playbooks for conducting a variety of OCS activities. However, as of September 2016, the site had received fewer than 400 visits, and new content was not posted on a regular basis.

Training Courses

A variety of locations currently offer courses that focus on OCS, or have a module of instruction that instructs on a particular aspect of OCS. Table 5.1 describes the totality of OCS courses available at the time of writing for DoD personnel. Both civilians and military personnel are able to take all of the listed courses, minus the Army Theater Sustainment Planners course, which is only for military personnel. The “Course Name” column is the title of the course; the “Institution” column includes training venues such as the ALU, DAU, DMDC, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, JKO, the Joint Staff (J4), and the U.S. Agency for International Development; the “Target

⁹ CJCSI 3150.25F, *Joint Lessons Learned Program*, June 26, 2015

Table 5.1
Current OCS Courses

Course Name	Institution	Target Level	Method
Army OCS (3C)	ALU	Tactical	Resident or MTT
Theater Sustainment Planners	ALU	Operational	Resident
CLC 011: Contracting for the Rest of Us	DAU	Tactical and Operational	Online
CLOR 206: Contracting Officer’s Representative in a Contingency Environment	DAU	Tactical	Online
CON 234: Joint Contingency Contracting	DAU	Operational	Online
CON 334: Advanced Contingency Contracting Officer’s Course	DAU	Operational	Resident
COR 222: Contracting Officer’s Representative Course	DAU	Operational	MTT
Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT)	DMDC	Operational	Online
Total Operational Picture Support System (TOPSS)	DMDC	Operational	Online
J4OP-US380: Joint OCS Essentials for Commanders and Staff	JKO	Operational	Online
Joint Logistics Course	Doctrine Networked Education and Training	Operational	Online
JOPEC	J4	Operational	MTT

SOURCE: Compiled from interviews and course catalogs.

NOTE: MTT = mobile training team.

Level” describes course focus; and the “Method of Training” column describes the course’s mode of delivery (residential, via an MTT, or online). The most prominent courses are described in greater detail following the chart.

Joint OCS Essentials for Commanders and Staff

This course provides essential and foundational information on the evolution, purpose, principles, authorities, and challenges of integrating, supporting and managing OCS. The course has two modules. Module 1 describes the OCS joint capability, defines key terminology, history, principles, planning requirements, and basic roles and responsibilities. Module 2 provides a detailed overview of OCS functions, contract support integration, contract support, and contractor management.¹⁰

JOPEC

This course develops command staff by introducing skills and knowledge necessary to integrate all aspects of planning for commercially sourced supplies and services, and the associated employment of contractor capability to support the joint force across the range of military operations. Initially developed for the GCC staff as well as sub-joint force command, service component, and combat support agency personnel performing in an OCS support or leadership role, it has evolved to become the largest and most thorough course available to instruct OCS for the total force. The course focuses primarily on OCS staff responsibilities for contract support integration, though it does touch on contractor support, contractor management, and elements of training.

Army Operational Contract Support Course—Additional Skill Identifier 3C

This is a two-week course for personnel who are assigned to tactical and operational staffs responsible for assisting in planning and integrating contracted support during operations. It prepares officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians to identify OCS requirements and develop requirements packages. It also instructs on managing tactical-level OCS during contingency operations. It is not a career development course; rather, it instructs on the intricacies of preparing acquisition requirements packages, performance work state-

¹⁰ Joint Staff, J4, 2015c.

ments, independent government cost estimates, and purchase requests, and on techniques for conducting proper performance oversight.

DAU Courses

DAU offers a variety of continuous learning modules on contracting, OCS, and various acquisition-related topics. Relevant DAU courses include contingency contracting officer courses (CON 234 and CON 334) and contracting officer’s representative training courses (COR 206 and COR 222).

Training Analysis

Growing OCS capability requires a better understanding of OCS and how it is incorporated into operations. To achieve this end, additional training is required. While there are no OCS courses at present, many additional courses need to be created to fill critical gaps in educating the force on OCS. As OCS has continued to evolve, several courses have been phased out, as shown in Table 5.2. These courses were removed from training venues for a variety of reasons, primarily

Table 5.2
Eliminated OCS Courses

Course Name	Institution	Target Level	Method
J3OP-US094: The Interagency Process: Full Spectrum Implementation (JKO Operations Course)	JKO	Operational	Online
J4ST-US429: OCS Flag Officer/General Officer Essentials Course	JKO	Operational	Online
J4ST-US432: Introduction to OCS Planning	JKO	Operational	Online
J5OP-US002: Joint Planning Orientation Course	JKO	Operational	Online
CLC 112: Contractors Accompanying the Force	DAU	Operational	Online

SOURCE: Compiled from course catalogs and interviews.

the lack of dedicated personnel required to update the course as new processes and lessons learned have become common practice.

In part because some courses have been eliminated, there are critical OCS knowledge gaps across the force. Such gaps could be remedied through the creation of new OCS courses. Table 5.3 is a sample list of courses that, if created, would help increase the planning and analysis capabilities of the OCS workforce. We developed the list based on an analysis of current and past classes and discussions with OCS practitioners, members of the Joint Staff, and OCS course instructors. These courses would help bridge the gap between tactical and operational-level OCS activities and help foster a basic comprehension of OCS at the beginning of an officer's military career. Currently, the Army is the

Table 5.3
Sample Additional Training Requirements for the Core Workforce

Course Name	Institution	Target Level	Method
Army Operational OCS (4C)	ALU	Operational	Resident
Requirements Generation	Service schoolhouse	O-1/O-2	Resident
Requirements Generation II	Service schoolhouse	O-3	Resident
Requirements Generation III	Service schoolhouse	O-4	Resident
JOPEC II: Shorter course focused on planning	Joint Staff (J4) or Joint Forces Staff College	Operational	Resident
OCS Tools: cASM, TBC, D&S, JCCS	JKO	Operational	Online
OCS Knowledge Management and Systems	JKO	Operational	Online
JOPEC II: Senior Leader	Individual commands	Operational	Resident
Achieving Economic Effects on the Battlefield	Senior service colleges	Strategic	Resident

SOURCE: Compiled from course catalogs and interviews.

NOTE: cASM = Contingency Acquisition Support Model. D&S = Dollars and Sense. JCCS = Joint Contingency Contracting System. TBC = theater business clearance.

only military service with a course focused specifically on OCS at the tactical level for non-contracting officials: the Army OCS-3C course. The other services should consider adding an OCS block of instruction into preexisting courses in an effort to expand OCS knowledge across their forces.¹¹ The Air Force Institute of Technology, Navy Supply Corps School, and the Marine Corps Logistics Operation School are all venues where OCS instruction could be offered.

At the operational level, several additional courses are needed to address the planning, analysis, and knowledge management (KM) aspects of OCS. As most effects are planned, synchronized, and generated at this level, lacking a broader base of OCS knowledge constrains a staff's ability to fully leverage contracted support options. At the time of this writing, there were no courses on OCS topics offered at the highest levels of instruction—the service war colleges, the National War College, or other senior military colleges. As noted in the OCSJX-16 after-action report, “OCS ties the military instrument of national power to the economic instrument of contracted support to seamlessly achieve those same goals and objectives. OCS is not widely viewed as a significant capability to define and achieve operational (and strategic) end states.”¹² Until education is offered to senior leaders, the ability to leverage contracts in support of strategic aims will not be realized.

Creating additional courses, such as those in Table 5.3, could increase OCS expertise at all levels of war. Courses should be offered in a variety of locations and blend resident, online, and MTT instruction. Each hypothetical course is described in more detail in the sections that follow.

Army OCS at the Operational Level (4C)

An Army OCS-4C course would ideally be designed to train planners at theater sustainment commands, expeditionary sustainment

¹¹ Interview with JCASO personnel, December 28, 2015; interview with U.S. Forces–Afghanistan personnel, April 6, 2016; interview with USNORTHCOM personnel, April 26, 2016.

¹² *OCSJX-16 After Action Review*, undated.

commands, the corps and division levels, SCCs, contracting support brigades, and engineer commands.¹³ Like the JOPEC II course, this course would build on the foundation provided by the Army OCS-3C course, instructing planners at the operational and strategic levels to ensure that they understand OCS in an Army context.

Requirements Generation I–III

The need for training in requirements generation was a recurring theme in our interviews. According to one interviewee, “Robust requirements development would fix a lot of problems. Everyone enables OCS. Everyone has a stake in it. What is your piece of that? Developing your requirements.”¹⁴ Another interviewee stated, “There ought to be orientation for this at every level. Certainly for pre-command, at O-5 and O-6 levels. Company commanders should come for a full day of ‘how do you build packets and harness contracting as a combat enabler?’”¹⁵

These courses could feasibly be included in service schools for incoming military personnel and continue on throughout the various levels of PME up through O-5. Due to the prevalence of OCS, early exposure to officers on contracted capabilities and limitations, as well as on how to request that support, are essential.

JOPEC II

A follow-on JOPEC course could be highly useful in building on the foundation that JOPEC sets and training advanced principles in OCS. As stated by one interviewee, “[You] can’t just finish with JOPEC, you need to keep learning.”¹⁶ To accomplish this, a JOPEC II course could usefully teach the planning functions necessary to embed OCS equities in plans. This course could be located at the service schools and could include more planning scenarios and modules focused on practical application of key concepts. The ultimate goal of this course would

¹³ Interview with Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology–Integration Office and Combined Arms Support Command personnel, February 24, 2016.

¹⁴ Interview with a Defense Contract Management Agency official, January 20, 2016.

¹⁵ Interview with JTF personnel, April 13, 2016.

¹⁶ Interview with Joint Staff personnel, February 19, 2016.

be to ensure that planners understand OCS and know when, where, and how to integrate OCS with existing processes.

OCS Tools

This course would be designed to provide instruction on, and hands-on experience with, a number of information systems used in OCS analysis, reviews, and evaluations to help merge inputs from diverse data sources into relevant OCS products necessary to inform commanders at various levels. Such systems include, but are not limited to, SPOT, cASM, TBC, D&S, JCCS, and Joint Asset Management and Movement System (JAMMS).

OCS Knowledge Management and Systems Course

This course would be designed to provide an introduction to the fundamental principles of data management and to the significance of the data management function to the operations of an OCSIC. It would focus on integrating OCS requirements into supporting systems and merging inputs from diverse data sources. The course would also cover the development and maintenance of the OCS COP.

Strategic Courses

Senior leader training in OCS could have great utility in strengthening OCS capabilities across the force. Noting this, one interviewee stated that one of the senior service colleges should offer a war college Master's degree program on OCS, and that it should provide credit for joint PME (JPME) and engender a broad perspective with regard to how OCS affects the strategic level of war. The same individual recommended that this Master's degree program should be mandatory to serve in GCC OCSIC billets and on the Joint Staff.¹⁷

There are two courses at this level that could be created and potentially be quite useful to senior leaders and OCS professionals: *Leveraging the Inter-Agency for Economic Effects and Achieving Economic Effects on the Battlefield*. The first course instructs DoD personnel on the effects of economic warfare and where DoD, through contingency

¹⁷ Interview with Joint Staff personnel, January 21, 2016.

operation planning, fits into a greater U.S. response. While JPME currently teaches that economic effects can be utilized as a source of hard power, no explanation is provided with regard to how to exploit that power.

The second course, *Achieving Economic Effects on the Battlefield*, would aim to capitalize on the use of military-sourced contracts to simultaneously fulfill requirements and to achieve second- and third-order effects on the battlefield.¹⁸

Training Courses for the Non-Core OCS Workforce

A course that was previously offered is J4ST-US432, *Introduction to Operational Contract Support Planning*.¹⁹ The purpose of the course was to provide the joint force and service component commanders and staff the basic knowledge needed to effectively integrate contracting and contractor management into contingency operations. Due to the criticality of this function in ensuring integration of OCS across the force, some similar type of course is needed as an introduction to all staff elements that participate in OCS working groups. According to one planner, “The biggest part of my responsibilities is selling and getting the buy-in from the other J-codes.”²⁰ This course, when offered, was specifically designed to act as a planning primer to increase the awareness of important OCS considerations and challenges among planners outside of logistics directorates.

There are also a number of courses that OCS trainers could usefully provide to military service, GCC, and JTF staffs. Table 5.4 provides a sample of the additional OCS training required for the non-core OCS workforce. We developed the list based on an analysis of current and past classes and discussions with OCS practitioners, members of the Joint Staff, and OCS course instructors.

¹⁸ See Chapter Two for a more detailed discussion of Integrated Monetary Shaping Operations.

¹⁹ The Joint Staff, J4, OCSD was responsible for the creation and content of the course. However, the content was dated and the course was unavailable at the time of this writing while it was being revised and updated.

²⁰ Interview with JTF personnel, February 26, 2016.

Table 5.4
Sample Additional Training Requirements for the Non-Core OCS P&I Workforce

Staff Organizations	Training Required	Priority 1 = high 2 = medium 3 = low	Estimated Course Length (hours)
Personnel	Contractor accountability	2	4
	Casualty reporting	2	2
	Identifying contract support requirements	1	4
	Receiving contract personnel	2	4
Intelligence	OCS security assessments	2	4
	OCS and joint intelligence preparation of the battlefield	1	8
	Vetting foreign vendors	1	4
	Interpreters and contract support requirements	3	4
Operations	Force protection and contractors	2	2
	Training requirements for contractors authorized to accompany the force	1	2
	Personnel recovery	3	2
	Armed contractors and private security contractors	3	2
	Identifying contract support requirements	1	8
Plans	Including OCS in the planning process	1	8
Communications	OCS support to IT systems	3	4
	Contractor frequency allocation and management	3	4
	Identifying contract support requirements	1	4

Table 5.4—Continued

Staff Organizations	Training Required	Priority 1 = high 2 = medium 3 = low	Estimated Course Length (hours)
Engineers	Land and facility allocation and use	2	4
	Identifying construction contract support requirements	3	4
Staff Judge Advocate	Contractor status/status of forces agreements	3	8
	Contract law support and fraud	2	8
	Trafficking in persons	2	4
Resource Management/ Finance	Budgeting and contracting	2	8
	Monitoring contract expenditures	1	4
	Integrated financial operations	2	4
	Counterthreat financing	2	4
Public Affairs	Messaging about contractors	3	2

OCSJX

The OCSJX is a joint exercise specifically designed to train and educate personnel in OCS equities. It evolved from an Army Contracting Command exercise that ran from 2009 to 2013 and focused on deploying military contingency contracting officers into joint, interagency, and multinational task forces. Initially started in 2014, USNORTHCOM was the lead GCC for planning and executing the exercise. It has since rotated to USPACOM (2015), USSOUTHCOM (2016), and USPACOM (2017), with the Army Contracting Command and Air Force Installation Contracting Agency rotating responsibility for leading the exercise each year. The 2016 iteration had joint, interagency, and multinational participation, as well as significant U.S. warfighter participation for the first time, primarily from the U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division.

Typically two to three weeks in duration, the exercise focuses training on the three supporting pillars of OCS: contract support integration, contract support, and contractor management. The Joint Training Information Management System allows scenario training events to be included in the exercise, and participants conduct Phase 0–3 operations following a predesignated scenario. Typical of most joint exercises, the OCSJX has multiple training audiences across the operational and tactical levels of war. While training objectives differ from year to year, they typically require participants to plan for commercially sourced capabilities, integrate them into an operational plan, and manage the positive and negative effects of contractors accompanying the force.

Exercises are a key method of training the force, and having a dedicated joint exercise is critical to ensuring the successful institutionalization and integration of OCS throughout the force. The exercise aims to increase OCS readiness and understanding by incorporating OCS objectives into mission readiness events, as well as through deliberate and crisis action planning activities.

Training Models and Recommendations

OCS is a joint enabling capability used to mitigate risks associated with the use of contracted support. It is a required capability as identified in the Joint Operational Access Implementation Plan, and is necessary to help advance the capstone concepts as articulated in Joint Force 2020.²¹ To realize this capability, a mix of training options that balance costs and benefits need to be considered for the Joint Force. Personnel that perform OCS activities on a day-to-day basis are going to need more comprehension of and training in OCS concepts than will those individuals who only need to think about OCS as it relates to their particular functional specialty.

²¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, September 10, 2012.

In order to provide a range of options for the military services, GCCs, and joint force commanders, we drew on the extensive interview data collected for this study, as well as an exhaustive review of training course material to devise two potential training frameworks, which we have called the Institutionalization Model and the Expeditionary Model, to provide tailored OCS training to the force. These models represent current training options, and were developed as solutions to the training and education gaps as well as future possibilities that would allow for a fully trained and knowledgeable OCS workforce.

Institutionalization Model

The Institutionalization Model would create a long-term OCS capability within the services and Joint Force, helping to institutionalize OCS across the force. As conceived, it would start with a basic level of instruction on OCS at initial entry into the military, and build at each level of professional development. Early blocks of instruction would be located at the appropriate service schools. As officer and select enlisted personnel progress in their career, they would be exposed to more advanced OCS concepts and techniques. Because OCS would be embedded in PME under this model, it would allow for the training of both core and non-core OCS P&I personnel. For example, an Army logistics captain or Navy Supply Corps officer would receive a more robust level of instruction on OCS at the Captain's Career Course compared to an Army infantry or Navy surface warfare officer. At these more advanced levels, OCS courses would ideally be located at one of the service colleges or with the Joint Forces Staff College. Here, full-time OCS personnel would be able to take a robust course in planning and contracting aimed at providing both breadth and depth of OCS knowledge. Non-core OCS personnel would be able to take elective OCS courses. This model would also allow advanced OCS topics to be incorporated into JPME for core OCS P&I personnel.

When assessing the viability of creating a training model such as this, key considerations include selecting a location/venue for the courses to be taught, the training of instructors, and the resource level needed. While this model would be well suited to meet many of the needs created by the lack of institutionalization of OCS throughout

the force,²² one of the key drawbacks of this model is the amount of resources—in terms of both manpower and funding—needed to create and sustain OCS training at this level. When faced with a resource-constrained environment, this ideal type of training model may not be viable. In such cases, an expeditionary training model such as that elaborated below may better meet DoD needs for OCS training across the core and non-core OCS P&I workforces.

