



AFRICA'S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING

An Examination of African-Led Peace Operations



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Preface

Since the turn of the century, the African Union (AU) and subregional organizations in Africa have taken on increasing responsibilities for peace operations throughout that continent. This report, co-authored by researchers at the RAND Corporation and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), builds on RAND's previous volumes on U.S., European, and United Nations (UN) nation-building efforts to explore the experience of African-led peace operations. It draws observations and recommendations from six detailed case studies of African-led missions in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Darfur, the Comoros, Somalia, and the Lake Chad Basin.

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Summary

Since the turn of the century, the African Union (AU) and sub-regional organizations in Africa have taken on increasing responsibilities for peace operations throughout that continent. In several previous volumes, the RAND Corporation has explored U.S., European, and United Nations (UN) nation-building efforts, defined as “the use of armed force after conflict to promote a durable peace and representative government.”¹ This report, co-authored by RAND and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), explores the experience of African-led peace operations within the larger context of the previous nation-building interventions. Although the notion that there should be “regional solutions to regional problems” has become a commonplace assertion, this report takes stock of what regional solutions have achieved in the case of peace operations, based on a comparative analysis of six African-led operations in Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Darfur, the Comoros, Somalia, and the Lake Chad Basin. It highlights in particular the comparative advantages of African-led missions over other types of missions, as well as the recurring challenges that they have been facing.

For each of the six African-led operations we examined, we assessed first the challenges they met in the five key areas of security, humanitarian relief, governance and civil administration, democratization, and economic reconstruction. Then, we analyzed the mandate,

¹ James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga R. Timilsina, *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-304-RC, 2005, p. xv.

size, and other relevant characteristics of the deployed missions, both in terms of the military police forces and the civil and economic role. Finally, we examined how the deployed missions contributed to the resolution of each of the previously identified challenges facing the society and differ in significant ways. Only one of the six missions, in Burundi, resembled peacekeeping as classically conceived—that is, external support to the implementation of a peace agreement. Two of the cases (CAR and Comoros) were closer to peace enforcement—that is, the use of armed force to compel a settlement and then its implementation. Two others (Somalia and the Lake Chad Multinational Joint Task Force [MNJTF]) were straightforward counterinsurgency operations designed to suppress violent extremist groups affiliated in the first case with al Qaeda and in the second with the Islamic State. And the operation in Darfur was largely confined to protection of civilians in the midst of an ongoing conflict over which the multinational force had limited influence. We believe that this is a representative sample of the range of recent African-led peace operations.

A division of labor within peace operations, including the UN, the AU, subregional organizations, and other international partners, has emerged to address these issues. Given its greater financial and logistical resources, the UN often remains in charge of larger peace operations on the African continent. The AU and African subregional organizations often take responsibility for conflicts that the UN declines to address on the grounds that there is no peace to keep, such as in Somalia, and conflicts that African institutions have the ability to resolve on their own, as in the case of the Comoros. This produces the anomalous result that the less financially or logistically well-resourced institution is sometimes left to deal with some of the most intractable conflicts and helps explain the eclectic range of African-led operations examined herein.

Burundi (2001–2004)

African-led peacekeepers, originally from South Africa and subsequently from other states under AU leadership, entered Burundi in

2001. Their mission was to support implementation of the Arusha agreement intended to end a long-running civil war that had pitted the Hutu and Tutsi populations against each other. Not all of the rebel groups had signed the accord, and those that had signed had not stopped fighting. African peacekeepers protected the return of expatriate political leaders and secured national elections. This was the AU's first operation. Within a few years, this African-led force, never more than 3,500 strong, had helped stabilize the situation sufficiently for the UN to judge the country secure enough for a larger and more capable UN force to deploy, which occurred in 2004.

This succession of African and then UN-led peacekeepers ushered in a decade of relative peace and very slow material improvement in the lives of Burundians. This two-step model became the preferred paradigm for AU-UN collaboration. Unfortunately, few subsequent operations followed such a positive trajectory.

Central African Republic (2001–2014)

CAR is a sparsely populated, internally divided, impoverished, landlocked country bordering three of the most strife-torn areas in the world: Darfur, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Since 1997, CAR has been the site of 16 international military missions: six from the UN, five from various African organizations, two from France, and three from the European Union (EU). None of these efforts have enduringly halted the country's downward trajectory. Our report looks at the four largest African-led missions; the first three were organized by three different subregional groups and eventually gave way to a larger mission led by the AU. This series of African-led troops came in the wake of a UN peacekeeping force that left in 2000 and was replaced by another UN force that arrived in 2014. To complicate matters further, yet another UN force was deployed alongside the African operations from 2007 to 2010, and French troops also operated in CAR throughout this period.

If this profusion of missions and overlap of international military interventions is confusing to the reader, one can only imagine

the impression made on the local population. Clearly, the international community was floundering, and the best that can be said for this series of largely ineffective UN-, African-, and French-led efforts is that the situation would have been even worse without them. The UN should not have withdrawn its peacekeepers in 2000 and should not have withdrawn them again in 2010, leaving smaller, less-capable African-led forces to fill the gaps.

Darfur (2004–Present)

Since 2003, a multisided conflict has ravaged the Darfur region of Sudan, pitting rebels against the government, government-sanctioned militia against the rebels, Muslim Arabs against non-Muslim Africans, Arabs against Arabs, Africans against Africans, and all these armed groups against defenseless civilians. A 5,000-strong AU force (which eventually reached 7,000) was deployed in 2004 with a largely humanitarian mission of protecting civilians and securing humanitarian relief for a displaced population that grew to nearly 5 million. Clearly inadequate to the task, this force was succeeded in 2008 by a hybrid UN-AU mission eventually numbering some 26,000 military personnel. This combined AU-UN mission continues to this day.

Both forces had some success in protecting civilians within their immediate areas of operation, but neither was able to cover the entire region or significantly affect the course of its multisided conflict. Darfur was, after all, only one region within Sudan, and once the conflict over South Sudan's bid for independence picked up, not even the region with the highest international priority could be fully covered. The Sudanese government had forced the UN-AU marriage as the price for accepting a UN mission in Darfur and has limited the scope of activity of the hybrid mission. Although neither the UN nor the AU has been entirely comfortable with this unique arrangement, the marriage seems to have worked tolerably well. The UN has a larger and more robust command, control, and support structure and largely assumed operational control. The vast majority of troops come from African countries, and the AU has better links to Khartoum and other

regional capitals. The two organizations seem to have worked out a division of labor that draws on these strengths.

Comoros (1998–2008)

The Comoros includes four main islands and a number of smaller islands off the coast of Mozambique. One of the four chose to remain with France, while the other three gained their independence in 1975. The country has since experienced 21 attempted or successful coups d'état. Beginning in 1998, the Organization of African Unity and its successor, the AU, dispatched eight military missions. This report focuses on the three largest missions, deployed from 2006 to 2008. Their mandate was to secure national elections and subsequently to suppress a secessionist attempt by one of the islands. The elections went forward peacefully, and the AU conducted an amphibious operation that ended the separatist attempt. There have been no coups since.

These were all small, largely bloodless affairs. One soldier drowned as the AU force came ashore. The AU force at its largest was 1,800 strong. These actions were well within the AU's capabilities, and the organization showed resolution in proceeding with the amphibious operation even when its largest troop contributor dropped out.

Somalia (2006–Present)

Somalia fell apart in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War and has never been put back together. The UN and subsequently the United States tried beginning in 1992. The United States gave up and left two years later, and the UN followed in 1995. In 2006, Ethiopian forces and shortly thereafter those of the AU tried again, driving the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a militant Islamist group, out of Mogadishu. Elements of the ICU rebranded themselves as al Shabaab and became affiliated with al Qaeda. The AU force, eventually some 22,000 strong, slowly pushed beyond the capital, providing time and space for a reasonably representative Somali government to form.

Al Shabaab has been pushed back but not eliminated. The government in Mogadishu and its security forces are still not capable of standing alone. Northern Somalia is governed by two autonomous administrations that refuse to recognize the authority of the central government. Twelve years on, there is no obvious exit strategy for the AU, and there is declining will among the international community to continue to fund and support the mission. But the country's prospects are brighter than they have been since U.S. and UN troops abandoned the stabilization mission nearly a quarter of a century ago.

Multilateral Joint Task Force: Lake Chad Basin (2015–Present)

In 2014, Boko Haram was the deadliest terrorist group in the world. This Islamist extremist insurgency affiliated with the Islamic State was born in Nigeria but was operating across the Lake Chad Basin. In 2015, Nigeria and its three northern neighbors, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, joined with Benin to form a multinational joint task force (MNJTF) to coordinate their counterinsurgency operations. The MNJTF was authorized by the AU and subsequently the UN Security Council. Rather than directly controlling troop movements, its staff facilitated intelligence-sharing and joint planning for coordinated national operations, including authorizing cross-border forays by the forces of one state onto the territory of the neighbor.

Over the next several years, these intensified and concerted military efforts reduced Boko Haram's numbers, exposed rifts within leadership, and forced the insurgency to revert to guerilla and terror tactics. Boko Haram has proved resilient, however, and MNJTF member governments have struggled to maintain control of recovered territory.

Comparative Analysis and Conclusions

The desired product of peace operations is peace. Success with this core objective is normally accompanied by the return of refugees, some

economic growth, and at least modest improvements in human development, governance, and democratization. Only two of the six countries where African-led missions were deployed achieved a peaceful trajectory. This is a lower success rate than that of the U.S., UN-, and European-led missions covered in earlier volumes of this series, but this discrepancy is less the fault of the African-led missions than of the larger structural problems facing these countries.

First, three of the six missions examined—Darfur, Somalia, and the MNJTF—are still under way, and in all three, the security situation is somewhat better than when the AU operations commenced.

Second, African-led missions were mandated to focus on security tasks and in some cases were only mandated to provide security in a limited part of the country. Meanwhile, other organizations, including the UN and Western countries or institutions, would need to provide assistance to meet the non-security challenges if these were to be addressed.

Third, these missions were also substantially less well resourced than those led by the United States, the UN, or Europeans. Their troops are generally less numerous, less well equipped, less well provisioned, and less mobile. As a result of these different mandates and levels of resources, African-led missions tend to have fewer police and fewer civilian experts attached—if they have any at all—than other missions. And the societies in which African-led missions operate generally receive less international economic assistance than those where UN, U.S., and European forces operate.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, many African-led missions simply face greater challenges. In many instances, African institutions are the peacekeepers of last resort, taking on tasks that have been shunned by all of the other more-capable institutions. In some cases, such as CAR, the resources provided were grossly insufficient to address the deep economic, military, and political problems facing the society.

Given these built-in disadvantages, the level of achievement of African-led missions is noteworthy. Of the six examined here, two were ultimately successful, and three have shown some progress. This has not been achieved without considerable external support. Nearly all

African-led missions received substantial funding, advice, training, and sometimes intelligence and logistical support from the UN, the EU and its member states, and, to a somewhat lesser degree, the United States. U.S. counterterrorism operations are conducted alongside some AU missions, notably in Somalia. Collaboration between the UN and the AU has particularly expanded in the last few years. In Burundi, the UN completed the work begun by the AU, and in Darfur it subsumed the African-led mission into a larger UN mission.

The AU and subregional missions have demonstrated several comparative advantages over non-African sources of peace operations. Representing the societies most directly affected by nearby conflicts, these institutions have been ready to run risks and take on tasks that others shun. In particular, African peace operations are engaged in active combat against Islamist insurgents in Somalia and the Lake Chad Basin that would be infeasible for the UN. African institutions are quicker to deploy, and supporting African forces is cheaper on a per-troop basis. African institutions can have better insights into the regions' difficulties, better access to the societies in conflict, and greater ability to mobilize and involve immediate neighbors. These advantages cannot always outweigh the more limited resources, lesser organizational capability, and greater dependency on third-party assistance that characterize African institutions. The AU and its member states are working to reduce these deficiencies, but progress will be slow. Even with the increased financial resources that would come with a proposed 0.2-percent levy on all imports to Africa, the AU will continue to depend on its collaboration with the UN, European countries, the United States, China, and other partners.

The hybrid model of AU-UN collaboration pioneered in Darfur offers one interesting means of addressing such limitations. There, a UN mission now exercises operational control while the AU provides political weight, and African countries contribute the majority of troops. But one could imagine other divisions of labor. In Somalia, for instance, both the UN and the EU maintain separate missions (two of them, in the UN's case) that support the AU's mission. The UN's role includes reimbursing AU contributors for equipment and providing their logistics. Might not these functions be performed more smoothly

and consistently within the context of a joint AU-UN mission, perhaps in this case with the AU retaining the operational lead?

What is most remarkable and commendable about Africa's institutional role in regional peace operations is the level of cooperation generally achieved among the states most directly affected by these conflicts—although, in some cases, national interests interfere with regional interventions, as in the case of CAR. This is all the more striking when contrasted with the absence of such collaboration among states in the other region presently most burdened with civil strife, the Middle East. There, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab League, and even the Gulf Cooperation Council are all at loggerheads. As a result, most insurgent groups in the Middle East enjoy external state sponsorship. By contrast, the African Union and African subregional organizations are models of collegiality. African countries do not all agree with one another but instead have established effective consultation processes. They are also able to form ad hoc coalitions to pursue the shared interests of countries. The ability of African countries to resolve their differences and create a modicum of regional unity carries over into the wider world. The UN Security Council acts with a fair degree of unanimity in addressing threats to security throughout sub-Saharan Africa while showing itself powerless to end the multiple conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa.

Regional solidarity is thus the greatest asset that African institutions bring to the conduct of peace operations on their continent and is reason enough to involve them more heavily in such endeavors. In the case studies in this volume, African-led peace operations have shown themselves to be flexible to undertake a range of different types of tasks, up to and including high-intensity combat, under different subregional or continent-wide institutions, supported by varying partners. This flexibility will remain essential in the future. African institutions will likely develop new capabilities for peace operations, especially if new funds become available. Still, the greater resources and organizational capacity that the UN and other partners wield will remain important to address the challenges facing the continent. Whatever the support provided by these partners, African countries and institutions will continue to have a major role in helping to support peace on the African continent.

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Abbreviations

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
ACOTA	Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
AFISMA	African-Led International Support Mission to Mali
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC	AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros
AMISOM	AU Mission in Somalia
APRD	Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUEOM	AU Election Observation Mission

AUSTF	AU Security Task Force
BINUB	UN Integrated Office in Burundi
BINUCA	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
BIR	Rapid Intervention Battalion
BNP	Burundi National Police
BNUB	UN Office in Burundi
BONUCA	United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
CAR	Central African Republic
CCAPS	Climate Change and African Political Stability
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defense of Democracy—Forces for the Defense of Democracy
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CONOPS	concepts of operations
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDPD	Doha Document for Peace in Darfur
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo

EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EU NAVFOR ATALANTA	EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta
EUFOR RCA	EU Military Operation in the Central African Republic
EUFOR Tchad/RCA	EU Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic
EUMAM RCA	EU Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic
EUTM RCA	EU Training Mission in the Central African Republic
EUTM Somalia	EU Training Mission in Somalia
FACA	Forces Armées de la Centrafrique [Central African Republic Armed Forces]
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FIDH	International Federation for Human Rights
FNL	National Liberation Forces
FOMUC	Multinational Force in the Central African Republic
GDP	gross domestic product
GNI	gross national income
GoS	Government of Sudan

GTD	Global Terrorism Database
HCA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
HDI	Human Development Index
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDP	internally displaced person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MAES	AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in Comoros
MAPROBU	African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi
MENUB	UN Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi
MICOPAX	Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic
MINURCA	UN Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURCAT	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad

MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MIOC	African Union Military Observer Mission in the Comoros
MIPROBU	Protection and Observation Mission for the Re-Establishment of Confidence in Burundi
MISAB	Inter-African Mission to Monitor Implementation of the Bangui Accords
MISCA	African-Led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NHF	Nigeria Humanitarian Fund
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	official development aid
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OMIB	Observer Mission in Burundi
OMIC	Observer Mission to Comoros
ONUB	United Nations Operations in Burundi
Palipehutu-FNL	Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People–National Forces of Liberation

PBC	UN Peacebuilding Commission
PPP	purchasing power parity
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSD	Peace and Security Department
REC	Regional Economic Community
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAPSD	South African Protection Support Detachment
SCR	Security Council Resolution
SLA	Sudan's Liberation Movement/Army
SNA	Somali National Army
SSR	security sector reform
START	National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
TCC	troop-contributing country
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	UN and AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

UNISFA	UN Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan
UNMISS	UN Mission in South Sudan
UNOAU	UN Office to the AU
UNOB	United Nations Office in Burundi
UNOSOM	UN Operations in Somalia
UNPOS	UN Political Office for Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOA	UN Support Office for AMISOM
UNSOM	UN Assistance Mission in Somalia
UNSOS	UN Support Office in Somalia
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
VIP	very important person
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction

This report is the fourth in the “RAND History of Nation-Building” series. The three earlier volumes examined the record of U.S., United Nations– (UN–), and European-led peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and postconflict stabilization operations.¹ Since the third of those reports was released, African-led peace operations have played an increasingly prominent role in addressing violent conflict on the African continent. Since its creation in 2000, the African Union (AU) and its Peace and Security Council (PSC), in coordination with several sub-regional African organizations, have developed a growing capacity for what it labels *peace support operations*. We refer to these as *African-led peace operations* or *missions*. They encompass a wide range of activities, from mediation and traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement and extended counterinsurgency campaigns. This volume examines the experience of African-led missions and has been prepared through the joint collaboration of the RAND Corporation and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD).

¹ James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, and Anga R. Timilsina, *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1753-RC, 2003; James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga R. Timilsina, *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-304-RC, 2005; and James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivvis, Andrew Radin, F. Stephen Larrabee, Nora Bensahel, Brooke Stearns Lawson, and Benjamin W. Goldsmith, *Europe’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-722-RC, 2008.

Scope, Methodology, and Definitions

Previous volumes in this series defined *nation-building* as “the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to promote a durable peace and representative government.”² Each volume examined six representative missions in some detail. This volume similarly looks at six societies that experienced African-led peace operations: Burundi (2001–2004), the Comoros (2006–2008), Darfur (2004–present), the Central African Republic (CAR) (2002–2014), Somalia (2007–present), and the Lake Chad Basin (2015–present). In Table 1.1, we classify the primary task of African peace operations associated with these countries, as well as several other African-led operations not studied in this volume, based on four types of general mandates:

- “classical” *peacekeeping*, involving monitoring and implementing an already agreed-upon peace agreement
- *peace enforcement*, in which a mission is intended to use military force to ensure a ceasefire, create security in a given area, or reestablish legitimate governance
- *the protection of civilians*, in which there is a specific mandate to provide security to a civilian population

Table 1.1
Main Task for African-Led Peace Operations

Traditional Peacekeeping	Peace Enforcement	Protection of Civilians	Counterinsurgency
• Burundi (2001–2004)	• The Comoros (2006–2008) • CAR (2002–2014) • The Gambia (2017)	• Darfur (2004–present)	• Somalia (2007–present) • Lake Chad Basin (2015–present) • Mali (2013–present) • G-5 Sahel (2014–present)

² The term *nation-building* is primarily used in the United States, while other organizations might refer to similar activities as *peace-building* or *state-building* (Dobbins et al., 2008, p. xv).

- *counterinsurgency*, meaning weakening or defeating a specific insurgent group.³

Although counterinsurgency operations in Somalia and the Lake Chad Basin do not strictly meet the definition established for *nation-building* in the previous volumes, we recognize that they perform many of the security functions required of more classic nation-building missions and seek to provide the conditions for other types of nation-building measures—such as economic or governance reforms—to succeed. These operations are, by now, part of the full range of contemporary missions executed by African organizations. As a result, we decided to include the operations in Somalia and the Lake Chad Basin in this study.

Several of these peace operations either preceded or succeeded UN missions or did both. We concentrate on the African-led period of these multiphased missions while providing information regarding earlier or later periods to establish the relevant context. For example, in the case of Somalia, we focus on the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) beginning in 2007, with only a brief mention of the earlier UN- and U.S.-led missions that took place there in the 1990s. In the case of Darfur, Sudan, we also examine both the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the subsequent UN and AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The head of UNAMID is jointly appointed by the leaders of the two organizations. Although command and control is provided by the UN, the mission has an African character and offers an informative example of one mode by which African organizations contribute to UN missions.

Each of these six case studies follows a similar format, which was originally developed for the previous three RAND nation-building volumes. The format is intended to evaluate how a particular intervention, including one or more missions, contributed to resolving the major challenges facing a given society. Although we recognize that each of the situations described in our case studies presented unique

³ See also Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006, pp. 10–18.

challenges and that contexts vary greatly, such challenges or needs generally fall under five broad types, which we found to be largely constant across nation-building missions: security, humanitarian relief, governance and civil administration, democratization, and economic reconstruction. Then, each case study analyzes the mandate, size, and other relevant characteristics of the deployed missions, both in terms of the military police forces and the civil and economic role. Third, the case study analyzes how the deployed missions contributed to the resolution of each of the previously identified challenges facing the society. A final section concludes and offers lessons learned from the case study. Chapter Eight completes the case studies by putting in perspective the inputs and outcomes of the six African-led operations studied here with U.S.-led, UN-led, and European-led missions examined in the previous volumes of our nation-building series. That chapter examines more systematically such inputs as the number of troops and other resources, as well as various outcomes relevant to the five challenge areas examined—such as the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) for the humanitarian relief challenge or World Bank government effectiveness indicators for the governance challenge (see Appendix B for more-detailed information on performance indicators).

African-led peace operations have major differences from most of the foreign interventions studied in previous volumes of the RAND nation-building series. The mandate of African missions has been almost exclusively focused on resolving the security situation facing particular societies. Other organizations, including the UN, Western states, and international nongovernmental organizations, were intended to help address humanitarian, democratization, and economic reconstruction issues. In the second section of each case study, on African and other international roles, although we focus on detailing the African-led missions, we also describe the other international organizations that were present. Although we concentrate on evaluating these six missions against their limited mandates, we also look at the adequacy of those mandates against the needs and comment on the efficacy of the whole international effort of which the African-led missions played a key part. We thus consider progress in these non-security challenges for two reasons. First, maintaining the same format as previous vol-

umes enables a comparison between the ambition and achievements of African-led peace operations and other types of foreign intervention. Second, the format enables us to analyze the achievement of the overall international effort to improve a given society, especially because the non-security issues, such as economic development and democratization, are believed to contribute to the overall development of peace and prosperity.

The case studies draw on a range of available sources, including official documents, academic and think-tank reports, and phone and in-person interviews with officials from international and regional organizations and analysts (from academia and think tanks) with specific knowledge of the case studies. Our interview questions focused on the process through which each African-led mission was established, deployed, and managed; the scope of these missions' mandates and the resources at their disposal; the relations of these missions with prior, concomitant, and/or subsequent missions (whether these other missions were also African-led or not); and the achievements of these missions, with particular attention paid to whether mandates were fulfilled or not. In some cases, there are gaps in the available sources of where and how peace operations were carried out. In the Comoros, for example, there are relatively few works analyzing the conduct and outcome of the mission, while the MNJTF mission is still ongoing. For each of the case studies, we have also collected quantitative indicators, including inputs that include the size of intervening military and police contingents and economic aid levels and outcomes that include the number of conflict casualties, the number of refugees and IDPs, and several economic and social development indicators. These quantitative indicators provide a measure of the success of the overall international effort, though we recognize that, in most cases, the African-led missions were mostly confined to the security realm and sometimes to only a part of the country concerned.

African Architecture for Peace Operations

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded in 1963 by 32 mostly newly independent African states. Its initial focus was on supporting national liberation movements and completing the process of decolonization. The OAU emphasized noninterference in the internal affairs of its member states and only supported very small observer missions in Chad (1981–82), Burundi (1994–1996), and Rwanda (1991–1993).⁴ The OAU had very limited institutional capacity for such activity—one interviewee explained that the OAU's military staff headquarters in Addis Ababa had only one officer with the rank of colonel in the early 2000s.⁵

Alongside the OAU, several subregional African organizations began to undertake more-substantial peace operations. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed multinational forces in Liberia (1990, 2003) Sierra Leone (1998), Guinea Bissau (1998), and Côte d'Ivoire (2002). The Southern African Development Community (SADC) also dispatched missions. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), made up of countries from the Horn of Africa, Nile Valley, and Great Lakes regions, was also active.⁶ In addition, the UN launched multiple peacekeeping missions in Africa. But the UN's failure to halt the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 contributed to a growing desire among African governments for a more robust African institutional capacity to deal with such challenges.⁷

⁴ Paul D. Williams, "The African Union's Peace Operations: A Comparative Analysis," *African Security*, Vol. 2, No. 2–3, 2009, p. 97. Williams also notes that the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was inaugurated in June 1994 and "produced little more than symbolic meetings, with little concrete action being taken on the ground."

⁵ Author interview with UN official, New York, December 5, 2017.


⁶ Victoria K. Holt with Moira K. Shanahan, "African Capacity-Building for Peace Operations: UN Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS," Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, February 2005, p. 29.

⁷ Alhaji Sarjoh Bah, Elizabeth Choge-Nyangoro, Solomon Dersso, Brenda Mofya, and Tim Murithi, *The African Peace and Security Architecture: A Handbook*, Addis Ababa: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2014, pp. 25–27.

Between 1999 and 2004, the OAU was transformed into the AU. Within that framework, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was gradually developed.⁸ African countries sought a new, stronger role for African institutions in addressing conflict and security on the continent, sometimes articulated as “African Solutions to African Problems.”⁹ Figure 1.1 shows the growth in African-led and hybrid (joint UN/AU) operations since 2002 as a proportion of overall peace operations on the continent.

The five institutional pillars of the APSA are the PSC, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African

Figure 1.1
Troops Deployed to Peace Operations in Africa, by Leadership, 2000–2014



SOURCE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, undated.

⁸ At the Sirte Extraordinary Session (1999), leaders decided to establish an AU. The Constitutive Act of the Union was adopted at the Lomé Summit (2000), submitting it for ratification from two-thirds of the OAU's 53 states. At the Lusaka Summit (2001), leaders drew up the road map for the implementation of the AU. Finally, the Durban Summit (2002) launched the AU and convened the first assembly of the AU (AU, “Constitutive Act of the African Union,” 2000).

⁹ Comfort Ero, “The Problems with ‘African Solutions,’” International Crisis Group, December 2, 2013.

Standby Force (ASF), and the Peace Fund (see Table 1.2).¹⁰ The underlying authority of all these institutions comes from the Assembly of the African Union, which consists of the heads of state of its 55 member states. The AU Assembly plays only a very limited role in ongoing peace operations: It meets twice a year and adopts an annual program, makes various political declarations, and considers the activities of the other AU institutions.¹¹ By including all African countries, the AU Assembly offers a venue for pan-African consultation and confers broader political legitimacy on the other AU institutions, which have more limited membership. The AU Assembly also establishes the normative agenda for peace operations. In particular, the AU’s Constitutive Act shifted the organization’s stance from “non-interference” in the internal affairs

Table 1.2
Pillars of the APSA, the RECs, and Operating Regions of ASF

The Five Pillars of the APSA	RECs ^a	Standby Forces of the ASF
PSC	CEN-SAD	ECCAS
Continental Early Warning System	COMESA	East African Standby Arrangement
Panel of the Wise	EAC	ECOWAS
ASF	ECCAS	North African Regional Capability (NARC)
Peace Fund	ECOWAS	SADC
	IGAD	
	SADC	

^a The AU also recognizes other regional mechanisms.

SOURCES: AU, “African Standby Force: Draft Maputo Strategic Work Plan (2016–2020) Version 1.5,” undated(b); AU, “Regional Economic Communities (RECs),” undated(f).

NOTES: CEN-SAD = Community of Sahel-Saharan States, COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, EAC = East African Community, ECCAS = Economic Community of Central African States, REC = Regional Economic Community.

¹⁰ See AU, “The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA),” 2012; Bah et al., 2014.

¹¹ AU, “The Assembly,” undated(c); AU, “African Peace and Security Architecture,” undated(a).

of member states, as embraced by the OAU, to “non-indifference” in the case of violent conflict where the security of citizens can no longer be guaranteed by the state or when the state is actually the threat to citizens’ security. This change is reflected in Article 4(h) of that act, which permits interventions in a member state in the case of “war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”¹² Although this article has been invoked only once, and then not successfully, it is indicative of a more proactive disposition of African institutions in this field.¹³

The Assembly delegates decisionmaking for most AU peace operations to the smaller PSC.¹⁴ This council is modeled on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It has 15 non-permanent members, represented at the ambassador level, and is designed to be continuously available for consultation and decisions.¹⁵ It has the authority to mandate the “mounting and deployment of peace support operations,” undertake preventative measures, and support peace-building and peace-making activities. Many of these operations are actually organized by the various subregional organizations. Nevertheless, the PSC plays an important authorizing role, as support from international partners depends on whether there is a PSC mandate.¹⁶

The Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the AU Commission provides support, advice, and management for the PSC, supervising and supporting various peace operations. Staff and capacity shortages limit the PSD’s ability to oversee large peace operations. A UN report found that the PSD had only 79 of 207 proposed staff, all but one of whom were on short-term contracts or seconded from member

¹² AU, 2000; Paul D. Williams, “From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union’s Security Culture,” *African Affairs*, Vol. 106, No. 423, 2007, pp. 253–279.

¹³ Ty McCormick, “The Burundi Intervention That Wasn’t,” *Foreign Policy*, February 2, 2016.

¹⁴ African Union Mandating Process for Peace Support Operations, *Aide Memoire: The African Union’s Planning and Decision-Making Process*, Version 4, February 2, 2010, p. 6.

¹⁵ AU, “Peace and Security Council (PSC),” undated(e).

¹⁶ We are grateful to Cedric de Coning for clarifying this issue.

governments.¹⁷ Those personnel on loan from member states often rotate too quickly to develop deep expertise and requisite institutional memory.¹⁸

The AU recognizes eight RECs, listed in Table 1.2. Three of these organizations, which are listed as part of the ASF concept, play the dominant role in the development and conduct of individual peace operations.¹⁹ Agreements between the AU and subregional organizations have established the responsibility of the AU to coordinate with the subregional organizations and adhere to the concept of subsidiarity, meaning that the lowest-level institution that is capable of dealing with a conflict should be responsible. Operating through the subregional groupings relieves the AU of the need to manage multiple missions.²⁰ Paul Williams and Arthur Boutellis observe tensions between the AU and the subregional organizations, noting that some of them “have pushed back against what they perceive as AU attempts to control them.”²¹ Not all crises clearly fall within the area of a single subregional group. On occasion, new ad hoc institutions are created by the

¹⁷ UN, “Report of the Joint African Union–United Nations Review of Available Mechanisms to Finance and Support African Union Peace Support Operations Authorized by the UNSC,” September 28, 2016, p. 10.

¹⁸ See also Isiaka A. Badmus, *The African Union's Role in Peacekeeping: Building on Lessons Learning from Security Operations*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015; and Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot, and John Karlsrud, eds., *The Future of African Peace Operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram*, London: Zed Books, 2016.

¹⁹ As part of the APSA, RECs are referred to as “Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RECs/RMs).” The relationship between the AU and the RECs is “mandated by the Abuja Treaty and the AU Constitutive Act, and guided by the: 2008 Protocol on Relations between the RECs and the AU; and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU, RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern and Northern Africa” (AU, 2012).

²⁰ Linda Darkwa, “The African Standby Force: The African Union's Tool for the Maintenance of Peace and Security,” *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2017, pp. 471–482; author interviews with U.S. and UN officials, Washington, D.C., and New York, November 28 and December 4, 2017.

²¹ Paul D. Williams and Arthur Boutellis, “Partnership Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities in the United Nations–African Union Relationship,” *African Affairs*, Vol. 113, No. 451, April 1, 2014, p. 262.

concerned member states to deal with a particular crisis. Two examples are the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin and the G-5 Sahel mission, which is a collaboration by Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad.²² The principle of subsidiarity does mean that the countries most affected and most likely to contribute to a peace operation have a greater role. But subsidiarity also means that operational expertise is dispersed among many organizations and requires a relatively complex political consultation whenever a new mission is deployed.²³

The subregional organizations each have different structures and varying levels of institutionalization for the conduct of peace operations. ECOWAS in West Africa is perceived to be the best organized and most experienced, while the subregional organizations grouping East and Central African states are less so. Subregional groups also play a critical role in mediation and political engagements. In the case of ECOWAS, Nigeria plays a dominant role.²⁴

A fourth component of the APSA is the ASF. As its name implies, the ASF is intended to be a standing force, composed of five regional formations of approximately 4,300 troops each.²⁵ This force was supposed to be operational in 2010 but was pushed back to 2015. In the interim, the AU adopted an alternative arrangement, known as the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), in which certain member states agreed to provide units or specific capabilities, deployable in 48 hours (instead of the 14 days assumed under the ASF framework). The ACIRC thereby became an alternate source

²² International Crisis Group (ICG), *Finding the Right Role for the G5 Sahel Joint Force*, Africa Report No. 258, December 12, 2017g.

²³ Interviews with U.S. and UN officials, Washington, D.C., and New York, November–December 2017.

²⁴ Interviews with U.S. and UN officials, Washington, D.C., and New York, November–December 2017. We are grateful to Cedric de Coning for clarifying this issue.

²⁵ AU, “Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force,” 2005; Jane Boulden, ed., *Responding to Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013, p. 57.

for deployable forces.²⁶ In late 2015, the ASF was declared operational in four of its five regions.

The ASF has not so far become the framework in which African peace deployments have occurred.²⁷ Instead, the ASF concept has led to the development of capabilities that have been employed by sub-regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions, rather than directly by the AU.²⁸ The ASF has, instead, acquired a “standards-setting” role through regular exercises, planning, and doctrine writing/reviews.²⁹

The APSA includes the Panel of the Wise. This body is composed of five “highly respected African personalities . . . who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent.”³⁰ It is one of several instruments at the AU’s disposal to support conflict resolution.

Another component of the APSA is the Continental Early Warning System, which acts as a data collection and analysis organization to inform the African Commission about potential future conflicts. It includes a Situation Room, which gathers data from a range of sources and works with the subregional organizations to analyze potential sources of crises.

The final component of the APSA is the Peace Fund, which is a mechanism that has existed since 1993 to fund peace activities of African institutions, originally for the OAU and subsequently the AU and the subregional organizations. We discuss the Peace Fund’s achieve-

²⁶ Darkwa notes that the ACIRC “was expected to be dissolved upon the operationalization of the ASF.” However, “[i]n October 2015, it became evident that it would become part of the ASF’s rapid deployment capability and it was exercised alongside the ASF. Although the ASF has been declared operationally ready, the ACIRC has neither been dissolved nor integrated into the ASF” (Darkwa, 2017, p. 474).

²⁷ As one author notes, African peace operations “have not been framed in terms of or deployed as ASF operations” (Jide Martyns Okeke, “United in Challenges? The African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises,” in Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot, and John Karlsrud, eds., *The Future of African Peace Operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram*, London: Zed Books, 2016, p. 97).

²⁸ Darkwa, 2017, pp. 477–479.

²⁹ Author interview, Washington, D.C., November 2017.

³⁰ AU, “Panel of the Wise (PoW),” December 20, 2016c.

ments in the next section, which explores the financing and external support for African-led operations in detail.

External Support, International Collaboration, and Financing Peace Operations

African-led peace operations are heavily dependent on non-African financial and in-kind support from the UN, the European Union (EU), and various Western governments, including the United States. These external supporters have provided essential financing, combat enablers, training, or other elements to various African-led missions.³¹

Arguably the most important support for African-led operations is financial contributions through the Peace Fund. In recent years, just 27 percent of the AU's \$787 million operational and programmatic budget has come from its member states' contributions.³² Non-African supporters have also been critical partners, including the EU's African Peace Facility, which has provided more than €2 billion to fund African-led peace operations since its creation in 2004. As of 2016, AU member states were contributing only 7 percent of the Peace Fund, despite an agreement in 2009 that they would begin to contribute 12 percent. To be sure, the total cost of AU-led peace operations on the continent is high, estimated at \$1.2 billion per year in 2016 (of

³¹ For an overview of partnership and hybrid operations, see Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, *Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships*, New York: International Peace Institute, April 2013; Thierry Tardy, "Hybrid Peace Operations: Rationale and Challenges," *Global Governance*, Vol. 20, No. 1, January–March 2014, pp. 95–118; and Paul D. Williams and Solomon A. Dersso, *Saving Strangers and Neighbors: Advancing UN-AU Cooperation on Peace Operations*, New York: International Peace Institute, February 2015.

³² Member states contributed \$212 million of the \$787 million 2017 AU budget. In 2016, AU member states covered a larger percentage of a smaller total budget (41 percent, or \$169 million out of \$416 million) (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, "Infographic: Financing the African Union," Addis Ababa University, 2017). Since 2006, the majority of the operational budget has been provided by just five states—Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa. The director of the Peace Fund emphasized his concern with this, especially in light of "the demise of the Libyan economy" (Christin Roby, "Q&A: Donald Kaberuka on Financing the AU Peace Fund," Devex, May 16, 2017).

which the Somalia mission, AMISOM, accounted for \$900 million).³³ The AU also lacks significant financial reserves to deal with unforeseen crises.³⁴ AU member states have established a system of assessed contributions, but only about two-thirds of assessed contributions have been collected, on average.³⁵

In 2015, AU member states agreed that by 2020 they would fund 100 percent of the AU's core operational budget, 75 percent of its program budget, and 25 percent of its peace operations budget. The AU justified only seeking to fund 25 percent of peace operations based on the argument that these operations address broader international concerns and thus call for broader financial responsibility.³⁶ In 2016, the AU agreed to impose a 0.2-percent tariff on all goods imported to the African continent to help achieve this goal. Funding from the new tariff was anticipated to total upwards of \$400 million by 2020, which might prove sufficient for the AU's mediation and preventive diplomacy efforts, institutional capacity, and the desired 25-percent share of peace support operations, while also creating a reserve fund for unanticipated crises. To ensure that the new tax was indeed used for peace operations, rather than other domestic priorities, the proposal called for creating AU accounts within the central banks of each member state.³⁷ As of December 2017, 14 countries have started to collect the tariff, including Kenya, Rwanda, Chad, Morocco, and Sudan.³⁸

However, the 0.2-percent tariff has run into several obstacles. The United States has expressed opposition on the grounds that it is not compatible with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Possibilities to address this objection include instituting a continent-wide free

³³ African Union Peace Fund, "Securing Predictable and Sustainable Finance for Peace in Africa," August 2016, pp. 3–4.

³⁴ African Union Peace Fund, 2016, pp. 1–6.

³⁵ AU, *Financing of the Union: "By Africa, for Africa,"* 2016b, p. 3.

³⁶ African Union Peace Fund, 2016, Annex 1, p. 5, paragraph 10. AMISOM alone (22,126 uniformed personnel and 114 civilians) accounted for an estimated \$900 million per year.

³⁷ See AU, 2016b.

³⁸ Philomena Apiko and Faten Aggad, "Analysis of the Implementation of the African Union's 0.2% Levy: Progress and Challenges," ECDPM, February 2018.

trade area, as the AU has previously proposed, or seeking a waiver from the WTO, which the EU has indicated it would support.³⁹ There are also difficulties persuading all African states to adopt the tariff. There are existing tariffs established by several subregional groups, including ECOWAS, ECCAS, and EAC, and some members are reluctant to add to this.⁴⁰

Another important element of international support has been in-kind contributions from the UN, outside of direct financing for African-led operations. The UN has drawn on assessed contributions from member states to provide more than \$15 billion of in-kind support to African-led peace operations through June 2016. The yearly budget for the UN support mission in Somalia has exceeded \$500 million per year from 2015 on.⁴¹

Several reports have repeatedly urged the UNSC to employ assessed contributions to support African-led but UN-authorized operations, including through “a subvention in exceptional emergency situations; joint financing of a jointly developed budget; establishment of a UN support office; or joint financing of a hybrid mission.”⁴² These proposals face significant resistance from UN member states,⁴³ some of whom feel that the AU’s “dependence for money from foreign countries [has] reached unacceptable levels.”⁴⁴

³⁹ Apiko and Aggad, 2018, pp. 10–12.

⁴⁰ Institute for Security Studies, “Will AU Members Manage to Pay Their Dues?” March 17, 2017a.

⁴¹ UN, 2016, p. 32; UN, “Budget Performance for the Period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016 for the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia and Proposed Budget for the Period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 for the United Nations Support Office in Somalia,” April 27, 2017b.

⁴² UN members could also provide voluntary contributions to the AU or RECs, but such contributions are unlikely to provide an “adequate, predictable, or sustainable” source of funding. See UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on Options for Authorization and Support for African Union Peace Support Operations*, S/2017/454, May 26, 2017c, pp. 9–10.

⁴³ Katharina P. Coleman, “Extending UN Peacekeeping Financing Beyond UN Peacekeeping Operations? The Prospects and Challenges of Reform,” *Global Governance*, Vol. 23, No. 1, January 2017, pp. 101–120.

⁴⁴ Roby, 2017.

Other international partners have provided in-kind support. The U.S.-funded Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, for example, provides training to contingents that are preparing to deploy personnel to peace operations.⁴⁵ Non-African institutions and states also sometimes provide critical enablers, such as transportation, communications, and logistics personnel, or undertake programs that support the broader political objectives of African-led operations, such as security sector reform or providing democracy and governance support.

Donors have also helped build the bureaucratic capacity of the AU and the subregional organizations. The EU, for example, has sought to improve the AU's fiduciary capabilities with a view to improving oversight of EU funding for stipends for peacekeeping troops. In 2010, the UN established the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) and has helped build the capacity of the AU to manage peace operations, including through exchanges of technical personnel as well as working to develop the AU's doctrine for peace operations. The United States has also provided advisors to the AU, as have NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.⁴⁶

Given the resources and logistical limitations of the AU and African subregional organizations and the size of some of the countries experiencing violence, the prospect of a follow-on UN mission has been essential to realistically address some larger security challenges. With UN missions come greater financial resources, including substantially higher reimbursement rates to troop-contributing countries, which made it far more attractive for states to contribute troop contingents. The UN has also helped sustain African-led operations through logistics and bureaucratic support and long-term peace-building activities, such as security-sector reform.⁴⁷ Western countries and international institutions have also launched missions that operate alongside

⁴⁵ U.S. Africa Command, "ACOTA—Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance," undated; Boutellis and Williams, 2013, p. 265.

⁴⁶ Interviews with U.S. and UN officials, Washington, D.C., and New York, December 2017.


⁴⁷ See also United Nations, 2016, pp. 22–25.

African-led missions, as in the case of the French Operation Serval in Mali, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Somalia, or the EU mission in Chad and CAR.

The UN cannot be counted on to support all African-led peace operations automatically. As former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice noted, “The Security Council is not subordinate to other bodies.”⁴⁸ For instance, the UN has sometimes been unwilling to mount follow-on missions if the initial African-led peace operation fails to secure a settlement and opens the prospect of a long counterinsurgency campaign.

For their part, African countries contribute more than half the manpower for UN operations in Africa. As Figure 1.2 shows, about 40,000 of the approximately 70,000 troops deployed in UN operations on the African continent in 2017 were African. The increase in contri-

Figure 1.2
Number of African Peacekeepers in UN Peace Operations in Africa



SOURCE: International Peace Institute, “IPI Peacekeeping Database,” undated.

⁴⁸ Williams and Boutellis, 2014, p. 270. See also UN, 2016, pp. 22–25, 33; Cedric de Coning, “Peace Enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal Distinctions Between the African Union and United Nations,” *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2017, p. 155.

butions from African countries is a major change over the last decade. In combination with African forces provided to African-led operations, this change indicates the significant steps that have African countries have made in providing for security on the continent.

Against this background, this report takes stock in more detail of some of the key achievements and challenges that African-led peace operations encountered. Our case studies examine the level of ambition that these missions had; how they fit within what was, in some instances, an almost constant succession of UN, European, and African missions; and what they achieved, either as part of their mandate or as “extra” benefits to their presence and action in societies that faced challenges in all domains, from security to governance and economy.

The remainder of this report examines in turn six case studies of African-led operations that span the whole range of missions executed by African organizations. Chapter Two focuses on Burundi (2001–2004); Chapter Three, CAR (2002–2014); Chapter Four, Darfur (2004–present); Chapter Five, the Comoros (2006–2008); Chapter Six, Somalia (2007–present); and Chapter Seven, the Lake Chad Basin (2015–present). Chapter Eight provides a comparative analysis of the case studies and puts in perspective the inputs and outcomes that U.S.-led, UN-led, and European-led missions examined in the previous volumes of our nation-building series. Chapter Nine provides conclusions. Appendix A, which includes nation-building inputs and outcomes data, and Appendix B, which provides additional information on the performance indicators used in case studies, complete this report.

Burundi

Burundi, located in the Great Lakes region of Africa, is a small¹ and densely populated country of 11.5 million inhabitants nested between Rwanda, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Lake Tanganyika (see Figure 2.1). From 1993 to 2005, a civil war pitted the Tutsi-dominated government against several Hutu rebel groups,² killing more than 300,000 and displacing almost one-fifth of the population.³

This chapter focuses on the role played by the first two African missions (South Africa's South African Protection Support Detachment [SAPSD] and the African Union Mission in Burundi [AMIB]) that were deployed in Burundi following the Arusha Peace and Rec-

¹ Burundi's size is roughly equivalent to Switzerland or New Jersey.

² Curtis (2003), however, notes that "this view of the conflict fails to capture many of the important nuances in Burundian history and social structure, and the way in which ethnicity has been used as an instrumental tool by elites. A more accurate description of the Burundian conflict takes into account political and economic ambitions, ethnic divisions, regional divisions, urban-rural division, the links to the conflicts in neighbouring Rwanda and Congo, and the problems of a politicized military" (Devon Curtis, "The Peace Process in Burundi: Successful African Intervention?" *Global Insight*, No. 24, September 2003). For an account of how Hutu and Tutsi identities were largely constructed during and after the colonial period and reflect history and socioeconomic status more than ethnicity, see James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity," *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 4, Autumn 2000, pp. 845–877.

³ United Nations Economic and Social Council, "Report of the Economic and Social Council Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi," E/2004/11, February 11, 2004, para. 26 and 30.

Figure 2.1
Map of Burundi



SOURCE: United Nations Cartographic Section, Map No. 3753, Rev. 9, February 2016.

conciliation Agreement to stabilize the country,⁴ implement the peace accord, and promote reconciliation in the immediate aftermath of the war. Although these first two missions faced numerous challenges, particularly in their protection of civilians in a context of residual armed violence, they did pave the way for the deployment of the UN mission that played a major role in improving peace and stability, reforming security forces, and assisting Burundian authorities in holding the democratic elections that successfully completed Burundi's political transition.

The conflict originated with the assassination in October 1993 of the first democratically elected (and first Hutu) president, Melchior Ndadaye. This event sparked a wave of violence across a country that had already experienced massacres in 1965, 1969, 1972, and 1988. The situation further deteriorated after Ndadaye's successor Cyprien Ntaryamira was killed in the same plane crash as Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana in April 1994. Ntaryamira's successor Sylvestre Ntibantunganya was toppled in a coup two years later by Major Pierre Buyoya, an officer in the mostly Tutsi Burundian Army.⁵

Regional actors took a leading role in mediating the conflict, particularly the OAU and its successor the AU after 2002, as well as the governments of South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire (now the DRC). Following the death of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere in 1999, former South African President Nelson Mandela took over his role as lead mediator, and on August 28, 2000, 13 Burundian parties agreed to sign the Arusha Agreement.

South Africa took the initiative to deploy a small military mission the following year in order to encourage exiled political leaders to return to Burundi. SAPSD's main purpose was to ensure the safety of those political leaders to participate in the transitional government established following the Arusha Agreement.

⁴ Hereafter referred to as the Arusha Agreement.

⁵ For a brief overview of Burundi's conflict, see, for instance, Stephen Jackson, "The United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)—Political and Strategic Lessons Learned," independent study commissioned by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, July 2006.

The SAPSD was replaced in April 2003 by the AU's first peace support operation, AMIB (Table 2.1 summarizes the timeline). AMIB was created as a temporary solution until the UN could deploy its own

Table 2.1
Chronology of Burundi's Political Transition, 2000–2005

Date	Event
August 28, 2000	Signature of Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
October 27, 2001	SAPSD deployed to Burundi
November 1, 2001	Transitional government sworn in
October 7, 2002	Ceasefire agreement between transitional government, CNDD-FDD (Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye), and Palipehutu-FNL (Alien Mugabarabona)
December 2, 2002	Ceasefire agreement between transitional government and CNDD-FDD (Pierre Nkurunziza)
April 2, 2003	AU central organ mandates deployment of AMIB
May 1, 2003	SAPSD integrated into AMIB
October 8, 2003	Transitional government and CNDD-FDD of Nkurunziza sign Pretoria Protocol on power-sharing
November 2, 2003	Transitional government and CNDD-FDD of Nkurunziza sign second Pretoria Protocol
November 15, 2003	CNDD-FDD signs Global Ceasefire Agreement
December 4, 2003	Deputy President of South Africa Jacob Zuma briefs the UNSC and argues for UN takeover of peace mission
May 21, 2004	UNSC authorizes deployment of ONUB
June 1, 2004	ONUB replaces AMIB
February 2005	Burundi adopts new constitution by referendum
August 2005	Pierre Nkurunziza elected president; only Palipehutu-FNL remains active

mission,⁶ and it was mandated to oversee the ceasefire between the transitional government and the main rebel group, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy–Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), and assist the implementation of the Arusha Agreement. AMIB also aimed to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and to initiate the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process.⁷ During AMIB’s tenure, the rebel CNDD-FDD signed a Global Ceasefire Agreement with the transitional government, resulting in lower levels of violence throughout the country, with the exception of those few areas where another holdout rebel group, the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People–National Forces of Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL), remained active.

