

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN THE GRAY ZONE: THE STRATEGIC ROLE
OF INTELLIGENCE IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

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General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

“MILITARY INTELLIGENCE IN THE GRAY ZONE:” THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, by Major Alan J. Schachtner, 162 pages.

Since World War II, the United States has developed a policy option to support resistance movements against hostile regimes. As an Army Special Operations Forces core activity, unconventional warfare (UW) serves to achieve U.S. national objectives. The sensitivities and strategic implications of these irregular conflicts require UW practitioners to provide strategic intelligence so as to best advise senior U.S. Government leaders to make informed national security decisions. This thesis examines three major UW campaigns in U.S. history. These included the Office of Strategic Services and its support to the French resistance during World War II, the Central Intelligence Agency and Army Special Forces support to indigenous groups in Southeast Asia resisting communist expansion during the Vietnam War, and the CIA's multinational UW campaign in support of the Afghan Mujahideen to defeat the Soviet army. These campaigns demonstrated the strategic role of intelligence in UW campaigns and the necessity for the Army special operations and military intelligence communities to continue developing this capability.

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ACRONYMS

ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
ATP	Army Training Publication
CI	Counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Groups
COI	Coordinator of Information
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DoD	Department of Defense
EO	Executive Order
FFI	<i>Forces Francaises de L'Interieur</i> (or French Forces of the Interior)
FM	Field Manual
IC	Intelligence Community
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistan)
IW	Irregular warfare
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JP	Joint publication
OG	Operational Group (branch of OSS)
ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MACV-SOG	Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Studies and Observations Group
MI	Military intelligence
NIS	National Intelligence Strategy

NLF	National Liberation Front (North Vietnam-supported)
NSC	National Security Council
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
SACRA	Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities
SF	Special Forces
SFC (A) (P)	Special Forces Command (Airborne)
SO	Special Operations (branch of OSS)
SOE	Special Operations Executive (Great Britain)
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOG	See MACV-SOG
SI	Secret Intelligence (branch of OSS)
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UW	Unconventional Warfare

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Unconventional Warfare

Irregular warfare (IW) is arguably the oldest form of organized violence originating as far back as the written record of human history exists. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) defines IW as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations.”¹ While this appears clear, many authors agree that IW is an incredibly complex concept and often debate the delineations of numerous interrelated concepts such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, civil war, and revolution. In his popular historical work *Invisible Armies*, describing the evolution of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, Max Boot describes this history as a “five-thousand-year historical narrative.” DoD analyst and author John Sutherland describes IW as a protracted conflict in which a “significantly weaker player” gains asymmetric advantage over a superior military, especially if that is the conventional armed forces of a state.²

Within the spectrum of IW, the concept of unconventional warfare (UW) emerged in the twentieth century among many western states including the United States as a unique strategic capability within the military instrument of national power. The U.S. DoD defines UW as a national effort to “coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a foreign nation or

¹ Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014), 14.

² John Sutherland, *iGuerrilla: Reshaping the Face of War in the 21st Century* (Palisades, NY: History Publishing Company, 2015), 48.

occupying power” through sponsorship of a resistance force or insurgency, provides a strategic alternative to waging large-scale, conventional or even nuclear war against an opponent.³ This unique capability emerged as a foreign policy alternative to conventional large-scale military operations in order to achieve national security objectives.⁴




Figure 1. U.S. Special Operations Command Activities

Source: U.S Army Special Operations Command, “Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide” (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), Deputy Chief of Staff G3, Special Activities Division G3X), 6.

In the United States, the military application of UW is considered a type of special operation and Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the military personnel specifically trained and tasked to conduct UW. Within the U.S. special operations community, Army Special Operations (ARSOF) is the doctrinal proponent for UW and

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, DC: Office of the JCS, 2015), viii.

⁴ Ibid., section I-3; Mark Grdovic, “A Leader’s Handbook, to Unconventional Warfare,” *Special Warfare Magazine* 9, no. 1 (November 2009): 1-40.

Army Special Forces is the unit specifically trained, equipped, and organized to conduct UW operations.⁵ There are many other ARSOF units who are also trained to participate and support UW operations including Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Army Special Operations Aviation, and others. Most important to note, UW is not intended as a single unit or single service activity. UW operations are inherently joint, interagency, intragovernmental, and multinational and, as these case studies will demonstrate, require the participation from a wide range of military and government organizations. There are a number of other United States SOF activities that contribute to and are closely related with UW. Two notable examples that will be found throughout this thesis, include preparation of the environment (PE) and special reconnaissance (SR). These activities can occur independently, in support of UW operations, or in conjunction with other SOF activities that support UW objectives.⁶

Preparation of the environment is an umbrella term describing activities conducted in foreign countries in order to set the conditions in the operational environment for the entry of follow-on forces and/or future operations, which could include other special operations such as UW, direct action, and others.⁷ PE activities are intended to precede other operations and are typically clandestine or covert in nature in order to protect the sensitivities of follow-on operations. Army doctrine considers PE a

⁵ JCS, JP 3-05.1, Section I-11.

⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Training Publication (ATP) 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2013), 3-1.

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the JCS, 2017), II-4.

core activity of UW because it helps establish intelligence, support, and operational human networks and infrastructure in the operational environment which are critical for the establishment of a U.S.-sponsored resistance movement or insurgency.⁸

Special reconnaissance involves the reconnaissance and surveillance of targets in especially sensitive or denied areas and often employs clandestine or covert methods to collect information. These reconnaissance objectives are usually operationally or strategically significant and out of the reach of conventional military forces and traditional reconnaissance methods. Intelligence is a key component of SR because of the necessity to collect or verify strategic or operational information.⁹ Like PE, SR adds an important intelligence capability to UW operations.

This thesis will also expose a distinct difference in UW thought and doctrine between ARSOF and Special Forces and another historic practitioner, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA and those who research its history tend to not use the same terminology as the military. Rather than referencing its sponsorship of resistance movements or insurgencies as unconventional warfare, as the military does, the CIA categorizes these relationships in two historic CIA activities: covert action and paramilitary operations. The military defines covert action as “an operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.” United States law authorizes the CIA to serve as the proponent for these secret

⁸ HQDA, ATP 3-05.1, 3-1.

⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the JCS, 2014), x, II-5 to II-6.

operations under the authorization of the president and the review of the National Security Council.¹⁰ U.S. Presidential Executive Order states:

No agency except the Central Intelligence Agency (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by the Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution, Public Law 93-148) may conduct any covert action activity unless the President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective.¹¹

When CIA covert actions involve the use of armed American forces to affect events in foreign nations, including support to resistance movements, these are historically referred to as paramilitary operations.¹² While the CIA and military use different doctrinal terms, the concept of UW is virtually synonymous between the two.

While the notion of irregular war, especially insurgencies, resistance movements, and guerrilla campaigns, are certainly not new concepts, the late twentieth century has seen a dramatic increase in IW. In large part, this is due to the breakup of the great European empires during the twentieth century and the rapid decolonization of their overseas territories. Opportunities to provide support to hopeful revolutions and insurgencies increased exponentially with the advent of the information age and the

¹⁰ United States National Security Council (NSC), *National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects*, 10/2 (Washington, DC: National Security Council Staff, 1948); Executive Office of the President of the United States, Executive Order (EO) 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities* (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register), 1981, section 1.7(a).

¹¹ Executive Office of the President of the United States, EO 12333, section 1.7(a).

¹² John Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 20.

ability to influence public opinion.¹³ In this setting of proliferating IW and limited wars, the leading global powers have often attempted to influence insurgencies and resistance movements with UW as a strategic option in order to achieve geo-political advantages around the world.¹⁴

This recent history of UW owes its origins to the Second World War and owes its development to the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. After witnessing the destructive nature of the two world wars and the evolution of even more destructive means in the hands of the two Cold War powers, UW evolved as an alternative to the unthinkable effects of modern military confrontation. However, the Cold War powers also chose to compete for access of strategic resources that largely existed in the less developed peripheral regions around the world, through the use of proxies and surrogates. As stated by the National Security Council at its inception in 1947, Cold War UW policy specifically sought to provide assistance to “indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.”¹⁵ The alternative would have been direct military confrontation in large-scale military operations or strategic nuclear strikes, turning each other’s homelands into destructive battlefields. Therefore, the Cold War powers were motivated by this unthinkable threat to instead engage in regional limited conflicts, a way to compete without the need for unleashing the long-

¹³ Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present* (New York: Norton, 2013), xxvi.

¹⁴ Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, rev. ed. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 67.

¹⁵ Ibid. 68; NSC, *National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects*, 10/2.

feared arsenals of nuclear weapons or large mechanized armies. In the 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower recognized this policy gap and directed the introduction of UW as a strategic option for the United States.¹⁶ This permitted the United States to implement UW in the more political sensitive or denied areas of the world, amidst irregular conflicts, to achieve hard-sought strategic objectives.

The Role of Intelligence in Unconventional Warfare

Intelligence is a critical function inherent in these new irregular conflicts of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Like all military campaigns, intelligence is vital to gaining information about the environment, the indigenous people, and the combatants with which senior government leaders set national objectives and commanders plan and execute operations. By its nature, UW campaigns aim to achieve strategic ends with as few resources as required in order to obfuscate the involvement of the sponsoring nation and keep the ways within the means available to the resistance or insurgency. Intelligence is a critical and fundamental requirement for effective UW, where limited ways and means are expected to achieve maximum ends. For the weaker resistance, accurate intelligence can give them critical tactical advantages over the potentially much stronger opponents. For the United States, accurate intelligence gained during UW can lead to strategic advantage, one that enables success for their indigenous resistance partners and for synchronizing the irregular conflict with other strategic objectives in the region. Therefore, UW campaigns need to incorporate the collection and analysis of strategic

¹⁶ Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, and Will Irwin, “Unconventional Warfare in the Grey Zone,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 80 (1st Quarter 2016): 108.

intelligence in order to provide assessments to national-level policymakers so that they may make informed national security decisions.

There are dozens of twentieth and twenty-first century case studies of American UW which demonstrate the strategic role of intelligence in these campaigns. World War II alone provided several individual examples of these early campaigns. In a conflict marked extensively by the aggressive and wide-scale territorial expansion of the Axis Powers, there was no shortage of disenfranchised and persecuted local resistance movements that fought back against Nazi German, Fascist Italian, and Imperial Japanese occupation. However, one example that showed both the creation of America's UW capability and its first wartime application was the combined campaigns of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to support the French resistance movement, the Maquis, from 1940 to 1945. The lessons of strategic intelligence provided during this campaign also represent one of the first times in American history where a national military policy combined the strategic effects of intelligence with irregular warfare.

A second case study was the Vietnam War and the wider American covert action campaigns in Southeast Asia during this period of the Cold War from 1955 to 1975. The conclusion of the Second World War and the breakup of the OSS resulted in the division of American UW responsibilities between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who primarily focused on covert action and national intelligence collection, and U.S. Army Special Forces (SF), who primarily focused on either training or fighting against insurgencies. The early years of the Cold War, especially the Korean War, painfully exposed the dichotomies between these two organizations and their frequent rivalries.

However, the Vietnam War required and at times promoted close cooperation and coordination between CIA and SF, especially their intelligence functions, to achieve unified UW objectives. The UW operations in Southeast Asia were well-known for tactical operations such as interdicting North Vietnamese logistics on the Ho Chi Minh trail or rescuing downed pilots. One of the most significant benefits of these operations was the intelligence gained about the strategic intentions and plans of North Vietnam, the People's Republic of China, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in Southeast Asia.

A third important case study in America's history of UW was the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s. Unlike the UW campaigns of the Vietnam War, which was defined by a complex network of indigenous groups who fought against the communist powers of Southeast Asia, the Soviet-Afghan War involved a more unified resistance movement and demonstrated a much more focused American UW strategy. The Soviet-Afghan War also represented a detachment from the large-scale IW approach of the Vietnam War. In this campaign, the CIA prosecuted a covert action campaign in Afghanistan, largely separate and unilateral from other U.S. government and military organizations. This included the notable absence of U.S. Army Special Forces. Also unlike World War II or the Vietnam War, the American role in Afghanistan was confined mainly to planning and coordinating logistics, rather than more direct roles such as training and leading resistance forces. For these direct tasks, the United States partnered with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) who directly managed the Afghan resistance, the Mujahideen.

The current U.S. military doctrine on IW and special operations largely does not address the important relationship between UW and strategic intelligence. Joint doctrine

acknowledges the operational necessity of providing intelligence support to UW operations.¹⁷ At the tactical level, the current doctrine focuses mainly on the conduct of standard military intelligence (MI) functions including protection, situational development, target development, indications and warnings, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and battle damage assessment within UW operations.¹⁸ Therefore, when Army special operations forces (ARSOF), specifically Special Forces, conduct UW campaigns, its MI attachments and partners typically only perform tactical-level support functions rather than focus its capabilities to collect and provide strategic intelligence that can inform national security objectives. This is in stark contrast to other U.S. government organizations who historically demonstrate an institutional integration of strategic intelligence collection and analysis into the application of UW in order to provide strategic intelligence to national security policymakers.

National and Strategic Intelligence

The term “strategic intelligence” is arguably easy to understand, especially among members of the intelligence community (IC), but at times exceedingly difficult to define. Because the purpose of this thesis is to examine the strategic role of intelligence in UW, the term “strategic intelligence” deserves closer inspection. This introduction will attempt to provide clear and standard definitions of common intelligence terms that are related according to their respective levels of war and range of military operations using

¹⁷ JCS, JP 3-05.1, xi.

¹⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-05, *Army Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2014), 9-1 to 9-2.

pertinent U.S. government and joint military doctrine. Most importantly, this chapter will attempt to differentiate between the often-interrelated but distinct terms “strategic intelligence” and “national intelligence,” both of which will be referenced throughout this thesis. In general, national intelligence refers to the role of intelligence in directing and supporting the national security decision-making process, most notably among the president and National Security Council (NSC), while strategic intelligence refers to a much broader role in shaping national and regional plans, strategies, and policies.

National intelligence is best examined using the definitions provided in U.S. presidential Executive Orders (EO), executive documents that describe the role of the intelligence community (IC) and the national-level intelligence organizations that comprise it. The concept of national intelligence and a national intelligence apparatus grew out of the lessons of the wartime OSS. This was the first time the U.S. federal government created a centralized framework for the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence for the purposes of shaping national policy and plans. While the OSS did not survive long past the end of World War II, the lessons of the OSS directly influenced the drafting of the National Security Act of 1947, which created the NSC, the CIA as the proponent of national intelligence, and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as the principal intelligence advisor to the president and NCS.¹⁹

The most important document for defining national intelligence is President Ronald Reagan’s EO 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, of 1981. In EO 12333, President Reagan provided his guidance for the “National Intelligence Effort” with his

¹⁹ United States Congress, Public Law 235 of July 26, 1947; STAT 496, *National Security Act of 1947* (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register), 1947.

opening statement, “Timely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons and their agents, is essential to the national security of the United States.”²⁰ The references to capabilities, plans, and intentions also provides a basis for the definition of strategic intelligence later in this chapter. This document defines national intelligence as information provided to the president and NSC “upon which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense, and economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats.”²¹ The purpose of EO 12333 was to provide guidance for the DCI and the other U.S. government members of the IC with respect to their statutory responsibilities and the conduct of intelligence activities.²² Since its adoption, EO 12333 remains the guiding U.S. government document for national intelligence.

In 2004, in the wake of the intelligence failures of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program, President George W. Bush amended EO 12333 with EO 13355, *Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community*. Congress reciprocated these reforms with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. EO 13355 defined the concept of national intelligence by specifying the relationship between the IC and national security. This EO amended Subsection 1.5(b) to state that members of the IC had the enhanced role to:

Develop such objectives and guidance for the Intelligence Community necessary, in the [judgement of the] Director [of Central Intelligence], to ensure timely and

²⁰ Executive Office of the President of the United States, EO 12333, Section 1.1.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

effective collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence of whatever nature and from whatever source derived, concerning current and potential threats to the security of the United States and its interests, and to ensure that the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) is structured adequately to achieve these requirements; and

Working with the Intelligence Community, ensure that United States intelligence collection activities are integrated in: (i) collecting against enduring and emerging national security intelligence issues; (ii) maximizing the value to the national security; and (iii) ensuring that all collected data is available to the maximum extent practicable for integration, analysis, and dissemination to those who can act on, add value to, or otherwise apply it to mission needs.²³

In other words, EO 13355 obligated the DCI to communicate national intelligence requirements to the members of the IC, with which the president and NSC can best make national security decisions that meet national objectives.²⁴ It is these intelligence requirements that UW operations should strive to provide, when capable, to support the national security process.

Additionally, President Barak Obama further enhanced Reagan's original presidential directive with his 2008 amendment, EO 13470, *Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities*. EO 13470 specifically defined the members of the IC including intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) elements of the military departments as well as "the other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs" in addition to the normal national-level agencies such as the

²³ Executive Office of the President of the United States, Executive Order (EO) 13355, *Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community* (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, 2004), subsection 1.5(a).

²⁴ *Ibid.*, section 1.5(m).

CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency.²⁵ This provision helped better codify DoD's membership in the IC and provided important statutory authority to special operations forces for the collection of national intelligence. EO 13470 also further expanded the definition of national intelligence (and intelligence related to national security) to state,

all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside the United States, that pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by the President . . . , to pertain to more than one United States Government agency; and that involves threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security.²⁶

Therefore, as the DoD representative for UW and subordinate part of the IC, ARSOF has a statutory obligation to collect and assess strategic intelligence and provide national intelligence using its MI capabilities.

While the term national intelligence is arguably well defined in presidential directives and can be tracked throughout the evolution of national security policy, the concept of strategic intelligence is much more difficult to define. The term is not always clearly or consistently defined in many national policy documents and DoD directives. John Heidenrich, of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, argues that there is a misconception that when intelligence activities are conducted at the tactical level then these produce only tactical intelligence. Another misconception, Heidenrich argues, is that strategic intelligence is inherently long term while tactical intelligence is short

²⁵ Executive Office of the President of the United States, Executive Order (EO) 13470, *Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities* (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, 2008), section 3.5.

²⁶ Ibid.

term.²⁷ Neither assumption take into account the substantive quality and the effects of that analysis. It is the depth, breadth, and ramifications of the intelligence which makes it strategic, not merely the quantity or the timeframe in which it was developed.

While U.S. government policy or EOs may not clearly define the strategic intelligence, national-level strategic guidance describes it in two documents. In particular, the National Intelligence Strategy of 2014 provides a succinct definition, stating, “Strategic intelligence is the process and product of developing deep context, knowledge, and understanding to support national security decision-making.”²⁸ This definition is important to note conceptually because it is intended to guide the entire IC, both civilian and military, and it connects strategic intelligence to the fulfillment of national security objectives, which originate in the president’s National Security Strategy, the most recent published in 2018.²⁹ This document addresses three broad strategic intelligence objectives:

1. “Improve Understanding.”
2. “Harness All Information at Our Disposal.”

²⁷ John G. Heidenrich, “The State of Strategic Intelligence: The Intelligence Community’s Neglect of Strategic Intelligence,” *Studies in Intelligence*, 51, no. 2, accessed January 25, 2018, <https://cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/the-state-of-strategic-intelligence.html>.

²⁸ Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Office of the DNI, 2014), 7.

²⁹ Heidenrich, “The State of Strategic Intelligence: The Intelligence Community’s Neglect of Strategic Intelligence.”

3. “Fuse Information and Analysis.”³⁰

The National Intelligence Strategy, on the other hand, categorizes the subject of strategic intelligence as one of seven “mission objectives.”³¹ However, the two documents are relatively consistent with regards to the broad tasks of achieving strategic intelligence.

Ironically, it is joint military doctrine, rather than national-level governmental policy, that most clearly defines strategic intelligence. Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, states that

strategic intelligence consist of the national strategic intelligence produced for the President, the National Security Council, Congress, Secretary of Defense, senior military leaders, combatant commanders, and other US Government departments and agencies, and theater strategic intelligence that supports joint operations across the range of military operations, assesses the current situation, and estimates future capabilities and intentions of adversaries that could affect the national security and US or allied interests.³²

Additionally, the joint military doctrine also distinguishes between national strategic and theater strategic intelligence, relative to the level of war and range of military operations. First, JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, defines national strategic intelligence similarly to national intelligence but with the additional description of how the intelligence is used at the national level.

[National strategic intelligence] is used to develop national strategy and policy, monitor the international and global situation, prepare military plans, determine major weapon systems and force structure requirements, and conduct strategic operations. Strategic intelligence operations also produce the intelligence required by [Combatant Commanders] to prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans

³⁰ Heidenrich, “The State of Strategic Intelligence: The Intelligence Community’s Neglect of Strategic Intelligence,” 32.

³¹ DNI, *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America*, 1-10.

³² Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, *Joint Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Office of the JCS, 2013), x.

to accomplish missions assigned by higher authorities. In addition to this focus primarily on the military instrument of national power, strategic intelligence also allows for national leadership to determine potential options using the nonmilitary instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, and economic) based on estimated opposing force or adversary reaction to US actions.³³

JP 2-01 defines theater strategic intelligence, on the other hand, as focusing more on the intelligence role in planning theater-level campaigns.

Theater strategic intelligence supports joint operations across the range of military operations, assesses the current situation, and estimates future capabilities and intentions of adversaries that could affect the national security and US or allied interests. Theater strategic intelligence includes determining when, where, and in what strength the adversary will stage and conduct theater level campaigns and strategic unified operations.³⁴

For the purposes of this thesis, these different terms all have merit. The U.S. government definition of national intelligence, originally provided in EO 12333 and expanded through its amendment in EO 13470, will be used to describe intelligence derived during joint, intergovernmental UW campaigns that inform and influence national security policy-making. The JP 2-0 definition of strategic intelligence will be used to describe national and theater-level intelligence that broadly affects national security, foreign policy, and national and theater strategies. This thesis will use the military terms national strategic intelligence and theater strategic intelligence sparingly and only when necessary to distinguish between the national and theater levels in the context of joint military operations.

³³ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the JCS, 2017), I-23 to I-24.

³⁴ JCS, JP 2-0, I-23 to I-24.

Problem Statement

The current U.S. military doctrine on IW, special warfare, and special operations largely does not address the relationship between strategic intelligence and UW. The current doctrine focuses mainly on standard MI functions such as analysis, information collection, targeting, and Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment. Therefore, within U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the Department of Defense's proponent for UW, MI typically only functions as tactical-level support rather than a strategic function in support of national security objectives. This is in stark contrast to other U.S. government agencies and other countries who hold strategic intelligence collection and exploitation at a premium and incorporate it into their UW campaign planning.

Primary Research Question

How can the United States best conduct unconventional warfare to provide strategic-level intelligence regarding global adversaries, strategic threats, and other national security interests?