Expeditionary Training Model

MTTs are a common way to train throughout the military. They are a cost-effective way to bring OCS instructors to the units that require the training. The Expeditionary Training Model, as it is conceived of here, would focus on the JOPEC course described in detail earlier in this chapter and would entail the creation of additional courses. Specifically, a one-week JOPEC course for non-core OCS experts and a train-the-trainer course would be needed.

A train-the-trainer course could be used to train core OCS personnel working in a GCC or SCC or designated to staff a JTF. These personnel would then be able to help train the non-core OCS personnel on their staffs in OCS equities. J4 or service schoolhouse instructors who are already fulfilling training roles would be well positioned to teach these courses.

Additionally, a short senior-leader course on OCS as it applies to military operations and reducing fraud, waste, and abuse in contracting should be created as part of the Expeditionary Training Model. Ideally, this course would be between one and three days in length and provide leaders with an understanding of OCS joint enabling capabilities.

Online training courses would be incorporated into the Institutionalization Model described earlier, but they would have a more prominent role in the Expeditionary Training Model. The online courses taught at DAU and JKO, as well as service-specific courses,

²² Indeed, 36 interviewees noted that the biggest challenge to effectively enabling OCS is the lack of institutionalization of the capability. This was the most frequently cited challenge to effective OCS, mentioned more often than lack of OCS training, lack of personnel, lack of knowledge of OCS across DoD, or institutional in-fighting.

would be expanded and updated, with specific short courses for non-core personnel made available to each level of directorate.

This model is designed to balance time commitments with the cost of implementation and very closely resembles the current model of training the total force in OCS equities. At present, a core of J4 OCS experts regularly updates training content that is delivered in an expeditionary fashion. However, there are several challenges associated with this model, including the ad hoc source of funding, the potential conflicts of interest and inherently governmental issues associated with the use of contractors to teach a course on OCS, and the fact that this model—at least as currently pursued—does not promote institutionalization of OCS across the force.

While both the Institutionalization Model and the Expeditionary Training Model have numerous advantages and disadvantages, each is uniquely suited to meet certain needs associated with growing OCS P&I capabilities across the force, and each would flourish under different circumstances. We discuss the utility of each training model in combination with other aspects of OCS capability development in the next chapter, which examines some potential alternative courses of action for growing and sustaining the OCS P&I workforce.

Closing Gaps: Potential Workforce Models

The analysis in the preceding chapters points to the question of how best to organize the OCS P&I workforce to best meet current and future doctrinal requirements. There is no single, correct answer to this question; rather, there are several potential alternative courses of action that DoD could pursue to ensure that the OCS P&I workforce is sufficiently staffed to meet doctrinal requirements both within and across organizations in the defense enterprise. This chapter explores these various alternative models for the OCS P&I workforce, laying out the respective advantages and disadvantages of each, and introduces both sample PDs and staffing estimates derived from our analysis; see Appendixes B and C, respectively, for more on these latter topics.

These alternatives can be considered across two intersecting dimensions, as shown in Figure 6.1: (1) capability development (i.e., personnel and training) and (2) billeting structure (i.e., manpower).


Given that effective contract support integration will require effective integration of OCS activities across both the core, full-time OCS P&I workforce and the non-core workforce comprising individuals whose work touches on OCS in a part-time or tangential capacity, we sought to assess combinations of manpower and personnel solutions with the potential to enable effective contract support integration. In doing so, we examined several related variables that, when added together, create a particular course of action for development of the OCS P&I workforce moving forward:

- workforce mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel
- structural options for identifying skilled OCS P&I personnel

- ownership of OCS P&I personnel and OCS expeditionary capabilities
- organizational placement and staffing of JCASO
- mix of training options
- mix of positions in the OCS P&I workforce
- estimated staffing needs for the OCS P&I workforce, by relevant organization.

We explore options for each of these variables in turn.

Figure 6.1
Range of Potential Manpower and Personnel Models for the OCS P&I Workforce




NOTE: MOS = Military Occupational Specialty. AFSC = Air Force Specialty Code.
NEC = Navy Enlisted Classification.

Workforce Mix of Military, Civilian, and Contractor Personnel

A critical consideration when determining how best to develop the OCS P&I workforce for both near- and long-term success is the type of personnel who should make up this workforce. We explored this issue in our interviews, asking interviewees whether they could provide any perspective, based on their experience, on whether OCS P&I positions were most suitable for military personnel, civilians, or contractors. Roughly equal numbers of interviewees endorsed each of three options for the workforce mix. As shown in Figure 6.2, 19 percent responded that military personnel were best suited for these positions, while 18 percent favored a mix of military and civilian personnel and 21 percent supported a tripartite mix of military, civilians, and contractors.

Figure 6.2
Interview Question: Based on Your Experience, Can You Provide Any Perspective on Whether OCS P&I Positions Are Most Suitable for Military Personnel, Civilians, or Contractors?



Those who favored military personnel for these positions cited the need to lend both credibility and operational experience to OCS P&I efforts. “Sometimes you need a military uniform to push an issue,” said one interviewee. According to another, “A lot of what the OCSIC does is personality- and experience-driven. If you haven’t deployed, you would struggle.”¹ Others emphasized the benefits that civilians can bring in terms of both continuity and technical expertise, stating, for example, “You need civilians who can build some institutional capability,” and “The bulk of technical expertise is in the civilian workforce.”²

Significantly, 23 percent of our interviewees were contractors serving in staff augmentation roles (see Chapter Four, Figure 4.1).³ While this is an imperfect proxy for the proportion of contractors across the entire OCS P&I workforce, our sample of 119 interviewees was sufficiently large and had sufficient breadth for us to assume that this proportion was roughly in line with the proportion of OCS P&I positions held by contractors. In other words, we feel comfortable making an informed assumption that roughly one-quarter of the OCS P&I workforce is staffed by contractors.

This is important for several reasons. First, contractors tend to be used to enhance flexibility in manpower allocation, and such extensive reliance on contractors for OCS P&I tasks could be interpreted to

¹ Interview with an OSD official, February 16, 2016; interview with an OSD official, March 1, 2016.

² Interview with a JCASO official, April 6, 2016; interview with a senior OSD official, February 17, 2016.

³ DoD engages in various types of contracting—ranging from staff augmentation to complete contracting. In staff augmentation contracting (also known as labor contracting), DoD provides the facility, materials, equipment, system, technology, and other inputs to the process. By contrast, in complete contracting, the contractor provides all productive inputs while DoD provides only contract management. Between these two extremes, there are many opportunities for “mixed contracting,” negotiated and modeled to fit the circumstances. While deployed operational support contractors tend to fall on mixed or complete contracting end of the spectrum, the contractors involved in planning and integrating OCS serve in staff augmentation roles. For more on this topic, see Nancy Y. Moore, Molly Dunigan, Frank Camm, Samantha Cherney, Clifford Grammich, Judith Mele, Evan Peet, and Anita Szafran, *A Review of Alternative Methods to Inventory Contracted Services in the Department of Defense*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, RR-1704-OSD, 2017.

mean that current needs for these capabilities far surpass the availability of military and civilian personnel skilled in OCS P&I. Second, contractors are intended to be a temporary manning option to fill short-term needs. They are beneficial as an OCS P&I capability when used to quickly surge personnel for a short-term operation, for instance. However, when they are used to meet more permanent needs with no specified end state, they become a relatively more expensive manpower solution than if civilian or military personnel were used in their stead. Finally, contractors are limited in policy and statute from performing “inherently governmental functions.”⁴ While the exact definition of this phrase is disputed, it is clear that certain OCS P&I tasks have a strong potential to fall within the scope of being inherently governmental—for example, issuing or approving contract requirements or handling budgeting for OCS.

A lack of available data makes it difficult to discern the variety of OCS P&I tasks that contractors currently perform, but it bears noting that the use of contractors carries both benefits and risks along the lines delineated here. Furthermore, effective utilization of staff augmentation contractors in the OCS P&I workforce entails a requirement for

⁴ The phrase *inherently governmental* dates to 1966, when the Office of Management and Budget issued its first Circular No. A-76. The circular stated, “certain functions are inherently governmental in nature, being so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance only by federal employees” (Office of Management and Budget, quoted in Acquisition Advisory Panel, *Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the United States Congress*, January 2007).

In addition to a prohibition on contractor performance of inherently governmental activities, there are three other major restrictions on the use of contractors in existing policy and law: (1) special rules for the use of contractors to perform functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions, (2) a prohibition on the use of personal services contracts, and (3) DoD-specific exemptions when a private-sector entity performs specific commercial functions identified in law and policy. The underlying intention behind each of these restrictions is straightforward: Only government employees should wield the authority of the government. However, the level of interpretation required to assess whether various functions meet these criteria makes consistent implementation a challenge. See Jessie Riposo, Irv Blickstein, Stephanie Young, Geoffrey McGovern, and Brian McInnis, *A Methodology for Implementing the Department of Defense’s Current In-Sourcing Policy*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR-944-NAVY, 2011, p. x; Kate M. Manuel and Jack Maskell, *Insourcing Functions Performed by Federal Contractors: An Overview of the Legal Issues*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 5, 2011.

effective military or civilian government oversight of contractors' activities to ensure that contractors are not used for either long-term or inherently governmental functions.

Reinforcing these findings, interviewees who questioned the appropriateness of contractors for OCS P&I tasks cautioned, "There's always a risk with contractors in terms of conflict of interest in how they'll participate in OCS-related decisions." To use contractors effectively in this workforce, one said, "The contractors need to focus on the nonrecurring aspects. The recurring ones need to be civilian or military."⁵ Another interviewee noted that "in crisis action planning, it very quickly gets inherently governmental. But Phase 0 planning is fine for contractors."⁶ However, others highlighted that contractors provide key flexibility to surge personnel when staffing needs increase: "I would actually like a combination of all three. . . . For steady-state, have one military and a few civilians. When an operation kicks off, you could hire more contractors."⁷

Considering these responses in the aggregate, we determined that a mix of each type of personnel across the total force is likely ideal for this workforce and that each organization needs to determine the appropriate staff mix to meet its unique needs. The PDs and staffing estimates in this chapter are therefore not specific to particular personnel types and are intentionally scoped to allow variability across offices. However, caution must be exercised when hiring contractors for OCS P&I workforce positions to ensure that they will not be performing inherently governmental functions.

⁵ Interview with a U.S. Forces–Japan official, May 17, 2016; interview with a Joint Staff contractor, April 7, 2016.

⁶ Interview with USAFRICOM officials, June 7, 2016.

⁷ Interview with a senior Army Expeditionary Contracting Command official, March 15, 2016.

Structural Options for Identifying Skilled OCS P&I Personnel

In conducting stakeholder interviews for this research, we discovered debate surrounding the question of whether it was necessary to create a unique occupational code (for DoD civilians) or a unique MOS (or, in the case of the Air Force or Navy, a unique AFSC or NEC, respectively) for OCS P&I personnel.⁸ We therefore weighed the advantages and disadvantages of several different structural options that would enable identification of skilled and trained OCS P&I personnel. Alternatives considered included continuing the ad hoc approach to manning OCS P&I positions, relying on relevant existing occupational codes to identify potential manpower, or creating an OCS qualification designator (in the form of a parenthetical, such as a skill identifier, or SI). The advantages and disadvantages of these three respective options are considered in turn below.

Ad Hoc Manning of OCS P&I Positions

OCS P&I positions are currently manned in a relatively ad hoc fashion, with most individuals coming up through the ranks of the logistics, acquisition, contracting, or program management career fields

⁸ OPM is responsible for creating civilian occupational series and codes for civilian personnel across the federal workforce. Occupational codes are classification standards established by the Classification Act of 1949 (5 U.S.C. 51) on the principle of providing equal pay for substantially equal work. The purpose of position classification standards is to “encourage uniformity and equity in the classification of positions by providing an established standard for common reference and use in different organizations, locations, or agencies” (Office of Personnel Management, *Introduction to the Position Classification Standards*, Washington, D.C., revised August 2009b, p. 5). This system of sorting out and recoding similar duties and responsibilities “provides a basis for managing essential Federal personnel management programs, such as those for recruiting, placing, compensating, training, reassigning, promoting, and separating employees” (Office of Personnel Management, 2009b, p. 5). However, the system does not diminish the authority of agencies to establish, modify, and abolish positions. It is a guide and supports agencies’ efforts to manage their workforces (see Office of Personnel Management, 2009b, pp. 2, 5–6).

Meanwhile, an MOS code is a code used in the Army and Marine Corps to identify a specific job. The Air Force uses a system of AFSCs, and the Navy uses a system of naval ratings and designators along with the NEC system.

in either the civilian or military DoD workforce. This structure does have some advantages in terms of its relatively low investment of both manpower and resources and its potential to provide greater flexibility across operational scenarios.

Yet, it is exactly this ad hoc manning of the capability that has posed the greatest challenges to institutionalizing OCS P&I capabilities, as it hinders planning for these capabilities and translates to less predictability in terms of the human capital available to perform OCS P&I functions at any given time. It also hinders institutionalization of OCS-relevant training, meaning that training is more sporadic, less targeted, and less systematic and is therefore likely to reach fewer relevant people than may otherwise be the case. This is particularly true for training in the non-core OCS workforce, whose members may be completely overlooked if training is sporadic or not systematized in some way. Moreover, such an ad hoc manning strategy does not allow systematic, synthesized thinking and planning for the use of OCS to manipulate the economic conditions of the operational environment, and—most critically—it does not meet the statutory and policy requirements for a well-defined OCS human capital strategy.

Creating a Unique Civilian or Military OCS Occupational Code/Specialty

Those arguing in favor of creating a unique MOS/AFSC/NEC suggested that this would be the best way to both redefine OCS as an entirely new DoD career field and ensure a system of institutionalized training that would be relatively easy to track across the force.⁹ With a unique OCS occupational specialty, OCS P&I capabilities would likely become institutionalized, the OCS P&I function would likely become more predictable and more easily integrated into planning functions, and training could be highly targeted and systematic. Under such a structure, OCS could be used intelligently to manipulate the economic conditions of a given operational environment.

⁹ Interview with Pacific Air Forces officials, May 20, 2016; interview with a USAFRICOM official, June 7, 2016; interview with a USNORTHCOM official, April 26, 2016.

While the mechanics for creating unique military specialties across the services are fairly straightforward, OPM (not DoD) is primarily responsible for creating civilian occupational codes. The majority of position classification standards created by OPM apply to occupations common to many or all U.S. federal agencies—a standard that OCS P&I positions are unlikely to meet. However, OPM guidance does specify, “standards for positions existing in one or a few agencies may be developed by OPM, or by a lead agency, under the guidance of OPM.”¹⁰ As discussed above, our research indicates utility in maintaining a total force mix of personnel in the OCS P&I workforce; as such, if a separate OCS MOS/AFSC/NEC were to be created for military personnel, the ability to create a unique OCS occupational code for civilian personnel as well would be critical.

It should be noted that there are also clear disadvantages to this approach. Because this option requires the greatest investment of human capital and resources, it may be a bridge too far at this point, when OCS is still gaining traction as a concept across the total force. Perhaps most significantly, numerous constraints—including uncertainty about the future of military and civilian personnel cuts, funding limitations, and potential operational or political disputes—pose challenges to the pursuit of this ambitious option.

There are pragmatic reasons to forgo pursuing this option as well. Most importantly, the extent to which a separate, unique OCS career field would be able to attract top talent (and talent spanning a variety of backgrounds and skill sets) across the force is uncertain—particularly if individuals had to relinquish alternative potential career fields to become OCS-proficient.

Creating an OCS Qualification Designator (Parenthetical Skill Identifier)

A third option bridges the gap between a completely separate OCS occupational code/specialty and reliance on ad hoc manning: creat-

¹⁰ Office of Personnel Management, 2009b.

ing a parenthetical OCS qualification designator, or SI.¹¹ This option for identifying skilled OCS P&I personnel has several advantages: It would help institutionalize the capability, it would allow for tracking and management of the career field, it could be used to leverage trained and experienced individuals for OCSIC needs, it could include a mix of training and specific utilization assignments, and it would be a manageable way to expand OCS capability within the services.¹² There are disadvantages to this option as well. Namely, it would require a greater resource commitment than is the case with the current ad hoc manning of OCS positions, and some incentive would be needed for qualified individuals to pursue the skill identifier.

Mix of Training Options

As discussed in Chapter Five, adoption of the Institutionalization Training Model, the Expeditionary Training Model, or a combination of the two would dramatically help to increase OCS knowledge. Whereas the Institutionalization Model requires more resources, it

¹¹ SIs consist of two characters, in either numeric-alpha or alphanumeric combinations, which are used to identify the skills required in combination with an area of concentration, of a position as well as the skills in which officers may be classified. SIs identify specialized occupational areas which are not normally related to any one particular branch, functional area, or area of concentration but are required to perform the duties of a special position. SIs may require significant education, training, or experience; however, SIs do not require repetitive tours and do not provide progressive career developmental assignments. SIs are authorized for use with any area of concentration unless expressly limited by the classification guidance contained in Department of the Army Pamphlet 611-21, *Personnel Selection and Classification: Military Occupational Classification and Structure*, January 22, 2007. SIs include aircraft qualification, specialized maintenance, medical, and veterinary duties and other required skills that are too restricted in scope to be considered an area of concentration. More than one SI may be used to denote the requirements of a position or to identify the qualifications of an officer. See Army Regulation 611-1, *Military Occupational Classification Structure Development and Implementation*, September 30, 1997.

¹² In addition to being based on RAND expertise in the manpower and personnel implications of creating a skill identifier, these advantages were discussed in the following stakeholder interviews: interview with JCASO official, April 6, 2016; interview with former JTF–Operation United Assistance official, April 6, 2016; interview with an OSD official, April 12, 2016; interview with a former U.S. Forces–Afghanistan official, April 6, 2016.

fully integrates OCS into the total force. Meanwhile, the Expeditionary Training Model requires less resources and is already established to some extent through current training practices and offerings. Regardless of the model or combination of models selected, starting training early and continuing throughout a service member or DoD civilian's career would dramatically help to increase institutional knowledge of OCS equities across the total force.¹³

Mix of Positions in the OCS P&I Workforce

Based on the interview and PD data collected by the study team, as well as the OCS activities identified through the literature review and gap analysis, we devised six PDs designed to be employed simultaneously and interdependently as a potential structure for this workforce. These positions are as follows:

1. OCS manager/senior OCS integrator
2. OCS planner
3. OCS analyst
4. OCS trainer
5. OCS KM specialist
6. OCS policy development specialist.