At this point, the UN—which had maintained a small political office, the UN Office in Burundi (UNOB), since 1993—judged that the security situation had been sufficiently stabilized for it to establish its own mission. The United Nations Operations in Burundi (ONUB) deployed in June 2004 “in order to support and help to implement the efforts undertaken by Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about national reconciliation, as provided under the Arusha Agreement.”⁸ Its main tasks included monitoring the ceasefire, conducting disarmament and demobilization, securing the delivery of humanitarian assistance, facilitating the return of IDPs and refugees, protecting civilians, securing the electoral process, and advising the transitional government on a range of issues from institutional reforms to monitoring of borders.⁹

⁶ Jide Martyns Okeke, “An Evolving Model of African-Led Peace Support Operations? Lessons from Burundi, Sudan (Darfur) and Somalia,” in Thierry Tardy and Marco Wyss, eds., *Peacekeeping in Africa: The Evolving Security Architecture*, New York: Routledge, 2014, p. 41.

⁷ African Union Central Organ, “Communiqué of the Ninety-First Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution at Ambassadorial Level,” Addis Ababa, April 2, 2003, para. 5.iii.

⁸ SCR 1545, May 21, 2004, para. 2.

⁹ United Nations Peacekeeping, “Burundi—ONUB—Mandate,” undated(a).

In August 2005, CNDD-FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza was elected as president of Burundi, marking the end of Burundi's transitional period. It took another year for the Palipehutu-FNL to lay down arms and for rebel activity in Burundi to come to an end. On that occasion, the AU again deployed a small military force, the 750-strong AU Security Task Force (AUSTF), to protect Palipehutu-FNL leaders as they took part in the peace process,¹⁰ while ONUB was replaced by the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), which focused on peace consolidation, particularly in the areas of security sector reform, transitional justice, and governance.¹¹ BINUB became the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) in January 2011.¹² BNUB came to an end in December 2014, but within a few weeks the United Nations deployed the UN Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (MENUB) in a context of increased tensions around the upcoming legislative and presidential elections. The conclusion of MENUB at the end of 2015 marked the end of 22 years of uninterrupted regional and international presence in Burundi.

Since then, the political and security situation in Burundi has deteriorated, with a coup attempt in May 2015 against President Nkurunziza, increased political and ethnic polarization, numerous violations of human rights, and heightened political violence.¹³ In 2015, the AU PSC authorized the deployment of a 5,000-strong African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) mandated to stabi-

¹⁰ Cedric de Coning and Walter Lotze, "South Africa," in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, eds., *Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 384.

¹¹ The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations called BINUB "an interim arrangement to allow for a smooth transition from peacekeeping towards a development-focused engagement by the UN" (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *UN Integration in Burundi in the Context of the Peacebuilding Office BINUB: Taking Stock and Lessons Learned from June 2006 to November 2007*, Bujumbura, Burundi, February 2008, p. 3).

¹² On BNUB's mandate, see United Nations Office in Burundi, "Mandate," November 30, 2010.

¹³ See, for instance, ICG, *Burundi: A Dangerous Third Term*, Africa Report No. 235, May 20, 2016c.

lize the country, protect civilians, and encourage a dialogue between the various Burundian political actors.¹⁴ However, MAPROBU was never deployed, mainly because the Burundian government opposed this initiative and threatened to use force against any foreign troops that would be deployed in the country.¹⁵

Challenges

Security

When the South African force (SAPSD) deployed in October 2001, Burundi was still largely at war. The talks in Arusha had resulted in two groups—the National Council for the Defense of Democracy and the National Liberation Forces (FNL)—splitting, with the military wing of each group—the CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL—continuing to fight against the transitional government.¹⁶ To a large extent, the peace agreement had preceded peace. Describing the situation as of late 2000, the ICG noted that “[t]he army, represented by President Buyoya, signed the Arusha accords on the condition of obtaining a ceasefire. But it is forging ahead with the war in the hope of crushing the rebellion and avoiding the reform of security forces, as provided for in the accord.”¹⁷ In this context, the UN estimated that the security situation did not allow for the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission.

¹⁴ PSC, “Communiqué of the 565th Meeting of the PSC on the Situation in Burundi,” December 28, 2015c.

¹⁵ “African Union Decides Against Peacekeepers for Burundi,” Al Jazeera, February 1, 2016. On the AU’s decision not to deploy MAPROBU, see also ICG, “The African Union and the Burundi Crisis: Ambition Versus Reality,” Africa Briefing No. 122, September 28, 2016d.

¹⁶ Jackson, 2006.

¹⁷ ICG, *Burundi After Six Months of Transition: Continuing the War or Winning Peace?* Africa Report No. 46, May 24, 2002, p. 2.

Governance and Civil Administration

Prior to the civil war, the government structures primarily served the interests of Tutsis. An example of this was a colonial educational system geared toward Tutsis, creating in the process an underclass of uneducated Hutus. The predominantly Tutsi administration and political leadership consistently resisted attempts at correcting this imbalance, and such inequalities were compounded by waves of violence, with more than 100,000 educated Hutus killed during the 1972 inter-ethnic clashes. By 2000, the majority of civil servants were still Tutsis, but the Arusha Agreement called for an administration that “shall be broadly representative and reflect the diversity of the components of the Burundian nation,”¹⁸ adding that “[n]o civil servant or member of the Judiciary may be accorded favorable or unfavorable treatment solely on grounds of her/his gender, ethnicity or political affiliation.”¹⁹

Democratization

Burundi, formerly a monarchy, was declared a republic in 1966 but never had a democratically elected government prior to the 1993 elections. Instead, the country experienced multiple coups and coup attempts, often supported or led by the army. The most recent such coup was carried out in July 1996 by Pierre Buyoya, who suspended the 1992 constitution and replaced Sylvestre Ntibantunganya as president.

Humanitarian

The civil war created an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe in Burundi, with more than 300,000 killed. An estimated 600,000 Burundians were internally displaced, and more than 250,000 took refuge in the neighboring countries of Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC.²⁰ Even after the signing of the Arusha Agreement, Burun-

¹⁸ Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, August 28, 2000, Chapter 1, Article 10, para. 4.

¹⁹ Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000, Article 10, para. 6.

²⁰ ICG, *A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi*, Africa Report No. 57, February 21, 2003a, p. 4; ICG, “Burundi’s Peace Process: The Road from Arusha,” 1998; Anna Dubuis, “Burundi’s Last Civil War Killed 300,000. A New One Is Coming,” PRI, March 28, 2016.

dians continued to experience violations of their most basic rights on a daily basis.²¹ In addition to being collateral victims to the combat, the population endured abuses perpetrated by the army and the rebel groups. Looting and banditry were rife in most of the country.²²

Economic Reconstruction

With much of the country's infrastructure destroyed in the conflict and a trade embargo imposed on Burundi by several of its neighbors to protest the 1996 coup, socioeconomic indicators—which were not very high to begin with, the country having experienced a recession since the 1990s—took a further plunge.²³ Although the sanctions aimed to restore constitutional order and force President Buyoya into peace talks with Hutu rebels, they further worsened living conditions for the population.²⁴ International assistance also declined, from nearly US\$300 million in 1992 to less than US\$100 million a year in 2002.²⁵ Burundi's main exports, such as tea and coffee, decreased, leading to further pauperization of rural areas. By the time the Arusha Agreement was signed, the Burundian economy had contracted sharply, with little foreign and local investment to speak of.²⁶

Another major issue that affected the economy was land management and redistribution. Land disputes in Burundi—the second-most densely populated country on mainland Africa after Rwanda,

²¹ Human Rights Watch, *Everyday Victims: Civilians in the Burundian War*, New York, Vol. 15, No. 20(A), December 2003.

²² UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Situation in Burundi*, S/2003/1146, December 4, 2003b, para. 55.

²³ Olivier Basdevant, "How Can Burundi Raise Its Growth Rate? The Impact of Civil Conflict and State Intervention on Burundi's Growth Performance," International Monetary Fund working paper, 2009.

²⁴ UN, "Economic Sanctions Against Burundi Suspended," *Africa Recovery*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1999.

²⁵ World Bank, "Interim Strategic Framework for Accelerating Economic Growth and Reducing Poverty (Interim PRSP)," 2003a.

²⁶ International Monetary Fund (IMF), "Burundi: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Report," IMF Country Report No. 04/14, 2004.

with 91 percent of its population qualifying as rural²⁷—have long been a trigger of violence, and, accordingly, this issue featured prominently in the Arusha Agreement.²⁸ The return of refugees, who often found that their land had been appropriated by other settlers during their absence, sparked further land disputes that courts lacked the capacity to resolve.²⁹

African and Other International Roles

The AU's predecessor, the OAU, had some degree of involvement in the Burundian crisis prior to the signing of the Arusha Agreement. In December 1993, it decided to send an observer mission, the Protection and Observation Mission for the Re-Establishment of Confidence in Burundi (MIPROBU), to assist in restoring stability.³⁰ However, the mission did not deploy due to the opposition of a number of Burundian military officers. The OAU then announced that it would establish an Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB) to help restore confidence and assist with prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. OMIB was deployed on February 5, 1994, with 18 civilians and 47 military observers in May 1994. This increased to 67 officers by 1995—from Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia.³¹ OMIB suffered from its small size, its lack of equipment, and its inability to travel or operate independently of the Burundi security

²⁷ UNSC, 2003b, para. 46–47.

²⁸ See, in particular, Article 4 (“Guidelines governing resettlement and integration”) and Article 8 (“Issues relating to land and other property”).

²⁹ On this issue, see, for instance, ICG, *Refugees and Displaced Persons in Burundi (I)—Defusing the Land Time-Bomb*, Africa Report No. 70, October 7, 2003b; Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), “Huge Challenges in Solving Land Crisis,” November 23, 2006; and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “The Link Between Land, Environment, Employment, and Conflict in Burundi,” May 2006.

³⁰ Amnesty International, “Burundi: Struggle for Survival: Immediate Action Vital to Stop Killings,” July 1, 1995; University of Central Arkansas, “Burundi,” undated.

³¹ University of Central Arkansas, undated; Amnesty International, 1995.

forces.³² It failed to stop the violence or de-escalate the conflict and was withdrawn from Burundi in July 1996 after Major Pierre Buyoya took power in a military coup.

The Arusha Agreement contained a provision stating that “[i]mmediately following the signature of the Agreement, the Burundian Government shall submit to the United Nations a request for an international peacekeeping force.”³³ However, the UN determined that the security conditions were insufficient for it to send peacekeepers. South Africa stepped in to fill that gap until such conditions could be met, first with the SAPSD and then with AMIB, for which it was the lead nation and the main troop contributor.

The South African government established SAPSD, at the request of the Burundian government, on October 29, 2001.³⁴ Its task was to provide physical protection to Burundian politicians, mainly Hutu leaders who returned from exile to take part in the transitional government. SAPSD received the endorsement of the UNSC.³⁵ Although there were 1,431 approved South African personnel for the mission, only half (about 750 military troops) were eventually deployed. The SAPSD was successful in completing its assigned functions but did not play a broader role in the peace process. As Paul D. Williams notes, the SAPSD “was [South African President Nelson] Mandela’s personal initiative and did not have an explicit mandate to intervene in the civil war—the troops were to evacuate should the hostilities resume in earnest and they become targets.”³⁶ The mission ended in May 2003, a month after the AU established AMIB.

AMIB was deployed for a period of one year that could be extended, but from the very beginning it was understood that it would be replaced as soon as possible by the international peacekeeping force mentioned in Article 8 of the Arusha Agreement. South Africa was the

³² Amnesty International, 1995.

³³ Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000, Article 8.

³⁴ Williams, 2009, p. 99.

³⁵ Williams, 2009, p. 99.

³⁶ Williams, 2009, p. 99.

lead nation, and the force had an Ethiopian Deputy Force Commander. In addition to South Africa (1,600) and Ethiopia (980), a third troop-contributing country was Mozambique (280).³⁷ It also included military observers from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Togo, and Tunisia.³⁸ Its mandate included monitoring the Arusha agreement and ceasefires, supporting DDR, promoting the political and economic stability of Burundi, and, more generally, acting as a transition for a larger, anticipated UN mission.³⁹

AMIB had an authorized maximal strength of 3,500 and reached 3,128 troops and military observers at its highest point.⁴⁰ The AU had difficulties finding funding for the mission from the very beginning. Donor countries only provided \$10 million—one-fifth of the amount they had initially pledged, and one-tenth of the estimated cost of the overall operation. The United States and the United Kingdom played a key role in bridging that financial gap, with the former funding the deployment of the Ethiopian component of AMIB, while the United Kingdom did the same for the Mozambican component.⁴¹ Italy and Germany contributed financially as well.⁴² AMIB's troops were re-hatted as ONUB troops when the UN mission took over in May 2004. Table 2.2 summarizes the major proposed and undertaken peacekeeping missions in Burundi.

Military and Police

The SAPSD trained a Burundian very important person (VIP) protection force and provided VIP protection to political leaders returning

³⁷ Henri Boshoff, "Burundi: The African Union's First Mission," Situation Report, African Security Analysis Programme, Institute for Security Studies, June 10, 2003, p. 3.

³⁸ Jackson, 2006.

³⁹ Jackson, 2006; Annemarie Peen Rodt, "The African Union Mission in Burundi," *Civil Wars*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2012, pp. 378–379.

⁴⁰ Paul D. Williams, "The African Union: Prospects for Regional Peacekeeping After Burundi & Sudan," *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 33, No. 108, June 2006a, p. 353; Boshoff, 2003, p. 4.

⁴¹ Rodt, 2012, p. 384.

⁴² UNSC, 2003b, para. 29.

Table 2.2
Foreign Interventions in Burundi, 1993–2009

Lead Organization or Country	Mission Name	Start Date	End Date	Peak Personnel Strength (Military Unless Specified)
OAU	MIPROBU	Nov. 1993	Feb. 1994	0 (mission canceled)
OAU	OMIB	Feb. 1994	Jul. 1996	67 (military observers)
South Africa	SAPSD	Oct. 2001	Apr. 2003	700–800
AU	AMIB	Apr. 2003	May 2004	3,250–3,500 (military and civilian) 42 military observers
AU	AUSTF	Dec. 2006	Jun. 2009	750
UN	ONUB	Jun. 2004	Dec. 2006	5,568 military (including 168 military observers) 97 police
UN	BINUB	Jan. 2007	Dec. 2010	8 (military observers) 14 police
UN	BNUB	Jan. 2011	Dec. 2014	1 (military observer) 1 police

NOTE: African-led missions are in red; UN-led missions are in blue.

from exile. South Africa provided this force when it became clear that Burundi's internal divisions would prevent the transitional government from taking this initiative.⁴³

AMIB replaced SAPSD in April 2003 and took over this VIP protection role.⁴⁴ In addition, it was tasked with monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and was responsible for the preliminary stages of the DDR process, including opening and securing disarmament centers.⁴⁵ AMIB's objective was to disarm an estimated

⁴³ ICG, 2002, p. 6.

⁴⁴ Tim Murithi, "The African Union's Evolving Role in Peace Operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia," *African Security Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2008, p. 75.

⁴⁵ Murithi, 2008, p. 75; Boshoff, 2003, p. 3.

20,000 combatants.⁴⁶ According to the Pretoria Protocols signed in late 2003 between the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD, AMIB was also to play a role, along with an Implementation Monitoring Committee and a Joint Ceasefire Commission, in the reform of the army and police.⁴⁷

Civil and Economic

SAPSD and AMIB's civil and economic role remained limited while other regional and international actors committed to helping Burundi rebuild its economy. In December 2000, Nelson Mandela convened an International Donors Conference for Burundi that took place in Paris and resulted in participants pledging US\$440 million to address both immediate and long-term needs of the country.⁴⁸

What Happened

SAPSD and AMIB's effort encouraged politicians to participate in the general elections and created a more stable environment. One analyst credits these missions for creating a situation "conducive to moving the peace process forward"⁴⁹ because they enabled a UN decision that the situation was safe enough to deploy its own mission. Burundi also started attracting foreign investments and became eligible for international financial institutions' economic structural programs. Rebel groups had entered the peace process, and Burundi was relatively peaceful for almost a decade, until President Nkurunziza's 2015 highly

⁴⁶ Festus Agoagye, "The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the First African Union Peacekeeping Operation," *Conflict Trends*, No. 2, 2004, p. 11.

⁴⁷ UNSC, 2003b, para. 19.

⁴⁸ The conference was co-chaired by the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). See World Bank, "Burundi Donor Conference Pledges \$440 Million in Urgent Aid," December 12, 2000.

⁴⁹ Isiaka Alani Badmus, "The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB): A Study of the African Union's Peacekeeping Success and 'Triangular Area of Tension in African Peacekeeping,'" *India Quarterly*, Vol. 73, No. 1, 2017, p. 11.

contested bid for a third term sparked renewed violence and insecurity in the country.

Security

Nkurunziza's faction signed a ceasefire agreement with the transitional government on December 2, 2002, leaving the Palipehutu-FNL led by Agathon Rwasa as the only active rebel group in the country. The ceasefire was repeatedly violated by both groups in 2002–2003, with intense fighting going on in several provinces and resulting in more killed and displaced.⁵⁰

The SAPSD's mandate was limited to ensuring the physical protection of political leaders returning from exile and performed well in that regard.⁵¹ Those leaders willing to participate in the transitional government following their signature of the Arusha Agreement were able to do so. The SAPSD had no further missions with regard to securing the country in a context of continued fighting.

During AMIB's deployment, the CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL continued to carry out attacks in different parts of Burundi in defiance of threats from Burundi's neighbors—Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania—to intervene if they did not sign a ceasefire.⁵² In June 2003, AMIB successfully repelled a CNDD-FDD attack against its cantonment site.⁵³ Following the Pretoria Protocols, which effectively marked the end of the fighting for the CNDD-FDD, AMIB successfully increased the level of security in those provinces where the Palipehutu-FNL was not active.⁵⁴ Rebel activity had largely decreased, in any case: Attacks from the Palipehutu-FNL were sporadic and mostly limited to the outskirts of Burundi's capital city, Bujumbura. By 2004, the UN estimated that "95 per cent of the country

⁵⁰ Boshoff, 2003. See also Williams, 2009, p. 99.

⁵¹ For a list of the politicians who received protection, see ICG, 2002, p. 1, fn. 3.

⁵² "Burundi Ceasefire Blow," BBC, September 20, 2000.

⁵³ UNSC, 2003b, para. 42.

⁵⁴ Jackson, 2006; Murithi, 2008, p. 75.

hostilities had ceased.”⁵⁵ Paul D. Williams concluded that “on balance, by December 2003 AMIB had contributed to a far more stable security situation in Burundi than existed on its arrival.”⁵⁶ AMIB’s work is credited with creating the conditions for the UN to decide to launch its own peacekeeping operation in Burundi, just one year after the deployment of the AU mission.⁵⁷

Although the DDR process was largely carried out by local, UN, and World Bank actors, rather than regional ones,⁵⁸ AMIB played an important role in initiating the process—for instance, by setting up the first cantonment site of the DDR process in June 2003. Yet, as of December 2003, that site had only processed close to 200 combatants—a far cry from the 20,000 it had been aiming for.⁵⁹ AMIB’s lack of financial resources, which limited what it could provide to the combatants in terms of food and compensation, as well as the lack of interest of some factions in participating in this effort, limited the mission’s ability to further push the DDR process,⁶⁰ which was officially launched by ONUB in December 2004.⁶¹ The delays in the DDR process were also largely due to the transitional government’s inability

⁵⁵ United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2004.

⁵⁶ Williams, 2009, p. 101.

⁵⁷ Murithi, 2008, p. 75.

⁵⁸ The National DRR program was established in 2004 and overseen by a DRR National Commission, while that same year the World Bank launched its Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program.

⁵⁹ UNSC, 2003b, para. 32.

⁶⁰ Henri Boshoff notes that “[t]he lack of resources has forced AMIB to remain largely outside the [demobilization and reintegration] process, limiting its activities to protecting convoys, providing food supplies to the FDD and protecting the FDD cantonment area from Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurkiye’s FDD faction” (Henri Boshoff, “Burundi Update: A New Hat for AMIB?” Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, March 16, 2004, p. 3).

⁶¹ Henri Boshoff, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration During the Transition in Burundi: A Success Story?” in Roger Southall, ed., *South Africa's Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa*, HSRC Press: Cape Town, 2006, p. 135; Williams, 2009, p. 100.

to meet the criteria set by the World Bank, which funded the DDR program.⁶²

As a result, the core of the reform of the Burundian military and police took place later, under ONUB's watch. A larger mission than AMIB, with 5,650 military personnel, as well as police and other civilian personnel, ONUB was tasked with supporting Burundi's security-sector reform, including disarming and demobilizing armed groups and integrating their members in the new Burundian armed forces. ONUB helped disarm and demobilize nearly 22,000 ex-combatants, including more than 3,000 children and about 500 women.⁶³ ONUB provided technical assistance to the Burundi National Police (BNP) in terms of logistics planning, human resources, the development of legal frameworks, and training.⁶⁴ ONUB trained about 2,500 Burundian police officers in a training-for-trainers police program on anti-corruption, antiterrorism, penitentiary security, border security, and airport security.⁶⁵ ONUB also documented serious human rights abuses and corruption, principally implicating the national security forces.⁶⁶

Humanitarian

The SAPSD improved the situation for civilians in Bujumbura, where the organization was concentrated,⁶⁷ but, unsurprisingly given its limited mandate, it had little impact on the rest of the country.⁶⁸ The humanitarian situation only got worse over the course of 2002.⁶⁹ After

⁶² Rodt, 2012, p. 380.

⁶³ UN, "The UN Peacekeeping Mission in Burundi Completes Its Mandate," December 20, 2006b.

⁶⁴ UN, *Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Burundi*, S/2006/163, March 14, 2006a.

⁶⁵ UN, 2006b, p. 1.

⁶⁶ UN, 2006a, p. 7.

⁶⁷ Agoagye, 2004, p. 11.

⁶⁸ Badmus, 2017, p. 7.

⁶⁹ Williams, 2009, p. 99.

2003, however, AMIB helped facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs by ensuring their safety as well as the protection of ex-combatants who had defected from rebel groups.⁷⁰ AMIB also facilitated the delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable persons, including IDPs.⁷¹

The number of returnees doubled between January and December 2003, prompted in part by a voluntary repatriation program facilitated by the governments of Burundi and Tanzania with the support of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).⁷² Yet the reintegration of refugees and IDPs in their communities remained problematic due, among other factors, to the stagnation of the Burundian economy and the difficulty for some returnees of getting back their land after years of exile.⁷³

Governance and Civil Administration

According to the Arusha Agreement, the country would be ruled by a transitional government with Pierre Buyoya (a Tutsi) as president for the first 18 months, followed by Domitien Ndayizeye (a Hutu) for the next 18 months while the political transition was being completed. The swap between Buyoya and Ndayizeye took place as planned in April 2003, building confidence between the former warring parties. It opened the way to further breakthroughs, such as the adoption of a new constitution by referendum in February 2005 and the democratic election of Pierre Nkurunziza later that year. The Pretoria protocol divided senior army officer positions in the Burundian Army and in the police between the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD of Pierre Nkurunziza, all while keeping a strict ethnic balance, as mandated by the Arusha Agreement.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Interview with the author, Bangui, CAR, July 15, 2017.

⁷¹ Jackson, 2006. AMIB, however, was criticized in one instance by the local population in Burumata for standing by while a CNDD-FDD militia committed violence (Williams, 2009, p. 100).

⁷² UNHCR, "Burundi," UNHCR Global Appeal, 2003, p. 71.

⁷³ Murithi, 2008, p. 75; UNHCR, 2003, p. 72.

⁷⁴ Boshoff, 2006, p. 138.

Furthermore, by protecting political leaders returning from exile, the SAPSD played a role in ensuring that Burundi's transitional government would be as inclusive as possible and integrate all parties willing to participate in the process. It was mandated to protect a total of 44 political leaders and train its own future Burundian replacement—a unit equally composed of Hutus and Tutsis.⁷⁵ The latter part of the mandate, however, does not appear to have been fulfilled due to the continuation of combat between the Burundian government and rebel groups.⁷⁶ AMIB continued this protection mission and also facilitated the return of IDPs by improving overall security.⁷⁷

Democratization

The SAPSD played an important role in guaranteeing the protection of political leaders.⁷⁸ The South African guarantee proved effective, as the transitional government was sworn in on November 1, 2001, with the support of various African leaders and international representatives. This transitional government was charged with implementing the Arusha Agreement and negotiating a ceasefire with rebel groups.

Economic Reconstruction

Neither SAPSD nor AMIB played a role in Burundi's economic reconstruction, which benefitted from considerable international support. After falling to -2.4 percent per annum, gross domestic product (GDP) growth went back up to 2.2 percent per annum, on average, over the 2001–2005 period.⁷⁹ The UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), created in December 2005, selected Burundi as one of its first two focus countries, along with Sierra Leone. As a result, both countries benefited from a new Peacebuilding Fund established to prevent countries from

⁷⁵ ICG, 2002, p. 6.

⁷⁶ ICG, 2002, p. 6.

⁷⁷ Murithi, 2008, p. 75.

⁷⁸ ICG, 2002.

⁷⁹ IMF, "Burundi: Selected Issues and Statistic Appendix," IMF Country Report No. 06/307, August 2006b, para. 35.

relapsing into violent conflict.⁸⁰ The PBC worked with the Burundian government and international and local partners to develop a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding supporting Burundi's efforts in terms of sustainable development, institutional reform, and peace consolidation.⁸¹ In 2009, the World Bank and the IMF approved full debt relief for Burundi under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative⁸²—a move that also suggested that Burundi was seen as implementing sound economic policies toward economic and social recovery.

Lessons Learned

The successive peace operations in Burundi illustrate the growing capability of African-led peace operations, their role in preparing the way for larger UN missions, and the important part played by major regional powers, South Africa in this case, in organizing and providing the core of such interventions. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 summarize the peacekeeping inputs and outcomes for Burundi.

The initial South African mission did effectively protect Hutu political leaders willing to integrate in the peace process. Its successor, AMIB, was able to implement its mandate despite severe resource constraints. AMIB's presence encouraged thousands of refugees and IDPs to return to their communities and empowered exiled political leaders to participate in the transitional government. AMIB and other partners initiated the DDR process until the mission's transition to ONUB. Although still volatile, the improved security situation paved the way for a return of international donors' financial support.

⁸⁰ UN, "United Nations Peacebuilding Fund," 2018; Anne M. Street, Howard Mollett, and Jennifer Smith, "Experiences of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission in Sierra Leone and Burundi," *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2008, p. 33.

⁸¹ Center for UN Reform, "Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi," 2007.

⁸² IMF, "IMF and World Bank Support Burundi's Completion Point Under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative and Approve Debt Relief Under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative," January 29, 2009.

Table 2.3
Peacekeeping Outputs: Burundi, 2001–2004

	Estimated Annual Conflict Fatalities ^a	GDP Per Capita Growth (%)	Freedom Score (7 = worst, 1 = best)	HDI Score (0 = worst, 1 = best)	Government Effectiveness Score (–2.5 = worst, 2.5 = best)	Refugee Population	IDP Population	African-Led Missions	Other Missions (Country/ Organization)
2001	3,915	–0.36%	6.0	0.268	---	553,999	20,000	SAPSD (S. Africa)	---
2002	2,132	1.57%	6.0	0.276	–1.45	574,557	100,000	SAPSD (S. Africa)	---
2003	1,471	–4.23%	5.5	0.279	–1.47	531,637	1,970	SAPSD (S. Africa), AMIB (AU)	---
2004	536	1.49%	5.0	0.286	–1.31	485,767	855	AMIB (AU)	ONUB (UN)

^a Reliable conflict fatality data are difficult to obtain, particularly in Africa. We compared several notable data sets: Climate Change and African Political Stability's (CCAPS's) Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism's (START's) Global Terrorism Database (GTD), UCDP's Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Uppsala Conflict Data Program's (UCDP's) One-Sided Violence Dataset, UCDP's Non-State Conflict Dataset, and Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Dataset. The data varied widely across these sources, though the trends generally agreed. Overall, we judged ACLED to be the most inclusive data set, but fatality data presented in this table should be interpreted as conservative estimates.

SOURCES: Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, "Introducing ACLED—Armed Conflict Location and Event Data," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 5, 2010, pp. 651–660; World Bank, "World Development Indicators," database, 2018b; Freedom House, "Freedom in the World," 2018b; UNDP, "Human Development Index," 2018; World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators," database, undated(b); UNHCR, "UNHCR Populations Statistics Database," 2017; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Global Internal Displacement Database," 2017.

NOTE: HDI = Human Development Index.

Table 2.4
Performance Indicators and Peacekeeping Inputs for Burundi

Performance Indicators	First Year of Intervention (2001)	5 Years Later (2006)	10 Years Later (2011)	Through Most Recent Year Available
At peace?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Government effectiveness (scale: -2.5 = low to 2.5 = high)	-1.38	-1.10	-1.06	-1.40
Freedom index (scale: 1 = high to 7 = low)	6.0	4.5	5.0	6.5
GNI per capita, PPP (current international dollars)	\$570	\$630	\$710	\$730
Average annual rate of growth in per capita GDP (%) ^a	---	-0.32%	0.28%	-0.24%
Cumulative growth in per capita GDP (%) ^a	---	-1.77%	2.68%	-4.02%
HDI (scale: 0 = low to 1 = high)	0.268	0.309	0.393	0.404
Peacekeeping Inputs				
Peak AU military presence per capita, number of AMIB troops per 1,000 inhabitants (2004) ^b	0.4			
Peak UN military presence per capita, number of ONUB troops per 1,000 inhabitants (2005) ^c	0.6			
Peak AU international civilian police presence per capita, number of AMIB police per 1,000 inhabitants (2004) ^b	0.0			
Peak UN international civilian police presence per capita, number of ONUB police per 1,000 inhabitants (2005) ^c	0.01			
Average annual per capita assistance in the first five years after intervention (current US\$)	\$35.74			

Table 2.4—continued

^a Average annual rate of growth in per capita GDP and cumulative growth in per capita GDP are based on purchasing power parity (PPP) measured in constant 2011 international dollars.

^b Peak AU military and police force levels are based on 2004 figures, at which time it was estimated that 3,128 military troops and 0 civilian police were deployed to Burundi under AMIB (out of a maximum authorized strength of 3,335 military troops and 0 civilian police).

^c Peak UN military and police force levels are based on 2005 figures, at which time it was estimated that 5,400 military troops and 97 civilian police were deployed to Burundi under ONUB (out of a maximum authorized strength of 5,650 military troops and 120 civilian police).

SOURCES: Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Barbara Harff, "PITF—State Failure Problem Set: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955–2016 Data Set," Center for Systemic Peace, revised June 21, 2017; World Bank, 2018b; IMF, "International Financial Statistics Database," 2017; World Bank, undated(b); Freedom House, 2018a; UNDP, 2018; Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics; United Nations, ONUB website; African Union, AMIB website; RAND calculations. For more information on performance indicators, see Appendix B.

NOTES: GNI = gross national income, PPP = purchasing power parity.

AMIB's financial constraints—along with logistical issues—delayed the deployment of its components and made it more difficult to accomplish its mandate.⁸³ The total cost of the mission ran at \$134 million, exceeding the planned budget.⁸⁴ Because of the precariousness of the security situation in Burundi, with constant violations of the ceasefires by the various rebel groups in 2002–2003, the UN was reluctant not only to deploy its own peacekeeping mission but also to help AMIB find more resources.⁸⁵ AMIB lacked institutional support, as most of the AU mechanisms to conduct peace missions—notably the PSC—were still in the process of being created.⁸⁶ It is therefore

⁸³ Rodt, 2012, pp. 384–385; Williams, 2006, p. 354.

⁸⁴ Agoagye, 2004, p. 13.

⁸⁵ Jackson, 2006.

⁸⁶ Emma Svensson, *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the African Union's First Peace Operation*, Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, September 2008b, p. 18; Rodt, 2012, p. 384.

noteworthy that the AU's first peace mission achieved so much with such limited means.

The SAPSD and AMIB proved able to intervene and execute their limited mandates at a time when the situation felt too unstable for the UN to step in. These two brief African-led missions effectively *built* peace at a time when there was no peace to keep, in the three-year gap between the Arusha Agreement and the signing of the Global Ceasefire Agreement by the CNDD-FDD.

Through political mediation and troops on the ground, South Africa played a prominent role in Burundi's peace process and sustained that role over time, taking part successively in the SAPSD, AMIB, ONUB, BINUB, and the AUSTF.⁸⁷ South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and the DRC were instrumental in getting most Burundian parties around the negotiations table. When the peace process seemed stalled in 2003, South Africa and Uganda again undertook renewed diplomatic efforts with those parties still engaged in conflict, resulting within a few months in the signing of the Global Ceasefire Agreement that effectively brought most of the Burundian conflict to an end.⁸⁸ There were, nevertheless, tensions among these countries. South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma reportedly refused to incorporate troops from Tanzania and Uganda—two countries whom South Africa accused of providing weapons to the CNDD-FDD.⁸⁹

The African-led phases (from 2001 to 2004) of this longer multinational intervention saw a marked reduction in violence and in IDPs, along with slight improvements in governance and human development. The activities of SAPSD and AMIB likely contributed to this reduction in violence, although other factors also played a role. Such improvements continued very gradually throughout the length of the international intervention and beyond, although the country's most recent governance and freedom ratings are actually lower than those in 2001, when the first international mission was deployed, suggesting that some of the other gains may not be sustained.

⁸⁷ Curtis (2003) argues that "[w]ere it not for South Africa's leadership in guaranteeing Arusha and ensuring its implementation, the peace process would undoubtedly have collapsed" (p. 3).

⁸⁸ UNSC, 2003b, para. 12–13 and 17; Jackson, 2006.

⁸⁹ Williams, 2009, p. 100.

Central African Republic

CAR is a landlocked former French colony that shares borders with Cameroon to the west, Chad to the north, Sudan and South Sudan to the east, and the Republic of the Congo and the DRC to the south (see Figure 3.1). In 1996, the country's armed forces (Forces Armées de la Centrafrique [FACA]) conducted three abortive coups in unsuccessful attempts to topple democratically elected president Ange-Félix Patassé. The country has since been engulfed in an almost uninterrupted internal conflict. This peaked in March 2013, when a loose coalition of armed groups named Seleka took over the capital city, Bangui.

For decades, CAR has struggled with severe socioeconomic difficulties compounded by the country's chronic instability and the state's inability to effectively project its presence outside of Bangui, particularly in the border regions with Chad and Sudan. As of February 2017, USAID estimated that 2.2 million people in CAR—more than half of the country's population—required humanitarian assistance.¹ An estimated 434,000 people were internally displaced, and 461,700 lived as refugees in neighboring countries, out of a population of 5.5 million.²

A host of regional and international missions have attempted to stabilize CAR. From 1997 to 2017, a total of 16 such missions were deployed by eight different authorities, including the UN, the AU,

¹ USAID, *Central African Republic—Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #2, Fiscal Year 2017*, February 1, 2017. Population estimate as of July 2016 (Central Intelligence Agency, "Central African Republic," CIA World Factbook, undated(a), accessed April 2017).

² USAID, 2017.

Figure 3.1
Map of the Central African Republic



SOURCE: United Nations Cartographic Section, Map No. 4048, Rev. 8, June 2016.

three subregional African organizations, the EU, an ad hoc coalition of African states, and France (see Table 3.1).

Five of these 16 missions were African-led. First, the Inter-African Commission to Monitor Implementation of the Bangui Accords (MISAB) was deployed in early 1997 at the initiative of a committee comprising the heads of state of Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, and Mali. Operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, MISAB was tasked with monitoring the implementation of the January 25, 1997, Bangui Accords between CAR President Patassé and those who had attempted to remove him from power the previous year. MISAB was replaced by the UN Mission for the Central African Republic (MINURCA), which operated from April 1998 to February 2000. A year after MINURCA came to an end, regional and international organizations were called again to CAR's assistance, in what would become an uninterrupted

Table 3.1
Foreign Interventions in CAR, 1997–2017

Lead Organization or Country	Mission Name	Start Date	End Date	Peak Personnel Strength (Military Unless Specified)
Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali	MISAB	Jan. 1997	Apr. 1998	800
UN	MINURCA	Apr. 1998	Feb. 2000	1,362 23 police
UN	BONUCA	Feb. 2000	Dec. 2009	5 (military observers) 6 police
CEN-SAD	Presidential Protection Force	May 2001	Dec. 2002	300
France	Operation Boali	Oct. 2002	Dec. 2013	300
Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC)	FOMUC	Dec. 2002	Jul. 2008	380
UN	MINURCAT	Sep. 2007	Dec. 2010	3,555 (including 24 military observers) 259 police
EU	EUFOR Tchad/RCA	Jan. 2008	Mar. 2009	3,420
ECCAS	MICOPAX	Jul. 2008	Dec. 2013	730 (including 30 military observers) 150 police
UN	BINUCA	Jan. 2010	Apr. 2014	2 (military observers)
AU	MISCA	Dec. 2013	Sep. 2014	5,100 880 police
France	Operation Sangaris	Dec. 2013	Oct. 2016	2,500
EU	EUFOR RCA	Feb. 2014	Mar. 2015	750
UN	MINUSCA	Apr. 2014	Ongoing	10,338 2,037 police
EU	EUMAM RCA	Mar. 2015	Jul. 2016	60
EU	EUTM RCA	Jul. 2016	Ongoing	170

Table 3.1—continued

NOTES: BINUCA = United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic, BONUCA = United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic, EUFOR RCA = EU Military Operation in the Central African Republic, EUFOR Tchad/RCA = EU Military Operation in Chad and the Central African Republic, EUMAM RCA = EU Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic, EUTM RCA = EU Training Mission in the Central African Republic, MINURCAT = UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, MINUSCA = United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic. African-led missions are in red; UN-led missions are in blue; European-led missions are in green. Data in this table for ongoing missions are current as of mid-2018. In several missions, the peak number of military and/or police personnel who deployed was notably lower than the maximum authorized strength, including FOMUC (authorized strength = 500 troops); MINURCAT (authorized strength = 5,200 troops and 300 police); EUFOR Tchad/RCA (authorized strength = 3,700 troops); MICOPAX (authorized strength = 2,000 troops); MISCA (authorized strength = 6,000 troops); and MINUSCA (authorized strength = 11,650 troops and 2,080 police). In June 1998, MINURCA's peak number of military personnel deployed slightly exceeded its maximum authorized strength of 1,350 troops.

series of African-led missions for the next 13 years, with the Presidential Protection Force (2001–2002); the Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC, 2002–2008); the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX, 2008–2013); and the African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA, 2013–2014).³ Although the Presidential Protection Force, as its name indicates, only aimed to provide for President Patassé's security, the other three more fully qualify as peace-building initiatives, with mandates focusing mostly on security but also covering protection of civilians, support to elections, and stabilization of the country more broadly. Finally, another African-led initiative in CAR was the AU Liaison Office in the Central African Republic, which was authorized in March 2010.⁴ This office supported

³ The African-Led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic is also sometimes called *AFISM-CAR*. The name *MISCA* will be used in the remainder of this chapter.

⁴ Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2013*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013, p. 81.

the election process in 2010–2011 and represented the AU in the steering committee set up for the DDR process.⁵

This chapter focuses on three missions (FOMUC, MICOPAX, and MISCA), examining how they came to existence, implemented their mandate, and altered—or failed to alter—the dramatic course that CAR took from 2002 to 2014. Although each mission had some accomplishments, and none can be held responsible for the disastrous political and security outcome of CAR, several key obstacles prevented these missions from playing more than a marginal role in CAR’s stabilization. The small size and limited operational capacity of these missions were major impediments to success. Rivalry among regional organizations and the prevalence of special interests within regional forces were also damaging to their ability to fulfill their mandates.

Challenges

President Patassé survived two more coup attempts in May 2001 and October 2002, prompting FOMUC in 2002 to stabilize the situation—the first of three African-led missions that would unfold in quick succession over the next 12 years. This section examines the security, humanitarian, governance, democratization, and economic challenges that CAR was facing when FOMUC was established.

Security

On February 15, 2000, the UN withdrew its mission (MINURCA) from CAR on the grounds that the country was sufficiently stable, leaving behind a small UN Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA) with a civilian staff of about 70 people.⁶ Yet the

⁵ Malte Brosig, *Cooperative Peacekeeping in Africa: Exploring Regime Complexity*, London: Routledge, 2015, p. 218. Because of the modest size of that initiative, with only 15 civilian staff as of September 2012 (Center on International Cooperation, 2013, p. 81), it will not be covered in further detail in this chapter.

⁶ ICG, *Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State*, Crisis Group Africa Report No. 136, December 2007d, p. 12. BONUCA’s mandate was “to support the Government’s efforts to consolidate peace and national reconciliation, strengthen democratic institutions,

security situation, particularly in CAR's border areas, remained tenuous due to widespread banditry, poaching, the activity of armed militias, and incursions from fighters from Sudan and particularly Chad.⁷ The situation between Chad and CAR became particularly tense in 2002, when Patassé's main opponent, François Bozizé, found protection in southern Chad, while Patassé offered protection in CAR to prominent figures of the Chadian opposition.⁸ Heavily armed herdsmen routinely crossing between CAR and Chad increased the general insecurity in that area.⁹ On the CAR-Sudan border, members of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the Sudan Armed Forces crossed into CAR either for economic predation or to fight each other.¹⁰

Humanitarian

By May 2002, attacks by armed groups in the north of the country had displaced 6,000 people.¹¹ Patassé created a special unit to combat the rebel forces in the north that was soon accused of major human rights

and facilitate the mobilization of international political support and resources for national reconstruction and economic recovery" (UNSC, "Letter Dated 3 December 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/1999/1235, December 10, 1999, p. 2).

⁷ Eric G. Berman with Louisa N. Lombard, *The Central African Republic and Small Arms: A Regional Tinderbox*, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008, p. 107; Angela Meyer, "Regional Conflict Management in Central Africa: From FOMUC to MICOPAX," *African Security*, Vol. 2, No. 2–3, 2009, p. 160.

⁸ Romain Esmenjaud, "Les opérations de paix africaines en Centrafrique et au Darfour: Bilans et leçons," in Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'Ecole Militaire (IRSEM), *Les défis stratégiques africains: Exploration des racines de la conflictualité en Afrique centrale*, Cahiers de l'IRSEM No. 25, 2013, p. 78; Roland Marchal, "CAR and the Regional (Dis)Order," in Tatiana Carayannis and Louisa Lombard, eds., *Making Sense of the Central African Republic*, London: Zed Books, 2015, p. 176.

⁹ Marchal, 2015, p. 176. Marchal notes that "[w]hile they were always armed, after 1990, their military capability increased dramatically in terms of weapons and skills. . . . Because of the conflicts in Chad and Darfur, weapons were distributed without much control or were looted from military arsenals by defecting soldiers."

¹⁰ Marchal, 2015, p. 177.

¹¹ Number of IDPs in May 2002 (IRIN, "Central Africa Republic: Chronology of 2002," January 17, 2003).

violations in the areas where it operated.¹² Abuses against the population were taking place in Bangui, too. The first coup attempt of May 2001, led by former president Andre Kolingba, resulted in 680 people being prosecuted for alleged involvement.¹³ Following that attempt, a curfew was imposed and remained in place until May 2003.¹⁴ After the second coup attempt of October 2002, led this time by former Army Chief of Staff François Bozizé, BONUCA reported looting, extrajudicial executions, and disappearances, as well as numerous cases of rape.¹⁵

Governance and Civil Administration

CAR has long experienced poor governance, with authorities largely failing to deliver basic services to the population. Both President Kolingba and his successor Patassé were accused of favoritism toward their region of origin, a practice that politicized, weakened, and divided the civil administration and the military.¹⁶ Anthropologist and CAR expert Louisa Lombard describes the country as a coexistence of two spaces rather than a unified territory: One is Bangui, “where political leaders compete to capture the benefits associated with the control of state administration structures,” while the other is a “vast hinterland” neglected by political leaders but “used as a reservoir of resources by bandits from the entire region.”¹⁷ Salaries of civil servants, particularly in remote areas, were often not paid for months, fueling resentment and leading a number of them to refuse taking posts too far from Bangui,

¹² ICG, 2007d, p. 11; Stephen W. Smith, “CAR’s History: The Past of a Tense Present,” in Tatiana Carayannis and Louisa Lombard, eds., *Making Sense of the Central African Republic*, London: Zed Books, 2015, p. 33.

¹³ IRIN, 2003. André Kolingba was the president of CAR from September 1985 to October 1993.

¹⁴ IRIN, 2003.

¹⁵ UNSC, *Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary-General*, S/2003/5, January 3, 2003a, para. 18.

¹⁶ Center on International Cooperation, “Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007, Central Africa Mission Notes,” 2007b; Human Rights Watch, *State of Anarchy: Rebellion and Abuses Against Civilians*, New York, Vol. 19, No. 14(A), September 2007b, p. 26.

¹⁷ Louisa Lombard, “Rébellion et limites de la consolidation de la paix en République centrafricaine,” *Politique africaine*, No. 125, March 2012, p. 190. Our translation from French.

compounding the absence of the state in rural and border areas.¹⁸ Borders were largely porous, allowing criminal activity to flourish and regional conflicts to spill over into CAR. Thus, the CAR border area was used by rebels from the south of Sudan to launch attacks against the north in the 1980s, and by north Sudan to launch attacks against the Sudan People's Liberation Army in the 1990s.¹⁹ Lack of state presence is one of the reasons why several rural communities in the north took up arms against the government in the early 2000s.²⁰

Democratization

Patassé was the first president of CAR elected in free and fair elections. His power, however, was repeatedly contested—partly as a result of his predecessor André Kolingba's favoritism toward southerners, which meant that the army and the country's elite in general were hostile to Patassé, a northerner.²¹ Patassé's lack of trust in the army only increased after the 1996 mutinies, which were the result of months of arrears in salary and poor living conditions for soldiers. Consequently, Patassé bolstered his personal protection by increasing the size of the Presidential Guard by 1,000 and setting up a personal militia.²²

Economic Reconstruction

CAR holds valuable natural resources that include timber, oil, diamonds, and uranium. The soil is fertile in the south of the country and favorable for agriculture. However, the exploitation of these resources has remained limited, partly due to the lack of state presence and public

¹⁸ As of April 30, 2002, public officials were owed 18 months of salary in arrears (UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic*, S/2002/671, June 14, 2002, para. 14). See also Lombard, 2012, p. 195, fn. 16. Lombard notes that as of 2012, civil servants still had to go to Bangui in order to get their paycheck.

¹⁹ ICG, 2007d, p. 25.

²⁰ Louisa Lombard, "A Brief Political History of the Central African Republic," *Cultural Anthropology*, June 2014.

²¹ Center on International Cooperation, 2007b.

²² ICG, 2007d, p. 11; Smith, 2015, p. 33; Brosig, 2015, p. 203.

investments.²³ The absence of an adequate network of transportation routes throughout the country represents a key obstacle to developing the country's periphery.²⁴ Trade is also limited by the prevailing insecurity in the north and northwest of the country, with bandits (called *zaraguinas*, or "road-cutters") particularly active near the borders with Chad and Cameroon.

African and Other International Roles

Through changes in government in CAR since 2002, there has been a series of African-led, UN, and French interventions. Three sequential African-led missions, FOMUC, MICOPAX, and MISCA, attempted to establish security supported by a long-running but small UN political mission (BONUCA) and a small French contingent (Operation Boali). The African-led missions were eventually replaced by a large UN peacekeeping mission, MINURCA, in 2013 after rebel groups overthrew the government. CAR's neighbors, including Sudan, Chad, and the DRC, have contributed to missions to help build peace in CAR. However, some contingents of peacekeepers, especially from Chad, were accused of abuses. Instability, incomplete control of territory, and porous borders in neighboring countries also contributed to the development of rebel groups that undermined CAR's security.

On October 2, 2002, the Presidential Protection Force established by regional economic community CEN-SAD was replaced with FOMUC, a force set up by a different regional economic community, CEMAC. Several African countries, supported by France, were concerned that Libya and its leader Muammar Qaddafi were gaining influence in CAR and wanted to regain the initiative. Libya, which at the time was growing frustrated with the lack of progress in CAR and was eager to improve its relations with the international community, pulled out its troops.²⁵ FOMUC's mandate included protecting

²³ Lombard, 2012, pp. 193–194.

²⁴ Lombard, 2012, p. 195.

²⁵ Esmenjaud, 2013, p. 78.

President Patassé from potential coups—a task it took over from the Presidential Protection Force—as well as monitoring the Chad-CAR border and restructuring CAR's military.²⁶ The first FOMUC contingent, composed of Gabonese soldiers, arrived in Bangui in December 2002, and the force started patrolling the streets of Bangui that same month.²⁷

FOMUC was the first military intervention ever launched by CEMAC.²⁸ CEMAC was an unlikely candidate to sponsor that force because it does not have any security mandate and focuses instead on promoting regional economic cooperation. Peace enforcement and security fall under the purview of ECCAS, whose membership overlaps with CEMAC's (see Figure 3.2).²⁹ Yet, in 2002, ECCAS security mechanisms, such as the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa, were still under development. In the interim, CEMAC became the forum where regional heads of state decided to launch a force to help stabilize their problematic neighbor.³⁰

A small force that never exceeded 380 soldiers—from Chad, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo—FOMUC received financial and logistical support from France during its first two years of existence.³¹ After 2004, the EU took over some of this financial support through its EU African Peace Facility Program. The force also received support

²⁶ IRIN, "Central African Republic: Loyal Troops Retake Bozoum," December 23, 2002.

²⁷ IRIN, 2003.


²⁸ Meyer, 2009, pp. 158–159.

²⁹ CEMAC members are Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo. Established in 1999, CEMAC is an economic and monetary community of Francophone countries all using the CFA Franc as their currency. ECCAS is a broader economic community that includes the same six countries along with Burundi, Rwanda, the DRC, and Sao Tome and Principe. Although it was created in 1983, it remained dormant for several years and was only reactivated in 1998. See AU, "Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)," undated(d).

³⁰ Meyer, 2009, p. 161.

³¹ Réseau de Recherche sur les Opérations de Paix, "Historique de l'opération FOMUC," undated(b); FOMUC's mandate authorized 500 military personnel.