Secondary Research Questions

1. How can strategic intelligence, conducted during an unconventional warfare campaign, allow a state to answer its national intelligence requirements?
2. How can strategic intelligence, conducted during an unconventional warfare campaign, enable a state to achieve national strategic objectives?
3. How can strategic intelligence, conducted during an unconventional warfare campaign, shape national security strategy?

4. How do Army Special Operations and other U.S. government organizations differ in their integration of strategic intelligence into unconventional warfare?
5. How well does current Army Special Operations doctrine incorporate national and MI into its framework for unconventional warfare?
6. How well does Army UW campaigns contribute to the mission objectives and enterprise objectives outlined in the National Intelligence Strategy?

Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is twofold: to help fill a gap in knowledge by contributing to the academic study of UW and to make recommendations in the form of capabilities solutions that practitioners of UW can use to improve the craft. There is a deep and broad expanse of research and publications on the subjects of UW and strategic intelligence, which this thesis will also address in chapter 2. This thesis is intended to contribute to these discussions and studies with the goal of furthering the professional community's understanding of the subject matter.

However, the existing research and analysis is not complete and this thesis intends to help fill that gap. Most military authors and students who research and analyze the subject of UW are from the special operations community and the majority of those are Special Forces officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers. This is understandable considering SF soldiers are those who are specifically trained and empowered to conduct UW operations according to U.S. joint military doctrine³⁵.

However, given the extensive requirement for MI and the underlying strategic role of intelligence in UW, this thesis intends to provide a MI perspective to the subject.

³⁵ JCS, JP 3-05.1, Section I-11.

With the exception of some recent academic papers, the Army's MI Corps does not regularly contribute to this field of study. This is indicative of an overall lack of awareness of UW in the MI community, despite ARSOF's heavy reliance on MI. The author hopes to use this thesis to provide a voice and inspiration to this under-represented point-of-view.

The second purpose of this thesis is more direct. The intent of this work is to inform and influence senior military and government leaders (or future leaders) who can/will be in positions to implement changes based on the recommendations of this thesis. With the exception of a brief analysis of current doctrine, the recommendations provided in chapter 5 are not intended to reflect the most current innovations to UW. Rather, these recommendations are intended to identify the capabilities gaps exposed during historic UW campaigns and to highlight areas in which future innovation should include. The author provides some specific recommendations based on the lessons of these case studies and with these does not mean to imply a lack of current capabilities development. As discussed in limitations, the author was also confined to unclassified academic and government sources which may preclude information about recent or on-going UW innovation.

Taken together, the academic community and military leaders related to this topic constitute the desired target audience of this thesis. As explained in chapter 2, while the literary body of knowledge is extensive, the analysis of the two principle terms at the heart of this thesis, UW and strategic intelligence, are largely treated as mutually exclusive. Rather, this study intends to convince its target audience that the two terms are not only mutually supporting but interdependent. In other words, UW cannot fulfill

national security objectives unless it provides strategic intelligence. Likewise, strategic intelligence assessments are incomplete if they do not reflect intelligence gleaned from current UW operations in those regions.

Limitations

During the course of this research, there were some predictable limitations to the creation of this thesis. These include issues of classification, current operational sensitivities, and the quantity and quality of academic study, all of which are affected by time. The most significant is the limitation of classification because it is a definitive constraint to the availability of primary source material. With the subjects of UW and strategic intelligence, the majority of primary sources are government documents. Because both of these topics often represent classified activities, the U.S. government typically archives the official records of these operations. Depending on the sensitivities, standard periods of time must elapse before the U.S. government will declassify these archived documents and make them publically available.

In the case of these three case studies, all three contained archived information about classified UW operations that required long periods of time before they were publically released. This thesis was intentionally written at the unclassified level in order to ensure its widest dissemination across both the academic and professional communities upon publication. While excluding classified research material limited primary sources that could have highlighted additional details, all three case studies occurred with enough time to provide the declassification of sufficient information. The case study of the Soviet-Afghan War is the most recent. Due to the relatively less amount of time to elapse and the extraordinarily sensitive nature of the UW campaign as a covert

action, this case study naturally had the least amount of primary source material available. For this reason, this case study deserves further study in the future in order to account for any further declassified material.

Additionally, recent and current UW activities are not included in order to keep this thesis unclassified and to help protect the tactics, techniques, and procedures which current UW practitioners depend upon for mission success, their safety, and the protection of future operations. This is the heart of classifying and compartmenting military and intelligence information. Classification and declassification standards ensure the protection of sources of information and the methods in which the United States gains it.

Last, the quality and quantity of academic study, especially secondary source material, corresponds directly with the amount of time that has elapsed. Seventy-three years has passed since the end of the Second World War which has provided the unfettered study of the era to several succeeding generations of students and authors. As a defining moment in the twentieth-century history of the U.S., World War II is understandably a popular subject of the military history community. On the other hand, the end of the Soviet-Afghan War has only provided twenty-eight years for reflective analysis. That conflict was also a covert action, significantly limiting the acknowledgement of American participation. Therefore, much less academic attention has been paid to the research of the Soviet-Afghan War and its UW campaign.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Summary

A review of the academic literature available concerning the topic of UW, strategic intelligence, and related topics, presents a logical organization of qualitative sources. A combination of historic works on IW and official U.S. policies and doctrines help narrow the window of historic case studies between World War II and the current time. Prior to World War II, UW was neither a commonly defined genre of IW nor was it an official U.S. policy or type of military operation. The three historic cases selected for this thesis are:

1. World War II and the European Theater: the OSS and SOE support to the French Resistance.
2. The Cold War in SE Asia and the Vietnam War: U.S. military and CIA support to anti-communist groups in Southeast Asia.
3. The Cold War in Central Asia and the Soviet-Afghan War: CIA support to the anti-Soviet Mujahideen.

The body of literature revealed two American organizations that have routinely conducted UW operations under statutory and military authorities, U.S. Army Special Forces and the CIA. Therefore, the author selected case studies to analyze how both organizations approached UW in concept and in practice, to illustrate institutional and doctrinal differences, and determine how they can complement or hinder each other. The cases selected fulfilled this objective by highlighting the modern origin of both

institutions (World War II), joint SF and CIA UW operations (Vietnam War), and a CIA UW campaign conducted unilaterally (Soviet-Afghan War).

The second criteria for the selection of these three case studies was their relative place in the chronologic history of modern American UW. As mentioned in Chapter 1, this thesis proposes four phases of American UW evolution:

1. World War II, 1940-1945.
2. Post WWII to Vietnam, 1945-1973.
3. Post-Vietnam to 9/11, 1973-2001.
4. The Global War on Terrorism, 2001-present.³⁶

Each case study focuses on one of the first three phases. This was an important research criteria because it demonstrates the evolution of UW theory and doctrine over time, especially with respect to its strategic significance. A fourth case study that analyzes the fourth phase was not included in this thesis for the limitations explained in chapter 1.

The third and final criteria for selecting these cases were UW campaigns that occurred within regional conflicts and within larger global conflicts that involved national strategic objectives. The World War II case study exhibited this by portraying the regional UW campaign in France, which enabled the Allied invasion of Europe and which existed as part of the broader Allied effort to defeat the Axis Powers across the entire globe during World War II. The Vietnam War case study portrays a UW campaign that occurred during the American war against North Vietnam and the Viet Cong and

³⁶ Jason Martinez, “From Foreign Internal Defense to Unconventional Warfare: Campaign Transition when US-Support to Friendly Governments Fails” (Master’s thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2015), 18-19.

which was also set against the greater Cold War conflict in Southeast Asia to contain the spread of Soviet and Chinese-supported Communism through locations such as Laos and Cambodia. The Afghan-Soviet War case study portrays a localized UW campaign to defeat the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan, which expanded to include several South and Middle East Asian allies and which also existed as part of the late Cold War conflict to defeat Soviet expansion in South Asia.

The historical literature for these three case studies is extensive overall. Some of these sub-topics, however, have more or less historical analysis and research than others. Likewise, some focus more on specific topics such as the military, the CIA, or clandestine intelligence. In general, the World War II case study of the French Resistance has the most scholarly literature available overall, the Vietnam case study has the most primary sources, and the Soviet-Afghan War is the most limited.

Irregular Warfare Theory

There are several definitive works that provide general overviews of the subjects of insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, and resistance movements throughout history, which, for the purpose of this thesis, are generally categorized as irregular warfare theory. Several of these works are significant to understanding this topic because they provide historical perspectives on the insurgency movements such as their motivations, the root causes of these conflicts, ideologies, sources of support, etc. Max Boot's historical work, *Invisible Armies*, is an extensive survey of insurgencies and guerrilla warfare throughout history as far back as ancient Greece and as recent as the current counterinsurgency

campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.³⁷ Additionally, author William Polk and defense analyst John Sutherland have contributed their contemporary analyses to the subject and focuses specifically on guerrilla warfare and terrorism with their works *Violent Politics* and *iGuerrilla*.³⁸

It is important to note, however, that many historical authors research the topic of IW in order to provide insights and to influence changes in military doctrine that deals with countering insurgencies, guerrillas, and terrorism. During the twentieth century, the U.S. has much more often participated in more campaigns to defeat insurgencies than to support them. At least in the eyes of the public. Therefore, there much more attention has been paid towards counterinsurgency and counterterrorism topics. These works are still important, however, for providing historical context of modern insurgencies and resistance movements where related or future movements could theoretically be the beneficiaries of U.S. support during unconventional warfare campaigns. These works, and other like them, examine specific movements from the perspectives of the societies, cultures, and their leaders, revolutionaries such as Mao Zedong, Che Guevera, Ho Chi Minh, Carlos Marighella, and Yasir Arafat. While historically significant, works that focus on these classic guerrilla leaders generally do not go into great detail about the strategic role of external sponsors for their insurgencies or resistance movements.

USASOC has extensively contributed to the study of IW over the past several years. Retired Army SF Warrant Officer, Paul Tompkins, has been instrumental in

³⁷ Boot, *Invisible Armies*.

³⁸ William R. Polk, *Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla War, From the American Revolution to Iraq* (New York: Harper Collin, 2007); Sutherland.

helping to establish the Special Operations Research Office, a collaboration between the John Hopkins University's Applied Physics Laboratory and USASOC. Tompkins has served as lead editor for a series titled *Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies*, which provides historical analysis of many significant irregular conflicts, revolutions, and limited wars throughout modern history.³⁹ Tompkins is also the co-author of a significant work published in *Small Wars Journal* titled "The Science of Resistance," which places unconventional warfare theory into historical context and describes its role as a strategic tool within the military instrument of U.S. national power.⁴⁰ In general, the Special Operations Research Office and Tompkins are a significant contributor to the U.S. Special Operations community and its understanding of IW.

Other related works include a number of academic theses, monographs, and professional journal articles researched and written by active and retired senior military officers and military students. Some of the more notable pieces written on the subject of IW and UW include General Votel and General (Ret.) Cleveland's article "Unconventional Warfare in the Grey Zone" published in the U.S. Army Special Operation Command's *Special Warfare* and Defense Department's *Joint Forces*

³⁹ Paul J. Tompkins, Jr., *Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies, Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Volume I 1933-1962*, rev. ed. (Fort Bragg, NC: Special Operations Research Office, United States Special Operations Command, 2013); Paul J. Tompkins, Jr. and Nathan Bos, eds., *Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies* (Fort Bragg, NC: Special Operations Research Office, United States Special Operations Command, 2013).

⁴⁰ Paul J. Tompkins, Jr. and Robert Leonhard, "The Science of Resistance," *Small Wars Journal* (February 2017), accessed 13 November 2017, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-science-of-resistance>.

Quarterly and Lee Doowan's "Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare."⁴¹ U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and USASOC both publish monthly or bi-monthly journals related to the study of special operations subjects, *Tip of the Spear* and *Special Warfare*, respectively⁴². These publications frequently discuss historic and emerging IW topics and are U.S. military journals that regularly explore the subject of UW.

The CIA, likewise, has its own method for providing critical historical analysis of many of its major operations and campaigns throughout the twentieth century. This is an officially-sponsored program called the Center for Intelligence Studies which publishes a professional journal called *Studies in Intelligence*.⁴³ These journals are typically classified when originally published but a number of articles are either written unclassified or are declassified over time. The journal's unclassified articles are publicly disseminated on the official CIA website but the CIA provides a disclaimer stating that many of the articles are not the official opinions of the CIA and are solely of the contributing authors, many of whom are historians and other academic professionals. Like the previously mentioned Special Operations publications, these journals are

⁴¹ Votel, Cleveland, and Irwin, "Unconventional Warfare in the Grey Zone," 27-32.

⁴² United States Special Operations Command (USASOC), *Tip of the Spear*, accessed 25 January 2018, <https://www.socom.mil/public-affairs/command-information/publications>; United States Special Operations Command (USASOC), *Special Warfare*, accessed 25 January 2018, <http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/swmag.htm>.

⁴³ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Center for the Study of Intelligence," accessed 25 January 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence>.

generally very comprehensive and peer-reviewed. However, because they are professional government journals, they do not provide the same unbiased analysis as other independent academic sources.

In regards to other IW literature, military-oriented think tanks such as the RAND Corporation often provide analysis and articles, either independently or in coordination with the U.S. government. Many of these works are especially relevant because they attempt tie historical perspectives of IW with instruments of U.S. national power and national security objectives, which gives critical insight for this thesis.

Last, throughout the last several decades, several renowned authors have published incredibly extensive historical accounts of the history of the CIA. Three of these works include *Safe for Democracy* by John Prados, *For the President's Eyes Only* by Christopher Andrew, and *Legacy of Ashes* by Tim Weiner.⁴⁴ These works are all intended to provide insight into the role of the CIA in the national security process while providing comprehensive histories of the CIA's numerous covert action campaigns and strategic intelligence activities since its inception after the Second World War. All three works provide some analysis that pertains to this thesis' second and third cases studies (Vietnam War and Afghan-Soviet War) and, more importantly, provide strategic perspective and context to these campaigns.

⁴⁴ Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995); Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*; Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*.

U.S. Government Publications

In general, U.S. military doctrine describes both UW and strategic intelligence but does not show the relationship between the two. In recent years, U.S. Army UW doctrine has undergone major updates, reflects a more academically consistent definition of UW, and provides clear operational approaches to UW. The Department of Defense and Joint Staff publications have since mirrored the Army's updates. Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare*, and JP 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*, both provide excellent strategic guidance for IW and UW respectively.⁴⁵ However, these policy and doctrinal documents give little direct guidance on the subject of strategic intelligence. On the other hand, other joint military documents provide more comprehensive descriptions of the role of intelligence in UW. These include the JCS Joint Operating Guide, *Irregular Warfare*, and the USASOC *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide*.⁴⁶

Army intelligence doctrine has likewise updated with changes in intelligence systems, technology, and processes to reflect a return to decisive action and unified land operations as opposed to the more counterinsurgency-centric doctrine of the early twentieth century. The Army maintains doctrinal publications that address the specific intelligence requirements for joint and Army Special Operations but these publications generally focus on tactical intelligence tasks, such as analysis and information collection,

⁴⁵ DOD, DODD 3000.07; JCS, JP 3-05.1.

⁴⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Operating Concept, *Irregular Warfare (IW)*, Version 1.0. (Washington, DC: Office of the JCS, 2007); United States Special Operations Command (USASOC), *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide*, Version 1.0 (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC, Deputy Chief of Staff G3, Special Activities Division G3X, 2016).

integrated processes such as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and targeting, and MI task organization within the different Army special operations units. In general, neither Army intelligence nor Special Operations doctrine address the strategic role of intelligence in IW, especially UW.

Several U.S. national policy documents contribute to the understanding of the concepts of strategic intelligence and national intelligence. These terms are explored in order to provide context and to illustrate why these concepts are so important when discussing national security policy. The National Security Act of 1947, which established, among other things, the Department of Defense and the CIA, and reinforced the concept of national intelligence. This concept, as well as the broader term strategic intelligence, were modified during successive presidential EOs including EO 12333 of 1981, EO 13355 of 2004, and EO 13470 of 2008. Adding to the understanding of these terms are works of joint military doctrine, including JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, and JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*⁴⁷.

In short, strategic intelligence can be a difficult term to define because of how broadly it can be applied. The National Intelligence Strategy, last updated in 2014 by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, provides a succinct description of strategic intelligence and attempts to nest it within the strategic framework of the president's National Security Strategy. However, there is a disparity between the two documents as the National Security Strategy has been updated during the current Administration and the National Intelligence Strategy is still dated to the previous.

⁴⁷ JCS, JP 2-0; JCS JP 2-01.

The European Theater of World War II

Historic UW study is exceedingly broad among scholarly works of World War II for several reasons. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America's wartime government agency that led the U.S. efforts in IW, clandestine intelligence activities, and covert action during World War II, had an extensive organizational and operational scope. The OSS was also the direct descendent of both the CIA and U.S. Army Special Forces. Moreover, the 72 years which has elapsed since the end of World War II has permitted the routine declassification of many of the U.S. government's wartime records regarding the OSS, which has provided large amounts of primary source documents that can be accessed through the U.S. National Archives and other government archival facilities. Some of the more comprehensive World War II primary sources available through the National Archives includes the U.S. War Department's, "War Report of the OSS," the OSS's after-action report "Lessons from the Resistance to the German Occupation of France, and OSS Director William Donovan's personal wartime records.⁴⁸

This time has also allowed for extensive research and a multitude of definitive works that delivery thorough examinations of the OSS during World War II including Colin Beavan's *Operation Jedburgh*, Albert Lulushi's *Donovan's Devils*, Patrick O'Donnell's *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs*, and Douglas Waller's biography of the OSS director, *Wild Bill Donovan*.⁴⁹ These books are a collection of the most

⁴⁸ Serge Karlow, *War Report of the Office of Strategic Services* (New York: Walker and Company, 1976); Serge Karlow, *War Report of the Office of Strategic Services: Volume 2, The Overseas Targets* (New York: Warrollton Press, 1976.)

⁴⁹ Colin Beavan, *Operation Jedburgh: D-Day and America's First Shadow War* (New York: Penguin Group, 2006); Albert Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2016); Patrick O'Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and*

comprehensive historical overviews of the OSS and their operations during World War II. These works also focus mainly on the OSS's European operations, especially France. Histories of the OSS and non-OSS UW campaigns in Asia are better analyzed in other works that focus on those regions specifically. The works of Beavan, Lulushi, and O'Donnell also include in-depth analysis of intelligence activities during this time, largely because of the primacy afforded to strategic intelligence by the OSS. An essential primary source accompaniment is William Casey's first-hand account of the OSS's UW operations in the European Theater of Operations. As SI chief, his memoir provided special emphasis to the strategic intelligence mission of the OSS and their integration with the British and French special operations and intelligence organizations.⁵⁰

Because of the extensiveness of the OSS's operations during World War II, there are also many excellent works that focus on specific theaters of the conflict including the Philippines, Burma, China, North Africa, and Western Europe. This thesis will focus on the French Resistance in Western Europe as its World War II case study because of the in-depth analysis available as well as additional British historic research as well. The French Resistance is a particularly well-suited case study for several reasons. This campaign was a joint Anglo-American operation of the OSS and SOE. France was its first major campaign. Last, the French campaign directly shaped much of the OSS's initial UW doctrine, which the CIA and SF would later inherit. Great Britain academia

Women of WWII's OSS (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004); Douglas Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011).

⁵⁰ William Casey, *The Secret War Against Hitler* (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1988).

has also provided two excellent works describing the British SOE's experience in France including the collaborative works of M.R.D. Foot and William Mackenzie, *SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940-1946* and *The Secret History of the Special Operations Executive*, respectively.⁵¹ Likewise, an essential companion to the study of the SOE is the historical work *The Maquis* by French resistance veteran Claude Chambard, which gives a primary source account of the Maquisards and their partnership with the SOE and OSS during World War II.⁵²

Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War

Similar to the history of the OSS and SOE of World War II, there is also extensive historical literature related to the Vietnam War and America's UW activities in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. The research challenge for this conflict is examining scholarly works that offer insight into both efforts. There are several respected works summarizing the wartime records of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam-Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG), Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), and other programs of Army SF and the CIA to support anti-communist resistance groups in Vietnam and neighboring countries. This thesis will focus on four general areas of analysis related to UW activities in Southeast Asia: the early UW strategy in Southeast Asia during the Cold War, works focusing on the history of the CIA including their operations during the

⁵¹ M.R.D. Foot, *SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940-1946* (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1984); William Mackenzie, *The Secret History of S.O.E.: Special Operations Executive 1940-1945* (London: St. Ermin's Press, 2002).

⁵² Claude Chambard, *The Maquis: A History of the French Resistance Movement* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1970).

Vietnam War, works focusing on SF operations, and archival CIA works describing and analyzing UW activities in Southeast Asia.

There are three government sources detailing the history of American UW operations across Southeast Asia from America's earliest involvement in the 1950s until its final withdraw from Vietnam in 1973. The CIA's *Studies in Intelligence* included several articles concerning its operations in the region throughout the Cold War. Several articles, such as "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975," "US Intelligence and Vietnam," and "Prospects for the Defense of Indochina Against a Chinese communist Invasion" detailed the CIA's early strategic planning for containing the spread of communism in Southeast Asia and how this policy evolved to include its IW campaigns, both counterinsurgency and UW, in Vietnam. Other CIA articles focused instead on particular regions such as Laos and Cambodia or specific operations such as "rural pacification," "black entry operations," and covert action."⁵³

Another extensive source detailing America's Cold War involvement in Vietnam and Southeast Asia was the 1969 report titled the "United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967," also infamously known as the Pentagon Papers after the report's unauthorized release to the public. The U.S. government officially declassified an archived State Department copy in 2011 which is now publicly available through the U.S. National Archives.⁵⁴ On June 17, 1967, Secretary of Defense directed the formation of an interagency task force for the management of Vietnam policy which comprised

⁵³ CIA, "Center for the Study of Intelligence."

⁵⁴ Leslie H. Gelb, Chairman, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vietnam Task Force report to the Secretary of Defense, "United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967," SecDef/CCS Regrading Action #35-71, Washington, DC, 23 June 1971.

representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of State, the military services, the CIA, and think tanks.⁵⁵ This report was created as a interagency history of America's involvement in Vietnam from the end of World War II until the time of the report's creation in 1967. While the report largely supported ongoing U.S. strategic policy in Vietnam at the time, it was exceptionally comprehensive and provides intricate details about all U.S. IW programs in the region, including the UW campaign of Army SF.⁵⁶

The U.S. Army sponsored its own history of Special Forces UW operations in Vietnam. SF veteran, Colonel Francis J. Kelly, wrote a summary of Special Forces operations during the Vietnam War titled *Vietnam Studies, U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971*. The Department of the Army published the original work with support from the Association of the United States Army in 1973. A reprint was later published in 1991 and retitled *The Green Berets in Vietnam 1961-71*. Kelly's work mostly focused on the CIDG participation of Special Forces and less their role in SOG. However, it gives key insights into the tactical experiences of Special Forces throughout the Vietnam War and how it shaped their institutional UW culture.⁵⁷ Former foreign service officer Stephen B. Young wrote a similar work based on his experience serving the CORDS program in the later period of the CIA's operation in Vietnam under future Director of Central Intelligence William Colby. Young's book *The Theory and Practice of Associative*

⁵⁵ Gelb, "United States-Vietnam Relations 1945-1967," 6-7.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Francis J. Kelly, *The Green Berets: In Vietnam 1961-71* (New York: Brassleys, 1991).