Detailed descriptions of each of these positions can be found in Appendix B of this report. The aim of this particular breakdown of positions is to meet the OCS capability needs identified in doctrinal, interview, and gap analysis with sufficiently specialized skill sets to enable the robust and effective completion of OCS tasks.

Alternatively, we created an OCS generalist position (also detailed in Appendix B) combining the most significant aspects of the OCS manager, OCS planner, and OCS analyst PDs. When resources are limited and less manning is possible, and or when flexibility is required

¹³ See Chapter Five for a full description of both training models.

in terms of skill set and daily tasks, the OCS generalist position may be a reasonable substitute for the other positions listed here.

Interestingly, we found that there are multiple existing functional codes that could be used to identify potential manpower solutions. RAND conducted a crosswalk between existing functional codes with the OCS P&I position types discussed here. The left column of Table 6.1 shows existing relevant functional codes, the center column provides a description of the code, and the right column shows the crosswalk with the various position types.

Ownership of OCS P&I Personnel and OCS Expeditionary Capabilities

One of the most critical considerations underlying any potential human capital strategy is the question of which organizational entities will “own” the personnel in question. That is, where will they reside, and under whose command and control will they fall?

For much of the OCS P&I workforce, particularly in an environment in which institutionalization of OCS capabilities across the core and non-core workforces is a primary goal, this question is not overly pertinent. Indeed, embedded within the goal of institutionalization of the capability across the total force is the assumption that OCS capabilities will be owned by innumerable entities across all varieties of DoD directorates. However, there is one area in which ownership of the OCS P&I capability is questionable at present—namely, the DLA-based JCASO’s ownership of embedded OCS planners at each of the GCCs. We discuss in greater detail the issues associated with this ownership, placement, and command-and-control structure and propose an alternative ownership structure in the sections that follow.

Organizational Placement and Staffing of JCASO

The DoD may want to consider moving JCASO, or restructuring operational OCS capabilities currently at JCASO (such as the MST

Table 6.1
Functional Code Options for Various Recommended OCS P&I Position Types

Functional Code	Functional Code Description	RAND-Developed Position Type
C400	Budget Support	Analyst
C999	Other Financial Management Activities	Analyst
J550	Software Support for Embedded and Mission Systems	KM specialist
M150	Support to the Combatant Commanders—Information Sharing Systems	KM specialist
C110	Management Headquarters—Financial Management	Manager
F310	Management Headquarters—Procurement and Contracting	Manager
F320	Contract Administration and Operations	Manager
F399	Other Procurement and Contracting Activities	Manager
I110	Management Headquarters—Audit	Manager
I120	Audit Operations	Manager
W100	Management Headquarters—Communications, Computing & Information	Manager
Y810	Management Headquarters—Administrative Support & Federal Compliance	Manager
Y815	Federal Compliance of Administrative Programs	Manager
F520	All Other Engineering Support	Planner
I510	Personnel Security (Clearances and Background Investigations)	Planner
M301	Management Headquarters—Intelligence	Planner
P110	Management Headquarters—Logistics	Planner
P119	Other Logistics Activities	Planner
T101	Management Headquarters—Supply	Planner
T110	Retail Supply Operations	Planner
T701	Management Headquarters—Transportation	Planner
Y210	Management Headquarters—Operation Planning and Control	Planner
Y215	Operation Planning and Control	Planner
Y405	Management Headquarters—Legal Services	Planner

Table 6.1—Continued

Functional Code	Functional Code Description	RAND-Developed Position Type
Y501	Management Headquarters—Public Affairs	Planner
M120	Combatant Headquarters—Combatant Commander Command Authority	Policy Development Specialist
M145	Combatant Headquarters—Military Department Command Authority	Policy Development Specialist
M302	Intelligence Policy and Coordination	Policy Development Specialist
Y105	Management Headquarters—Defense Direction and Policy Integration	Policy Development Specialist
U001	Management Headquarters—Military Education and Training	Trainer
U050	Military Institutional Education and Training Management	Trainer
U150	Multiple Category Training	Trainer
U200	Officer-Acquisition (Pre-Commissioning) Training	Trainer
U300	Specialized Skill Training	Trainer
U510	Professional Military Education	Trainer
U530	Other Full-Time Education Programs	Trainer
U550	Training Development and Support for Military Education & Training	Trainer
U599	Other Military Education and Training Activities	Trainer
U605	Management Headquarters—Civilian Education and Training	Trainer
U620	Management of Civilian Institutional Training, Education, and Development	Trainer
U630	Acquisition Training, Education, and Development	Trainer
U650	Intelligence Training, Education, and Development	Trainer
U660	Medical Training, Education, and Development	Trainer
U699	Other Civilian Training, Education, and Development	Trainer

element), under JECC's purview.¹⁴ This recommendation arose during our interviews and warrants serious consideration for several reasons.

First, the organizational structure of the JECC is more in line with a deployable, operational capability. The JECC provides mission-tailored, joint capability packages to combatant commanders to facilitate the rapid establishment of joint force headquarters, fulfill Global Response Force execution, and bridge joint operational requirements.¹⁵ It consists of three subordinate joint commands, of which one is the Joint Planning Support Element. That command's mission is to provide rapidly deployable joint planners with expertise to accelerate the formation and increase the effectiveness of a joint force headquarters.¹⁶ This element has expertise in planning, operations, logistics, and KM. Meanwhile, JCASO's current location within DLA, a combat support agency, is not well suited to an operational force and creates a sometimes-problematic chain of command for both JCASO planners embedded at the GCCs and for the MSTs that routinely deploy to support training and operational requirements (as discussed in Chapter Four).¹⁷

Second, as a combat support agency, the Joint Staff (J8) evaluates JCASO every two years through the Combat Support Agency Readiness and Training assessment. This assessment looks at the quality, training, and experience of the organization. According to at least one

¹⁴ We are aware of the recent memorandum of agreement between DLA and JCASO, and although we believe it is a step in the right direction, we still recommend transferring ownership of JCASO to JECC. See Defense Logistics Agency, "Nature of Working Relationship Between Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) and the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC)," memorandum, October 4, 2016.

¹⁵ Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, homepage, undated.

¹⁶ Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, undated.

¹⁷ Interview with USPACOM officials, May 16, 2016; interview with Pacific Air Forces officials, May 20, 2016; interview with Army Expeditionary Contracting Command official, March 15, 2016; interview with a Joint Staff official, January 21, 2016; interview with a DLA Pacific official, May 20, 2016; interview with Joint Staff personnel, April 7, 2016; interview with U.S. Pacific Fleet official, May 19, 2016; interview with JCASO planner embedded at a GCC, June 9, 2016; interview with DLA official at USEUCOM, June 8, 2016; interview with two JCASO planners embedded at a GCC, June 7, 2016.

interviewee, JCASO has not received a positive assessment through this evaluation process to date.¹⁸

Third, interview data indicate that training and experience for JCASO MST personnel is insufficient, with multiple interviewees stating that JCASO MST personnel had the wrong mentality, lacked experience, were unfamiliar with the theater in which they were operating, or were a capability that did not contribute to mission success.¹⁹

Countering these findings are several interview responses indicating that JCASO's current structure and location within DLA operates effectively, and is preferable to the possible alternatives. For instance, one senior military official at USPACOM stated, "JCASO planners work for DLA, but are assigned to the GCCs. Is it the best model? No, but it's the best of some bad choices."²⁰ Another interviewee working at DLA noted, "I've heard that GCCs were skeptical that they needed OCS planners. Having the JCASO planners under DLA protects them."²¹ An interviewee with the Joint Staff heralded the success of JCASO's efforts, stating, "The end-state [result] of JCASO working with you is (1) a mature process—boards, cells, working groups; (2) you get a well-written plan Annex W; and (3) you get a reachback capability as you go through the process."²²

Taken in the aggregate, our interview data indicate that the structure of JCASO as currently task-organized is not ideally situated to most efficiently and effectively provide OCS P&I capabilities to GCCs, JTFs, and operational missions. While JCASO serves an important function for the OCS community, restructuring the organization and moving some of its personnel to different entities across the OCS

¹⁸ Interview with Joint Staff personnel, February 19, 2016.

¹⁹ Interview with an Army Expeditionary Contracting Command official, March 15, 2016; interview with Joint Staff personnel, April 7, 2016; interview with a USPACOM official, May 16, 2016; interview with Pacific Air Forces officials, May 20, 2016; interview with USAFRICOM personnel, June 7, 2016; interview with a JCASO planner embedded at a GCC, June 9, 2016.

²⁰ Interview with a USPACOM official, May 16, 2016.

²¹ Interview with a DLA official, April 6, 2016.

²² Interview with a Joint Staff, J7, official, February 25, 2016.

P&I workforce may help enhance overall OCS P&I across the defense enterprise.

As discussed in detail in Chapter Four, the organization has between 76 and 80 personnel, half of whom are in management or oversight roles, with an additional 16 personnel embedded in the GCCs as full-time OCS planners. The MST “flyaway” capability to provide some training and establish OCSICs appears to be the JCASO capability that is most unique to the organization—and the one that is most in demand.

Based on our interview data, the doctrinal review and breakdown of critical OCS activities, and the gap analysis conducted for this research, we were able to devise an alternative notional staffing structure for JCASO’s MST capability to establish and support OCSICs. Starting with a baseline assumption that JCASO MST personnel would be needed to establish approximately five OCSICs per year, and assuming that well-trained personnel with regional familiarity are hired for this purpose, our analysis concluded that approximately 21 personnel could fulfill global demands for an MST capability. We conceived of these 21 personnel being allocated to three five-person teams, with an additional six personnel (mainly planners and trainers) maintained at a high level of readiness and available to augment the capability as needed.²³ The standard composition of each team under this construct would be one OCS manager, two OCS planners, one OCS analyst, and one OCS KM specialist. Each team could be created for scenario-specific missions. Significantly, although the baseline assumption of five OCSICs may or may not be accurate at any given time, it allows the capability to be scaled as more OCSICs are needed. Therefore, this

²³ These estimates assume transition to an OCS P&I workforce model in which the GCCs “own” their OCS enablers and in which JCASO is solely an expeditionary MST capability tasked with establishing OCSICs and some degree of expeditionary training responsibilities. Note that there is a risk that the OCS planners could be reassigned to non-OCS tasks if they fall under direct control of the geographic combatant commander, leading to a hollowing out of the GCCs’ OCS P&I capabilities in general. While this is cause for concern, one potential way of resolving this risk would be to assign a lead service (such as the Department of the Army) to advocate for OCS manpower.

construct would provide the ability to expand or contract with operational demands.

Staffing Needs for the OCS P&I Workforce

At the time this research was conducted, the OCS P&I workforce comprised 158 personnel, with 142 full-time and 34 part-time personnel conducting OCS work as of mid-2016. These numbers were provided during interviews with the relevant organizations, and it is critical to note that they are not comparable to or the same as full-time equivalents (FTEs). As such, part-time personnel all have a primary occupation but perform some level of OCS work as necessary. Table 6.2 shows the breakdown of personnel by organization as of October 2016.

Meanwhile, one of the objectives of this research was to estimate the staffing requirements for OCS P&I personnel at a delineated set of U.S. defense organizations. Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 show the results of this analysis, with the approach and methodology used to reach these conclusions detailed extensively in Appendix C. Note that these three tables differ qualitatively in some sense from Table 6.2. Whereas Table 6.2 illustrates the number of individuals performing OCS-related functions in either a part-time or full-time capacity at the various organizations, Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 show FTEs. This means that the figures in Table 6.2 are not comparable to those in these latter tables at a 1:1 ratio; rather, one must make allowances for the uncertainty in the amount of part-time work performed in comparing the numbers in Table 6.2 with the FTEs in the tables that follow.

In each of these tables, our staffing estimates are based on a breakdown of OCS tasks across the six hypothetical OCS positions we recommend earlier. Again, Appendix C details our weighting scheme and calculations in reaching this breakdown of staffing estimates across various positions and organizations.

It should be noted that the staffing estimates for the SCCs in Table 6.5 are specific to the largest service component command in a particular theater (usually the Army SCC). They are not intended to

Table 6.2
Current OCS P&I Workforce, by Organization

Personnel Type	Number of Personnel							
	USAFRICOM	USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	USNORTHCOM	USPACOM	USSOUTHCOM	JCASO	Joint Staff (J4) ODASD(PS)
Full-time	7	14	3	5	5	2	41	18 2
Part-time	4						19	2
SCC full-time	4	15	4	5	7	2		
SCC part-time			1	1		6		
JTF full-time	3			1				
JTF part-time				1				

NOTE: JCASO planners are counted under the relevant organization to which they are assigned, and these positions are not tabulated in the JCASO column. In addition, the “SCC” categories include the sub-unified commands of U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan. Significantly, total FTE estimations are not delineated in the part-time category; that category does not account for how much OCS-related work is being done on a part-time basis. It could be 5 percent or 95 percent of an individual’s time. Finally, the numbers in the table indicate the actual number of personnel doing the work; they are not FTE calculations.

Table 6.3
Final Staffing Estimates, by Organization and Position

Position	FTEs					
	JTF	Joint Staff		ODASD(PS)	JCASO	Services
		J4	J7			
Manager	1.14	4.08		2.83	3.00	0.90
Planner	1.50	3.21		0.46	9.00	1.23
Analyst	0.90	0.70			3.00	1.00
Trainer			5.94		3.00	0.13
KM specialist	2.00	2.00			3.00	0.5
Policy specialist		2.79		2.00		1.25
Total	5.54	12.78	5.94	5.29	21.00	5.01

represent all SCC OCS personnel across *all* the services in a particular theater.

Potential Alternatives to Remedy OCS P&I Capability Gaps

Based on the foregoing analysis, we devised five potential alternative sets of activities for DoD’s OCS human capital strategy moving forward, as summarized in Table 6.6.

Each of these combinations of activities could be useful to DoD under varying sets of resource constraints, operational demands, and overall goals for the OCS P&I workforce. Because our interviews indicated that one of the greatest challenges facing the OCS P&I workforce is the lack of institutionalization across the force, we recommend that DoD consider the extent to which each alternative is likely to remedy

Table 6.4
Staffing Estimates for the Geographic Combatant Commands

Position	FTEs					
	USAFRICOM	USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	USNORTHCOM	USPACOM	USSOUTHCOM
Manager	1.32–1.39	2.76–2.83	2.07–2.13	2.79–2.83	2.83	0.66–0.69
Planner	1.73–1.80	3.61–3.69	2.70–2.79	3.65–3.69	3.69	0.86–0.90
Analyst	2.11–2.20	4.41–4.51	3.30–3.41	4.46–4.51	4.51	1.06–1.10
Trainer	0.94–0.98	1.96–2.00	1.47–1.51	1.98–2.00	2.00	0.47–0.49
KM specialist	0.47–0.49	0.98–1.00	0.73–0.76	0.99–1.00	1.00	0.23–0.25
Policy specialist	0.47–0.49	0.98–1.00	0.73–0.76	0.99–1.00	1.00	0.23–0.25
Total	7.04–7.35	14.70–15.03	11.00–11.36	14.86–15.03	15.03	3.51–3.68

Table 6.5
Staffing Estimates for the Service Component Commands

Position	FTEs					
	USAFRICOM	USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	USNORTHCOM	USPACOM	USSOUTHCOM
Manager	—	—	—	—	—	—
Planner	0.42–0.44	0.88–0.90	0.66–0.68	0.89–0.90	0.90	0.21–0.22
Analyst	0.47–0.49	0.98–1.00	0.73–0.76	0.99–1.00	1.00	0.23–0.25
Trainer	0.48–0.50	1.00–1.02	0.75–0.77	1.01–1.02	1.02	0.24–0.25
KM specialist	1.10–1.15	2.30–2.35	1.72–1.78	2.33–2.35	2.35	0.55–0.58
Policy specialist	0.12	0.24–0.25	0.18–0.19	0.25	0.25	0.06
Total	2.59–2.70	5.40–5.52	4.04–4.18	5.47–5.52	5.52	1.29–1.36

Table 6.6
Summary of Alternatives to Remedy OCS P&I Capability Gaps

Possible Alternative	Manning	Organizational	Training	Additional Manpower	Benefits and Risk
Steady state	Ad hoc manning and filling of joint manning requirements	JCASO owns GCC planners and expeditionary capability (mission support teams)	JOPEC, MTTs, and JKO, DAU, and ALU current courses	Maintain current OCS branch chief, planner, and PDs with OCS equities	No major changes to service force structure but this does not meet the requirements for OCS characterization
Fully integrated	Divide OCS requirements among other staff organizations (J-codes)	JCASO and positions used to offset GCC and SCC requirements are eliminated	JOPEC institutionalized in service schools; OCS parenthetical skill identifier established to recognize OCS training	No unique OCS PDs; add manpower	OCS capabilities added to the services, but additional training and institutionalization are required
OCS specialization	Create unique civilian and military OCS occupational codes	JCASO expeditionary capability moved to the JECC; OCS planners reassigned to GCCs	Training on multilevel requirements generation moved to service schools; JOPEC institutionalized and JOPEC II added.	Create unique OCS PDs (OCS generalist or six OCS PD types); add manpower	Establishes core OCS expertise but requires manpower

Table 6.6—Continued

Possible Alternative	Manning	Organizational	Training	Additional Manpower	Benefits and Risk
Hybrid approach	Create OCS parenthetical skill identifier to track OCS-trained personnel	JCASO expeditionary capability moved to the JECC; OCS planners reassigned to GCCs	Develop tiered training solution to fully institutionalize the capability across the total force	Create six unique OCS PDs to enable targeted training for OCS skill sets; add manpower	Identifies OCS experts but requires manpower and institutionalization
Hybrid approach that maintains JCASO	Create OCS parenthetical skill identifier to track OCS-trained personnel	JCASO owns GCC planners and expeditionary capability (MSTs)	Develop tiered training solution to fully institutionalize the capability across the total force	Create six unique OCS PDs to enable targeted training for OCS skill sets; add manpower	Identifies OCS experts but requires manpower and institutionalization

this lack of institutionalization.²⁴ The following sections describe the alternative sets of activities in detail, weighing their respective advantages and disadvantages.