Figure 3.2
Membership of CEN-SAD, CEMAC, and ECCAS



from Germany and China, the latter providing military equipment.³² Two hundred French soldiers (Operation Boali) provided logistical, technical, and—when needed—operational support to FOMUC.³³

As soon as ECCAS completed its new peace and security architecture and was ready to take over, FOMUC troops were re-hatted in 2008 under MICOPAX, an ECCAS force that counted 680 troops at its peak.³⁴ The EU covered almost half of MICOPAX's budget, with France and ECCAS covering 30 percent and 20 percent, respectively. CAR paid less than 1 percent of the mission's costs.³⁵ The French

³² IRIN, 2003.

³³ Brosig, 2015, p. 209. Another purpose of Operation Boali was to conduct train-and-advise missions for the FACA. See International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), *République centrafricaine: Un pays aux mains des criminels de guerre de la Séléka*, No. 616f, September 2013, p. 20.

³⁴ ICG, "Central African Republic: Untangling the Political Dialogue," Africa Briefing No. 55, December 9, 2008a, p. 11; Brosig, 2015, p. 220.

³⁵ Thomas Poulin, "Historique de l'opération MICOPAX," Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix website, February 1, 2012.

Operation Boali provided MICOPAX with the same logistical and operational support it had provided to FOMUC.

The deteriorating security situation in Bangui and the rest of the country, coupled with the realization that MICOPAX did not have sufficient strength, led ECCAS to request assistance.³⁶ In response, the AU announced a new mission on July 19, 2013. Named MISCA, the mission had an authorized strength of 3,500 troops, part of which would be re-hatted MICOPAX troops.³⁷ MISCA's mandate included the protection of civilians, restoration of public order, stabilization of the country, establishment of state authority over the country, support to the provision of humanitarian assistance, and support to DDR and security-sector reform (SSR).³⁸ The mission was deployed on December 19, 2013.

In addition to MISCA, UN's Security Council also authorized the deployment of French forces (Operation Sangaris) to "take all necessary measures to support MISCA in the discharge of its mandate."³⁹ Launched two weeks before MISCA, Operation Sangaris aimed at reestablishing a sufficient level of security in the country to prevent large-scale violence by armed groups against the civilian population and make it possible for MISCA to operate.⁴⁰ Other international actors besides France increased their presence in the country. The EU deployed the 700-strong EUFOR RCA, based in Bangui and acting in support to MISCA, for which it pledged 75 million euros.⁴¹ With

³⁶ Martin Welz, "Multi-Actor Peace Operations and Inter-Organizational Relations: Insights from the Central African Republic," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 23, No. 4, 2016, p. 579. Welz also notes that "[t]he transfer of authority away from ECCAS was initiated from the outside. France, the EU, the USA and the AU agreed that ECCAS's crisis management left a great deal of room for improvement" (p. 583).

³⁷ ICG, "Central African Republic: Better Late Than Never," Africa Briefing No. 96, December 2, 2013, p. 7; Welz, 2016, p. 579.

³⁸ SCR 2127, December 5, 2013, para. 28.

³⁹ UNSC, 2013d, para. 50.

⁴⁰ French Ministry of Defense, "Opération Sangaris," July 2016.

⁴¹ Welz, 2016, p. 579. Other financial contributors included ECCAS, the United States, Canada, Japan, Norway, Luxembourg, South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, and Gambia (AU, "About MISCA: Funding and Partnerships," last updated July 10, 2014).

5,137 military and 602 police personnel, MISCA represented a sizable mission, yet it was still insufficient to handle the situation in CAR and was intended to bridge the gap until a UN mission could deploy.⁴² MINUSCA took over in April 2014 and fully deployed in September 2014.⁴³

An important contributor to African-led missions in CAR has been Chad, which was involved in FOMUC, MICOPAX, and MISCA. Chad's security is closely linked to CAR's due to the porosity of their borders and the rebel groups that move freely from one country to the other. Groups hostile to President of Chad Idriss Déby, in particular, have used CAR as a rear base.⁴⁴ Chad also has economic interests in the region. A number of oil fields are located on both sides of the border, and Chad does not want its production—which almost quintupled its GDP between 2002 and 2014—disrupted.⁴⁵ Chad has been involved in almost all of the episodes of CAR's political drama since the late 1990s.⁴⁶ During MICOPAX and MISCA, Chadian soldiers were particularly present in the Chad-CAR border area.⁴⁷ In April 2014, Chad decided to pull its troops from MISCA after accusations from the UN that its soldiers had opened fire on a market in Bangui, killing 30 civilians and wounding another 300.⁴⁸ The departure of Chad's sizable

⁴² African Union Peace and Security Department, *Thank You MISCA for Piecing Together the Puzzle of Elusive Peace in the Central African Republic*, Addis Ababa: African Union Commission, 2015; FIDH, 2013, p. 20.

⁴³ Welz, 2016, p. 579.

⁴⁴ Welz, 2016, pp. 581–582.

⁴⁵ World Bank, "Overview: Chad," October 18, 2016c; Stefanie Duckstein, "Chad's Role Behind the Scenes in the Central African Republic," *Deutsche Welle*, February 12, 2014.

⁴⁶ Tensions between Chad and CAR were particularly high during the presidency of Patassé. In 2002, following his failed coup attempt, Bozizé found refuge in Chad, while the head of Patassé's personal militia was Chadian rebel leader Martin Koumta Madji (also known as Abdoulaye Miskine). Relations between the two countries improved under the presidency of Bozizé, whom Chad helped to topple Patassé in 2003. Well into his presidency, Bozizé relied on a personal guard of Chadian military personnel for his security (IRIN, 2003; ICG, 2007d, p. 17; Lombard, 2014).

⁴⁷ Welz, 2016, pp. 581–582.

⁴⁸ BBC, "CAR Crisis: UN Says Chad Troops Fired Into Market," April 4, 2014.

contingent—850 military personnel at the time—proved challenging for the AU, which had to replace these troops quickly, as well as for the UN, which had to find troops for its own upcoming mission.⁴⁹ These were not the only instances when Chadian soldiers had been accused of abuses against the population. A U.S. State Department report notes, for instance, that “[a] Chadian MISCA contingent committed extrajudicial killings in Bangui and in multiple villages as they escorted Chadian citizens On March 13 [2014], in what was reportedly an unprovoked attack, Chadian peacekeepers killed seven persons There was no investigation into and no accountability for these killings during the years.”⁵⁰

Military and Police

FOMUC was mandated, first and foremost, to address CAR's security issues.⁵¹ Beyond the protection of President Patassé, it was tasked with monitoring joint CAR-Chad patrols along the two countries' border and disarming rebel groups.⁵² The force, which was initially based in Bangui, deployed two units in Bria and Bozoum—respectively, north-east and northwest of the capital. These units, however, only counted 80 military personnel each, limiting what they could achieve with regard to containing rebel activity.⁵³

Another key element of FOMUC's mandate was restructuring the Central African Army, which was an overaged, small, and predatory force.⁵⁴ Of its 5,000 members, only 1,500 were combat ready, and the

⁴⁹ Somini Sengupta and Alan Cowell, “Chad, Amid Criticism, Will Pull Troops from Force in Central Africa,” *New York Times*, April 3, 2014.

⁵⁰ U.S. State Department, “Central African Republic 2014 Human Rights Report,” 2014, p. 3.

⁵¹ Réseau de Recherche sur les Opérations de Paix, “FOMUC,” undated(a).

⁵² Réseau de Recherche sur les Opérations de Paix, “Mandat de l'opération FOMUC,” undated(c). For more details on DDR programs during the deployment of FOMUC, see ICG, 2007d, pp. 31–32.

⁵³ Meyer, 2009, pp. 161–162.

⁵⁴ Poulin, 2012.

force experienced major recruiting, equipment, and training issues.⁵⁵ FOMUC's efforts were complemented by France's training and equipping of three Army battalions and assistance from BONUCA's (the small advisory UN mission) military section.⁵⁶

MICOPAX's mandate was broader than FOMUC's but still emphasized assisting CAR authorities in establishing security. Unlike the previous mission, it came with a police contingent.⁵⁷ MICOPAX worked to increase the FACA presence on the ground by building barracks in each military region. It was present in Bangui, Paoua, Kaga-Bandoro, and Ndele.⁵⁸ Overall, however, MICOPAX's capacity outside the capital city remained limited throughout the mission's five years of existence.⁵⁹

Intervening at a time of acute crisis for CAR, MISCA had a mandate almost exclusively focused on security and stabilization. It included the protection of civilians, the restoration of security and public order, the stabilization of the country, the restoration of the authority of the government, defense and security sector reform, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid.⁶⁰ MISCA had an authorized police presence of 1,025 personnel, representing almost one-third of the total authorized uniformed personnel.⁶¹

⁵⁵ Poulin, 2012.

⁵⁶ UNSC, "The Situation in the Central African Republic and the Activities of the United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic," S/2003/1209, December 29, 2003c, para. 16.

⁵⁷ Meyer, 2009, pp. 168–169; Poulin, 2012.

⁵⁸ ICG, 2008a, p. 11. Paoua is located in the west, near the borders with Chad and Cameroon; Kaga Bandoro is in the northwest, near the Chad border; and Ndele is in the south, near the border with the Republic of Congo.

⁵⁹ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 22 of Security Council Resolution 2121 (2013)*, S/2013/677, November 15, 2013a, para. 18; ICG, 2013, p. 10.

⁶⁰ UNSC, 2013a, para. 15.

⁶¹ Yvonne Akpasom, "What Roles for the Civilian and Police Dimensions in African Peace Operations?" in Cédric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot, and John Karlsrud, eds., *The Future of African Peace Operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram*, London: Zed Books, 2016, p. 109.

Civil and Economic

After FOMUC failed to keep Patassé in power, it was tasked with supporting the political transition and providing security during the 2005 presidential and legislative elections. Yet its civilian component was small, with only 38 civilian personnel.⁶² Overall, most civilian tasks—from support to political dialogue and mediation to the promotion of national unity and reconciliation—during the mission's deployment fell under BONUCA's purview.⁶³

MICOPAX's mandate was more comprehensive than FOMUC's and included such tasks as supporting the political transition and national reconciliation process and coordinating humanitarian aid.⁶⁴ For that purpose, it was planned that MICOPAX would have a stronger civilian component than FOMUC, but this never materialized, and, during the entire course of the mission, MICOPAX's staff remained overwhelmingly military.⁶⁵ Still, the mission was involved closely in the implementation of the Libreville agreement signed in June 2008 between the government and rebel groups and supported the 2010 elections.⁶⁶ More generally, civil tasks fell largely under the purview of the UN presence in CAR rather than the African-led missions. BONUCA and, after 2010, its successor, BINUCA, were almost exclusively staffed with civilians—78 for BONUCA and almost twice as many for BINUCA.⁶⁷ In 2014, BINUCA was subsumed by MINUSCA.

⁶² Réseau de Recherche sur les Opérations de Paix, undated(b).

⁶³ Djacoba L. Tehindrazanarivelo, "The African Union's Relationship with the United Nations in the Maintenance of Peace and Security," in Abdulqawi A. Yusuf and Fatsah Ouguerouz, eds., *The African Union: Legal and Institutional Framework—A Manual on the Pan-African Organization*, Boston, Mass.: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, p. 404.

⁶⁴ Center on International Cooperation, 2013, p. 77; Meyer, 2009, p. 168–169.

⁶⁵ Center on International Cooperation, 2013, p. 77; Poulin, 2012.

⁶⁶ Poulin, 2012.

⁶⁷ Strength of BONUCA as of October 31, 2008 (Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008, p. 34); Strength of BINUCA as of September 2014 (Center on International Cooperation, "2014 Country Profile," undated).

What Happened

Despite a succession of African-led forces, CAR saw a drastic degradation of security conditions in the country. After FOMUC first arrived in 2002, successive African-led missions were unable to establish peace, defeat rebel groups, prevent coups, or help establish a more effective state. In September 2012, three groups intent on overthrowing Bozizé, the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace, Convention Patriotique pour le Salut wa Kodro, and the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity, formed the Seleka (meaning “alliance” in Sango) coalition and started attacking urban centers, quickly progressing toward the capital. These groups were joined by various other armed actors—combatants from Chad and Darfur, poachers—intent on taking part in what they saw as an opportunity for predation.⁶⁸ In January 2013 in Libreville, Bozizé and Seleka leader Michel Djotodia signed a ceasefire and agreed on the formation of a national unity government that would include members of Seleka and of the political opposition. Bozizé named a prime minister from that latter group, but claims from Seleka that Bozizé was not implementing the Libreville agreement in good faith, particularly on the issue of integrating Seleka fighters into the FACA, led the movement to take up arms again.⁶⁹ In March 2013, Seleka took Bangui and overthrew Bozizé. Even after new CAR president and former Seleka leader Djotodia dissolved his movement, its combatants continued to commit exactions against the population. In reaction, “anti-balaka” (meaning “anti-machete” or “anti-bullet”) groups were created, initially as self-defense units. They soon started targeting all Muslims (the religion of a majority of Seleka leaders and an estimated 15 percent of the population), giving the conflict a sectarian turn, while various militias remained active in CAR’s rural areas.⁷⁰ In 2014, as a

⁶⁸ Smith, 2015, p. 42.

⁶⁹ Paul-Marín Ngoupána, “Central African Republic Rebel Chief to Name Power-Sharing Government,” Reuters, March 24, 2013.

⁷⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, undated(a), accessed April 2017; Wendy Isaacs-Martin, “The Motivations of Warlords and the Role of Militias in the Central African Republic,” African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, December 23, 2015.

UN mission took over from AU-led MISCA, CAR was experiencing its highest-ever levels of violence, massive displacements of the population, and the collapse of a state that had never more than nominally fulfilled its functions.⁷¹

The situation in CAR was thus worse in 2014 than it had been in 2002 in all sectors—security, humanitarian, governance, democratization, and economic reconstruction. The Seleka rebellion, as well as the anti-balaka movement, plunged CAR into a civil war with unprecedented levels of sectarian violence.⁷² UN officials warned that a genocide might be looming.⁷³ Yet, although they could not turn the tide of a deteriorating security situation in CAR, the three African-led missions did make modest but positive contributions, commensurate with the amount of resources they were given to pursue what were, at times, unrealistically ambitious mandates. Such contributions were more significant in the security domain than in the humanitarian, governance, or democratization areas, due to their generally military-heavy composition. The impact of these missions on CAR's economy is even more limited, as this domain largely fell outside of their purview.

Security

Over the 2002–2014 period, new rebel groups came to existence that made insecurity even more prevalent. These include the rebel groups that would eventually form Seleka, as well as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) that terrorized the eastern part of CAR starting in 2008. The successive African-led peace missions successfully reinstated some

⁷¹ Alexis Arieff and Thomas F. Husted, *The Central African Republic: Background and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service Report, December 1, 2016, p. 5.

⁷² See, for instance, Human Rights Watch, "Central African Republic: Massacres in Remote Villages," April 3, 2014; MINUSCA, "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Central African Republic, 15 September 2014–31 May 2015," 2015; FIDH, 2013.

⁷³ Michelle Nichols and Louis Charbonneau, "U.N. Authorises French, African Troops in Central African Republic," Reuters, December 5, 2013.

degree of order in the capital in times of crisis but could never effectively pacify the rest of the country.⁷⁴

Taken individually, each mission has a mixed track record with regard to security. During FOMUC's six years of existence, President Patassé, whom the force was supposed to keep in power, was toppled in a coup, and Chadian mercenaries loyal to Bozizé pillaged Bangui.⁷⁵ Rebellions erupted in the north of the country in 2005–2006, with rebel forces progressing toward Bangui from the border and populations caught in the middle being subject to sectarian violence from the rebels, the Central African Army, and the Presidential Guard.⁷⁶ The *Libérateurs*, a group of disenfranchised individuals—Chadian mercenaries, for a large part—that supported Bozizé in his successful coup against Patassé were instrumental in the eruption of these rebellions, as was the fallout from the Darfur conflict just across the eastern border.⁷⁷

Although FOMUC did play a small role in containing violence—it conducted patrols in the restive areas, arrested combatants, and participated in the peace dialogue between armed groups and the government—overall, it proved unable to reduce the prevalent insecurity due to the small size of the force and the fact that its equipment was, as described by the UN, “either inadequate or old.”⁷⁸ Although, in some instances, patrols along the country's main routes—a rare instance of the mission venturing outside of Bangui—may have acted

⁷⁴ Nathaniel Olin, “Pathologies of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in CAR,” in Tatiana Carayannis and Louisa Lombard, eds., *Making Sense of the Central African Republic*, London: Zed Books, 2015, p. 214.

⁷⁵ ICG, 2007d, p. 16.

⁷⁶ ICG, 2007d, pp. 22–23.

⁷⁷ Meyer, 2009, p. 163; ICG, 2007d, p. 25. The *Libérateurs* turned to banditry and violence after finding that their loyalty had not been rewarded by the new president to the extent that they hoped.

⁷⁸ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic and the Activities of the United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic*, S/2004/1012, December 23, 2004, para. 10; Meyer, 2009, p. 164.

as a deterrent, FOMUC did not have the ability to hold territory, and criminality resumed immediately after its departure from a given area.⁷⁹

Under ECCAS-led MICOPAX, the level of security further deteriorated. In 2008, the LRA started carrying out attacks, which surged in April 2011.⁸⁰ The group was attracted to CAR by its porous borders and lack of state presence that also made it possible to use CAR's territory to smuggle ivory poached in the DRC.⁸¹ As of December 2012, LRA activity had displaced 21,000 people and created 2,400 refugees in CAR.⁸²

MICOPAX participated in the disarmament process of rebel groups that joined the political dialogue with the government. However, the process showed little progress. Few small arms were collected overall, and a proper reintegration strategy for former combatants was lacking.⁸³ The process was also undermined by the refusal of one of the main rebel groups, the Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic (APRD), to participate until mid-2012.⁸⁴ Yet, even after APRD finally joined the process, disarmament efforts did not have much of an impact on the ability of rebel groups to fight.⁸⁵

CAR's security situation took a turn for the worse when groups opposing Bozizé formed the Seleka coalition and attacked two towns north of Bangui. As the number of attacks increased, FACA forces looked increasingly powerless to stop Seleka's advance, while MICOPAX chose not to intervene in the conflict. In addition to requesting a reinforcement for MICOPAX, Bozizé asked Chad and South Africa for assistance. At that point, CAR security forces—FACA, gendar-

⁷⁹ UNSC, 2003c, para. 14.

⁸⁰ Lombard, 2012, p. 192.

⁸¹ Arieff and Husted, 2016 (citing Enough Project), p. 12.

⁸² UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Central African Republic and on the Activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in That Country*, S/2012/956, December 21, 2012.

⁸³ FIDH, 2013, p. 8.

⁸⁴ Poulin, 2012.

⁸⁵ Brosig, 2015, p. 218.

merie, and police—had collapsed, deserting their barracks in spite of the years of training and assistance that MICOPAX and other international partners of CAR's, such as France, had spent in trying to restructure and reinforce CAR's security sector.⁸⁶

Following the January 2013 Libreville agreement, MICOPAX's mandate was updated to include monitoring its implementation.⁸⁷ As some elements of Seleka took up arms again, MICOPAX soldiers and ex-Seleka conducted a joint mission to pacify the south and center of the country.⁸⁸ President of Chad Idriss Deby, who was also at the time the president of ECCAS, limited MICOPAX's role to implementing the Libreville agreement—not taking part in the fighting.⁸⁹ MICOPAX did not oppose the entry of Seleka into Bangui and its taking of power on March 22, 2013.⁹⁰ As Bozizé fled to the DRC, Djotodia became president of CAR. After some back and forth, ECCAS recognized Djotodia on April 18, 2013. The organization decided to deploy 1,500 soldiers in addition to the 500 already in the country and to change the mission's mandate to support the transition—without establishing, however, any precise timetable for these changes.

Overall, MICOPAX's impact on security was limited. On the positive side, the FIDH calls MICOPAX “competent and appreciated by the population.” On the negative side, the same organization notes that the Chadian contingent stands as an exception to the previous assessment and mentions reports of collusion between some Chadian elements of MICOPAX and Chadian elements of Seleka. The organization also mentions reports of MICOPAX soldiers offering to protect

⁸⁶ FIDH, 2013, p. 17.

⁸⁷ Réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix, “Mandat de l'opération MICOPAX,” undated(d), accessed April 2017. This Libreville agreement is separate from the 2008 Libreville agreement that had been brokered between Patassé and rebel groups.

⁸⁸ Poulin, 2012.

⁸⁹ Poulin, 2012.

⁹⁰ Brosig, 2015, p. 219. Similarly, the French contingent did not intervene on the side of Bozizé's forces during the taking of Bangui; the South African contingent that had been deployed in December 2012 to protect Bozizé and provide military training to FACA engaged the rebels militarily, and, after heavy losses, Pretoria decided to withdraw them from the country.

private homes and businesses for money.⁹¹ MICOPAX's results with regard to DDR and SSR were minimal. A May 2013 AU-led military mission of assessment, including representatives from ECCAS, the UN, and the International Organization of Francophonie, showed that only about 10 percent of the roughly 6,000 FACA were still operational, the rest having blended into the population for fear of attacks and reprisals from Seleka.⁹²

AU-led MISCA's impact on security was even more limited, due to its brevity and the fact that it operated in the worst conditions that CAR had experienced to that point. In 2013, the ICG noted that "[t]hree months after its creation, it [MISCA] is still understaffed, its civilian component is extremely weak, its senior management team has only just been appointed and it still does not have administrative resources. For the moment, the only genuine change from MICOPAX to MISCA is the significant increase in the force's numbers, which makes the logistical deficit even more problematic."⁹³ MISCA's size, although larger than its predecessors', allowed it to cover only a fraction of the geographic area affected by the crisis.⁹⁴

Humanitarian

MICOPAX's size and mandate were not sufficient for the severely degraded environment it was facing. A UN interagency technical assessment mission to CAR (October 27–November 8, 2013) concluded that MICOPAX's "ability to protect civilians was seriously limited, with some contingents perceived as siding with particular communities based on religion. Troops also had limited logistical support and lacked equipment."⁹⁵ This inability was particularly marked outside of

⁹¹ FIDH, 2013, p. 19.

⁹² PSC, "Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Central African Republic," PSC/PR/2 (CCCLXXX), June 17, 2013, para. 15.

⁹³ ICG, 2013, pp. 7–8.

⁹⁴ Badmus, 2015.


⁹⁵ UNSC, "Central African Republic Powerless to Resolve Crisis, Security Council Told, as Regional Leader Urges Stronger Mandate for Support Mission," SC/11188, November 25, 2013b.

Bangui, where MICOPAX's three detachments had a limited area of operation and left many parts of the country without any protection.⁹⁶

Chronic insecurity, combined with the growing activity of rebel groups, created a stream of IDPs and refugees (see Figure 3.3). At the same time, CAR was itself a destination for refugees fleeing the conflict in Darfur.⁹⁷ MICOPAX and MISCA could not prevent the collapse of the Central African state in 2013 and the massive human rights abuses and displacements of the population that came with it.⁹⁸

MISCA's effort was also marred with grave accusations of sexual abuses on the population, including on children. Such accusations were

Figure 3.3
Increase of CAR Refugees, 2002–2014



SOURCE: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "UNHCR Population Statistics Database," 2017.

⁹⁶ FIDH, 2013, p. 4.

⁹⁷ Brosig, 2015, p. 210.

⁹⁸ A fact-finding mission from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in June–July 2013 found substantial evidence of war crimes, in addition to other serious violations of human rights, which it blamed largely on the Seleka. See United Nations General Assembly, "Situation of Human Rights in the Central African Republic: Report of

also directed at French and UN troops.⁹⁹ The allegations against some MISCA troops did not prevent some of the alleged perpetrators from being re-hatted as blue helmets in UN-led MINUSCA.¹⁰⁰

Governance and Civil Administration

Governance did not improve during the course of the three missions. The Bozizé regime was marked by an overreliance by the president on members of his family and of his ethnic group.¹⁰¹ Except for control of corruption, all other World Bank governance indicators decreased for CAR over the 2002–2014 period—government effectiveness, for instance, went from the 2.93rd to the 1.44th percentile. Rule of law experienced a particularly dramatic decrease, from the 13.40th percentile in 2002 to the 1.44th percentile in 2014.¹⁰²

MICOPAX saw progress in the political dialogue in CAR, with the Libreville peace agreement in 2008 and the formation of an inclusive government with some members of rebel groups in January 2009. Bozizé created two new ministries with ministers named from the rebel groups, but this did not change the balance of power, which was largely in favor of the president.¹⁰³ As a result, a number of political parties rejected the legitimacy of that government.¹⁰⁴

the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,” A/HRC/24/59, September 12, 2013, para. 92 and 93.

⁹⁹ Marie Deschamps, Hassan B. Jallow, and Yasmin Sooka, *Taking Action on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Report of an Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the Central African Republic*, United Nations, December 17, 2015, pp. 19–20. It is not clear whether some of the accused MISCA soldiers had been in MICOPAX previously.

¹⁰⁰ Deschamps, Jallow, and Sooka, 2015, pp. 74, 93.

¹⁰¹ ICG, 2007d, p. 17.

¹⁰² World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” interactive data access and reports, website, undated(a).

¹⁰³ Lombard, 2012, pp. 205–206.

¹⁰⁴ Poulin, 2012.

Democratization

FOMUC's mandate included explicitly maintaining Patassé in power. Yet, Patassé did not trust FOMUC to keep him in power and tried to get a military force from France to protect him—a request that Paris did not grant.¹⁰⁵ Patassé's concern was well founded: Not only did Paris show a lack of concern for the overthrow of Patassé in favor of Bozizé in March 2003,¹⁰⁶ but several countries from CEMAC—Chad, the Republic of the Congo, and Gabon—supported the coup in various ways, during which CEMAC forces had been instructed not to intervene.¹⁰⁷

After the 2003 coup, FOMUC's mandate included monitoring the transition process and taking part in the preparation of the presidential and legislative 2005 elections.¹⁰⁸ FOMUC provided support to CAR security forces as they ensured the safety of voters during the electoral process, which took place without major incidents.¹⁰⁹ The 2005 elections provided some legitimacy to Bozizé. He won the presidential election and his party received a majority of seats at the National Assembly, but constant rebel attacks continued to threaten his presidency.¹¹⁰

Economic Reconstruction

Economically, the situation in 2014 was even more critical than at the beginning of the period. In some regions, constant rebel activity had caused major destruction of infrastructure and resulted in the absence of the most basic services, from health and education to water supply.¹¹¹ The conflict brought economic activities to a low, disrupted trade, and

¹⁰⁵ ICG, 2007d, p. 15.

¹⁰⁶ ICG, 2007d, p. 15.

¹⁰⁷ ICG, 2007d, p. 16.

¹⁰⁸ Meyer, 2009, pp. 161–162.

¹⁰⁹ UNSC, "Security Council Gratified by Successful Presidential, Legislative Elections in Central African Republic," press release, SC/8457, July 22, 2005.

¹¹⁰ ICG, 2007d, p. 17.

¹¹¹ ICG, 2013, p. 12.

impeded farming, resulting in food insecurity.¹¹² As of 2014, CAR's HDI was the second lowest in the world after Niger, with a life expectancy at birth of 50.7 years and a GNI per capita of 581 PPP dollars—the lowest in the world.¹¹³ External aid increased drastically, with CAR receiving in 2014 \$611 million in bilateral official development aid (ODA)—three times what it had received in 2013 (\$203 million).¹¹⁴ CAR also benefited from specific initiatives from the AU, such as the needs assessment it carried out in the country in August 2016¹¹⁵ and the setting up of an African Solidarity Conference for the Central African Republic¹¹⁶ aimed at garnering donor support to implement CAR's National Plan for Recovery and Peacebuilding (2017–2021).¹¹⁷

Lessons Learned

By almost any standard, these three African-led missions failed to arrest the decline in security or the decline of any of the other political, economic, or social indicators. The best that can be said is that without these efforts, the country would be even worse off. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 summarize the peacekeeping inputs and outcomes for CAR.

¹¹² PSC, 2013, para. 15.

¹¹³ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development*, New York, 2015, Table 1, “Human Development Index and Its Components,” pp. 208–211.

¹¹⁴ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “Aid (ODA) Disbursements to Countries and Regions,” data extracted from OECD website on September 21, 2017.

¹¹⁵ Institute for Security Studies, “Life Support for the Central African Republic,” September 30, 2016.

¹¹⁶ The conference is described as aiming “to mobilise multi-faceted support from the AU Member States and contribute to the post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts of the CAR” (AU, “African Solidarity Conference for the Central African Republic,” last updated February 3, 2017.)

¹¹⁷ This plan was drafted by the CAR government with the support of the EU, the UN, and the World Bank. See World Bank, *Central African Republic: National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan 2017–21*, 2018a.

Yet, comparing the overall situation in CAR in 2014 with what prevailed in 2002 says little about what each individual mission achieved. Such a comparison would suggest that peacekeeping missions had a net negative effect on the country, while they, in fact, had some positive impacts—albeit limited.¹¹⁸ It would also attribute too much responsibility for CAR's negative trajectory to missions that were small and poorly resourced and whose effect on the overall situation was, at best, marginal. These missions were not resourced or intended to address the deep political and security challenges facing CAR.

The impact of FOMUC, MICOPAX, and MISCA on the situation in CAR is also difficult to isolate against the background of the other missions that operated in CAR at the same time. Although some institutional overlap and duplication is usual in a postconflict country, the concurrence of missions took an extreme turn in CAR, with African-led missions working with other international actors on every aspect of their mandate.

Thus, the lessons to be derived from the experience of African-led missions in CAR are largely negative, highlighting several key problems:

- the limited sizes and operational capacity
- competition between African organizations
- the interference of national interests in regional interventions
- limited resource provision to the missions
- the porous borders that allowed external rebels to destroy infrastructure, displace communities, and disrupt community economic and sustenance activities.

African organizations tried to address these problems, but, in spite of their efforts, they never caught up with the demands of the situation. At the N'Djamena Summit in April 2013, ECCAS member states pledged to contribute more troops for MICOPAX—an addi-

¹¹⁸ For instance, MICOPAX's provision of security during the 2010 elections reportedly played a critical role in ensuring that the vote could take place in some regions (Poulin, 2012).

Table 3.2
Peacekeeping Outputs: Central African Republic, 2002–2014

	Estimated Annual Conflict Fatalities ^a	GDP Per Capita Growth (%)	Freedom Score (7 = worst, 1 = best)	HDI Score (0 = worst, 1 = best)	Government Effectiveness Score (–2.5 = worst, 2.5 = best)	Refugee Population	IDP Population	African-Led Missions ^b	Other Missions (Country/ Organization) ^b
2002	539	1.62%	5.0	0.316	–1.54	25,000	---	Pres. Protection Force (CEN-SAD), FOMUC (CEMAC)	BONUCA (UN), Operation Boali (FRN)
2003	84	–7.16%	6.0	0.315	–1.46	35,000	---	FOMUC (CEMAC)	BONUCA (UN), Operation Boali (FRN)
2004	80	4.08%	5.5	0.319	–1.53	31,000	---	FOMUC (CEMAC)	BONUCA (UN), Operation Boali (FRN)
2005	73	–0.87%	4.5	0.323	–1.56	43,000	---	FOMUC (CEMAC)	BONUCA (UN), Operation Boali (FRN)
2006	296	2.93%	4.5	0.330	–1.50	72,000	147,000	FOMUC (CEMAC)	BONUCA (UN), Operation Boali (FRN)
2007	216	2.80%	5.0	0.338	–1.54	98,000	197,000	FOMUC (CEMAC)	MINURCAT (UN), BONUCA (UN), Operation Boali (FRN)

Table 3.2—continued

	Estimated Annual Conflict Fatalities ^a	GDP Per Capita Growth (%)	Freedom Score (7 = worst, 1 = best)	HDI Score (0 = worst, 1 = best)	Government Effectiveness Score (–2.5 = worst, 2.5 = best)	Refugee Population	IDP Population	African-Led Missions ^b	Other Missions (Country/ Organization) ^b
2008	192	0.42%	5.0	0.345	–1.37	125,000	197,000	FOMUC (CEMAC), MICOPAX (ECCAS)	MINURCAT (UN), BONUCA (UN), Operation Boali (FRN), EUFOR Tchad/ RCA (EU)
2009	268	0.35%	5.0	0.352	–1.41	160,000	197,000	MICOPAX (ECCAS)	MINURCAT (UN), BONUCA (UN), Operation Boali (FRN), EUFOR Tchad/ RCA (EU)
2010	412	2.02%	5.0	0.361	–1.39	165,000	193,000	MICOPAX (ECCAS)	MINURCAT (UN), BONUCA (UN), Operation Boali (FRN)
2011	218	2.66%	5.0	0.366	–1.28	163,000	105,000	MICOPAX (ECCAS)	BINUCA (UN), Operation Boali (FRN)
2012	260	3.78%	5.0	0.370	–1.45	165,000	132,000	MICOPAX (ECCAS)	BINUCA (UN), Operation Boali (FRN)

Table 3.2—continued

	Estimated Annual Conflict Fatalities ^a	GDP Per Capita Growth (%)	Freedom Score (7 = worst, 1 = best)	HDI Score (0 = worst, 1 = best)	Government Effectiveness Score (−2.5 = worst, 2.5 = best)	Refugee Population	IDP Population	African-Led Missions ^b	Other Missions (Country/Organization) ^b
2013	2,556	−36.83%	7.0	0.345	−1.61	253,000	935,000	MICOPAX (ECCAS), MISCA (AU)	BINUCA (UN), Operation Boali (FRN), Operation Sangaris (FRN)
2014	3,607	0.69%	7.0	0.347	−1.85	412,000	439,000	MISCA (AU)	BONUCA (UN), Operation Boali (FRN)

^a Reliable conflict fatality data are difficult to obtain, particularly in Africa. We compared several notable data sets: CCAPS' ACLED, START's Global Terrorism Database (GTD), UCDP's Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, UCDP's One-Sided Violence Dataset, UCDP's Non-State Conflict Dataset, and Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Dataset. The data varied widely across these sources, though the trends generally agreed. Overall, we judged ACLED to be the most inclusive data set, but fatality data presented in this table should be interpreted as conservative estimates.

^b Country codes: BFO = Burkina Faso; CHA = Chad; GAB = Gambia; MLI = Mali; FRN = France.

SOURCES: Raleigh et al., 2010; World Bank, 2018b; Freedom House, 2018a; UNDP, 2018; World Bank, undated(b); UNHCR, 2017; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2017.

Table 3.3
Performance Indicators and Peacekeeping Inputs for Central African Republic

Performance Indicators	First Year of Intervention (1997)	5 Years Later (2002)	10 Years Later (2007)	Through Most Recent Year Available
At peace?	---	No	No	No
Government effectiveness (scale: -2.5 = low to 2.5 = high)	-1.46	-1.54	-1.54	-1.77
Freedom index (scale: 1 = high to 7 = low)	4.0	5.0	5.0	7.0
GNI per capita, PPP (current international dollars)	\$610	\$700	\$810	\$700
Average annual rate of growth in per capita GDP (%) ^a	---	0.64%	0.50%	-0.76%
Cumulative growth in per capita GDP (%) ^a	---	3.05%	4.44%	-21.7%
HDI (scale: 0 = low to 1 = high)	0.307	0.316	0.338	0.352
Peacekeeping Inputs				
Peak AU military presence per capita, number of MISCA troops per 1,000 inhabitants (2014) ^b	1.06			
Peak UN military presence per capita, number of MINUSCA troops per 1,000 inhabitants (2017) ^c	2.11			
Peak AU international civilian police presence per capita, number of MISCA police per 1,000 inhabitants (2014) ^b	0.18			
Peak UN international civilian police presence per capita, number of MINUSCA police per 1,000 inhabitants (2017) ^c	0.35			
Average annual per capita assistance in the first five years after intervention (current US\$)	\$26.39			

Table 3.3—continued

^a Average annual rate of growth in per capita GDP and cumulative growth in per capita GDP are based on purchasing power parity (PPP) measured in constant 2011 international \$.

^b Peak AU military and police force levels are based on 2014 figures, at which time it was estimated that 5,100 military troops (out of a maximum authorized strength of 6,000 military troops) and 880 civilian police were deployed to CAR under MISCA.

^c Peak UN military and police force levels are based on 2017 figures, at which time it was estimated that 10,337 military troops and 1,697 civilian police were deployed to CAR under MINUSCA (out of a maximum authorized strength of 10,750 military troops and 2,080 civilian police).

SOURCES: Marshall, Gurr, and Harff, 2017; World Bank, 2018b; IMF, 2017; World Bank, undated(b); Freedom House, 2018a; UNDP, 2018; United Nations, MINUSCA website; African Union, MISCA website; RAND calculations. For more information on performance indicators, see Appendix B.

tional 2,000 in total—but these reinforcements never materialized.¹¹⁹ MISCA's initial mandate was for 3,652 personnel, later revised to 6,000.¹²⁰ This represents a quantitative jump when compared with MICOPAX, but that number was still small, considering the needs of CAR at the time. Even the better-equipped Sangaris could achieve little outside of Bangui to establish peace, given CAR's size and the challenges it faced. It took a UN mission, MINUSCA, to reach 12,158 uniformed personnel and 1,007 civilians and finally extend control of the peace mission from Bangui to all of CAR.¹²¹

If it is difficult for the reader to keep track of the names, mandates, participants, and sponsoring organizations of these missions, one can only imagine the confusion prevailing among the local population and even its leaders. The several regional organizations that deployed a mission in CAR experienced some degree of competition and overlap, which, in some cases, affected the efficiency of the mission. This is particularly the case for ECCAS and the AU. The AU was critical of

¹¹⁹ ICG, 2013, p. 7.

¹²⁰ UNSC, 2013a, para. 15.

¹²¹ Figures as of February 28, 2017. United Nations, "Peacekeeping Fact Sheet," February 28, 2017a; French Ministry of Defense, 2016.

ECCAS's decision to recognize Djotodia as the legitimate president of CAR.¹²² Meanwhile, ECCAS was reluctant to yield power to the AU, even as its mission, MICOPAX, was clearly insufficient to address a worsening situation in CAR. This affected MISCA negatively, delaying the effective beginning of the operation at a time when the security situation in CAR was becoming critical.¹²³ Eventually, ECCAS managed to keep some degree of political control over the AU mission through occupying its management positions.

Each of the three African-led missions ended either for bureaucratic reasons (e.g., MICOPAX replacing FOMUC because ECCAS was ready to take charge) or because they were overwhelmed by the severity of the situation. FOMUC replaced the Presidential Protection Force when it became clear that it was too small to operate beyond Bangui, at a time when violence was increasing in the northern regions and France and CAR's neighbors wished to curtail Libya's influence.¹²⁴ MISCA replaced MICOPAX because the situation on the ground was becoming too taxing for MICOPAX's limited capacity; MINUSCA then replaced MISCA for similar reasons. As the situation in CAR deteriorated, missions became overwhelmed and were replaced by larger missions with a broader mandate that soon found themselves overwhelmed in turn.

The successive African-led interventions in CAR also illustrate what Welz and Meyer (2014) call "interference of particular interest" on the part of one or more of the countries intervening.¹²⁵ Chad, in particular, has been an important contributor to African-led missions

¹²² Welz, 2016, p. 586.

¹²³ ICG, 2013, p. 7; Welz, 2016, p. 586. The AU "commended [countries contributing to MICOPAX] for their commitment and sacrifices" but made a very critical assessment of the mission: "The Mission faces many challenges, related particularly to the inappropriateness of its mandate within the present security context, the lack of clarity in its chain of command, the lack of logistics and financial resources, the lack of clarity in the security plan for Bangui and the disproportionate size of its headquarters compared to the size of the Mission" (PSC, 2013, para. 17).

¹²⁴ Brosig, 2015, p. 209; Esmenjaud, 2013, p. 78.

¹²⁵ Martin Welz and Angela Meyer, "Empty Acronyms: Why the Central African Republic Has Many Peacekeepers, but No Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, July 24, 2014.

in CAR due to its security, political, and economic interests in this country. Yet Chad's contribution was both an asset and a liability.

Lombard (2012) explains the failure of these international interventions by the fact that the state never possessed the monopoly of violence.¹²⁶ Without an effective state presence, particularly in border areas, armed groups function both as providers of and threats to security for the population. With no better security provider in sight, and when peace looks more like a lower-level phase of conflict than an absence of violence, such groups are unlikely to disarm.¹²⁷

In this situation, small peace-building missions could provide some degree of security in the capital and usually (albeit not always) provide some modicum of stability to the regime in place. In times of acute crisis, however—such as when armed groups threatened to take over the capital or to commit large-scale killings or abuses of civilians—the situation in CAR required a large peace-building presence that regional organizations could provide and that others—the UN and bilateral partners, such as France—were willing to offer until the near collapse of the state and the prospect of genocide forced their hand.

¹²⁶ Lombard, 2012, p. 203.

¹²⁷ Lombard, 2012, p. 203.

Darfur, Sudan

Darfur is the westernmost region of Sudan, bordering Chad, Libya, CAR, and southern Sudan (now South Sudan) (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Armed conflict and a large-scale humanitarian crisis have consumed the Darfur region since 2003. The immediate trigger of the violence was the creation and initial successes of two Darfurian rebel groups. In response, the Government of Sudan (GoS) launched a counterinsurgency campaign and armed local militia, collectively called the *Janjaweed*. At a deeper level, the conflict reflects mounting challenges throughout Darfur and the Sudanese state, including decades of neglectful national governance, bankrupt local law-and-order structures, regional conflicts and proxy dynamics, manipulated ethnic tensions, and increasing resource scarcity.

The first wave of violence (2003–2005) killed at least 35,000 civilians and affected more than 2.4 million.¹ In the decade and a half since, conflict dynamics have evolved as groups splintered, communal and intragroup rivalries emerged, banditry and crime rose, and the government launched periodic offensives. As of July 2017, the security situation remained volatile, despite two peace agreements and two interna-

¹ Debarati Guha-Sapir and Olivier Degomme, “Counting the Deaths in Darfur: Estimating Mortality from Multiple Survey Data,” *Households in Conflict Network*, 2006; Evelyn Depoortere, Francesco Checchi, France Broillet, Sibylle Gerstl, Andrea Minetti, Olivia Gayraud, Virginie Briet, Jennifer Pahl, Isabelle Defourny, Mercedes Tatay, and Vincent Brown, “Violence and Mortality in West Darfur, Sudan (2003–04): Epidemiological Evidence from Four Surveys,” *The Lancet*, Vol. 364, No. 9442, October 9, 2004, pp. 1315–1320; Olivier Degomme and Debarati Guha-Sapir, “Patterns of Mortality Rates in Darfur Conflict,” *The Lancet*, Vol. 375, No. 9711, January 23, 2010, pp. 294–300.

Figure 4.1
Map of Sudan



SOURCE: United Nations Cartographic Section, Map No. 4458, Rev. 2, March 2012.

tional peacekeeping missions. The root causes of the conflict had not been adequately addressed, and more than 2 million Darfuris remained displaced.² Nonetheless, as early as 2016, the GoS began to push for the current hybrid UN and AU mission to leave the country, arguing that the 2016 regional referendum marked the completion of the most recent peace agreement. In June 2017, the UN and AU renewed the UNAMID mission for another year—under a revised mandate and with reduced force numbers—but insisted that previously set benchmarks for a successful conclusion to the operation had not yet been reached.

The international community has undertaken two missions to Darfur since the start of the conflict. AMIS deployed in 2004, after

² United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview (1 July 2017),” July 1, 2017d.

Figure 4.2
Map of Darfur



SOURCE: United Nations Cartographic Section, Map No. 4262, Rev. 1, December 2007.

the government and two rebel groups signed the Humanitarian Cease-fire Agreement (HCA). Initially intended as a very small observer mission, AMIS's size and mandate grew significantly as violence in the region continued unabated and the humanitarian situation deteriorated. Meanwhile, pressure mounted for the UN to assume peacekeeping responsibilities from the resource-stressed AU—a proposal that the GoS strongly resisted. Eventually, a compromise was reached for the creation of a novel UNAMID, on the condition that its force would be “African in character.” In January 2008, AMIS peacekeepers were re-hatted under UNAMID command, with an expanded mandate, in what was then the largest mission the UN had ever authorized.³ During this period, the UN also deployed two additional missions elsewhere in Sudan—the UN Mission in Sudan (2005–2011) and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (2011–present)—but this chapter focuses on the Darfur experience.⁴ Table 4.1 summarizes the major peacekeeping missions in Sudan from 2000 to 2017.

This chapter examines AMIS and UNAMID as cases of African-led and co-led peace operations, respectively. Although the AU clearly led the initial AMIS mission, the unique African role in UNAMID is more opaque. In the transition from AMIS to UNAMID, the AU formally retained a co-leadership role, but for all intents and purposes the mission, as one UN official explained, operationally became a UN-led

³ And it remained the most expensive mission for six consecutive budget cycles (David Lanz, “African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID),” in Joachim A. Koops, Thierry Tardy, Norrie MacQueen, and Paul D. Williams, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015.

⁴ Sudan has been involved in numerous, lengthy internal wars since independence. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established in 2005 to support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which primarily addressed the decades-old conflict between Khartoum and southern Sudanese. UNMIS transitioned into the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) when South Sudan declared independence in 2011. The second mission, the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), was established in 2011 after violence escalated in the disputed Abyei Area between Sudan and the new South Sudan. UNISFA's 4,200 Ethiopian peacekeepers are mandated to verify the redeployment of armed groups, monitor the demilitarized area, and protect civilians and aid workers.

Table 4.1
Foreign Interventions in Sudan, 2000–2017

Lead Organization or Country	Mission Name	Region Within Sudan	Start Date	End Date	Peak Personnel Strength (Military Unless Noted)
AU	AMIS (AMIS II) (AMIS II-E)	Darfur	Jun. 2004 (Oct. 2004) (Apr. 2005)	Dec. 2007	5,874 (including 646 military observers) 1,456 police
AU and UN	UNAMID	Darfur	Jan. 2008	Ongoing	18,097 (including 319 military observers) 5,511 police

Interventions Simultaneously Deployed to Other Parts of Sudan

UN	UNMIS	Southern Sudan	Mar. 2005	Jul. 2011 (became UNMISS)	9,817 (including 513 military observers) 702 police
UN	UNISFA	Abyei	June 2011	Ongoing	4,545 (including 135 military observers) 29 police

NOTES: African-led missions are in red; UN-led missions are in blue; hybrid AU-UN missions are in purple. Data in this table for ongoing missions are current as of mid-2018.

endeavor.⁵ The head of mission, an African, is jointly appointed by the AU and the UN, but command and control of the forces is provided by the UN. The mission composition and leadership remained predominantly African, as required by the mission mandate, but experts suggest that the AU's most valuable contributions were of a political nature, mediating the often-contentious relationship between the UN and the Sudanese government.⁶ UNAMID is not exclusively or even dominantly African-led, therefore, but studying it does offer context for how African-led operations evolve and the role of African countries and institutions in contributing to joint efforts with international

⁵ Author phone interview with UN official, June 5, 2017.

⁶ Author phone interview with UN officials, June 5 and 9, 2017.

partners. The following sections examine the challenging context into which both missions deployed, the evolution of their mandates, and their impact on the Darfur conflict from 2003 to present.

Challenges

The Darfur conflict and humanitarian crisis reflects both underlying structural challenges—including hyper-domination of the capital, unequal development, increasing resource scarcity, manipulated ethnicity, and poor conflict management—and more-proximate causes related to political maneuvering and national conflict developments. Alex de Waal argues that in many ways the conflict in Darfur was “over-determined.”⁷ Out of this mix of root problems and immediate triggers, the following sections examine in greater detail the security, humanitarian, governance, democratization, and economic challenges facing Darfur as the rebellion and counterinsurgency unfolded. They outline the situation that African peacekeepers confronted when AMIS first deployed in 2004.

Security

The timing of the armed violence in Darfur perhaps best reflects events unfolding around *another* ongoing center-periphery conflict in Sudan. The advancing Naivasha negotiations to end the decades-long war between the Sudan and southern Sudanese rebels (the Sudan People's Liberation Army and Sudan People's Liberation Movement) pushed other marginalized populations across Sudan to jockey for inclusion in the proposed comprehensive national reform process.⁸ In this context, two Darfuri groups—the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—took up arms against

⁷ Alex de Waal, “Sudan: What Kind of State? What Kind of Crisis?” Occasional Paper Series, Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, April 2007b.

⁸ Prunier states, “it was largely the changes in the diplomatic North-South relationship which finally worked as an eye-opener for the young people of the West and drove them to take up arms” (Gérard Prunier, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005).

the Arab-dominated national government in early 2003 to protest years of political and economic disenfranchisement and began attacking government outposts.⁹ In April, a joint attack against the El Fasher airport destroyed a dozen military aircraft and announced the rebels as a significant fighting force.¹⁰ After some initial confusion over how to handle the emerging insurgency in its west, the government decided to try to defeat the Darfur rebels before they could jeopardize the high-profile southern negotiations.

The government launched its counterinsurgency campaign in 2003. To bolster its overstretched army, it began arming local Arab tribes, colloquially called the *Janjaweed*. The ethnic dimensions of the Darfur conflict has roots in the differential group access to land, resources, and power in Darfur;¹¹ however, the simplified Arab versus African polarization also reflects the manipulation of race and ethnicity by all parties to the conflict.¹² Continuing a history of divide-

⁹ The SLA announced its existence in February 2003. Derived from Fur self-defense militias originally created in 1988–1989, most of its members were from Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit groups who felt that local Arab groups and the Khartoum government were conspiring against them. JEM did not initially “pack the same military punch” as the SLA. Nonetheless, and more than the SLA, it struck fear into the Sudan government because of its politically savvy leader, Khalil Ibrahim. Ibrahim had previously held several posts within the Khartoum government but left in 1998 and released the infamous “Black Book” with other dissidents in 2000 (Prunier, 2005).

¹⁰ This attack was larger than the southern rebels had managed in decades of conflict (Alex de Waal, “Mission Without End? Peacekeeping in the African Political Marketplace,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 1, January 2009, pp. 99–113).

¹¹ Historically, land, resources, and power were distributed among the region’s groups on the basis of ethnicity and mode of livelihoods. Sedentary farmers—generally non-Arabs—mostly received ownership over specific lands, while others, particularly nomadic Arab pastoralists, were often excluded from land—and subsequently governance structures—due to their transient lifestyles. This was less conflictual in the past when land and water were more abundant and a traditional system of seasonal reciprocity and resource-sharing evolved. Climate change and desertification, however, have stressed available resources and increased exploitable tensions between groups.