Power differed significantly from Kelly's work, however, by providing much more critical and focused analysis of this particular American IW program in Vietnam.⁵⁸

During the later days of the Vietnam War, veteran OSS and senior CIA officers began to retire and many recounted their experiences in covert action and clandestine activities publicly. Two of the most significant CIA directors from this era, Richard Helms and William Colby, published memoirs detailing their CIA careers. Both Helms and Colby were OSS veterans and described their perspectives of the CIA's evolution from World War II to the Vietnam War. Both directors also served during times of tumultuous intelligence reform and provided first-hand accounts of their strategic roles in the national security policymaking process. Helms's memoir, *A Look Over My Shoulder*, gives a Washington perspective of the IC and his challenging relationship with Presidents Johnson and Nixon.⁵⁹ Colby's memoir, *Honorable Men*, focuses more on the Congressional inquiries, investigations, and reforms that changed the CIA's role in conducting UW, covert action, and providing national intelligence.⁶⁰

Other notable secondary sources examine SOG operations in both Vietnam and Southeast Asia include John Plaster's *SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam* and Robert M. Gillespie's *Black Ops Vietnam* both of which detail the joint CIA-SF operations of the Studies and Observations Group (SOG) during the Vietnam

⁵⁸ Stephen B. Young, *The Theory and Practice of Associative Power: CORDS in the Villages of Vietnam 1967-1972* (Lanham, MD: Hamilton, 2017).

⁵⁹ Richard Helms and William Hood, *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003).

⁶⁰ William Colby and Peter Forbath, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978).

War.⁶¹ Plaster's work is a comprehensive and detailed overview of SOG's activities during conflict. However, it focuses exclusively on the organization's operational history, not its intelligence significance. Gillespie, on the other hand, continuously illustrates the integration of intelligence functions into SOG's UW operations and the strategic intelligence they were designed to yield.⁶² Another significant work which provided a British academic perspective and broader strategic perspective of the West's multiple UW campaigns, intelligence activities, and covert actions across Cold War Asia is the University of Nottingham's collaborative work *Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-1965*, which the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies published in 1999.⁶³

The Soviet-Afghan War

Analysis of America and Pakistan's UW campaign to support the Afghan Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s presented the biggest research challenge. There is extensive historic literature about this conflict. However, the majority of these are secondary sources that examine the conflict itself and focusing tactically on the principal combatants, the Soviet army forces and the Afghan guerrilla fighters of the Mujahideen movement. Most of these works do not address the secret side of the conflict, which was America and Pakistan's covert sponsorship of the Mujahideen in an immense

⁶¹ John L. Plaster, *SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam* (New York: Penguin Group, 1997); Robert M. Gillespie, *Black Ops Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011).

⁶² Kelly, *The Green Berets in Vietnam 1961-71*.

⁶³ Richard J. Aldrich, Gary D. Rawnsley, and Ming-yeh T. Rawnsley, *The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-1965: Western Intelligence, Propaganda, and Special Operations* (London: Frank Cass, 1999).

UW campaign that spanned the entirety of the 1980s. A significant reason for this apparent lack of historic literature is because the U.S. conducted this UW campaign solely through the CIA, in partnership with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, as a covert action. This covert approach stressed operational secrecy which now severely limits subsequent academic research. Since the end of the conflict, the U.S. government likely continued to safeguard its more sensitive records about the conflict, especially given Operation Enduring Freedom and America's military involvement in Afghanistan after 9/11.

There are several historic examinations of the Soviet-Afghan War that include analysis of America's UW activities in particular which include the book by former Pakistani ISI officer, Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, and British Army officer Mark Adkin, *Afghanistan – The Bear Trap, the Defeat of a Superpower*.⁶⁴ Brigadier Yousaf brings an important firsthand account of Soviet-Afghan War because he served as the ISI Afghan Bureau chief, the Pakistani officer principally responsible for managing the Mujahideen and the resistance campaign in Afghanistan. Renowned Afghan and Russian and Soviet expert at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, Lester Grau, and Soviet Army veteran Michael Gress translated and compiled the Soviet/Russian General Staff after-action report of the Soviet-Afghan War, republished in the United States as *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*.⁶⁵ Brookings

⁶⁴ Mohamad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *Afghanistan the Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower* (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2001).

⁶⁵ Russian General Staff, *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, ed. and trans. Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).

Institute contributor and retired CIA officer Bruce Riedel provided the most comprehensive analysis of the covert action aspect of this conflict with *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan*, a work that was most relevant to the study of UW in Afghanistan.⁶⁶

There are many definitive other authors who leveraged the knowledge of former CIA officers, Pakistani military and government officials, and former Afghan Mujahideen fighters, many of whom left Afghanistan after the war and lived throughout the Afghan diaspora. Two respected authors who explored the complex history of America's covert and clandestine involvement in Afghanistan include Pakistani and American journalists Ahmed Rashid and Steve Coll with their critical works *Descent into Chaos* and *Ghost Wars*.⁶⁷ American journalist George Crile has written two historical works chronically the CIA's participation in this conflict. The first, *Charlie Wilson's War*, focuses on the campaign's funding champion in the U.S. Congress, Texas Congressman Charles Wilson.⁶⁸ The second, *My Enemy's Enemy*, explored the campaign from the perspective of operation's architects at CIA headquarters.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Bruce Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan 1979-1989* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2014).

⁶⁷ Ahmad Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Penguin, 2009); Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin, 2005).

⁶⁸ George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War* (New York: Grove Press, 2003).

⁶⁹ George Crile, *My Enemy's Enemy: The Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History: The Arming of the Mujahideen by the CIA* (London: Grove Press, 2003).

A definitive work regarding CIA's operations during the final years of the Cold War, including the Afghan-Soviet War, is Milton Bearden and James Risen's book, *The Main Enemy*. Bearden served as the Islamabad Chief of Station and was the CIA's senior officer in Pakistan. He provides a detailed firsthand account of his relationship with his Pakistani counterpart, the chief of the Inter-services Intelligence Service (ISI), the CIA's facilitation of funding, equipment, and weapons for the Afghan resistance, and a tactical overview of the conflict.⁷⁰ This primary source is best paired with the collection of declassified senior-level CIA policy documents, made available through the Center for the Study of Intelligence, which give insights into the evolution of the CIA's operational framework and strategic objectives during the 1980s.

⁷⁰ Milton Bearden and James Risen, *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB* (New York: Random House, 2003).

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The design of this thesis is based on a qualitative and comparative case study research methodology. The research approach will follow a framework outlined in the illustration provided below titled “Case Study Methodology Visual Model.” This framework begins with a problem statement, introduced in chapter 1, which defines the purpose of this research is to fill a critical gap in U.S. Army UW doctrine and practice. The research question, also presented in chapter 1, summarizes the purpose of this thesis in which evidence extrapolated from the case studies will aim to answer the questions that could help solve or improve the situation presented in the problem statement. The problem statement progresses to the literature review (chapter 2) which examines the body of literary and academic sources available concerning the thesis topic. The critical review of the literature provides three distinct cases that provide a deep and broad representation of the available historic data. The analysis and conclusions from each case study (chapter 4) drives the synthesis of these conclusions through a standard model of evaluation criteria and aims to provide recommendations for the target audience of this thesis (chapter 5).




Figure 2. Case Study Methodology Visual Model.

Source: Created by author.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the academic literature about UW, strategic intelligence, and related topics present a logical organization of qualitative sources. A combination of historic works on IW and official U.S. policies and doctrines help narrow the window of historic case studies between World War II and the current time. Prior to World War II, UW was neither a commonly defined nor an analyzed sub-topic in the genre of IW nor was it expressed in U.S. policy or doctrine as an officially recognized type of military operation. The three historic cases selected for this thesis are:

1. The Second World War and the European Theater: the OSS and SOE support to the French Resistance.

2. The Cold War in SE Asia and the Vietnam: U.S. military and CIA support to anti-communist groups in SE Asia.
3. The Cold War in Central Asia and the Soviet-Afghan War: CIA support to the anti-Soviet Mujahideen.

Each case study will include three sections during Chapter 4: a historic background with which to provide historic context and illustrate continuity between other major UW campaigns, an analysis that examines the strategic role of intelligence during the UW campaign, and lessons and conclusions. The intent for the lessons is to critically examine and highlight both intelligence successes and failures. These lessons are intended to translate into specific intelligence functions applicable to the current MI and Army Special Operations communities.

Chapter 5 will consolidate the intelligence lessons from each sub-chapter in chapter 4 and examine them according to a set of criteria that reflect strategic intelligence objectives and capabilities. This thesis will present the conclusions as strategic intelligence capabilities that can help answer national intelligence requirements as depicted in the last chain of the Case Study Methodology Visual Model. The criteria for strategic intelligence objectives are taken from the 2014 National Intelligence Strategy Roadmap.⁷¹ Specifically, chapter 5 will examine conclusions as regional and functional strategic intelligence issues and how they support the intelligence communities' customers, other mission objectives, and enterprise objectives. The criteria for recommended capabilities developments will be organized along the DOTMLPF-P

⁷¹ DNI, *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America*, 18.

capabilities development model (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, people, facilities, and policy) found in the Army's Capabilities-Based Assessment model and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.⁷² This thesis will specifically focus on doctrine, organization, training, and policy.

The resulting recommendations from the final process in this methodology are intended to inform leaders in the MI and ARSOF communities. In both cases, joint counterparts are also secondary audiences as well. ARSOF and its MI partners are the primary targets because USASOC is the DoD's leading proponent for UW.⁷³ However, this thesis fully acknowledges that UW are inherently joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts and can only be developed in unison with military, government, and academic partners. Additionally, it is these other interrelated communities and enterprises that can contribute to the development of new capabilities not addressed in this thesis, especially technology and other new innovations.

⁷² Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Regulation (AR) 71-32, *Force Development and Documentation* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2013), 18.

⁷³ JCS, JP 3-05.1, Section I-11.




Figure 3. 2014 National Intelligence Strategy Roadmap.

Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Office of the DNI, 2014), 6-10, 18.

This thesis will not include any human subject research or any research methods that require review by the Human Protections Administrator or Institutional Review Board.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

World War II and the French Resistance, 1940-1945

Historical Overview

At the beginning of the Second World War, the United States had little institutional or doctrinal capability for conducting unconventional warfare.⁷⁴ That is not to say, however, that the United States did not have experience in irregular wars at the beginning of World War II and had not supported resistance movements in the past. The United States had a century's worth of experience in conducting countering insurgencies in territories the United States hoped to control or occupy. At the turn of the century, the United States became embroiled in a counterinsurgency campaign against the *insurrecto* guerrillas of the Philippines after the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898 and America's administration of the former Spanish colony.⁷⁵ During the interwar period of the early twentieth century, the U.S. Marine Corps developed a tradition of fighting small, irregular conflicts throughout the southern hemisphere in order to support friendly governments, protect American overseas commercial interests, and suppress local insurgency movements. These so-called "Banana Wars" gave the United States an introduction to the conditions of IW involving armed non-state fighters, which the

⁷⁴ Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, 3.

⁷⁵ Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*, 198.

Marines codified in the doctrinal work *The Small Wars Manual* in 1940.⁷⁶ These examples and others represent America's entry into IW prior to World War II and the foundation upon which UW would later be developed.

Nazi Germany's rapid expansion across Europe and North Africa in 1939 and 1940 presented unique but different opportunities for which the counterinsurgency warfare tactics conducted by the conventional U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps were not well suited. These opportunities included the resistance movements that materialized from within the populations of subjugated nations such France, Italy, and Greece in Europe and the Philippines and Burma in the Pacific who fought against their Axis occupiers. The British and American World War II campaigns to support these resistance movements with equipment, intelligence, funding, training, leadership, and combat advisors, became the framework for modern American UW doctrine.

The purpose for conducting special operations that could provide vital support to these resistance movements was to take advantage of their geographic placement behind enemy lines and their access to key locations, persons, and information. By exploiting the placement and access of these partisan groups, the British and Americans postulated that they could better "harass the Axis armies, gather intelligence, and support the more conventional Allied military efforts", across the occupied territory that the Axis believed themselves free from direct attack.⁷⁷ The British and Americans also pursued the

⁷⁶ Bradford A. Wineman and Jonathan M. House, "US Marines in the Banana Wars," in *H200: Military Innovation in Peace and War Parallel Course* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2017), 125, 130.

⁷⁷ David W. Hogan, Jr., *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Press, 1992), 3.

development of other highly specialized commando units capable of conducting raids, reconnaissance, and other direct action against the Axis militaries in occupied territory.⁷⁸

However, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the Allied support to the resistance movements which was intended to provide long term disruption and subversion effects against the Axis powers as opposed to commando attacks against specific Axis targets.

The American organizational solution to the problem of supporting resistance movements in occupied Europe and the Pacific grew not from a direct examination of America's overseas special operations capabilities but, ironically, from a political decision to better support America's best-regarded ally, Great Britain. The British had a significant head start on the American in their preparation for war. The summer of 1940 saw Great Britain at its most vulnerable having lost all its European allies to the German blitzkrieg, the expulsion of its ground forces from the continent, unrestricted German submarine warfare against British merchant marine convoys, and Germany's strategic bombing campaign known as the Battle of Britain. During this time, the Democratic second-term American president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, restructured his cabinet to include, among others, a Republican Secretary of War, Henry Stimson. Providing better support to America's strongest ally, Great Britain, was part of Roosevelt's plan to create a unified, bipartisan wartime government that could prepare the United States for its inevitable entry into the war.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Hogan, *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II*, 3.

⁷⁹ Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage*, 58.

Another of President Roosevelt's early wartime priorities was the examination of the capabilities of the remaining Allied Powers and, in particular, Great Britain and its newly elected prime minister, Winston Churchill. During the summer of 1940, Roosevelt and the administration determined that Great Britain was extremely vulnerable but would likely endure through the German air and naval campaigns. However, this was based primarily on vague and conflicting reports written by Britain's intelligence services. Therefore, Roosevelt ordered a team to travel to London to assess the likelihood of Britain surviving the continued German strategic bombing and a possible cross-channel invasion. One of the emissaries among this group was a close Republican ally of Roosevelt, a successful attorney and hero of World War I named William "Wild Bill" Donovan.⁸⁰ In addition to assisting with the assessments of Britain's Admiralty and Royal Air Force, Donovan had unprecedented access to Britain's intelligence services, including its counterintelligence-focused Security Service (later known as MI5) and its foreign intelligence service, the Special Intelligence Service (later known as MI6).^{81 82}

During this period, Donovan conducted many similar overseas fact-finding trips on behalf of the U.S. government to evaluate the changing global situation during the interwar period. In 1936, then-Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, approved a war department excursion to southern Europe and North Africa to assess Benito

⁸⁰ Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage*, 58-59.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁸² Foot, *SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940-1946*, 10.

Mussolini's fascist Italy.⁸³ This trip was ordered, in part, to make up for the significant lack of intelligence provided by the War Department's Military Intelligence Service. At the time, the United States had multiple civilian, law enforcement, and military organizations that fulfilled intelligence gathering and analysis functions. However, there was largely no coordination or unity of effort between these organizations. Donovan's interwar trips instilled in him a need for a single national intelligence service that specialized in foreign intelligence and reported directly to the senior national security leaders of the U.S. government.⁸⁴

Meanwhile, given the growing Axis threats to Great Britain, the British operationalized their own instrument of UW with the creation of the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Unlike their American counterparts, the British had a much deeper institutional background in IW that included campaigns to support foreign resistance groups or insurgencies, consistent with the American concept of UW. Some of the most notable examples that SOE drew upon included the Peninsular War during the Napoleonic era of the early nineteenth century whereby small, irregular groups of Spanish *guerrillas*, fought against their French occupiers.⁸⁵ Additionally, the British drew upon the lessons of the Afrikaans-speaking Boers who similarly fought as small, irregular

⁸³ Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage*, 50-51.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 42-43.

groups called *kommandos* against the colonial British administrators of South Africa in the nineteenth century.⁸⁶

The founders of SOE recognized the power in supporting and enabling guerrilla forces in order to achieve strategic objectives. During the First World War, the aging and fractured Ottoman Empire presented an opportunity for the Allies to subvert a major partner of the Axis Powers and open the Middle East to European colonial control. These efforts were made famous by British army officer, T.E. Lawrence, who embedded with, trained, and led the nomadic Arabs against the over-extended Turkish army across the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant.⁸⁷ The War Office later created the General Staff (Research), or GS(R), an organization the House of Commons authorized in 1938 to study and develop tactical and organizational solutions to British preparations for conducting IW.⁸⁸ This organization drew upon its own additional experiences including the early twentieth century campaigns in India, Iraq, Ireland, and Soviet Union whereby they examined their opponents' guerrilla tactics, especially those of the Irish Republican Army.⁸⁹ The War office later renamed this organization MI (Research), or MI(R).⁹⁰ These were both important precursors for both SOE and OSS and helped develop

⁸⁶ Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 42-43.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 43.

⁸⁸ Mackenzie, *The Secret History of the S.O.E.: Special Operations Executive 1940-1945*, 8.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

techniques for setting conditions in a region for UW and other combat operations, a concept later known to U.S. SOF as preparation of the battlefield (PE).

Throughout the interwar period, the British observed Nazi Germany and other autocratic regimes grow in power and influence across Europe. In the late 1930s, the British Foreign Office and intelligence services began exploring methods for not just collecting strategic intelligence clandestinely against these growing threats but also alternative methods of conducting offensive actions against these threats clandestinely.⁹¹ Examples of non-military, unconventional methods the Foreign Office and Special Intelligence Service considered in order to disrupt Nazi Germany from within included “sabotage, labour unrest, inflation, anything else that could be done to weaken an enemy.”⁹² Additionally, these early architects of the SOE also considered who in these German occupied regions could conduct these disruption actions and how to influence populations through propaganda.

This early British development of its wartime unconventional warfare capability culminated in March 1939, where the SIS’s Section D, the Foreign Office’s propaganda-focused section code-named Electra House, and the War Office’s IW-focused MI(R) combined with the creation of the Special Operations Executive on 22 July 1940.⁹³⁹⁴ Churchill particularly supported a larger concept for striking at Nazi Germany through a

⁹¹ Foot, *SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940-1946*, 10-11.

⁹² Ibid., 11.

⁹³ Ibid, 11-13.

⁹⁴ Lulushi, *Donovan’s Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 31.

combination of guerrilla operations, propaganda, and commando direct action raids and made a strong petition to the U.S. Department of War to participate in these campaigns in late 1940.⁹⁵ Churchill's advice to his newly appointed chief of the SOE, former minister of economic warfare Hugh Dalton, included his guidance to ". . . now set Europe ablaze' as though, with such little provocation, the people of the occupied territories would enthusiastically rise up in rebellion."⁹⁶ Throughout its first year, 1940, SOE conducted its first operations across Europe to support the resistance movements fighting against Nazi German occupation. This included airdropping supplies, infiltrating agents to conduct clandestine intelligence collection, and infiltrating trainers to assist guerrillas and saboteurs in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and other occupied nations.⁹⁷ These operations initially involved PE activities and quickly began including information collection activities, known later in U.S. SOF doctrine as special reconnaissance (SR), which helped solidify this as another key component of UW operations.

Understandably, France was among the top priorities for SOE through the early 1940s given the amount of German occupation forces devoted to controlling the nation, the influence of the Free French government-in-exile, or Comité National led by Charles de Gaulle, and its geographic proximity to the British isle.⁹⁸ Before de Gaulle could hope to organize resistance efforts in France, however, he realized he needed to gain much

⁹⁵ Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 44.

⁹⁶ Beavan, *Operation Jedburgh: D-Day and America's First Shadow War*, 11.

⁹⁷ Hogan, *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II*, 5.

⁹⁸ Mackenzie, *The Secret History of S.O.E.: Special Operations Executive 1940-1945*, 263.

needed information that neither his Free French government nor British intelligence possessed at the time. In the summer of 1940, de Gaulle formed a loose network of French exiles for the purpose infiltrating them back into German-occupied France to collect and report intelligence back to his government-in-exile.⁹⁹

Meanwhile, the SOE sought to gain the intelligence gathered by de Gaulle's agents and to help develop the growing resistance movement. SOE established the French (or "F") Section which assumed control of many of the French agents in order to build organized intelligence networks in France.¹⁰⁰ The British Special Intelligence Section contributed to SOE's efforts by identifying and recruiting French exiles on behalf of the resistance.¹⁰¹ The French resistance became known as the Maquis, "a name derived from [the] dense undergrowth found on Corsica," referencing the ability of the resistance to operate across rural France. The Maquis included a broad cross-section of the men and women of French society and broad ideological representation including conservatives, social democrats, communists and others.¹⁰² By 1943, the Maquis was roughly organized along three political factions. The strongest was the Forces Francaises de L'Interieur (FFI, or French Forces of the Interior), originally formed by Charles de Gaulle. Others included the communist-oriented Francs Tireurs et Partisans, and the Organisation de

⁹⁹ Charmbard, *The Maquis: A History of the French Resistance Movement*, 4-7.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 6-7; Beavan, *Operation Jedburgh: D-Day and America's First Shadow War*, 5-6.

¹⁰¹ Chambard, *The Maquis: A History of the French Resistance Movement*, 9.

¹⁰² O'Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and Women of WWII's OSS*, 143.

Résistance de l'Armée, led by former French army general Henri Giraud.¹⁰³ While de Gaulle and other French leaders in exile helped form some of the resistance networks, others formed on their own and remained independent of the Free French government-in-exile. While de Gaulle continuously attempted to gain control of the resistance movement throughout the war, the SOE, and later OSS, exerted much more influence.¹⁰⁴

In September 1940, F Section's newly appointed chief, Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Buckmaster, authorized the first large-scale UW operation in France aimed at the creation of a resistance network, code-named "Carte", and the gathering of intelligence regarding German military activities.¹⁰⁵ The majority of F Section's officers already had combat experience in the Middle East, North African, South Asian, and European theaters and were predominantly recruited from among London's Francophile society. These SOE officers infiltrated into France to organize and inspire "hundreds of thousands of Resistance fighters to rise up and attack the Nazis from behind."¹⁰⁶ As the operation progressed for more than a year, the British High Command increasingly anticipated an eventual large-scale, cross-channel Allied invasion of Europe. Therefore, the SOE leadership intended to use the French resistance, especially the Carte network, to enable the invasion by attacking the German Wehrmacht's lines of communications and

¹⁰³ F. S. Wight, *Lessons from the Resistance to the German Occupation of France* (Washington, DC: Office of Strategic Services, 1945), 19.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Beavan, *Operation Jedburgh: D-Day and America's First Shadow War*, 5, 7; O'Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and Women of WWII's OSS*, 143.