Alternative 1: Maintain the Status Quo Manning, Organizational, and Training Structures for OCS

The status quo, or steady-state, alternative describes the current state of the OCS P&I workforce. At present, OCS-relevant billets are manned on an ad hoc basis. While this does provide flexibility in staffing the workforce, it creates serious challenges in tracking trained personnel and ensuring that open billets are filled by appropriately trained and skilled OCS personnel.

Meanwhile, JCASO is currently owned by DLA, and the majority of OCS staffs at the GCCs are owned by JCASO and simply embedded within the GCCs, leading to the command-and-control issues discussed earlier in this chapter and in Chapter Four.

Training in the status quo model is in line with a limited Expeditionary Training Model composed of JOPEC, MTTs, and a variety of DAU, ALU, and JKO courses; however, such training is confined to certain elements of the force and does not reach all who require some level of OCS-related education.

Finally, OCS-relevant PDs across the total force are fairly limited, with two primary positions (OCS branch chief and OCS planner) supplemented by a variety of other PDs that involve OCS equities but do not specifically contain “OCS” in the position title. Again, this delineation of OCS P&I positions does allow for some flexibility in staffing the workforce and could be effective in ensuring some level of OCS activity in a severely resource-constrained environment. However, it also makes it more likely that the OCS P&I workforce will be understaffed and that gaps in doctrinally mandated activities will occur.

²⁴ Indeed, 36 interviewees cited the lack of institutionalization of the capability as the greatest challenge to effectively enabling OCS, compared with 30 interviewees who cited lack of training, 28 interviewees who cited lack of personnel, 17 interviewees who cited lack of knowledge of OCS across DoD, and 13 interviewees who cited institutional in-fighting as the greatest challenge to effectively enabling OCS.

Alternative 2: Fully Integrate OCS Human Capital Strategy

A fully integrated human capital strategy for OCS P&I is one of the most extreme options for managing the workforce and would differ significantly from the status quo approach. Under this strategy, no unique OCS positions or manpower would be created. Rather, the various directorates across the Joint Staff and services (e.g., J1, J2, J3) would divide OCS requirements among themselves, as appropriate. OCS-relevant training would be institutionalized within the service schoolhouses, and JCASO would be entirely eliminated. However, an OCS SI would be created to identify individuals trained in OCS equities who are able to perform roles requiring OCS-related skill sets in the various directorates across DoD.

This approach would go furthest in institutionalizing OCS across the force and would effectively integrate OCS into the non-core OCS workforce. Yet, it would also require a large investment of resources at the outset to initiate the requisite level of integration, and it may therefore be too difficult to secure the necessary buy-in across DoD for this approach at this time.

Alternative 3: Include OCS Specialization in Human Capital Strategy

At the opposite end of the spectrum from the fully integrated strategy is a human capital strategy focusing on OCS specialization across the force. This approach would entail creating a unique OCS MOS/AFSC/NEC and civilian occupational code, as well as creating the six OCS-specific positions listed earlier and described in Appendix B. (Alternatively, this approach could involve establishing the OCS generalist position either on its own or in combination with the other six positions.) As these positions are created, additional OCS manning—or a realignment of current OCS manning levels across organizations based on their degree of OCS doctrinal responsibilities—would likely be required.²⁵

²⁵ For example, one might reasonably expect to see additional manning at the GCCs in line with the staffing estimates presented here, but OCS planners reassigned to the GCCs from JCASO could easily supply this manpower. It is questionable whether a *wholesale growth* of the capability across the force for Phase 0 operations is either possible or necessary; however, it is clear that reassigning personnel (for instance, from JCASO) to organizations with more

JCASO's mandate in this situation would be limited solely to providing an expeditionary MST capability to establish OCSICs and perform some limited training functions, and JCASO would therefore consist of considerably fewer billets. Ownership of this expeditionary JCASO capability would move from DLA to the JECC, and JCASO planners embedded in the GCCs would be reassigned directly to the GCC staffs.

Training under this course of action would reflect a combination of the Institutionalization and Expeditionary Training Models. Introductory-level training in OCS requirements generation would be institutionalized within the service schoolhouses, but more specialized training would be maintained in line with an expeditionary format (with both a JOPEC I and a JOPEC II course being the cornerstone of such training, along with JKO courses).

The advantage of this type of strategy is that it would allow for easy identification of appropriately trained and skilled personnel to fulfill OCS functions, and it could provide a well-defined career path for OCS professionals. In this way, it could help facilitate some degree of institutionalization of OCS throughout the force, though not to the degree seen in the second alternative strategy.

Yet, shortcomings remain: Most significantly, creating a unique OCS MOS/AFSC/NEC and civilian occupational code assumes that highly qualified individuals would find such a high degree of specialization in the OCS career field to be desirable for their overall career trajectory. Such specialization would, of necessity, entail some degree of opportunity cost, making it less likely that such individuals could specialize in other fields as well. This could be seen as a limiting factor and thus could make it difficult to attract the best and brightest to the OCS P&I workforce. Another risk associated with this approach is apparent in the potential for OCS planners who are assigned directly to the GCCs to be reassigned to other functions by GCC commanders. However, this risk may be mitigated by assigning a lead service (such as the Department of the Army) to advocate for OCS manpower

extensive OCS doctrinal responsibilities would be possible and could result in more effective OCS P&I across the force.

and to make the case to commanders that OCS is a vital function with which they should not tamper.

Alternative 4: Establish Hybrid OCS Human Capital Strategy

The fourth alternative strategy blends aspects of the other three, aiming to find some middle ground between the current, status quo strategy and the most extreme strategies calling for either the total institutionalization of OCS across the force or total specialization of OCS. This hybrid model entails creating an OCS SI (parenthetical) to both track OCS-trained individuals and create an incentive for individuals across the total force to seek out OCS training opportunities.

As was the case with the OCS Specialization Human Capital Strategy, under this model, JCASO would be limited to an expeditionary MST capability aimed at establishing OCSICs. Similarly, ownership of JCASO would be transferred from DLA to the JECC, and JCASO planners currently embedded at the GCCs would be reassigned directly to the GCC staffs.

This strategy aims to train the core and non-core OCS P&I workforces adequately and effectively in OCS-relevant topics to the greatest extent possible. To achieve this goal, the model calls for a tiered training strategy combining the Institutionalization Training Model and the Expeditionary Training Model—essentially, the development of OCS training courses at multiple levels to be made available in a variety of venues to a variety of audiences. This would include introductory-level OCS training in the service schoolhouses, OCS course offerings in PME, train-the-trainer courses for both the core and non-core workforces, MTTs providing on-the-ground training to deployed units, JOPEC I and II, and a JOPEC senior-leader course, among other options.

Finally, the hybrid approach would also require creating the six aforementioned OCS-specific positions and an OCS generalist position to substitute for these six positions in resource-constrained organizations where only low-level OCS manning is possible. Ideally, however, the manning for these six positions would resemble that shown in the staffing estimates and detailed in Appendix C.

This approach, like the OCS specialization approach, would make it easy to track OCS-trained individuals. However, unlike the OCS specialization approach, this approach would not be at risk of attracting only a limited pool of individuals to become OCS-qualified. Indeed, individuals may be more incentivized to pursue an SI than to invest time in developing a specialization in line with a distinct MOS/AFSC/NEC or civilian occupational code. Pursuing an MOS/AFSC/NEC or occupational code specialization requires a substantially higher level of effort—with higher opportunity costs and fewer alternative career path choices—than pursuing an SI. The choice to pursue an SI may be seen as a relatively low-cost, low-effort means of broadening one's career options.

The hybrid OCS human capital strategy would also balance the need to institutionalize the capability across the force with the reality of a resource-constrained environment in which commanders' buy-in on OCS has not yet been completely reached. The hybrid approach, in short, would aim to grow OCS capabilities across the core and non-core workforces while also realizing the challenges facing any efforts to achieve either total institutionalization or total specialization of OCS.

The greatest potential disadvantage of this approach is the possibility that JCASO planners reassigned directly to the GCCs would be retasked by their respective commanders to work on issues other than OCS. However, the goal of this approach is to train individuals in OCS at all levels across the force, increasing the likelihood that more commanders will come to appreciate the operational and logistical significance of OCS. Indeed, strong adherence to this approach might offer the best chance that commanders would benefit from OCS, understand its criticality as an operational function, and protect OCS capabilities under their command. Moreover, as noted earlier, a related potential means of resolving the risk of GCC reassignment of OCS personnel to other tasks would be to assign a lead service (such as the Department of the Army) to advocate for OCS manpower.

Alternative 5: Establish Hybrid OCS Human Capital Strategy, Maintaining JCASO

A fifth potential strategy would very closely resemble the fourth strategy, entailing the following: (1) developing an OCS SI (parenthetical) both to track OCS-trained individuals and to create an incentive for individuals across the total force to seek out OCS training opportunities; (2) developing a tiered training strategy that combines the Institutionalization Training Model and the Expeditionary Training Model; and (3) creating the six OCS-specific positions outlined earlier and the substituting an OCS generalist position for these six positions in resource-constrained organizations.

However, this alternative strategy would leave JCASO intact in its current state and under DLA ownership, at least in the near term. JCASO would retain its current number of embedded planners at the GCCs, as well as its expeditionary capability. The advantage of this strategy is that it could be implemented in stages, allowing a large percentage of existing JCASO planners to act as trainers and to remain in GCC planning roles until sufficient numbers of additional core staff were trained and qualified for OCS P&I positions. In addition, this strategy would maintain JCASO's reachback support to its embedded OCS planners at the GCCs.

There are also disadvantages to this strategy. For example, it would not resolve the command-and-control challenges faced by JCASO planners embedded at the GCCs, whereby they are answerable to both the command staff and JCASO/DLA and are often dual-tasked. Moreover, the existing JCASO workforce would be required to undergo additional training to, in turn, effectively train new OCS P&I core personnel to the standards of a qualification designator.

Potential Workforce Models: A Concluding Note

The choice of any of these alternative approaches, or some amalgamation of them, will depend on several factors, including the extent to which resources are constrained, the scope of senior leader buy-in on OCS as a significant operational concept, and the extent to which

incentives can be created to attract top talent to an OCS-related career field. While the elements of each of these approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and these are not the only potential courses of action available to DoD, these four alternatives capture the essence of the major debates surrounding OCS. Each has advantages and disadvantages, but in a resource-constrained environment in which the goal is to increase the institutionalization of OCS across the force even marginally, a middle-ground approach may be most effective.

The next chapter discusses these findings alongside other conclusions derived from this research and makes recommendations for enhancing DoD's OCS human capital across the total force.

Conclusions and Recommendations

As noted in Chapter One, this study aimed to address a mandated requirement to comprehensively delineate the staffing capability and training requirements of the DoD organic OCS P&I workforce in Phase 0, steady-state operations. The purpose of this chapter is to present conclusions and recommendations in line with this goal.

Conclusions

Overall, our findings suggest that OCS is likely to remain strategically significant for the foreseeable future. Because DoD is likely to continue to rely on contractors in the future, and because contracting for goods and services is ultimately an economic activity, OCS has the potential for unforeseen non-kinetic effects across all levels of military effort. This finding serves to underscore the importance of “characterizing the OCS capability requirement,” as Congress and defense leadership have directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do, and which was the ultimate goal of this research.

Significantly, in characterizing this capability requirement, we found gaps—sometimes considerable—between each organization’s doctrinally mandated OCS responsibilities and those tasks performed in practice. The degree and scope of these gaps varied across the organizations studied. The GCCs and service headquarters appeared to be falling furthest behind in meeting their doctrinal OCS responsibilities, with gaps occurring mainly in the areas of OCS management, analysis, and planning. Underlying such gaps may be staffing shortfalls; indeed,

most OCS P&I capabilities across the force appear to be understaffed, sometimes to such a significant level that it impedes the ability to meet OCS-related doctrinal responsibilities.

With regard to the composition of the current OCS P&I workforce, we found that is primarily composed of military, civilian, and contractor personnel with contracting, acquisition, logistics, or program management backgrounds. Most individuals we interviewed throughout the course of this research think the OCS P&I workforce should continue to be composed of a total force mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel, though the use of contractors for OCS-related tasks should be monitored to ensure that they are focused on non-recurring tasks and tasks that are not inherently governmental.

We found that training is an essential ingredient for healthy development of the future OCS P&I workforce, is critical for *both the core and non-core* aspects of that workforce, and is one of the key tools that could be utilized to institutionalize OCS across the force. Training is uneven across the OCS P&I workforce, however, and there are gaps in the training regimen. As it stands, primarily Army personnel attend what is widely regarded as the most advanced OCS training course, the Joint Staff's JOPEC. Training offerings are limited in general, and many personnel have never received any training in OCS, leaving the force with a limited understanding of OCS and its relevance.

Finally, various potential OCS human capital strategies exist, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. We offer four overriding recommendations to inform decisions about appropriate courses of action to implement—with senior leader endorsement—a successful human capital strategy for the OCS P&I workforce going forward.

Recommendations

Establish, resource, and staff a dedicated OCS P&I workforce with competencies in such areas as management, planning, analysis, training, knowledge management, and policy development.

First, DoD should staff the six types of positions to create a balanced OCS P&I workforce: managers, planners, analysts, trainers, KM spe-

cialists, and policy development specialists. The requirements of each of these positions are detailed in Appendix B. In situations of limited resources or uncertainty/fluctuation in the types of OCS tasks performed on a regular basis, the OCS generalist position may be a reasonable substitute for these more specialized positions denoting specific areas of OCS expertise.

Ensure that sufficient numbers of personnel with the requisite levels of OCS expertise are available to perform OCS P&I tasks delineated in guidance during peacetime and contingency operations.

DoD should bring staffing levels for the OCS P&I workforce in Phase 0 in line with the staffing estimates elaborated herein to ensure that OCS-related doctrinal responsibilities are met. While this may not require extensive wholesale growth across the OCS workforce, it will likely require some realignment of OCS personnel across various organizations to ensure that doctrinal requirements can be met. Along these lines, it is critical to note that the staffing estimates created through this research are to be considered as “full-time equivalents” in the truest sense—that is, that they are not numbers of bodies, per se, but are the additive sum of the total manpower effort needed across the organizations of interest. For instance, an estimate of 1.5 FTEs of OCS P&I manpower needed in one office could be fulfilled by one full-time person and one half-time person, or it could be fulfilled by three people each working on OCS for half of their portfolio. While one ideal way of ensuring the completion of all OCS P&I tasks outlined in existing guidance would be the addition of dedicated OCS manpower, the research team does acknowledge and is sensitive to existing resource and manning constraints. The recommendations provided here are therefore intended to provide flexibility in terms of how such staffing levels might be achieved.

The workforce should be a mix of military, civilians, and contractors: military to ensure credibility and leadership support, civilians to ensure expertise and continuity, and contractors *only in non-inherently governmental roles* to ensure flexibility.

Institutionalize, broaden, and systematize OCS P&I training across the defense enterprise while maintaining expeditionary training opportunities and increasing training availability for non-core functions.

It is up to DoD to determine when and where OCS P&I training will be conducted, and whom it will target. Based on the research conducted for this study, we recommend that DoD offer OCS P&I training courses for both the core, full-time OCS professional workforce and the “non-core” OCS workforce across a spectrum of training venues, and integrate OCS P&I training into existing officer professional development models. Meanwhile, we recommend that DoD simultaneously continue the emphasis on MTTs and expeditionary training options. This capability is critical both to provide JOPEC I and II training, but also to ensure that the non-core workforce is exposed to train-the-trainer options, and to ensure that personnel anticipating deployment to an OCSIC can receive specialized quick-turn training as needed.

Integrate OCS P&I personnel into manpower and personnel processes to sufficiently track, train, and retain OCS personnel.

As outlined in Chapter Six, various options exist to provide for better tracking and identification of trained OCS personnel. One reasonable means of doing so at the present time, given current resource constraints (both in terms of funding and personnel limitations), would be for DoD to reassign JCASO’s embedded OCS planners directly to the GCCs, move JCASO’s expeditionary OCS MST capability under the JECC, and create an OCS SI (parenthetical) to identify and track trained OCS professionals while simultaneously incentivizing talented individuals to seek out OCS-related training in order to become OCS qualified with this SI. When reassigning JCASO planners directly to the GCCs, DoD may want to consider assignment of a lead service to advocate for OCS manpower as a means of mitigating the risk that GCC commanders will task these planners with non-OCS activities.

Overview, Summary, and Analysis of Key Policy Documents

A handful of fundamental policy and doctrinal documents dictate the contours of existing OCS-related policy and doctrine. The first foundational policy document published was DoDI 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support (OCS)*.¹ The initial draft instruction was published in 2003, the same year that Operation Iraqi Freedom began. The final version was published in 2005 and later updated in 2011. The 2005 draft was published in response to Section 1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2005, which instructed the Secretary of Defense to “issue guidance on how the Department of Defense shall manage contractor personnel who support deployed forces and [to] direct the Secretaries of the military departments to develop procedures to ensure implementation of that guidance.”² According to the legislation, the guidance should establish policies for the use of contractors, delineate the responsibilities of commanders for oversight and management of the contractors, and integrate into one document other relevant doctrine and policy regarding DoD responsibilities to contractors.

The purpose of DoDI 3020.41 was to “[e]stablish policy, assign responsibilities, and provide procedures for OCS, including OCS program management, contract support integration, and integration of defense contractor personnel into contingency operations outside the

¹ DoDI 3020.41, 2011.

² Public Law 108-375, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, October 28, 2004.