¹² By 2003, Darfur’s diverse and complex ethnic identities were increasingly simplified to an African versus “Arab” dichotomy. The Arab/African construction was jointly the result of a political ideology of Arab supremacism exported from neighboring states, especially Qaddafi’s Libya and Chad; a simplification used by the rebels themselves, in opposition to a national government that they saw as Arab-dominated; and a construction that Khartoum

and-rule counterinsurgency tactics, Khartoum recruited Arab tribes in Darfur—especially the landless Northern Rizeigat—in part through a strategy of stoking ethnic fears by depicting the rebellion—led primarily by African Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit tribes—as being anti-Arab.¹³

The initial intense period of violence in Darfur lasted from September 2003 to March 2004. Government attacks against alleged rebel communities followed a standard pattern of air raids by government aircraft followed by the arrival of Janjaweed, on camel or in jeeps, and involved widespread destruction, death, and abuse.¹⁴ Almost 600 villages (598) were bombed in 2003 and another 864 in the summer of 2004.¹⁵ Rebel groups also committed serious violations of human rights in attacking Arab communities, though not on the same scale as the government.¹⁶ By 2005, approximately 75 percent of all villages in Darfur had been damaged or destroyed. Survivors fled—either displaced within Darfur or entering Chad—and insecurity persisted both outside and inside displacement camps. Mortality figures during this period are highly controversial; the most authoritative study estimated at least 300,000 deaths from 2003 to 2008.¹⁷ Initially, most deaths were the result of violent attacks, but eventually over 80 percent

leveraged to divide and manipulate the region's diverse groups (Alex de Waal, *Famine That Kills: Darfur, Sudan*, revised ed., Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005).

¹³ Alex de Waal, "Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap," *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 31, No. 102, 2004, pp. 716–725.

¹⁴ de Waal, 2004, p. 723; Prunier, 2005; William G. O'Neill and Violette Cassis, "Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur," Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, November 2005.

¹⁵ Linnéa Gelot, *Legitimacy, Peace Operations and Global-Regional Security: The African Union–United Nations Partnership in Darfur*, London: Routledge, 2012, p. 4.

¹⁶ Raids on Arab nomads and villages, hijacking humanitarian aid vehicles, burning, looting, and kidnapping—AU monitors have confirmed numerous cases throughout the three Darfur states (O'Neill and Cassis, 2005).

¹⁷ The Sudanese government put forward a very low figure of 9,000, while some estimated that as many as 400,000 people had died in Darfur (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Sudan: Death Toll in Darfur," fact sheet, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, March 25, 2005; Associated Press, "Death Toll of 200,000 Disputed in Darfur," NBC News, March 28, 2008).

were caused by disease and hunger, reflecting the hazards of extended displacement.¹⁸

The number of armed groups operating in Darfur during this early period is difficult to estimate. In 2004, the Sudanese Army officially numbered 200,000 troops, though it only had a logistical capacity for about 60,000.¹⁹ Between 40,000 and 45,000 troops were believed to have deployed to Darfur by 2005.²⁰ Calculations for the number of Janjaweed in this period range from 10,000²¹ to 20,000.²² The two main insurgent groups, the SLA and JEM, were thought to have several thousand fighters each.²³ Most assessments emphasize that the various forces were typically trained, cohesive, and motivated units, well-equipped and well-supported, and deployed across a very large and difficult terrain.²⁴

Humanitarian

By November 2004, more than 1.8 million people were uprooted by the violence in Darfur—some 1.6 million of them were displaced internally within Sudan, while another 200,000 sought refuge in neighbor-

¹⁸ Degomme and Guha-Sapir, 2010, p. 299. In this way, the Darfur conflict “shows a typical pattern of mortality rates with time.”

¹⁹ UN, *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General: Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1546 of 18 September 2004*, Geneva, January 25, 2005, para. 78.

²⁰ ICG, “The AU’s Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps,” Africa Briefing, July 6, 2005a, p. 10, footnote 60.

²¹ ICG, 2005a.

²² David C. Gompert, Courtney Richardson, Richard L. Kugler, and Clifford H. Bernath, *Learning from Darfur: Building a Net-Capable African Force to Stop Mass Killing*, National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2005.

²³ ICG, 2005a.

²⁴ Sarah E. Kreps, “The United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur: Implications and Prospects for Success,” *African Security Review*, Vol. 16, No. 4, December 1, 2007, p. 76; O’Neill and Cassis, 2005, p. 17; Human Rights Watch, *Imperatives for Immediate Change: The African Union Mission in Sudan*, New York, Vol. 18, No. 1(A), January 2006a; Small Arms Survey, “Supply and Demand: Arms Flows and Holdings in Sudan,” Issue Brief, Geneva, December 2009.

ing Chad.²⁵ Civilians were subjected to a wide range of abuses by all parties to the conflict, including indiscriminate bombing and killing, rape, torture, and the destruction of livelihoods. The internally displaced gathered in more than 100 fragile and poorly organized temporary settlements or camps that lacked basic infrastructure, were severely overcrowded, and provided only limited access to health care.²⁶ Levels of malnutrition significantly exceeded emergency thresholds, and civilians remained exposed to daily threats of violence, sexual harassment, and further displacement.²⁷

Throughout 2003, the international attention to the escalating crisis was negligible, despite calls by local and some international organizations.²⁸ This changed in March 2004 when, in the context of the tenth anniversary of the Rwanda genocide, the link was made between Rwanda and Darfur.²⁹ Darfur quickly became a highly publicized conflict—civil society activists around the world organized, the U.S. government called the situation in Darfur a “genocide,” and individual countries imposed sanctions and began to substantially fund a humanitarian effort.³⁰ In March 2004, there were only about 200 aid workers in Darfur. By the time AMIS started to deploy in June 2004,

²⁵ UNHCR, “UNHCR Withdraws South Darfur Staff over Sudanese Restrictions,” press release, November 11, 2004.

²⁶ World Health Organization, *Darfur: One Year On*, Khartoum: WHO Country Office in Sudan, 2004a.

²⁷ World Health Organization, 2004a; World Health Organization, “Health Update for Darfur, Sudan and Chad,” World Health Organization Media Centre, August 31, 2004b.

²⁸ Prunier, 2005; World Health Organization, 2004a.

²⁹ In March 2004, the UN’s humanitarian coordinator in Sudan said that “the only difference between Rwanda and Darfur now is the numbers involved.” The European Parliament allowed that the situation was “tantamount to genocide,” and, in late 2004, the UNSC passed Resolution 1564 calling for a Commission of Inquiry on Genocide in Sudan (Agence France-Presse, “West Sudan’s Darfur Conflict ‘World’s Greatest Humanitarian Crisis,’” *Sudan Tribune*, March 19, 2004; Rebecca Hamilton, *Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

³⁰ World Health Organization, 2004a.

Darfur hosted the world's largest humanitarian operation, with more than 9,100 aid workers active in the region by the end of that year.³¹

Governance and Civil Administration

In many ways, the Darfur crisis is a story about Sudan's larger governance in crisis, characterized by hyper-domination by the capital and the failure to govern or provide basic services locally.³² De Waal describes Sudan as a "turbulent state" affected by "chronic political instability."³³ Decades of intra-elite competition in the capital impeded coherent and stable state-building. Instead, elites became "skilled at the default option of short-term crisis management," including the manipulation of peripheral leaders and the arming of tribal militias.³⁴ Capital elites rely on the peripheries for votes and militia power and mobilized support by leveraging sectarian and ethnic loyalties³⁵ rather than building it through the provision of welfare or development.³⁶ This resulted in underdevelopment, exclusion, and violent conflict, but disorder in the peripheries was never an existential threat—either economically or politically—to those in Khartoum.³⁷ According to the *Worldwide Gov-*

³¹ World Health Organization, 2004a, p. 6.

³² de Waal, 2007b; World Bank, "Darfur: Dimensions of Challenge for Development, Background Volume," Washington, D.C., June 29, 2007.

³³ Alex de Waal, "Sudan: The Turbulent State," in Alex de Waal, ed., *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007a.

³⁴ De Waal acknowledges that many regimes around the world have used the principle of "divide and rule" to maintain the dominance of power of the central authority but argues that few have employed it with as much skill as Sudan. Khartoum has used this technique to create a state of continuing chaos and uncertainty on its peripheries that prevents them from threatening central power (de Waal, 2007a).

³⁵ Particularly Arab nationalism and political Islamism.

³⁶ Weiss suggests that Sudan is "perhaps best characterized not as a nation-state in the manner of Italy, Argentina, or Malawi, but as an empire-state ruling over its internal colonies (in the south, the east, the Nuba Mountains, and Darfur), with an especially effective combination of violence, manipulation, and the cooptation of possible opponents" (J. H. Weiss, ed., "Book Review: Alex de Waal, ed., *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*," *Genocide Studies and Prevention*, Vol. 4, No. 3, December 2009, pp. 379–387).

³⁷ de Waal, 2007b, p. 17.

ernance Indicators, 1996–2005, Sudan measured in the lowest decile of nations in most areas of governance—voice and accountability, political stability, and government effectiveness.³⁸

In Darfur specifically, the structure of local government underwent a series of federally dictated changes in recent decades that successively undermined local structures without providing sufficient resources to any replacement institutions.³⁹ State and local administrations throughout Sudan are greatly dependent on federal transfers to meet expenditure requirements, but support for the three Darfur states averaged just half of that provided to northern states.⁴⁰ In 2000, the controversial “Black Book” detailed Darfur’s relative underdevelopment and systematic underrepresentation in national government. Almost no basic services were provided in the region—virtually no schools, health services, or developmental infrastructure—and bankrupt law and order institutions encouraged endemic banditry as well as the defensive self-arming of groups.⁴¹ According to one expert, “Within Darfur, Arabs and non-Arabs alike have been marginalized, and it is Darfur’s tragedy that the leaders of these groups have not made common cause in the face of Khartoum’s indifference.”⁴²

³⁸ World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators: Country Data Report for Sudan, 1996–2014,” 2014a.

³⁹ Called the “Native Administration,” Darfur’s historic local governance system is based on the allocation of land and authority to tribes from the precolonial Fur. Since independence, successive Sudanese governments have worked to undermine the authority of traditional tribal leaders and to use them to gain control of Darfur. This has resulted in the politicization of the native administration; increasing polarization between groups in Darfur; the exclusion of segments of the population from resources, authority, and power; and the deterioration of traditional law and order and conflict resolution mechanisms (Musa A. Abdul-Jalil, Adam Azzain Mohammed, and Ahmed A. Yousef, “Native Administration and Local Governance in Darfur: Past and Future,” in Alex de Waal, ed., *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007; World Bank, 2007; Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, *Darfur: A New History of a Long War*, 2nd ed., London: Zed Books, 2008).

⁴⁰ World Bank, 2007, p. 20.

⁴¹ Alex de Waal and Helen Young, “Steps Towards the Stabilization of Governance and Livelihoods in Darfur, Sudan,” U.S. Agency for International Development, March 2005.

⁴² de Waal, 2004, p. 720. In the 1990s, a short-lived secular and pluralist rebellion attempted to unite Darfur’s many tribes and aligned with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in the

The two main early rebel groups reflect reactions to different dimensions of the governance challenge in Darfur. From the outset, JEM and its charismatic leader sought wholesale national reform and regime change, broadcasting the atrocities in Darfur to delegitimize the Sudanese government internationally.⁴³ The SLA, by contrast, has its roots in the self-defense militias formed by communities in western Darfur in the mid-1990s. Its initial stated political demands were more reactionary and local, including calls for socioeconomic development for the region, an end to tribal militias, and power-sharing with the central government.⁴⁴

Democratization

Since independence, Sudan has been ruled by a succession of unstable civilian and military governments. In 1989, General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir came to power in a military coup and declared himself president in 1993. In the early 2000s, national politics remained opaque, characterized by elite infighting in Khartoum and repeat declarations of “states of emergency” in response to conflict developments. In 2003, Freedom House assessed the country as “not free,” with Sudan receiving the worst possible scores on freedom, civil liberties, and political rights. The 2003 Local Government Act created “people’s committees” at the village level that ostensibly provided for citizen participation in selecting representatives. Ultimately, however, the people’s committees were often led by political appointees, had little legitimacy to act as an interface with other government institutions, and simply

south but was brutally decapitated by Khartoum. A generation of opposition leaders was killed or neutralized—and suspicion sown between groups in Darfur (de Waal, 2009).

⁴³ de Waal and Young, 2005, p. 100. Established by a group of educated and politically experienced Darfurians—many of them former members of the Popular Congress Party of Hassan al Turabi—JEM did not initially “pack the same military punch” as the SLA. Nonetheless, JEM, more than the SLA, struck fear into the Sudanese government because of its leader, Khalil Ibrahim. Highly educated and a superb organizer, Ibrahim never pretended that the neglect and marginalization of Darfur was a prime concern. His political object was for unity within a reformed Sudan (Prunier, 2005).

⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch, *Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan*, New York, Vol. 16, No. 5(A), April 2004. The SLA was initially called the Darfur Liberation Front.

reflected another episode in a long history of the central government manipulating local systems.⁴⁵

Economic Reconstruction

Roughly the size of Spain, Darfur stretches from uninhabited desert areas in the north to a Sahelian semi-arid area in the center and more-fertile savanna landscape in the south.⁴⁶ It is hard to overstate the disruptive impact of drought and famine in the 1980s to the region's agricultural and pastoralist-based economy.⁴⁷ Historically, sedentary farming communities granted nomadic groups customary rights to migrate and pasture their animals and, through "relaxed reciprocity," would in turn receive gifts of meat, transport, and fertilization of fallow fields. In recent decades, however, desertification, shifting migratory patterns, the expansion of farms, and an influx of groups from Chad strained this "socio-geographical" order as land and water became increasingly scarce and precious economic resources.⁴⁸

Sudan, as a whole, is rich in natural and human resources, but the high economic growth and increasing oil revenue of the 1990s and early 2000s were never equitably distributed to the country's hinterlands, and high poverty rates persist throughout the country.⁴⁹ Darfur lacks any oil itself and is among the country's most underdeveloped regions—without basic transportation, health, and education infrastructure.⁵⁰ Mortality rates of children under the age of five in Darfur

⁴⁵ World Bank, 2007, p. 70.

⁴⁶ Ola Olsson, "After Janjaweed? Socioeconomic Impacts of the Conflict in Darfur," *World Bank Economic Review*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2010, pp. 386–411.

⁴⁷ de Waal, 2005; de Waal, 2004. During the preconflict period (2000–2004), crops were key to wealth in Darfur and generated between 63 percent and 75 percent of the region's agricultural GDP. Since the conflict, crop output has plummeted by almost half because severe insecurity has prevented cultivation and destroyed crops (World Bank, 2007, p. 14).

⁴⁸ de Waal, 2004; Ola Olsson, "Climate Change and Market Collapse: A Model Applied to Darfur," *Games*, Vol. 7, No. 9, 2016; Michael Kevane and Leslie Gray, "Darfur: Rainfall and Conflict," *Environmental Research Letters*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2008.

⁴⁹ World Bank, *Sudan—Stabilization and Reconstruction: Country Economic Memorandum*, Vol. 1: *Main Text*, Washington, D.C., June 30, 2003b.

⁵⁰ de Waal and Young, 2005.

reached 100 per 1,000 in 2000, and only 47 percent of the population had access to an improved water source.⁵¹ Although Darfuris are “well-known for remarkable resilience and adaptability,” livelihoods that were already stressed by adverse environmental and social trends were further and severely compromised by the sustained insecurity and massive displacement since 2003.⁵²

African and Other International Roles

Both of the international peacekeeping missions that subsequently deployed in Darfur have been led, at least in part, by the AU. The AU initially took the lead on the Darfur crisis, as the rest of the international community was focused on the North-South conflict in Sudan. The decision to deploy AMIS in 2004 received near-universal support from international society, hailed as a concrete example of “African solutions to African problems.”⁵³ When the conflict and humanitarian crisis continued unabated, pressure eventually mounted for the UN to assume responsibility. The Sudanese Government strongly resisted early proposals for a UN-led mission but eventually allowed a novel hybrid AU and UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID), with the caveat that the mission would be “African in character.” UNAMID re-hatted AMIS peacekeepers in 2008, with an expanded mandate, increased force threshold, and more resources; however, the larger mission still faced the same challenging operating environment. This section walks through African and international roles in the lengthy Darfur crisis in greater detail.

On April 8, 2004, the GoS and two main rebel groups signed an HCA, brokered by Chad and co-signed by the African Union. The

⁵¹ Millennium Development Goal indicators; World Bank, 2007, p. 29.

⁵² de Waal and Young, 2005, para. 76.

⁵³ The UNSC endorsed AMIS with SCR 1556 (July 30, 2004), and the mission was welcomed by the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Arab League (Gelot, 2012; Paul D. Williams, “Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 1, 2006b, pp. 168–183).

following month, the AU authorized AMIS to support the work of the newly created ceasefire commission, which was charged with monitoring and reporting on violations to the agreement. AMIS was initially composed of just 60 military observers; it quickly became apparent that more observers and provisions for their security were needed.⁵⁴ In July, the AU sent a 300-strong protection force of Rwandan and Nigerian soldiers to safeguard the observers. As the situation on the ground continued to deteriorate, the PSC authorized a tenfold increase in the size of the AMIS force and an expansion of its mandate. Designated “AMIS II” by some, the enhanced mission would consist of up to 3,320 personnel, including new police units, and was tasked with three mandates:

- monitoring HCA compliance
- contributing to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief
- assisting in the process of confidence-building.

A number of additional tasks were also outlined, including a new, if heavily caveated, provision for the protection of civilians.⁵⁵ In early 2005, a joint AU-UN assessment acknowledged that AMIS remained “extremely stretched to implement its mandate,”⁵⁶ and the AU subsequently approved a second expansion of the mission (“AMIS II-E”) of several thousand additional troops. The AU again adjusted the mis-

⁵⁴ Seth Appiah-Mensah, “AU’s Critical Assignment in Darfur,” *African Security Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2, January 1, 2005, p. 8.

⁵⁵ The communiqué mandated that AMIS “[p]rotect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of civilian population is the responsibility of the Government of Sudan” (PSC, “Communiqué, 17th Meeting,” Pub. L. No. PSC/PR/Comm. [DCLVIII], 2004). Most of the caveats—imminence, proximity, recognition of resource, and capability constraints—are standard for most peacekeeping missions, including robust UN missions with protection mandates; however, the deference to the Sudanese government was both atypical and problematic.

⁵⁶ UN Secretary-General, “Report of the Joint AU-UN Review of Available Mechanisms to Finance and Support AU Peace Support Operations Authorized by the UNSC,” S/2016/809, September 28, 2016.

sion's mandate to make "contributing to a secure environment" the top priority (see Table 4.2).⁵⁷

AMIS was only the second mission ever undertaken by the AU, and this time the organization faced a far more difficult operating environment than during its first mission in Burundi. Throughout, the AU received significant international assistance in terms of financing, in-kind contributions, and training and support.⁵⁸ The UN was primarily concerned with supporting ongoing negotiations around the North-South conflict, but it dispatched a planning assistance team to Addis Ababa to help the logistically overstretched AU Commission. In October 2004, this ad hoc arrangement transformed into a full-time assistance and liaison cell. Nonetheless, AMIS continued to face chronic capacity, logistical, and mandate constraints as the AU struggled to adequately equip, manage, and support its most extensive peacekeeping endeavor to date. Inconsistent financial streams made long-term strategic planning even more difficult.

As violence continued and the number of displaced rose, many began calling for the UN to replace AMIS with a more robust and better-resourced mission.⁵⁹ In January 2006, under pressure from donors, the Chairman of the AU Commission accepted, in principle,

⁵⁷ PSC, "Communiqué," Pub. L. No. PSC/PR/Comm. (XXVIII), 2005.

⁵⁸ The EU contributed some 300 million euros toward operating costs; the U.S. commissioned a contractor to build and maintain the mission's 32 camps; NATO began airlifting AU troops into the region in 2005; and numerous countries made in-kind contributions of vehicles, communication equipment, and trainers. The British government, for example, provided 143 four-by-four vehicles in 2004, another 476 in 2005, and by 2008 had delivered over 1,000 vehicles via a British contractor (Lanz, 2015; ICG, *The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning Combination*, Africa Report No. 99, October 25, 2005b; Arvid Ekengard, "The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned," Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, August 2008, p. 19; Appiah-Mensah, 2005, p. 8; ICG, 2005a; Human Rights Watch, 2006a).

⁵⁹ Donor fatigue played another contributing role in the decision, as the United States and EU in particular sought to shift their ongoing financial responsibility to the broader international community (O'Neill and Cassis, 2005; ICG, 2005a; Human Rights Watch, 2006a; ICG, "Getting the UN into Darfur," Africa Briefing No. 43, October 12, 2006; Williams, 2006b).

Table 4.2
Mission Mandate Evolutions, Key Communiqués, and Resolutions

Mission		Communiqué, Resolution	Mandate	Size
AMIS	AMIS	May 2004	Monitor and report on violations of HCA in support of ceasefire commission	60 military observers, 300 troops
	AMIS II	Oct. 2004	- Monitor HCA compliance - Contribute to secure environment for humanitarian relief - Assist in the process of confidence-building Plus many outlined tasks, including a caveated protection of civilians provision.	3,320 personnel
	AMIS II-E	Apr. 2005	Contribute to a secure environment (prioritized).	7,731 personnel
UNAMID		SCR 1769 (Jul. 31, 2007, starts Jan. 2008)	- Protect personnel and facilities, and ensure freedom of movement and humanitarian access - Support the implementation of DPA, prevent disruption and armed attacks, and protect civilians Other mandated tasks outlined elsewhere include:^a - Support joint AU-UN mediation efforts - Contribute to a secure environment for economic reconstruction and development - Contribute to promotion of human rights, rule of law - Monitor security situation at the borders Successive SCRs clarify that protection of civilians and facilitating humanitarian access are the priorities.	26,000 personnel
		SCR 1935 (Jul. 30, 2010)	New task added: Support local conflict resolution mechanisms	—
		SCR 2063 (Jul. 31, 2012)	New task added: Support implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), including mediation between GoS and non-signatory groups	20,890 personnel

Table 4.2—continued

Mission	Communiqué, Resolution	Mandate	Size
	SCR 2148 (Apr. 3, 2014)	• After strategic review,^b four revised priorities: • Protection of civilians (prioritized)	19,248 personnel
	SCR 2173 (Aug. 27, 2014)	• Facilitation of humanitarian assistance (prioritized) • Mediation between GoS and non-signatories (DDPD) • Support for mediation of community conflict	
	SCR 2228 (Jun. 29, 2015)	Annex with Secretary-General benchmarks for mission success: ^c • Inclusive peace process through mediation between GoS and non-signatories, on basis of DDPD • Protection of civilians and humanitarian access • Prevention or mitigation of community conflict, via mediation and measures to address root causes	—
	SCR 2363 (Jun. 29, 2017)	Same mandate, more thoroughly outlined subtasks, support for recommended “dual-pronged approach”: ^d • Focus on military protection and emergency relief where recent active fighting • Focus on stabilization, state-building, protection, mediation and SSR in less kinetic areas	Two-phased drawdown: 14,283 personnel 11,235 personnel

^a Referencing the Report of the Secretary-General and Chairperson of the AU Commission (S/2007/307/Rev.1, June 5, 2007, paragraphs 54 and 55) for the expanded list of tasks.

^b Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of UNAMID (S/2014/138, February 25, 2014)

^c Resolution annex relays benchmarks and indicators from the Secretary-General’s report of April 15, 2014 (S/2014/279)

^d Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission in the Special Report, as supported in paragraph 2 of SCR 2363.

NOTE: African-led missions are in red; hybrid AU-UN missions are in purple. DPA = Darfur Peace Agreement, SCR = Security Council Resolution.

the possible transition of AMIS into a UN operation.⁶⁰ Four months later, the GoS and one rebel group signed the DPA, paving the way for the UN to consider deploying its own mission.⁶¹ The two largest rebel groups refused to sign the DPA, and the agreement certainly did not bring peace to Darfur, but it satisfied the UN's requirement of having a political framework to provide direction to its peacekeepers.

The UN's initial proposal in 2006 called for its already-deployed mission in southern Sudan (UNMIS) to expand north into Darfur, but the GoS refused to consent, accusing the UN of "neo-colonialism" and harboring a hidden agenda of regime change.⁶² With the geopolitical deadlock, the UN initiated a series of light- and heavy-support packages of military, civilian, and police staff and equipment seconded to AMIS command.⁶³ Meanwhile, in late August 2006, the government launched an offensive in all three Darfur states against the rebel groups who had not signed the DPA.⁶⁴

A compromise was reached in July 2007, and the UN and AU authorized a novel hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The proposed 26,000-strong joint force was given a lengthy mandate, including the protection of civilians, facilitation of humanitarian aid, support for the implementation of the peace agreement, contribution to an environment for economic reconstruction and development, and the

⁶⁰ Hamilton, 2011.

⁶¹ SCR 1679 (2006) recommends that "concrete steps should be taken to transition AMIS to a UN operation" (Lanz, 2015).

⁶² The first mandating resolution, SCR 1707 (2006), increased UNMIS's force levels by an additional 17,300 troops and 3,300 police and "invited" the consent of the host parties for their deployment in Darfur. President al-Bashir refused to consent. In addition to the above objections, Bashir accused the UN of targeting Sudan to access its oil reserves. Experts explained that the regime was also concerned that substantial international troops would make them more vulnerable to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for atrocity crimes committed in Darfur. The UNSC had controversially referred the Darfur situation to the court in 2005 (ICG, 2006, p. 4; Lanz, 2015).

⁶³ In September, that AU also announced its intention to increase AMIS personnel to number 11,000, under the same limited mandate, but the additional personnel were never deployed.

⁶⁴ ICG, 2006, p. 4.

promotion of human rights and the rule of law.⁶⁵ In successive resolutions, the Security Council underlined that UNAMID should prioritize the protection of civilians and facilitating humanitarian access.⁶⁶ In a concession to the Sudanese government, the mandate specified that the operation would be “African in character,” comprised predominantly if not entirely of African forces. The agreement further stated that the AU and UN would jointly appoint mission leadership from African countries, but the UN would be responsible for command-and-control structures and backstopping. At the time of its creation, UNAMID was the UN’s largest and most expensive mission.

In January 2008, UNAMID assumed responsibility from AMIS for the situation in Darfur. The new mission benefited from increased resources and capacity, but the challenging operational environment had not changed appreciably. In the decade since, UNAMID’s mandate has evolved as the conflict developed and dynamics shifted (see Table 4.2). New mandated tasks included providing support for local conflict resolution mechanisms and mediating between the GoS and rebel forces on the basis of a second peace agreement signed in 2011. Additionally, UNAMID’s force size has been reduced multiple times.⁶⁷ In July 2017, a new mandate significantly restructured the mission. It outlined a new “two-track concept of operations,” in light of diverging conflict dynamics, and proposed a two-phased significant reduction in force. UNAMID resisted the government’s calls for a total and swift withdrawal, maintaining that exit was contingent on achievement of outlined benchmarks.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ SCR 1976 refers to a joint report by the UN Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission, June 5, 2007, which defined UNAMID’s mandate in greater detail.

⁶⁶ SCR 2011, 2011.

⁶⁷ In 2012, the Security Council decided to reduce the size of UNAMID by several thousand personnel, even though the mission had never reached its prior full authorized deployment capacity (SCR 2063, 2012). A further, smaller reduction was authorized in 2014 (SCR 2173, August 27, 2014).

⁶⁸ Benchmarks and indicators were laid out by the Secretary-General in an April 2014 report (S/2014/279) and included in the annex of the 2015 mandate renewal resolution (“Sudan Sticks to UNAMID Exit from Darfur: Minister,” *Sudan Tribune*, May 19, 2016;

Military and Police

The military constituted the largest component of AMIS, eventually numbering several thousand troops. After the very small initial observer mission was quickly expanded, the larger operation was restructured into eight sectors located throughout Darfur.⁶⁹ Each sector consisted of two military observer teams tasked with monitoring and reporting on compliance with the HCA and associated protection forces.⁷⁰ In addition to escorting the observer teams, protection forces also protected AU personnel and property, escorted AU and humanitarian convoys in the area, provided protection for the civilian police, and protected civilians in the community within their capability.⁷¹ The military component approached full deployment by mid-2005, with the shortfall mostly in terms of military observers.

AMIS did not include a police contingent until the AMIS II expansion in October 2004. The AU had never deployed a police component before, lacked an operational plan and recruiting criteria, and rebuffed early offers by the UN to provide training and its own roster.⁷² The initial deployment was marked by significant delays, confu-

"Sudan Says Keen to Carry Out Smooth UNAMID Exit from Darfur," *Sudan Tribune*, August 7, 2016).

⁶⁹ Recall that AMIS was initially mandated as an observer mission with 60 military observers. The early military observers began to arrive in Darfur in mid-2004. Six sectors were created at the end of July, and each sector commander was given US\$5,000, four vehicles, and two satellite phones to deploy to isolated and high-risk areas (Appiah-Mensah, 2005, p. 9). A protection force of 300 Nigerian and Rwandan soldiers followed a month later. The October 2004 AMIS II enhancement authorized 2,341 troops, including 450 military observers, and, in March 2005, the AMIS II-E revision nearly tripled the force levels, calling for 6,171 troops.

⁷⁰ A "military observer team" consisted of military observers, representatives of the conflict parties, and AU partners, escorted by a protection force of at least section size. Theoretically, groups had a ground operational force of 60–70 km.

⁷¹ Human Rights Watch, 2006a, p. 18.

⁷² AMIS police did not begin to deploy significant numbers until February 2005, and the first 250 only had four cars between them. Language barriers between English- and French-speaking units further complicated operations on the ground (O'Neill and Cassis, 2005, pp. 18–21). In June 2005, the component was still nearly 300 short of its authorized 815 personnel (interviews with research organization, Darfur and Kenya, May and June 2005;

sion, and logistical and capacity shortfalls. Once in the field, AMIS civilian police were structured differently than the military—divided into three regional offices across the three Darfur states and 26 police outputs.⁷³ Focused on the confidence-building mandate, the civilian police collaborated with government police to perform village, town, and IDP patrols and, if requested, lead capacity enhancement initiatives. Police also undertook nontraditional duties, including popular “firewood patrols” and escorting IDPs to water points. Cooperation between AMIS police and military components was inconsistent, and units often duplicated patrolling and reporting efforts.

UNAMID’s mandate was considerably wider and its authorized personnel levels higher, but both remained conservative relative to the challenging context and ongoing crisis facing peacekeepers on the ground. Assessments of international intervention recommend 10 to 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants, dependent on the situation on the ground.⁷⁴ With a population of approximately 6 million in Darfur, this translates to a requirement of 60,000 to 120,000 peacekeepers. At its height, UNAMID was only authorized to include up to 19,555 troops, 3,772 police personnel, and an additional 19 formed police units (of up

UN Secretary-General, *Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur*, New York: United Nations Security Council, S/2005/378, June 9, 2005a).

⁷³ Seth Appiah-Mensah, “The African Mission in Sudan: Darfur Dilemmas,” *African Security Review*, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 1, 2006, p. 9. Of the 65 sensitive villages identified by the civilian police, Norway provided for the initial 26.

⁷⁴ A previous RAND nation-building report found that stabilization missions in states that lack a credible indigenous security force—as in Darfur—require an international force of 10 to 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants (James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse, *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-557-SRF, 2007, p. xxvii). O’Hanlon and Singer outline a second metric: A protection should at least be the size of the largest indigenous armed force. In Darfur, this translated to a minimum of 10,000 and potentially 45,000 troops (Michael O’Hanlon and P. W. Singer, “The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention Capacity,” *Survival*, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2004, pp. 77–99). In 2005, the ICG advocated for the deployment of a NATO “bridging force” of up to 13,000 to 15,000 troops to supplement AMIS troops or an enforcement operation of up to 40,000 troops if the GoS did not consent (AU, 2005).

to 140 personnel each). The actual maximum number deployed was 17,778 troops and 5,511 total police in late 2011 and 2012.⁷⁵

As Figure 4.3 demonstrates, the composition of troops deployed to UNAMID was indeed decidedly more African in character than most UN missions, including the neighboring mission in southern Sudan, which later became South Sudan. Figure 4.3 also shows that deployment of the additional troops promised in UNAMID's authorizing mandate was characterized by serious delays. Six months into the new mission's mandate, only 600 troops had been added to the ex-AMIS forces, and the mission never reached its initial authorized 26,000 force level.⁷⁶ This partially reflects force generation challenges common among UN peacekeeping operations in Africa but was also a result of concerted and sustained obstruction by the Sudanese government.⁷⁷

Under UNAMID, AMIS's eight sectors were consolidated into three theaters of operation—North, South, and West.⁷⁸ Each sector included several additional bases located in provincial towns and around IDP camps. Peacekeepers conducted regular patrols around camps and along major roads, escorted humanitarian convoys, and, in some cases, actively defended civilians against attack. Unlike AMIS, UNAMID peacekeepers were authorized under a Chapter VII mandate to use force to protect civilians and their mandate; although, as in other UN operations, the mission's troops rarely leveraged this.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Numbers are from aggregate monthly UN peacekeeper reports collected and published by the International Peace Institute (International Peace Institute, undated).


⁷⁶ International Refugee Rights Initiative, "The Challenges of Peacekeeping in Darfur: 'No One on the Earth Cares If We Survive Except God and Sometimes UNAMID,'" June 2016, p. 18.

⁷⁷ Paul D. Williams, "Peace Operations in Africa: Lessons Learned Since 2000," Africa Security Brief No. 25, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 2013b, p. 3; ICG, "The Chaos in Darfur," Africa Briefing No. 110, April 22, 2015a.

⁷⁸ Two further sectors were added when the government unilaterally created two new states in Darfur in 2011.

⁷⁹ Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), *Evaluation of the Implementation and Results of Civilians Mandates in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, New York: United Nations, March 7, 2014.

Figure 4.3
Comparing Troop Composition for UNAMID and UNMIS/S



SOURCE: International Peace Institute, undated.

UNAMID's police component focuses on supporting the protection of civilians, especially in IDP camps; facilitating humanitarian access; and creating a protective environment by coordinating police capacity-building and community-oriented policing initiatives. Police units conduct patrols in and around IDP camps and farms in all five sectors and 35 team sites.

Since 2008, the mandate of UNAMID personnel has evolved to reflect changing conflict dynamics, and the mission's force size has been repeatedly reduced. In July 2017, a "two-track" concept of operations was adopted, which called for UNAMID's military units to focus on "traditional peacekeeping" in areas of ongoing violence and for police units to increasingly assume responsibility for stabilization activities in other parts of the region.⁸⁰

Civil and Economic

AMIS included only a small civilian element, charged primarily with supporting its military and police components. Belatedly, AMIS created a human rights and humanitarian component to monitor, investigate, and report on related issues; however, the new section was sparsely staffed.⁸¹ Indirectly, AMIS military components helped UNMIS's civilian staff report on human rights violations in Darfur, allowing monitors from the nearby UN mission to embed with AMIS units.⁸²

UNAMID's mandate authorized an "appropriate civilian component" of unspecified size and, in the transition, incorporated many AMIS civilian staff members.⁸³ The mission included civilian affairs, human rights, political affairs, humanitarian issues, and several issue-

⁸⁰ UN Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on Sudan*, New York: United Nations Security Council, March 23, 2017a, para. 49–55.

⁸¹ AMIS was an entirely military operation for months. Civilian police arrived in early 2005, and three humanitarian and human rights officers deployed individually to each of the region's capitals only in late 2005 (O'Neill and Cassis, 2005, p. 40; Appiah-Mensah, 2006, p. 9).

⁸² Author interview with UN official II.

⁸³ Lanz, 2015.

specific sectors.⁸⁴ Government obstruction, especially its frequent declaration of UN staff as *personae non gratae*, and the levels of insecurity have made staff vacancy a challenge for the mission, especially in its early years.⁸⁵ UNAMID works alongside a UN country team, which is organizationally distinct.⁸⁶ Recently, the Darfur mission has begun to hand over some functions—for example, rule of law promotion and capacity-building functions—to the country team.⁸⁷

What Happened

Since 2003, conflict in Darfur has evolved as rebel factions splintered, new rivalries and communal violence spiraled, banditry and criminal violence rose, and the government armed different groups and launched successive offensives. Darfur's crisis can be divided roughly into five phases, based on the most-violent conflict dynamics of the given period:

- the government and Janjaweed fighting rebels and targeting rebel communities, most intense in 2003 and 2004
- the rise of intra-Arab communal violence, beginning in 2006⁸⁸

⁸⁴ Including gender, HIV/AIDS, and water and sanitation.

⁸⁵ Williams, 2013b, p. 3.

⁸⁶ UN country teams work closely with but are distinct from UN peacekeeping missions. Country teams are the interagency coordination among the many organizations within the UN system that work in a given country—for example, the International Organization for Migration, the World Food Programme, and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). For more, see United Nations Sustainable Development Group, "The UN at the Country Level," 2016.

⁸⁷ See SCR 2296 (2016), para. 54 (g) and 55 (c). The UN country team assumed primary responsibility for assisting in the promotion of the rule of law, through institution-building and strengthening local capacities to combat impunity.

⁸⁸ See ICG, *Darfur's New Security Reality*, Africa Report No. 134, November 26, 2007c; Julie Flint, *Beyond "Janjaweed": Understanding the Militias of Darfur*, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2009; Julie Flint, *The Other War: Inter-Arab Conflict in Darfur*, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010.

- the rise of fighting among non-Arab groups, beginning in late 2010⁸⁹
- a dramatic spike in all three prior conflict dynamics in 2013 and 2014⁹⁰
- a major government offensive in 2016.⁹¹

Elements of prior conflict phases persisted and compounded throughout, and the ground-level tactics and dynamics—i.e. arming of militias, targeting of civilians, widespread destruction, and shifting alliances—remained consistent.⁹²

In this complex context, both AMIS (2004–2007), an observer mission, and UNAMID (2008–ongoing), a multidimensional peace-keeping mission, were dispatched under the unjustified assumption of “good faith” commitment to signed agreements by the parties. In reality, both deployed into a situation of ongoing war. Taken in turn, each operation had a mixed track record. Although both improved the security of displaced populations and localities at the margins, their contributions were dwarfed by the scope of the challenges faced. The overall situation in Darfur, in terms of security, humanitarian, governance, democratization, and economic reconstruction, remains fragile or unimproved. Despite two peace agreements, two missions, and 13 years, a sustainable political resolution in Darfur remains elusive and the humanitarian crises dire.

Security

The security situation has fluctuated significantly since 2003. Both AMIS and UNAMID made positive but limited contributions to

⁸⁹ See Claudio Gramizzi and Jérôme Tubiana, “Forgotten Darfur: Old Tactics and New Players,” Geneva: Small Arms Survey, July 2012.

⁹⁰ See ICG, *Sudan's Spreading Conflict (III): The Limits of Darfur's Peace Process*, Africa Report No. 211, January 27, 2014a; ICG, 2015a.

⁹¹ See UNSC, *Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Strategic Review of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur*, New York, May 18, 2017b, p. 2.

⁹² Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2012, p. 9.

improving security on the ground. The missions were largely in a position of reacting to rather than driving conflict developments (or transformation).

AMIS deployed in mid-2004, after the most intense period of early armed violence. Many observers argued that the lull in fighting more accurately reflected the initial success of the government's indiscriminate counterinsurgency strategy, rather than the impact of AMIS's presence. As the head of USAID stated, "frankly . . . there are not many villages left to burn down and destroy."⁹³ Nevertheless, severe human insecurity persisted. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan explained, "active combat has been replaced by a suffocating environment of intimidation and fear, perpetuated by ever-present militias."⁹⁴ The number of Darfuris displaced continued to rise, doubling in AMIS's first year and further accelerating into its second.

In the immediate areas around which AMIS established a presence, the security situations improved, but the mission failed to affect the broader conflict.⁹⁵ AMIS troops conducted popular "escort firewood patrols,"⁹⁶ deterred attacks against IDP camps and some vulnerable towns,⁹⁷ occasionally escorted humanitarian convoys,⁹⁸ and, at the most basic level, successfully protected the mission's military observers,

⁹³ As quoted in Williams, 2006b, p. 179. Similarly, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, "the decrease in attacks may also be a function of a reduced number of targets" (UN Secretary-General, *Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur*, New York: United Nations Security Council, S/2005/467, July 18, 2005b).

⁹⁴ UN Secretary-General, 2005b.

⁹⁵ Williams, 2006b; Lanz, 2015; O'Neill and Cassis, 2005; Appiah-Mensah, 2005; Appiah-Mensah, 2006.

⁹⁶ O'Neill and Cassis, 2005, p. 23.

⁹⁷ In several reported cases, AMIS preventatively deployed to vulnerable towns, evacuated besieged humanitarian actors, and acted as an interposition force to protect civilians from imminent attacks. AMIS's police presence appears to have reduced the number of attacks on IDP camps in some places, and AMIS police increasingly pursued reported abuses of the highly distrusted government police who are primarily responsible for monitoring the camps (Appiah-Mensah, 2006, p. 8; O'Neill and Cassis, 2005, pp. 22–25).

⁹⁸ O'Neill and Cassis, 2005, p. 23.

which was the original purpose for the protection force.⁹⁹ With more than 2 million vulnerable persons displaced across scattered camps and settlements, however, AMIS's force numbers were markedly insufficient.¹⁰⁰ The mission's impact was further undermined by a dearth of strategic intelligence, a lack of training, unclear doctrine,¹⁰¹ and severe logistical and capacity constraints.¹⁰² In 2006, the number of armed attacks again increased as intercommunal fighting among Arab tribes became the largest single cause of violent death in Darfur,¹⁰³ while the government launched offensives against those rebel groups that had rejected the controversial DPA. AMIS suspended its patrols, and many parts of the country were designated "no-go" areas.¹⁰⁴ Increasingly, peacekeepers became targets of violence themselves, especially by rebel groups that distrusted their work with the government and consequently impeded AMIS's deployment to rebel-held areas.¹⁰⁵ The

⁹⁹ Williams, 2006b.

¹⁰⁰ Outposts of 30 to 40 troops could only send one or two patrols out at any given time and with a limited driving distance. As a sheikh from a village in West Darfur noted, "we have seen only one AMIS patrol. They have not come back for more than two months" (O'Neill and Cassis, 2005, p. 39).

¹⁰¹ The mission lacked standard doctrine, standard operating procedures, and rules of engagement for use of force for at least the first year of deployment. The latter was especially problematic as AMIS troops had been fired on at least eight times by 2005, with no clear instruction of whether they were authorized to defend themselves (O'Neill and Cassis, 2005, p. 44). In 2006, the chairperson of the AU admitted that "AMIS' current mandate . . . is not clearly understood by commanders at all levels" (Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010, p. 208).

¹⁰² Appiah-Mensah, 2005, p. 5; ICG, 2006c.

¹⁰³ Government-sponsored Arab militias began to act independently in response to declining financial support and increasingly fought among themselves. On one hand, intra-Arab violence was "a struggle for the spoils of the counter-insurgency." More holistically, it reflected long-running competition over land and power and insufficient governance and security institutions (Flint, 2009; Flint, 2010).

¹⁰⁴ ICG, 2007c, p. 22.

¹⁰⁵ Nearly 30 AMIS peacekeepers died during deployment, including a September 2007 attack on an outpost that killed ten and left many more wounded (AMIS, *Investigation Report on the Attack on MGS Haskanita on 29/30 Sep 07 by Armed Faction to the Darfur Conflict*, 2007; Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p. 210).

“enhanced” observer mission was operating in an ongoing civil war across a huge territory; faced trained, cohesive, well-supplied, and motivated killers; and was insufficiently mandated, equipped, supported, and trained.¹⁰⁶

UNAMID assumed responsibility from AMIS in January 2008 with an expanded mandate, a significantly increased troop threshold, and the authorization to use force. The first 18 months saw a drop in violent deaths across Darfur, but conflict trends fluctuated thereafter.¹⁰⁷ UNAMID had two prioritized tasks, the protection of civilians and facilitating humanitarian access, and assessments of its contribution in these areas vary widely. On the one hand, observers applaud the mission’s patrols, its escorts of (some) humanitarian convoys, the creation of community policing centers, and instances of proactive defense of civilians.¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, reports reveal cases of dramatic failures—including occasions when militias dragged civilians from camps and executed them in front of peacekeepers¹⁰⁹—and an internal UN review found that UNAMID contingents regularly abstained from conducting scheduled patrols.¹¹⁰

Even with triple AMIS’s numbers, UNAMID struggled to project security beyond its immediate areas of deployment. UNAMID faced a highly volatile conflict that largely overwhelmed its ability to safeguard civilians, humanitarian operations, and even its own troops.

¹⁰⁶ Ekengard, 2007; Kreps, 2007, p. 76.

¹⁰⁷ Alex de Waal, Chad Hazlett, Christian Davenport, and Joshua Kennedy, *Evidence-Based Peacekeeping: Exploring the Epidemiology of Lethal Violence in Darfur*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, March 2010, p. 7.

¹⁰⁸ David Mickler, “UNAMID: A Hybrid Solution to a Human Security Problem in Darfur?” *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol. 13, No. 5, December 1, 2013, pp. 487–511; Lanz, 2015; International Refugee Rights Initiative, 2016; Human Rights Watch, “UN: Drastic Cuts to Darfur Mission Misguided,” June 14, 2017a.

¹⁰⁹ ICG, 2014a, p. 1; Justin Lynch, “UN Failed to Protect Civilians in South Sudan: Report,” *Al Jazeera*, June 22, 2016; Colum Lynch, “A Mission That Was Set Up to Fail,” *Foreign Policy*, April 8, 2014; Lanz, 2015.

¹¹⁰ According to the UN’s internal auditing group, UNAMID contingents conducted only 36 to 75 percent of the planned patrol targets in a given month (OIOS, *Audit of Patrolling by Military Contingents in the AU-UNAMID*, New York: United Nations, June 22, 2015).

The multiplying of communal conflicts, arming of new militia groups, shifting alliances, rising crime and banditry, and launching of successive government offensives resulted in periodic spikes in violence and displacement. A second peace agreement in 2011 did little to ameliorate insecurity.¹¹¹ In 2015, the ICG reported that violence in Darfur continued unabated, arguing against what it saw as the international community and UNAMID's presentation of "a narrative of an improving situation divorced from reality."¹¹² Additionally, the mission faced persistent equipment and personnel shortages, exacerbated by constant Sudanese government obstruction in delaying shipments and denying visas.¹¹³ Finally, absent strong support from the UN or the AU, UNAMID was often seen as too deferential to Khartoum—viewed alternately as toothless or complicit by local populations and actors¹¹⁴—and, like AMIS before it, became the target of violence. The mission has suffered 250 deaths since 2008.¹¹⁵

The conflict entered a new phase in 2016, after a successful government offensive against rebel holdouts in the mountainous Jebel Marra region. In late 2016, Khartoum unilaterally declared victory, a ceasefire, and the end of the Darfur conflict.¹¹⁶ A special joint UN and AU 2017 report corroborated the reduction in rebel-government vio-

¹¹¹ ICG, 2015a; Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2012; Small Arms Survey, "Broken Promises: The Arms Embargo on Darfur Since 2012," Issue Brief, Geneva, July 2016.

¹¹² ICG, 2015a, p. 1.

¹¹³ The government withheld hundreds of visas, imposed curfews prohibiting night patrols, abused the status of forces agreement requirement to provide flight lists, and commonly declared proactive mission staff *personae non gratae*, thus forcing prompt exits of UN staff (Lanz, 2015).

¹¹⁴ Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p. 210.

¹¹⁵ United Nations Peacekeeping, "Fatalities," January 2017. In one dramatic incident, JEM rebels held 50 peacekeepers for several days, accusing them of cooperating with the Sudanese intelligence service.

¹¹⁶ United Nations Meetings Coverage, "Civilians in Darfur Still Under Threat, as Proliferation of Weapons Aggravates Situation, Peacekeeping Chief Tells Security Council," 7860th Meeting, January 12, 2017a. The campaign displaced 100,000 people (UN Secretary-General, *Secretary-General Report on UNAMID*, March 22, 2016; OCHA, "Humanitarian Needs Overview, 2017," OCHA Country Team, Sudan, December 2016c).

lence in the region but simultaneously stressed that security remained “precarious” and intercommunal conflict continued.¹¹⁷ The Joint Special Representative for Darfur further cautioned that the relative improvements in the security situation have not yet resulted in a long-term political resolution.¹¹⁸ Outside observers voiced deeper skepticism about the sustainability of the 2016–2017 lull in violence.¹¹⁹ More-cautionary assessments point to a rise in attacks beginning in April 2017¹²⁰ and highlight the unresolved challenges of widespread proliferation of militias,¹²¹ weapons,¹²² and local conflict.¹²³ As Figures 4.4 and 4.5 indicate, attacks and civilian casualties dropped from 2009 on even as

¹¹⁷ UNSC, “Sudan (Darfur),” *June 2017 Monthly Forecast*, 2017a.

¹¹⁸ Joint Special Representative for Darfur and head of UNAMID Jeremiah Mamabolo in his April 2017 briefing (UNSC, 2017a).

¹¹⁹ ACAPS, “Sudan: Conflict in Darfur,” Geneva, July 6, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017a; Jérôme Tubiana, “The Dangerous Fiction of Darfur’s Peace,” Integrated Regional Information Networks, August 2, 2017.


¹²⁰ ACAPS, 2017; Tubiana, 2017.

¹²¹ The government’s policy of arming groups has led to the creation and partial incorporation of a vast number of auxiliary units in the region, including the Border Guards, the Popular Defense Forces, Central Reserve Police, and the Rapid Support Forces (UNSC, 2017b). These forces are well equipped with small and heavy arms and increasingly operate outside the control of the government, sometimes fighting each other or against government forces, further exacerbating insecurity and threats against civilians (Small Arms Survey, 2016).

¹²² The political changes in Chad and Libya significantly diminished two vectors for arms into the region, but the Sudanese domestic supply chain remains robust, and the Sudanese Armed Forces have become the primary source of weaponry for all sides (Small Arms Survey, 2016).