¹⁰⁶ O'Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and Women of WWII's OSS*, 7.

disrupting its ability to reinforce its defenses along the Atlantic coast.¹⁰⁷ The significant challenge to the SOE's campaign in France was its relationship with Charles de Gaulle, who attempted to assert control of the French resistance and was often adversarial with F Section whom he considered too unilateral.¹⁰⁸ The SOE sustained its biggest blow, however, at the hands of the effective German security and intelligence services that specialized in counterintelligence, the Abwehr and the Gestapo, which uncovered much of the Carte network's members, including its senior-most British agents.¹⁰⁹ The SOE's campaign in France almost died before the United States entered the war because of this blow to the Carte network in addition to the internal rivalries between British leaders and de Gaulle and the unanticipated difficulty in recruiting new resistance networks in France. The SOE found many French communities to be largely ambivalent towards the resistance because the Germans treated them relatively well during the early period of the occupation and targeting the population with sustained German propaganda throughout their occupation.¹¹⁰

After the U.S. War Department's 1940 assessment of Great Britain's situation during the Battle of Britain, Donovan undertook one last overseas mission on behalf of President Roosevelt in order to assess the rapidly devolving situations in North Africa, the Balkans, the Iberian Peninsula, and Great Britain. This trip culminated Donovan's

¹⁰⁷ Beavan, *Operation Jedburgh: D-Day and America's First Shadow War*, 6-7.

¹⁰⁸ Mackenzie, *The Secret History of S.O.E.: Special Operations Executive 1940-1945*, 291-292.

¹⁰⁹ Wight, *Lessons from the Resistance to the German Occupation of France*, 52-54.

¹¹⁰ Beavan, *Operation Jedburgh: D-Day and America's First Shadow War*, 8-9.

assessment for the likelihood of the war's expansion, the growing need for American intervention abroad, and his recommendation for consolidating American intelligence gathering functions within one federal agency.¹¹¹ On 11 July 1941, Roosevelt approved the office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) and appointed Donovan as its chief, empowered "with the authority to collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear upon national security; to correlate such information and data, and to make such information and data available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as the President may determine . . ."¹¹² As stated in President Roosevelt's executive order, the COI was first and foremost designed as a "service of strategic information" for the president. Or in other words, an agency prepared to collect and analyze national intelligence with which drive strategic decision making.¹¹³ A secondary purpose of the COI was to conduct psychological warfare, especially the aggressive propaganda necessary to counter Nazi Germany. Lastly, while the EO establishing the COI did not explicitly decree "physical subversion and guerrilla warfare" as part of the COI's mandate, Donovan intended to eventually incorporate special operations into his organization in order to mirror the capabilities of the SOE.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 24-25.

¹¹² Franklin D. Roosevelt, *Executive Order Designating a Coordinator of Information* (Washington, DC: The Office of the White House, 1941).

¹¹³ Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 28.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 28; Karlow, *War Report, Office of Strategic Services*, 9.

Having seen the intelligence and special operations capabilities of the British, Donovan immediately saw the value of closely coordinating his newly created COI with the active UW organization in Great Britain. The British services, likewise, took an early interest in the new American experimentation towards UW. Donovan prioritized the development of the elements that would eventually make up a “central intelligence service” that he envisioned ¹¹⁵ and helped implement critical Anglo-American intelligence sharing. Donovan’s second priority in 1941 was to establish direct ties with the SOE in order to benefit from the experience and expertise of their training programs in sabotage, small unit tactics, and the support to and recruitment of resistance fighters. The COI used this training exchange to help develop a Special Operations (SO) branch, specializing in “morale and physical subversion, including sabotage, fifth column activities and guerrilla warfare,” modelled after the special operations component of the SOE, and designated as Special Activities/Guerrilla, or SA/G. ¹¹⁶

After these initial interactions between SOE and COI in late 1941 and early 1942, Donovan proposed a re-organization of COI to include a mandate for conducting special operations, specifically UW. On 13 June 1942, Roosevelt approved the replacement of the COI with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), appointed Donovan as its director, and placed it directly under the jurisdiction of the JCS. ¹¹⁷ Roosevelt’s military order establishing the OSS charter with the following duties for the new organization:

¹¹⁵ Lulushi, *Donovan’s Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 29.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 35.

1. Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be required by the United States JCS.
2. Plan and operate such special services as may be directed by the United States JCS.¹¹⁸

Like the COI, Donovan envisioned a specific strategic intelligence function for the OSS, or what he termed “a national central foreign intelligence agency,” with the authority to:

- a. Service all departments of the government.
- b. Procure and obtain political, economic, psychological, sociological, military, and other information which may bear on the national interest and which has been collected by the different Governmental Departments or agencies.
- c. Collect when necessary supplemental information either at its own instance or at the request of any Governmental Department by open or secret means from other and various sources.
- d. Integrate, analyze, process, and disseminate, to authorize Governmental agencies and officials, intelligence in the form of strategic interpretive studies.¹¹⁹

In terms of special operations, Donovan originally foresaw the OSS’s mission as all-encompassing to include direct-action raids as well as a specialization in guerrilla warfare and physical sabotage like the SOE. The guerrilla warfare aspects of Donovan’s vision, supported by robust intelligence capabilities, aligned closest with the modern concept of UW. However, Roosevelt’s directive limited OSS’s special operations mission to just the UW tasks and precluded direct-action which eventually became the mission of the Army Rangers, the American-Canadian 1st Special Service Force, the Marine Raiders,

¹¹⁸ Franklin D. Roosevelt, *Order Establishing the Office of Strategic Services* (Washington, DC: The Office of the White House, 1942).

¹¹⁹ Karlow, *War Report of the Office of Strategic Services*, xii.

and others.¹²⁰ While Donovan did not achieve this lofty goal, he did achieve his objective of creating an independent, UW organization that was capable of gathering strategic intelligence and conducting special operations focusing on supporting resistance movements fighting the Axis powers. This resistance-oriented UW approach separated the special operations core mission of the OSS from other wartime special operations units. The presidential directive for OSS also helped keep its ranks predominantly filled by the U.S. Army which frequently put the OSS's mission at odds with the Department of the Army but ensured the steady flow of talented recruits.¹²¹

The organizational design of OSS was large and multi-functional, including several major departments that were the result of Donovan's observation of the disparate British intelligence and special operations organizations as well as the early progress of COI. These departments included Secret Intelligence (SI), Special Operations (SO), Operational Groups (OG), Counterespionage (X-2), Maritime Units, Morale Operations, Research & Analysis, and Research & Development.^{122 123} For the purposes of analyzing the operational roles of OSS, this thesis will focus primarily on its most operations and intelligence-focused departments including SO, the OGs, SI, and X-2. By early 1943, the primary area of operations for the OSS was France. At the time, SOE focused predominantly on France and OSS followed suit. France provided some of the best

¹²⁰ Hogan, *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II*, 7-8.

¹²¹ Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, 27.

¹²² O'Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and Women of WWII's OSS*, xvi.

¹²³ Karlow, *War Report of the Office of Strategic Services*, 122-123.

intelligence access to the intentions and activities of the German Wehrmacht and its high command (through the extensive intelligence networks of the SOE and French resistance). France also provided some of the best opportunities to strategically affect the German war effort, and PE activities in France would be critical to setting conditions for the eventual allied invasion of the continent. Collecting intelligence and integrating with the French resistance networks became OSS's primary goals in France at this time.¹²⁴

London was the center for coordinating resistance efforts in Europe, so it was logical that OSS would establish its headquarters in London, led by David K. E. Bruce, and its subordinate headquarters for SO, SI, X-2, communications, and Research and Analysis.¹²⁵ SI was particularly significant to the London headquarters. David Bruce and SI Chief, William Casey, worked hard throughout 1943 to integrate with Britain's immense intelligence bureaucracy. In addition to MI5 and MI6, British wartime intelligence also included the British Theater Intelligence Organization, which collected and collated MI from all available sources throughout Europe. Another was the Joint Intelligence Committee which functioned as an extension of the British War Cabinet and helped bring together the intelligence of the different branches of British government in order to provide strategic assessments to the senior war planners.¹²⁶ The OSS's SI branch sought to emulate this model by organizing itself around processing not just tactical intelligence from agents and units in the field but intelligence from all branches of the

¹²⁴ O'Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and Women of WWII's OSS*, 143.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 144.

¹²⁶ Casey, *The Secret War Against Hitler*, 30.

U.S. government and private sectors, especially the American business sector.¹²⁷ This enabled SI branch to provide strategic intelligence assessments, both military analysis and also economic and political analysis directly to General Eisenhower's Supreme Allied Headquarters staff in London and OSS headquarters in Washington, DC.

However, given the ongoing allied operations in North Africa in 1942 and 1943, Algeria, rather than Great Britain, became the point from which OSS infiltrated its first officers and agents into France to begin developing networks, collecting valuable intelligence, and conducting sabotage against the Germans in their rear areas.¹²⁸ This was especially important given the success of German CI against SOE's first intelligence networks in France. These early OSS activities fell primarily under the auspices of SI due to their predominantly intelligence collection and SR focus. The co-location of American, British, and French intelligence and special operations organizations in London permitted extensive intelligence sharing between the allies beginning in 1943. The most significant of this intelligence sharing relationship was the Americans' newfound access to Great Britain's most highly classified intelligence, its Ultra Secret reporting which Great Britain's code word for signals intelligence derived from intercepted and decrypted German communications.¹²⁹ The new OSS London headquarters also enabled them to recruit foreign agents extensively from among the French émigré community in Great Britain, especially those who recently fought in North Africa and returned to Britain. The

¹²⁷ Casey, *The Secret War Against Hitler*, 236-237.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ O'Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and Women of WWII's OSS*, 194-195.

OSS provided extensive training to these French recruits, furnished them counterfeit documentation, and infiltrated them back into France as part of new OSS agent networks.¹³⁰

By the summer of 1943, the OSS and SOE began jointly focusing their efforts in France to preparing for the invasion of Europe. In June, the SOE and OSS initiated an intelligence operations called “Sussex” which was designed to provide tactical and strategic intelligence to the allied ground forces during the invasion of northern France.¹³¹ This necessitated the infiltration of approximately one hundred and twenty new French agents. These were organized into two-man teams whose task was to report German Wehrmacht activity at key locations across northern France, such as lines of communication and command and control nodes, that could most affect the allied landings.¹³² While an ambitious operation that resulted in high casualties, the Sussex missions proved invaluable to the Operation Overlord planners of the upcoming invasion.

OSS headquarters in London reported this intelligence directly to the G-2 section of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. SI’s intelligence so impressed its commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, that he authorized an escalation in the clandestine operations in France to further prepare the theater for the invasion. Therefore, in 1943, the SO branches of the OSS and SOE merged under the formal title SOE/SO

¹³⁰ O’Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and Women of WWII’s OSS*, 160-161; Karlow, *War Report of the Office of Strategic Services: Volume 2, The Overseas Targets*, 192-197.

¹³¹ Karlow, *War Report of the Office of Strategic Services: Volume 2, The Overseas Targets*, 163.

¹³² O’Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and Women of WWII’s OSS*, 160-161.

from which to coordinate the French resistance and accelerate the guerrilla campaign against the Germans, especially through sabotage activities.¹³³ In May 1944, SOE/SO was renamed Special Force Headquarters and officially integrated into the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force G-3 so that General Eisenhower, by now a significant supporter of the OSS's operations in Europe, could better synchronize their operations with the invasion.

The first American SO officers parachuted into France in the summer of 1943 attached to SOE teams. These teams were designed either as RF Section, which designated them as affiliated with de Gaulle's FFI guerrillas, or F Section, who were partnered with the other non-Gaullist resistance elements.¹³⁴ The sabotage activities of the SOE/SO teams and the concurrent intelligence activities of the SI networks continued until the invasion finally came the following year, 6 June 1944. Combinations of SO, SI, and X-2 teams were attached to the Allied army groups during Operation Overlord.¹³⁵ The four SO teams that were embedded within the allied units were referred to as "Special Force Detachments," and primarily provided tactical support to their much larger conventional formations such as sabotaging German lines of communication in their rear areas, organizing local French resistance elements, and reporting intelligence

¹³³ O'Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and Women of WWII's OSS*, 165-166; Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 151.

¹³⁴ O'Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and Women of WWII's OSS*, 166-167.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 168.

regarding German army activity.¹³⁶ The attached X-2 units, called Special Counterintelligence teams, also proved invaluable to the allied invasion forces. The Special CI teams conducted a host of tactical intelligence functions including exploiting captured enemy documents, conducting counterespionage against German human intelligence networks, and conducting signals intelligence collection against German military communications.¹³⁷

Also synchronized with the allied invasion of France, General Eisenhower authorized Special Force Headquarters to transition to a new SO phase called Operation Jedburgh in August and September 1944. This was made up of three-man Jedburgh teams which were multinational teams consisting of either a British or American officer serving as the team leader, a native-born assistant team leader (most of whom were French), and a noncommissioned officer serving as the radiotelephone operator.¹³⁸ The Jedburgh teams began parachuting into Europe at the onset of Operation Overlord, the majority of which were designated to operate in France. Specifically, most of the French Jedburgh teams operated across the mountainous Massif Central Region of south central France. This is where many of the FFI guerrillas were based and from where the resistance determined it could best disrupt military lines of communication between Germany,

¹³⁶ O'Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and Women of WWII's OSS*, 169.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 195-196.

¹³⁸ Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 155.

France, and Italy through direct attacks and sabotage.¹³⁹ The Jedburghs acted primarily as liaisons between the French resistance and Special Force Headquarters, served as advisors to their resistance partners, and augmented the F and RF Section SOE/SO teams operating across France since before D-Day. The Jedburgh's depended heavily on clandestine communications techniques to deliver intelligence reports from behind German lines regarding the status of the French resistance and the German Wehrmacht while receiving operational guidance and directives from Special Force Headquarters.¹⁴⁰

Like the Jedburghs, the OG teams provided training, equipment, and expertise to the Maquisards. OSS employed many more OG teams who were organized into significantly larger units than the Jedburghs. The OG teams were large enough and carried enough weapons that they often pursued their own direct-action missions as well. As the Allied forces advanced east across France, the OGs organized airborne resupplies, secured key infrastructure, ambushed retreating Wehrmacht units, and sought to capture Germans soldiers whenever possible. In all, the OG teams in France assisted the Maquis with capturing more than 10,000 German soldiers. Given their areas of operation were usually ahead of the front lines of the main Allied units, these prisoners-of-war were a

¹³⁹ Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 155; O'Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs: The Unknown Story of the Men and Women of WWII's OSS*. 174.

¹⁴⁰ Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 155.

tremendous source of intelligence to the Allied high command by providing information as to the Axis defenses of Germany.¹⁴¹

The culmination of OSS operations in France was the Jedburgh, OG, and Maquis operation at Vercors, the mountainous plateau region west of the Alps, in the summer of 1944. Similar to the OSS's D-Day preparations in northern France, the Vercors campaign was a large-scale UW operations that called for the OSS and Maquis to strategically disrupt German forces in France. Throughout the war, Vercors provided relative safe haven to the French guerrillas who established networks of camps throughout the rugged terrain.¹⁴² After the surrender of the Italian Fascists in early 1944, German forces began an aggressive counterinsurgency operation in Vercor in order to defeat the French resistance elements who enjoyed relative freedom to move throughout the traditionally ungoverned border area. The German campaign against the Maquisards in Vercors was especially brutal, even by World War II standards, and Maquis reported of German atrocities and reprisals against the local population for the activities of the resistance. The Wehrmacht occupied the region in order to deny its use to the resistance as a line of communication between the Vichy-controlled territory of southern France and potential safe havens in the Italian Alps.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 155-156; Karlow, *War Report of the Office of Strategic Services: Volume 2*, 204-210.

¹⁴² Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 167-168.

¹⁴³ Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 169-173; Hogan, *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II*, 56-57.

The OSS concentrated much of its OG and Jedburgh support directly to the Vercor Maquisards. The Free French leadership in Great Britain helped plan a counterattack against the occupying Germans in a concept known as Plan Montagnards, in which the resistance would simultaneously attack across the region. In June 1944, the isolated border area devolved into an intense conflict for control of this area between French guerrillas with their OSS partners against German paratrooper units.¹⁴⁴ By August, the Germans had finally withdrawn and the Allies took control of Vercors.¹⁴⁵ While never part of the larger Allied operations plan, Plan Montagnards proved an innovative and responsive option that involved only the French resistance and the OSS for severely disrupting the German army so as to the Allied advance across northern France, the Allied landings in southern France, and the on-going campaign in Italy.¹⁴⁶

For the remainder of 1944 and early 1945, the majority of OSS operations occurred in the eastern regions of the European theater such as Italy, Greece, and the Balkans, especially in areas without conventional Anglo-American forces and where the Allies hoped to disrupt or defeat the Axis in their rear areas. Overall, most assessments of OSS operations in Europe attribute only minimal strategic effects to this UW campaign. The early intelligence, sabotage, and subversion efforts of the SOE and OSS before D-Day were ambitious and contributed tactically to the landings, but demonstrated how

¹⁴⁴ Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War I*. 175-184.

¹⁴⁵ Hogan, *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II*, 56-57.

¹⁴⁶ Lulushi, *Donovan's Devils: OSS Commandos Behind Enemy Lines – Europe, World War II*, 188.

vulnerable these operations are to effective counterinsurgency and counterespionage operations.

However, the OG and Jedburgh missions to organize and enable resistance activities ahead of the main Allied lines and in the German rear areas was operationally important to helping maintain the Allied momentum through their advance across France. This was a force multiplier that projected combat capabilities through the OSS's resistance partners, exponentially more than the small size of their teams. Eisenhower reportedly even "equated the worth of the resistance to fifteen divisions, but the degree to which American operatives contributed to this success is impossible to estimate."¹⁴⁷ Ultimately, the OSS operations in France developed and validated most of the core capabilities that the OSS employed in later campaigns such as Southeast Europe, Northern Europe, Burma, and China. Even though President Harry S. Truman disbanded the OSS after the war, it left an enduring legacy. Donovan's vision of a permanent national intelligence and special operations organization, responsible for conducting UW, was shortly realized with the creation of the CIA in 1947 and U.S. Army Special Forces in 1952.¹⁴⁸ Both of these organizations drew direct lineage to the OSS and its World War II operations in France with the SOE and Maquis.

Intelligence Lessons

The OSS produced some of the most profound lessons in intelligence because the extraordinary innovation of so many of its components and operations during World War

¹⁴⁷ Hogan, *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II*, 57.

¹⁴⁸ Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins*, 39, 132.

II. In short, the OSS represented a first of its kind in the U.S. – a centralized, national-level intelligence agency, with direct access to the national-security decision making process, that was capable of utilizing its clandestine access around the world to conduct special operations. Donovan’s suggestion for a centralized intelligence agency was particularly innovative. Up until this point, intelligence functions at all levels from tactical to strategic were decentralized throughout multiple government organizations and military services who primarily focused on other functions. Chief among these “primitive,” “parochial,” “underfunded and undermanned” agencies were the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Army, the Navy, and the State Department. None of these agencies coordinated, consolidated, or corroborated their intelligence with each other, all aggressively defended their core missions, and all spoke out against Donovan’s initial concept that he pitched to President Roosevelt.¹⁴⁹

Donovan’s original concept for a single clearinghouse for strategic intelligence, that was intended to inform the president, has continued to resonate well through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The National Security Act of 1947 established the CIA as the direct successor to the OSS and empowered its chief as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). This dual role would last until 2004 when Congress determined that an organizational change was needed in the IC. After the intelligence failures of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the justification for the invasion of Iraq, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 which created the Director of

¹⁴⁹ Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage*, 70.

National Intelligence and his subordinate office, responsible for overseeing all IC assessments for the National Security Council.¹⁵⁰

Organizationally, the OSS was far ahead of its time. To support his pursuit of a single, centralized intelligence agency, Donovan designed the organization complete with the major intelligence disciplines of the time. These included the disciplines currently known in U.S. military doctrine as all-source analysis (Research and Analysis), human intelligence (SI), counterintelligence (X-2), signals intelligence (X-2 and SI), technical intelligence (Research and Development).¹⁵¹ As previously mentioned, the other OSS departments were responsible for operational activities such as guerrilla warfare, maritime infiltrations, and psychological warfare. One method of intelligence collection the OSS did not employ with its own means, which could have further expanded their intelligence reach, was aviation for conducting airborne reconnaissance.

With regard to intelligence sharing and operational de-confliction, the OSS learned tremendous lessons from its French campaign, both successes and failures. A basic lesson the OSS learned was a priority Donovan and other senior OSS leaders: learning from their predecessors, the SOE. Not only did Donovan model the OSS after the robust intelligence capabilities of Great Britain's Special Intelligence Service, MI5, and the SOE, the OSS embedded with the SOE and conducted many of their early operations in France either jointly with the British or at least in very close coordination. This was especially important for the agent networks in France responsible for collecting

¹⁵⁰ United States Congress, *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, Public Law 108-458, 118 STAT. 3638 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2004).

¹⁵¹ JCS, JP 2-0, B-1.

intelligence, spreading propaganda, and conducting sabotage missions against the Germans. As with the case of the Carte network, the OSS had to rebuild French agent networks from the beginning after the catastrophic defeat of this SOE network. However, the British contributions to the OSS in terms of expertise, existing agent infrastructure, caches, and other capabilities were still indispensable. This relationship set the standard for multinational intelligence cooperation after World War II and the U.S. and Great Britain continue their special relationship to this day, due in no small part to the OSS and SOE experiences in France during World War II.¹⁵²

William Casey reflected on the French UW operations as having been possible only because of the OSS's partnership with the SOE and the French without which an Allied campaign in Western Europe would not have been possible. As the senior intelligence officer in OSS headquarters in London, Casey was in a position to assess the effects of the OSS and Allied UW operations in Europe. He concluded that their strategic impacts, especially the advantages gained from strategic intelligence, prevented a much longer and costlier conflict and enabled more decisive large-scale military operations after D-Day.¹⁵³ This model then made follow-on and interconnected OSS operations elsewhere in Europe in Asia possible against the Axis Powers. Casey remarked:

The thrust and cutting edge that intelligence, deception, and psychological and irregular warfare can give to troops in battle cannot be conjured up overnight. The foundations of the covert war against Hitler were built by the British when they stood alone. The organization that William J. Donovan created in the United States, the Office of Strategic Services, had to be taught and trained and build on

¹⁵² Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage*, 122, 129, 164, 186.