United States.”³ In the subsection on OCS planning, DoDI 3020.41 instructed combatant and subordinate joint force commanders to determine whether there was a need for contract support. If such a need were found, planners would be responsible for developing a variety of relevant plans, including contract support integration plans and contractor management plans.⁴

DoDI 3020.41 also outlines the high-level responsibilities of relevant agencies and organizations, including ODASD(PS), DLA, the Defense Contract Management Agency, DMDC, the secretaries of the military departments and directors of the defense agencies and DoD field activities, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the GCC commanders.⁵

In 2007, in the midst of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the unique demands of those engagements, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren established the bipartisan Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Contracting (referred to as the Gansler Commission, after its chair, former Under Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics Jacques Gansler). The purpose of the commission was to review the Army’s expeditionary contracting processes and policies and to provide recommendations to address shortfalls. The scope of review was broad, extending to Army acquisition and program management in USCENTCOM, the sufficiency of existing legislation, and the adequacy of staffing levels.⁶

The Gansler Commission found that the Institutional Army was ill prepared to recognize and support the use of contractors in expeditionary operations. The commission specifically found that the following elements of the Institutional Army had failed to adapt in order to enable responsive acquisitions and sustainment for expeditionary operations: financial management, civilian and military personnel,

³ DoDI 3020.41, 2011, p. 1.

⁴ DoDI 3020.41, 2011, p. 11.

⁵ DoDI 3020.41, pp. 35–44.

⁶ Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (Gansler Commission), *Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting*, October 31, 2007, pp. 79–80.

contracting and contract management, training and education, and doctrine, regulations, and processes.⁷ Its major findings included a failure to recognize the significance of contracts and contractors in expeditionary environments, as well as a dearth of expeditionary contracting skills in the Army, a failure to recognize the importance of contracting in the Army, inadequate contracting regulations for expeditionary operations, a lack of appreciation for the complexity of contracting, inadequate organization and responsibility to facilitate contracting, and very poor interagency operations.⁸

The Gansler Commission report also recommended a number of actions for the Army to take to address these problems. These detailed recommendations specified the desired outcome and the organizations responsible for enabling the reforms. For example, the commission report recommended increasing “the statute, quantity, and career development of the Army’s contracting personnel, military and civilian (especially for expeditionary operations).”⁹ It then outlined specific actions for various organizations, including Congress, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of Defense, to achieve the recommended goal.¹⁰ The report also recommended that the Army restructure its organization and “restore responsibility to facilitate contracting and contract management in expeditionary and [continental United States] operations,” “[p]rovide training and tools for overall contracting activities in expeditionary activities,” and “[o]btain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting effectiveness in expeditionary operations.” In total, the commission recommended 18 specific actions for OSD and 22 for the Army.¹¹

The year after the Gansler Commission report was published, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 called for the establishment of the neutral, bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contract-

⁷ Gansler Commission, 2007, p. 1.

⁸ Gansler Commission, 2007, pp. 1, 21, 26, 29, 39, 43–44, 79–80.

⁹ Gansler Commission, 2007, p. 47.

¹⁰ Gansler Commission, 2007, pp. 48–50.

¹¹ Gansler Commission, 2007, p. 51, 54–55.

ing. Far broader than the Gansler Commission, this commission issued two interim reports, five special reports, and a final report between 2009 and 2011. Its mandate was to “assess contingency contracting for reconstruction, logistics, and security functions; examine the extent of waste, fraud, and abuse; and provide recommendations to Congress to improve the structures, policies, and resources for managing the contracting process and contractors.”¹² The commission found problems that were broader than OCS, but several were OCS-specific. Chapter 5 of the commission’s report discusses the specific challenges facing OCS and provided recommendations to address some of these shortfalls.¹³ The report led to two DoD policy documents with OCS implications: DoDD 3020.49, *Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution*, and DoDI 3020.50, *Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations*.

The fourth key policy document, JP 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*, was promulgated in October 2008. It has since been revised, most recently in July 2014. It is the Joint Staff’s essential OCS document, providing “doctrine for planning, executing, and managing operational contract support in all phases of joint operations.”¹⁴ JP 4-10 is the most substantial of the documents discussed here in terms of contract support integration, contracting support, and contractor management, and well as the roles and responsibilities of agencies and individuals. It also provides useful information about the OCSIC construct and explains the planning process and procedures for OCS.¹⁵ JP 4-10 is a highly cited document and referenced by practitioners on a regular basis.

DoDI 1100.22, *Policy and Procedure for Determining Workforce Mix*, was released in 2010. Workforce mix is an important consideration underlying OCS: It is a total force capability that relies on

¹² Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011.

¹³ Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2011, p. 114.

¹⁴ JP 4-10, 2014, p. i.

¹⁵ JP 4-10, 2014, p. D-1.

civilians, military, and contractors to perform its key functions. This instruction explains the workforce mix decisionmaking process—that is, when to use civilians, military personnel, or contractors to perform DoD activities—and delineates the roles and responsibilities of the individuals involved, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders.¹⁶

The following year, CJCSN 4130.01, *Guidance for Combatant Commander Employment of Operational Contract Support Enabler—Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO)*, provided guidance on the use of JCASO by combatant commanders was issued.¹⁷ The CJCSN explains the importance of OCS and DoD’s commitment to maturing and growing the capability: “When shortfalls exist that can be met by JCASO capabilities, combatant commands will integrate those capabilities into their plans and operations.”¹⁸ The notice provides context for JCASO, which had been established three years prior in July 2008, and details the OCS roles and responsibilities of JCASO and others.¹⁹

Most recently, the Joint Staff, J4, issued CJCSM 4301.01, *Planning Operational Contract Support*, on planning for operational support. The manual’s purpose is to “provide processes, methodologies, tools, techniques and guidance to aid OCS planners implementing the planning guidance” in other joint planning doctrine and to “assist OCS planners when conducting deliberate, crisis action, and theater campaign planning to include developing OCS planning documents and specifically ANNEX W.”²⁰ This lengthy document that outlines

¹⁶ DoDI 1100.22, *Policy and Procedure for Determining Workforce Mix*, April 12, 2010, pp. 9–13.

¹⁷ CJCSN 4130.01, 2011.

¹⁸ CJCSN 4130.01, 2011, p. 2.

¹⁹ JCASO is located in DLA’s Directorate of Logistics Operations (J3) and is led by a one-star general officer. It consists of an Operations Division, Program Integration Division, and Expeditionary Contract Division, and it has the mission to provide OCS joint strategic enabling capability to the GCCs and USSOCOM through planning, joint training, and initial OCS mission support. See Chapter Four for a more detailed discussion of JCASO’s activities and organizational structure. See CJCSN 4130.01, 2011, pp. 5, A1–A6, B1–B4.

²⁰ CJCSM 4301.01, 2015, p. 1.

the various steps of OCS planning, from concept development through plan assessment, and details the OCS planning roles and responsibilities of various agencies and organizations.²¹

²¹ CJCSM 4301.01, 2015, pp. A2–A10.

Illustrative Position Descriptions

Illustrative Position Description 1: OCS Manager/Senior OCS Integrator

Position Title: OCS Manager/Senior OCS Integrator

Occupational Group:

Mission Category:

Occupational Specialty:

Pay Plan/Series/Grade: GS-14/15 or O-5/O-6

Work Category: Professional **FLSA:** Exempt

Work Level: Expert **Job Code Number:** IA0000

Security Clearance Required: TOP SECRET/SCI

General Summary

The incumbent serves as an OCS manager. Incumbent must understand OCS and be able to effectively communicate how OCS affects the mission to subordinates, staff, and superiors. The OCS manager must be able to work with GCCs, SCCs, military departments, the Joint Staff, and JTFs to coordinate and synchronize OCS equities. Incumbent must understand planning, Annex Ws, OCS reporting, and OCS COP and have a firm grasp of OCS business practices and procedures.

Major Duties

- Lead OCS P&I effort with primary and special staffs.
 - Establish and chair relevant boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups to establish OCS policies and procedures;

develop, integrate and synchronize requirements; determine common contracted commodities, support, and services.

- Designate personnel to oversee requirements, OCS program management, and contingency contracting and requests for forces, as required.
- Ensure that OCS planning and capabilities, personnel, processes and procedures, and supporting IT systems are established.
- Oversee and report on OCS to OSD and the Joint Staff as required.
 - Conduct periodic reviews or inspections of staff and component commands to ensure compliance with required OCS tasks.
- Provide guidance regarding OCS use during operations, exercises, and other joint activities of the command to the commander, staff, and service components.
 - Inform the commander, staff, and components of alternative acquisition strategies, non-organic support (e.g., host-nation support, contracted support) as a means to mitigate potential gaps and meet operational requirements and goals/objectives.
 - Advise the combatant commander on required OCS capabilities and risks in deliberate and crisis action planning.
 - Validate and prioritize requirements.
- Establish subordinate OCSIC (when subordinate command is established).
- Establish and run the JTF OCSIC.

Recruitment KSAs¹

1. Strong knowledge of existing OCS policy and practice.
2. Experience leading a team of OCS experts.
3. Knowledge of military doctrine and organization.
4. Understanding of why OCS is important, how it will be used in the future, how to establish requirements, how to request OCS, rules for using OCS in different contingencies, what documents/people to refer to for guidance on OCS questions, and reachback to JCASO.

¹ Knowledge, skills, and abilities.

5. Understanding of GCC and SCC responsibilities with regard to OCS planning, reporting, and synchronization.
6. Ability to establish and maintain relationships with key individuals/groups outside the immediate work unit.
7. Ability to communicate clearly orally and in writing. Be an OCS champion.

Work Category Description

Professional: Duties and responsibilities that primarily involve professional or specialized work that requires interpreting and applying concepts, theories, and judgment. At a minimum, all groups in this category require either a bachelor's degree or equivalent experience for entry. However, some occupations in this category have positive education requirements (i.e., a requirement for a particular type or level of academic degree). This work category features multiple career progression stages and work levels.

Work Level Description

Expert: Work at this level involves an extraordinary degree of specialized knowledge or expertise and a requirement to perform highly complex and ambiguous assignments that normally require integration and synthesis of a number of unrelated disciplines and disparate concepts. Employees at this level set priorities, goals, and deadlines, and make final decisions about how to plan and complete their work. Components rely on employees at this level to accomplish critical mission goals and objectives and, as a result, employees may lead the activities of senior and other expert employees, teams, projects, or task forces. Employees at this level create formal networks involving coordination among groups across the Intelligence Community and other external organizations.

FACTOR A—Knowledge

FACTOR B—Guidelines

FACTOR C—Scope of Authority and Effect of Decisions

FACTOR D—Work Relationships

FACTOR E—Supervision Received

Illustrative Position Description 2: OCS Planner/OCS Integrator

Position Title: OCS Planner/OCS Integrator

Occupational Group:

Mission Category:

Occupational Specialty:

Pay Plan/Series/Grade: GS-12/13 or O-3/O-4

Work Category: Professional **FLSA:** Exempt

Work Level: Expert **Job Code Number:** IA0000

Security Clearance Required: TOP SECRET/SCI

General Summary

The incumbent will provide expertise in OCS and contingency contracting policy, doctrine development, and oversight as it applies to humanitarian assistance, natural and manmade disaster response, and declared or nondeclared contingencies and military operations. The incumbent will leverage expertise in OCS, contracting and procurement policy and regulation, and joint OCS doctrine to plan, manage, and monitor Army contingency contracting support to the full spectrum of Army exercises and operations.

Major Duties

- Coordinate OCS P&I effort with primary and special staffs.
 - Serve on relevant boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups.
- Formally develop and refine contractor management and contract support integration plans when drafting Annex Ws for contingency and operations plans.
- In coordination with the services and functional components, identify military capability shortfalls in all the joint warfighting functions that require contracted solutions. Ensure that these requirements are captured in the appropriate combatant commander, subordinate JFC, service component, and combat support agency or other appropriate section of the contingency plan

with time-phased force deployment data, operations plan, or operations order.

- Determine and distribute specific theater OCS organizational guidance in plans, including command, control, and coordination and humanitarian and civic assistance relationships.
- Plan for OCS as part of deliberate planning activities, crisis action planning activities, and for GCC assigned Phase 0 activities (non-crisis/contingency operations, exercises, security cooperation activities, and initiatives.
 - Develop an Annex W (OCS) for plans, orders, and exercises.
 - Review plans for periodic updates.
- Develop recommendations for the assignment and execution of an appropriate contracting construct (e.g., lead service for contract coordination, lead service for contracting, Joint Theater Support Contracting Command) in the theater/AOR and for any specific plans/operations.
- Establish contractor management plan (TBC) requirements for the theater or joint operations area to support operations across all phases.
- Ensure that OCS planning incorporates multinational and U.S. government department and agency requirements.

Recruitment KSAs

1. Strong knowledge of existing OCS policy and practice.
2. Knowledge of military doctrine and organization.
3. Understanding of why OCS is important, how it will be used in the future, how to establish requirements, how to request OCS, rules for using OCS in different contingencies, what documents/people to refer to for guidance on OCS questions, and reachback to JCASO.
4. Understanding of GCC and SCC responsibilities with regard to OCS planning, reporting, and synchronization.
5. Ability to establish and maintain relationships with key individuals/groups outside the immediate work unit.
6. Ability to communicate clearly orally and in writing.

Work Category Description

Professional: Duties and responsibilities that primarily involve professional or specialized work that requires interpreting and applying concepts, theories, and judgment. At a minimum, all groups in this category require either a bachelor's degree or equivalent experience for entry. However, some occupations in this category have positive education requirements (i.e., a requirement for a particular type or level of academic degree). This work category features multiple career progression stages and work levels.

Work Level Description

Expert: Work at this level involves an extraordinary degree of specialized knowledge or expertise and a requirement to perform highly complex and ambiguous assignments that normally require integration and synthesis of a number of unrelated disciplines and disparate concepts. Employees at this level set priorities, goals, and deadlines, and make final decisions about how to plan and complete their work. Components rely on employees at this level to accomplish critical mission goals and objectives and, as a result, employees may lead the activities of senior and other expert employees, teams, projects, or task forces. Employees at this level create formal networks involving coordination among groups across the Intelligence Community and other external organizations.

FACTOR A—Knowledge**FACTOR B—Guidelines****FACTOR C—Scope of Authority and Effect of Decisions****FACTOR D—Work Relationships****FACTOR E—Supervision Received**

Illustrative Position Description 3: OCS Analyst

Position Title: OCS Analyst

Occupational Group:

Mission Category:

Occupational Specialty:

Pay Plan/Series/Grade: GS-12/13 or O-3/O-4

Work Category: Professional **FLSA:** Exempt

Work Level: Expert **Job Code Number:** IA0000

Security Clearance Required: TOP SECRET/SCI

General Summary

The incumbent serves as an OCS analyst, integrating OCS requirements into supporting system/capabilities and trackers to provide situational awareness and real-time data for decisionmakers. The incumbent will provide analysis, reviews, assessments, and evaluations of a myriad of unusual, unique, and complex policies associated with the contracting process. Responsible for merging inputs from diverse data sources, including SPOT, cASM, TOPSS, and JAMMS, into products to inform forward-deployed OCSICs or command decisions. Supports the development of the OCS COP. Develops and reviews TTPs and SOPs related to OCS knowledge and information management. Provides support to training audiences at OCS exercises with data requirements as appropriate.

Major Duties

- Develop metrics and measures of OCS and contingency contracting planning and resourcing effectiveness, including benchmarks, standards, and reporting frequency to ensure effective OCS planning across all service contracting activities.
- Analyze existing and projected theater support and external support contracts to minimize or eliminate redundant and overlapping requirements and contracted capabilities.
- Collect, assess, and validate OCS lessons learned and after-action reports.

- Review, share, and integrate OCS lessons learned and after-action reports into plans, staff training, and exercises, as appropriate.
- Review all orders, policies, and other documents for OCS equities and impact.
- In conjunction with the service components, combat support agencies, and lead contracting activity, collect, analyze, and disseminate Phase 0/steady-state OCS-related analysis of the operational environment.
- Coordinate with KM specialist with regard to whether tools are appropriate, asking and answering the right questions.
- Perform assessments across a range of OCS-relevant activities.
- Create, maintain, and update the OCS COP.

Recruitment KSAs

1. Extensive knowledge of multiple contracting systems and databases.
2. Knowledge of DoD and external data systems that is sufficient to conduct situational analyses and communicate them to commanders and officials.
3. Thorough knowledge of relevant quantitative and qualitative methods to merge, compile, and sort relevant data to produce timely analyses to inform command decisions.
4. Ability to communicate clearly, concisely, and with technical accuracy both orally and in writing and to prepare and brief senior management officials on complex OCS issues and problems.
5. Ability to establish and maintain relationships with key individuals/groups outside the immediate work unit.

Work Category Description

Professional: Duties and responsibilities primarily involve professional or specialized work that requires interpreting and applying concepts, theories, and judgment. At a minimum, all groups in this category require either a bachelor's degree or equivalent experience for entry. However, some occupations in this category have positive education requirements (i.e., a requirement for a particular type or level of aca-

demic degree). This work category features multiple career progression stages and work levels.

Work Level Description

Expert: Work at this level involves an extraordinary degree of specialized knowledge or expertise to perform highly complex and ambiguous assignments that normally require integrating and synthesizing unrelated disciplines and disparate concepts. Employees at this level set priorities, goals, and deadlines and make final decisions about how to plan and complete their work. Components rely on employees at this level to accomplish critical mission goals and objectives and, as a result, employees may lead the activities of senior and other expert employees, teams, projects, or task forces. Employees at this level create formal networks involving coordination among groups across the Intelligence Community and other external organizations.

FACTOR A—Knowledge**FACTOR B—Guidelines****FACTOR C—Scope of Authority and Effect of Decisions****FACTOR D—Work Relationships****FACTOR E—Supervision Received**

Illustrative Position Description 4: OCS Trainer

Position Title: OCS Trainer

Occupational Group:

Mission Category:

Occupational Specialty:

Pay Plan/Series/Grade: GS-12/13 or O-3/O-4

Work Category: Professional **FLSA:** Exempt

Work Level: Expert **Job Code Number:** IA0000

Security Clearance Required: TOP SECRET/SCI

General Summary

The incumbent serves as OCS trainer. Incumbent must understand why OCS is important, how it will be used in the future and how to develop requirements, as well as the various rules for using OCS in different contingencies. The OCS trainer must understand the responsibilities for GCCs, SCCs, headquarters, and other organizations with regard to planning, reporting, and synchronization. The incumbent must be able to provide training in a variety of settings to a variety of individuals.