¹²³ The absence of peace at the national level continues to provide space for local-level violence. Experts emphasize the need for parallel peace processes at local, regional, and national levels (Aditi Gorur and Madeline Velturo, “Local Conflict, Local Peacekeeping,” Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, January 2017; Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010; ICG, 2014a; ICG, 2015a; UNSC, 2017b, para. 10; OCHA, “Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview,” April 1, 2017b). Observers of the UN suggest that the cuts to the mission reflect changes in geopolitical dynamics and priorities more than any improvement in the situation on the ground. Specifically, they point to pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration to cut peacekeeping costs (Human Rights Watch, 2017a; Tubiana, 2017; “U.S. Pressures U.N. into Agreeing to Deep Budget Cuts in Peace-

Figure 4.4
Refugee and IDP Populations, Sudan



NOTES: These numbers are for all of Sudan and thus do not map exactly onto the situation in Darfur. Some key dates are April 2004, Humanitarian Ceasefire is signed; June 2004, AMIS starts to deploy; May 2006, GoS and one rebel group sign the DPA; January 2008, AMIS becomes UNAMID; and January 2011, South Sudan votes for independence.

Figure 4.5
Humanitarian Incidents, Darfur



SOURCE: Aid Worker Security Database, "Humanitarian Outcomes (2017)," 2017.

the number of displaced continued to rise through 2016. In June 2017, there were still more than 2.1 million displaced, even as the UN authorized a restructuring and reduction of UNAMID forces.

Humanitarian

The number of people displaced and of those in need of humanitarian assistance in Darfur remained extremely high throughout the conflict (see Figure 4.4). Reaching vulnerable populations was often difficult for humanitarian actors working in the region, as the government and rebel groups have all hindered access through obstruction, travel restrictions, attacks on convoys, and theft. At times, Darfur was among the most dangerous regions in the world for humanitarian actors to work: Casualties were higher in UNAMID than in UNAMIS/S in South Sudan.¹²⁴ Both AMIS (once expanded) and UNAMID had mandates to contribute to a secure environment for humanitarian actors to deliver aid in Darfur, which they implemented with mixed success.

During AMIS's deployment, as many as 14,000 aid workers and 85 NGOs were working to assist the 3.5 million Darfuris in need of assistance.¹²⁵ In general, AMIS peacekeepers lacked experience working with humanitarian counterparts and only belatedly created liaison mechanisms.¹²⁶ At times, AMIS provided protection to humanitarian convoys and rescued endangered aid workers, but such cooperation was largely the result of individual initiative. In 2006, waves of attacks against convoys and personnel resulted in "no-go areas" for AMIS peacekeepers and UN humanitarians alike.¹²⁷ AMIS's main contribution to humanitarian efforts was indirect: Its presence provided relative security around its various bases and areas of operation, facilitating humanitarian efforts.

keeping Missions," *Japan Times Online*, June 29, 2017; "UN Agrees to Cut Down Darfur Peacekeeping Force," *Al Jazeera*, June 29, 2017).

¹²⁴ United Nations Peacekeeping, 2017.

¹²⁵ Human Rights Watch, "Darfur: Humanitarian Aid Under Siege," Background Briefing, New York, May 2006b.

¹²⁶ O'Neill and Cassis, 2005.

¹²⁷ Human Rights Watch, 2006b.

Facilitating humanitarian access was more routinized but still challenging under UNAMID. The mission supported aid delivery by regularly conducting road patrols between main towns, escorting humanitarian convoys, and, in extreme cases, directly delivering aid. At the same time, government obstruction remained a challenge—peacekeeping forces were denied access to certain rebel-held areas, and the state frequently refused to issue visas to aid workers. Obstructionist behavior often tracked outside geopolitical events—intensifying, for example, after the ICC's indictment of Sudanese President al-Bashir for crimes in Darfur angered the regime and improving somewhat after the United States lifted sanctions in January 2017.¹²⁸ Between 2009 and 2017, the number of aid workers in Darfur dropped from 17,700 to just over 4,000.¹²⁹

As of July 2017, more than 2 million people remained displaced in Darfur, and about half of the region's population required humanitarian assistance.¹³⁰ Protracted displacement has disrupted traditional livelihood activities, eroded community resilience to withstand shocks, and imperiled food security.¹³¹ Additionally, recent conflict in neighboring South Sudan spurred an influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees into Darfur, further stressing host community resources and the humanitarian capacity.¹³² Despite some relative improvements in security since late 2016 and increasing pressure from the government,

¹²⁸ After the indictment, Khartoum expelled 13 international nongovernmental organizations in protest, and significant portions of the region became inaccessible to UN and humanitarian personnel. The number of aid workers in Darfur dropped from a preexpulsion level of 17,700 to 12,658 in December 2009. Another five humanitarian agencies left Darfur in 2015–2016, either closed by authorities or deciding to leave because financial and operational difficulties from government obstruction became insurmountable. The number of aid workers in the region decreased from 6,850 in 2013 to 4,446 in 2016 (OCHA, "Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview," June 1, 2016b). Relations with the government improved somewhat in late 2016 and 2017 (UNSC, 2017b).

¹²⁹ OCHA, 2017b.

¹³⁰ OCHA, 2017d.

¹³¹ OCHA, 2016c.

¹³² More than 297,000 South Sudanese refugees have entered Sudan since December 2013, with a fresh wave following violence and critical food insecurity in late 2016.

the displaced continue to fear returning home.¹³³ In 2017, UN reports explained that IDPs continued to face “grave security challenges”—with reports of IDPs being killed, raped, or harassed as they conducted life-sustaining activities outside camps—and the UN and its partners remained committed to the principle of voluntary return.¹³⁴

Governance and Civil Administration

Despite two peace agreements with multiple reform provisions each, the governance situation in Darfur has not improved. Sudan remains in the bottom 10th percentile worldwide for governance indicators—control of corruption, government effectiveness, rule of law, voice, and accountability¹³⁵—and inequitable sharing of power and wealth continued to undermine stability throughout the country.¹³⁶ Analysts insist that sustainable peace in Darfur will require difficult measures on land rights, access to services, and the distribution of political power as part of parallel peace processes at local, regional, and national levels.¹³⁷

Addressing underlying governance challenges was never part of AMIS’s mandate, which some point to as an operational mismatch.¹³⁸ The mission’s closest governance-related task involved assisting in building local confidence in the long-distrusted Sudanese police.¹³⁹ AMIS police conducted joint patrols, assisted in capacity enhance-

¹³³ “Sudan: ‘No Voluntary Return in Insecure Darfur’—Displaced to U.S.,” *Radio Dabanga*, April 25, 2017; “North Darfur Displaced Reject Voluntary Return,” *Radio Dabanga*, January 1, 2017; “Sudan V-P Calls for Voluntary Return Survey in Darfur,” *Radio Dabanga*, May 2, 2017.

¹³⁴ UNSC, 2017b, para. 24; UN Meetings Coverage, “Despite Increased Stability in Darfur, Reconfiguration of Peacekeeping Mission Must Not Compromise Gains, Special Representative Tells Security Council,” Security Council, 7912th Meeting, April 4, 2017b.

¹³⁵ 2014 and 2015 numbers (World Bank, undated[b]).

¹³⁶ World Bank, 2007, p. 59.

¹³⁷ ICG, 2015a; ICG, 2014a; Gorur and Velturo, 2017.

¹³⁸ Recall that AMIS operated as an “enhanced” observer mission in a situation of ongoing violence without a workable political settlement to end the war.

¹³⁹ Chronically underfunded and at times complicit in atrocities themselves, the police in Darfur remain deeply distrusted by a civilian population that has been traumatized and ter-

ment initiatives, and are credited with having a positive effect on the behavior of Sudanese police in some locations.¹⁴⁰ The close cooperation helped make AMIS police effective intermediaries between the Sudanese police and civilians, but it also tainted the mission in the eyes of some locals and armed groups and contributed to the perception that AMIS was biased toward Khartoum.¹⁴¹

UNAMID, by contrast, was indirectly tasked with a number of governance-related measures as part of its mandate to support the implementation of the two peace agreements, the DPA in 2006 and the DDPD in 2011. Both agreements included some provisions for power- and wealth-sharing, but government concessions fell short of rebel groups' demands for greater representation in federal and state structures and for greater decentralization.¹⁴² Many criticized the process as being externally driven exercises in "deadline diplomacy,"¹⁴³ and most rebel groups refused to sign either agreement.¹⁴⁴ The government

rorized by its government (Human Rights Watch, "Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design: Peacekeeping Challenges for AMIS and UNAMID," New York, 2007a).

¹⁴⁰ Appiah-Mensah, 2006, p. 8.

¹⁴¹ Edward Ansah Akuffo, "Cooperating for Peace and Security or Competing for Legitimacy in Africa? The Case of the African Union in Darfur," *African Security Review*, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 1, 2010, p. 118.

¹⁴² Rebels also called for a rotating vice president position for Darfur. To some degree, the North-South peace agreement signed earlier in 2006 limited what the government was able and willing to offer Darfuri groups (ICG, *Darfur: Revitalising the Peace Process*, Africa Report No. 125, April 30, 2007b).

¹⁴³ Desperate for a quick accord to facilitate a transition to a UN peacekeeping mission, the AU and its international partners truncated the DPA negotiations, resulting in the imposition of an externally constructed agreement. See L. Nathan, "The Making and Unmaking of the Darfur Peace Agreement," in Alex de Waal, ed., *War in Darfur and the Search for Peace*, Global Equity Initiative, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007; and ICG, 2007b. The DDPD process was similarly rushed to conclusion. In 2011, the lead AU-UN mediator was reappointed as Burkina Faso's foreign minister, and there was a rush to complete the process before his exit (ICG, 2014a, pp. 4–5).

¹⁴⁴ The DPA was deeply unpopular among Darfur's civilians. In mid-May, violent demonstrations against the DPA in IDP camps led to a number of deaths and injuries. AMIS personnel were also targeted, forcing AMIS to reduce its presence in camps. The signing of the DDPD did not trigger the same wave of hostile protests in IDP camps as seen in 2006 after the DPA but was still greeted with "mixed sentiments, some skepticism and even rejec-

launched military offensives in 2006 and 2011 against non-signatories, and the few power-sharing measures implemented focused on granting individual appointments to those rebel leaders who signed, rather than institutionalizing structural governance reform. In 2016, the government controversially declared that the DDPD had been successfully implemented and announced that it would dissolve the agreement's interim implementing body.¹⁴⁵ Others countered that such statements were “absurd” in the context of continued widespread displacement and insecurity.¹⁴⁶

Throughout, UNAMID's political and civil affairs sections have supported mediation efforts at local and national levels, run public information campaigns, and facilitated civil society in negotiations.¹⁴⁷ Analysts argue, however, that neither peace agreement left UNAMID with much strategic guidance for how to support improved governance.¹⁴⁸

Democratization

Democratization was not a part of AMIS's mission, and accusations of intending such “regime change” were a key reason why the government fought initially to keep a UN mission *out* of the country and then to limit its activities. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the government and southern Sudanese rebels was

tion” (Ted Dagne, “Sudan: The Crisis in Darfur and the Status of the North-South Peace Agreement,” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, June 15, 2011, p. 28; ICG, 2014a, pp. 4–5).

¹⁴⁵ Officials stated that the Darfur Regional Authority successfully “implement[ed] 85 percent of the items stipulated in the peace agreement for Darfur” and especially pointed to the controversial 2016 referendum held on the status of Darfur's multistate administrative system (“Darfur Regional Authority to Dissolve, Peace Committee Stays,” *Radio Dabanga*, June 14, 2016).

¹⁴⁶ Critics minimized the importance and impact of the interim body: “[T]he people of Darfur have nothing to do with that, nor are they paying it any attention” (“Sudan: ‘Little Interest in Darfur Regional Authority Wind-Up on the Ground,’” *Radio Dabanga*, September 7, 2016).

¹⁴⁷ Lanz, 2015, p. 784; UNAMID, “Civil Affairs,” undated.

¹⁴⁸ Lanz, 2015, p. 786.

perhaps the most promising opportunity for widespread democratic reform in the country, but implementation of its more liberal provisions stalled after the sudden death of a key proponent, rebel leader John Garang. Darfur's two peace agreements were partially based on the CPA—including similar references to “democratic values” and the value of elections—but there is little evidence of real commitment to democratic transformation. The Darfur Regional Authority, created by the second Darfur peace agreement, was designed to serve as the voice of Darfuris during a peace-building process. In practice, however, the body was dominated by signatory rebel members accused of anti-democratic practices and was unable to enable greater representation of Darfuris in local and national government.

In the lead-up to the country's first multiparty elections in two decades, UNAMID provided support on the margins—training police in elections security, aiding UNMIS in providing logistical support in southern Sudan, and providing technical assistance to the National Elections Commission.¹⁴⁹ The government resisted deeper involvement of “unfriendly countries” monitoring the elections and has at other times accused the mission of supporting anti-government protests.¹⁵⁰ In 2010, Bashir was reelected to the presidency with 68 percent of the (northern) vote, but the election was criticized as falling well below international standards.¹⁵¹

Economic Reconstruction

Fifteen years of conflict have massively disrupted Darfur's economy and undermined livelihoods—displacing communities, systematically destroying assets, radically reducing crop production, and bank-

¹⁴⁹ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan*, S/2010/388, July 19, 2010, para. 9.

¹⁵⁰ For example, in the lead-up to the controversial 2016 Darfur referendum, it accused UNAMID peacekeepers of providing support to anti-election protests (“N. Darfur Accuses UNAMID of Attempting to Support Anti-Election Protests,” *Sudan Tribune*, April 16, 2015).

¹⁵¹ David Smith, “Omar Hassan Al-Bashir Declared Winner of Sudan Election,” *The Guardian*, April 26, 2010.

rupting traders.¹⁵² Peacemaking and economic reconstruction efforts have been further undermined by conflict-induced patterns of land redistribution,¹⁵³ a growth in “maladapted” livelihood strategies,¹⁵⁴ and rapid urbanization around displacement camps.¹⁵⁵ The second peace agreement required that the government provide \$2.6 billion toward reconstruction in Darfur, but payments were partial and delayed,¹⁵⁶ and skeptical international observers have been wary of providing anticipated supplementary support.¹⁵⁷ The larger Sudanese economy faced problems following the downturn in the global oil market and oil-rich South Sudan’s secession.¹⁵⁸ The most recent indicators revealed

¹⁵² Darfur Joint Assessment Mission, “Developing Darfur: A Recovery and Reconstruction Strategy,” 2013, p. 38.

¹⁵³ Using data from 547 villages in southwestern Darfur, one study found that almost one-fourth of all destroyed or abandoned villages have subsequently been “squatted” (Olsson, 2010). National laws that land unoccupied for two or three years can be claimed by newcomers further complicate the situation.

¹⁵⁴ A report focused on livelihoods of Northern Rizeygat found that imperiled traditional livelihoods have pushed many to diversify into “maladaptation” strategies, or rapid militarization and the use of intimidation and violence as a means of controlling or restricting access to natural resources. Such strategies are “short-term, quick-return, and depend on a grossly distorted economy and a semi-captive market of IDPs” (Helen Young, Abdal Monium Osman, Ahmed Malik Abusin, Michael Asher, and Omer Egemi, *Livelihoods, Power and Choice: The Vulnerability of the Northern Rizeygat, Darfur, Sudan*, Somerville, Mass.: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2009).

¹⁵⁵ Prior to conflict, urbanization in Darfur was about 18 percent, growing by 6.4 percent annually. By 2005, more than 40 percent of the population was categorized as “urban” (World Bank, 2007, p. 34).

¹⁵⁶ The World Bank argued that the DDPD offered a “credible window of opportunity for sustainable peace” and for renewed World Bank engagement but also cautioned of multiple potential pitfalls that might prompt a return to violence (World Bank, “Interim Strategy Note (FY 2014–2015) for the Republic of Sudan,” August 30, 2013, p. 46).

¹⁵⁷ An international donor conference in 2013 barely raised half of the \$7.2 billion target for the envisioned development fund, even though the host state (Qatar) had announced a \$500 million contribution (“Darfur Donors Conference in Qatar Falls Short of Goal,” *Sudan Tribune*, April 8, 2013).

¹⁵⁸ Sudan lost 70 percent of its annual oil revenue in South Sudan’s secession. Sudan’s economy contracted by 3.3 percent in 2011 and by a further 11.1 percent in 2012 (Darfur Joint Assessment Mission, 2013, p. 10).

continued underdevelopment and inequality. Although Sudan boasts a GNI per capita of US\$1,490 (i.e., lower-middle income), the poverty rate is 46.5 percent nationwide—at 26 percent in Khartoum state but 62.7 percent in Darfur.¹⁵⁹

AMIS's mandate did not include provisions to support economic development, but UNAMID's mandate indirectly included some reconstruction tasks, via support for the implementation of Darfur's peace agreements and contribution to a secure environment for stabilization and development efforts.¹⁶⁰ UNAMID has contributed to economic recovery and social welfare on the margins through programs in education, health care, and environmental protection.¹⁶¹ The July 2017 mandate revision suggested that part of the mission would more explicitly focus on supporting stabilization and state-building efforts in areas where there is active fighting, under a second "track" led by the mission's police.¹⁶²

Lessons Learned

The transition from a clearly AU-led mission in AMIS to UNAMID's novel hybrid structure offers an interesting case study of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of African-led endeavors. It also highlights the challenges that are ubiquitous across organizations. In Darfur, the AU assumed leadership for a crisis that the rest of the world neglected, embarking on its most ambitious operation to date. Despite significant external support and dedicated action on the ground, the mission's impact was undermined by severe capacity, logistics, and doc-

¹⁵⁹ Based on 2009 National Baseline Household Survey data. The World Bank is still citing these same numbers in the 2016 poverty report (World Bank, 2013, para. 2).

¹⁶⁰ In 2013, a large multistakeholder report outlined that UNAMID's unique contribution to developing Darfur should focus on supporting the peace process, contributing to a secure environment for *others* to lead peacebuilding activities, and providing logistics and technical advice (Darfur Joint Assessment Mission, 2013).

¹⁶¹ Lanz, 2015.

¹⁶² UNSC, 2017b.

trinal gaps.¹⁶³ When the UN assumed joint leadership for the hybrid UNAMID mission in 2008, the re-hatted operation benefited from the UN's greater resource base, funding, and logistical capacity.¹⁶⁴ The larger UN Secretariat assumed *de facto* primary operational responsibility for the mission, which became a largely UN, not African-led operation. The stark contrast in management capacity between the AU and the UN led some officials to question the utility of international efforts to improve the AU's institutional capabilities.¹⁶⁵ That said, on the ground, the larger UNAMID mission also struggled to meaningfully affect ongoing conflict and displacement in Darfur. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 summarize peacekeeping inputs and outputs for Darfur.

Despite the UN's larger operational role in UNAMID, the AU continued to play an important part in managing political and diplomatic affairs in the region. Experts and observers alike stress that the AU afforded important legitimacy to the UNAMID mission and provided crucial political backing and leverage throughout.¹⁶⁶ The UN's access to Darfur was conditional on joint AU leadership and assuring the mission's "African character," and anecdotes abound of the valuable if informal interlocutor role that the AU played helping to manage the often-contentious relationship between the UN and the government.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ In the early stages, the Darfur crisis appeared emblematic of the trope that, in cases of humanitarian interventions in Africa, "the advanced Western nations are short on will and the Africans are short on means" (Gompert et al., 2005, p. 5).

¹⁶⁴ UN official II, interview; Lanz, 2015.

¹⁶⁵ UN official I, interview.

¹⁶⁶ Scholars have argued that the AU and African troops can sometimes add political legitimacy and leverage to peace operations, especially in contexts in which the host government and/or subregion did not welcome a UN presence (Williams and Boutellis, 2014, p. 270; UN official I, interview).

¹⁶⁷ For example, in 2014, the government was displeased by UN reporting of Sudanese army abuse and started calling for the UNAMID to leave. Quiet but firm diplomacy by AU leadership convinced Bashir to temper his demands (UN official I, interview). At a more tactical level, officials report that the AU has helped with overcoming daily obstructionist behavior by the government, in terms of releasing shipments and providing visas.

Table 4.3
Peacekeeping Outputs: Darfur, 2004–2017

	Estimated Annual Conflict Fatalities (Darfur) ^a	GDP Per Capita Growth (%) (Sudan)	Freedom Score (7 = worst, 1 = best) (Sudan)	HDI Score (0 = worst, 1 = best) (Sudan)	Government Effectiveness Score (–2.5 = worst, 2.5 = best) (Sudan)	Refugee Population (Sudan)	IDP Population (Sudan ^b / Darfur ^c)	African-Led Missions in Darfur (Country/ Organization ^d)	Other Missions Elsewhere in Sudan (Country/ Organization ^b)
2004	8,279	1.05%	7.0	0.423	–1.22	731,000	662,000	AMIS (AU)	---
2005	1,160	4.61%	7.0	0.430	–1.40	694,000	842,000	AMIS (AU)	UNMIS (UN)
2006	1,137	7.17%	7.0	0.440	–1.14	686,000	1,325,000	AMIS (AU)	UNMIS (UN)
2007	1,688	8.64%	7.0	0.444	–1.10	523,000	1,250,000	AMIS (AU)	UNMIS (UN)
2008	961	5.05%	7.0	0.456	–1.27	419,000	1,201,000	UNAMID (UN/AU)	UNMIS (UN)
2009	162	0.61%	7.0	0.461	–1.25	368,000	4,900,000	UNAMID (UN/AU)	UNMIS (UN)
2010	809	0.83%	7.0	0.463	–1.34	387,000	4,800,000	UNAMID (UN/AU)	UNMIS (UN), UNISFA (UN)
2011	163	7.89%	7.0	0.468	–1.38	500,000	2,200,000	UNAMID (UN/AU)	UNISFA (UN)
2012	766	12.82%	7.0	0.478	–1.42	569,000	3,000,000	UNAMID (UN/AU)	UNISFA (UN)
2013	2,659	1.96%	7.0	0.485	–1.49	649,000	2,000,000	UNAMID (UN/AU)	UNISFA (UN)
2014	2,115	0.26%	7.0	0.488	–1.53	666,000	2,500,000	UNAMID (UN/AU)	UNISFA (UN)
2015	1,698	2.45%	7.0	0.490	–1.46	635,000	2,500,000	UNAMID (UN/AU)	UNISFA (UN)

Table 4.3—continued

	Estimated Annual Conflict Fatalities (Darfur) ^a	GDP Per Capita Growth (%) (Sudan)	Freedom Score (7 = worst, 1 = best) (Sudan)	HDI Score (0 = worst, 1 = best) (Sudan)	Government Effectiveness Score (–2.5 = worst, 2.5 = best) (Sudan)	Refugee Population (Sudan)	IDP Population (Sudan ^b /Darfur ^c)	African-Led Missions in Darfur (Country/ Organization ^d)	Other Missions Elsewhere in Sudan (Country/ Organization ^b)
2016	939	2.21%	7.0	0.490	–1.41	627,000	2,600,000	UNAMID (UN/AU)	UNISFA (UN)
2017	631	---	7.0	---	---	650,588	2,000,000	UNAMID (UN/AU)	UNISFA (UN)

^a Reliable conflict fatality data are difficult to obtain, particularly in Africa. We compared several notable data sets: CCAPS' Armed ACLED, START's GTD, UCDP's Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, UCDP's One-Sided Violence Dataset, UCDP's Non-State Conflict Dataset, and Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Dataset. The data varied widely across these sources, though the trends generally agreed. Overall, we judged ACLED to be the most inclusive data set, but fatality data presented in this table should be interpreted as conservative estimates.

^b IDP figures from 2004 to 2008 are taken from the UNHCR Populations Statistics Database and only include conflict-generated IDPs to whom the UNHCR extends protection and/or assistance. Figures from 2009 to 2012 are from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Global Internal Displacement Database and are not limited to IDPs receiving aid or protection. Although all figures from this period are aggregates for Sudan as a whole, the Darfur conflict is widely assumed to account for the majority of displaced.

^c IDP figures from 2013 to 2016 are taken from OCHA Humanitarian Snapshot reports, public on ReliefWeb. These figures are specific to the Darfur crisis. Where possible, figures released in December are used. Where December figures are missing, the next closest month with IDP figures is used.

^d Organization codes: AMIS = African Union Mission in Sudan; UNMIS = United Nations Mission in Sudan; UNAMID = United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur; UNISFA = United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei; AU = African Union; UN = United Nations.

SOURCES: Raleigh et al., 2010; World Bank, 2018b; Freedom House, 2018a; UNDP, 2018; World Bank, undated(b); UNHCR, 2017; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2017; Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics; United Nations, UNAMID website; African Union, AMIS website; IPI Peacekeeping Database; OCHA/ReliefWeb; RAND calculations.

Table 4.4
Performance Indicators and Peacekeeping Inputs for Darfur/Sudan

Performance Indicators	First Year of Intervention (2004)	5 Years Later (2009)	10 Years Later (2014)	Through Most Recent Year Available
At peace?	No	No	No	No
Government effectiveness (scale: -2.5 = low to 2.5 = high)	-1.22	-1.25	-1.53	-1.41
Freedom index (scale: 1 = high to 7 = low)	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
GNI per capita, PPP (current international dollars)	\$2,060	\$2,990	\$3,980	\$4,290
Average annual rate of growth in per capita GDP (%) ^a	---	5.21%	4.98%	4.54%
Cumulative growth in per capita GDP (%) ^a	---	28.7%	61.5%	69.1%
HDI (scale: 0 = low to 1 = high)	0.423	0.461	0.488	0.490
Peacekeeping Inputs				
Peak AU military presence per capita, number of AMIS troops per 1,000 inhabitants (2006) ^b	0.9			
Peak UN/AU military presence per capita, number of UNAMID troops per 1,000 inhabitants (2011) ^c	2.3			
Peak AU international civilian police presence per capita, number of AMIS police per 1,000 inhabitants (2006) ^b	0.2			
Peak UN/AU international civilian police presence per capita, number of UNAMID police per 1,000 inhabitants (2011) ^c	0.7			
Average annual per capita assistance in the first five years after intervention (current US\$)	\$45.89			

Table 4.4—continued

^a Average annual rate of growth in per capita GDP and cumulative growth in per capita GDP are based on purchasing power parity (PPP) measured in constant 2011 international \$.

^b Peak AMIS military and police force levels are based on August 2006 figures, at which time it was estimated that 5,874 military personnel (5,228 troops and 646 military observers) and 1,456 civilian police were deployed to Darfur (out of a maximum authorized strength of 6,171 military personnel and 1,560 civilian police) (Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008). Per capita military/police estimates are based on 2006 population, equaling 6.2 million. Darfur population estimates obtained from Lydia Polgreen, "Refugee Crisis Grows as Darfur War Crosses a Border," *New York Times*, February 28, 2006; UNICEF, Sudan, "Darfur Emergency Programme, Current Situation," 2009.

^c Peak UNAMID military and police force levels are based on 2011 and 2012 figures, at which time it was estimated that 17,778 military troops and 5,228 civilian police were deployed to Darfur under SCR 1769 (2007) (out of a maximum authorized strength of 19,555 military troops and 3,772 civilian police plus an additional 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each). Maximum deployed numbers were identified using International Peace Institute, undated, accessed May 24, 2017. Per capita military/police estimates based on 2011 population, at which time the estimated populations of the three Darfur states were 2,140,392 (North), 1,349,308 (West), and 4,210,607 (South), totaling 7,700,307. Population estimates obtained from Sudan's Central Bureau of Statistics's total project population of states calculations, 2009 to 2018. The last census for the Sudan state was taken in 2008.

SOURCES: Marshall, Gurr, and Harff, 2017; World Bank, 2018b; Freedom House, 2018a; UNDP, 2018; World Bank, undated(b); UNHCR, 2017; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2017; IMF, International Financial Statistics database; Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics; United Nations, UNAMID website; AU, AMIS website; RAND calculations. For more information on performance indicators, see Appendix B.

According to one UN official, "Certain situations require jointness [and] we won't get 'hybrid' out of our vocabulary anytime soon."¹⁶⁸

A final universal lesson is that mandate mismatch undermines mission impact, regardless of the implementing leadership. As of July 2017, a sustainable political resolution to the conflict remained elusive and the humanitarian situation dire.¹⁶⁹ Both missions struggled with mandates that

- were poorly aligned to the reality of the ongoing and evolving conflict on the ground
- offered little leverage in the face of wavering consent and obstructionist actions by the host government¹⁷⁰
- insufficiently acknowledged and addressed the complicated root causes of the crisis.

Mandated to keep the peace in a situation of ongoing war and deployments, with insufficient numbers and resources relative to the task at hand, AMIS and UNAMID peacekeepers alike were left reacting to conflict developments and dynamics that remained largely outside of their control while struggling to execute their humanitarian responsibilities.

¹⁶⁸ UN official II, interview. Sudan is not the only country where the host government is deeply skeptical of the UN—operations in Chad and the DRC, for example, also face growing distrust by African governments.

¹⁶⁹ Even as UNAMID officially remains committed to supporting the implementation of the DDPD, officials are blunt in their assessment that, in reality, there is still "no viable peace process" in Darfur (UN official I, interview).

¹⁷⁰ Paul Williams argued that the first key lesson of peace operations in Africa is that peacekeeping operations should generally avoid crossing the "Darfur line"—that is, "deploying where there is no (real) consent by the state." If civilians are being systematically massacred by their own governments and the international community wants to stop it, Williams maintained, then a military intervention is needed rather than a peacekeeping operation. Successful peace operations require partnership with conflict partners committed to peace and a viable political process for managing and resolving the conflict (Williams, 2013b).

Comoros


Since independence from France in 1975, the Union of the Comoros has suffered from severe political instability. The country is composed of three volcanic islands—Grand Comore (Ngazidja), Anjouan (Nzwani), and Moheli (Mwali)—in the Indian Ocean between Mozambique and Madagascar. It has experienced 21 coups (see Figure 5.1).¹ It has additionally faced multiple secession attempts, the most significant of which occurred in 1997. In that year, separatists on the islands of Anjouan and Moheli each declared independence. The national government, based on Grand Comore, attacked Anjouan in an unsuccessful attempt to restore control. The fighting led to over 50 civilian and military casualties—a large number for such a small country.² The OAU and its successor, the AU, undertook a series of interventions over the course of a decade to promote stability in the archipelago and prevent the country from breaking apart.

The first four interventions (Observer Mission to Comoros [OMIC] I, OMIC II, OMIC III, and the African Union Military Observer Mission in the Comoros [MIOC]) were small observer missions, the largest of which only had 41 international observers. This chapter focuses on the AU's two larger missions, the AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) in 2006 and the Electoral and Security Assistance Mission in Comoros (MAES) in

¹ The islands' Comorian names are in parentheses. The island chain has a fourth major island, Mayotte (Maore), which voted to not gain independence and remain part of France.

² Tufts University Fletcher School, "African Peace Missions: Comoros Short Brief," July 21, 2016.

Figure 5.1
Map of the Islands of Comoros



SOURCE: United Nations Cartographic Section, Map No. 4088, Rev. 1, January 2004.

2007–2008, including the military intervention on Anjouan in March 2008, known as Operation Democracy in the Comoros. See Table 5.1 for a list of missions in the Comoros.

Challenges

The Comoros have faced significant challenges developing a stable polity because of the lack of a unifying identity, resource poverty, and the partition of the archipelago (with Mayotte remaining a French ter-

Table 5.1
Foreign Interventions in Comoros, 1998–2016

Lead Organization or Country	Mission Name	Start Date	End Date	Peak Personnel Strength (Military Unless Specified)
OAU	OMIC I	1998	1999	20 (military observers)
OAU	OMIC II	2002	Mar. 2002	14 (military observers)
OAU	OMIC III	Mar. 2002	May 2002	39 (military observers)
AU	MIOC ^a	Mar. 2004	May 2004	41 (military observers)
AU	AMISEC	Apr. 2006	Jun. 2006	1,200 30 police
AU	MAES	May 2007	2008	356 (military and civilian)
AU	Operation Democracy in the Comoros	Mar. 2008	Oct. 2008	1,800 15 police
AU	AU Election Observation Mission (AUEOM)	2016	2016	35 (military observers)

^a Sometimes known as OMIC IV.

NOTE: African-led missions are in red.

ritory while the other three islands gained independence).³ Starting in 1998, the OAU and subsequently the AU launched four small observer missions, ranging from 14 to 41 African observers,⁴ and several diplomatic initiatives aimed at maintaining stability and preventing the country from splitting apart. Yet these efforts were generally unsuccessful, and the Comoros continued to face substantial instability leading into the mid-2000s.

³ Bruce Baker, “Comoros: The Search for Viability,” *Civil Wars*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2009, pp. 215–233.

⁴ Tufts University Fletcher School, 2016; and Terry M. Mays, *Historical Dictionary of Multinational Peacekeeping*, 3rd ed., Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2011, pp. 205–207.

Security

Despite being relatively ethnically and religiously homogeneous, Comoros has never been able to develop a shared national identity.⁵ Anjouan and Moheli feel marginalized by Grand Comore, where the national capital sits. As a result, relations between the three islands are characterized by distrust and a desire for autonomy. The structure of the Comorian security forces reflects the power struggle between the islands: There are six different security forces on the islands (police and military) that report to four authorities.⁶ This system is rooted in mutual suspicion and is a deliberate attempt to disperse power in order to prevent coups. Each island would prefer to have its own security force than to give up power to the other islands or a central government.⁷

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the OAU helped to negotiate three agreements between the leaders of the Comorian islands: the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1997, the Antananarivo Agreement in 1999, and the Fomboni Framework Agreement in 2001. The agreements established a federated structure for the country. Elections for president of the Union of the Comoros were scheduled for the spring of 2006, and the AU anticipated unrest and instability, as during previous Comorian elections. Cooperation between the three islands “came to a virtual halt” in the run-up to the election because of a dispute over revenue sharing.⁸

A central manifestation of political instability has been a recurrence of military coups. As mentioned above, there have been 21 attempted or successful coups since independence from France in

⁵ I. Walker, “What Came First, the Nation or the State? Political Process in the Comoro Islands,” *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 77, No. 4, 2007, pp. 582–605; Baker, 2009.

⁶ Tufts University Fletcher School, 2016; Baker, 2009, p. 224, writes that the National Development Army, Federal Police (Gendarmerie), and Union Security Agency report to the Ministry of Defence; the Presidential Guard reports to the Union President; and each island’s police force reports to the Ministry of Interior of that island.

⁷ Tufts University Fletcher School, 2016.

⁸ International Monetary Fund, *Union of the Comoros: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix*, IMF Country Report No. 06/385, 2006a, p. 22.

1975.⁹ Four of the coups were led by the French mercenary Bob Denard (1975, 1978, 1989, and 1995), with what many allege was the approval of France.¹⁰ Despite such perennial instability, violence has rarely been severe. With the prominent exception of the 50 casualties caused by the 1997 Comorian attack on Anjouan, most violent episodes in recent history have led to less than five deaths.¹¹

Humanitarian

Classified by the UN as a least-developed country, Comoros ranked 132 out of 177 in the 2006 HDI.¹² In 2004, 45 percent of Comorians lived below the poverty line, and the poverty rate increased to 54.7 percent in 2005.¹³ The local government of Anjouan was accused of violence against its citizens, including torture and rape. Several thousand people fled to the other islands.¹⁴

Governance and Civil Administration

A significant crisis of governance occurred when the islands of Anjouan and Moheli each declared independence in 1997, leading to the national government's failed invasion of Anjouan. Their declarations, which called for the islands to rejoin France, were not recognized by the international community. A decentralized system of government was put forward in the 1999 Antananarivo Agreement, brokered by the OAU. Each island would receive partial autonomy; establish its

⁹ Simon Massey and Bruce Baker, *Comoros: External Involvement in a Small Island State*, London: Chatham House, July 2009, p. 10. Baker, 2009, p. 221, reports that the number of coups is between 19 and 25.

¹⁰ Massey and Baker, 2009, p. 10; Emma Svensson, *The African Union's Operations in the Comoros: MAES and Operation Democracy*, Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, September 2008a, p. 15; Baker, 2009, p. 222.

¹¹ Tufts University Fletcher School, 2016.

¹² United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2006: Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis*, New York, 2006, pp. 285, 415.

¹³ Massey and Baker, 2009.

¹⁴ Jude Cocodia, *Peacekeeping and the African Union: Building Negative Peace*, London: Routledge, 2018, p. 82.

own local government, led by its own president and parliament; and manage its own finances, and the presidency of the national government would rotate between the islands every four years. Decentralization did not fully quell the desire for secession, especially on Anjouan, which rejected the agreement in a referendum considered illegitimate by the OAU.¹⁵ The Fomboni Agreement, reached in 2001 in negotiations led by South Africa, built on the federal system of the Antananarivo Agreement and was approved by a nationwide referendum. It established a new national constitution and set the stage for new constitutions for all three islands and for the subsequent OAU observer missions.¹⁶

Democratization

Despite holding several contested, multiparty elections since 1990, Comoros was far from fully democratic. The elections themselves were regularly marked by claims of fraud, and elected national leaders were overthrown in military coups in 1995 and 1999. The 1995 coup was led by Denard, who attempted to depose President Said Mohammed Djohar. The coup attempt ended when Denard was arrested by French troops.¹⁷ During the 1999 coup, Colonel Azali Assoumane toppled President Abbas Djoussouf after riots in the capital city of Moroni over Anjouan's refusal to sign the Antananarivo Agreement.¹⁸

Economic Reconstruction

Among the poorest countries in the world, Comoros' GDP per capita in 2004 was \$623 (\$1,943 in PPP). The CIA Factbook describes the country as having "a subsistence level of economic activity."¹⁹ Between 1990 and 2004, the annual growth rate was -0.5 percent. During that same

¹⁵ Svensson, 2008a, p. 13; Daniel Brett, "Comoros," in *Africa Review 2003/04: The Economic and Business Report*, London: Kogan Page Publishers, 2003, pp. 64–65.

¹⁶ Brett, 2003, p. 65.

¹⁷ Svensson, 2008a, p. 15; "French Mercenary Gives Up in Comoros Coup," *New York Times*, October 6, 1995.

¹⁸ Baker, 2009, p. 217.

¹⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, "Comoros," CIA World Factbook, undated(b).

period, Comoros saw a significant decline in foreign aid, on which it relies heavily. Annual official development assistance dropped from US\$60 million in 1990 to US\$25 million 15 years later.²⁰ Comoros has few natural resources and an economy based on fishing and agriculture. Eighty percent of the population was employed in those sectors, and 40 percent of GDP came from them.²¹ The most important crops were spices for export, such as vanilla and cinnamon. This reliance on agricultural exports made Comoros very vulnerable to global price fluctuations. For example, between 2003 and 2005, the price of vanilla dropped by over 80 percent (from more than \$300 per kilo to less than \$50 per kilo).²² Finally, one-quarter of GDP came from remittances from Comorians living abroad.²³

African and Other International Roles

Anticipating trouble with the April–May 2006 elections, the Comorian government requested assistance from the AU, which authorized AMISEC on March 21, 2006.²⁴ AMISEC was mandated to support the national reconciliation process, create a secure environment to hold free and fair elections, monitor the elections, ensure that the Comorian security force was not involved in the election, protect civilians near polling stations, and provide the necessary administrative and security support for the elections to run smoothly.²⁵ To achieve its mandate, AMISEC was to send troops to each polling station in the country.²⁶ AMISEC withdrew its troops from Comoros in June 2006.

²⁰ Baker, 2009, p. 219.

²¹ IMF, 2006a.

²² Matthew Dwyer, “Comoros: Big Troubles on Some Small Islands,” CSIS Commentary, April 14, 2008.

²³ Dwyer, 2008.

²⁴ PSC, “Communiqué on the Situation in the Comoros,” PSC/PR/Comm. 1 (XLVII), March 21, 2006.

²⁵ PSC, 2006.

²⁶ Svensson, 2008a, p. 19.

Less than a year later, the AU authorized a new mission called MAES on May 9, 2007.²⁷ MAES was established due to uncertainty surrounding the elections for president of each island, set for June 10, 2007. Its initial mandate was to secure the islands so the elections could occur, monitor the elections, encourage dialogue, and “facilitate the effective restoration of the authority of the central government in Anjouan.”²⁸ The final part of the mandate was intended to address the refusal of the president of Anjouan, Mohammed Bacar, to step down.

MAES was unable to get Bacar to change his mind, so in October 2007, the AU updated MAES's mandate to focus more on Anjouan and placed sanctions on Bacar and the other “illegal authorities of Anjouan and all other persons and entities that impede the process of reconciliation and constitute a threat to peace and security in the Comoros.”²⁹ However, Bacar remained in power and did not allow MAES onto Anjouan. So, in early 2008, the government of Comoros requested the AU's military assistance to restore its authority in Anjouan.³⁰ MAES's mandate “transformed from election security to a Chapter Seven peace enforcement–style operation.”³¹ The resulting intervention, Operation Democracy in the Comoros, took place on March 25, 2008.

Military and Police

AMISEC began in March 2006 with 462 “military and civilian police personnel” from six African countries.³² The majority (341) of the troops were South African, and the others came from Rwanda (30), Nigeria (11), Mozambique (10), Congo-Brazzaville (5), and Egypt (5).

²⁷ PSC, “Communiqué on the Situation in the Comoros,” PSC/MIN/Comm. 1 (LXXVII), May 9, 2007b.

²⁸ PSC, 2007b.

²⁹ PSC, “Communiqué,” PSC/PR/Comm. (XCV), October 10, 2007c.

³⁰ Svensson, 2008a, p. 20.

³¹ Mays, 2011, p. 42.

³² PSC, 2006.

Fifteen police officers were sent by both Madagascar and Mauritius.³³ For the second round of the elections, in May 2006, South Africa deployed an additional 763 troops.³⁴

MAES began with 300–350 AU peacekeepers, who were transported by France and funded, in part, by the League of Arab States.³⁵ When MAES shifted gears for Operation Democracy in the Comoros, South Africa removed its troops because it thought peaceful negotiations were still possible.³⁶ Even without South Africa, Operation Democracy had a significant force: approximately 1,800 total troops, including AU forces and the Comorian military.³⁷ The AU troops came from Tanzania, which led the operation, and Sudan, while Senegal provided military advice and Libya and France provided logistical support.³⁸ Morocco, which at the time was not a member of the AU, also supplied zodiac boats for the landings.³⁹ The United States provided “valuable moral support” for the intervention.⁴⁰

After the troops that had joined MAES for Operation Democracy departed, MAES received a new mandate in April 2008. This mandate included helping the federal government to disarm Anjouan

³³ Williams and Boutellis, 2014, p. 106; Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007a, p. 110.

³⁴ Tufts University Fletcher School, 2016.

³⁵ Mays, 2011, p. 42; Tufts University Fletcher School, 2016.

³⁶ Mays, 2011, p. 42.

³⁷ The 1,800-troop count comes from Paul Williams, who reports that there were 1,350 AU troops and 450 Comorians. The figure, however, is disputed, and different sources give varying numbers. France 24 reports that there were 1,000 AU troops and 400 Comorians; Svensson reports that there were 1,500 troops total; Mays reports that there were 1,250 AU troops and does not give a number for the Comorians; and Tufts University Fletcher School reports that there were 1,800 AU troops and 1,500 Comorians. See Williams, 2009, p. 107; France 24, “Comoros Takes Control of Anjouan,” March 26, 2008; Svensson, 2008a, p. 21; Mays, 2011, p. 42; and Tufts University Fletcher School, 2016.

³⁸ Tufts University Fletcher School, 2016; Williams, 2009, p. 107.

³⁹ Alex Vines, “A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 1, January 2013, p. 100.

⁴⁰ Vines, 2013, p. 100; PSC, “Communiqué,” PSC/PR/Comm. (CXXIV), April 30, 2008.

and organizing and securing elections on Anjouan.⁴¹ To carry out this mission, MAES had several hundred military and civilian personnel.⁴²

Civil and Economic

In addition to the security personnel, AMISEC had an unknown number of “necessary support staff.”⁴³ To boost the mission during the second round of the 2006 elections, the AU sent 62 international observers, representing several international organizations (AU, International Organisation of La Francophonie, and League of Arab States) and countries (France, the United States, and the Netherlands).⁴⁴

MAES, as just reported, also had civilian staff focused on civil issues. In particular, after Operation Democracy, MAES was mandated to assist “in the domain of governance and other related areas” and to “provide support to the activities of the Inter-Comorian Committee relating to the definition of constitutional competences between the Union and the autonomous Islands, as well as to the efforts aimed at rationalizing the current institutional arrangements in the Comoros.”⁴⁵

What Happened

The AU's interventions in Comoros both accomplished their primary objectives swiftly and without difficulty. The 2006 elections proceeded according to plan, the Anjouanese secessionists were defeated, and the federal government's authority was restored to the island. In the decade since the missions, Comoros has become more stable.

⁴¹ PSC, 2008.

⁴² Mays, 2011, p. 42, reports that there were about 470 troops (150 Tanzanian, 120 Senegalese, and 200 Sudanese) by the end of 2008; Williams, 2009, p. 107, reports that there were “approximately 350 civilian personnel from Tanzania and Sudan”; and Svensson, 2008a, p. 22, reports that “256 military and civilian personnel from Tanzania and Sudan” remained.

⁴³ PSC, 2006.

⁴⁴ Tufts University Fletcher School, 2016.

⁴⁵ PSC, 2008.

Security

AMISEC successfully secured the 2006 elections, which went “smoothly,” according to one analyst.⁴⁶ Comorian security forces were kept out of the elections, and several people were arrested for election fraud.⁴⁷ AMISEC suffered no casualties and withdrew from the islands in June 2006, after the new president was successfully inaugurated.⁴⁸

In the months following the election, Comoros experienced peace and stability throughout the islands. But this calm was ruptured in the run-up to the elections for president of each island scheduled for June 10, 2007. Bacar, the president of Anjouan, would not step down at the end of his term. The Comorian government appointed an interim president in May, but Bacar loyalists attacked government buildings and killed two federal officers.⁴⁹

Shortly after, MAES was authorized and deployed. However, Bacar did not permit the AU forces onto Anjouan, so they remained on Grand Comore and had little influence on the situation on Anjouan. Heeding the request of the president of Comoros for military assistance to restore federal control of Anjouan, the AU planned Operation Democracy in the Comoros. Despite opposition from South Africa, which until that time had played a key role in AU operations in Comoros, the invasion took place the morning of March 25, 2008.

The AU and Comorian forces quickly overwhelmed the 500 French-trained Anjouanese troops. The pan-African soldiers captured the airport, seaport, and two main towns with little resistance.⁵⁰ Bacar fled the island, and Operation Democracy in the Comoros succeeded in taking full control of Anjouan by the end of the day.⁵¹ The only

⁴⁶ Williams, 2009, p. 106.

⁴⁷ Mays, 2011, p. 44; Williams, 2009, p. 106.

⁴⁸ Center on International Cooperation, 2007a, p. 109; Mays, 2011, p. 44. (According to Center on International Cooperation, 2007a, p. 109, the withdrawal was in late May 2006.)

⁴⁹ Center on International Cooperation, 2008, p. 103.

⁵⁰ Massey and Baker, 2009, p. 15.

⁵¹ Mays, 2011, p. 42.

known casualties on either side were two Tanzanian soldiers who drowned during the amphibious landing.⁵²

After the successful invasion, there were approximately 100 arrests for offenses, including human rights violations.⁵³ MAES also began disarming the Anjouanese security forces still loyal to Bacar.⁵⁴ Elections were finally held on Anjouan in June and July 2008, and they passed without violence.⁵⁵

MAES's post-Operation Democracy mandate included SSR. Specifically, the SSR framework sought to (1) develop and implement a security vision and policy aimed at achieving sustainable peace and security; (2) sensitize the security forces to the revitalization of the training platform of the National School of Armed Forces and Gendarmerie; and (3) rehabilitate military camps and infrastructure, which have led to serious security problems for the population.⁵⁶ The security-sector reforms achieved improvements in the Comorian security services, including the rehabilitation of several military facilities and infrastructure; the training of 153 army and gendarmerie officers, which improved the "republican spirit" of the forces; and increased military training on ethics, human rights, and peace-building.⁵⁷ Although the federal government wanted the AU to remain to promote stability, MAES forces departed by the end of 2008.⁵⁸ Since then, Comoros

⁵² Massey and Baker, 2009, p. 15. Williams, 2009, p. 107, reports that the AU and Comorian troops suffered no casualties or injuries; and Tufts University Fletcher School (2016) reports "no casualties on either side."

⁵³ Massey and Baker, 2009, p. 16.

⁵⁴ Svensson, 2008a, p. 21.

⁵⁵ Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009*, New York, 2009, p. 88.

⁵⁶ GlobalSecurity.org, "National Army for Development (l'Armee Nationale de Developpement, AND)," 2017.

⁵⁷ GlobalSecurity.org, 2017.

⁵⁸ Tufts University Fletcher School, 2016.

has remained relatively stable and secure, and the security service has remained loyal to “One Comoros.”⁵⁹

Humanitarian

In order to reduce harm to civilians during Operation Democracy, the mission’s mandate required that residents be informed of the invasion so that they could seek safety. The AU dropped leaflets from a helicopter warning the residents of Anjouan that a military invasion was imminent. Some people fled before the attack, but there were no civilian casualties or major population displacements as a result of the fighting.⁶⁰ MAES and Operation Democracy otherwise did not have a humanitarian mandate and had little impact on the humanitarian situation in Comoros.

Governance and Civil Administration

Besides ensuring that the 2006 elections and inauguration passed without incident, AMISEC did not aspire to affect Comorian governance and civil administration. MAES, however, did seek to improve the country’s governance. In addition to fostering successful elections on all the islands, MAES promoted improved governance and SSR, discussed above. Although governance indicators have shown some improvement in recent years, governance in Comoros remains weak and ineffective. Institutions have a very low capacity, and corruption is a severe problem. For instance, although the establishment of the High National Anti-Corruption Commission by President Ikililou Dhoinine in 2011 was lauded, it has not made any progress, and Comoros actually fell in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index between 2013 and 2015.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Tufts University Fletcher School, 2016; African Development Bank Group, “Union of the Comoros Country Strategy Paper 2016–2020,” March 2016, p. 1.