¹⁵³ Casey, *The Secret War Against Hitler*, xiii-xiv.

the organization and professional expertise that had been built in Britain – and France and Poland, Belgium and Holland, Scandinavia and Czechoslovakia.¹⁵⁴

The Cold War in Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War, 1954-1975

Historic Overview

America's involvement in Vietnam began as far back as 1944 during World War II. The OSS contacted and coordinated with Vietnamese guerrillas opposed to the Imperial Japanese Army occupying the French colony, then known as Indochina, which comprised the countries that would become Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. During this time, the OSS teams focused on collecting intelligence about the Japanese military operations and locating and assisting downed Allied pilots.¹⁵⁵ These OSS activities in Indochina also afforded them the opportunity to first come into contact with Indochina's most capable resistance group, the Viet Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam), led by its longtime political leader Ho Chi Ming and military commander Vo Nguyen Giap.¹⁵⁶

After World War II, Asia soon became a significant and strategic center of gravity for Cold War confrontation between the United States and the USSR. Even though direct confrontation with the Soviet Union in Europe dominated the attention of U.S. national security policy-makers, Asia's rapid decolonization and the expansion of communism to

¹⁵⁴ Casey, *The Secret War Against Hitler*, xiii-xiiv.

¹⁵⁵ Clayton D. Laurie, and Andres Vaart, "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-75," in *Studies in Intelligence*, DA MPG 16-12463 10-16 (September 2016): 13, accessed 25 January 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/Anthology-CIA-and-the-Wars-in-Southeast-Asia/index.html>.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 13.

fill these geopolitical gaps created an environment ripe for the struggle for the control of these destabilized regions.¹⁵⁷ These devolving security crises, by themselves, did not justify American intervention. In the early Cold War, the United States adopted a policy of containment to prevent the Soviet Union's spread of communism to less developed nations around the world. Influenced heavily upon the assessment of diplomat and Soviet expert George Kennan in his "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," containment theory necessitated America's military buildup and engagement in limited conflicts around the world in order to prevent the spread of communism.¹⁵⁸

An important catalyst for American and other Western involvement in Asia was to respond to the Chinese nationalists' loss to the communists of Mao Zedong and the creation of a new communist satellite in the eastern hemisphere. In general, while the Soviet Union represented the existential Cold War threat to the United States, Chinese communism had a much stronger influence eastern hemisphere and helped set the conditions leading to America's involvement in Indochina.¹⁵⁹ Initially, American and other Western intelligence organizations focused their efforts at Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, locations in close proximity to China where direct confrontation was either occurring or likely imminent and where the West could best gather intelligence or

¹⁵⁷ Aldrich, Rawnsley, and Rawnsley, *The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-1965*, 2-6.

¹⁵⁸ George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1947): 566-82.

¹⁵⁹ Aldrich, Rawnsley, and Rawnsley, *The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-1965*, 3.

promote influence directly into China.¹⁶⁰ The Korean War, however, was the first Western attempt to contain communism in Asia that resulted in war. Given the destructiveness of the Korean War and the lack of strategic objectives, Western policymakers may have realized the costs involved in limited conflicts against Chinese or Soviet supported countries required a different approach.¹⁶¹ By employing indigenous guerrillas rather than American forces, UW operations may have appeared a far better option for policymakers in the 1950s. Of course, the United States would eventually deviate from this indirect, UW approach to Asian containment during the 1960s with the escalation to a conventional war in Indochina.

By 1950, the United States had entered a partnership with France to help provide monetary and logistical support to its counterinsurgency efforts in Indochina. It was also at this time that the CIA began to recognize Indochina's vulnerability to encroaching communism. At this point, France's control of the region was significantly weakened by years of wartime Japanese occupation, the growth of indigenous insurgencies who first resisted Japanese occupation and later turned against the French, and political unrest at home in France. The CIA and the IC began seeing indicators of Mao's ideological influence and support for Vietnam's dominant resistance movement, the Viet Minh. Additionally, a significant build-up of Chinese communist forces along its southern border Indochina indicated an invasion was imminent. The CIA assessed that the Chinese intended to invade in order to seize the strategic Tonkin plain region of Vietnam, partner

¹⁶⁰ Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," 3.

¹⁶¹ Aldrich, Rawnsley, and Rawnsley, *The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-1965*, 3-4.

with the Viet Minh and other guerrilla groups, forcibly expel the French colonial forces, and expand communist control across greater Indochina.¹⁶² This assessment was the foundation of CIA's recommendation to U.S. national security policy-makers to increase support for the French counterinsurgency campaign in Indochina.¹⁶³

In 1954, France decided to finally withdraw from Indochina after their defeat to the Viet Minh forces at Dien Bien Phu. A multinational commission subsequently met in Geneva, Switzerland to discuss a political compromise for the future of Indochina. Borrowing the diplomatic techniques of the Korean War, the Geneva commission divided the country of Vietnam at the 17th parallel which created a communist North Vietnam and a democratic South Vietnam.¹⁶⁴ America's support to the French was soon overshadowed by efforts to directly assess Ho Chi Minh's increasing popularity across the ungoverned rural areas and to assess the South Vietnamese government. The DCI, Allen Dulles, advised President Dwight Eisenhower that the popular spread of communism throughout the rural populations of Vietnam could lead to an election victory for communist candidates in South Vietnam's first post-colonial elections. This helped convince the administration to adopt a Vietnam policy that included strong support to the

¹⁶² Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), *Prospects for the Defense of Indochina Against a Chinese Communist Invasion*, ORE 50-50 and ORE 50-50 Supplement, (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1950, approved for release 2005), 1-2.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 2; Laurie and Vaart, "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975," 14.

¹⁶⁴ Laurie and Vaart, "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975," 15.

South Vietnamese government to ensure its stability amidst a volatile political environment.¹⁶⁵

In 1954, President Eisenhower authorized the first American advisors to South Vietnam. The CIA established a Saigon Military Mission led by Air Force Colonel Edward Lansdale in order to provide political support to the South Vietnamese regime and reduce the popular influence of the Viet Minh across the country. Lansdale was an expert in anti-communist counterinsurgency warfare earning his expertise supporting the Philippine government of Ramon Magsaysay during their fight against its indigenous communist resistance movement, the Hukbalahap, from 1946 to 1954.¹⁶⁶ One of Lansdale's first initiatives was to affect North Vietnam, however, not South Vietnam. Recognizing that Ho Chi Minh directly supported and facilitated the insurgency in the south, Lansdale implemented a covert program in North Vietnam that aimed to undermine Ho's rule directly. These measures included recruiting anti-communist agents, conducting sabotage actions such as closing ports and disrupting bus lines, and establishing networks of weapons caches.¹⁶⁷ However, the program yielded few successes and little operational effect. The CIA closed the Saigon Military Mission in 1956, but this served as a prelude to the agency and military's much larger scale UW efforts across the region during the following decade.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Laurie and Vaart, "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975," 17.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

Despite the American support to the South Vietnamese government and its president, Ngo Dinh Diem, the political situation became increasingly untenable. Diem's rule was marked by Diem's autocratic, repressive, and corrupt rule which resulted in popular unrest and protests against his government.¹⁶⁹ Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese-supported insurgency escalated dramatically into a guerrilla campaign that sought to overthrow the Diem regime. These guerrillas comprised the newly designated National Liberation Front (NLF), better known as the Viet Cong.¹⁷⁰

In 1961, Lansdale reported to Washington that the Viet Cong was gaining the initiative and significant control of the highlands regions of South Vietnam. He reinforced the concepts of containment theory and domino theory with his warning, "If 'Free Vietnam' falls, the remainder of Southeast Asia will be easy picking for our enemy, because the toughest local force on our side will be gone."¹⁷¹ This convincing assessment resulted in continued American support for the controversial Diem regime, an escalation in military support, and a commitment to defeating the North Vietnamese-supported insurgency. President John F. Kennedy authorized a significant increase in U.S. forces to Vietnam, including a contingent of the relatively new U.S. Army Special Forces who were tasked to "expand present operations in the field of intelligence, unconventional warfare, and political-psychological activities."¹⁷² The Chairman of the JCS, General

¹⁶⁹ Laurie and Vaart, "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975," 17-18.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Max Boot, *The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam* (New York: Liverlight Publishing, 2018), 350.

¹⁷² Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 338.

Maxwell Taylor, advocated for a much more substantial escalation in Vietnam. While the president limited troop numbers to the advisors he previously authorized, the chairman secured the president's permission to "increase covert offensive operations in the North as well as in Laos and South Vietnam."¹⁷³

The CIA's strategy during the early 1960s was twofold and included two population-centric operations and one focused on North Vietnam itself, both largely consistent with Lansdale's original vision. The new Saigon Chief of Station, OSS veteran William Colby, developed an initial program called Project Tiger which recruited, trained, and infiltrated Vietnamese guerrillas and intelligence agents clandestinely into North Vietnam.¹⁷⁴ Throughout the early Cold War the CIA utilized airborne parachute insertions as its primary means of infiltrating its agents into closed societies, much in the spirit of the World War II Jedburghs. The CIA developed this capability in Europe in the 1950s with its Redsox Program that aimed to infiltrate personnel directly into the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1961, the CIA hoped to apply the same capability in North Vietnam with what it termed "black entry operations".¹⁷⁵ The program proved a failure when North Vietnam easily penetrated and compromised the program by taking advantage of weaknesses in the program's operational security and agent protection. Notwithstanding the risks to the program and its participants, the military assumed control of the program

¹⁷³ Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 339.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 340.

¹⁷⁵ Thomas L. Ahern, "The Way We Do Things: Black Entry Operations into North Vietnam, 1961-1964," *Studies in Intelligence* (2005): 1-5, accessed 25 January 2018. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5076e89c993247d4d82b62ec>.

from the CIA and continued it for another five years which resulted in hundreds more casualties.¹⁷⁶

The CIA's two population-centric programs were prominent in the early 1960s before the military escalation in the war. Colby and other senior CIA officers agreed that pacifying and denying the NLF access among the ungoverned networks of villages along Vietnam's central highlands could have strategic affects. Senior American leaders also viewed Vietnam's ethnic minority communities scattered throughout these ungoverned areas as especially vulnerable to communist influence because of their dissatisfaction with the Saigon government.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, the CIA embarked on one of its most significant programs called the Village Defense Program, better known as the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) program, which it established in 1961.¹⁷⁸ To supplement the program with much needed trainers, logistical support, weapons, and ammunition, the CIA partnered with Special Forces who provided personnel to the program under the leadership of the CIA. The program originally involved a partnership the Montagnards, an ethnic minority who inhabited Vietnam's central highlands, with which to develop networks of interconnected villages and rural self-defense militias.¹⁷⁹

The objective of the CIDG program was to deny access and influence of the NLF throughout these ungoverned areas, roll back their tactical gains, and help consolidate

¹⁷⁶ Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 340-341.

¹⁷⁷ Kelly, *The Green Berets in Vietnam, 1961-1971*, 19.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 340; Laurie and Vaart. "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975," 18.

¹⁷⁹ Laurie and Vaart. "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975," 18.

South Vietnam's control of territory south of the 17th parallel. CIDG also developed a unique intelligence capability that was largely absent from conventional large-scale military operations. CISC's SF teams establishing the networks of training and operational camps throughout South Vietnam heavily pursued intelligence collection, primarily human intelligence through the Montagnards, the South Vietnamese army, and other indigenous guerrilla partners.¹⁸⁰ The CIDG operations in Vietnam and follow-on UW operations across Southeast Asia would help ingrain this intelligence approach into the Special Forces culture that still exists today.

Additionally, CIA also initiated a less kinetic program in 1962 to influence the population called the Strategic Hamlet program. This program involved the relocation of villagers from contested areas influenced by the NLF to new secure areas, ostensibly under better government protection and control. From here, the program stipulated the redistribution of land and introduction of social programs for the villagers in order to win their popular support for the South Vietnamese government and undermine their support for the NLF. While initially promising and theoretically complimentary with the CIDG program, the corrupt South Vietnamese government gradually undercut the project which was also underfunded and undermanned from its inception.¹⁸¹

After the failed CIA Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, President Kennedy developed a distrust of the CIA, a mentality that the Johnson administration inherited. On the other hand, President Kennedy was very impressed with the capabilities of the newly formed Army Special Forces. He pressured the Joint Chiefs of Staff to empower Special Forces

¹⁸⁰ Kelly, *The Green Berets in Vietnam, 1961-1971*, 16, 81.

¹⁸¹ Laurie and Vaart, "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975," 19.

with more responsibility for conducting irregular warfare, tasked that normally the CIA had traditionally undertaken since the end of World War II. To appease the president, the Pentagon created the position of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACRA) within the Special Operations Division of the Joint Staff on 23 February 1962 in order to oversee the military's execution of irregular warfare. This position was intended to ostensibly fulfill the president's vision for the Pentagon to assume a more active role in Southeast Asia.¹⁸²

From 1963 to 1964, a series of events would dramatically affect the CIA's programs and escalate the U.S. military's involvement in Vietnam. These measures represented a tactical continuation of the Vietnam UW campaign's transition from the CIA to the military, which began with the creation of the position of SACRA. First, the newly established Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) assumed control of the CIDG program in a transition called Operation Switchback.¹⁸³ This was partly the result of the outspoken U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's attempts to shift more responsibility for the growing conflict in Vietnam to the military. Additionally, the failure of the CIA's Bay of Pigs operation to topple the Castro regime in Cuba caused many Washington policy-makers to reconsider their support for CIA paramilitary programs in general.¹⁸⁴

With direction and guidance from the JCS, MACV formed a new organization known as the Studies and Observations Group (SOG, or MACV-SOG) on 24 January

¹⁸² Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACSOG*, 6-7.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 341, 343.

1964. This was a joint special operations unit which developed over the next year into the leading unconventional warfare task force of the Vietnam War, operating extensively in all extended theaters of the war including South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.¹⁸⁵ The unit's original purpose was codified in MACV's Operations Plan 64, the military directive approved by Secretary of State Robert McNamara and President Lyndon Johnson for the escalation of the war in Vietnam. Operation Plan stipulated the mission of SOG "was the conduct of covert operations that would convince Hanoi that its support and direction of the conflict in the South and its violation of Laotian neutrality should be reexamined and halted."¹⁸⁶ These covert activities included "a broad spectrum of operations in and against North Vietnam."¹⁸⁷

Therefore, SOG's first missions were a series of covert actions directed at North Vietnam, similar to the CIA's Project Tiger, but at an increased frequency and with an added littoral component.¹⁸⁸ These early maritime special operations were the likely cause of the U.S. escalation to large-scale, conventional military operations in Vietnam in 1964. On July 31st, a SOG swift boat returned from a raid against North Vietnamese island facilities in the Gulf of Tonkin. The water craft passed the U.S. Navy's USS *Maddox* which was travelling north to conduct routine off shore signals intelligence collection. North Vietnamese torpedo boats scrambled in response to the island raid and

¹⁸⁵ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACSOG*, 92.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 11.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Laurie and Vaart, "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975," 20; Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 343.

upon encountering the *Maddox* attacked the U.S. Navy destroyer. The *Maddox*, a second destroyer, the USS *Turner Joy*, and the carrier USS *Ticonderoga*, reportedly engaged in ship-to-ship and close air attacks against North Vietnamese naval vessels that responded to the apparent escalation in U.S. activity in the Gulf of Tonkin. Meanwhile, the maritime SOG raids continued in early August 1964.¹⁸⁹ President Johnson issued the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on 5 August, which ordered the significant escalation of conventional U.S. forces in Vietnam by taking “all necessary measures to repel armed attacks against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression” in Southeast Asia. On 7 August, Congress passed the “Southeast Asia Resolution” as public law.¹⁹⁰

After the transfer of CIDG control to MACV in 1964, CIA continued focusing its efforts at promoting rural development and local security, albeit at a very reduced level, utilizing a concept called the “Oil Spot Approach” throughout the mid 1960s. This scheme hypothesized that by building security in remote, ungoverned villages and gradually spreading security outward, then these local South Vietnamese would begin to accept the South Vietnamese government, reject the influence of North Vietnamese communist ideology, and identify local NLF leaders.¹⁹¹ This initiative remained relatively small, however, until 1967 when MACV re-examined its own counterinsurgency strategy and decided to consolidate all rural pacification activities into a new organization called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support

¹⁸⁹ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACSOG*, 25-26.

¹⁹⁰ Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 343-344; United States Congress, *Joint Resolution 1145*, August 7, 1964, Public Law 88-408 (Washington DC: Government Publishing Office, 1964).

¹⁹¹ Laurie and Vaart, “CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975,” 29.

(CORDS) under the leadership of diplomat and National Security Council staff member Robert Komer.¹⁹²

While the CORDS program was generally more of a counterinsurgency operation than a UW one, the program did include many aspects of UW. A notable aspect of CORDS was the development of indigenous guerrillas to resist the influence of the NLF and the North Vietnamese army (also known as the People's Army of Vietnam or PAVN), similar to the approaches of the Strategic Hamlet and the CIDG programs. More importantly, CORDS afforded MACV a coordinated strategy with which to help bring South Vietnamese government control back to the rural areas, reducing the conflict's dependence on the U.S. military, and freeing CIA and SOG resources to concentrate more on its external operations. After his service as Chief of Station and the Chief of the CIA's Far East Division, William Colby returned to Vietnam in 1968 to assume control of CORDS. Under Colby's leadership, CORDS became instrumental in helping to defeat the NLF insurgency in South Vietnam through the widespread implementation of its rural pacification strategy.¹⁹³

Like its predecessor CIDG, CORDS incorporated Special Forces to provide expertise on counterinsurgency, guerrilla operations, and intelligence gathering. Unlike its predecessor, however, CORDS maintained a balance with MACV whereby CIA, SF, and conventional military advisors all participated in the program and contributed the capabilities of their parent organizations. CORDS implemented three subordinate

¹⁹² Laurie and Vaart, "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975," 29; Young, 17.

¹⁹³ Young, *The Theory and Practice of Associative Power: CORDS in the Villages of Vietnam 1967-1972*, 17-18.

programs: the Phoenix Program, Provincial Reconnaissance Units, and the Hamlet Evaluation System. Phoenix originally began as a separate CIA initiative called Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation which established district and provincial centers throughout South Vietnam for the purpose of gathering intelligence and targeting the local NLF networks. Phoenix expanded this program into a system of NLF targeting where the dossiers of NLF leaders were developed and passed to military units to capture, and if necessary kill the suspected insurgent commanders. The units responsible for apprehending and interrogating these Phoenix targets were composite forces known as Provincial Reconnaissance Units comprised of U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine special operators as well as Vietnamese, Thai, and Chinese guerrillas and South Vietnamese police and SOF.¹⁹⁴ Last, MACV created the Hamlet Evaluation Program in 1966, and later incorporated it into CORDS, as a method of surveying and assessing the progress of rural pacification efforts and measuring the level of NLF influence across South Vietnam. This program was used as the measure of performance of the Phoenix, PRU, and other related activities of CORDS until the end of the NLF insurgency and North Vietnam's transition back to conventional military operations in 1972.¹⁹⁵

Throughout the Vietnam War, the CIA and SOG also participated in a related conflict in the neighboring country of Laos.¹⁹⁶ Like many of its neighboring Southeast Asian neighbors, Laos suffered from weak post-colonial government institutions which made it vulnerable to aggressive communist influence, especially from China, throughout

¹⁹⁴ Laurie and Vaart, "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975," 30.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 35.

the 1950s and 1960s. Also like Vietnam, Laos would evolve into a region in which the CIA would conduct covert paramilitary activities to disrupt the spread of communism through the region. As the Vietnam War intensified, so did the covert action in Laos. In an effort to utilize diplomacy rather than military force in the country, however, the United States arranged an agreement in Geneva in 1961 which created a coalition government in Laos led by the royal family but also included other political groups such as the communist Pathet Lao.¹⁹⁷

North Vietnam, however, did not respect Laos's neutrality. After North Vietnam switched from a conventional war to supporting the NLF insurgency in the early 1960s, the North Vietnamese depended upon Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was a vital line of communication that extended through Laos and Cambodia and which enabled North Vietnam to provide much needed logistical support to the NLF in South Vietnam. To combat this, the CIA began a paramilitary-focused covert action in Laos that provided direct support to a mountainous Laotian minority group, the Hmong, in order to disrupt the North Vietnamese along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.¹⁹⁸ The CIA trained more than 40,000 Hmong fighters who succeeded in significantly hindering North Vietnamese cross-border operations. However, the Pathet Lao fought a vicious civil war against the royal Laotian government. The military capabilities of the Hmong began to wane after 1968 as the Pathet Lao achieved military victories over the royalists in Laos and the

¹⁹⁷ Laurie and Vaart, "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975," 35; Thomas L. Ahern, "Under cover Armies: CIA and Surrogate Warfare in Laos, 1961-1973," in *Studies in Intelligence* (2006): xiii-xv, accessed 25 January 2018. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5076e89c993247d4d82b62ef>.

¹⁹⁸ Laurie and Vaart, "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975," 35.

North Vietnamese escalated their direct involvement in South Vietnam during the Tet Offensive.¹⁹⁹

The CIA also employed an effective covert air capability that proved a long-term and essential support function to not only CIA's Laos campaign, but many of its other covert action programs around the world. In order to supply the Hmong and its paramilitary officers on the ground with food, medical equipment, and ammunition, the CIA employed civilian airline companies who operated in contracts with the CIA. The most prolific and well-known of these companies was Air America, who provided logistics and transportation services to the CIA in Laos, North Vietnam, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Air America later added photoreconnaissance to its operational portfolio and supported interrelated SOG operations in these same regions.²⁰⁰

SOG contributed to the U.S. efforts in Laos with its own cross-border operations beginning in 1965. Like the CIA, MACV understood the strategic significance of Laos and North Vietnam's reliance on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In their own effort to disrupt this line of communication, the Defense Department convinced President Johnson in March 1965 to authorize Special Forces to conduct cross-border operations into Laos for the purpose of conducting special reconnaissance.²⁰¹ Unlike the CIA mission in Laos, which resembled a much more advanced UW campaign with a mature resistance movement, the SOG missions were limited primarily to intelligence gathering. SOG understood that "the

¹⁹⁹ Laurie and Vaart, "CIA and the Wars in Southeast Asia 1947-1975," 35-36.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.; Ahern, "Undercover Armies," viii-vx; Curtis Peebles, *Twilight Warriors: Covert Air Operations Against the USSR* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 227-229, 245.

²⁰¹ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACSOG*, 49.

South Vietnamese military had been conducting its own operations in Laos since 1960,” and absorbed these small teams into their initial Laotian operation called Project Delta.²⁰² This effort also included the employment of small elements of SF-trained Montagnard fighters, who operated independently in Laos, called Leaping Lena teams.²⁰³ The Montagnards were an ethnic minority of the central mountains of Vietnam who historically persecuted by the Vietnamese and the communists. Montagnards readily volunteered to fight the North Vietnamese in both their country and in Laos. Over the course of SOG’s many cross-border operations, they partnered with a number of different ethnic groups representative of both disenfranchised minorities and South Vietnamese special forces counterparts.