Major Duties

- Develop and synchronize OCS objectives, scenarios, and events to train personnel to combat readiness standards and to test new concepts in an exercise environment.
- Provide training to program management and contingency contracting personnel to facilitate the execution of OCS and integration of these skills and personnel to meet contingency requirements.
- Incorporate lessons learned from previous contingencies into training.
- Demonstrate proficiency in OCS training programs for operators and warfighters.
- Understand how to synchronize Federal Acquisition Regulation, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, acquisition instruction, etc., with Annex Ws.

- Apply a broad knowledge of service and joint doctrine and organizations with a specific emphasis on OCS functions, such as requirements development, contracting officer representative duties, acquisition review board package development, and associated contractor personnel integration issues and challenges.
- Maintain awareness of the state-of-the-art of operational contracting–related developmental actions. Keeps abreast of related policy, concept, doctrine, material, training, and systems development initiatives, including those of other military services, DoD agencies, foreign military organizations, and commercial organizations.
- Conduct training in a variety of settings (e.g., JOPEC, online).
- Integrate OCS into service component–directed exercises.
- Collect, review, and analyze lessons learned and after-action reports.

Recruitment KSAs

1. Strong knowledge of existing OCS policy and practice.
2. Knowledge of military doctrine and organization.
3. Understanding of why OCS is important, how it will be used in the future, how to establish requirements, how to request OCS, rules for using OCS in different contingencies, what documents/people to consult for, e.g., guidance on OCS questions, reachback to JCASO.
4. Understanding of the responsibilities for GCCs and SCCs for OCS planning, reporting, and synchronization.
5. Ability to establish and maintain relationships with key individuals/groups outside the immediate work unit.
6. Ability to communicate clearly orally and in writing.

Work Category Description

Professional: Duties and responsibilities primarily involve professional or specialized work that requires interpreting and applying concepts, theories, and judgment. At a minimum, all groups in this category require either a bachelor's degree or equivalent experience for entry. However, some occupations in this category have positive education

requirements (i.e., a requirement for a particular type or level of academic degree). This work category features multiple career progression stages and work levels.

Work Level Description

Expert: Work at this level involves an extraordinary degree of specialized knowledge or expertise to perform highly complex and ambiguous assignments that normally require integrating and synthesizing unrelated disciplines and disparate concepts. Employees at this level set priorities, goals, and deadlines and make final decisions how to plan and complete their work. Components rely on employees at this level to accomplish critical mission goals and objectives, and, as a result, employees may lead the activities of senior and other expert employees, teams, projects, or task forces. Employees at this level create formal networks involving coordination among groups across the Intelligence Community and other external organizations.

FACTOR A—Knowledge**FACTOR B—Guidelines****FACTOR C—Scope of Authority and Effect of Decisions****FACTOR D—Work Relationships****FACTOR E—Supervision Received**

Illustrative Position Description 5: Knowledge Management Specialist

Position Title: Knowledge Management Specialist

Occupational Group:

Mission Category:

Occupational Specialty:

Pay Plan/Series/Grade: GS-12/13 or O-3/O-4

Work Category: Professional **FLSA:** Exempt

Work Level: Expert **Job Code Number:** IA0000

Security Clearance Required: TOP SECRET/SCI

General Summary

The incumbent serves as a KM specialist, integrating OCS requirements into supporting system/capabilities roadmaps. Responsible for merging inputs from diverse data sources, including SPOT, cASM, TOPSS and JAMMS, into products to inform forward-deployed OCSICs and command decisions. Supports the development of the OCS COP. Develops and reviews TTPs or SOPs related to OCS knowledge and information management. Provides support to training audiences during OCS exercises with data requirements, as appropriate.

Major Duties

- Integrate and merge the contents of disparate databases into new data sets that meet the needs of users.
- Process, generate, and translate metadata to make data searchable and discoverable for users.
- Participate in configuration control/requirements review boards.
- Facilitate and participate in boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups, as appropriate.
- Maintain and review TTPs/SOPs.
- Provide subject-matter expertise and review the development of KM TTPs and SOPs.
- Synthesize information gleaned from DoD systems and collected by interagency systems or from the interagency community in theater.

- Coordinate program offices' participation in system-supporting exercise.
- Coordinate data requirements for training audiences/systems.
- Provide on-site support during OCSJX and other OCS-related exercises.
- Pull data from systems/tools.
- Coordinate with program offices to build/deploy custom systems and/or plans to meet specific information requirements.
- Coordinate with program offices to support exercise requirements.
- Coordinate data findings and methods of analysis with relevant offices across the force.
- Access and use information from SPOT and train others in the use of that system.
- Monitor command use of SPOT, TOPSS, and JAMMS, among other relevant data systems.
- Assess existing and emerging business systems to improve and integrate OCS planning and execution equities.
- Deliver short reports on data system findings to commanders.
- Works with other KM specialists across the defense enterprise to ensure that all data elements in relevant systems are archived and protected to the extent possible.
- Ensure linkage and interoperability of businesses to joint planning and execution systems.
- Develop and maintain relevant webpages, portals, and directories, as appropriate.
- Perform other duties as assigned.

Recruitment KSAs

1. Extensive knowledge of multiple IT specialties.
2. Knowledge of DoD and external data systems that is sufficient to conduct situational analyses and communicate them to commanders and officials.
3. Thorough knowledge of relevant quantitative and qualitative methods to merge, compile, and sort relevant data to produce timely analyses to inform command decisions.

4. Ability to communicate clearly, concisely, and with technical accuracy, both orally and in writing, to prepare and brief senior management officials on complex IT issues and problems.
5. Ability to establish and maintain relationships with key individuals/groups outside the immediate work unit.

Work Category Description

Professional: Duties and responsibilities primarily involve professional or specialized work that requires interpreting and applying concepts, theories, and judgment. At a minimum, all groups in this category require either a bachelor's degree or equivalent experience for entry. However, some occupations in this category have positive education requirements (i.e., for a particular type or level of academic degree). This work category features multiple career progression stages and work levels.

Work Level Description

Expert: Work at this level involves an extraordinary degree of specialized knowledge or expertise to perform highly complex and ambiguous assignments that normally require integrating and synthesizing unrelated disciplines and disparate concepts. Employees at this level set priorities, goals, and deadlines, and make final decisions about how to plan and complete their work. Components rely on employees at this level to accomplish critical mission goals and objectives, and, as a result, employees may lead the activities of senior and other expert employees, teams, projects, or task forces. Employees at this level create formal networks involving coordination among groups across the Intelligence Community and other external organizations.

FACTOR A—Knowledge**FACTOR B—Guidelines****FACTOR C—Scope of Authority and Effect of Decisions****FACTOR D—Work Relationships****FACTOR E—Supervision Received**

Illustrative Position Description 6: OCS Policy Development Specialist

Position Title: OCS Policy Development Specialist

Occupational Group:

Mission Category:

Occupational Specialty:

Pay Plan/Series/Grade: GS-13/14 or O-4/O-5

Work Category: Professional **FLSA:** Exempt

Work Level: Expert **Job Code Number:** IA0000

Security Clearance Required: TOP SECRET/SCI

General Summary

The incumbent is responsible for developing, publishing, and promulgating OCS-related doctrine. The incumbent must also review existing doctrine, identify gaps and shortcomings, and communicate gaps to relevant stakeholders. The incumbent should also review new and forthcoming policy and doctrine and be able to understand how changes to policy will affect the office's programs and plans.

Major Duties

- Develop and publish OCS-related regulations, instructions, and directives as necessary for the effective use of OCS to support joint operations.
- Develop and promulgate OCS planning policy, related procedures, and templates.
- Incorporate OSD and joint OCS policy, as well as joint doctrine, into applicable service policy, doctrine, training, and leader development and education.
- Ensure office or branch compliance with existing OCS policy.
- Regularly review and comment on new and evolving OCS policy documents.
- Attend interagency discussions and meetings on OCS policy.
- Understand and communicate the implications of OCS policy changes.

- Forecast how impending policy changes will affect the office's plans and programs.
- Identify gaps or shortcomings in existing OCS policy and communicate them up the agency chain of command.
- Participate in relevant boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups.

Recruitment KSAs

1. Expert knowledge of existing OCS policy documents.
2. Expert knowledge of pertinent laws, regulations, and policies that affect OCS policy, including the Federal Acquisition Regulation and its supplements.
3. Ability to communicate clearly orally and in writing.
4. Ability to recognize and analyze problems, conduct research, summarize results, and make appropriate recommendations.
5. Ability to establish and maintain relationships with key individuals/groups outside the immediate work unit.

Work Category Description

Professional: Duties and responsibilities primarily involve professional or specialized work that requires interpreting and applying concepts, theories, and judgment. At a minimum, all groups in this category require either a bachelor's degree or equivalent experience for entry. However, some occupations in this category have positive education requirements (i.e., for a particular type or level of academic degree). This work category features multiple career progression stages and work levels.

Work Level Description

Expert: Work at this level involves an extraordinary degree of specialized knowledge or expertise to perform highly complex and ambiguous assignments that normally require integrating and synthesizing unrelated disciplines and disparate concepts. Employees at this level set priorities, goals, and deadlines and make final decisions about how to plan and complete their work. Components rely on employees at this level to accomplish critical mission goals and objectives, and, as a result,

employees may lead the activities of senior and other expert employees, teams, projects, or task forces. Employees at this level create formal networks involving coordination among groups across the Intelligence Community and other external organizations.

FACTOR A—Knowledge

FACTOR B—Guidelines

FACTOR C—Scope of Authority and Effect of Decisions

FACTOR D—Work Relationships

FACTOR E—Supervision Received

Illustrative Position Description 7: OCS Generalist

Position Title: OCS Generalist

Occupational Group:

Mission Category:

Occupational Specialty:

Pay Plan/Series/Grade: GS-13/14/15

Work Category: Professional **FLSA:** Exempt

Work Level: Expert **Job Code Number:** IA0000

Security Clearance Required: TOP SECRET/SCI

General Summary

The incumbent will provide expertise in OCS and contingency contracting policy, doctrine development, and oversight as they apply to humanitarian assistance, natural and manmade disaster response, and declared or nondeclared contingencies and military operations. The incumbent will leverage expertise in OCS, contracting and procurement policy and regulation, and joint OCS doctrine to plan, manage, and monitor contingency contracting support across the spectrum of exercises and operations. The incumbent must understand OCS and be able to effectively communicate how OCS affects the mission to subordinates, staff, and superiors.

Major Duties

- Lead and coordinate OCS P&I effort with primary and special staffs.
- Establish and chair relevant boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups to establish OCS policies and procedures.
- May develop, integrate, and synchronize requirements and determine common contracted commodities, support, and services.
- May designate personnel to oversee requirements definition, OCS program management, and contingency contracting and requests for forces, as required.
- Ensure that OCS planning and capabilities, personnel, processes, and procedures and supporting IT systems are established.

- Oversee and report on OCS to OSD and the Joint Staff as required.
 - Conduct periodic reviews or inspections of staff and component commands to ensure compliance with required OCS tasks.
- Provide guidance regarding OCS use during operations, exercises, and other joint activities of the command to the commander, staff, and service components.
 - May be responsible for informing the commander, staff, and components of alternative acquisition strategies and non-organic support (e.g., host-nation support, contracted support) as a means to mitigate potential gaps and meet operational requirements and goals/objectives.
 - Advise the combatant commander on required OCS capabilities and risks in deliberate and crisis action planning.
- Validate and prioritize requirements as needed.
- May be involved with formally developing and refining contractor management and contract support integration plans when drafting Annex Ws.
- Determine and establish contractor management plan requirements for the theater and/or joint operations area to support operations across all phases.
- Determine and distribute specific theater OCS organizational guidance in plans, including command, control, and coordination and humanitarian and civic assistance relationships.
- Develop recommendations for the assignment and the execution of a contracting construct in theater/AOR for all specific plans or operations.
- Analyze existing and projected theater support and external support contracts to minimize and eliminate redundant requirements and contracted capabilities.
- Collect, assess, and validate OCS lessons learned and after-action reports.
- Provide training to program management and contingency contracting personnel to facilitate the execution of OCS and integra-

tion of these skills and personnel to meet contingency requirements.

- Conducts training in variety of settings: JOPEC, online, etc.
- Integrate OCS into service component–directed exercises.

Recruitment KSAs

1. Strong knowledge of existing OCS policy and practice.
2. Experience leading a team of OCS experts.
3. Knowledge of military doctrine and organization.
4. Understanding of why OCS is important, how it will be used in the future, how to establish requirements, and how to request OCS, as well as rules for using OCS in different contingencies, what documents/people to consult for, e.g., guidance on OCS questions, reachback to JCASO.
5. Understanding of the responsibilities for GCCs and SCCs for OCS planning, reporting, and synchronization.
6. Ability to establish and maintain relationships with key individuals/groups outside the immediate work unit.
7. Ability to communicate clearly orally and in writing and to be an OCS champion.

Work Category Description

Professional: Duties and responsibilities primarily involve professional or specialized work that requires interpreting and applying concepts, theories, and judgment. At a minimum, all groups in this category require either a bachelor's degree or equivalent experience for entry. However, some occupations in this category have positive education requirements (i.e., a requirement for a particular type or level of academic degree). This work category features multiple career progression stages and work levels.

Work Level Description

Expert: Work at this level involves an extraordinary degree of specialized knowledge or expertise to perform highly complex and ambiguous assignments that normally require integrating and synthesizing unrelated disciplines and disparate concepts. Employees at this level set pri-

orities, goals, and deadlines and make final decisions about how to plan and complete their work. Components rely on employees at this level to accomplish critical mission goals and objectives, and, as a result, employees may lead the activities of senior and other expert employees, teams, projects, or task forces. Employees at this level create formal networks involving coordination among groups across the Intelligence Community and other external organizations.

FACTOR A—Knowledge

FACTOR B—Guidelines

FACTOR C—Scope of Authority and Effect of Decisions

FACTOR D—Work Relationships

FACTOR E—Supervision Received

Methodology for Estimating Staffing Requirements for OCS P&I Workforce Positions

This appendix provides a detailed discussion and explanation of the methodology employed to develop staffing estimates for the OCS positions identified in Chapter Six.¹ Staffing estimates varied across a number of dimensions, including the positions themselves, the organizations, and, in the case of the GCCs and SCCs, across the six AORs. We address each dimension in turn and provide a detailed explanation of how we developed staffing estimates for each position at each organization.

The WISN Method

The initial inspiration for developing a method for estimating OCS personnel staffing was the WISN method promoted by the World Health Organization to determine staffing needs in hospitals. The WISN method is used to calculate staffing needs for various types of positions in a medical facility and takes four factors into account: available working time, workload components, activity standards, and activity statistics.

¹ Note that the staffing estimates are reported in “full-time equivalents” in the truest sense—that is, that they are not numbers of bodies, per se, but are the additive sum of the total manpower effort needed across the organizations of interest. For instance, an estimate of 1.5 FTEs of OCS P&I manpower needed in one office could be fulfilled by one full-time person and one half-time person, or it could be fulfilled by three people each working on OCS for half of their portfolio.

Available Working Time

This is the estimated amount of time an individual has to complete his or her duties. Available working time takes into account the standard working time each week, as well as paid time off. In the medical field, the working time each week is not standardized and varies by profession and location. For example, some medical professionals work the standard five eight-hour shifts, while others may work three 12-hour shifts. The amount of paid time off may also vary by profession and location.

Workload Components

These are the activities on which workers spend the majority of their time. They can be further broken into “health service activities,” which are the standard activities performed by all workers in a certain category (e.g., nurses); “support activities,” which are additional (typically administrative) tasks performed by all workers; and “additional activities,” which are performed by few workers and tend to be managerial or supervision-type tasks.

Activity Standards

According to the World Health Organization, “An activity standard is the time necessary for a well-trained, skilled and motivated worker to perform an activity to professional standards in the local circumstances.”² Activity standards are determined by experts in the field and may be expressed explicitly as a unit of time or as a rate over a defined period.

Activity Statistics

Data are regularly collected on the workload components, particularly the health service activities and, to some extent, support activities to determine the annual workload of a medical facility. (Note that data are collected at the facility for which staffing estimates must be made, with the number of each health service activity completed each year being highly important.) Sparing the finer details, the WISN method

² World Health Organization, 2010, p. 18.

integrates available working time, workload components, activity standards, and activity statistics to determine staffing needs based on health service activities and takes into account *allowance factors* for the support activities and additional activities. Key factors in the calculations are an individual's available working time and the annual workload. For more detailed information on the WISN method calculations see the WISN user's manual.³

Adapting the WISN Method to the OCS P&I Workforce

Some differences between the OCS P&I workforce and the medical workforce prompted a modification to the WISN method for the purposes of this study. First, key tasks in the OCS workforce, which most closely correspond to the health services activities described earlier in this appendix, tend to be performed by just a few OCS personnel within an organization. Support and additional activities in the WISN method tend to be performed by many. Often, such activities are completed by whomever has the time to do so and may be shared or rotated among a group of people. For this reason, it is difficult to clearly identify categories of tasks that parallel those set forth in the WISN method.

Second, activity standards for OCS-related tasks have not yet been determined. Without an idea of how long tasks should take, it is difficult to determine the annual workload of an organization. Along these same lines, the workload may vary from year to year, depending on the number of plans or exercises.

Finally, estimates of the annual OCS workload at an organization do not exist, with one exception: the workload data collected by the OCS mission integrator (OMI) demonstration at USPACOM. To our knowledge, these are virtually the only OCS workload data that have been collected across the force. While doctrine sets forth the OCS-related tasks that should be performed by each organization, in most cases, there are no data on what occurs in practice or on how much

³ World Health Organization, 2010.

effort is required for each task. Over the course of this study, it became apparent through interviews that some organizations often perform the tasks deemed to be the responsibility of another organization, in addition to their own responsibilities. Therefore, the annual workload of these organizations would be higher than expected based on doctrinal responsibilities. Finally, the fact that many different people are performing the same task or sharing tasks makes it difficult to track the total amount of effort put forth for each task.