⁶⁰ United Nations Country Team in Comoros, *Comoros: Situation Report No. 1*, March 25, 2008.

⁶¹ African Development Bank Group, 2016, p. 2.

Democratization

AMISEC directly contributed to the success of the 2006 elections, which are “widely regarded as the first democratic transition of power in the Comoros.”⁶² Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, a moderate Islamist from Anjouan, was elected with 58 percent of the vote in a process judged “free and fair” by international observers.⁶³

The Anjouanese elections held after Operation Democracy in June and July 2008, which elected Moussa Toybou, were considered free and fair.⁶⁴ Several of the elections held since then have been delayed for various reasons, and there have been allegations of irregularities. But they have passed without serious violence, and the results have been respected. In 2016, the AU sent 35 election observers to monitor the polls. The first round went smoothly, but the second round experienced irregularities on Anjouan. The Comorian Constitutional Court ordered new elections, and the AU again sent observers.⁶⁵ Overall, according to Freedom House, Comoros is “partly free.”⁶⁶

Economic Reconstruction

Comoros remains economically fragile, undiversified, and dependent on the export of agricultural commodities. Yet, despite its highly agrarian economy, Comoros imports 70 percent of all its food, making a majority (84 percent) of Comorian households food-insecure.⁶⁷ Rice and dried vegetables make up one-quarter of imports to the islands.⁶⁸

⁶² Svensson, 2008a, p. 19. See, for instance, Williams, 2009, p. 106: “AMISEC’s presence helped ensure that the second round of the elections took places as planned on May 14.”

⁶³ Center on International Cooperation, 2007a, p. 110; Williams, 2009, p. 106.

⁶⁴ Center on International Cooperation, 2009, p. 88; Svensson, 2008a, p. 22.

⁶⁵ African Union Commission, “AU Commission Chairperson Commends Peaceful First-Round Elections in Comoros,” February 23, 2016; AU, “The Chairperson African Union Commission Approves the Deployment of an Election Expert Observer Mission to the Re-Run Elections in the Union of the Comoros,” African Union Press Release No. 166/2016, 2016a.

⁶⁶ Freedom House, “Comoros: Freedom in the World, 2016,” 2016a.

⁶⁷ African Development Bank Group, 2016, p. 8.

⁶⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, undated(b).

The agricultural sector has actually declined in the years since the AU interventions (from 43 percent of GDP in 2009 to 35 percent in 2014), while the service sector has grown (from 46 percent of GDP in 2009 to 54 percent in 2014). The industrial sector remains small and undeveloped.⁶⁹ Since 2014, there has been new income from licensing oil and gas exploration, but so far they have not discovered anything.⁷⁰

African and non-African states became supportive when Comoros became a postconflict state. In 2008–2009, Dubai and Kuwait invested \$70 million and \$56 million, respectively, while the United States began trading with the Comoros as part of the African Growth and Opportunity Act.⁷¹ The IMF approved a \$21 million three-year loan in 2009, and in 2012 the IMF and World Bank provided Comoros \$176 million in debt relief.⁷²

Comoros signed the COMESA Free Trade Area in 2006.⁷³ Recently, the Union has been admitted as a new member of the SADC, raising the number of member states to 16.⁷⁴ In that respect, Comoros's GDP performance on average between 1980–2016 rose to \$0.31 billion, reaching an all-time high of \$0.65 billion in 2014.⁷⁵

Lessons Learned

Although relatively small operations, the AU's interventions in Comoros have been considered very successful.⁷⁶ They secured the first

⁶⁹ African Development Bank Group, 2016, p. 3.

⁷⁰ African Development Bank Group, 2016, p. 3.

⁷¹ Ahmed Ali Amir, "Kuwait to Invest \$56mn in Comoros," *ArabianBusiness*, March 30, 2008; African Growth and Opportunity Act, "Country Info: Comores," undated.

⁷² African Growth and Opportunity Act, undated.

⁷³ Elias Biryabarema, "Africa: Libya and Comoros Join COMESA Free Trade Area," *AllAfrica*, May 26, 2006.

⁷⁴ Southern African Development Community, "The Union of Comoros Becomes the 16th SADC Member State," August 20, 2017.

⁷⁵ Trading Economics, "Comoros GDP," 2018a.

⁷⁶ E.g., Cocodia, 2018, p. 83.

peaceful, democratic transition of power; restored government authority over the entire archipelago and prevented the breakup of the country; and sustained minimal casualties among combatants and civilians. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 summarize the peacekeeping inputs and outputs for the Comoros.

Operation Democracy in the Comoros succeeded despite the fact that the AU's usual leading nations did not participate.⁷⁷ South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria all stayed on the sidelines during the military operation. In fact, South Africa, which had been the key player in earlier AU involvement in Comoros—including AMISEC and MAES prior to the invasion—specifically opposed the use of force.

The fact that the military intervention took place over the wishes of the dominant southern African state, argues Kwaku Asante-Darko, “underscores the primacy of the AU as a continental organization over the position of any of its individual Member States.”⁷⁸ Importantly, the Comoros also requested that the AU intervene in its internal affairs. Comorian forces were part of the operation, and the local population generally supported the intervention.⁷⁹

The military collaboration between Tanzania and Sudan, along with support from Senegal, Libya, and France, rapidly accomplished its central mission. Along with the success of AMISEC, the AU's Comoros missions demonstrated that it could “undertake effective short-term peace operations.”⁸⁰ AMISEC lasted less than 3 months, MAES lasted around 1.5 years, and Operation Democracy lasted about one day, yet all of them achieved most of their mandates. This was possible because the mandates were carefully aligned to the needs and capabilities of the missions. The AU updated the mandates several times, tailoring them to ensure that they were appropriate and achievable. This is reflected

⁷⁷ Svensson, 2008a, p. 25.

⁷⁸ Kwaku Asante-Darko, “OAU and AU Missions in the Comoros: Towards a Pedagogy of Theory and Practice in African Peace Support Operations,” in African Union Commission, *A Comprehensive Review of African Conflicts and Regional Interventions [CRACRI]*, 2016, p. 229.

⁷⁹ Cocodia, 2018, p. 86.

⁸⁰ Center on International Cooperation, 2007a, p. 110.

Table 5.2
Peacekeeping Outputs: Comoros, 2006–2008

	Estimated Annual Conflict Fatalities ^a	GDP Per Capita Growth (%)	Freedom Score (7 = worst, 1 = best)	HDI Score (0 = worst, 1 = best)	Government Effectiveness Score (–2.5 = worst, 2.5 = best)	Refugee Population	IDP Population	African-Led Missions	Other Missions (Country/ Organi- zation)
2006	0	0.22%	4.0	0.459	–1.68	72	0	AMISEC (AU)	---
2007	0	–1.59%	3.5	0.461	–1.76	96	0	MAES (AU)	---
2008	0	–1.98%	4.0	0.465	–1.78	378	0	MAES (AU)	---

^a Reliable conflict fatality data are difficult to obtain, particularly in Africa. We compared several notable data sets: CCAPS' ACLED, START's GTD, UCDP's Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, UCDP's One-Sided Violence Dataset, UCDP's Non-State Conflict Dataset, and Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Dataset. The data varied widely across these sources, though the trends generally agreed. Overall, we judged ACLED to be the most inclusive data set, but fatality data presented in this table should be interpreted as conservative estimates.

SOURCES: Raleigh et al., 2010; World Bank, 2018b; Freedom House, 2018a; UNDP, 2018; World Bank, undated(b); UNHCR, 2017; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2017.

Table 5.3
Performance Indicators and Peacekeeping Inputs for Comoros

Performance Indicators	First Year of Intervention (2006)	5 Years Later (2011)	10 Years Later (2016)	Through Most Recent Year Available
At peace?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Government effectiveness (scale: -2.5 = low to 2.5 = high)	-1.68	-1.76	-1.54	-1.54
Freedom index (scale: 1 = high to 7 = low)	4.0	4.0	3.5	3.5
GNI per capita, PPP (current international dollars)	\$1,350	\$1,410	\$1,540	\$1,540
Average annual rate of growth in per capita GDP (%) ^a	---	-0.83%	-0.44%	-0.44%
Cumulative growth in per capita GDP (%) ^a	---	-3.87%	-4.10%	4.10%
HDI (scale: 0 = low to 1 = high)	0.459	0.484	0.498	0.498
Peacekeeping Inputs				
Peak AU military presence per capita, number of MAES troops per 1,000 inhabitants (2008) ^b	2.7			
Peak AU international civilian police presence per capita, number of MAES police per 1,000 inhabitants (2008) ^b	0.02			
Average annual per capita assistance in the first five years after intervention (current US\$)	\$72.41			

^a Average annual rate of growth in per capita GDP and cumulative growth in per capita GDP are based on PPP measured in constant 2011 international dollars.

^b Peak AU military and police force levels are based on 2008 figures, at which time it was estimated that 1,800 military troops and 15 civilian police were deployed to Comoros under MAES.

SOURCES: Marshall, Gurr, and Harff, 2017; World Bank, 2018b; IMF, 2017; World Bank, undated(b); Freedom House, 2018a; UNDP, 2018; Sudan Central Bureau of Statistics; Tufts University Fletcher School, "Case Study: The AU in the Comoros," undated; RAND calculations. For more information on performance indicators, see Appendix B.

in the fact that the mandates had clear objectives and limited scopes.⁸¹ Cocodia points out that for each of the AU interventions in Comoros, starting with OMIC in 2003 through MAES in 2008, the AU never mandated more than six functions.⁸² These narrow, tailored mandates ensured that the various interventions did not raise expectations and then fail to deliver. By keeping the mandates achievable with the missions' available resources, the AU paved the way to success.

Another reason Operation Democracy succeeded in taking control of Anjouan so quickly is that it used overwhelming force to subdue Bacar and his forces. The 500 Anjouanese troops were no match for the AU and Comorian forces, and they essentially gave up without a fight. Some have argued that this was an excessive amount of force,⁸³ but others have suggested that using such a large intervening force minimized civilian casualties by compelling the Anjouanese to surrender within hours and ending the fighting as soon as possible.⁸⁴ The 1997 invasion of Anjouan by Comorian federal forces used fewer troops and failed to take control of the island and caused serious casualties, although the different outcome may also be due to the greater legitimacy and preparedness of the AU-flagged forces.⁸⁵

⁸¹ Svensson, 2008a, p. 24; Cocodia, 2018, p. 83; Tufts University Fletcher School, 2016.

⁸² Cocodia, 2018, p. 83.

⁸³ Alex Perry, "What the Comoros Invasion Reveals," *Time*, March 25, 2008.

⁸⁴ Cocodia, 2018, p. 84.

⁸⁵ Cocodia, 2018, p. 84.

Somalia

Since the overthrow of Major General Muhammad Siad Barre in 1991, Somalia has been the poster child of failed states (see Figure 6.1 for a map of the country). The rebels who had removed Barre from power immediately turned on each other over the control of the country. Violence, crime, and lawlessness flourished in the absence of a functioning central government. In 1992, in response to the civil war and widespread famine, the UN launched the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to provide protection and humanitarian assistance.¹ Yet conditions in Somalia continued to deteriorate. The UNSC authorized a U.S.-led military operation called the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in 1992 to safeguard the mandate of the mission and bring order to the country.² The UN expanded its mission in 1993 after the termination of the brief UNITAF operation to include economic development and political reform (UNOSOM II). The United States withdrew its contingent in UNOSOM II and other forces in the country a year later after losing 18 soldiers in a firefight in downtown Mogadishu. All other UN troops left in 1995.

Violence, criminality, and the lack of a central state continued to beset Somalia. By the mid-2000s, the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and subsequently al Shabaab, an al Qaeda affiliate, posed threats to Somalia and its neighbors. The newly established Somali

¹ Dobbins et al., 2003, p. 55–68.

² David Cunningham, *Barriers to Peace in Civil War*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Figure 6.1
Map of Somalia



SOURCE: United Nations Cartographic Section, Map No. 3690, Rev. 10, January 2004.

Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was incapable of defending itself against these armed groups. The East African Regional Economic Community, IGAD, approved a military intervention in 2005, but because of disagreements among the concerned governments, insufficient funding, and the UN arms embargo on Somalia, the mission never deployed.³ The ICU took power in Mogadishu in mid-2006. Its victory, which prompted fears of the “emergence of a Taliban-style haven for al-Qaeda and other Islamist extremists,”⁴ led to an invasion by Ethiopia in December 2006.⁵ The Ethiopian military drove the ICU out of Mogadishu on December 28, 2006.⁶ In January 2007, the AU authorized the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which remains more than a decade later. See Table 6.1.

Challenges

A quarter-century of continuous civil warfare had destroyed nearly every social, economic, and political system and institution in the country. Thus, when AMISOM was deployed in March 2007 to protect the three-month-old TFG, it faced numerous urgent problems.

Security

Somalia was marked by severe insecurity. Numerous armed actors competed for control of territory, and politics was characterized by violence. The most immediate threat to the TFG came from al Shabaab,

³ Terry M. Mays, *The African Union's African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Why Did It Successfully Deploy Following the Failure of the IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM)?* United Nations Peace Operations Training Institute, 2009, p. 1.

⁴ ICG, “Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead,” Africa Briefing No. 45, January 26, 2007a, p. 1.

⁵ Seth G. Jones, Andrew Liepman, and Nathan Chandler, *Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against Al Shabaab*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1539-OSD, 2016, p. 13.

⁶ Jones, Liepman, and Chandler, 2016.

Table 6.1
Foreign Interventions in Somalia, 1991–2017

Lead Organization or Country	Mission Name	Start Date	End Date	Peak Personnel Strength (Military Unless Noted)
UN	UNOSOM I	Apr. 1992	Mar. 1993	947 (including 54 military observers) ^a
United States	UNITAF/ Operation Restore Hope	Dec. 1992	May 1993	37,000 ^b
UN	UNOSOM II	Mar. 1993	Mar. 1995	29,209 ^c 236 police
United States	Operation Continue Hope	May 1993	Mar. 1994	1,000
United States	Operation United Shield	Jan. 1995	Mar. 1995	4,000
UN	UNPOS	Apr. 1995	Jun. 2013	3 police ^d
Ethiopia		Dec. 2006	Jan. 2009	10,000 ^e
AU	AMISOM I	Feb. 2007	Jul. 2010	5,221 ^f 6 police
EU	EU NAVFOR ATALANTA	Dec. 2008	Ongoing	1,900
UN	UNSOA	Jan. 2009	Nov. 2015	No military or police ^g
EU	EUTM Somalia	Apr. 2010	Ongoing	121 ^h
AU	AMISOM II	Jul. 2010	Feb. 2012	9,796 ⁱ 50 police
Kenya	Operation Linda Nchi	Oct. 2011	May 2012	6,000 ^j
AU	AMISOM III	Feb. 2012	Ongoing	22,564 562 police
UN	UNSOM	June 2013	Ongoing	579 (including 8 military observers) 16 police ^k
UN	UNSOS	Nov. 2015	Ongoing	41

Table 6.1—continued

^a The peak number of personnel who deployed under UNOSOM I was well beneath the authorized strength of “50 military observers, 3,500 security personnel and up to 719 military support personnel, supported by international civilian and local staff.”

^b The total number of troops who ultimately deployed under UNOSOM I was well beneath the authorized ceiling set at 28,000 U.S. troops plus 17,000 additional forces.

^c Following the Battle of Mogadishu/Black Hawk Down incident in October 1993, forces deployed under UNOSOM II peaked in November 1993 above their authorized ceiling of 28,000 military and civilian police. Additionally, although President Bill Clinton announced immediately following the Battle of Mogadishu that all U.S. troops would exit Somalia within six months, the United States simultaneously surged some 17,000 additional U.S. personnel into the country as part of a joint task force over the last months of 1993 (United Nations Peacekeeping, “Somalia—UNOSOM II Facts and Figures,” undated(b); United Nations Peacekeeping, “Summary of Contributions to Peace-Keeping Operations by Countries as of 30 November 1993,” undated(c); U.S. Army, “The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994,” U.S. Army Center of Military History, CMH Pub 70-81-1, 2002).

^d Additionally, the UN Political Office for Somalia included some 60 international civilians and 39 national civilians (Center on International Cooperation, 2013, pp. 426–427; Peace Operations Review, “Somalia,” undated, p. 39).

^e Matt Freear and Cedric de Coning, “Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali,” *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2013, p. 7.

^f AMISOM I had an authorized strength of 8,000 troops and 270 police.

^g 145 international civilians and 104 national civilians were authorized for 2010/2011 (Office of Internal Oversight Services, *Audit Report: Recruitment of International and National Staff in UNOSA*, February 25, 2011, section I.3).

^h As of September 30, 2012; Center on International Cooperation, 2013, p. 41.

ⁱ AMISOM II had an authorized strength of 12,000 troops and 1680 police.

^j David M. Anderson and Jacob McKnight, “Kenya at War: Al-Shabaab and Its Enemies in Eastern Africa,” *African Affairs*, Vol. 114, No. 454, January 2015, p. 21.

^k International Peace Institute, undated. UNSOM also included some 486 international civilians and 1,175 national civilians as of December 1, 2017 (UNSC, 2017d, p. 15).

NOTES: EU NAVFOR ATALANTA = EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, EUTM Somalia = EU Training Mission in Somalia, UNPOS = UN Political Office for Somalia, UNSOA = UN Support Office for AMISOM, UNSOM = UN Assistance Mission in Somalia, UNSOS = UN Support Office in Somalia. African-led missions are in red; UN-led missions are in blue; European-led missions are in green; U.S.-led missions are in orange. Data in this table for ongoing missions are current as of mid-2018.

an extremist group that split off from the ICU in August 2006.⁷ In late 2006 and early 2007, it was beginning its rapid rise, was already attacking civilians, and had freedom of movement in about 10 percent of the country.⁸ Somalia's insecurity extended to its adjacent waters. Piracy was endemic off the coast, significantly disrupting global trade.

Humanitarian

Somalia was a humanitarian catastrophe and had been for decades. In 1991 and 1992, violence in Mogadishu killed approximately 25,000 people and caused 1.5 million people to flee the country and another 2 million to be displaced internally. A drought then led to a famine that killed an estimated 250,000 people.⁹ During the years that followed, civil strife affected adults and children, causing starvation and diseases associated with malnutrition.¹⁰ Periodic droughts and famines continued to be a major threat continuing well into the AU intervention.¹¹

Governance and Civil Administration

The total collapse of the state in 1991 meant the disappearance of central governance.¹² From 1991 to 2006, there were 13 efforts to establish a central government, but each failed.¹³ In 2000, for example, the Transitional National Government (TNG) was created with the assistance of the international community. At first, the TNG gained the support of the Mogadishu business community, but the new government's inability to bring security and stability led business leaders to

⁷ UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia*, December 26, 2017d.

⁸ Jones, Liepman, and Chandler, 2016, p. 8.

⁹ Ken Menkhaus, "Diplomacy in a Failed State: International Mediation in Somalia," *Accord*, No. 21, 2010, pp. 16–20.

¹⁰ Cunningham, 2011.

¹¹ ICG, "Instruments of Pain (III): Conflict and Famine in Somalia," Africa Briefing No. 125, May 9, 2017d.

¹² Lise Morjé Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

¹³ Stephanie Hanson and Eben Kaplan, "Somalia's Transitional Government," Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2008.

withdraw their support and build their own private militias to protect their properties. These private security forces soon became some of the most powerful armed groups in the city, while the TNG was “unable to exercise authority over more than a few neighborhoods in the capital.”¹⁴ The prioritization of private interests over the establishment of an effective central government illustrates the central theme in the recent history of governance in Somalia. As political scientist Ken Menkhaus argues, “many political and business leaders supported the declaration of a transitional government, but not the actual establishment of a functional state. Instead, they approached the TNG as an opportunity to create a ‘paper state’—one that would attract foreign aid, which they could then divert, but not one that could become powerful enough to enforce laws and regulations that might threaten their economic and political interests.”¹⁵ The TNG collapsed in 2003.

In 2004, the 14th attempt at creating a central government generated the TFG. The TFG emerged from two years of negotiations led by the East African Regional Economic Community, IGAD. It aimed to represent all the major clans. However, this inclusiveness engendered deep divisions in the government, leading one analyst to describe the TFG as “feeble, faction-ridden, corrupt and incompetent.”¹⁶ Because of security concerns, the TFG, led by President Adbullahi Yusuf Ahmed, worked from Nairobi until February 2006, when it moved to Baidoa, Somalia. The president did not enter Mogadishu until January 8, 2007, after Ethiopian forces drove the ICU out of the capital.¹⁷

Democratization

Somalia had a brief period of democratic rule, including two multi-party parliamentary elections, from independence in 1960 until a coup

¹⁴ Ken Menkhaus, “Governance Without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building, and the Politics of Coping,” *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 3, Winter 2006/2007, pp. 88, 92.

¹⁵ Menkhaus, 2007, pp. 96–97.

¹⁶ John Prendergast, “15 Years After Black Hawk Down: Somalia’s Chance?” in Hanson and Kaplan, 2008.

¹⁷ Prendergast, 2008.

in 1969. Following the coup, Somalia had an autocratic regime until the government collapsed altogether. Since the fall of Barre in 1991, Somalia has lacked the first precondition of democracy: a state. Thus, Somali democracy has been impossible. Even the members of the TFG were selected by negotiation rather than elections.¹⁸

Economic Reconstruction

By the mid-2000s, Somalia's economic and physical infrastructure was largely destroyed. Compounding the problem, much of the foreign aid had been misused for personal and political gain by powerful domestic actors.¹⁹ This resulted in little or no progress on recovery and reconstruction. Earlier international interventions, such as UNITAF and work by the UN Development Program in the early 1990s, made some progress toward economic and physical recovery, but they were neither sufficient nor permanent, and the formal Somali economy was in tatters.

African and Other International Roles

AMISOM entered Somalia several months after a unilateral intervention by Ethiopia. AMISOM was, in fact, created to provide an exit option for the Ethiopian military.²⁰ In addition to that first Ethiopian intervention, which lasted from 2006 to 2009, there was also a second in 2011 and a Kenyan intervention that same year. Thus, from the beginning, "AMISOM has operated in parallel with both external militaries and the nascent Somali security forces."²¹

AMISOM was first mandated by the PSC in January 2007, a decision endorsed by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Char-

¹⁸ Prendergast, 2008.

¹⁹ Howard, 2008.

²⁰ ICG, *Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State*, Africa Report No. 147, December 23, 2008b, p. 20; Williams and Boutellis, 2014, p. 272.

²¹ Walter Lotze and Paul D. Williams, *The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia*, New York: International Peace Institute, May 2016, p. 2.

ter.²² Its initial mandate was to protect the TFG; combat antigovernment armed forces, mainly al Shabaab; and provide humanitarian assistance. Also included in the mandate was a small police component to train and guide the Somali Police Force, but very few international police arrived until 2011.

When it authorized the mission, the AU hoped that AMISOM would be replaced by a UN peacekeeping mission after six months. This never happened. Instead, AMISOM's size and mandate has gradually expanded and "evolved from principally a warfighting operation to an operation focused on implementing a stabilization agenda."²³ Yet even in the stabilization phase of the mission, AMISOM's priority has continued to be the fight with al Shabaab and other antigovernment militias. AMISOM has been supported by the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS; 1995–2013) and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM; 2013–present) and has received logistical assistance from the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA; 2009–2015) and the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS; 2015–present) (see Figure 6.2). The EU pays the monthly salaries of the AMISOM troops through the AU, which from 2007 to 2016 totaled over €1 billion.²⁴

Military and Police

AMISOM's primary mission has been to combat the armed groups that threatened the TFG and the Somali population. The AU's initial authorization was for 8,000 troops, but reluctance on the part of African leaders to send soldiers to Somalia led to "chronic delays in the deployment of soldiers and the acquisition of equipment over the first several years, making it largely irrelevant on the battlefield."²⁵ The first troop deployment came in March 2007, when Uganda sent 1,600 soldiers to the mission. They were joined by a Burundian bat-

²² PSC, "Communiqué," PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), January 19, 2007a; and SCR 1744, February 20, 2007.

²³ Lotze and Williams, 2016, p. 1.

²⁴ Paul D. Williams, "Paying for AMISOM: Are Politics and Bureaucracy Undermining the AU's Largest Peace Operation?" January 11, 2017a; Williams and Boutellis, 2014.

²⁵ Jones, Liepman, and Chandler, 2013, p. 42.

Figure 6.2
Troop-Contributing Country Timeline

Country (maximum troop contribution)	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Uganda (6,200)		AMISOM (March 2017)										
Burundi (5,400)		AMISOM (March 2017)										
Djibouti (1,800)						AMISOM (December 2011)						
Kenya (4,300)						Unilateral (October)	AMISOM (June 2012)					
Sierra Leone (850)				Pledge (reported)		Public pledge		AMISOM (April 2013–January 2015)				
Ethiopia (4,400)	Unilateral (pulled out January 2009)					Unilateral (at request of IGAD)			AMISOM (January 2014)		Unilateral	

NOTE: Ethiopia continued its unilateral intervention in support of its AMISOM contingent until late 2016/early 2017.

talion in December 2007. Eventually, AMISOM also received troops from Djibouti (2011), Kenya (2012), Sierra Leone (2013), and Ethiopia (2014). Figure 6.2 provides a timeline of the different troop contributors' involvement. AMISOM did not meet its originally authorized strength until late 2010, at which point the troop authorization was increased. The authorization was raised again in 2012, 2014, and 2016 to its current level of 22,126.²⁶ See Table 6.2 for details of the shifting size of the mission.

AMISOM has experienced several major changes since it was first deployed. After Ethiopian troops left Mogadishu in early 2009, AMISOM “became the principal barrier preventing the TGF from being overrun by al-Shabaab fighters.”²⁷ This also meant that AMISOM itself became a prime target for al Shabaab. AMISOM

²⁶ Lotze and Williams, 2016, pp. 3, 8.

²⁷ Paul D. Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018a, p. 225.

Table 6.2
AMISOM Deployment, 2007–Present

	Troops	Police	Civilians
2007–2008	11,600	270	
2010	12,800	800 IPOs, 10 FPUs; 2,200 total	
2012	17,731		20
2013		547	70
2017	21,564	562	70+
UNSCR 2372 withdrawal of 1,040 troops from AMISOM			
2017, December	Total personnel: 21,086		

NOTES: FPU = formed police unit, IPO = individual police officer. One FPU contains about 140 police officers.

underwent a significant transformation in 2012. In late 2011, in response to AMISOM's success in driving al Shabaab out of central Mogadishu and the unilateral invasions by Kenya and Ethiopia to fight al Shabaab, the AU and UN endorsed a revised mandate with a new concept of operation for the mission.²⁸ They increased the troop authorization by about 6,000 troops to nearly 18,000 and authorized a much larger area of operation, expanding AMISOM's geographic mandate from essentially just Mogadishu to four land sectors in south-central Somalia and a maritime sector.²⁹

AMISOM's command-and-control structure is fairly weak and decentralized. The six troop-contributing countries (TCCs) more or less control their own soldiers, which means that there is not strong coordination among the TCCs or between the TCCs and AMISOM

²⁸ PSC, "Communiqué," PSC/PR/Comm. (CCCVI), January 5, 2012; and SCR 2036, February 22, 2012.

²⁹ Williams, 2018a, p. 226.

headquarters.³⁰ Additionally, Ethiopia and Kenya maintain troops in Somalia who are not part of AMISOM.³¹ There is also evidence that Kenya and Ethiopia are training private Somali militias, outside of the authority of the Somali National Army or Somali government, to secure the border they share with Somalia.³² Two researchers observe that “[f]ragmentation as a consequence of how the national interests of Kenya and Ethiopia unfold in Somalia, combined with and permitted by a weak force headquarters, are defining characteristics of AMISOM.”³³

In addition to the military mission, the PSC authorized a police component with 540 police officers in 2012. Ugandan and Nigerian police entered Mogadishu as formed police units in that year. Their mission was to work with the Somali Police Force and to enhance policing efforts in the city.³⁴

AMISOM has been supported by two UN logistical field support operations: UNSOA, from 2009 until 2015, and UNSOS, from 2015 to the present. The establishment of UNSOA was an unprecedented move by the UN. It was the first time the UN had used its assessed peacekeeping budget to directly finance a non-UN peacekeeping mission.³⁵ These UN missions assist AMISOM in numerous ways, including “provision of rations, fuel, water, accommodation and infrastructure, maintenance services . . . , medical support, aviation, strategic communications, explosive hazard management capacities (including

³⁰ Paul D. Williams, “AMISOM Under Review,” *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 161, No. 1, 2016, p. 45; and Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu and Daniel Gebreegziabher Kebede, “AMISOM: Charting a New Course for African Union Peace Missions,” *African Security Review*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2017, p. 211.

³¹ Paul D. Williams, “Joining AMISOM: Why Six African States Contributed Troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2018b, p. 13.; Peter Albrecht and Cathy Haenlein, “Fragmented Peacekeeping: The African Union in Somalia,” *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 161, No. 1, 2016, p. 55.

³² Albrecht and Haenlein, 2016, p. 55.

³³ Albrecht and Haenlein, 2016, p. 57.

³⁴ Lotze and Williams, 2016, p. 7.

³⁵ SCR 1863, January 16, 2009; Wondemagegnehu and Kebede, 2017, p. 205; and Williams, 2016, p. 43.

mitigation strategies) and strategic personnel and equipment movements,” as well as reimbursement to TCCs for equipment, supplies, and services.³⁶ However, the TCCs must supply their own weapons and ammunition.³⁷ This logistical arrangement weakens AMISOM’s control over the TCCs because UNSOA, not AMISOM, distributes the mission’s resources.³⁸

The United States trains officers from the TCCs prior to their deployment with AMISOM through the ACOTA program funded by the U.S. State Department. The United States has spent over \$500 million since 2007 on training and supplying 15,000 TCC soldiers operating under AMISOM.³⁹ U.S. Special Operations Forces have also directed airstrikes and conducted raids against al Shabaab since 2007.⁴⁰ According to a UN official, U.S. air support and Special Operations Forces have been critical to the military success in Somalia, especially with intensified air strikes since 2017.⁴¹

Civil and Economic

In 2007, AMISOM created a small civilian team based in Nairobi, primarily to work with the TFG, UNPOS, and the UN Country Team. The civilian component was enhanced in 2011, including preparations to move the civilians to Mogadishu when it became possible.⁴² Fifty more civilians were added in 2012.⁴³

³⁶ United Nations Support Office in Somalia, “UNSOS Mandate,” November 9, 2015.

³⁷ Wondemagegnehu and Kebede, 2017, p. 205.

³⁸ Albrecht and Haenlein, 2016, p. 53.

³⁹ Nathan Maysonet, “ACOTA Force HQ Course Prepares Personnel for AMISOM Operations,” Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, August 29, 2015; and G. R. Olsen, “Fighting Terrorism in Africa by Proxy: The USA and the European Union in Somalia and Mali,” *European Security*, Vol. 23, 2014, pp. 296–297.

⁴⁰ Paul D. Williams, “A Navy SEAL Was Killed in Somalia. Here’s What You Need to Know About U.S. Operations There,” *Monkey Cage*, May 8, 2017b.

⁴¹ Interview with UN official, January 12, 2018.

⁴² Williams, 2017b, p. 4.

⁴³ Paul D. Williams, “AMISOM in Transition: The Future of the African Union Mission in Somalia,” Rift Valley Institute, February 13, 2013a, p. 2.

USAID and the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development have also provided experts and financial support to help draft the latest constitution and establish government institutions in Somalia.⁴⁴ The UK provided the Somalia Development Fund with £5 million (\$7.8 million)⁴⁵ in 2015 to further support infrastructural refurbishment, reconstruction, development, and improved service delivery.

The UN has also provided civil and political assistance to Somalia via two political missions: UNPOS (1995–2013) and UNSOM (2013–present). UNSOM provides policy advice to AMISOM and the Somali government on a wide range of governance and peace-building issues, such as rule of law, democratization, and SSR.⁴⁶

What Happened

AMISOM and the TFG's combined military effort managed to drive al Shabaab out of Mogadishu and keep them out and also reclaimed and held territories liberated outside of the capital.⁴⁷ Although al Shabaab has been degraded, these victories are precarious. Many observers believe that AMISOM's military presence is the only thing keeping al Shabaab from returning to take over Mogadishu.⁴⁸

Security

Since the deployment of AMISOM in Somalia, the security landscape has evolved positively, and the foundations for restoring peace have improved. AMISOM cleared al Shabaab out of significant portions of southern Somalia and weakened the group. AMISOM entered Somalia

⁴⁴ Thomas Bridle, "Dispatch from Mogadishu: A Visit to Somalia's Parliament," *World Affairs*, Vol. 176, No. 5, 2014, pp. 31–37.

⁴⁵ Conversion rate from oanda.com, as of January 1, 2015.

⁴⁶ United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, "Mandate," undated.

⁴⁷ Lotze and Williams, 2016, pp. 3–4.

⁴⁸ Interview with UN official, January 12, 2018; and Claire Felter, Jonathan Masters, and Mohammed Aly Sergie, "Al-Shabaab," Council on Foreign Relations, January 9, 2018.

in 2007 to prop up the TFG, which had very little political or military strength.⁴⁹ The AU troops, made up of Ugandan and Burundian contingents totaling 6,100 military personnel, managed to drive the ICU out of Mogadishu. Some degree of law and order was reinstated in the capital, buttressed by a small international police component with officers from Burundi, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Uganda.⁵⁰ By 2013, the peace-enforcement operations had secured the support of most of the regional communities in Africa (East African Community, ECCAS, ECOWAS, and SADC). In retreat, the ICU divided into several factions, including al Shabaab, which continues to pose a grave threat to the Somali government and people.

The capacity of the Somali security forces was also improved. By 2013, approximately 12,000 Somalis received basic police training from the UNDP, including 5,300 in South Central Somalia.⁵¹ During that same period, the Somali National Army (SNA) was built up, and by 2015 there were 19,800 SNA troops.⁵² Because of a lack of experience and resources, however, the SNA has been working side by side with the AMISOM forces to fight off al Shabaab and any other militant insurgent groups.⁵³ When it does operate on its own, the SNA has proven unable to hold territory. The SNA is often unable to keep up with AMISOM's superior battlefield capabilities in clearing or holding territory. As a result, Somalia is unable to maintain its own security without AMISOM.⁵⁴

The police component has worked to restore the rule of law. AMISOM has had a shortage of specialized and experienced training officers on the mission but has relied on the few available experts to train and prepare thousands of Somali officers. The police force

⁴⁹ Adekeye Adebajo, *UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011.

⁵⁰ Amnesty International, "Somalia: International Military and Policing Assistance Should Be Reviewed," January 21, 2010.

⁵¹ United Nations Development Programme, "Building Effective Policing," January 2013.

⁵² World Bank, "World Development Indicators: Armed Forces Personnel, Total," 2018c.

⁵³ Albrecht and Haenlein, 2016, p. 57; and Williams, 2016, p. 46.

⁵⁴ Wondemagegnehu and Kebede, 2017, p. 209.

in Mogadishu has expanded over the years to Kismayo, Baidoa, and Beletwenye and has been part of the Joint Operation Command Centre, working alongside intelligence and the military to execute efficient and professionally well-planned operations.⁵⁵

Humanitarian

In 2009, Somalia was experiencing the world's worst humanitarian crisis, with 3.5 million people in need of emergency humanitarian aid.⁵⁶ The country also experienced major famines in 2011–2012 and 2017.⁵⁷ Natural disasters (especially drought) are compounded by the conflict. Violence, including the killing of aid workers, has impeded the implementation of planned humanitarian objectives.⁵⁸ But AMISOM troops were able to secure the most-important humanitarian corridors in Mogadishu and outside the capital to ensure that humanitarian assistance reached greater numbers of civilian populations.⁵⁹ International efforts to improve local capacities for the provision of humanitarian assistance have had some success. As of 2017, there were, nevertheless, still 2.5 million displaced Somalis, with about 1 million seeking refuge in other countries and 1.5 million IDPs.⁶⁰

Governance and Civil Administration

On AMISOM's intervention in 2007, Somalia did not have a central government. With AMISOM's assistance, the TFG was installed in the capital, and government institutions were restored. In 2012, the interim TFG was replaced by the internationally recognized Federal

⁵⁵ A. Pilay, *AMISOM Police*, slides, AMISOM, 2017.

⁵⁶ Ken Menkhaus, "Somalia: 'They Created a Desert and Called It Peace(Building),'", *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 36, No. 120, 2009, pp. 223–233.

⁵⁷ ICG, 2017d.

⁵⁸ U.S. Department of State—Humanitarian Information Unit, "Attacks on Aid Workers: Countries with Ten or More Victims, Jan. 2016–Mar. 2017," April 14, 2017.

⁵⁹ Isabel K. Düsterhöft and Antonia I. Gerlach, "The Successes and Failures of the Interventions of the European Union, the African Union and Neighbouring Powers in Somalia," *Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F)/Security and Peace*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2013, pp. 18–23.

⁶⁰ See Table 6.3.

Government of Somalia (FGS). The FGS still faces significant challenges, but in a relatively more manageable security environment.

The improvements in governance and service provision have been notable when compared with the complete absence of all forms of national social services after Barre's regime collapse in 1991. Yet the reconstructed services are nowhere near sufficient to meet the needs of Somalia.

An additional challenge for the FGS is that two northern regions of Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland, are de facto self-governing. Somaliland declared independence in 1991, but it has not been recognized by any foreign government.⁶¹ To Somaliland's east is Puntland, a region that declared its autonomy in 1998.⁶² Unlike Somaliland, Puntland does not seek internationally recognized independence. Both regions, particularly Somaliland, have maintained more stability and more effective and representative governments than the rest of Somalia in the past decades.⁶³

AMISOM's mandate and focus has been on counterinsurgency rather than governance capacity-building. Limited budgetary resources and severe insecurity prevent a greater focus on reform, reconstruction, resettlement, and development of governance infrastructures. With AMISOM and the SNA successfully pushing out al Shabaab and reclaiming territory, the need to support the reestablishment of local and regional administrations in the territories to deliver services, enforce law and order, and provide humanitarian assistance has become even more crucial.⁶⁴

AMISOM's civilian component has sought to support the operational gains of the military forces. However, the civilian component

⁶¹ Claire Felter, "Somaliland: The Horn of Africa's Breakaway State," Council on Foreign Relations, February 1, 2018.

⁶² "Somalia Country Profile," BBC News, January 4, 2018.

⁶³ Central Intelligence Agency, "Somalia," CIA World Factbook, undated(c).

⁶⁴ Solomon A. Dersso, "Stabilization Missions and Mandates in African Peace Operations: Implications for the ASF?" in Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot, and John Karlsrud, eds., *The Future of African Peace Operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram*, London: Zed Books, 2016, pp. 38–51.

is seriously understaffed when compared with the police and military components of AMISOM.

Democratization

In February 2017, Somalia elected a new president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, and there was a peaceful transition of power. The process involved 135 clan elders selecting 14,000 delegates, who voted for the members of Parliament. The Parliament then elected the president. Although the delegates who took part in the election were less than 0.2 percent of the population of Somalia, proponents point out that it was an improvement over the 2012 process, when the 135 clan elders selected the parliament directly. The voting for the 2017 election also took place in six cities, whereas the 2012 vote only occurred in Mogadishu.⁶⁵ Despite challenges including corruption and the limited franchise, the election produced “some causes for (cautious) optimism,” according to a Chatham House analyst.⁶⁶ These include the increased political and geographic diversity of the electoral process and of the resultant government, the increased representation of women (67 Members of Parliament out of 275), and public scrutiny of the election in the press and social media. The analyst concludes: “Somalia has demonstrated a more competitive electoral process and plural political landscape than many countries in east Africa or elsewhere on the continent.”⁶⁷ AMISOM played an important role in the election’s success by providing security in collaboration with Somali forces.⁶⁸

Economic Reconstruction

GDP growth figures are not available for much of the period. The IMF does have available estimates after 2014, estimating GDP growth

⁶⁵ Mary Harper, “Somalia’s Rocky Road to Democracy,” BBC News, October 19, 2016.

⁶⁶ Ahmed Soliman, “Is Democracy Emerging in Somalia?” Chatham House, February 16, 2017.

⁶⁷ Soliman, 2017.

⁶⁸ African Union Mission in Somalia, “Somalia Destined for a Brighter Future After Successful Elections, Says AU Special Representative,” February 15, 2017.

to be 3.7 percent in 2014, with a decline in projected growth down to 1.8 percent in 2017 (see Table 6.3). However, given the continuing conflict in the country, these figures remain uncertain. At a minimum, it is possible to say that the economy is beset with significant problems. More than half (51 percent) of the population lives below the poverty line, and youth unemployment is 75 percent.⁶⁹ Somalia's GDP growth is not sufficient for the mammoth task of eradicating poverty while creating employment. One of the biggest challenges for economic development is the lack of security as AMISOM and Somali forces continue to battle al Shabaab and other militias.

In addition to causing disruptions to the economy, decades of violence have destroyed much of the important infrastructure in Somalia. Since AMISOM troops drove al Shabaab out of Mogadishu, the reconstruction efforts have begun, and there is a visible thriving business environment of supermarkets, restaurants, hotels, and other downstream industries. Somalia's growing economy and developing infrastructure has put the country on a better path. Somalia's natural resources are attractive to international companies: Oil and gas are abundant on- and offshore, and there is gold and other deposits of feldspar, gypsum, iron ore, kaolin, limestone, quartz, silica sand, tantalum, tin, and uranium. Somalia offers extensive fishing resources as well.⁷⁰ Somalia's import-export ratio is still unhealthy but understandable for a country emerging from conflict and still destabilized by insurgent groups. The fragile economy is heavily reliant on foreign currency inflows from a few sectors, such as agriculture, livestock, remittances, and telecommunications.⁷¹

⁶⁹ World Bank, *Somali Poverty Profile: Findings from Wave 1 of the Somali High Frequency Survey*, Washington, D.C., 2017, p. 2; World Bank, *Youth as Agents of Peace: Somalia*, Washington, D.C., 2018d, p. 25.

⁷⁰ Hassan Yusuf, "Investment Opportunities in Somalia," *East Africa Business Journal*, August 2, 2015.

⁷¹ Richard Walker and Salome Kimani, "Somalia," in African Development Bank, OECD, and United Nations Development Programme, *Africa Economic Outlook 2017: Entrepreneurship and Industrialization*, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017, pp. 1–13.

Lessons Learned

The AMISOM experience highlights some important strengths of African-led peace operations. First, and perhaps most importantly, African states, increasingly working through the AU, have been willing to take on missions that no one else will touch, in this case combating a violent extremist insurgency. African militaries have been able to expand the area of Somali state authority, thereby providing space and time for the creation and development of new, more-representative government institutions. They have been able to do this despite heavy dependence on non-African sources of funding, lack of strong central command and control over the forces engaged, and dependence on the UN and other actors for logistics and most other forms of civil engagement. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 summarize peacekeeping inputs and outcomes for Somalia, drawing from more-limited data than available in the other cases.

AMISOM prevented al Shabaab from taking over Somalia. According to one UN official, this alone made the mission worthwhile.⁷² Yet al Shabaab remains a significant threat. Indeed, the deadliest attack attributed to al Shabaab, a truck bomb with over 500 casualties, took place in Mogadishu in October 2017.⁷³ There is so far no exit strategy for AMISOM, as efforts to develop the Somalia security sector have not yet created an effective or sustainable force, and Somalia continues to face significant economic and humanitarian challenges. These issues likely are more indicative of the limitations of the overall international response to Somalia dating back to the U.S. and then UN abandonment of the country in 1994–1995, rather than the problems of the AMISOM mission itself.

⁷² Interview, UN official, January 12, 2018.

⁷³ Jason Burke, "Mogadishu Truck Bomb: 500 Casualties in Somalia's Worst Terrorist Attack," *The Guardian*, October 16, 2017.

Table 6.3
Peacekeeping Outputs: Somalia, 2007–Present

	Estimated Annual Conflict Fatalities ^a	GDP Growth (%) ^b	Freedom Score (7 = worst, 1 = best)	HDI Score (0 = worst, 1 = best) ^c	Government Effectiveness Score (–2.5 = worst, 2.5 = best)	Refugee Population	IDP Population	African-Led Missions ^d	Other Missions (Country/ Organization) ^d
2007	1,988	---	7.0	---	–2.23	457,356	1,000,000	AMISOM I (AU)	Ethiopia
2008	2,057	---	7.0	---	–2.40	561,155	1,277,200	AMISOM I (AU)	Ethiopia
2009	1,102	---	7.0	---	–2.23	678,309	1,550,000	AMISOM I (AU)	Ethiopia, UNSOA (UN)
2010	3,742	---	7.0	---	–2.21	770,154	1,463,780	AMISOM I (AU), AMISOM II (AU)	EUTM Somalia (EU), UNSOA (UN)
2011	1,953	---	7.0	---	–2.14	1,077,048	1,459,000	AMISOM II (AU)	EUTM Somalia (EU), Kenya, UNSOA (UN)
2012	3,334	---	7.0	---	–2.20	1,136,719	1,350,000	AMISOM II (AU), AMISOM III (AU)	EUTM-S (EU), Kenya, UNSOA (UN)
2013	3,153	---	7.0	---	–2.22	1,121,770	1,100,000	AMISOM III (AU)	EUTM Somalia (EU), UNSOA (UN)
2014	4,457	3.7	7.0	---	–2.45	1,233,649	1,106,751	AMISOM III (AU)	EUTM Somalia (EU), UNSOA (UN)
2015	4,104	2.5	7.0	---	–2.20	1,105,618	1,223,000	AMISOM III (AU)	EUTM Somalia (EU), UNSOA (UN), UNSOS (UN)

Table 6.3—continued

	Estimated Annual Conflict Fatalities ^a	GDP Growth (%) ^b	Freedom Score (7 = worst, 1 = best)	HDI Score (0 = worst, 1 = best) ^c	Government Effectiveness Score (−2.5 = worst, 2.5 = best)	Refugee Population	IDP Population	African-Led Missions ^d	Other Missions (Country/ Organization) ^d
2016	5,641	2.4	7.0	---	−2.18	1,123,086	1,107,000	AMISOM III (AU)	EUTM Somalia (EU), UNSOM (UN), UNSOS (UN)
2017	5,859	1.8 (projected)	7.0	---	---	1,012,277	1,500,000	AMISOM III (AU)	EUTM Somalia (EU), UNSOM (UN), UNSOS (UN)

^a Reliable conflict fatality data are difficult to obtain, particularly in Africa. We compared several notable data sets: CCAPS' ACLED, START's GTD, UCDP's Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, UCDP's One-Sided Violence Dataset, UCDP's Non-State Conflict Dataset, and Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Dataset. The data varied widely across these sources, though the trends generally agreed. Overall, we judged ACLED to be the most inclusive data set, but fatality data presented in this table should be interpreted as conservative estimates.

^b Per capita GDP growth rates for Somalia have not been regularly published since 1990. The IMF offers estimates of real GDP growth since 2013.

^c The World Bank does not publish human development indicators for Somalia.

^d From 2011 to 2016, Ethiopia also operated a support mission to AMISOM and conducted anti-Shabaab operations independent of AMISOM. Additionally, several counterpiracy and maritime training missions have operated in Somali waters during this period, including NATO's Operation Ocean Shield (2009–2016); EU NAVFOR ATALANTA (2008–present); EUCAP Nestor (2012–2016); and EUCAP Somalia (2016–present).

SOURCES: Raleigh et al., 2010; World Bank, 2018b; Freedom House, 2018a; UNDP, 2018; World Bank, undated(b); UNHCR, 2017; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2017.

Table 6.4
Performance Indicators and Peacekeeping Inputs for Somalia

Performance Indicators	First Year of Intervention (2007)	5 Years Later (2012)	10 Years Later (2017)
At peace?	No	No	No
Government effectiveness (scale: -2.5 = low to 2.5 = high)	-2.23	-2.20	-2.18
Freedom index (scale: 1 = high to 7 = low)	7.0	7.0	7.0
GNI per capita, PPP (current international dollars) ^a	---	---	---
Average annual rate of growth in per capita GDP (%) ^a	---	---	---
Cumulative growth in per capita GDP (%) ^a	---	---	---
HDI (scale: 0 = low to 1 = high) ^a	---	---	---
Peacekeeping Inputs			
Peak AU military presence per capita, number of AMISOM troops per 1,000 inhabitants (2017) ^b	1.6		
Peak AU international civilian police presence per capita, number of AMISOM police per 1,000 inhabitants (2017) ^b	0.04		
Average annual per capita assistance in the first five years after intervention (current US\$)	\$58.02		

^a GNI and GDP for Somalia have not been published by either the World Bank or IMF since 1990. The World Bank also does not publish human development indicators for Somalia.

^b Peak AU military and police force levels are based on 2017 figures, at which time it was estimated that 22,564 military troops and 562 civilian police were deployed to Somalia under AMISOM. Per capita military/police estimates are based on the 2017 population of 11,030,386.

SOURCES: Marshall, Gurr, and Harff, 2017; World Bank, 2018b; IMF, 2017; World Bank, undated(b); Freedom House, 2018a; UNDP, 2018; AU, AMISOM website; RAND calculations. For more information on performance indicators, see Appendix B.


The MNJTF, Response to Boko Haram

Since 2009, the radical revivalist Islamic movement Boko Haram¹ has waged an insurgency from the underdeveloped region of northern Nigeria. The conflict has cost tens of thousands of lives, uprooted millions, and spread to neighboring states, damaging local economies and cross-border trade. In 2013, the U.S. government designated the group a terrorist organization. In 2014, Boko Haram was the deadliest terrorist group in the world.² The porous borders and relatively ungoverned nature of the Lake Chad Basin region provided refuge and resources for the group and complicated the state and regional response (see Figure 7.1). In 2015, a coalition of affected and concerned countries—Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin—belatedly launched the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to coordinate and expand unilateral and bilateral military efforts against the insurgency. The cooperation facilitated by the MNJTF helped to turn the tide against Boko Haram militarily, but the group proved adaptive and resilient, reverting to suicide attacks and guerilla tactics. As of

¹ *Boko Haram* roughly translates as “Western education is forbidden.” The group’s official name is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’a Wa’ati Wal Jihād (“Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad”).