SOG expanded and centralized this operation in a plan called Shining Brass which included the introduction of SOG SF personnel on the ground, an intelligence gathering mission, an air component to support ground elements, the introduction of more teams that later comprised ethnic-Chinese fighters known as the Nung, and eventual the development of a complete resistance movement in Laos.²⁰⁴ Despite heavy casualties among the SF members of the cross-border teams, the Shining Brass operations continued for several years. The majority of the Shining Brass reconnaissance teams were designated as Spike Teams, consisting of three Americans and nine indigenous personnel each. SOG supported the Spike Teams with follow-on exploitation forces, known as

²⁰² Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACSOG*, 48.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 49-53; Plaster, *SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam*, 14-17.

Haymaker Forces, which were comprised of indigenous, SF-trained fighters organized in infantry-style battalions and who travelled relatively short distances into Laos to interdict targets identified by the Spike Teams.²⁰⁵ In 1968, Shining Brass was re-designated as Prairie Fire to coincide with another marked escalation in SOG's efforts in Laos.²⁰⁶ This year was the peak of the growing air-to-ground fire support functions of the Laos campaign. This concept, known as Slam, involved an increase in airborne intelligence aircraft, bombers and strike aircraft, and forward air controller personnel on the ground in order to interdict high payoff North Vietnamese targets along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.²⁰⁷

In addition, Shining Brass and Prairie Fire also served a secondary purpose by giving SOG an alternate method of infiltrating agents into North Vietnam. After the CIA's largely failed black entry operations to penetrate North Vietnam during Project Tiger, the agency shifted much of its resources and energy towards the Strategic Hamlet Program in the south and its UW campaign in Laos.²⁰⁸ However, after SOG assumed control of these missions in North Vietnam, it soon realized how vulnerable its agent teams were, just as the CIA had in the early 1960s. By 1967, SOG largely abandoned any hope of organizing a mass resistance movement that could overcome the PAVN in the north. Instead it developed Operation Forae, a concept that included a number of relatively small disruption efforts that aimed to deceive, instill doubt or suspicion from

²⁰⁵ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACSOG*, 78-79, 177.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 108.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 112.

²⁰⁸ Ahern, "The Way We Do Things," 5.

within, spread propaganda, or identify double agents within the PAVN.²⁰⁹ After the escalation of Prairie Fire in 1968, SOG consolidated all its disparate North Vietnam activities under Operation Footboy which oversaw all SOG missions in the north including maritime, psychological, airborne, and intelligence operations.²¹⁰

The U.S. effort to stem the expansion of communism throughout Southeast Asia also brought Cambodia within the containment strategy and led to its own UW operations that were interconnected with the larger SOG UW campaign. During the war, North Vietnam supplied the NLF and its PAVN elements in South Vietnam via two means. The first was the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos into an area bordered by Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.²¹¹ As previously discussed, SOG's Operations Shining Brass and Prairie Fire and the CIA's Hmong program were developed in order to disrupt this logistics line of communication in Laos. The second was a maritime logistics line of communication whereby Chinese arms traffickers moved military equipment to the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. Cambodia's political neutrality in the conflict and tolerance of Vietnamese communist activity at the time ensured that this arms trafficking network could proceed unhindered.²¹² From Sihanoukville, North Vietnamese army personnel would facilitate the onward overland movement of the supplies across the border into South Vietnam. The CIA even monitored evidence of direct Chinese support

²⁰⁹ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACSOG*, 140.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 93.

²¹¹ Ibid., 121.

²¹² Ibid., 121; Plaster, *SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam*, 125.

to the North Vietnamese forces in the south throughout the early 1960s²¹³ and the situation developed into a difficult diplomatic challenge for the United States. As a neutral nation with its own growing communist insurgency, the Khmer Rouge, the regime of Prince Norodom Sihanouk appeared genuinely against Vietnamese communist activity in his country. However, the breakdown of diplomatic relations with Cambodia in 1965 and Washington's reluctance to accept the CIA's intelligence assessment of the Cambodia arms trafficking scheme led MACV to develop its own plan for disrupting this second enemy logistics route.²¹⁴

The 5th Special Forces Group was the resident Army Special Forces command in Vietnam, which was primarily responsible for leading other counterinsurgency operations throughout South Vietnam under the command of MACV. While not officially apart of SOG, many of 5th Group's units frequently attached to or directly support SOG's UW operations. By 1966, 5th Group developed its own concept to gather intelligence on North Vietnamese smuggling in Cambodia. These early efforts, called Project Omega and Project Sigma, were organized similarly to the Spike Teams and Haymaker Forces employed by SOG in Laos, including their SR approach and use of indigenous forces. The indigenous forces employed in the Omega and Sigma teams included ethnic

²¹³ Thomas L. Ahern, "Good Questions, Wrong Answers: CIA's Estimates of Arms Traffic Through Sihanoukville, Cambodia, During the Vietnam War," *Studies in Intelligence* (2004): 12-13, accessed 25 January 2018. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/4_GOOD_QUESTION_WRONG_ANSWERS.pdf.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 12, 17.

Cambodians and Nungs.²¹⁵ Since SOG had operational authority to conduct military covert action, delegated from the Department of Defense and Joint Staff, MACV transferred command and control of Sigma and Omega to SOG.²¹⁶ Throughout 1967, SOG expanded its Cambodia campaign that included Sigma, Omega, and its air component into a more unified operation known as Operation Daniel Boone.²¹⁷ Again, like the escalation of SOG operations in Laos, the campaign in Cambodia was later given a new name in 1967, Operation Salem House, and increased in its operational scope to include more ground forces including new Montignard units and forward air control teams to enable air-to-ground interdiction of North Vietnamese supply convoys.²¹⁸

Intelligence Lessons

Given the immense scope, complexity, and duration of the Vietnam War and America's involvement in Southeast Asia, the most prominent gap in the U.S. strategic intelligence capability was its intelligence reach within North Vietnam. The CIA and SOG both realized the difficulties associated with attempting to penetrate a closed communist society. Both organizations attempted to infiltrate agents into North Vietnam with little success in even ensuring their survival, never mind enabling them to achieve their operational and intelligence objectives or PE activities for follow-on operations. At

²¹⁵ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACSOG*, 121-122.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 123.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 123; Plaster, *SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam*, 77-78.

²¹⁸ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACSOG*, 181.

this point, both CIA and SOG included a number of senior leaders who were World War II veterans of the OSS. Both organizations drew upon many of the same World War II experiences in regards to conducting UW, missions like infiltrating and managing clandestine human networks, conducting sabotage and subversion, and special reconnaissance.

Therefore, it is possible that both organizations considered the penetration of North Vietnam as the easier of their tasks in comparison with some of their other UW objectives such as organizing indigenous guerrilla forces in the lawless highlands of South Vietnam or establishing covert networks in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. However, both organizations likely did not anticipate the sophistication of North Vietnam's security forces to conduct effective counterintelligence and counterespionage within its population and territory. Considering the difficulty SOE and OSS both had in developing UW networks in wartime France amidst Germany's efficient CI capability, the CIA and SOG should have anticipated the challenges and prioritized resources to these operations appropriately. The result, unfortunately, was a series of unsuccessful attempts to penetrate North Vietnam throughout the war, especially early in the conflict, which could have provided senior CIA, theater military, and national security leaders with a much more comprehensive intelligence outlook on the region and better informed early Vietnam policy.

The lack of deep intelligence reach and overall lack of strategic intelligence concerning America's primary adversary, the North Vietnamese regime and PAVN, leads to another intelligence deficiency. At the national and strategic levels, intelligence routinely failed to adequately inform and influence national security policy. Throughout

the early years of the conflict, especially during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the CIA had to contend with the personal influence of key members of the president's cabinet, especially Secretary of McNamara and later National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger during Richard Nixon's administration. The presidents themselves, especially Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, had difficult relationships with the CIA at times and were often disregarded their intelligence if it did not support their strategic outlooks. The lack of access to and influence upon the president, his cabinet, and the National Security Council often resulted in strategic and national intelligence assessments not affecting policy making and key decisions.

Richard Helms personified this difficult CIA relationship with policymakers during his time as DCI in the late 1960s. As the senior intelligence advisor to the president, Helms represented not only the entirety of the IC and its strategic assessment of the world but also the CIA's tactical and operational assessments of the situation in Southeast Asia.²¹⁹ While Helms often had difficulty maintaining his relationship with President Johnson and convincing him of his agency's recommendations, the CIA maintained much better access to the policymaking process than SOG, which had to report assessments through multiple layers of bureaucracy in the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense.

For example, the CIA's assessments failed to convince or sway national security decision making in Vietnam after reporting indications of North Vietnam's transition from a conventional military campaign to a South Vietnamese insurgency based around

²¹⁹ Helms and Hood, *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency*, 292-295.

the NLF, the lack of operational affects from the Operation Rolling Thunder bombings against North Vietnam targets, and North Vietnam's Tet Offensive which caught MACV by surprise in 1968. At the strategic regional level, the IC possibly could have made a strong argument that dispelled the myth of a singular, monolithic communist threat emanating from the Soviet Union and more accurately portrayed the regional interests of communist Asian nations, and refuted aspects of the containment and domino theories. Former Chairman of the JCS, General Bruce Palmer (ret.), summarized the role strategic intelligence had upon policy-making during the Vietnam era:

generally American intelligence had a good feel for the true situation and certainly a far better grasp than US policymakers and leaders who tended to deceive themselves in their desire to make their chosen policies succeed. On the other hand, it can also be said that US intelligence officials failed to articulate their views in a manner convincing enough to make US policymakers understand the harsh realities of the Vietnamese problem. It seems particularly ironic that the United States in essence ignored the French experience and committed itself in haste without adequate thought.²²⁰

CIA veteran of the Vietnam War (Saigon Chief of Station, Far East Chief, CORDS Chief, and DCI), William Colby, affirms the strategic role of intelligence to inform the senior leaders in the U.S. government during UW campaigns. Colby even considered this role a constitutional duty of the IC. Colby had the unique experience of spending the majority of his career as an operations officer, first with the OSS in wartime France and later with CIA in Indochina and Vietnam. As DCI, Colby recognized that the CIA had not just a statutory responsibility but a Constitutional obligation to assist the

²²⁰ Bruce Palmer, Jr., "US Intelligence and Vietnam," *Studies in Intelligence* (1984): 28, accessed 25 January 2018.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0001471756>.

President by keeping him as well-informed as possible.²²¹ Ironically, after the numerous Congressional inquiries and commissions that investigated the legalities of the many of the CIA's activities during the 1970s, President Gerald Ford lost trust in the CIA and replaced Director Colby amidst a period of massive reform throughout the IC.

Theoretically, SOG had a method for delivering strategic intelligence assessments to the policymaking level as well. The Joint Staff's Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACRA) was intended to provide direct Pentagon oversight of SOG's UW operations in Southeast Asia and therefore could have served as its intelligence outlet to DoD and the NSC.²²² In reality, SACRA primarily served as a watchdog group and a way for the conventionally-minded Joint Staff to limit SOG's seemingly very risky operations. It is important to note, too, that only a few of the SACRAs during the duration of the Vietnam War had any experience in UW, covert action, or clandestine operations. The few notable exceptions included Major General William "Ray" Peers, an OSS veteran of the World War II campaign in Burma, and Brigadier General Donald Blackburn, a World War II veteran of the guerrilla campaign in the Philippines, former 77th Special Forces Group commander, and SOG Chief from 1965-1966. Even though a staff supported the SACRA, none of these staff sections included intelligence and it was ultimately an afterthought.²²³

Despite these strategic shortcoming, the CIA and SOG made exponential gains in the tactical application of intelligence. Edward Lansdale was probably one of the first

²²¹ Colby and Forbath, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA*, 453-454.

²²² Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACSOG*, 6-7.

²²³ Ibid., 86-90.

Americans to recognize the importance of IW theory, the tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by the World War II veterans in the CIA and SF, and applying them to the new irregular environments of the Cold War. Most importantly, Lansdale voiced the imperative of partnering with the indigenous population during irregular conflicts. Local engagement became standard procedure for both the CIA and Special Forces during their conduct of counterinsurgency within South Vietnam and UW in ungoverned and external territory such as Laos and Cambodia. Before the Vietnam War, local engagement was largely an afterthought and certainly not a priority when compared to the maneuvering of large Army formations during World War II and the Korean War. After the Vietnam War, however, and America's reintroduction to insurgency warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, local engagement became a foundational part of all American IW doctrine. From an intelligence perspective, this expanded America's sources of tactical intelligence to the capabilities limited to just its military forces and CIA officers on the ground to the theoretical limits of entire indigenous populations.

The CIA and SOG's UW operations during Vietnam War also provided the settings and conditions for incredible intelligence innovation, especially technological innovation. One of the best examples of Vietnam War innovation was in the development of high altitude, high speed, and long-range reconnaissance aircraft. In the late 1950s, the CIA began a program called project Oxtail to develop a replacement for the venerable U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. The CIA began employing the U-2 in 1954. It was revolutionary for its time, designed to fly at extremely high altitudes, albeit relatively slow, and above the limits of the Soviet Union's anti-air capabilities of the time. However, even Captain Francis G. Powers was shot down in a U-2 over the Soviet Union

in 1960, the CIA was already at work to find a replacement for the U-2 that could fly at high altitude and very high, supersonic speeds. The CIA partnered with Lockheed Martin in its the Oxtail program and the result was the A-12.²²⁴

While not designed specifically for the Vietnam War, the first operational deployment of the A-12, known as Operation Black Shield, employed the A-12 in reconnaissance sorties to collect intelligence on North Vietnamese ground targets in 1967 and 1968. The A-12 missions were successful in demonstrating the capabilities of its new photographic equipment, its ability to monitor and avoid the North Vietnamese integrated anti-air defenses, and the ability to employ this strategic capability covertly. The advantage in deploying the A-12 to service in Southeast Asia was to fill a gap in strategic intelligence concerning targets in North Vietnam.²²⁵

While the A-12 directly supported the bombing campaign, its development in the CIA and not the military illustrated its intended use in covert action programs and, by extension, to support UW campaigns on the ground. By proving the Oxtail concept in Vietnam, it demonstrated the A-12's potential for use in collecting strategic intelligence against other Cold War adversaries and targets, especially North Korea and China who were already within range of its current facilities. However due to budget constraints and competition with the U.S. Air Force, who developed a very similar high-altitude, high-speed, and long-range reconnaissance aircraft of its own, the SR-71, the Oxcart program was terminated in 1968 in favor of the SR-71 which continued flying reconnaissance

²²⁴ Thomas P. McNich, "The Oxcart Story," *Studies in Intelligence*, 15, no. 1 (July 1996), accessed 25 January 2019. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol15no1/html/v15i1a01p_0001.htm.

²²⁵ Ibid.

missions in support of Strategic Air Command. While short lived, the A-12 and the Oxcart program began an era of unprecedented aircraft innovation. Many of those developments continue on with today's modern intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance airborne platforms capable of discretely collecting information and delivering strategic intelligence.²²⁶

Last, intelligence dissemination was another important innovation that SOG and the CIA dramatically improved throughout the Vietnam War. SOG, in particular, developed in circumstances that required effective information sharing in order to exist symbiotically among the other major players in the Vietnam and Southeast Asia theaters, namely its parent unit MACV, the other SF units conducting counterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam, with whom SOG shared many operational interests, the many U.S. Embassies and their Country Teams, in whose countries SOG operated, and the strategic military chain of command at the Pentagon. Intelligence gathering was the foundation of SOG's mission. Before any resistance movement could be achieved in North Vietnam and before North Vietnam's reach into neighboring Laos and Cambodia could be defeated, SOG and their CIA cohorts had to collect and interpret intelligence from these regions. Most critical were the cross-border reconnaissance teams which gathered first-hand intelligence on North Vietnamese lines of communication and identified high value targets with their indigenous partners. In addition, SOG airborne operations units collected information on North Vietnam's air defenses, SOG's agent

²²⁶ McNich, "The Oxcart Story."

networks described the environment in North Vietnam, and maritime units reconnoitered coastal defenses and captured enemy personnel in raids.²²⁷

At the tactical level, SOG instituted a remarkable system for processing and exploiting intelligence. The unit's headquarters organized three offices, each devoted to a specific area of operation. These included the North Vietnam Study Group, the Laos Study Group, and the Cambodia Study Group. The more difficult step in this intelligence process was dissemination. Given the covert nature of SOG's operations, the intelligence section of SOG headquarters had to carefully filter its reports of information that could reveal sensitive sources of intelligence and methods used to collect it. The MACV J-2 supported SOG with this task by sanitizing those reports and removing any information that could indicate its connection to SOG. From there, MACV disseminated the intelligence reports across all units in theater.²²⁸

The Soviet-Afghan War and American Support to the Mujahedeen, 1979-1992

Historic Overview

By the mid 1970s and the gradual conclusion of America's nearly 20-year involvement in Vietnam, the CIA underwent its most significant reforms since its inception in 1947. These reforms were largely the result of the American public and Congress's perception that the CIA was fighting its own conflicts, both at home and abroad, and often doing so without regard to civil liberties, human rights, or the

²²⁷ Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACSOG*, 93.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 94.

sovereignty of foreign nations.²²⁹ As Directors of Central Intelligence, the testimonies of Richard Helms and William Colby to Congress on the conduct of the CIA during the Vietnam War and elsewhere around the world further convinced Congressional leaders of the need to reform the intelligence community, especially the CIA.²³⁰ The military was less associated with these controversial activities because its role was largely seen as fulfilling a wartime, *in extremis* role which, at times, fell under the direction or closely aligned with the CIA. The culpability of the CIA and, to a lesser degree, the military was reinforced with the revelations of the New York Time's *Pentagon Papers*, a comprehensive classified history of the Vietnam conflict commissioned by Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1969.²³¹

Throughout the mid to late 1970s, Congress and the National Security Council sought to impose new oversight over the activities and the budgets of the CIA's Directorate of Operations.²³² The subsequent Congressional committees and commissions in 1975 and 1976 resulted in significant new government oversight regulations for the CIA that included a moratorium on the assassination of foreign leaders, a reduced influence in the affairs of foreign nations, and strict parameters for collecting and storing information about U.S. persons.²³³ The agency's new DCI, George

²²⁹ Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 462.

²³⁰ Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*, 318-319.

²³¹ Ibid., 318-319; Gelb, "United States Vietnam Relations 1945-1967."

²³² Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 459-462; Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*, 346-348.

²³³ Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 434-438, 451-460.

H. W. Bush, was responsible for implementing Congress's new regulations and restructuring of the CIA. This included the reduction of its Directorate of Operations staff, the CIA's division responsible for covert action and which had grown significantly during its operations in Southeast Asia. While Bush had the difficult task of transforming the agency, he worked hard to retain the CIA's statutory control of covert action and to maintain a strong global presence for gathering strategic intelligence.²³⁴

Similar to the Vietnam War, America's involvement in Afghanistan was an inheritance of a protracted colonial conflict between global powers for control of a strategic region of the world. In this case, modern Afghanistan was shaped by the approximately century's long "Great Game" between the British and Russian empires.²³⁵ Russia and the USSR continuously exerted its influence into the region seeking geopolitical opportunities in Asia throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Great Britain was often convinced that Russia's intention was to eventually annex Afghanistan into its Eurasian empire in order to gain warm water port access to the Indian and the Mediterranean Sea, via Afghanistan's neighbors to the west. Regardless of Russia's true intentions, Great Britain fought three unsuccessful wars for control of Afghanistan, committing its colonial Indian forces to its western frontiers in 1832-1842,

²³⁴ Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 455-456; for more information concerning the Congressional reforms of the IC during the 1970s, most notably the Senate's Church Commission and the House of Representative's Pike Commission, refer to Tim Weiner's *Legacy of Ashes*; additionally, refer to the memoirs of Richard Helms, *A Look Over My Shoulder*, and William Colby, *Honorable Men*, for CIA and DCI perspectives of these reforms.

²³⁵ Riedel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 8.

in 1878-1893, and 1919-1921.²³⁶ The general outcome of these conflicts was the partition of the tribal lands of the regional majority Pashtuns between Afghanistan and Pakistan with the Durand Line, an artificial border the British foreign ministry imposed on the Afghans at the conclusion of the Second Anglo-Afghan War. This, more than any other factor, defined the eternally contentious relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan and set the conditions for Pakistan to exert influence over its westerly neighbor throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.²³⁷

In the 1950s, the United States developed close diplomatic ties with Pakistan, providing military aid, and securing a partnership to help counter the influence of the Soviet Union and China. Pakistan joined the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organization in 1955, both were western-oriented security alliances created in order to help contain China and the USSR. However, by heavily supporting Pakistan, the United States largely marginalized its neighbor Afghanistan who turned to the Soviet Union for military and economic assistance. The Soviets took advantage of this growing rift to exploit oil reserves and other natural resources in the region and extended its support to Afghanistan.²³⁸ The Soviet influence during the 1960s and 1970s helped create a period of limited modernization in Afghanistan, mostly confined to the capital region of Kabul, select projects around the country, and the military.

²³⁶ Riedel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 8-10.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

The Soviets also had a significant influence on Afghan politics and cultivated a growing communist movement. In the 1960s, Afghan King Mohammad Zahir Shah opened the government to competing political parties. The political arena was dominated throughout the 1970s by two rival Afghan communist factions, the Khalq, led by Nur Muhammad Taraki, and the Parcham, led by Babrak Karmal. The ambitions of Afghan politicians culminated in 1973 when the prime minister, Mohammad Daoud Khan, waited for King Zahir to travel to Europe in the summer of 1973 when he organized a coup d'état with the support of Pashtun nationalists, students, and reformers. Daoud seized power on 17 July 1973 as a representative of the Afghan communists and declared the creation of the Republic of Afghanistan. Soviet intelligence had advanced knowledge of Daoud's planned take-over and welcomed the regime change.²³⁹

However, for the next several years the Soviets became convinced that Daoud was drifting further from the Eastern bloc after witnessing his close ties with the Shah of Iran and the easing of tensions with Pakistan. To shape the political situation in Afghanistan to better meet its regional interests, the Soviet Union helped negotiate an alliance between the two competing communist factions, the Khalq and the Parcham, in 1977. While Moscow always maintained close relationships with the Afghan communists, they never had control of them. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union observed warnings of yet another imminent coup d'état. This time, the change of government involved the assassination of prominent Afghan communist member, Mir Akbar Khyber, on 17 April 1978, which triggered communist demonstrations to protest the Daoud

²³⁹ Riedel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 14-15.

government. The prime minister predictably responded heavy-handedly, which led to increased protests and the take-over of the government. Protesters killed Daoud while he attempted to resist the coup and installed Nur Muhammad Taraki as president and prime minister and Babrak Karmal as his deputy. This period became known as the Saur Revolution (Afghan Farsi for “April Revolution”).²⁴⁰

The Saur Revolution was not complete, however, and its last phase occurred in 1979. While Taraki nominally served as the head of government, the real power of the regime laid with Hafizullah Amin, the newly appointed prime minister. On 8 October 1979, Amin conducted his own well-planned take-over of the government, detaining Taraki’s supporters, and ordering the assassination of the president. As U.S. intelligence would later indicate, the Soviet Union most likely did not authorize the coup, preferring Taraki over Amin at the time. The unstable Kabul government combined with its deteriorating control over its provincial tribal territories justified the Soviet Union’s decision to intervene militarily in order to restore order in Afghanistan.²⁴¹

The creeping influence of the Soviet Union further into Central Asia and the events of the Saur Revolution were undoubtedly concerning to U.S. policy-makers. By themselves, however, these events hardly warranted a direct American response at this time, especially not an armed response. Full American attention did not turn to Afghanistan until February of 1979 when unidentified Afghans kidnapped the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs. The communist Afghan government ordered

²⁴⁰ Reidel, *What We Won: America’s Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 16-17, 18; Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 468.