The issues discussed here suggested that a more straightforward calculation of staffing needs would be required. In an effort to adapt the WISN method for the purposes of this study and simplify calculations, our first step was to devise a survey for the purposes of collecting data on OCS-related tasks at various organizations. Our goal with this survey was to develop an estimate of the annual workload of an organization as well as determine the annual level of effort for the various tasks described in our position descriptions.

Task-Time Survey

Interviews were conducted with 119 individuals across 22 organizations. A follow-up survey aimed at gathering more in-depth information on OCS-related tasks performed at each organization was sent to these individuals. The three key elements of the survey asked respondents to describe the individual OCS-related tasks they performed in their jobs, an estimate of the annual amount of time spent on each task, and the number of individuals performing each task. Overall, we had a 61-percent response rate.

Yet, even with this response rate, not all survey respondents provided complete and useful data. We encountered a variety of issues with survey responses that made it difficult to draw the conclusions we had hoped to from the survey. First, some individuals reported the OCS-related tasks they performed, but did not provide an estimate of the time spent on such tasks. We also encountered cases where time data was only provided for some of the reported tasks. Second, in many cases tasks were described too generally to be useful. These descriptions

often encompassed the entirety of a job and did not provide insight into the specific tasks performed. Two examples of such responses are “being a liaison and talking about OCS” and “warfighter support.” Third, a fair number of responders grouped multiple, often unrelated, OCS tasks together into a single task description and provide a single time estimate. In many cases, the grouped tasks would fall under very different job titles and the grouping made it difficult to separate individual tasks with appropriate time estimates. Fourth, the time responses from some individuals were inconsistent and often could not be used. For example, one individual reported having 88 tasks and spending 100 percent of work time on each task. Finally, in some cases, it was difficult to determine whether an individual was reporting his or her own time data or providing an estimate for the average amount of time spent by each person on the task (when multiple people performed the task). In these cases, we often assumed that the time reported was only for the responder and did not take into account anyone else at the organization.

For these reasons and others, it was impossible to ascertain the annual workload of OCS personnel in an organization. A contributing factor was the overall small amount of data available for any single organization. In general, we had very few responses from each organization, and the responses represented a very small portion of the overall OCS workforce at a given organization. The two exceptions were OCSD and ODASD(PS), which had fairly complete responses across their staffs. For this reason, we developed an alternative method for estimating the staffing needs at organizations other than OCSD and ODASD(PS). The next section details our approach to calculating staffing estimates at each of the organizations of interest.

Initial Organization-Level Staffing Estimates

We estimated staffing needs for the six PDs—planner, analyst, trainer, KM specialist, manager, and policy specialist—at each of the following seven organizations: ODASD(PS), GCCs, JCASO, JTFs, OCSD, SCCs, and the services (service headquarters and the military depart-

ments). As noted, the method used to compute staffing estimates for OCSD and ODASD(PS) differed from the method used for the remaining five organizations.

Calculating Staffing Estimates for the Joint Staff and ODASD(PS)

Survey response rates for OCSD and ODASD(PS) were fairly high compared to other organizations: 50 percent and 68.18 percent, respectively.⁴ After reviewing the number of total staff dedicated to OCS-related tasks in each organization, we believe the survey responses account for approximately 56 percent of OCSD staff and 40 percent of ODASD(PS) staff. Additionally, the survey responses from individuals at these organizations were sufficiently robust for the tasks reported—covering both doctrinal responsibilities and additional tasks performed—to suggest that they provided a representative overview of the OCS-related tasks being performed. For this reason, we chose to use the survey data to calculate staffing estimates at OCSD and ODASD(PS) in a manner similar to the WISN method.

For each of these two organizations, we first categorized (as accurately as possible) tasks reported in the surveys as belonging to one of the six PDs.⁵

Notationally, we define t_{ijk} as the total time devoted to task by individuals in position i at organization j . (Note that we assume that the set of tasks includes all tasks reported by all individuals at all organizations. Therefore, the value of t_{ijk} will be zero when individuals in position i at organization j do not work on task k .) If we denote the annual workload, in hours per year, of position i at organization j by w_{ij} , then

$$w_{ij} = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} t_{ijk}.$$

⁴ Note that response rates at the Joint Staff are, in actuality, a bit lower because not all respondents provided time data in their surveys, but they did provide useful information regarding OCS-related tasks performed.

⁵ Note that it was not a requirement that each of the six positions be represented at each organization. At ODASD(PS), for example, the analyst and KM specialist positions were not represented in the survey data, nor are these positions required at ODASD(PS).

The staffing estimate, z_{ij} , for position i at organization j is then given by

$$z_{ij} = \frac{w_{ij}}{1,848},$$

where the annual workload is divided by 1,848 hours. According to OMB A-11, one FTE is calculated using 2,088 hours per year as the baseline working time (the number of hours in an FY ranges from 2,080 to 2,096).⁶ This document also states that staffing requirements should be based on estimated *available work hours* per employee (i.e., the available working time addressed in the WISN method). According to OPM, full-time employees are entitled to approximately 43 paid days off per year: 20 vacation days, 13 sick days, and ten federal holidays.⁷ This amounts to approximately 8.5 weeks of paid time off, and we have chosen to estimate the *staffing needs* using 1,848 hours per year as an individual's *available working time* per year, which allows for six weeks of paid time off. While we recognize that many individuals may not take six weeks off over the course of the year, we believe our staffing estimates allow for this possibility and that each organization should be staffed at a level that is flexible enough to permit all employees to take their allowable time off. The annual reported workload for each position, as well as the staffing estimate, is shown in Table C.1.

One important fact to note about these estimates is that they are based only on the workload reported in interviews and surveys, and, as noted earlier, the individuals who provided feedback through our interviews and survey accounted for only a portion of the total OCS staff at ODASD(PS) and OCSD. Thus, these data represent only a portion of the annual workload and our estimates must be adjusted (increased) accordingly to account for this partial representation of the OCS workforce. We calculate separate *increase factors* for ODASD(PS)

⁶ Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-11, *Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget*, Washington, D.C., 2015.

⁷ Office of Personnel Management, "Pay and Leave: Leave Administration, Fact Sheets," web page, undated.

Table C.1
Staffing Estimates for ODASD(PS) and the Joint Staff (OCSD)

Position	Annual Reported Workload (hours)		Staffing Estimate (people)	
	ODASD(PS)	OCSD	ODASD(PS)	OCSD
Manager	1,305.00	4,191.60	0.71	2.27
Planner	339.30	3,293.12	0.18	1.78
Analyst	—	722.00	—	0.39
Trainer	417.60	6,102.40	0.23	3.30
KM specialist	—	1,668.80	—	0.90
Policy specialist	1,360.60	2,860.56	0.74	1.58
Total	3,422.50	18,838.40	1.86	10.22

and OCSD that are used to adjust estimates. The increase factor for an organization is given by

$$\text{Increase factor} = \frac{100\%}{\% \text{ of staff represented by survey responses}}.$$

For example, survey responses at ODASD(PS) accounted for 40 percent of the FTE staff, which suggests an increase factor of 100 percent divided by 40 percent, or 2.5. Applying the increase factor to each organization to all positions' staffing estimates produces the adjusted estimates shown in Table C.2. Here, we see that ODASD(PS) requires a total of approximately 4.63 individuals devoted to OCS and OCSD requires approximately 18.35 individuals.

It is critical to note several caveats with regard to these estimates. First, these estimates are not *in addition* to the current staff at each organization; rather, they are cumulative estimated requirements. So, for example, if ODASD(PS) already has 3.5 individuals working on OCS-related tasks, then approximately one additional person would be needed. Furthermore, staffing requirements do not necessarily need to be filled by full-time OCS personnel only. Staffing may be distributed

Table C.2
Staffing Estimates for ODASD(PS) and the Joint Staff
(OCS) Adjusted to Account for Total Annual Workload

Position	Staffing Estimate	
	ODASD(PS)	OCS
Manager	1.77	4.08
Planner	0.46	3.21
Analyst	—	0.70
Trainer	0.56	5.94
KM specialist	—	1.63
Policy specialist	1.84	2.79
Total	4.63	18.35

across both full-time and part-time staff so long as the total effort satisfies the staffing requirements. For example, ODASD(PS) may choose to employ four full-time OCS personnel and one person who works on OCS approximately 60 percent of his or her time, or nine employees may be used, each of whom works on OCS approximately 50 percent of the time. Such staffing recommendations require additional information on the current personnel of an organization, including their duties, skill sets, and other similar information that would allow us to identify an optimal distribution of staffing across full- and part-time OCS employees for each position. We leave the decision about how to best fill staffing needs to the discretion of each organization.

Calculating Staffing Estimates for the GCCs, JCASO, JTFs, SCCs, and the Services

Due to low response rates in the remaining five categories of organizations (GCCs, JCASO, JTFs, SCCs, and the services), as well as the response issues previously described, the task-time data collected through interviews and surveys were insufficient to calculate staffing estimates for these organizations. Instead, we devised a different approach that utilized doctrinal responsibilities along with a baseline

(total) annual workload estimate for USPACOM to estimate staffing needs at these organizations.

Doctrinal Responsibilities of Each of the Organizations

The number of doctrinal tasks for each position-organization combination is an important element of our method for estimating staffing needs at the five organizations mentioned earlier. As discussed in Chapter Three, we created a literature review map that identified the OCS-related tasks that each organization is responsible for completing and categorized them into one of six main categories: management, integration/coordination, analysis/monitoring, planning, training/exercises, and policy, doctrine, and guidance development. For the purposes of developing staffing estimates, we considered formal doctrinal tasks that appeared in one of five documents: CJCSN 4130.01, draft CJCSM 4301.01, DoDD 3020.49, DoDI 3020.41, and JP 4-10.

We matched the tasks described in the five documents for each organization with the appropriate position description. We then used the task category to determine the appropriate corresponding position (e.g., analysis/monitoring tasks corresponded to the analyst position). We did not include integration/coordination tasks or tasks that were included in multiple categories, as we often could not assign them to only one position. In most cases, these were tasks that all OCS personnel should be doing to promote the proper function of OCS and healthy relationships with other government and service entities. Though we did not have a category of tasks explicitly identified as “knowledge management” or “data management,” we were able to identify a few of the IT-related tasks as those that would be the responsibility of a KM specialist. The doctrinal task counts for each position-organization combination are shown in Table C.3. We explain in more detail how these numbers are used later in this section. Now, we turn to developing an annual workload estimate for one of the organizations.

Baseline Annual Workload Estimate at USPACOM

In developing a nascent capability like OCS, we had to rely on the most specific data available to us. The OMI staff provided us with a detailed breakdown of work performed (or to be performed) across

Table C.3
Doctrinal Task Counts, by Organization and Position

Position	Number of Tasks						
	GCC	SCC	JTF	JCASO	Joint Staff	ODASD(PS)	Services
Manager	19	7	8	3	1	9	6
Planner	18	13	12	18	6	0	7
Analyst	12	6	6	2	6	0	4
Trainer	4	2	0	1	2	1	1
KM specialist	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Policy specialist	4	0	2	0	5	3	2
Total	58	29	28	24	20	14	20

a three-year period at USPACOM, FYs 2015–2017.⁸ This helped us better understand the types of tasks people spend their time completing and the amount of time devoted to each task. In terms of OCS staffing levels today, USCENTCOM and USPACOM arguably have the most robust J4 contracting divisions. At USPACOM, unlike other AORs, OMI personnel provided specific time data for OMI members. Time spent on each task was recorded, which allowed us to extrapolate the level of work to other organizations (as we did in the previous section), as well as to the other GCCs. USCENTCOM did not provide a detailed breakdown or recent estimate of workload; therefore, we did not use that command as a benchmark in this study.

An annual workload estimate for USPACOM was established using the USPACOM OMI demonstration workload data as an initial reference. The data for each FY included the specific tasks, the annual level of effort (in hours), when the task was to be completed, who would lead the task, and the success criteria. For our purposes, we were interested only in the tasks and the annual level of effort for

⁸ USPACOM OCS *Mission Integrator Demonstration Plan of Action and Milestone (POAM) Synchronization—Contract Year #3: 2016–2017*, March 2, 2015, master file provided to RAND by OMI officials, May 2016.

each. An overview of the tasks revealed that most OCS-related tasks to be completed by the GCCs as specified in doctrine were addressed in this study, at least at a general level. The only obvious gaps were KM specialist tasks.

According to the three years of OMI data, the average total annual workload at USPACOM is approximately 12,142 hours. This estimate includes an average of 2,436 hours devoted to additional administrative tasks, miscellaneous document review, and client-directed training. Based on the time-task data collected through our survey and interviews, the amount of time devoted to additional administrative tasks and training was a bit higher than the roughly 20 percent suggested by the OMI study. Thus, we added an additional 1,044 hours to the yearly workload estimate to produce an estimate of approximately 26 percent of an individual's time being devoted to additional administrative tasks and training, which more closely matched our interview and survey data.

According to the distribution of workload across the six positions, KM specialist tasks doctrinally accounted for 1.72 percent of the workload at the GCCs. As noted, KM specialist tasks did not seem to be included in the OMI manpower study estimate. Therefore, it was necessary to adjust the annual workload estimate accordingly. To determine the annual workload, w , of the KM specialist position, we solved the following equation:

$$\frac{w}{13,186 + w} = \frac{1.72}{100},$$

which implies that the annual workload of a KM specialist at USPACOM should be approximately 231 hours. This increases the total annual workload estimate for USPACOM to 13,417 hours. Once again, assuming an available working time of 1,848 hours per year, we estimated that USPACOM would need approximately 7.26 OCS full-time OCS personnel. We then used the distribution of workload across PDs as determined by doctrine task ratios shown in Table C.4 to estimate the staffing needs for each PD. The breakdown of staffing across the six positions is also shown in Table C.4.

Table C.4
Distribution of Workload at USPACOM

Position	% of Workload	Staffing Estimate
Manager	33	2.38
Planner	31	2.25
Trainer	7	0.50
Analyst	21	1.50
KM specialist	8	0.13
Policy specialist	7	0.50
Total	100	7.26

NOTE: Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Extrapolation to Other Organizations

The “baseline” estimates for staffing needs at USPACOM derived in conjunction with the distribution of doctrinal tasks across the five organizations permitted us to extrapolate USPACOM’s estimates to the other four organizations. To do so, we first introduce a bit of notation. Let

x_{ij} = number of doctrine tasks for position i at organization j

and

z_{ij} = staffing estimate (number of personnel needed) for position i
at organization j .

For example, if we consider the position of planner (i = planner) from Table C.3, we have $x_{\text{planner},GCC} = 18$ and, from Table C.4, we observe that $x_{\text{planner},GCC} = 2.25$. The staffing needs for each position at each of the other four organization types—SCCs, JTFs, JCASO, and the services—can then be calculated as

$$z_{ij} = z_{i,GCC} \times \left(\frac{x_{ij}}{x_{i,GCC}} \right), \text{ for all positions } i \text{ at all organizations } j.$$

For example, if an SCC has half as many (doctrinal) analyst tasks as a GCC, this suggests that the SCC needs half as many analysts as the GCC. Applying this ratio analysis to USPACOM’s estimates produces the staffing estimates for the remaining four organizations shown in Table C.5.

Adjustments to Staffing Estimates

As discussed in the previous section, an estimate of the annual workload at USPACOM formed the underlying basis for the analysis described here. According to interview data, however, it is apparent that these staffing estimates are likely insufficient for a couple of reasons. First, there are obvious gaps in the completion of doctrinal responsibilities at some organizations. Second, there is inconsistency in the availability of personnel across organizations who are capable of completing certain types of tasks (e.g., IT, data management). Finally, some organizations lack OCS-related doctrine and require additional personnel to develop such doctrine. We addressed the first issue by applying a gap-analysis adjustment to our estimates based on the doctrinal task counts introduced earlier, our interview findings, and PD analysis described in Chapter Four. We then used interview data to inform additional, final adjustments to the staffing estimates.

Table C.5
Initial Staffing Estimates for USPACOM

Position	Staffing Estimate				
	GCC	SCC	JTF	JCASO	Services
Manager	2.38	0.88	1.00	0.38	0.75
Planner	2.25	1.63	1.50	2.25	0.88
Analyst	1.50	0.75	0.75	0.25	0.50
Trainer	0.50	0.25	—	0.13	0.13
KM specialist	0.13	0.13	—	—	—
Policy specialist	0.50	—	0.25	—	0.25
Total	7.26	3.63	3.50	3.01	2.51

Incorporation of Gap Analysis

As is evident from the gap analysis described in Chapter Four, each organization has some number of doctrinal responsibilities that are not being completed in-house. The goal of this study was to establish staffing estimates that are sufficient for each organization to completely fulfill its doctrinal responsibilities without “passing the buck” to external parties but always working in coordination and in a highly integrated fashion with other defense organizations. To account for tasks that are doctrinally mandated but not being performed by a particular organization, we incorporated the gap analysis described in Chapter Four to increase staffing estimates for each position accordingly.

Recall that Table C.3 showed the total number of tasks that appeared in doctrine for each position-organization combination. Table C.6 shows the number of doctrine tasks that were not being completed by the responsible organization (tier 1 gaps). Again, we did not include tasks classified as “integration/coordination” or “mixed” because these tasks were not included in the total task counts in Table C.3.