² In 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) engaged in more attacks than Boko Haram (1,071 compared with 452), but the latter’s attacks were more lethal (killing 6,644 compared with 6,073) (Institute for Economics & Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism*, Sydney, 2015; Edward Delman, “The World’s Deadliest Terrorist Organization,” *The Atlantic*, November 18, 2015; Dionne Searcey and Marc Santora, “Boko Haram Ranked Ahead of ISIS for Deadliest Terror Group,” *New York Times*, November 18, 2015).

Figure 7.1
Map of Lake Chad Basin



SOURCE: ICG, "Boko Haram on the Back Foot?" Africa Briefing No. 120, May 4, 2016b, p. 16. Used with permission.

2017, Boko Haram was diminished but not defeated, and the political, social, and economic challenges that facilitated its rise and expansion remained unresolved. Stabilization and development measures have been largely conducted on a national basis, which is reminiscent of the discordant national responses that characterized the region's military approach just a few years ago.

The MNJTF case is unique among those studied in this report. Although created by the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and authorized by the AU, the force is less a unified intervention than a pragmatic coordination mechanism that facilitated cooperation among states facing a shared regional threat. Nevertheless, this new variant

of African operations warrants attention, as similar “coalitions of the willing” have been created or proposed to address multinational threats across the continent. This chapter looks at the challenges that Nigeria and the other Lake Chad Basin states faced, the scope of their multinational collaboration, and the results of the MNJTF efforts up to September 2017. The case offers both lessons and warnings for ad hoc military cooperation as a model for future African-led operations against transnational regional threats.

Challenges

Formed in 2002 by Muslim cleric Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram began as a radical rejectionist group of Islamist youth in northern Nigeria. Alex Thurston explains the group’s ideological framework as theologically similar to “Salafi-jihadi” movements around the world but also reflecting distinctly local dynamics.³ The group’s worldview centered dually around

- *religious exclusivism* that vehemently “opposes all other value systems, including democracy, constitutionalism, alliances with non-Muslims, and Western education”
- a “*politics of victimhood*” that explains its violence as a response to decades of alleged persecution of Muslims in Nigeria, with the state’s crackdown against the group as simply the most recent manifestation.⁴

Similar sentiments of mistrust of and alienation from local and national governing institutions were a widespread challenge throughout northern Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad Basin region.⁵ How-

³ Alex Thurston, “*The Disease Is Unbelief*”: *Boko Haram’s Religious and Political Worldview*, Analysis Paper, Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, January 2016.

⁴ Thurston, 2016.

⁵ ICG, *Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict*, Africa Report No. 168, December 20, 2010; ICG, *Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency*, Africa Report

ever, Boko Haram was a fringe group in its aspirations to replace the Nigerian state with an Islamic caliphate and in its use of indiscriminate violence against the secular state, other Muslims, and Christians.⁶

Northern Nigeria was the epicenter of the Boko Haram threat, but the conflict there also raised challenges for the Lake Chad Basin region generally. Lake Chad is located at the intersection of four countries—Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger—and is home to an estimated 30 million people of multiple and overlapping cultures and ethnicities.⁷ Once one of the largest bodies of water in Africa, the size of Lake Chad has been drastically reduced since the 1960s due to a variety of factors, including overuse, climate change, poor enforcement of environmental legislation, and weak capacity for water resource management.⁸ Nonetheless, the region has one of the highest population growth rates in the world, and the population is expected to double in the next 30 years.⁹ About 60 percent of the basin inhabitants live in Nigeria,¹⁰ but many can easily travel across porous borders where there are multiple transnational ethnic ties.¹¹ Lake populations in neighboring states also proved vulnerable to Boko Haram recruitment for a

No. 216, April 3, 2014b; Thurston, 2016; Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), “Boko Haram in Nigeria,” CFR Model Diplomacy Podcast, Washington, D.C., April 28, 2017.

⁶ Hakeem Onapajo and Abubakar A. Usman, “Fuelling the Flames: Boko Haram and Deteriorating Christian–Muslim Relations in Nigeria,” *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 35, No. 1, January 2, 2015, pp. 106–122; ICG, 2010; Thurston, 2016.

⁷ Lake Chad directly borders Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Hydrologically, parts of CAR are in its active basin, and some of the aquifers connected to the lake are in Libya (World Bank, “The Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan,” working paper, 2016a).

⁸ The landlocked lake declined from over 22,000 km² in 1960 to about 1,700 km² in January 1985 but has since increased again to an average of approximately 8,000 km² during the 2000–2015 period (World Bank, 2016a; see also World Bank, “Restoring a Disappearing Giant: Lake Chad,” March 27, 2014b).

⁹ World Bank, “Investing in Resilience and Development in Lake Chad,” February 11, 2016b.

¹⁰ Theresa Krinninger, “Lake Chad: Climate Change Fosters Terrorism,” *Deutsche Welle*, July 12, 2015.

¹¹ Many are from the dominant regional ethnic group, the Kanuri, as well as other communities that straddle the borders.

number of similar reasons, including poor governance, intra-Muslim struggles, and constrained political spaces.

Security

Conventional narratives of the Boko Haram conflict begin with a series of clashes between the group and police in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state in northern Nigeria, in 2009.¹² Nigerian forces initially crushed the insurrection and extrajudicially executed its leader. After a brief period underground, the group began to again launch attacks against the Nigerian state, police, and “strategic” individuals.¹³ Under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s tactics became more sophisticated and its violence less discriminating.¹⁴ By late 2014, Boko Haram controlled large swathes of northeastern Nigeria, with territory amounting to the size of Belgium or Maryland.¹⁵ That same year, the group killed at least 6,644 people, making it the year’s deadliest designated terrorist group in the world, responsible for nearly half of all deaths of noncombatants on the African continent.¹⁶ Estimates

¹² Boko Haram grew out of a group of radical Islamist youth in Borno state and their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, who promoted a literal interpretation of the Quran, advocated for Sharia, and condemned Westernization throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. In 2009, a series of clashes between the group and police in Maiduguri escalated into a five-day armed insurrection in July. Nigerian forces crushed the rebellion, killed hundreds of members, destroyed the group’s principal mosque, and extrajudicially executed its leader (ICG, 2014b).

¹³ Individuals targeted included local officials, civil servants, chiefs, imams, traders who refused to cooperate, and turncoats. Early attacks were explicitly justified in terms of revenge for the deaths of Yusuf and other comrades (ICG, 2016b).

¹⁴ Its tactics evolved from bombing attacks and hit-and-run raids to conventional warfare and the occupation of large towns and expanded beyond government and security installations to target civilians who resisted them, Christians, moderate Muslim clerics, traditional leaders, UN development organizations, bars, and schools.

¹⁵ It had complete control of about 15 local government areas and partial control in more than 15 other local government areas (Amnesty International, “Boko Haram at a Glance,” January 29, 2015). The group declared a caliphate in July 2014 (“Boko Haram Declares ‘Islamic State’ in Northern Nigeria,” BBC News, August 25, 2014; “Nigeria Rejects Boko Haram ‘Caliphate’ Claim,” *Al Jazeera*, August 25, 2014; Julia Payne, “Nigerians Face Killings, Hunger in Boko Haram’s ‘State,’” Reuters, January 19, 2015).

¹⁶ In 2014 and 2015, Nigeria suffered the highest number of civilian deaths in any African war zones. In January 2015, insurgents took the Borno town of Baga in what Amnesty

of the group's size ranged from a core force of about 6,000 fighters to reports of more than 15,000 members.¹⁷

Between 2010 and 2014, Nigerian military operations against the group had limited effect.¹⁸ This was largely the result of insufficient attention, resource commitment, strategy, and capacity on the part of the Nigerian government and military, but it also reflected challenging regional security dynamics. Boko Haram exploited the porous borders around Lake Chad and cultural, ethnic, and religious affinities shared by the region's transnational basin communities for refuge, recruits, and supplies.¹⁹

Nigeria's neighbors were initially reluctant to crack down on the group's presence on their respective territory for reasons including limited capacity and fear of retaliation, and because Boko Haram itself tried to avoid confrontation with the neighboring governments.²⁰ Nigeria had historically poor relations with many of its neighbors—including long-standing territorial disputes with both Cameroon and Chad—and regional governments were inclined to view the conflict as primarily an internal Nigerian problem.²¹ Nigeria accused its neighbors of not doing enough to prevent militants from using their territory as

International described as the "deadliest massacre" in the history of Boko Haram. As many as 2,000 people were killed in a single day (Mark Anderson, "Boko Haram Violence Leaves Nigeria with Highest Civilian Death Toll in African War Zones," *The Guardian*, January 23, 2015; Monica Mark, "Boko Haram's 'Deadliest Massacre': 2,000 Feared Dead in Nigeria," *The Guardian*, January 10, 2015; Institute for Economics & Peace, 2015; Delman, 2015; Searcey and Santora, 2015).

¹⁷ Mark Hosenball, "Nigeria's Boko Haram Has Up to 6,000 Hardcore Militants: U.S. Officials," Reuters, February 6, 2015; Amnesty International, 2015.

¹⁸ ICG, 2014b.

¹⁹ The links facilitated smuggling of weapons, recruitment of fighters, and supply and personnel flows between Boko Haram in Nigeria and their Hausa, Kanuri, and Muslim kin in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon (Virginia Comolli, "The Regional Problem of Boko Haram," *Survival*, Vol. 57, No. 4, July 4, 2015, p. 110).

²⁰ Comolli, 2015; ICG, *Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram*, Africa Report No. 241, November 16, 2016e; ICG, "Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures," Africa Report No. 246, March 8, 2017c; ICG, "Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-Insurgency," Africa Report No. 245, February 27, 2017b.

²¹ They were also limited in capabilities and fearful of retaliation.

safe havens, while the Lake Chad states accused Nigeria of insufficiently addressing conflict spillover effects that were damaging their economies.

The dramatic upsurge of violence and refugees in 2014 and Boko Haram's encroaching territorial expansion started to change the calculus of the regional states, creating the conditions that would eventually lead to the deployment of the MNJTF in 2015. For example, between 2010 and 2014, Boko Haram had established a logistics network in the Far North region of Cameroon—managing supplies, setting up local cells, and recruiting between 3,500 and 4,000 Cameroonians.²² After an initial strategy of denial, Cameroon belatedly started to dismantle the networks on its territory in 2014. This prompted retributive attacks by Boko Haram that quickly escalated to open warfare between the group and Cameroon.²³ Similar dynamics played out in Niger²⁴ and Chad.²⁵ In mid-2014, Niger started to mount unilateral defensive operations along its border with Nigeria, and, later that year, Chad sent its military forces to Cameroon and Niger to support their military operations. Boko Haram responded with attacks in both Chad and Niger.

²² Boko Haram was present in Cameroon's Far North since at least 2009, relying on the region of "strategic depth," but the government's initial response was denial (ICG, 2016e).

²³ ICG, 2016e.

²⁴ Boko Haram had used Niger's Diffa region as a logistics hub to acquire funds, supplies, and weapons since 2009, but the government's initial response was relative tolerance and surveillance. Niger viewed the group as a fundamentally Nigerian problem, and collaboration with Nigeria was minimal. ICG cites two reasons for Niger's 2014 decision to go to war against the group: (1) increasing regional pressure for joint action and (2) concern as Boko Haram stepped up recruitment in the Diffa area (ICG, 2017b, pp. 8–9).

²⁵ Chad initially adopted a neutral "wait-and-see" stance toward Boko Haram's activities in Nigeria and presence among its lake region. At the time, the government was more concerned with the conflict on its northern border, in Libya. Boko Haram's October 2014 seizure of Baga, a settlement in Nigeria close to the border with Chad, was reportedly a "wake-up call" for Chad and others in the region. Beyond demonstrating a more immediate security threat, Chad was also increasingly concerned about its deteriorating economic relations with Nigeria and Cameroon because of the group's disruptive activities and feared its routes to the sea may be severed (ICG, 2017c, pp. 17–18).

The “regionalization of both the threat and the military response fed each other.”²⁶

In advance of the 2015 presidential elections, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan was under increased pressure to address the situation in the north. Troops from Chad and Niger were allowed to launch bilateral offensives against Boko Haram on Nigerian soil, while the Nigerian military was controversially and unofficially supplemented by a few hundred South African mercenaries.²⁷ The United States and France also provided support.²⁸ These offensives substantially—if temporarily—reduced Boko Haram’s foothold in Nigeria’s northeast, but Jonathan still lost the election to Muhammadu Buhari. A northerner and devout Muslim, Buhari promised to make fighting corruption and Boko Haram centerpieces of his administration.²⁹

The Boko Haram violence overlaid and interacted with at least four other conflict dynamics. First, northern Nigeria had a long history of smaller-scale violence, including urban riots that pitted Muslims against Christians and confrontations between different Islamic sects.³⁰ Second, even prior to the rise of Boko Haram, Lake Chad Basin communities experienced pervasive human insecurity in the form of cattle rustling, banditry, and vigilantism endemic to an active illicit

²⁶ ICG, 2017b, p. 10.

²⁷ Adam Nossiter, “Neighbors of Nigeria Take on Boko Haram,” *New York Times*, March 9, 2015a; Adam Nossiter, “Mercenaries Join Nigeria’s Military Campaign Against Boko Haram,” *New York Times*, March 12, 2015b.

²⁸ Eric Schmitt, “Leading Role for France as Africa Battles Back,” *New York Times*, March 15, 2015; Seth G. Jones, James Dobbins, Daniel Byman, Christopher S. Chivvis, Ben Connable, Jeffrey Martini, Eric Robinson, and Nathan Chandler, *Rolling Back the Islamic State*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-1912, 2017, pp. 131–133.

²⁹ Adam Nossiter, “Nigerian President-Elect Muhammadu Buhari Sets Out His Agenda,” *New York Times*, April 1, 2015c.

³⁰ According to ICG reporting, clashes of violent conflict reflected a more general failure of the state to assure public order and contribute to settlement resolution, as well as economic drivers. Additionally, a unique “thread of rejectionist thinking” persisted throughout northern Nigerian history, which viewed collaboration with secular authorities as illegitimate (ICG, 2010).

economy, as well as abuse by state officials.³¹ Third, Boko Haram is emblematic of a larger global trend of jihadist movements, though the nature and extent of its relationship with other international jihadist groups is debated. There are credible reports that Boko Haram fighters trained in Northern Mali during the jihadi takeover there in 2012–2013, and the group’s leader pledged allegiance to ISIS in March 2015.³² There is little evidence, however, of sustained tactical or strategic cooperation among the groups.³³ Finally, Nigeria’s neighbors were simultaneously facing other challenging regional security threats, including spillover effects from ongoing conflicts in CAR, Libya, Mali, and Darfur.³⁴

Humanitarian

The Boko Haram violence and successive military counteroffensives had a massive humanitarian impact, including repeat attacks on villages and towns, an increasing number of suicide bombings, and the destruction of vital infrastructure. International attention on the crisis increased after the April 2014 kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls in Chibok, Nigeria. Body counts are difficult to verify due to limited information from the region, but more than 20,000 people were estimated to have been killed between 2009 and 2015 as a direct result of the Boko Haram conflict.³⁵ Countless more died from the secondary impacts

³¹ On the other hand, the basin region simultaneously demonstrated “much capacity for peaceful coexistence between its ethnic and religious communities” (ICG, 2016b, p. 9).

³² The timing of the affiliation was strategic and reflected the weakness of the group. At the time, ISIS was expanding its territory, while Boko Haram was losing ground.

³³ Thurston explains that some of Boko Haram’s tactics borrow from the repertoire of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb—kidnapping Westerners and suicide attacks—while others are unique: attacking cell phone towers and kidnapping women en masse. He concludes that much of the group’s violence seems “improvised, rather than directed from abroad” (Thurston, 2016, p. 8; see also CFR, 2017).

³⁴ See, e.g., ICG, *The Central Sahel: A Perfect Sandstorm*, Africa Report No. 227, June 25, 2015b.

³⁵ CFR’s Nigeria Security Tracker uses media reports to track deaths and breaks the count down by perpetrator. Perpetrators include Boko Haram, state security services, and sectar-

of war—including hunger, disease, and a lack of health care.³⁶ Up to 85 percent of households fled the worst-hit conflict areas in northern Nigeria and Cameroon, and, by mid-2015, 2.5 million people were displaced in the Lake Chad Basin.³⁷ The majority of the displaced—more than 2.1 million people—were in northern Nigeria.³⁸ Food insecurity in the region spiked dramatically, affecting one in every three people, and the international humanitarian efforts were hampered by insecurity.³⁹ Counterinsurgency measures, especially the military's decision to close borders and markets, exacerbated food insecurity—in attempts to deny the group's financing activities, state restrictions also cut local communities off from their sources of livelihood and blocked trade.⁴⁰

Governance and Civil Administration

The Lake Chad region consists of a diverse, dynamic, and relatively autonomous basin area, with little state presence from any of the four respective governments.⁴¹ Central governments paid little attention to their basin peripheries, which were not seen as an immediate threat or power base for politicians. When and where central funds were redistributed to these underdeveloped areas, they often benefited only local powerbrokers and left populations feeling alienated and neglected and, thus, potentially vulnerable to radicalization like that promulgated by Boko Haram. In a region where cultural, ethnic, and religious affiliations often straddled international borders, many identified more

ian groups (excluding Boko Haram), in order of lethality (CFR, "Nigeria Security Tracker," undated, accessed July 5, 2017).

³⁶ Jessica Skinner and Sultana Begum, *Lake Chad's Unseen Crisis: Voices of Refugees and IDPs from Niger and Nigeria*, Oxford, UK: Oxfam International, August 2016.

³⁷ OCHA, "Lake Chad Basin Crisis Update No. 1," February 29, 2016a; OCHA, "Multiple Displacements Around Lake Chad," Humanitarian Bulletin: West and Central Africa, September 2015.

³⁸ OCHA, 2015; Skinner and Begum, 2016.

³⁹ This is a number three times higher than the same period two years prior. UN agency operations were restricted in most of the Borno state region (OCHA, 2015).

⁴⁰ OCHA, 2015.

⁴¹ ICG, 2015b.

closely with locally defined groups and actors, including the rebels, and held only fragile loyalty to the central state.

Boko Haram's initial platform advocated for the creation of an Islamic state in northern Nigeria specifically to address alleged state failure and the widespread poverty, corruption, and unemployment.⁴² Since returning to civilian rule in 1999, the Nigerian state has suffered growing legitimacy, capacity, and security gaps.⁴³ The country is consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt in the world, and, by the turn of the century, most Nigerians were poorer than they were when Nigeria became independent.⁴⁴ Entrenched corruption, crony capitalism, and poor governance resulted in deteriorating public service provision, an increasing number of militia and separatist groups, and a deepening sense of frustration and alienation in segments of the population. The situation was particularly dire in the northern periphery, where state presence and service provision was sparse, dysfunctional, corrupt, or all three. In its stead, groups that were often both criminal and extremist emerged from local communities to compete—or collaborate—with local officials for power monopolies.⁴⁵

Democratization

Democratization in the Lake Chad region was fragile or nonexistent. Since 1999, Nigeria's democracy has been marred by flawed and violent elections, an attempt to eliminate presidential term limits, and a constitutional crisis. This led some experts to label the country a "stunted or eroding" democracy, only "partly free," and even authoritarian.⁴⁶

⁴² Thurston, 2016; ICG, 2010. Former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria John Campbell makes the point that this platform is based in religious argument, rather than political or economic justifications (CFR, 2017).

⁴³ ICG, 2014b; ICG, 2016b.

⁴⁴ In many parts of the country, the government is unable to provide security, good roads, water, health, reliable power, and education (ICG, 2014b; ICG, 2016b; Comolli, 2015).

⁴⁵ ICG, 2016b.

⁴⁶ The country experienced violent elections in 2003 and 2007, an attempt to eliminate term limits in 2006, and a constitutional crisis when the president disappeared for nearly six months following a November 2009 illness (Said Adejumobi, ed., *Governance and Politics in Post-Military Nigeria: Changes and Challenges*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010;

Although political participation was possible at multiple levels, political choice was impaired or undermined by corruption, vote buying, intimidation, and local domination. Nigeria's neighbors had similar challenging democratization histories. At the time, Cameroon's leader was in his fourth decade of power, after a tainted 2011 election. Chad had held regular elections since 1996, but none had produced a change in power. Niger had held a legitimate election after a 2010 military coup removed its increasingly authoritarian president, but its newly democratic regime appeared to be backsliding in the face of significant regional security threats.

Throughout the region, changing demographics and differential generational access to political power presented a special challenge for democratization, even as they further highlighted the need for political changes. In Nigeria's case, more than half of the population was under 18, but a narrow political space and "sclerotic patriarchal social system" gave youth little access to political levers or social capital.⁴⁷ Absent opportunity or redistributive measures, the growing youth population stressed state capacity to absorb intergenerational tensions, leading to restlessness, alienation, and, in some cases, disillusionment with the secular state and a turn to radicalization.⁴⁸ A final exacerbating dynamic was the increasing role played by Muslim associations in supplementing or even supplanting state institutions throughout the basin region, especially in providing education.⁴⁹ For many youths in Cameroon, for example, an appointment as imam offered the sole route to a position in society, but these positions were scarce, pushing

Adigun Agbaje, "Nigeria: Prospects for the Fourth Republic," in E. Gyimah-Boadi, ed., *Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004; Freedom House, "Nigeria: Freedom in the World, 2014," 2014; Economist Intelligence Unit, "Democracy Index 2014: Democracy and Its Discontents," *The Economist*, 2015).

⁴⁷ ICG, 2016b.

⁴⁸ Mercy Corps, "Motivations and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth," April 2016; ICG, 2010; ICG, 2014b; ICG, 2015b.

⁴⁹ ICG, 2015b; ICG, 2014b; ICG, 2010.

some toward establishing their own mosques, greater radicalism, and even rejection of the secular state.⁵⁰

Economic

Within each of their respective countries, the Lake Chad region's communities were generally among the poorest and most underdeveloped. Nigeria's North East, Boko Haram's main field of operations, had the worst poverty rates of the country's six official "zones."⁵¹ In Cameroon's Far North basin region, 74.3 percent of the population lived below the poverty line—compared with a national average of 37.5 percent—and school enrollment in border districts was less than a quarter of the national average.⁵² Despite the country's increasing oil revenues, Chad failed to invest in its lake region, where there was only one doctor for every 140,000 inhabitants, one-quarter of the national average.⁵³ Niger's basin region, Diffa, was not poor relative to the rest of Niger's very poor national population. Diffa benefited from the lake's natural resources and proximity to the larger Nigerien market. Niger's basin region was not well integrated into the rest of the national Nigerien economy, however, and its dependence on the lake economy made it more vulnerable economically when the Boko Haram conflict arose.

Boko Haram built upon and exacerbated economic challenges throughout the region. The Lake Chad Basin had a long history of trafficking, smuggling, and licit and illicit trade along its porous borders. The conflict badly damaged this informal economy—destroying or driving away the few services that the state provided, forcing traders to flee, and straining local communities with the number of displaced. Checkpoints, curfews, and temporary border closures, together with the threat of violence, significantly reduced cross-border trade and led

⁵⁰ ICG, 2016e, p. 6.

⁵¹ ICG, 2014b, p. 3.

⁵² School enrollment was 46 percent in the Far North and 20 percent in border districts, compared with the nation's 84.1 percent average in 2014 (ICG, 2016e, pp. 3–4).

⁵³ ICG, 2017c, pp. 7–8.

to food shortages.⁵⁴ In an effort to break Boko Haram's financial base, the region's states deliberately targeted economic activities that they believed benefited the group,⁵⁵ ordering a variety of bans, including on motorbike taxi service in the countryside; rural markets; the sale of fuel; and trade in fish, pepper, cattle, and dried meat. These measures further strained local economies.⁵⁶

African and Other International Roles

The MNJTF was not an international intervention in the conventional sense. Rather, it was a novel framework that facilitated the coordination of the military efforts of countries that were all effected by the Boko Haram conflict in the Lake Chad Basin. The MNJTF built upon and enhanced existing unilateral and bilateral operations and involved a mix of regional and subregional organizations.

The MNJTF consists of military forces from four of the six LCBC states⁵⁷—Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger—and Benin. The LCBC was created in 1964 to conserve and manage basin resources and promote regional integration, peace, and security.⁵⁸ In 1994, the commission established the original MNJTF as an (unsuccessful) regional operation to combat banditry and organized crime.⁵⁹ Begin-

⁵⁴ Economic costs associated with the disruption of trade with Nigeria and Cameroon, as well as the fear of being denied its main route to the sea, significantly affected Chad's decision to get involved in the conflict.

⁵⁵ These activities benefited the group through tribute, criminal racket, or direct militant participation in certain businesses.

⁵⁶ ICG, 2016b.

⁵⁷ The LCBC was created to manage the resources from Lake Chad; its members are Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, CAR, and Liberia.

⁵⁸ The Republic of Central Africa and Libya joined the organization in 1996 and 2008, respectively. Observer status is held by Sudan, Egypt, the Republic of the Congo, and the DRC.

⁵⁹ The force was not created until 1998, with very little tangible effect. Cameroon was not part of the early MNJTF because of its strained relations and territorial disputes with Nigeria (William Assanvo, Jeannine Ella A. Abatan, and Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo, "Assessing

ning in 2012, the LCBC worked to revive the MNJTF and extended its mandate to address the growing threat posed by Boko Haram.⁶⁰ Initial efforts at multilateral cooperation stalled, hindered by the poor relations and mistrust between Nigeria and its neighbors.⁶¹

Deteriorating regional security throughout 2014 and 2015 eventually encouraged neighboring states to unilaterally and bilaterally address the Boko Haram threat (as described above) and accelerated efforts to establish the multinational force. Diplomatic progress on negotiating the scope and structure of multinational cooperation proceeded incrementally, as follows:

- Throughout 2014, agreements on the force structure were decided, and a final arrangement was recognized at the LCBC Extraordinary Summit in October.⁶²
- The PSC formally authorized the activation of the MNJTF in January 2015.⁶³

the Multinational Joint Task Force Against Boko Haram,” Institute for Security Studies, September 2016).

⁶⁰ During the 14th ordinary summit on April 30, 2012, the LCBC heads of states and government decided to reactivate and operationalize the MNJTF and to expand its mandate to fight against Boko Haram (Usman A. Tar and Mala Mustapha, “The Emerging Architecture of a Regional Security Complex in the Lake Chad Basin,” *Africa Development*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2017, pp. 99–118).

⁶¹ In 2012, for example, Cameroon did not grant Nigeria rights to cross-border hot pursuit; however, the Nigerian forces did cross into Cameroon twice in 2013 (ICG, 2016e, p. 27).

⁶² Amid a worsening regional security situation in early 2014, the ministers of defense and chiefs of staff of the LCBC originally called upon countries to each contribute a battalion of up to 700 soldiers. In March, the heads of the external intelligence services of Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, along with France, signed a deal to increase border-policing coordination and intelligence-sharing (Comolli, 2015, p. 111). Benin joined the LCBC Extraordinary Summit in Niamey, Niger, in October 2014, where leaders finalized the establishment of pledged contingents and command headquarters.

⁶³ PSC, “Communiqué of the 484th PSC Meeting on Boko Haram Terrorist Group,” PSC/AHG/Comm. 2 (CDLXXXIV), 2015a.

- More-detailed operational, strategic, and legal frameworks for an 8,700-strong force were created and endorsed throughout 2015.⁶⁴

Regional cooperation was eased by the election of the new Nigerian president, Muhammadu Buhari, in May 2015. Buhari succeeded the regionally unpopular Goodluck Jonathan and immediately worked to strengthen cooperation with the country's neighbors in the fight against Boko Haram.⁶⁵

It is difficult to ascertain with certainty when and to what extent various national contingents deployed to the MNJTF, but command headquarters in N'Djamena were inaugurated in May 2015.⁶⁶ In terms of operations, the MNJTF is a stabilization coordination mechanism. Rather than being modeled after unified UN peacekeeping operations, as was the case for AMIS and AMIB, the MNJTF more closely resembles "coalitions of the willing"–type missions, similar to the Regional Task Force countering the LRA, the Sahel G5 in Mali, and the pro-

⁶⁴ In February 2015, a multistakeholder meeting (LCBC, ECOWAS, ECCAS, CEN-SAD, AU, UN, and others) drafted concepts of operations (CONOPS) and rules of engagement for the mission, and the countries announced contributions of 8,700 personnel. The strategic CONOPS defined the force mandate, specific tasks, command-and-control structures and composition, troop strength, and zones of operational sectors. It also determined the right of pursuit, essential for cross-border operations. The CONOPS was validated by the PSC in March 2015 and approved by the heads of states and government of the LCBC and Benin in June 2015. A memorandum of understanding between the AU and UN on the operationalization and sustenance of the MNJTF was signed in October 2015, and an inaugural meeting between the MNJTF force commander and sector commanders was held in N'Djamena on November 13, 2015 (Assanvo, Abatan, and Sawadogo, 2016; Daniel Flynn, "African Allies Aim to Pin Down Boko Haram, Official Says," Reuters, February 19, 2015).

⁶⁵ Outgoing President Goodluck Johnathan (2010–2015) was criticized for weak leadership, lack of political will, inability to combat Boko Haram, and poor relations with neighbors. Soon after assuming the presidency, Buhari visited each MNJTF-contributing country. He committed to contributing up to US\$100 million to establishing the MNJTF (ICG, 2016b). It does appear clear that the original July 2015 deadline for deployment went, like all previous deadlines for the force, unmet (Assanvo, Abatan, and Sawadogo, 2016, pp. 11–12; Wendyam Aristide Sawadogo, "Can the Joint Task Force Against Boko Haram Stay the Course?" Institute for Security Studies, *ISS Today* (blog), January 13, 2017).

⁶⁶ Sawadogo, 2017.

posed Regional Protection Force in South Sudan.⁶⁷ The MNJTF's mandate is threefold:

- Create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram.
- Facilitate the implementation of stabilization programs, including the full restoration of state authority and the return of IDPs and refugees.
- Facilitate, within the limit of capabilities, humanitarian access and assistance.⁶⁸

Outlined tasks include conducting military operations to prevent the expansion of Boko Haram activities, conducting patrols, preventing arms proliferation, actively searching for and freeing abductees, and encouraging defection among Boko Haram ranks. Perhaps most importantly, the force coordinates intelligence-sharing and joint planning among its national sectors.⁶⁹

The MNJTF was authorized but not led by the AU. Nonetheless, the AU played two key roles in relation to the force. First, the AU's authorization provided political legitimacy and a proper international legal framework for the multilateral operation. This was critical for ensuring that the regional force subsequently obtained UNSC authorization and was eligible for external funding opportunities.⁷⁰ Second,

⁶⁷ By one analysis, the MNJTF reflects a “new African stabilization model where offensive force is used to actively regain control over territory controlled by rebel groups, with the aim of weakening and eventually defeating those aggressors committed to violence, and to force their political associates to the negotiating table” (de Coning, Gelot, and Karlsrud, 2016, p. 144). See also Institute for Security Studies, “Challenges and Opportunities for the G5 Sahel Force,” Situational Analysis, July 7, 2017b.

⁶⁸ PSC, 2015a.

⁶⁹ ICG, 2016b, p. 8; interview with Cameroon expert, Yaoundé, August 7, 2017; interview with U.S. State Department official, in person, Washington, D.C., October 20, 2017.

⁷⁰ By some estimates, prior to the AU's formal authorization, the region already had a “de facto” coalition of the willing given that some countries had bilaterally granted authority of neighbors to pursue Boko Haram across borders. “The very purpose of establishing the MNJTF was, hence, to provide political legitimacy and a proper diplomatic framework to the military operation and to eventually access extra money and additional operational

the AU created a Strategic Support Cell, based in Addis Ababa, to provide oversight of the MNJTF and to receive, coordinate, and manage donor contributions. The AU's experience in the management of peace operations dwarfed that of the LCBC Executive Secretariat.

Financial constraints delayed operationalization and plagued the force throughout. Most of the costs of the MNJTF were borne by the contributing countries, raising questions about their ability to maintain such an engagement over the long term. In January 2015, the AU outlined potential models for UN financial support to the operation but was disappointed when the UN declined to create a trust similar to those created for previous AU missions.⁷¹ International donors, including the UK, France, and Nigeria, pledged at least \$250 million to fight the insurgents, but the promised sum was well short of the force's projected budget of \$700 million, and disbursements were repeatedly delayed.⁷² Other international support included a mix of direct funding to the MNJTF, contributions to the AU, and bilateral training and financing arrangements with specific TCCs' efforts.⁷³

capacity for it" (Michelle Ndiaye, "The Relationship Between the AU and the RECs/RMs in Relation to Peace and Security in Africa: Subsidiarity and Inevitable Common Destiny," in Cedric de Coning, Linnéa Gelot, and John Karlsrud, eds., *The Future of African Peace Operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram*, London: Zed Books, 2016, p. 60).

⁷¹ The AU called for the UN Secretary-General to set up a trust fund for MNJTF operation—like that set up for the African-Led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), MISCA, and AMISOM—and to help mobilize international funding and logistics support (PSC, 2015a).

⁷² In February 2016, the AU organized a donors' conference for the MNJTF, raising \$250 million, including past donations (African Union Peace and Security Department, "The African Union Commission Holds a Donors' Conference in Support of the Multi-national Joint Task Force Operations Against Boko Haram Terrorist Group," February 3, 2016). By September 2016, only funds from Nigeria, the UK, and CEN-SAD had materialized. The UK had pledged 5 million pounds through the Peace Facility prior to the conference, which translated into 34 vehicles, 30 rough-terrain motorcycles, 14 electrical generators, and assorted communications equipment. As of September 2017, the majority of the EU's promised 50 million euros was still tied up in red tape at the AU.

⁷³ Nigeria is said to have contributed at least US\$30 million toward construction on MNJTF headquarters. The UK dispersed an estimated US\$3.5 million to the AU for the mission. CEN-SAD contributed US\$1.5 million to Chad, Niger, and Benin to prepare their contingents. Many Western countries, particularly the United States and France, were

Through a number of large peacekeeping and counterterrorism programs in Africa, the United States continued to provide parallel training on a wide spectrum of military tasks to the region's militaries.⁷⁴ France took a prominent and direct role in battling violent extremism in the overlapping Sahel region. Since 2014, it has had 4,000 troops deployed throughout the region under Operation Barkhane, and, in 2017, it advocated for the creation of a second African multinational force, the G5, to counter terrorism in the Sahel.⁷⁵ The United States, UK, and France provided intelligence and training support through a small coordination and liaison cell on the ground in N'Djamena.⁷⁶

Military and Police

The MNJTF was divided into four operation sectors—one each in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger—with an operation headquar-

already supplying training, equipment, and intelligence to specific regional states and their militaries. Although much of this support was originally focused on Nigeria's neighbors, Buhari's reformist agenda saw an increase in commitment and pledges directed at Nigeria as well (Assanvo, Abatan, and Sawadogo, 2016; John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, "The Consequences of Party Organization in the House: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties in Conditional Party Government," in Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, eds., *Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era*, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000.

⁷⁴ U.S. Africa Command, undated; U.S. State Department, "Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)," undated.

⁷⁵ The new regional anti-terror force is set to include up to one battalion each of the G5 Sahel countries: Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. Niger and Chad are also part of the MNJTF ("West African and French Leaders Launch Sahel Force," *Al Jazeera*, July 2, 2017; Michelle Nichols, "France Softens Proposed U.N. Backing for Sahel Force to Appease U.S.," Reuters, June 20, 2017; Gregory Viscusi, Pauline Bax, and Kaourou Magassa, "Macron Says France to Provide Combat Support for Sahel Force," *Bloomberg*, July 2, 2017; Schmitt, 2017).

⁷⁶ In French, Cellule de Coopération et de Liaison (CCL). By one assessment, however, the CCL was severely underutilized, for reasons related to limited trust, poor communications, and insufficient processes to plan and convey intelligence requests in a timely manner (ICG, 2016b; Jennifer G. Cooke and Thomas M. Sanderson, "Militancy and the Arc of Instability: Violent Extremism in the Sahel," Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2016; interview with U.S. State Department official, 2017).

ters based in N'Djamena.⁷⁷ Officially, a Nigerian force commander—supported by a Cameroonian deputy and a Chadian chief of staff—exercised command and control of the MNJTF and directed the military actions of the contingents.⁷⁸ In practice, however, N'Djamena's commander did not exercise control over national contingents. MNJTF contingents deployed primarily to their respective sectors and prioritized operations within their own boundaries but could advance into the territory of a neighboring state in accordance with specific rules and regulations. The force's headquarters played a coordinating and information-sharing function among the various sectors.

It is important to note that the MNJTF was never the exclusive military body combating Boko Haram in the region. Unilateral and bilateral military responses had preceded the creation of the MNJTF and continued to operate in the Lake Chad Basin (see Table 7.1). Most prominently, Nigeria began investing significantly more into military operations in the lead-up to the 2015 presidential elections and prior to the deployment of the MNJTF. By January 2015, Nigeria was thought to have between 30,000 and 40,000 troops total in the north.⁷⁹ Similarly, Cameroon deployed unilateral operations in its Far North region—Operation Alpha, led by the elite Rapid Intervention Battalion (Bataillon d'intervention rapide, BIR), and Operation Emergence

⁷⁷ Sector 1 in Mora, Cameroon; 2 in Baga-Sola, Chad; 3 in Baga, Nigeria; and a new Sector 4 in Diffa, Niger.

⁷⁸ According to the February 2015 CONOPS.

⁷⁹ Chris Stein, "Why Nigeria's Military Is Losing the Battle Against Boko Haram," *Al Jazeera America*, January 13, 2015. In early 2011, the government sent 3,600 troops to the region, and, in May 2013, the president declared a state of emergency in three states, deploying an additional 2,000 troops (ICG, 2014b, p. 34). Goodluck Jonathan belatedly tried to further ramp up military actions against Boko Haram in advance of the 2015 election. Jonathan reached out to Russia and China for training and weapons; arranged for a South African private military company to operate a small force in Borno state; and, most significantly, Chad and Niger were allowed to intervene on Nigerian territory around Lake Chad in February and March 2015 (ICG, 2016b, p. 6). Once elected, Buhari further improved the military's capacity, operations, and morale. In January 2016, Buhari announced plans to double the army's strength to 200,000, including the creation of another (8th) division in the north to complement the 7th division created in 2013 (Senator Iroegbu and Jaiyeola Andrews, "Nigeria: Army to Increase Personnel Strength to 200,000," *This Day (Lagos)*, January 14, 2016).

Table 7.1
Unilateral, Bilateral, and Multilateral Operations Against Boko Haram

Operation	Dates	Countries, Organization	Mission, Area of Operations
Operation Flush	2009–2014	Nigeria, local and state security forces	Formal and informal counterinsurgency in northeast Nigeria (Borno state), turned combined joint task force
Operation Zaman Lafiya ^a	2014–Jul. 2015	Nigeria	Counterinsurgency in northeast Nigeria
Operation Lafiya Dole ^b	Jul. 2015–ongoing	Nigeria	Counterinsurgency in northeast Nigeria
Operation Alpha, including multiple “Arrow” operations in Nigeria	2014–ongoing; first Arrow Operation in Nov. 2015	Cameroon (BIR)	Counterinsurgency in Cameroon; operations in Nigeria, after creation of MNJTF
Operation Emergence 4, including multiple “Tentacles” operations in Nigeria	2014–ongoing	Cameroon (Army)	Counterinsurgency in Cameroon; operations in Nigeria, after creation of MNJTF
Operation Ngaa ^c	Jun. 2014	Niger	Strengthening Niger’s border, protecting civilians, containing Boko Haram, intelligence collection
(Joint operations)	Feb.–Nov. 2015	Chad, with Cameroon	Chad forces deployed to Cameroon, with offensives into Nigeria
(Joint operations)	Mar.–Nov. 2015	Chad, with Niger	Chad forces deployed to Niger, with offensives into Nigeria
Operation Safe Corridor	Apr. 2016–ongoing	Nigeria	DDR, deradicalization support and vocational training
Operation Gama Aiki	Jun.–Nov. 2016	MNJTF, specifically Chad, Niger, Nigeria	Around Lake Chad and in Borno state; simultaneous, cooperative action by all four force sectors ^d
Operation Thunder 1	Dec. 2016	MNJTF, specifically Cameroon and Nigeria	

Table 7.1—continued

Operation	Dates	Countries, Organization	Mission, Area of Operations
Operation Thunder 2	Feb.– Mar. 2017	MNJTF, specifically Cameroon and Nigeria	Cameroon and Nigeria; much- publicized release of 5,000 Boko Haram captives
Operation Gama Aiki II, or Rawan Kada	Mar. 2017– ongoing	MNJTF, specifically Chad, Niger, Nigeria	Follow-up to Gama Aiki
Operation Thunder 4	Around May 2017	MNJTF, specifically Cameroon and Nigeria	

^a Translates as “We will live in peace.”

^b Translates as “Peace by all means.”

^c Translates as “Shield.”

^d Sawadogo, 2017.

NOTES: Listed operations were compiled using publicly available sources and reporting. This may not be a comprehensive list. African-led missions are in red; MNJTF-led missions are in blue.

4, led by the regular army—prior to the creation of its MNJTF sector. After being militarily outnumbered three to one by Boko Haram in the Far North in early 2014, Cameroon's total military presence in the Far North eventually grew to between 8,500 to 10,000 soldiers, or one-seventh of its total defense force.⁸⁰

On the one hand, these overlapping military efforts make assessing the unique impact of the MNJTF challenging. On the other, attempts to carefully parse outcomes potentially confuse the contribution of the joint framework in the first place. Experts emphasize that the MNJTF structure facilitated cross-border operational management, intelligence-sharing, and some joint planning while assuaging sovereignty concerns.⁸¹ The headquarters provided a venue for coordination not just for the MNJTF-specific forces, but also for the other

⁸⁰ Africa Defense Forum, “Adapting for Victory,” blog, January 19, 2017; ICG, 2016e, p. 24.

⁸¹ ICG, 2016b, p. 8; Assanvo, Abatan, and Sawadogo, 2016, p. 2.

national units operating in the area.⁸² MNJTF leadership met with national military chiefs, defense ministers, and heads of state to build consensus and harmonize plans for dry-season offensives.⁸³ The goal was to create a “multiplier effect,” and countries leveraged the framework creatively. For example, a Cameroon expert recounted how Cameroon’s elite BIR would sometimes bring a handful of MNJTF soldiers on its anti-Boko Haram operations into Nigeria, enabling it to use the multilateral force’s cross-border authorization.⁸⁴

There is some uncertainty over the number of MNJTF personnel and the timing of their deployment. Several adjustments to the mandated force size have been made over time, and reporting on counter-Boko Haram campaigns inconsistently distinguishes between MNJTF contingents and parallel national units. In its January 2015 endorsement of the LCBC decision to deploy, the PSC recommended a total staff complement of 7,500 military personnel, police, and civilians.⁸⁵ This number was later increased to 8,700 in February and 10,000 in March 2015.⁸⁶ Officially, all the national contingents were deployed to their respective operational sectors by 2016, but events suggest that *de facto* deployment was uneven across the sectors.⁸⁷ According to our

⁸² U.S. State Department official, interview.

⁸³ According to one close observer, the resultant level of coordination achieved should be neither overstated nor undervalued (U.S. State Department official, interview).

⁸⁴ Cameroon expert, interview.

⁸⁵ Prior to the AU authorization, in March 2014, LCBC countries had approved the creation of a multinational force with the mandate to ensure peace and security in the region that called upon each country to contribute a battalion of up to 700 troops. Nigerien and Chadian troops were temporarily deployed to Baga, Nigeria—where the headquarters were to be established—but both countries later withdrew these forces. ECCAS member states established an emergency fund of about \$110 million.

⁸⁶ The first increase was recommended by the meeting of experts in Yaoundé, and the second was made during the 480th meeting of the PSC. In August 2015, numbers announced at the meetings of the chief of staff of LCBC countries and Benin raised the numbers to nearly 11,150 personnel—3,750 from Nigeria, 3,000 from Chad, 2,650 from Cameroon, 1,000 from Niger, and 750 from Benin—while a May 2016 accounting reported a total of 8,500 personnel.

⁸⁷ Assanvo, Abatan, and Sawadogo, 2016, p. 10.

interviews, as late as November 2015, the headquarters was still not fully operational, delayed by financial problems, quarrels among senior officers, and a lack of coordination fueled by old rivalries.⁸⁸ Provisions for an MNJTF police force were outlined in the CONOPS but, as of October 2017, had not been installed, and there was no indication of its imminent establishment.⁸⁹

Civil and Economic

The MNJTF's CONOPS stated that the force should include "a limited number of civilian and police personnel, to undertake liaison and advisor functions."⁹⁰ By one account, about 150 civilian personnel contributed to force operations by providing administrative and financial assistance and advising on issues of political and civil affairs, protection, human rights and gender, public information, and humanitarian liaisons.⁹¹ In September 2017, the UN Secretary-General reported that the AU Commission had deployed two human rights officers to the MNJTF headquarters in N'Djamena and was in the process of recruiting for additional civilian posts.⁹² Most observers, however, stress that the MNJTF is an overwhelmingly—if not exclusively—military operation.

Many, including the AU, have emphasized the need to supplement military action with development projects that improve the socioeconomic development of basin communities and thus address the root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency.⁹³ Although several experts advocated that the subregion should collectively elaborate a development strategy for the Lake Chad Basin, it was not clear that

⁸⁸ ICG, *Chad: Between Ambition and Fragility*, Africa Report No. 233, March 30, 2016a, p. 6, fn 29.

⁸⁹ Cameroon expert, interview.

⁹⁰ PSC, "Communiqué of the 489th PSC Meeting on Boko Haram Terrorist Group," 2015b.

⁹¹ de Coning, Gelot, and Karlsrud, 2016, p. 108.

⁹² UN Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Lake Chad Basin Region*, New York: United Nations Security Council, September 7, 2017b, para. 75.

⁹³ PSC, "Press Statement, 702nd PSC," July 26, 2017b.

the MNJTF would have a role to play in these efforts. By one account, fear of such a proposal was already spurring resistance amongst the secretariat of the two Regional Economic Communities (ECCAS and ECOWAS), who argued—not without reason—that matters of regional economic development were their expertise and responsibility.⁹⁴ Most expert recommendations for postconflict development initiatives were directed at the state level, calling on specific governments to expand, improve, expedite, and/or share existing unilateral efforts.⁹⁵ The Lake Chad Basin Commission was implementing a regional development program funded mainly by the African Development Bank, but the scope and implementation were very limited.⁹⁶ Because of the scale of the ongoing humanitarian crisis, it was difficult for national, regional, and international actors alike to prioritize long-term investments over short-term crisis relief.

What Happened

As of September 2017, Boko Haram was a somewhat weakened but certainly not eradicated force in the Lake Chad region. Concerted military efforts had reduced the group's numbers, exposed rifts within leadership, and forced the insurgency to revert to guerilla and terror tactics. Boko Haram proved resilient, however, and state actors have struggled to maintain control of recovered territory after repeat offensives and to progress with stabilization and state-building. The AU and other international observers have stressed the importance of expanding beyond military measures to address the underlying root causes of the insurgency, but it is unclear whether the individual countries have the necessary will or capacity to tackle the persistent governance, social, and economic challenges.

⁹⁴ Cameroon expert, interview.

⁹⁵ ICG, 2014b; ICG, 2016e; ICG, 2017b.

⁹⁶ ICG, 2017c, p. 17.

Security

Since 2015, Nigeria and its neighbors have progressively developed a stronger military response to Boko Haram, eventually tipping the balance in the favor of the Lake Chad states. Whereas the insurgent group had posed a more or less conventional security threat in 2014, by 2017 it had lost much of its territory and reverted to suicide attacks and guerrilla warfare. The sustained military pressure aggravated internal divisions and split the group into two factions.⁹⁷ Boko Haram proved adaptable and resilient, however, and opportunistically switched between urban and rural operations, diversified its funding streams, and innovated tactically.⁹⁸ The islet enclaves on Lake Chad, forests in northern Nigeria, and hills along the Nigeria-Cameroon border offered significant cover for ongoing guerrilla operations. The group continued to engage in recurrent attacks on communities, markets, religious centers, and even major cities and, in late 2017, still posed a serious security threat for Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad region.⁹⁹

The MNJTF headquarters were officially inaugurated in May 2015, and operations by various sectors began to layer on top of the unilateral and bilateral national operations by late 2015.¹⁰⁰ In Novem-

⁹⁷ As of September 2017, the nature and extent of Boko Haram's fragmentation remained murky. It appeared that the split was the result of strategic disagreement, especially opposition to Shakau's long-standing strategy of widespread and indiscriminate violence. The new, larger branch appeared to avoid killing Shiite Muslims, though it still commits violence against Shias, Christians, and those considered government affiliates (CFR, 2017; U.S. State Department official, interview).

⁹⁸ Comolli, 2015, p. 114.

⁹⁹ In September 2017, the PSC summarized the state of affairs, stating that "despite MNJTF successes, Boko Haram still retains the capacity to threaten peace and security in the region, in particular through the perpetration of asymmetric attacks on isolated locations, strike at soft targets such as markets and public gatherings, in the form of guerilla warfare and suicide bombings" (PSC, "Communiqué: 721st Meeting of the Peace and Security Council," September 28, 2017c).