²⁴¹ Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 468; Reidel, *What We Won: America’s Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 19.

an immediate rescue attempt. The ambassador was killed during the rescue operation and the United States was left wondering whether this was a conspiracy and if so, had this been a plot engineered by the Soviets and their Afghan surrogates? Regardless, the administration and National Security Council of President Jimmy Carter ordered the CIA to shift its attention towards the Soviet Union's involvement in Afghanistan.²⁴²

Therefore, at the time of Amin's take-over of the Afghan government, the CIA and the IC observed the Soviet Union's response to the degrading conditions in Afghanistan. In mid-September, the CIA first detected signs of the Soviet 105th Guards Airborne Division staging at Fergana Air Base in neighboring Uzbekistan and issued a warning of an imminent, large-scale Soviet ground invasion. The CIA's warning, however, failed to mobilize the U.S. National Security Council, most notably the president himself, who later stated they were unaware of imminent Soviet activity.²⁴³ Nevertheless, the Soviet 40th Red Army invaded Afghanistan on December 25, 1979 and within 72 hours the Soviets secured Kabul and all other major cities with a force of approximately 25,000 to 30,000 troops.²⁴⁴

²⁴² Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 468-469.

²⁴³ Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*, 365-367.

²⁴⁴ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 19, 21; Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 470-471; Douglas MacEachin, "Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community's Record," *Studies in Intelligence* (2008): 1, accessed 10 March 2018. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/predicting-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan-the-intelligence-communitys-record/predicting-the-soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan-the-intelligence-communitys-record.html>.

President Carter approved a new counter-Soviet policy in Afghanistan. Throughout the growth of the Afghan communist movement, the CIA had gradually increased low-level logistical support to underground groups who resisted the new communist government. In 1979, President Carter authorized the implementation of a new CIA-led covert action in Pakistan to support the growing Afghan resistance movement fighting against the Afghan communists and their Soviet supporters.²⁴⁵ The president's guidance to his National Security Council and the CIA was to respond aggressively to the USSR's invasion by supplying weapons to the Afghan guerrillas and to create a coalition of allied countries willing to contribute to the effort.²⁴⁶ Throughout 1980, the president's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, formulated the plan with which the United States intended to assemble the plan.²⁴⁷ In accordance with the intelligence reforms of the mid to late 1970s, the administration reported its covert action proposal to Congress and succeeded in gaining broad bipartisan support and initial funding.²⁴⁸

During the Vietnam War and its greater conflict to contain the spread of communism throughout Southeast Asia there was no pre-existing or unifying resistance movement. The Afghan resistance, on the other hand, existed well before America's involvement and would have continued to fight the Soviets and the Afghan communists with or without Western support. In many ways, the Afghan resistance resembled the

²⁴⁵ Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 472.

²⁴⁶ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 93.

²⁴⁷ Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 470-472.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 471.

French Maquis of World War II. The Afghan Mujahedeen, also known as soldiers of God or holy warriors,²⁴⁹ consisted of numerous disparate guerrilla groups across Afghanistan who were united principally in their Islamic faith, Afghan nationalism, and their resentment of foreign, communist influence. The social and psychological motivations behind the Mujahideen were exceedingly strong, rooted deeply in Afghanistan's conservative Sunni Islamic faith. The Mujahideen were religiously unified in their jihad, or holy war, against the Soviet and communist Afghan kafirs (unbelievers).²⁵⁰

The Mujahedeen represented a broad cross-section of Afghan ethnic groups, clans, provinces, and languages. In addition to the guerrilla fighters, the Mujahedeen had representation in several of Afghanistan's opposition political parties including the Hezb-I Islami (Party of Islam) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Jamiat-e Islami (Society of Islam) led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Ittihad-i-Islam Bara-I Azadi Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan) led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.²⁵¹ These political parties were more extreme than their secular and more traditional counterparts and as a result maintained closer ties with the Mujahedeen guerrilla factions and gained more support.

Of the many Mujahedeen groups in Afghanistan, three dominated the insurgency of the 1980s. A Tajik named Ahmad Shah Massoud led a loyal and well-organized Mujahedeen group in his native Panjsher Valley east of the Afghan capital. Prior to the

²⁴⁹ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 5.

²⁵⁰ Yousaf and Adkin, *Afghanistan – The Bear Trap, the Defeat of a Superpower*, 33.

²⁵¹ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 43.

Saur Revolution, Massoud lived in exile in Pakistan where he trained in guerrilla warfare with the assistance of the Pakistani Department of Inter-services Intelligence (ISI), where he studied Eastern warfare and revolutionary theory and he developed ties with sympathetic Saudi supporters. In 1979, Massoud clandestinely slipped back into Afghanistan and returned to his home province where he mounted one of the most successful insurgencies against the Soviet Army and its communist Afghan counterparts. However, by belonging to an ethnic minority and having a relatively secular ideology compared to others Islamists in the movement, Massoud was not among the ISI's preferred commanders.²⁵² Nevertheless, Ahmad Shah Massoud famously earned the moniker the "Lion of the Panjsher" for his leadership and bravery in combat, which garnered him national admiration for decades to come.²⁵³ As a relatively moderate Mujahedeen commander and one who was somewhat marginalized by the Pakistani, the British and Americans extended their support to Massoud's group throughout the conflict.²⁵⁴

At the opposite end of the spectrum was Jalaluddin Haqqani, one of ISI's favorite Afghan commanders who originated from the eastern Afghan province of Paktia close to the Durand Line and de facto border with Pakistan. Unlike Massoud's relative secularism, Jalaluddin was educated at the Dar al-Ulum Haqqaniyya madrassa outside the frontier city of Peshawar, Pakistan. This began Jalaluddin's development in the Deobandi

²⁵² Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 45-47.

²⁵³ Ibid., 45.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 48-49.

custom of militant Sunni Islam, common in Pashtun society and a characteristic the ISI sought out during its Mujahedeen training program.²⁵⁵ Like many other Mujahedeen groups, Jalaluddin escalated his insurgent activities throughout the 1970s and even went as far as to conspire with other commanders to organize a mass national insurgency to attempt to overthrow the Daoud government. While the coup failed, Jalaluddin maintained close ties with his co-conspirators, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Yunis Khalis. These two also became leading Mujahideen commanders and favorites of the ISI due to their effectiveness in the border areas and their fundamentalist tribal ideology. Hekmatyar and Yunis Khalis were also important leaders for Hezb-I Islami (later split into Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin and Hezb-i Islami Khalis) which served as both a guerrilla force and political party.²⁵⁶

While the Mujahedeen did the fighting in Afghanistan, the Pakistanis conducted the preponderance of organizing, planning, and training of the Mujahedeen in secret bases in Pakistan and along the border.²⁵⁷ The ISI took advantage of the massive refugee crisis in Afghanistan to identify and support key leaders in the Mujahideen, men like Hekmatyar and Yunis Khalis. As the Soviets inflicted more and more violence against the Afghan population, more Afghans escaped to refugee camps in Pakistan, where the Mujahideen and ISI recruited many to fight or give valuable information about the Soviet

²⁵⁵ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 50-51.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.; Russian General Staff, *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, 53-54.

²⁵⁷ Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*, 384-385; Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, xii-xiii.

and Afghan troops. This proved to be one of the most difficult challenges for the Soviets throughout the conflict.²⁵⁸ The ISI controlled the majority of the Mujahideen groups from Peshawar, the Pakistani frontier city close to the border with Afghanistan and the Kyber Pass.²⁵⁹

Of all the dominant leaders supporting the Mujahedeen, the most significant was Pakistan's president, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. Zia's motivation was a combination of Pakistani nationalism, conservative Islamic faith, his generation's protracted conflict with India, and a wariness of continuously encroaching Soviet communism. This manifested itself into Zia's policy of covert support to the Mujahedeen which eventually transformed into a campaign that the United States and other allies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Zia's former classmate and longtime Army peer and chief of the ISI, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman, oversaw the war.²⁶⁰ General Akhtar selected Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf to lead the ISI's Afghan Bureau, a position he held from 1983 to 1988 and which gave him the responsibility for training, supplying, and planning the Mujahideen and their operations.²⁶¹ When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, ISI provided Zia with both the early warning and an ominous prediction that the Soviets would likely invade Baluchistan in southern Pakistan in order to gain access to a warm

²⁵⁸ Russian General Staff, *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, 29.

²⁵⁹ Yousaf and Adkin, *Afghanistan – The Bear Trap, the Defeat of a Superpower*, 39.

²⁶⁰ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 59; Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 473.

²⁶¹ Yousaf and Adkin, *Afghanistan – The Bear Trap, the Defeat of a Superpower*, 21-22.

water port. This fear necessitated Zia's decision to escalate the Mujahedeen war in Afghanistan. However, Zia and Akhtar understood the need for discretion in their support to the Mujahedeen in order to prevent a Soviet military response against Pakistan. Therefore, ISI reached out and developed the strong bonds with Saudi Arabia and the United States who helped finance and supply the conflict and helped prevent them from using regular Pakistani military forces.²⁶² The ISI's Afghan Bureau established a network of camps throughout its northwestern frontier areas along the border, with which it organized, trained, and equipped the Mujahedeen for their operations in Afghanistan.²⁶³

Like the CIA, the ISI was not only responsible for covert action and IW but was a national intelligence agency. Therefore, ISI also had a prevailing mission to collect intelligence on the Soviet 40th Red Army and monitor conditions in Afghanistan.²⁶⁴ With this mandate, ISI developed strong intelligence-sharing relationships with many of its allied counterparts including CIA, the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate, and the British Special Intelligence Service. Because the Mujahedeen were the primary source of intelligence from within Afghanistan and because Zia insisted on controlling the direction of the resistance, ISI maintained sole access to the Mujahedeen.

The ISI typically served as an intermediary for the exchange of intelligence between the Mujahideen and the CIA. In exchange for the Mujahedeen and ISI's supply of strategic intelligence from within the conflict, the CIA supplied tactical intelligence

²⁶² Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 60-61.

²⁶³ Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 474.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 62.

yielded from American technical means, especially satellite imagery, and its analysis to the ISI. American intelligence was critical to the resistance and the ISI used it to identify Soviet targets and plan operations with Mujahedeen commanders.²⁶⁵ The United States provided a stream of high-quality images and analysis to the ISI, which proved to be invaluable in helping to select targets for Mujahedeen operations, briefing commanders and ISI advisers on what to expect at target locations, and assessing how much damage a raid or ambush had actually done. The imagery also formed the basis for producing detailed maps of targets for raids and comprehensive order-of-battle analysis of the 40th Red Army and the Afghan communist forces.²⁶⁶

The American covert action in Afghanistan fell under the auspices of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, and, more specifically, its Near East Division, led by Charles G. Cogan. As the CIA's lead for operations across the Middle East, Cogan helped his division recover from the disastrous loss of the American embassy in Tehran and the capture of much of the staff as hostages on 4 November 1979. Adding to the stain against American clandestine operations abroad, an attempted hostage rescue also ended in disaster and was aborted at a desert landing zone in Iran on 24 and 25 April 1980. Therefore, the CIA and policy-makers were both hesitant to commit Americans directly to a new covert action in the Middle East. However, given the Pakistani's tight control of the Afghan Mujahedeen and President Carter's instructions to provide aid, the CIA found itself with an operational concept to support the war against the 40th Red Army without

²⁶⁵ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 62-64.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 64.

involving Americans in Afghanistan directly.²⁶⁷ To coordinate CIA's Afghan operations, the Directorate of Operations appointed veteran Middle East CIA officer, John MacGaffin, to lead the South Asia Operations Group, more commonly known as the Afghan Task Force.²⁶⁸ Cogan's initial guidance for the task force was to initially provide non-lethal aid to the Mujahideen and incrementally shift to Soviet-made weapons. He emphasized the president's directive for providing weapons and equipment to the Mujahideen that could plausibly originate with the Soviet army and not attributed to the United States.²⁶⁹ With this steady flow of equipment, provided to Pakistani ISI who, in turn, provided it to the Mujahideen, U.S. national security policy-makers hoped to "bleed the Soviets dry" as they had the Americans during the Vietnam War.²⁷⁰

When President Ronald Reagan took office in 1980, one of his first acts as president was to appoint a new DCI who could take the CIA from its tumultuous days of national scandals during the 1970s and empower it to contribute to his vision of a strong foreign policy against the Soviet Union. The president appointed former OSS veteran and career attorney William Colby to assume leadership of the CIA and the IC.²⁷¹ Casey's first acts as DCI in support of the Afghan operation was to personally solidify America's relationships with Pakistan's Prime Minister Zia and Saudi Arabia's King Fadh bin

²⁶⁷ Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 473.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 103.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.; Yousaf and Adkin, *Afghanistan – The Bear Trap, the Defeat of a Superpower*, 78-80.

²⁷¹ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 110-111.

Abdulaziz al-Saud which helped secure additional Saudi financial support to the operation. President Reagan's first term in office was a period of relative stagnation for the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, however. While coalition support for the resistance was strong, U.S. policy-makers hoped to escalate the conflict in order to achieve more tangible effects against the Soviets in Afghanistan. This policy change was codified in National Security Decision Directive 166, in March 1985, which provided "a new American objective in Afghanistan: to win, "to push the Soviets out," "by any means available."²⁷² The new policy included additional strategic intelligence objectives to better support the covert aspect of the program and to "exploit Soviet sensitivities and vulnerabilities arising from their occupation of Afghanistan."²⁷³

During this time, junior Texas Congressman Charles Wilson became a key supporter of the program in Congress. While senior CIA leaders resisted Congressman Wilson's initial attempts to intervene in the program, Wilson eventually integrated himself with members of the Afghan Task Force and lent his support by securing critical Congressional appropriations increases for the CIA's Afghan program.²⁷⁴ Congressional funding for the program was significant in supporting its transformation in the mid-1980s. By this point, President Reagan and Director Casey shifted from their Afghan policy from committing the Soviets to a long, costly war in Afghanistan to supporting the

²⁷² Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 120; Crile, *My Enemy's Enemy*, 356.

²⁷³ Executive Office of the President of the United States of America, National Security Decision Directive 166, *U.S. Policy, Programs and Strategy in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: National Security Council, 1985.)

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 119-120; Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 480.

Mujahideen in order to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan. This required the Afghan Task Force, the CIA station in Pakistan, and their ISI partners to introduce increasingly more aggressive tactics and equipment for the Mujahideen, capabilities that included the ability to destroy the Soviet Union's modern armored vehicles and helicopters and ultimately to break the stalemate.²⁷⁵ Saudi Arabia's commitment to the conflict included its pledge to match America's financial investments.

This culminated in 1985 when Wilson succeeded in increasing Congressional funding for the program to a high of \$250 million (plus the Saudi's matching contribution).²⁷⁶ This extraordinary budget increase specifically enabled the CIA to provide two key weapons systems to the Mujahideen, the Stinger man-portable surface-to-air missile, and the Milan wire-guided anti-tank missile. These weapons were obviously not Soviet made and signaled a stark departure from CIA's original requirement for its covert actions, which is to disguise America's involvement. However, under the provisions of National Security Decision Directive 166, the Administration was willing to risk plausible deniability if it gave the Mujahideen a tactical capability that could lead to the Soviet's strategic defeat.²⁷⁷ The CIA and ISI delivered these new American weapons directly to the leading Mujahideen commanders including Hekmatyar, Sayyaf, Khalis, and Rabbani.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁵ Bearden and Risen, *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB*, 229-230.

²⁷⁶ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 121.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 121-123.

²⁷⁸ Bearden and Risen, *The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB*, 238.

Evidence shows that the Soviets may have begun preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan as early as 1985. In 1986, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev met with Afghan President Babrak Karmal in Moscow to inform him of his intentions to eventually withdraw the 40th Red Army and asked him to step down as president. Karmal eventually agreed and was replaced by his chief of the Afghan secret policy and intelligence service, the Khedamati Ittlaati-e Dawlet (or State Information Service), Najibullah Ahmadzai.²⁷⁹ In 1988, the Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze even hinted to U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz that the Soviets intended to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan within a year.²⁸⁰ After about a year of negotiations between Reagan and Gorbachev and between multinational parties in the United Nations, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, the United States, and Afghanistan agreed to the provisions of the 1988 Geneva Accords. This agreement required the 40th Red Army's departure from Afghanistan which the Soviets completed on February 15, 1989.²⁸¹

The United States had achieved its strategic objective of causing drawing the Soviets into a costly, protracted conflict and then causing their withdrawal from Afghanistan in defeat. The war in Afghanistan continued, however. At this point, the ISI convinced the CIA to support their decision to transition the Mujahideen from guerrillas into a more conventional military in order to continue the war against the Najibullah regime. Believing the communist government would quickly collapse, the CIA decided

²⁷⁹ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 123.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid., 125.

not to prepare the Afghans for a political transition.²⁸² They remained in power for another four years, however, and did were not expelled from the government in Kabul until 1992 when the most powerful Mujahideen groups and Afghan army defectors isolated the capital and destroyed much of it in a large-scale siege.²⁸³ The result was a civil war that consumed Afghanistan in internecine fighting among the multitude of Mujahideen groups whose leaders returned to their traditional roles as tribal warlords.

Meanwhile, Pakistan underwent one of its most turbulent periods of political change since its war for independence. The 1988 death of Prime Minister Zia and his ISI Chief Akhtar in a plane crash ushered an era of rapid changes in government, the deterioration of Pakistan's relations with the U.S., and the escalation of the Pakistan's conflict with India over control of the border region of Kashmir. While ISI lessened its support to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, it used its existing training camps and cadre to dramatically expand the Pakistani-supported insurgency in Kashmir.²⁸⁴ Therefore, the combination of lawless civil war in Afghanistan, Pakistan's policy of continuing its insurgent training to support the Kashmir insurgency, and the U.S. decision to conclude its support to the Mujahideen created the conditions for the rise of the Taliban in the mid 1990s.²⁸⁵

²⁸² Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA*, 196.

²⁸³ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 128-132.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., 130-134.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

According to many experts, the ISI trained many of the Taliban's senior leaders during the Afghan-Soviet War, including its leader, Muhammad Omar. During the Afghan Civil War, Pakistan viewed the Taliban, a collection of extremely hardline Islamists and former Mujahideen fighters as capable of stabilizing Afghanistan. The result of course, was the Taliban. The more hardline Islamist Mujahideen, notably Hekmatyar, also redirected their stance against nonbelievers and secular Middle Eastern supporters including the new Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto and the United States.²⁸⁶ The end result was the creation of the brutal Taliban theocracy, supported monetarily by Pakistan, which provided safe haven to al-Qaeda during their orchestration of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.²⁸⁷

Intelligence Lessons

As an UW campaign and America's longest and most successful covert action, the U.S. involvement in the Soviet-Afghan War illustrated several key lessons on strategic intelligence and its critical role throughout the campaign. Because the American-component of the campaign was prosecuted almost entirely by the CIA, it is easy to categorize the campaign as an intelligence campaign. As demonstrated in the previous section about the Vietnam War and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, the CIA is much more than an intelligence agency, albeit the agency which is responsible for consolidating strategic intelligence from across the Intelligence Community into national-level assessments. However, even in conflict where the CIA's activities were remarkably

²⁸⁶ Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA*, 202-203.

²⁸⁷ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 136-140.

non-kinetic, especially when compared to those of the Vietnam War, and mostly related to logistics and communications, strategic intelligence served as the campaign's foundation.

The CIA's strategic intelligence, collected tactically by the Mujahideen fighters, passed to their Pakistani ISI handlers, and onward to CIA officers in Pakistan, enabled the formulation of national intelligence assessments that directly affected national security policy formulation. Unlike the CIA of the 1960s and its inability to counter the influence of Secretary of Defense McNamara and affect the decision making of President Johnson, the CIA of the 1980s had direct impacts on President Reagan's decision making. After the confusion amidst the CIA's reports of the Soviet 1979 build-up along the Afghan border and the Administration's claims of lack of warning of the invasion, the CIA under Casey reformed its intelligence analysis capability.²⁸⁸

The method for delivering strategic intelligence to the president to affect national security decisions was unique to the relationship between Reagan and Casey throughout the 1980s. As originally envisioned in the National Security Act, the DCI serves as a statutory advisor to the National Security Council.²⁸⁹ As the OSS wartime chief of Special Intelligence, Casey excelled in serving as a personal intelligence advisor to senior leaders. Therefore, when President Reagan appointed him DCI in 1980 he also elevated his position to serve as a member of his cabinet. This cabinet status, a position equal in status to other advisors such as the Secretaries of State and Defense, was unprecedented among DCIs before and after. Even though the IC delivered little strategic intelligence to

²⁸⁸ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 112.

²⁸⁹ United States Congress, Public Law 235, 1947.

the president through the NSC during the 1980s, Casey kept President Reagan continuously informed through their personal interactions in the Oval Office.²⁹⁰

While much of the strategic intelligence flowed directly to the president and the IC had little direct input into the NSC, the IC was very successful at indirectly influencing the entire national security enterprise through the use of its annual National Intelligence Estimate. In the specific case of Afghanistan, the CIA's Afghan program had direct input into this strategic assessment, even leading the creation of multiple Special Nation Intelligence Estimates written specifically about Afghanistan and the wider regional conflict.²⁹¹ In addition, to influencing the NSC and President, the CIA also directed a considerable amount of influence upon Congress. This relationship was significant considering Congress's harsh view of the CIA after the Vietnam War. The reforms of the 1970s required CIA to keep the Congress informed as to its activities, including covert programs, and to provide operational justifications for its funding requests. Securing the CIA's vital budget increases which sustained its operations in Afghanistan, Congressman Charles Wilson of the defense appropriations subcommittee became a key supporter of the CIA's Afghan program among otherwise very skeptical Congressional policymakers.²⁹²

As previously discussed, indicators and warnings was a strategic intelligence capability provided by the CIA at the tactical level in the field. In addition, throughout the Soviet-Afghan War, the CIA continuously provided policy-makers updates on the

²⁹⁰ Reidel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-1989*, 112.