Table C.6
Tier 1 Guidance Implementation Gap Counts

Position	Number of Tasks						
	GCCs	SCCs	JTFs	Joint Staff	ODASD(PS)	JCASO	Services
Manager	3	1	1	—	2	1	1
Planner	7	4	—	—	—	—	2
Analyst	8	1	1	—	—	—	2
KM specialist	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Trainer	3	—	—	—	—	—	—
Policy specialist	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	21	6	2	—	2	1	5

From Table C.6, we can see that most organizations required an increase in staffing estimates for at least one position. At the GCCs, for example, we see that significant increases were needed in the analyst, planner, and trainer positions, since only 33 percent of analyst tasks, 61 percent of planner tasks, and 25 percent of trainer tasks were reported as being completed. To adjust the staffing estimates, we needed to address each position-organization combination individually, determining the appropriate increase factor for each combination. The increase factor, r_{ij} , for position i at organization j was based on the number of tasks not being completed and is given by

$$r_{ij} = \frac{1}{1 - \frac{y_{ij}}{x_{ij}}},$$

where y_{ij} is the number of doctrinal tasks for position i at organization j that are *not* being done. We then updated the staffing estimates as follows:

$$z_{ij} := z_{ij} \times r_{ij}.$$

For example, at the GCCs, seven out of 18 tasks related to the planner position were not being completed. The increase factor for the planner position at a GCC is given by

$$r_{\text{planner}, \text{GCC}} = \frac{1}{1 - \frac{7}{18}} \approx 1.64,$$

and using this to adjust the staffing estimate yields

$$z_{\text{planner}, \text{GCC}} = 2.25 \times 1.64 = 3.69.$$

Therefore, our gap analysis suggests that the staffing estimate for the planner position at the GCCs should be increased from 2.25 to 3.69

FTEs to account for the current incompleteness of doctrinal responsibilities. Applying this methodology to all position-organization combinations produces the updated staffing estimates shown in Table C.7.

Interview-Informed Adjustments

We made final adjustments to the staffing estimates based on information collected during our interviews. First, at all organizations, interviewees expressed a need for individuals with IT and data management skills to be able to work with the various systems and databases used for OCS-related tasks. We increased the staffing estimates for KM specialists at all organizations except ODASD(PS) to reflect this need; ODASD(PS) does not need someone in a KM specialist role.⁹

We made two additional changes to the staffing estimates for ODASD(PS). First, we removed the staffing requirement of 0.56

Table C.7
Staffing Estimates Adjusted to Account for Performance Gaps

Position	FTEs						Services
	GCC	SCC	JTF	Joint Staff	ODASD(PS)	JCASO	
Manager	2.83	1.02	1.14	4.08	2.27	0.56	0.90
Planner	3.69	2.35	1.50	3.21	0.46	2.25	1.23
Analyst	4.51	0.90	0.90	0.70	—	0.25	1.00
Trainer	2.00	0.25	—	5.94	0.56	0.13	0.13
KM specialist	0.13	0.13	—	1.63	—	—	—
Policy specialist	0.50	—	0.25	2.79	1.84	—	0.25
Total	13.66	4.65	3.79	18.35	5.13	3.19	3.51

⁹ Recall that there were very few doctrinal tasks related to such skills, which explains the low initial estimates for the KM specialist position. The Joint Staff had the highest initial estimate for this position because we developed its staffing estimate using the task-time data collected via interviews and surveys and because the Joint Staff was one of the few organizations with personnel performing tasks related to the KM specialist position. We recognize that adjustments to KM specialist staffing needs are not consistent in terms of the fixed

for the trainer position and moved this requirement to the manager position. The one doctrinal task related to the trainer position could (and likely would) be handled by someone in a managerial role, so we opted to eliminate the minor need for a trainer and increase the manager requirement by an equivalent amount. Second, we increased the final staffing estimate for the policy specialist position by 0.16 (simply rounding up from 1.84 to 2.00). Because ODASD(PS) is a policy-oriented organization, its major staffing needs fall into management and policy categories, and we believe that increasing the staffing requirement for the policy specialist position would help alleviate the workload burden of the current staff.

At the Joint Staff, we explicitly identified the two directorates—Logistics (J4) and Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J7)—that are most appropriate for OCS-related personnel. Personnel hired into the trainer position should fall under J7, while all other OCS-related personnel would belong to J4. This division of responsibilities between J4 and J7 is reflected in Table C.8, which presents our final staffing recommendations.

In the services, we increased the recommended need for policy specialists from 0.25 to 1.25 to account for the fact that some services do not have their own OCS doctrine. Therefore, additional policy specialists will be required to develop this doctrine in the future.

At the JTF level, we eliminated the small need for a policy specialist suggested by doctrine. The role of the JTF in terms of OCS is not to develop policy, so this organization does not require personnel who are responsible for reading, interpreting, and developing policy. The two tasks at the JTF that were identified as “policy-related” are, as suggested by our gap analysis, being performed by individuals in other roles at the JTF—most likely individuals in a managerial position.

Finally, the staffing estimates for JCASO were determined qualitatively based on interview data, assessments of JCASO’s current organizational structure, and assessments of the potential for JCASO to

amount or percentage of total workload at all organizations. The amounts by which these staffing needs increased at each organization were the result of well-informed assessments of need based on interview data.

add unique value to OCS P&I activities. These estimates are discussed in detail in Chapter Six and are based on an assumed requirement for JCASO MST personnel to establish approximately five OCSICs per year. They are also based on an assumption—one that is not necessarily true, according to numerous interviewees—that well-trained personnel with regional familiarity will be hired to staff these MST positions. Assuming that both of these criteria are met, our analysis indicates that approximately 21 personnel could fulfill global demands for an MST capability. We conceive of these 21 personnel serving on three five-person teams, with an additional six personnel (mainly planners and trainers) maintained at a high level of readiness and available to augment the capability as needed.¹⁰ The standard composition of each team under this construct would be one OCS manager, two OCS planners, one OCS analyst, and one OCS KM specialist. Each team could be created for scenario-specific missions. Significantly, this construct would have the ability to expand or contract with operational demands.

Staffing Estimates at the GCCs and SCCs

We assume that the estimates for the GCCs and SCCs in Table C.8 reflect the staffing needs of USPACOM, because the underlying basis for our analysis was a manpower study conducted for that command. These staffing estimates should not be taken as estimates for all GCCs and SCCs. In this section, we present staffing estimates for the remaining five AORs (USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USNORTHCOM, and USSOUTHCOM). We describe our approach in the context of the GCCs and then apply the results to the corresponding SCCs.

Staffing Estimates for the GCCs

To extrapolate USPACOM's staffing estimates to the other GCCs, we used a weighting scheme based on the number of deployed troops (across

¹⁰ These estimates assume transition to an OCS planning and integration workforce model in which the GCCs “own” their OCS enablers and in which JCASO is solely an expeditionary MST capability tasked with establishing OCSICs and some degree of expeditionary training responsibilities.

Table C.8
Final Staffing Estimates, by Organization and Position

Position	FTEs					
	JTF	Joint Staff (J4)	Joint Staff (J7)	ODASD(PS)	JCASO	Services
Manager	1.14	4.08	—	2.83	3.00	0.90
Planner	1.50	3.21	—	0.46	9.00	1.23
Analyst	0.90	0.70	—	—	3.00	1.00
Trainer	—	—	5.94	—	3.00	0.13
KM specialist	2.00	2.00	—	—	3.00	0.5
Policy specialist	—	2.79	—	2.00	—	1.25
Total	5.54	12.78	5.94	5.29	21.00	5.01

all services), number of plans, and average number of exercises per year. However, due to the unique characteristics of USNORTHCOM, we did not explicitly calculate staffing estimates for that command using the weighting scheme.¹¹ For USSOUTHCOM, we were unable to obtain current and accurate estimates of the number of deployed troops, so we did not include it in the weighting scheme approach. Instead, we based estimates for USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM on those of the other GCCs. We discuss USNORTHCOM and USSOUTHCOM in more detail later in this appendix.

The GCCs provided us with current estimates of the number of deployed troops and plans in their respective AORs. We estimated the number of troops deployed to USAFRICOM slightly differently.¹²

¹¹ USNORTHCOM does not have “deployed” troops, and if we were to count all the troops stationed in the USNORTHCOM AOR, its numbers would have been significantly higher than for the other GCCs.

¹² We obtained information on the number of personnel deployed to each GCC through discussions with GCC officials. The numbers are generalized (and therefore approximations) to keep this report unclassified.

According to discussions with USAFRICOM personnel, there were 6,300 troops deployed to USAFRICOM at the time of this writing.¹³ However, this AOR is somewhat unique in terms of troop deployment. The region is quite hostile, but the United States tends not to deploy (proportionally) as many troops to this area as it does to others.¹⁴ For this reason, contractors are an extremely important staffing source in this AOR. Therefore, to factor USAFRICOM into our weighting scheme using data that would appropriately reflect its need for OCS P&I personnel, we adjusted its deployed number of troops to reflect what it would be if personnel were deployed at the same level as they are to the other GCCs.

From Table C.9, we see that USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, and USPACOM have approximately 84,000 troops, 62,000 troops, and 100,000 deployed troops, respectively. These GCCs cover areas of approximately 4 million square miles, 21 million square miles, and 100 million square miles, respectively. This translates to coverage of approximately 0.021 people per square mile in USCENTCOM, 0.002952 people per square mile in USEUCOM, and 0.01 people per square mile in USPACOM. Using the median of these values (0.002952 people per square mile) as the coverage requirement in USAFRICOM suggests a need for approximately 35,000 troops to cover the 11.6 million square miles in USAFRICOM's AOR.¹⁵ Hence, we used 35,000 as an estimate of the troop deployment to USAFRICOM.

¹³ Interview with a USAFRICOM official, October 4, 2016.

¹⁴ We can assume from the number of plans and exercises in Table C.9 that USAFRICOM responsibilities are not much different from those of the other GCCs, but that command's numbers of deployed troops are significantly lower.

¹⁵ Although we have a fairly small sample size of only three GCCs and our use of the median is equivalent to suggesting that USAFRICOM requires proportionally as many troops as USEUCOM in terms of coverage (which may or may not be true), it makes more sense to select the median of the three GCC coverage requirements rather than the mean because of the drastic differences in coverage between USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, and USPACOM. USCENTCOM's coverage per square mile is much higher than that of the other two GCCs, likely because the United States is actively engaged in wars in that region and the coverage cannot necessarily be considered "steady-state" coverage. Its dense coverage is an extreme outlier that drastically skews the mean. It also makes sense that coverage in USEUCOM and

To calculate the average number of exercises, we referenced the FY 2016 Joint Exercise Schedule, which contains exercise schedules for the various command and force centers for FYs 2016–2018.¹⁶ We calculated the average number of exercises for each GCC based on the exercise schedule for these three FYs. However, we assumed that all exercises were equally important and that the significance of OCS was equivalent across all exercises. That is, we did not take into account the sizes of the exercises or the role that OCS plays in each.

USAFRICOM would be greater than in USPACOM, because the latter has such vast area that consists mostly of water.

Table C.9
Number of Troops, Plans, and Exercises Across GCCs

Category	USAFRICOM	USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	USPACOM	Total
Deployed troops	35,000	84,000	62,000	100,000	281,000
Plans	12	29	27	13	81
Exercises (average number per year)	3.7	4.6	2.6	5.0	

Table C.10
Distribution of Troops, Plans, and Exercises Across GCCs (%)

Category	USAFRICOM	USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	USPACOM
Deployed troops	13	30	22	36
Plans	15	36	33	16
Exercises	23	29	16	32

NOTE: Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.

¹⁶ “Joint Exercise Schedule FY16 and FY17,” briefing provided to RAND by the Joint Staff, J7, in February 2016.

To properly apply a weighting scheme, we converted the numbers in Table C.9 to percentages for each AOR in each of the three categories (i.e., percentage of total troops, percentage of total plans, and percentage of total exercises). These distributions are shown in Table C.10.

Based on the data in Table C.10, along with information we received during our interviews, we concluded that the number of deployed troops would likely have the greatest effect on the number of OCS personnel needed and, therefore, would carry the majority of the weight in our weighting scheme. The number of plans and exercises would have similar effects, with the number of plans carrying a slightly greater weight due to greater knowledge of the role of OCS in plans versus exercises. For example, we know that OCS personnel contribute a great deal to the development of plans (e.g., Annex Ws) but may not always play a large role in joint exercises. This weighting scheme as implemented is shown in Table C.11.¹⁷

Applying the weighting scheme yields a *staffing index* for each of the GCCs, which we used to determine staffing needs relative to USPACOM (the baseline estimate). For example, with deployed troops

Table C.11
Weighting Schemes for GCC Estimates

Category	Weighting Scheme (%)
Deployed troops	60–65
Exercises	17.5–20
Plans	15–20

Table C.12
Staffing Index Example

Category	USAFRICOM	USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	USPACOM
Staffing index	0.4685	0.9959	0.7554	1

¹⁷ This weighting scheme is partially based on expert opinion of responsibilities and staffing needs at USCENTOM and USEUCOM, in particular, and of how their staffing levels would compare to those of USPACOM.

weighted at 65 percent, plans at 20 percent, and exercises at 15 percent, we obtained the staffing index shown in Table C.12.

Under this weighting, we see that USAFRICOM's staffing needs are 47 percent of USPACOM's, compared with almost 100 percent for USCENTCOM and 76 percent for USEUCOM. Allowing the weight ranges for troops, exercises, and plans to vary within the bounds shown in Table C.11, we developed a range of staffing indices for USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, and USEUCOM, which are shown in Table C.13.

Applying these staffing indices to the baseline USPACOM staffing estimates produced the range of estimates shown in Table C.14.

Aside from deployed troops (recall that USNORTHCOM was unique in terms of troops), we determined that OCS requirements at USNORTHCOM would most closely resemble those at USPACOM or USCENTCOM. Therefore, to determine the staff-

Table C.13
Staffing Index Ranges

Category	USAFRICOM	USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	USPACOM
Staffing index	0.4685–0.4891	0.9782–1.0000	0.7326–0.7554	1

Table C.14
Range of Staffing Estimates for the GCCs

Position	USAFRICOM	USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	USPACOM
Manager	1.32–1.39	2.76–2.83	2.07–2.13	2.83
Planner	1.73–1.80	3.61–3.69	2.70–2.79	3.69
Analyst	2.11–2.20	4.41–4.51	3.30–3.41	4.51
Trainer	0.94–0.98	1.96–2.00	1.47–1.51	2.00
KM specialist	0.47–0.49	0.98–1.00	0.73–0.76	1.00
Policy specialist	0.47–0.49	0.98–1.00	0.73–0.76	1.00
Total	7.04–7.35	14.70–15.03	11.00–11.36	15.03

ing needs at USNORTHCOM, we computed the average needs at USCENTCOM and USPACOM. USSOUTHCOM is the smallest of the GCCs, and from information collected during interviews with individuals at USSOUTHCOM, we determined that USSOUTHCOM's OCS needs would likely be, *at most*, half of those of USAFRICOM. Thus, we estimated USSOUTHCOM's staffing needs to be 50 percent of USAFRICOM's for all positions. The staffing estimates for all six GCCs are shown collectively in Table C.15.

Staffing Estimates for the SCCs

We applied the method just described for developing estimates at the GCCs to the SCCs as well. In Chapter Six, we derived initial estimates of staffing needs for the SCCs, which should be interpreted as staffing needs for USPACOM's SCCs.¹⁸

Using the previous SCC estimate as a baseline for USPACOM in conjunction with the staffing indices computed for USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, and USEUCOM, we obtained the SCC staffing estimates shown in Table C.16. As before, to compute staffing needs for the SCCs at USNORTHCOM, we computed the average needs of USCENTCOM and USPACOM, and, for USSOUTHCOM, we assumed a need that was 50 percent of USAFRICOM's.

¹⁸ Note that although we do not further identify staffing needs for the individual services, our SCC estimates represent the staffing needs for the largest service in terms of OCS-related functions (typically, the Army) in each AOR.

Table C.15
GCC Staffing Estimates

Position	USAFRICOM	USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	USNORTHCOM	USPACOM	USSOUTHCOM
Manager	1.32–1.39	2.76–2.83	2.07–2.13	2.79–2.83	2.83	0.66–0.69
Planner	1.73–1.80	3.61–3.69	2.70–2.79	3.65–3.69	3.69	0.86–0.90
Analyst	2.11–2.20	4.41–4.51	3.30–3.41	4.46–4.51	4.51	1.06–1.10
Trainer	0.94–0.98	1.96–2.00	1.47–1.51	1.98–2.00	2.00	0.47–0.49
KM specialist	0.47–0.49	0.98–1.00	0.73–0.76	0.99–1.00	1.00	0.23–0.25
Policy specialist	0.47–0.49	0.98–1.00	0.73–0.76	0.99–1.00	1.00	0.23–0.25
Total	7.04–7.35	14.70–15.03	11.00–11.36	14.86–15.03	15.03	3.51–3.68

Table C.16
SCC Staffing Estimates

Position	USAFRICOM	USCENTCOM	USEUCOM	USNORTHCOM	USPACOM	USSOUTHCOM
Manager						
Planner	0.42–0.44	0.88–0.90	0.66–0.68	0.89–0.90	0.90	0.21–0.22
Analyst	0.47–0.49	0.98–1.00	0.73–0.76	0.99–1.00	1.00	0.23–0.25
Trainer	0.48–0.50	1.00–1.02	0.75–0.77	1.01–1.02	1.02	0.24–0.25
KM specialist	1.10–1.15	2.30–2.35	1.72–1.78	2.33–2.35	2.35	0.55–0.58
Policy specialist	0.12	0.24–0.25	0.18–0.19	0.25	0.25	0.06
Total	2.59–2.70	5.40–5.52	4.04–4.18	5.47–5.52	5.52	1.29–1.36

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The United States relies on contractors to fill support roles in theaters of conflict to an extent that is unprecedented in modern history. Contractors provide supplies and perform a variety of other functions, including security (personal security details, convoy security, and static site security), logistical support, weapon and equipment upkeep and maintenance, intelligence, communication, transportation, construction, engineering, and base support operations and maintenance. It is important to ensure that these operational contract support (OCS) capabilities are available when needed for operations, but U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) oversight and planning for OCS activities is decentralized, making it difficult to determine manpower and training requirements for these DoD activities. This comprehensive review of the DoD OCS planning and integration workforce shows that some doctrinally mandated OCS planning and integration tasks are not being performed by DoD personnel, that personnel across the force receive little or no training in OCS, and that there are several human capital approaches to address these shortfalls. Staffing estimates, findings, and recommendations were informed by an exhaustive review of OCS-related policy, doctrine, and training materials, as well as survey responses and interviews with experts. The result is a clearer picture of staffing requirements for the OCS planning and integration workforce and gaps in awareness, training, and career path options.



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