²⁹¹ Ibid., 116, 125-126, 152.

²⁹² Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War*, 133, 205.

tactical disposition and composition of the Soviet 40th Red Army including traditionally MI requirements of the Cold War such as order of battle, planned operations, command and control nodes, supply lines of communications, and other vulnerable targets.²⁹³ The CIA gleaned much of this tactical intelligence from the Mujahedeen and ISI, synthesized it with intelligence yielded from other technical and national means, and used it to inform and drive national-level decisions. In order to sustain its UW campaign through its partnership with the ISI and Mujahedeen, the CIA fostered an exceptionally strong intelligence sharing relationship with the Pakistanis. Therefore, in addition to the ISI delivering tactical intelligence to the CIA, the CIA reciprocated by delivering finished intelligence to the Pakistanis that enabled the Mujahedeen to affect follow-on targets and plan future operations.²⁹⁴

The CIA's Afghan program represented a time whereby strategic intelligence collected during a UW operation was synthesized specifically in order to inform the national security policy-making process. By providing assessments that described the region's "current situation," estimated the Soviet Union's "future capabilities," and the "intention of adversaries that could affect the national security of the US or allied interests,"²⁹⁵ the CIA's UW campaign served an important national intelligence function

²⁹³ CIA, "Talking Points on Soviet Strategy and Performance in Afghanistan" (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1986), accessed 14 February 2018, <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/6KzBJ0>; CIA, "Soviet Intentions Vis-à-vis Pakistan" (Washington, DC: CIA, 1980), accessed 14 February 2018, <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/6KzEA4>.

²⁹⁴ Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 482.

²⁹⁵ Executive Office of the President of the United States, EO 13470, section 3.5.

that supported the achievement of national strategic objectives, namely the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which contributed to its eventual fall.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

Since the Second World War, UW has proven to be one of the most versatile, yet sensitive, methods for the United States to involve itself in irregular conflicts, act against the interests of strategic adversaries, and achieve national security objectives around the world. History has shown that national security policymakers, specifically the president, his cabinet advisors, and the National Security Council monitor these irregular conflicts and tightly regulate the authority to conduct UW. USASOC, and Special Forces in particular, therefore also have the responsibility to ensure it provides strategic effects. This especially includes strategic intelligence, gathered and assessed during UW operations, to provide to policymakers in order to make informed national security decisions. Given this strategic necessity, UW plans and campaigns need to always include intelligence capabilities that can achieve theater and national strategic objectives.

UW was developed as a strategic instrument in the U.S. Government's arsenal during World War II with the OSS campaign to undermine and defeat the Axis forces in regions they occupied. To illustrate how the early practitioners of UW employed intelligence strategically, this thesis examined OSS's first major UW campaign, the joint OSS-SOE campaign to support the French resistance. While the concept was developed during World War II, UW evolved during the Cold War as a strategic policy option for containing and deterring Soviet and Chinese-supported Communism throughout less developed nations. America's involvement in Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War was the longest U.S. UW campaign during the Cold War, its operations in North Vietnam,

Laos, and Cambodia collectively spanning 1954 to 1975. America's Cold War UW tradition culminated during the CIA's multinational UW campaign to disrupt and later defeat the Soviet army in Afghanistan.

Despite the end of the Cold War, irrational, fanatical, and genocidal regimes and non-state actors continue to prevail in areas outside the governance or justice of more stable or liberal democratic nations. So long as insurgencies still exist to resist coercive powers and are able to provide the United States strategic access to achieve its national objectives, UW will remain a strategic policy option in the U.S. military instrument of national power. The significant growth of the U.S. SOF enterprise during the Global War on Terrorism has concurrently developed a far stronger military UW capability. To provide the strategic intelligence capability required of UW, the Army MI community need to adapt to keep pace with the ARSOF, intelligence, and interagency communities.

Recommendations

By demonstrating the strategic role intelligence has served in three of the United States' most significant UW campaigns, this thesis offers recommendations for improving the strategic MI capabilities in the conduct of UW. As the proponent for UW doctrine and the primary military organization designed to conduct UW, these recommendations are primarily intended for U.S. Army Special Forces and their MI partners. However, history and doctrine demonstrates that SF does not conduct UW unilaterally.²⁹⁶ Therefore, these recommendations are also intended for other participants in USASOC UW operations, notably Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) (1st SFC (A)), and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special

²⁹⁶ HQDA, ATP 3-05.1, 4-1.

Warfare Center and School. Secondly, these recommendations are also intended for the greater Army and joint special operations communities whose intelligence forces support UW operations and which help integrate conventional forces, interagency partners, and the IC into UW operations.

These recommendations are organized according to the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, policy, facilities, personnel model, also known as DOTMLPF-P. As discussed in chapter 3, these recommendations will specifically address doctrine, organization, training, and policy. The standards against which these recommendations are weighed are found in the 2014 National Intelligence Strategy (see Figure 4.) This document is a strategic guidance document of the Director of National Intelligence issued to the IC. Therefore, this document helps ensure that these recommendations meet the strategic intent of the Director of National Intelligence.




Figure 4. 2014 National Intelligence Strategy Roadmap

Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Office of the DNI, 2014), 18.

The case studies examined in chapter 4 reveal three general themes that drive this chapter's recommendations. These include:

1. The protection of intelligence operations and assets during UW.
2. The strategic integration of MI into the IC and the national security process to better inform policymakers during UW campaigns.
3. The long-term, anticipatory role for MI to better support future UW campaigns.

Given the themes provided in this thesis' case studies, recommendations will mainly focus on the National Intelligence Strategy's mission objectives and, in particular, the anticipatory intelligence objective, strategic intelligence objective, and the regional and functional issues objectives.

Recommendation 1 – Doctrine

In order to meet the mission objectives of the National Intelligence Strategy and based on the strategic role of intelligence illustrated during historic UW campaigns, the ARSOF and Army MI communities should make important changes to current doctrine. In general, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence generates doctrinal updates for the MI Corps. Additionally, the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence incorporates intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures unique to SOF and incorporates those into ARSOF doctrine. Updates to ARSOF MI doctrine needs to be developed as a partnership between these two communities. The reason doctrinal updates are recommended at the Army level first is because, is because USASOC possesses both the statutory responsibility and resident expertise to lead the Department of Defense in developing and adopting changes to joint UW doctrine.

A traditional deficiency in most MI doctrine has been an emphasis on tactical intelligence operations at the expense of the operational and strategic considerations. In fact, there is no single Army doctrinal publication devoted to strategic intelligence. Another deficiency is an absence of special operations considerations in MI doctrine, a significant oversight given the strategic role of intelligence in special operations, most notably UW. MI doctrine's tactical emphasis lends itself to supporting the third foundational mission objective of the National Intelligence Strategy Roadmap, current

operations. Updates to ARSOF MI doctrine should better address the other two, strategic intelligence, which “informs and enriches the understanding of enduring national security issues,” and anticipatory intelligence, which “detects, identifies, and warns of emerging issues and discontinuities.”²⁹⁷

The three primary Army MI publications, Army Doctrine Publication 2-0, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 2-0, and Field Manual 2-0 mainly address the standard intelligence roles, capabilities, and processes inherent in unified land operations. These and future 2-0 series publications should further emphasize the roles of MI in special operations, including the different ARSOF units and their core competencies, as well as the strategic role MI holds in the IC. For the purposes of this thesis, this specifically recommends describing how MI contributes to UW during special operations.

Beginning in 2013, USASOC published a series of documents called ARSOF 2022 and USASOC 2035 which were intended to convey the USASOC commanding general’s vision for ARSOF innovation. The most comprehensive Army special operations document that describes the role of MI is Army Training Publication 3-05.20, *Special Operations Intelligence*. However, like 2-0 series MI doctrine, it is predominantly tactically focused. It also does not include many of the innovations described in ARSOF 2022 and USASOC 2035. Two obsolete Army Field Manuals (FM), 3-05.232, *Special Forces Intelligence*, and 3-05.102, *ARSOF Intelligence*, were useful publications because they provided detailed guidance on the roles and responsibilities of intelligence personnel and the functions of MI units in IW activities including UW. Again, while very tactically focused, they did describe MI’s role in the many IW activities that special operations

²⁹⁷ DNI, *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America*, 6.

conduct. An update to Army Training Publication 3-05.20, or similar publication, that combines the details of the obsolete ARSOF intelligence Field Manuals, the innovation of the USASOC vision documents, and adds a strategic MI focus would greatly enhance the doctrinal foundation for future ARSOF MI, especially during UW operations. A summary of these updates should also be included in a future update of Army Training Publication 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*, or similar publications, in order to show how intelligence functions are inherent within and should be integrated into UW operations.

Recommendation 2 – Organization

The historic case studies demonstrated a clear pattern of vulnerabilities to UW intelligence operations in denied areas. During World War II, the SOE and OSS French UW agent networks proved especially vulnerable to German counterinsurgency and counterespionage tactics. Similarly, the CIA and MACV-SOG Vietnamese agents who infiltrated into North Vietnam during the Vietnam War were incredibly vulnerable to communist exposure and North Vietnamese infiltration of their networks. Additionally, the small reconnaissance teams of U.S. Special Forces, South Vietnamese, and other indigenous guerrilla partners were also incredibly vulnerable to detection by the enemy. Counterintelligence was instrumental in ensuring the operational security and the lack of effective CI often resulted in the enemy's penetration of these clandestine networks.

Based on these historic lessons learned, it is important for units that participate in UW operations, especially Special Forces, to task organize their units with CI units at the tactical level to ensure this vital capability can provide the necessary support. After the most recent re-organization of the Special Forces Group modified table of organization

and equipment, CI capabilities are currently consolidated in the Group Support Battalion's MI Company.²⁹⁸ To better provide CI support to UW and other sensitive IW operations, SF Groups would benefit from additional CI personnel. While the MI Company's CI personnel are trained and prepared to support tactical units, battalions, companies, and operational detachments could conduct better UW operations if CI personnel were permanently assigned at the lowest levels, organic to the units conducting these operations.²⁹⁹ CI personnel and capabilities are without doubt a scarce resource across the U.S. Army and DoD and reassigning more CI soldiers to SF Groups could lead to decreased capabilities in other important units. However, ARSOF and its Special Forces formations have a unit requirement for CI that can have strategic implications during the course of future UW campaigns.

With regards to the National Intelligence Strategy, ARSOF and Special Forces should place added emphasis to its counterintelligence capabilities and capacity in order to better contribute to the mission objectives. ARSOF doctrine addresses counterterrorism and counterproliferation extensively, key mission objectives in the NIS. ARSOF 2035 also addresses innovations to improve its cyber capabilities with a similar emphasis as the NIS.³⁰⁰ Counterintelligence, on the other hand, is the one NIS mission objective that is not emphasized in ARSOF doctrine or its vision documents. The OSS

²⁹⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), "SF Group Support BN – Modified Table of Organization and Equipment," U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, accessed 6 March 2018, <https://fmsweb.fms.army.mil>.

²⁹⁹ HQDA, ATP 3-05.1, chapter 1.

³⁰⁰ United States Special Operations Command (USASOC), "USASOC 2035: Communicating the ARSOF Narrative and Setting the Course to 2035," *Special Warfare* 30, no. 2 (2017): 3-32.

operations in France during World War II and the CIA and MACV-SOG operations across Southeast Asia during the Cold War demonstrated that CI is vital to UW campaigns and is a capability that should be employed to enable the strategic intelligence capabilities of those campaigns.

Recommendation 3 – Training

This thesis's recommendations for training are general but target themes #2 and #3 specifically and Army soldiers assigned to the units of 1st Special Force Command (Airborne) (Provisional) (1st SFC (A) (P)). The reason for targeting this echelon is because 1st SFC (A) (P) would be the ideal level for establishing training programs for the personnel who most practice UW, which include Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units. USASOC may be too broad because the intelligence training requirements for UW might not apply to the soldiers assigned to other ARSOF units that primarily conduct other IW operations, such as Rangers or Army Special Operations Aviation. The Special Forces Group could be too limiting because, as mentioned, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units are also important contributors to UW operations and establishing 1st SFC (A) (P) standards for MI soldiers could help keep these soldiers' capabilities consistent throughout the command. These recommendations for enlisted and officer training are not intended to imply that USASOC and 1st SFC (A) (P) do not have UW standards for training MI personnel. These are simply meant to reinforce the historic requirement for UW capabilities for preparing MI soldiers for service in these units and to reiterate that these training standards should be standardized.

In addition to the standard Advanced Individual Training requirements for new Soldiers, all enlisted MI soldiers and Noncommissioned Officers assigned to 1st SFC (A) (P) tenet units, including Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units should undergo standardized ARSOF MI training. In particular, USASOC should provide training for all-source intelligence analysts that enables them to analyze and assess strategically. This training should provide a capability that lies between the tactical focus of conventional MI and the national strategic focus of the Defense Intelligence Agency and other strategic units. The result would be a cohort of ARSOF MI all-source analysts whose analytical range can span the tactical to strategic levels, incorporating tactical-level intelligence collection, informing the Joint Task Force or Theater Special Operations Command with regional assessments, and providing analysis of emerging threats that require national security decisions at the policymaking level of the U.S. government.

Likewise, 1st SFC (A) (P) should provide training for ARSOF MI officers that enables them to operate more strategically and enables them to integrate better with joint and interagency partners. Like the other service special operations commands, USASOC should deliberately manage the talent of its officers in order to attract high quality personnel, select qualified officers, track their professional development, and offer quality officers with advanced capabilities back to the force. In addition to the other ARSOF core competencies, 1st SFC (A) (P) should provide UW training to its new MI officers and offer broadening opportunities such as ARSOF internships with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or interagency partners, that continue to develop these officers UW and other special operations skills.

Recommendation 4 – Policy

Based on the intelligence lessons provided in this thesis's case studies and the mission objectives of the National Intelligence Strategy, the final recommendation is related to policy. Given the strategic significance of UW campaigns to achieve national security objectives, ARSOF military intelligence should integrate as much as possible into the intelligence community so as to better inform national security policymaking. General Donovan created the OSS as an independent government agency so that its intelligence, collected tactically and assessed strategically, could directly influence national security policymakers without the interference from the traditional military bureaucracy. The CIA has strived throughout its history to embody this characteristic of the OSS.

USSOCOM and ARSOF have tremendous intelligence capabilities and these policy recommendations aim to provide modest suggestions to help improve the SOF intelligence role during UW. These recommendations only reflect the historical lessons learned during the timeframe covered in the three case studies, from 1940 to 1992. The author understands that there are often instances when joint task forces and other military organizations establish solid and very productive relationships with the IC and senior policymakers. These recommendations simply intend to illustrate the need to codify these relationships as permanent channels for USSOCOM and USASOC to contribute strategic intelligence directly to the IC to help function as better participants in the national security decision-making process.

During the Vietnam War and Soviet-Afghan War, the CIA demonstrated an ability to conduct both tactical-level intelligence operations during UW operations and deliver its strategic assessment to policymakers. This afforded them the ability to process

their intelligence, circulate it directly throughout the IC, and present their findings at the senior levels of the U.S. Government. The military practitioners of UW, on the other hand, cannot always complete these steps. In the DoD, the organizations that present strategic intelligence at the national level are rarely represent the organization or community that originally collected and analyzed it. In accordance with EO 12333 and its amendments, the DoD's statutory IC members are limited to the "intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps".³⁰¹ In practice, these are Title 10 organizations, responsible for manning, training, and equipping the force, and not the warfighting combatant commands. In addition to the service department headquarters, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, its Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence), the Joint Staff J2, and the defense-affiliated intelligence agencies often represent the senior-most levels of MI. USSOCOM, which includes the ARSOF experts in UW, often have to report intelligence through these non-SOF and non-UW affiliated intelligence organizations in order to have any strategic effect on the IC and policymakers.

The special operations community should have a standard and official method for delivering and representing its strategic intelligence assessments at the national policymaking level. DoD can assist USSOCOM, USASOC, and the UW practitioners by reducing these bureaucratic barriers and providing a more efficient and direct reporting chain during UW campaigns. One possible method would be to grant the USSOCOM J2 membership in the IC, commensurate with the military service departments, the Joint

³⁰¹ Executive Office of the President of the United States, EO 12333, section 1.7; Executive Office of the President of the United States, EO 13470, section 1.7.

Staff, and the intelligence agencies. This would allow USSOCOM the ability to deliver strategic intelligence directly at the national level during the course of UW operations, unencumbered and unfiltered by extra bureaucratic layers, and provide its own assessments based on its resident UW expertise. Another way to give the SOF community its own intelligence voice at the policymaking level is to permit USSOCOM the ability to provide intelligence officers, especially ARSOF MI officers, to the National Security Staff. Ensuring USSOCOM and UW organizations have a way to present strategic intelligence to the uppermost levels of the U.S. Government would be a step towards the military achievement of one of General Donovan's original visions of the OSS and unconventional warfare.

Areas of Further Study and Research

The subject of strategic intelligence and UW are incredibly broad topics whose interdependence still offers many additional opportunities for further study and research. Throughout America's history of UW campaigns, there are many other examples of irregular conflicts that could provide important lessons on strategic intelligence. Each case study selected for this thesis was intended to show an evolution over the course of the twentieth century. However, each one could be expanded for further research. For example, further Vietnam War study could include preceding conflicts in Southeast Asia such as the Chinese Civil War, Philippine insurgency, or the Malayan Emergency, and subsequent conflicts such as the Cambodian Civil War that offer insights into American UW operations and the role of intelligence in driving Cold War strategy.

Furthermore, there are a near limitless amount of case studies that can be drawn from foreign nations participating in irregular conflicts in ways consistent with the

American concept of UW. Countries such as Russia, Iran, China, Great Britain, and many others have long, documented histories of involvement in irregular conflicts around the world. For example, the USSR and Russian Federation have a long history throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War eras of conducting “protracted whole-of-government approach[es] to undermine, isolate, and incapacitate an adversary through influencing and mobilizing relevant populations in order to prepare the environment for decisive military action.”³⁰² These Soviet and Russian campaigns, as well as those of many other foreign nations, could provide useful insight as to how they conduct IW and generate strategic intelligence that influences their national policymaking. USASOC and the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory published a well-regarded work on the Russian UW titled “Little Green Men,” which analyzes the Russian theory and application of UW in eastern Ukraine from 2013-2014.³⁰³ This offers a variety of opportunities to continue the study of Russian active measures or UW activities in other regions such as Georgia, Syria, and the Arctic or continued analysis of the Ukraine conflict since 2014. Analysis of foreign case studies can yield a wide range of innovative intelligence practices and concepts, not present in the doctrine or practice of the United States or other Western allies, which could significantly contribute to the development of future American UW.

³⁰² Stephanie K. Whittle, “Conquest from Within: A Comparative Analysis Between Soviet Active Measures and United States Unconventional Warfare Doctrine” (Master’s thesis, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2014), 97.

³⁰³ United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), ““Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014,” *Assessing Revolutions and Insurgent Strategies* (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC G3X Sensitive Activities, 2014). The media commonly used the term “little green men” to describe the Russian-speaking soldiers, suspected of being Russian military personnel but wearing no identifying insignia, who seized control of Crimea before Russia’s annexation of the territory in 2014.

Lastly, the study of recent UW operations could provide essential insight into the latest innovations and specific capabilities gaps to help improve American UW and Army intelligence in the current operating environment. This research would most likely require the use of classified sources of information which could limit the dissemination of the researcher's findings across the academic community. However, the analysis of recent UW operations could provide unique insights that could translate into responsive changes for current practitioners of UW.

GLOSSARY

All-source intelligence. 1. Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information in the production of finished intelligence. 2. In intelligence collection, a phrase that indicates that in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements, all collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting systems and resources are identified for possible use and those most capable are tasked.³⁰⁴

Army special operations forces. Those Active and Reserve Component Army forces designated by the Secretary of Defense that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations.³⁰⁵

Auxiliary. Refers to that portion of the population that provides active clandestine support to the guerrilla force or the underground.³⁰⁶

Clandestine operation. An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.³⁰⁷

Covert operation. An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.³⁰⁸

Counterintelligence. Activities to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities.³⁰⁹

Denied area: An area under enemy or unfriendly control in which friendly forces cannot expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force capabilities.³¹⁰

³⁰⁴ JCS, JP 2-0.

³⁰⁵ HQDA, ADRP 3-05.

³⁰⁶ JCS, JP 3-05.1.

³⁰⁷ JCS, JP 3-05.

³⁰⁸ JCS, JP 3-05.

³⁰⁹ JCS, JP 2-0.

³¹⁰ JCS, JP 3-05.

Guerrilla force. A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory.³¹¹

Human intelligence. A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.³¹²

Insurgency. The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.³¹³

Irregular warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).³¹⁴

National intelligence. Intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside the United States, that pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by the president . . . , to pertain to more than one United States Government agency; and that involves threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security.³¹⁵

Paramilitary operation. The use of armed force secretly supported by the covert actor to affect events in other nations.³¹⁶

Preparation of the environment. An umbrella term for operations and activities conducted by selectively trained special operations forces to develop an environment for potential future special operations.³¹⁷

Resistance movement. An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability.³¹⁸

³¹¹ JCS, JP 3-05.

³¹² JCS, JP 2-0.

³¹³ JCS, JP 3-24.

³¹⁴ JCS, JP 1.

³¹⁵ Executive Office of the President of the United States of America, EO 13470.

³¹⁶ Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, 20.

³¹⁷ JCS, JP 3-05.

³¹⁸ JCS, JP 3-05.

Signals intelligence. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals.³¹⁹

Special Forces. U.S. Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare capabilities.³²⁰

Special operations. Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.³²¹

Special reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces.³²²

Strategic intelligence. The national strategic intelligence produced for the president, the National Security Council, Congress, Secretary of Defense, senior military leaders, combatant commanders, and other US Government departments and agencies, and theater strategic intelligence that supports joint operations across the range of military operations, assesses the current situation, and estimates future capabilities and intentions of adversaries that could affect the national security and US or allied interests.³²³

Unconventional warfare. Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.³²⁴

³¹⁹ JCS, JP 2-0.

³²⁰ JCS, JP 3-05.

³²¹ JCS, JP 3-05.

³²² JCS, JP 3-05.

³²³ JCS, JP 2-0.

³²⁴ JCS, JP 3-05.

Underground. Cellular organization within the resistance that has the ability to conduct operations in areas that are inaccessible to guerrillas, such as urban areas under the control of the local security forces.³²⁵

³²⁵ JCS, JP 3-05.1

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