¹⁰⁰ In the short term, the increased involvement of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger in the fight against Boko Haram provoked violent retaliation. As the structure and deployment of the MNJTF was still being finalized, unilateral and bilateral military campaigns started gathering momentum. In late January 2015, Chadian troops based in Cameroon's Far North staged their first offensive onto Nigerian territory and launched a second offensive shortly after from another position in Niger. At the time, Chad was the only neighboring country to have

ber, Cameroon's elite BIR launched its first Arrow operation into Nigeria. Although the BIR in Cameroon's Far North was technically separate from Cameroon's MNJTF contingent, the Arrow operations used the legal authority of the multilateral force to operate more than ten kilometers inside the Nigerian frontier, with prior approval and often the participation of Nigerian armed forces.¹⁰¹ From June to November 2016, the entire MNJTF launched Operation Gama Aiki (in Hausa, "Finish the Job"), a significant offensive that involved simultaneous and cooperative military action by all four of the force sectors.¹⁰² Operation Gama Aiki successfully diminished Boko Haram's reach, liberated certain occupied areas, released some hostages, and spurred defections within Boko Haram's ranks. However, suicide bombings and hostage-taking continued—becoming "almost daily occurrences" in 2016—and the group retained the ability to launch periodic raids from strongholds in rural areas.¹⁰³

In 2017, the MNJTF launched another major joint operation, Rawan Kada. Advertised as the successor to Gama Aiki and a precursor to a promised second phase of stabilization programs, Rawan Kada was another mixed success. Some, including the AU, commended the force for efforts that have "substantially degraded Boko Haram's capabili-

a right of hot pursuit into Nigeria. In February, Nigeria postponed the presidential elections for six weeks to launch an offensive against Boko Haram and recaptured Baga. In March 2015, Boko Haram lost its self-declared capital, Gwoza. Despite these gains, the Nigerian army struggled to maintain control of liberated areas, and Chadian authorities were frustrated by the lack of joint military operations and intelligence cooperation. Boko Haram's raids and suicide bombing targeting continued, though generally against softer targets and with a diminishing ability to control territory (ICG, 2017c, pp. 17–18; Institute for Security Studies, "PSC to Approve Final Plans for the Regional Fight Against Boko Haram," *On the Agenda* (blog), February 24, 2015; Vincent Foucher, "Boko Haram Is Losing Ground—but Will Not Be Defeated by Weapons Alone," International Crisis Group, May 13, 2016).

¹⁰¹ Between November 2015 and June 2016, eight Arrow operations were conducted. The two most successful operations (Arrows 5 and 6) destroyed Boko Haram's main training bases for suicide bombers (ICG, 2016e, p. 36).

¹⁰² Sawadogo, 2017.

¹⁰³ OCHA, 2016a; ICG, 2016b, p. 3.

ties, shrank its geographical reach and freed thousands of captives.”¹⁰⁴ Others warned that the insurgency remained “very much alive,” pointing to an upsurge of Boko Haram attacks between April and September 2017 that had killed at least 400 civilians in Nigeria and Cameroon.¹⁰⁵ A U.S. State Department report found that the Nigerian military continued to struggle to hold and stabilize areas that had been cleared. It concluded that “[d]espite gains made by the MNJTF, much of its reported progress was merely duplication of failed efforts carried over from the end of the last dry/fighting season.”¹⁰⁶

Observers of the MNJTF present competing assessments of the force's collaboration. Some emphasized that disjointedness among the different national contingents persisted—highlighting difficulties with command and control, tense relations between the countries, uncoordinated actions, and contentious unilateral claims of victory by coun-

¹⁰⁴ In April 2017, the PSC “commended the ongoing MNJTF major Joint Operation ‘Rawan Kada,’ which is expected to be a prelude to the 2nd phase of the MNJTF mandate aimed at implementing stabilization programs, including restoration of state authority in areas affected by Boko Haram and IDPs and refugees to return to their homes” (PSC, “Press Statement of the 680th PSC Meeting on the Operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) Against Boko Haram Terrorist Group-African Union,” PSC/PR/BR. (DCLXXX), April 21, 2017a).

¹⁰⁵ “Report: Boko Haram Attacks Killed 400 Since April,” *Al Jazeera*, September 5, 2017; “Nigerians Fear ‘No End in Sight’ to Boko Haram Fight,” *Al Jazeera*, October 1, 2017. The UN Secretary-General’s September 2017 report to the Security Council on conflict concluded that Boko Haram continued “to pose a significant threat to civilian populations” via suicide attacks, looting, raids, and incursions during rainy season; and the group continued to target military positions (UN Secretary-General, 2017b; ICG, “Nigeria: Growing Insecurity on Multiple Fronts,” Watch List 2017, July 20, 2017f). Another explained, “This is an escalation at a time when security services are saying that they have gotten a grip of the situation. But over the last two months in particular, we’ve seen heightened activities on the part of the Boko Haram, who have stepped up their suicide bombings, especially on the Nigerian side” (“Boko Haram Suspected in Deadly Niger Attack,” *Al Jazeera*, July 3, 2017). These concerns were echoed by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to West Africa and the Sahel in July (ICG, 2017f).

¹⁰⁶ Sections of the report were covered by “US: Nigerian Military Unable to Hold Territories Recovered by MNJTF,” *TheCable*, blog, August 2, 2017; and Joseph Erunke, “Nigeria: U.S. Faults Army’s Claim of Boko Haram Defeat in N-East,” *The Vanguard, Nigeria*, August 2, 2017.

tries after joint operations.¹⁰⁷ According to one analyst, the MNJTF “works in spurts, and works in little bursts” but is not a “consistently working, effective coalition.”¹⁰⁸ A Cameroonian military spokesman concurred that the national “lanes” remained clearly defined, with MNJTF troops mostly staying within their own borders; however, he presented this as a positive characteristic of the force and emphasized that contingents were still empowered to conduct joint operations and to pursue across borders.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, an assessment of Nigeria’s MNJTF troops—i.e., Sector 3—made clear that their approach to Boko Haram remained “essentially national in nature” but argued that this was underpinned by regional cooperation.¹¹⁰ Others explained the diffused force structure as both a practical necessity for regional cooperation and, ultimately, a reasonably effective military response.¹¹¹ One Cameroon expert explained that an integrated force structure was never practical because the region’s states would never have allowed their militaries to be under the command of what they assumed would be Nigerian leadership.¹¹² Further, he observed that cooperation and information-sharing had in fact dramatically improved with the creation of the MNJTF and its institutionalized communication pro-

¹⁰⁷ Sawadogo, 2017.

¹⁰⁸ Statement by Yan St-Pierre, chief executive officer of the Berlin-based security firm MOSECON. St-Pierre continued, “We’re really talking about a regional coalition [where] everybody’s on his own and collaborating when there’s a need to and basically when they’re forced to” (Chris Stein, “Multinational Force Fighting Boko Haram Gets Mixed Results,” *VOA*, July 15, 2016).

¹⁰⁹ The Cameroonian military spokesperson stated, “If everybody is playing his role in the zone, Boko Haram will finish” (Stein, 2016).

¹¹⁰ Nigeria’s 3,000 MNJTF troops were operating under national command—rather than the authority of the MNJTF commander—but they nevertheless worked together with troops of neighboring countries on several occasions (Assanvo, Abatan, and Sawadogo, 2016).

¹¹¹ Assanvo, Abatan, and Sawadogo, 2016; ICG, 2016e; Sawadogo, 2017; ICG, 2016b; U.S. State Department official, interview.

¹¹² Cameroon expert, interview.

cesses, and that the Cameroonian military at least was happy with the multinational effort.¹¹³

The overlapping national and regional efforts strained the staffing and financial resources of the MNJTF states. International funding pledged to support the force was both delayed and insufficient.¹¹⁴ In July 2017, Chad's president, Idriss Déby, warned that his country could not afford to fund all of its military efforts.¹¹⁵ Recognized as having one of the largest, best-trained, and best-equipped militaries in the Sahel, Chadian troops were deployed across multiple multinational operations in addition to the MNJTF.¹¹⁶ At its peak involvement in the MNJTF, Chad had 2,000 troops in Niger in 2016, but its contributions had decreased as the conflict along its northern border with Libya commanded increasing attention. In September 2017, Chad withdrew its remaining troops from the MNJTF in protest of an updated U.S. travel ban on its citizens.¹¹⁷ Nigeria's military was deployed in 28 of the country's 36 states in response to its own multiple internal security challenges. Several reports emphasized that Nigerian troops were over-stretched and exhausted.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Cameroon expert, interview.

¹¹⁴ Donors, including Nigeria and the EU, have pledged at least \$250 million to fight the insurgents, but that remains well short of the force's original projected budget of \$700 million.

¹¹⁵ These comments were made in the context of the creation of the new FC-G5S (Force conjointe du G5 Sahel), launched in July 2017 to fight terrorism in the Sahel subregion. Chad also had troops in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and President Déby stated that Chad could not afford troops in all three missions—FC-G5S, MNJTF, and MINUSMA (ISS, 2017b).

¹¹⁶ A significant increase in oil production since 2003 has allowed President Déby to build one of the Sahel's largest, best-trained, and best-equipped militaries—viewed by the United States and France as a key partner and staging base for counterterrorism operations throughout the region (ICG, 2017c, p. 18).

¹¹⁷ Wale Odunsi, "Boko Haram: Chad Withdraws Its Troops," *Daily Post Nigeria*, October 13, 2017. The level of Chad's engagement—significant or simply symbolic—at this period is disputed.

¹¹⁸ ICG, 2017f.

A final important security dynamic of note was the growth and spread of vigilante groups throughout the Lake Chad Basin to support the fight against Boko Haram.¹¹⁹ As early as 2013 in Maiduguri, Nigeria, local citizen groups played a major role in national security responses. They bolstered the region's overstretched militaries, filled security gaps, provided essential local knowledge and intelligence, and, perhaps more importantly, gave populations a chance to reconnect with state institutions when they might otherwise have looked to Boko Haram for protection.¹²⁰ On the flip side, vigilante groups have also provoked severe retribution by Boko Haram against local communities, committed abuses themselves, become involved in a war economy, and currently present a thorny demobilization challenge for the region's states. The ICG warned that the rise of vigilantism is "as much a long-term symptom of [and challenge for] state weakness in the Lake Chad basin as a short-term solution to it," especially in terms of the disappointing delivery of security and law and order.¹²¹

Humanitarian

As of October 2017, the Lake Chad Basin remained in a state of complex emergency. OCHA reported that 17 million people were living in affected areas, 2.3 million were still displaced in the region, and 10.9 million—or one in every two people—needed urgent humanitarian assistance.¹²² Northern Nigeria remained the worst-affected area, with 5 million people facing severe food insecurity and UN warnings

¹¹⁹ For extensive reporting on this dynamic, see ICG, *Watchmen of Lake Chad: Vigilante Groups Fighting Boko Haram*, Africa Report No. 244, February 23, 2017a; see also ICG, 2016b.

¹²⁰ ICG, 2016b, p. 7.

¹²¹ ICG, 2017a, p. 23.

¹²² These figures are from the September 2017 OCHA crisis update. The majority of the affected remained in Nigeria. The distribution of displacement numbers was as follows: Nigeria, 1.62 million; Cameroon, 306,000; Niger, 246,000; Chad, 126,000. The distribution of humanitarian need: Nigeria, 8.5 million; Cameroon, 1.6 million; Niger, 406,000; Chad, 345,000 (OCHA, "Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Overview [Sep 2017]," September 2017f; OCHA, "Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Overview," July 7, 2017e).

of famine in early 2017.¹²³ With limited resources and weak capacity, the Lake Chad states struggled to handle the humanitarian crisis, and, in some cases, state policies exacerbated the challenge. Early in the conflict, Niger and Chad pushed Nigerian refugees and nationals away from areas of Boko Haram control, sometimes forcibly, and have since prevented voluntary returns.¹²⁴ At the other extreme, reports cite incidents of forceful return, in which unwelcome displaced persons and refugees were compelled by state authorities to leave camps in Cameroon and Nigeria, regardless of the safety of their home and contrary to recent international agreements reaffirming the principle of voluntary repatriation.¹²⁵

International cooperation on the humanitarian front fell outside of the MNJTF's military-focused purview. In February 2017, the UN took some responsibility in this arena by setting up the Nigeria Humanitarian Fund (NHF) to address the crisis in northern Nigeria. The NHF is a country-based pooled fund managed by OCHA and meant to promote a stronger collective response of the more than 70 humanitarian organizations working to provide assistance in the region.¹²⁶ It aimed to attract \$50 million to \$80 million in support in its first year of operations to play "a vital role in ensuring an effective, coordinated, prioritized and principled humanitarian response." On the whole, international funding for humanitarian aid was inadequate for the scope of the crisis. A 2017 donor conference for the Lake Chad region, co-hosted by Germany, Nigeria, Norway, and the UN,

¹²³ In the wider Lake Chad Basin, 8.5 million faced severe food insecurity (ICG, "Instruments of Pain (IV): The Food Crisis in North East Nigeria," Africa Briefing No. 126, May 18, 2017e). The UN also flagged parts of Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen—in all, warning that 20 million lives were endangered (Jeffrey Gettleman, "Drought and War Heighten Threat of Not Just 1 Famine, but 4," *New York Times*, March 27, 2017).

¹²⁴ ICG, 2017b, pp. 14–15.

¹²⁵ In 2014 and 2015, Cameroon alone expelled more than 40,000 Nigerian refugees, mostly by force and in failure of international law (ICG, 2016e, p. 21). See also OCHA, "Lake Chad Basin Crisis Update 15 (May 2017)," May 9, 2017c; UN Secretary-General, 2017b; and Human Rights Watch, "They Forced Us onto Trucks Like Animals," September 27, 2017b.

¹²⁶ It is one of 18 country-based pooled funds currently active globally (OCHA, "Nigeria Humanitarian Fund, Info Sheet," March 2017a).

only raised about one-third of the \$1.5 billion in emergency funding sought.¹²⁷

Governance and Civil Administration

The governance failings that contributed to Boko Haram's rise—including oil-fed corruption, chronic mismanagement, growing inequalities between regions, and dysfunctional federalism—remained unresolved in 2017. The MNJTF had no role to play in addressing these challenges and, in some ways, was emblematic of the problem of exclusively relying on military measures to address complex challenges. Other regional organizations were potentially well positioned to support collective work toward improving governance around the Lake Chad region. One report especially faulted the Nigerian government for failure to enlist the support of ECOWAS and ECCAS to help rebuild civilian structures and institutions in areas that it had cleared militarily.¹²⁸ Indeed, the call for cooperation beyond military measures is repeated by many experts, with the Regional Economic Communities occasionally mentioned as the most appropriate—but, as of yet, untapped—source.¹²⁹

Democratization

As of 2017, it is hard to extrapolate how regional democratization trends have been affected by the Boko Haram conflict and regional response, if at all. In Nigeria, Buhari's 2015 defeat of Jonathan represented the first time that a sitting Nigerian president was democratically replaced. Buhari's reputation and regional engagement certainly contributed to the implementation of the MNJTF, and national democratic metrics have improved somewhat in successive years.¹³⁰ Never-

¹²⁷ UN Secretary-General, 2017b; Ben Quinn, "Donors Pledge \$672m at Oslo Summit to Avert Famine in Nigeria and Lake Chad," *The Guardian*, February 24, 2017.

¹²⁸ "US: Nigerian Military Unable to Hold Territories Recovered by MNJTF," 2017; Erunke, 2017.

¹²⁹ Cameroon expert, interview.

¹³⁰ Freedom House noted "significant improvements" in the competitiveness and quality of national elections and a general upward trend in 2015 and 2016, though political corruption

theless, concerns remained about the country's "fragile unity," given the pressure of fractious ruling elites, a difficult economy, still-endemic corruption, general discontent, and persistent unrest throughout the country.¹³¹ Among some, these concerns have reignited a debate on the future of Nigerian federalism.¹³² In Cameroon, President Biya's handling of the fight against Boko Haram was generally believed to have increased his popularity in the Far North and throughout the country.¹³³ Entering his 37th year in power, however, Biya's regime remained authoritarian, marked by aging political leadership.¹³⁴ In the struggle to address their many regional security challenges, including Boko Haram, both Niger's and Chad's governments appear to have regressed somewhat in favor of militarization and away from democratization.¹³⁵

Economic Reconstruction

Boko Haram's attacks have destroyed infrastructure throughout the Lake Chad basin, including health centers, markets, roads, and

remains endemic. In 2016, the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index placed Nigeria as a "hybrid regime," up from its previous designation as "authoritarian" (Freedom House, "Nigeria: Freedom in the World, 2017," 2017b; Economist Intelligence Unit, "Democracy Index 2016: Revenge of the 'Deplorables,'" *The Economist*, 2017a).

¹³¹ After some initial bumps, the conflict appears to have reinforced Cameroon President Paul Biya's leadership and boosted the legitimacy of the nation's military forces with parts of the population. Despite some criticism, many Cameroonians—and international actors—are satisfied with Biya's response to Boko Haram (Economist Intelligence Unit, "Nigeria's Fragile Unity Is Under Pressure," *The Economist*, July 12, 2017b).

¹³² There are also concerns about the ill health of President Buhari, who has been in the UK for medical treatment since May 2017 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017b).

¹³³ ICG, 2016e.

¹³⁴ Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017a. "Not free," according to Freedom House (Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2015," 2015, and Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2016," 2016c).

¹³⁵ Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017a. According to Freedom House, "Nigeria: Freedom in the World, 2016," 2016b, Niger was partly free, but it declined in 2016 because of repressive conditions surrounding the 2016 presidential and legislative elections, including harassment of the opposition and alleged serious ballot irregularities (Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2017," 2017a). The struggle to meet regional security challenges has served as an alibi for the government to restrict freedoms and civil liberties. According to Freedom House, 2016b, Chad is "not free, authoritarian."

schools, and the conflict economy has evolved in destructive ways.¹³⁶ In the short term, measures aimed at suppressing insurgent financing depressed local economies and achieved ambiguous counterinsurgency results: Boko Haram lost tributes from vanished trade flows but also appeared to have substituted increased raids on already economically stressed communities.¹³⁷ The region's countries have struggled to shift from a military-based approach to combating Boko Haram to a focus on socioeconomic development and state-building. Cooperation in these domains has been minimal.

The region's fundamental economic challenges—youth unemployment, lack of investment in border communities, corruption, and poor provision of basic services—remained and were only further exacerbated by the conflict's destruction and ensuing military costs. In Cameroon, the indirect costs of the Boko Haram conflict amounted to \$740 million a year, and promised development and emergency funds were a fraction of estimated needs—and were plagued by accusations of embezzlement.¹³⁸ Niger's participation placed a heavy burden on the country's already stressed public finances, diverting funds from social service investment to increase the military expenditure.¹³⁹ The two largest military contributors to the MNJTF, Nigeria and Chad, faced severe economic downturns when global oil prices plummeted in 2014 and again in 2015. This caused some to question the sustainability of the regional military response and undermined both nations' proposed development responses.¹⁴⁰ The governments and international donors

¹³⁶ Foucher, 2016; ICG, 2017c; ICG, 2017b; PSC, 2017a.

¹³⁷ ICG, 2017b, pp. 11, 14. According to President Mahamadou Issoufou, at a May 2016 conference, Niger's military expenditure has reportedly increased fifteenfold since 2010.

¹³⁸ Or \$2.2 billion total lost between 2014 and 2016. The government announced development projects in the Far North, but implementation has been delayed and limited in scale (ICG, 2016e, p. 20; Hans de Marie Heungoup, "The Humanitarian Fallout from Cameroon's Struggle Against Boko Haram," International Crisis Group, February 21, 2017, p. 27).

¹³⁹ ICG, 2017b.

¹⁴⁰ Sawadogo, 2017. Oil accounts for 95 percent of Nigeria's export revenue and as much as 80 percent of government revenue. Nigeria's economy grew by 3.2 percent in 2015, well below the average of 6 percent for the previous decade, in large part because of the falling global oil prices. In 2016, Nigeria released the Buhari Plan, which sought to integrate the

alike struggled to balance the competing priorities of providing short-term humanitarian aid and investing in long-term development.

Lessons Learned

The MNJTF is a unique adaption of the “coalition of the willing” intervention structure that has become increasingly prominent across the African continent.¹⁴¹ The force significantly contributed to more-effective regional military operations against Boko Haram; however, the failure of basin governments to subsequently “fill in” behind military victories and the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the region highlight the limitations of this model as a strategy for comprehensive conflict transformation. It offers both lessons and cautions for future ad hoc regional operations.

Operationally, the MNJTF's flexible framework facilitated cooperation among states confronting a common threat that were also historically mistrustful neighbors, jealous of their sovereign rights.¹⁴² The four-sector structure meant that national contingents operated primarily on their own territories, while the MNJTF headquarters facilitated vital information-sharing across contingents, established a venue for cross-national coordination, and created a lawful structure for joint efforts on neighboring territory. The result of iterative negotiations among affected states, the intervention was truly African-created and African-led. It did not resolve all tensions between the individual

government's humanitarian and reconstruction initiatives in the northeast, but little appears to have come from the initiative (Freedom House, 2016b). Few details are available about Chad's plan to coordinate its military response with development projects around the lake. Although substantial investment is required, Chad is a very poor country with many vulnerable communities. It may also be risky to focus excessively on the lake region if it angers other underdeveloped parts of the country (OCHA, 2017e, p. 28; ICG, 2016a; ICG, 2017c).

¹⁴¹ de Coning, Gelot, and Karlsrud, 2016, p. 124; Institute for Security Studies, 2017b.

¹⁴² Experts and observers described the force as an “effort dictated by pragmatism” or a “flexible and innovative collaboration between members states and between [regional organizations] that grew out of necessity and pragmatism” (Ndiaye, 2016, p. 60; Assanvo, Abatan, and Sawadogo, 2016, p. 6).

state actors, but the MNJTF suggests a pragmatic model for facilitating cooperation among African militaries facing similar transnational threats.

A key factor that influences the effectiveness of peace operations is predictable and sustainable financing.¹⁴³ The MNJTF case highlights the opportunities and challenges of financing multinational African missions in an ad hoc manner from diverse funding streams. The relationship with the AU in this regard is instructive. On the one hand, the AU provided crucial legitimacy that facilitated international fundraising. It sponsored donor conferences, (unsuccessfully) petitioned the UN for routinized financial support, and played a managing role coordinating international contributions. On the other hand, the AU's bureaucracy complicated the procurement and disbursement process of pledged funds, and, as of September 2017, significant amounts of promised contributions remained trapped in the organization's red tape. International donors did make contributions to the force and to individual MNJTF countries, but, in the end, the bulk of the force costs was borne by the troop-contributing states, who faced financial pressures at home and stress from simultaneous deployments to operations elsewhere across the continent. The reality of multiple deployments split Chad's attention and caused difficulties for Cameroon, when some of its forces deployed to the MNJTF were disgruntled that their participation in this multinational mission was not financially rewarded at the same level as their peers' service in other UN missions.¹⁴⁴ The latter anecdote highlights the challenging and, at times, distorted political economy of regional peacekeeping and the need for

¹⁴³ PSC, *Report on Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa*, 2016; Cedric de Coning, "The Need for a Strong UN–African Union Partnership for Peace in Africa," in *Complexity 4 Peace Operations*, 2016.

¹⁴⁴ In 2017, 30 Cameroon soldiers revolted. The creation of the MNJTF raised expectations among Cameroonian troops who believed that they would be paid as if on a UN operation. Their peers serving in the UN peacekeeping mission in CAR were getting an additional bonus of \$500 per month. When they were not similarly rewarded, the soldiers believed that their leaders were corruptly withholding their pay (Moki Edwin Kindzeka, "Cameroon Detains 30 of Its Soldiers Fighting Boko Haram," *VOA*, June 19, 2017). Cameroon also faced additional difficulties given the insurgency in its Anglophone region (Tim Cocks, "Anglophone Cameroon's Separatist Conflict Gets Bloodier," *Reuters*, June 1, 2018).

further consideration of the unintended consequences of using ad hoc interventions to address multinational challenges. International efforts to create adequate and routine financial structures—via the UN or, in time, by the AU—could help alleviate such pressure.

Ultimately, however, the regional approach to the Boko Haram threat suffered from a more fundamental challenge facing a wide range of missions—the lack of a holistic strategy to address the overlapping social, economic, and political drivers of the conflict. Most observers, including the AU, stressed that the region's military-heavy strategy did not and indeed could not conclusively resolve the insurgent threat or transform the challenging context that allowed its creation and expansion. Greater efforts are required to tackle corruption and state weakness, poverty, youth unemployment, and alienation among the peripheries—even as the appropriate mechanism for regional cooperation on such efforts remained ambiguous. We have not included the usual country statistical tables for this chapter because five states were involved, but only a small proportion of the territory and population of each was affected.

Comparative Analysis

This chapter provides further statistical data on the inputs and outcomes of countries that hosted the six African-led peace operations examined in this volume alongside similar information regarding the 18 U.S.-, UN-, and European-led operations covered in the first three volumes of this series. The African-led peace operations studied here are quite different from most of the interventions studied in previous volumes. The African-led missions were focused on addressing security outcomes and were not mandated or resourced to improve humanitarian, governance, democratization, and economic outcomes. They mostly rank along the lower end of the spectrum among post–Cold War multinational peace operations in size and availability of resources, yet several rank among the most demanding in regard to the challenges faced. Some missions had narrow mandates, such as improving security in the capital in the case of FOMUC in CAR. Our intention is not just to evaluate each mission against its specific mandate, but to also evaluate the mandate against the dimensions of the problem faced and the adequacy of the overall international response.

The outcomes of different societies experiencing a peace operation are not simply or even principally the product of resources applied. They also depend on the wisdom and consistency with which these are applied. They may depend on which organization is undertaking the operation: Peace operations led by African organizations may be seen as less “foreign” than those undertaken by the UN or European organizations. To be sure, neighboring countries that contributed to African-led peace operations were not always seen as having entirely

benevolent motives. Some strategies may work better in some societies than others. Levels of success are also influenced by indigenous factors, including the level of economic development, the ethnic or social divisions within the society, and the quality of local leadership. In some cases, even though outcome measures may indicate declining conditions, a mission may have prevented even worse outcomes from coming about. Although there is a necessary connection between the inputs provided by foreign interveners, several studies suggest that the level of resources expended, in terms of military strength and economic assistance over time, affects the chances of success.¹ We therefore analyze these factors to offer insight into how the international community can develop missions in the future.

Following on previous volumes, we tabulated the following measures of the input of African and other operations in the six cases examined in this volume:

- number of international troops per 1,000 inhabitants
- number of international police per 1,000 inhabitants
- length of the mission in months
- per capita foreign economic assistance in constant U.S. dollars.

We also trace the following metrics that provide an indication of the progress achieved in the five areas we observed (security, humanitarian relief, governance and civil society, democratization, and economic reconstruction):

- refugee returns
- growth in per capita GDP
- a qualitative assessment of representative government (Freedom House)
- estimated annual casualties
- the HDI score (UNDP)
- government effectiveness (World Bank)

¹ In addition to previous works in the RAND nation-building series, see also Doyle and Sambanis, 2006; and Paul D. Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure 1898–2012*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013.

- refugee population
- IDPs.

The data available to judge these six African missions are likely to be less reliable than for many of the other interventions. Some of the peace operations occurred in very weak states unable to collect reliable statistics. In some cases, such as Darfur, data-gathering in large part depended on the presence of an international mission, which was always limited. In the case of the MNJTF mission in the Lake Chad Basin, the peace operation covered an area stretching across different countries and regions that was neither clearly defined nor carefully surveyed. We recognize the many challenges in collecting and presenting data from these conflicts but present the information nevertheless because it helps to provide a sense of scale of the challenges faced, the level of ambition of these missions, the adequacy of the overall international response, and the associated outcomes.


Security

Military Presence

As Figures 8.1 and 8.2 indicate, peak African troop levels varied greatly in different operations.² The largest by far was AMISOM in Soma-

² In three cases, leadership transitioned between continuous lead actors: In Bosnia in 2004, the EU (EUFOR) assumed responsibility from the United States/NATO (IFOR/SFOR); in Burundi in 2004, the UN (ONUB) assumed responsibility from the AU (AMIB); and in Darfur in 2008, the UN/AU hybrid mission (UNAMID) assumed responsibility from the AU (AMIS). In Bosnia, U.S./NATO forces deployed under IFOR/SFOR peaked at 60,000 in 1995, while those deployed under the EU mission (EUFOR) peaked at 5,700 in 2005. In Darfur, AU forces deployed under AMIS peaked at 5,874 in 2006, while those deployed under the joint AU-UN mission (UNAMID) peaked at 17,778 in 2012. In Burundi, AU military troops deployed under AMIB peaked at 3,128 in 2004, while those deployed under the UN mission (ONUB) peaked at 5,400 in 2005. In four cases, European or African forces operated coincidentally with—but as distinct missions from—an ongoing UN operation: In Sierra Leone, UK forces operated alongside UN forces; in Côte d’Ivoire, French forces operated alongside UN forces; in the DRC, EU forces operated alongside UN forces; and in CAR, AU forces operated alongside UN forces. In each of these cases, the UN forces (and, indeed, total forces) peaked years after the European or African forces peaked. Note that


Figure 8.1
Peak Military Presence (Number of Troops Deployed)



SOURCES: Dobbins et al., 2008; Center on International Cooperation, 2008; International Peace Institute, undated; and summary tables in Chapters Two through Seven.

NOTE: See footnote 2 for details regarding missions involving contiguous and overlapping national and international contingents.

Figure 8.2
Peak Military Presence (Number of Troops Deployed per 1,000 Inhabitants)



SOURCES: Dobbins et al., 2008; Center on International Cooperation, 2008; International Peace Institute, undated; and summary tables in Chapters Two through Seven.

NOTES: See footnote 2 for details regarding missions involving contiguous and overlapping national and international contingents. Per capita military presence for the Lake Chad Basin has been excluded because of the difficulty of attributing MNJTF presence to subnational regions.

lia, which dwarfed the other African-led missions, with the exception of the hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur. The peak troop levels in the non-Somalia missions reached comparable overall levels with other UN-led missions, ranging from the low thousands to nearly 20,000. On a per capita basis, the African-led missions were on the low side of the spectrum, more comparable with the smaller EU missions than the majority of UN missions or the much larger American-led operations. The largest on a per capita basis was the 1,800-person mission in the Comoros, showing how in some smaller African countries the smaller African-led missions can offer a sizable force relative to the size of the country.

Civilian Police

Significant numbers of civilian police were deployed in CAR, Darfur (especially with the hybrid UN/AU mission), and Somalia (see Figure 8.3). Indeed, the number of civilian police in Darfur translated into a per capita presence higher than many U.S., UN, and EU missions (see Figure 8.4). However, as shown in Figure 8.5, the police-to-military ratio was quite low for Burundi, the Comoros, and Somalia.


Duration of Operations

African-led missions are on the longer side of the spectrum of the overall nation-building efforts, as shown in Figure 8.6.³ This trend likely

in Sierra Leone, the peak UK troop level occurred in 2000, while the peak UN troop level occurred in 2002; the total troop level peaked in 2002, when approximately 100 UK troops were deployed alongside 17,368 UN troops. In Côte d'Ivoire, the peak French troop level occurred in 2007, while the peak UN troop level occurred in 2011. In the DRC, the peak EU troop level occurred in 2006, while the peak UN troop level occurred in 2014. And in CAR, the peak AU troop level occurred in 2014, while the peak UN troop level occurred in 2016.

³ Duration data are rounded up to the next whole year; for instance, if an operation lasted four years and three months, it is counted as five years. Duration data only count major peacekeeping operations; they do not count smaller political and security advisory and training missions. Several European-led and African-led missions overlapped with or were contiguous with major UN-led peacekeeping missions. Overlapping missions (Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, the DRC, and CAR) are illustrated as adjacent bars. Contiguous missions (Bosnia, Burundi, and Darfur) are illustrated as stacked bars. More specifically, in Sierra Leone, the UN mission began in July 1998 and ended in December 2005; the UK mission began in


Figure 8.3
Peak Civilian Police Presence (Number of Police Deployed)



SOURCES: Dobbins et al., 2008; Center on International Cooperation, 2008; International Peace Institute, undated; and summary tables in Chapters Two through Seven.

NOTES: In the U.S.-led missions in Germany, Japan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, no civilian police were deployed (except in advisory roles). All the civilian police in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire were from the UN, not European-led missions. In the DRC, the EU deployed a small police contingent of a few dozen personnel alongside the much larger UN one; the UN police presence in the DRC peaked in 2013. In CAR, civilian police deployed under AU's MISCA mission peaked at 880 in 2014, while police deployed under the much larger follow-on UN mission (MINUSCA) peaked at about 1,700 in 2017. In Darfur, civilian police deployed under AU's AMIS mission peaked at 1,456 in 2006, while police deployed under the much larger follow-on UN/AU hybrid mission (UNAMID) peaked at 5,228 in 2011. No civilian police were deployed to Burundi under the AU's AMIB mission; subsequently, 97 police deployed under the UN's ONUB mission in 2005. In the Lake Chad Basin, no police are deployed as part of MNJTF.

Figure 8.4
Peak Civilian Police Presence (Number of Police Deployed per 1,000 Inhabitants)




SOURCES: Dobbins et al., 2008; Center on International Cooperation, 2008; International Peace Institute, undated; and summary tables in Chapters Two through Seven.

NOTES: In the U.S.-led missions in Germany, Japan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, no civilian police were deployed (except in advisory roles). All the civilian police in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire were from the UN, not European-led missions. In the DRC, the EU deployed a small police contingent of a few dozen personnel alongside the much larger UN one; the UN police presence in the DRC peaked in 2013. In CAR, civilian police deployed under AU's MISCA mission peaked at 880 in 2014, while police deployed under the much larger follow-on UN mission (MINUSCA) peaked at about 1,700 in 2017. In Darfur, civilian police deployed under AU's AMIS mission peaked at 1,456 in 2006, while police deployed under the much larger follow-on UN/AU hybrid mission (UNAMID) peaked at 5,228 in 2011. No civilian police were deployed to Burundi under the AU's AMIB mission; subsequently, 97 police deployed under the UN's ONUB mission in 2005. In the Lake Chad Basin, no police are deployed as part of MNJTF.

Figure 8.5


Peak Police-to-Military Ratio (Number of Police Deployed per 1,000 Troops)



SOURCES: Dobbins et al., 2008; Center on International Cooperation, 2008; International Peace Institute, undated; and summary tables in Chapters Two through Seven.

NOTES: For Sierra Leone, the ratio is based on the peak total of UN and UK troops deployed in 2002 versus the peak of UN police deployed in 2004. For Côte d'Ivoire, the ratio is based on the peak total of UN and French troops deployed in 2007 versus the peak of UN police deployed in 2013. For DRC, the ratio is based on the peak of UN troops deployed in 2014 versus the peak of UN police deployed in 2013. For Burundi, the ratio is based on the peak of UN troops deployed in 2005 versus the peak of UN police deployed in 2005. For CAR, the ratio is based on the peak of UN troops deployed in 2016 versus the peak of UN police deployed in 2016. For Darfur, the ratio is based on the peak of UN/AU hybrid troops deployed in 2012 versus the peak of UN/AU hybrid police deployed in 2011.

Figure 8.6
Duration of Operations (Years)



* Indicates ongoing operation. Duration data are current through mid-2018.
 NOTE: See footnote 3 for details regarding duration data and mission overlap.

reflects the deep and lingering challenges facing the societies in which these missions occurred. One interpretation of the longevity of African-led missions may be the difficulty in deploying a sufficiently large mission to strongly address the challenges in the society. Nevertheless, the larger missions in Somalia and the hybrid mission in Darfur both had lasted for more than ten years as of mid-2018. In both cases, the UN and the AU were struggling with exit options. Burundi and the Comoros represent alternative experiences, where shorter-duration missions were feasible because of the more-favorable circumstances on the ground.

Refugee Returns


One core metric of security success is the return of refugees. We used refugee return information combined from several databases to gain some indication of the overall refugee flows. There were more refugees after five years than when the mission began in CAR and Somalia and only partial refugee return in Burundi (Figure 8.7). These statistics, while inexact, reflect the ongoing conflict in these societies. We could not find appropriate data in the cases of the Lake Chad Basin and Sudan that would have allowed a comparison with other missions. There were practically no refugees in the case of the Comoros.

Enduring Peace

In Table 8.1, we note whether there was sustainable peace, drawing from the definition and data set developed by Monty G. Marshall, Ted

May 2000 and was concluded by the end of 2000, though a small number of British advisors remained for over a decade. In Côte d'Ivoire, the French mission began in September 2002 and concluded in January 2015; the UN peacekeeping mission began in April 2004, replacing the UN political mission that had been in place before that, and concluded in 2017. In the DRC, the UN mission began in November 1999 and is ongoing; European troops were deployed to the country for two periods: June–September 2003 and July–November 2006. In Burundi, two African-led missions were deployed between 2001 and 2004; they were succeeded by a UN peacekeeping mission from June 2004 to December 2006. In CAR, multiple African-led missions deployed between 2002 and 2014; these have overlapped with an increasingly robust UN peacekeeping presence. However, data from these missions are likely to be of lower reliability than the other nation-building missions.

Figure 8.7
Refugee Returns After Five Years (Percentage)



SOURCES: Dobbins et al., 2008; UNHCR, 2017.

NOTES: Germany and Japan are excluded because all refugees were stranded as a result of offensive operations by a state military or deliberate government colonization, not civilians fleeing a conflict. Belgian Congo is excluded because there were insufficient data. Comoros is excluded because the number of refugees was negligible (fewer than 100 in the first year of intervention). The Lake Chad Basin countries are excluded because reliable figures could not be aggregated for the districts affected by the Boko Haram conflict. Darfur is excluded because reliable subnational data could not be obtained.

Robert Gurr, and Barbara Harff.⁴ Sustained peace was rarer in the six African-led cases than in the prior nation-building cases, with only the Comoros and Burundi experiencing sustained peace and the other five cases experiencing a degree of continued conflict. This observation reflects the fact that African-led operations tended to occur in more-difficult circumstances—for instance, when a UN mission was not attempted because of ongoing conflict or the lack of a peace agreement to deploy. CAR and Darfur remained at conflict even when a larger UN mission was deployed, while Somalia and the Lake Chad Basin continued to experience conflict despite the sustained presence of African-led missions.

Economic Reconstruction

Per Capita External Assistance

In Figure 8.8, we use official development aid as reported by the World Bank in constant 2000 U.S. dollars to judge the financial assistance provided to countries with African-led operations as compared with past missions. Most African-led missions had significantly lower per capita assistance compared with other missions, including other UN and EU missions in Africa. The higher per capita aid was received by the Comoros and Somalia, likely due to the small size of the Comoros and the international importance of Somalia and AMISOM, which received significant financial aid from the EU. CAR, one of the poorest countries in the world, received the second smallest, \$13 in per capita assistance per year. No figures are available for Darfur and the Lake Chad Basin, so we provide Sudan and Nigeria as proxies, but these do not reflect aid provided in these regions. These figures are notable in comparison with the far more generous assistance provided to nation-building efforts in Europe, which averaged more than \$100 per capita per year.

⁴ Marshall, Gurr, and Harff, 2017.

Table 8.1
Sustained Peace (2017)

Operation	Country	Sustained Peace (2017)
United States	Germany	Yes
United States	Japan	Yes
United States	Somalia (I)	No
United States	Haiti	Yes
U.S./NATO	Bosnia (I)	Yes
U.S./NATO	Kosovo	Yes
U.S./NATO	Afghanistan	No
United States	Iraq	No
UN	Belgian Congo	No
UN	Namibia	Yes
UN	El Salvador	Yes
UN	Cambodia	Yes
UN	Mozambique	Yes
UN	Eastern Slavonia	Yes
UN	East Timor	Yes
Europe	Albania	Yes
Europe	Sierra Leone	Yes
Europe	Macedonia	Yes
Europe	Côte d'Ivoire	Yes
Europe	DRC	No
Europe	Bosnia (II)	Yes
Africa	Burundi	Yes
Africa	CAR	No
Africa	Darfur/Sudan	No
Africa	Comoros	Yes
Africa	Somalia (II)	No

Table 8.1—continued

NOTES: The Lake Chad Basin case has been excluded from this table because scores for multiple countries could not be aggregated in a meaningful way. As of the end of 2017, intrastate conflict remained active in six of the countries contained in this table: Afghanistan, CAR, Darfur/Sudan, the DRC, Iraq, and Somalia. Additionally, although the Lake Chad Basin case does not appear in this table, armed conflict by and against Boko Haram continues there. By definition, these countries have not experienced sustained peace. Additionally, it should be noted that two countries (Burundi and Haiti) are also at peace at the time of this writing, but they experienced brief returns to violence after the departures of U.S.-led and African-led peacekeeping missions in 1996 and 2004, respectively.

SOURCES: Dobbins et al., 2008; Marshall, Gurr, and Harff, 2017.


Per Capita GDP Growth

Economic growth in the wake of the three African-led operations, where statistics were available, was low to negative, reflecting the lower aid levels that these missions attracted (Figure 8.9).

Democratization

The African societies that experienced African-led missions were generally less democratic in 2018 than the other societies that experienced interventions by the United States, UN, and Europe, including other UN- and European-led mission in Africa (Table 8.2). Although the Comoros and Nigeria were rated as “partly free” according to Freedom House rankings, Burundi, CAR, Darfur, and Somalia were all rated as not free, with the latter three getting the worst possible ranking by Freedom House. It is notable that, for the most part, the African-led missions studied in this volume did not include substantial efforts in developing democracy and governance, although, in several cases, they did provide security for the existing leadership, secured elections, prevented coups, and prevented separatism, as in the Comoros. The comparatively poor democracy ratings for countries reflect that African organizations take on the least-promising missions.

Figure 8.8
Average Annual Per Capita Assistance Over First Two Years of Operations (2000 U.S. Dollars)




SOURCES: Dobbins et al., 2008; World Bank, 2018b.

NOTES: Per capita aid to Germany is aid to the U.S. sector only. Subnational ODA data for the Darfur region were not available, so Darfur has been excluded. ODA data for areas of the Lake Chad Basin affected by armed conflict with Boko Haram could also not be obtained, so this case is excluded. ODA in current dollars has been converted to constant 2000 U.S. dollars using the GDP deflator.

Figure 8.9

Average Annual Growth in Per Capita GDP Over the First Five Years of Operations (Percentage)



SOURCES: Dobbins et al., 2008; IMF, 2017; World Bank, 2018b.

NOTES: Reliable GDP data were not available for Somalia, Darfur, and Eastern Slavonia, so they are not included in this figure. Data could not meaningfully be aggregated for the Lake Chad Basin countries, so that case has been excluded as well.

Table 8.2
Level of Freedom (2018)

Operation	Country	First Year of Intervention	Freedom Rating (2018)	Freedom House Score (2018)	Freedom House Score (Year 1, or earliest available <i>in italics</i>)	Change in Freedom House Score (Year 1 to 2018)
United States	Germany	1945	Free	1.0	<i>1.5 (1998)</i>	0.5
United States	Japan	1945	Free	1.0	<i>1.5 (1998)</i>	0.5
United States	Somalia (I)	1992	Not free	7.0	<i>7.0 (1999)</i>	0.0
United States	Haiti	1994	Partly free	5.0	<i>5.0 (1998)</i>	0.0
U.S./NATO	Bosnia (I)	1995	Partly free	4.0	<i>5.0 (1998)</i>	0.0
U.S./NATO	Kosovo	1999	Partly free	3.5	5.0	1.5
U.S./NATO	Afghanistan	2001	Not free	5.5	7.0	1.5
United States	Iraq	2003	Not free	5.5	7.0	1.5
UN	Belgian Congo	1960	Not free	6.5	<i>6.5 (1998)</i>	0.0
UN	Namibia	1989	Free	2.0	<i>2.5 (1999)</i>	0.5
UN	El Salvador	1991	Free	2.5	<i>2.5 (1999)</i>	0.0
UN	Cambodia	1991	Not free	5.5	<i>6.0 (1998)</i>	0.5
UN	Mozambique	1992	Partly free	4.0	<i>3.5 (1999)</i>	-0.5
UN	Eastern Slavonia	1996	Free	1.5	<i>4.0 (1998)</i>	2.5
UN	East Timor	1999	Free	2.5	5.0	2.5
Europe	Albania	1997	Partly free	3.0	<i>4.5 (1998)</i>	1.5
Europe	Sierra Leone	1998	Partly free	3.0	4.0	1.0
Europe	Macedonia	2001	Partly free	3.5	3.5	0.0
Europe	Côte d'Ivoire	2002	Partly free	4.0	4.5	0.5

Table 8.2—continued

Operation	Country	First Year of Intervention	Freedom Rating (2018)	Freedom House Score (2018)	Freedom House Score (Year 1, or earliest available <i>in italics</i>)	Change in Freedom House Score (Year 1 to 2018)
Europe	DRC	1999	Not free	6.5	6.5	0.0
Europe	Bosnia (II)	2004	Partly free	4.0	4.0	0.0
Africa	Burundi	2001	Not free	6.5	6.0	–0.5
Africa	CAR	2002	Not free	7.0	5.0	–2.0
Africa	Sudan/Darfur	2004	Not free	7.0	7.0	0.0
Africa	Comoros	2006	Partly free	3.5	4.0	0.5
Africa	Somalia (II)	2007	Not free	7.0	7.0	0.0

NOTES: The Lake Chad Basin case has been excluded from this table because scores for multiple countries could not be aggregated in a meaningful way. Freedom House scores range from 1 (free) to 7 (not free). 1998 is the first year for which Freedom House scores are available. In cases where the intervention came before 1998, we have added the data in 1998 or 1999 in italics. Freedom House scores were not available for the subnational regions of Eastern Slavonia and Darfur, so those for Croatia and Sudan, respectively, have been used as proxies. In Appendix Table A.5, we also present data from the Polity score, which are broadly comparable to these results.

SOURCES: Dobbins et al., 2008; Freedom House, "Freedom in the World," 2018a.

African Peace Operations in Context

The analyses in this chapter suggest several observations regarding African institutions' role in peace operations. First, African-led missions tended to be less well-resourced than U.S.-, UN-, or EU-led missions, with the exception of missions that benefited from substantial outside support, such as Somalia or Darfur. Nevertheless, African missions were substantially less expensive than equivalent UN missions would have been, given the UN's higher reimbursement rates for

peacekeeping forces alone.⁵ African-led peace operations also had generally lower levels of civilian police and economic assistance, even in the larger missions. Part of the reason for the relatively lower number of civilian police is that African missions tended to be mainly responsible for the provision of security, while other UN, nongovernmental organization, or bilateral missions were responsible for police training, economic development, and humanitarian assistance. Still, some of the figures in this chapter reflect the fact that there was a relatively small overall international contribution to African societies facing severe conflict. It would appear that even when the international community is willing to commit resources to facilitate a large military presence in Africa, it is not necessarily equally willing to commit the resources necessary for political and economic reconstruction that might reduce the risk of future conflict.

Second, African-led missions varied in duration, from a few years in the Comoros and Burundi to more than a decade in Darfur and Somalia. In CAR, a combination of AU, UN, and EU missions (in some cases simultaneous) extended the time frame of the mission. In Burundi, a UN mission followed on from the AU mission, while the AU mission in Darfur transitioned into a hybrid AU/UN mission. The variation in duration likely reflects the diversity of the mandate and objectives of African-led peace operations, which, in part, reflected the varying challenges facing particular societies and the willingness of the international community to contribute resources to address a conflict.

Third, there were highly variable levels of improvement in the outcome indicators and a looser link between the activities of African-led peace operations and the outcomes of particular societies. Missions in the Comoros and Burundi largely achieved the goals set out in their mandates, but outcome indicators in CAR, Somalia, and Darfur generally declined despite the presence of African-led peace operations. African-led missions in societies such as CAR and Somalia had mandates and associated resources that were limited to security tasks and could not significantly contribute to broader economic, humanitarian,

⁵ Interviews with U.S. and UN officials, Washington, D.C., and New York, December 2017.

and democratization goals. Even where the security situation declined while an African mission was present, as in CAR, the situation would likely have been worse without them. The poor outcomes in societies such as CAR, Somalia, and Darfur do not imply problems with the activities of African missions but instead reflect the imbalance between the challenges on the ground and the overall international efforts that were deployed to address them. The lack of progress achieved in economic, humanitarian, and democratization goals reflects not just the modest resources that African missions have had to work with but also the limited commitments made by other elements of the international community.

Fourth, data availability was a far greater challenge for African-led peace operations than for previous nation-building efforts. Gathering data was particularly problematic for cases where the zone of conflict was not contiguous with nation-states, as in Darfur and the Lake Chad Basin. In other cases, basic statistics were not available for all years, such as GDP growth in Somalia. Where data were available, they were not perceived as especially reliable. Better data collection in future interventions will be helpful to better evaluate and improve these missions.

Conclusions

Since the turn of the century, African institutions have assumed an increasing share of the responsibility for peace and security within that continent. The six case studies contained herein highlight the diversity of these African-led peace support operations—from Burundi, where there was a UN-style peace operation mandated and executed by the AU; to the Comoros, where African countries deployed less than 2,000 soldiers to suppress a separatist revolt; to Somalia, where a force of up to 22,000 African-led troops has for eight years and counting conducted combat operations against an al Qaeda–affiliated insurgency. In the most successful cases, including the Comoros and Burundi, African-led operations resolved the most-immediate security challenges and either left behind a society at peace or set the stage for a larger follow-on UN mission. In Somalia and the Lake Chad Basin, African-led counterinsurgency operations have improved security and reduced areas under extremist control. In CAR and Darfur, African-led operations helped protect civilians but failed to stem the conflicts.

These six case studies are not representative of wider trends in the African continent. During the two decades covered by this report, much of Africa experienced rapid economic growth, especially in Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Rwanda. Many countries have also consolidated their democratic institutions, including Ghana, Senegal, and South Africa.¹ Despite economic and social progress, parts of the African

¹ These countries, for example, were rated as “free” by Freedom House (Freedom House, “Sub-Saharan Africa,” 2018b; Brookings Institution, “Taxonomy of Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP Growth in 2015–18 Versus 1995–2008,” 2018).

continent still face persistent violent conflict. The case studies point to several causes: ethnic and separatist divisions, as in Burundi and the Comoros; Islamist extremist movements, such as those in Somalia and the Lake Chad Basin; and, underlying all these cases, poverty, weak institutions, and pervasive hardship. Environmental change, driven by global warming, is also likely a factor—and one that will only become worse.²

A division of labor regarding peace operations, including the UN, the AU, subregional organizations, and other international partners, has emerged to address these issues. Given its greater financial and logistical resources, stemming from its ability to assess contributions from a much larger and wealthier pool of member states, the UN often remains in charge of the larger peace operations on the African continent. The AU and African subregional organizations often take responsibility for conflicts that the UN declines to address on the grounds that there is no peace to keep, such as Somalia, and conflicts that African institutions have the ability to resolve on their own, as in the case of the Comoros. This produces the anomalous result that the less financially or logistically well-resourced are sometimes left to deal with some of the most intractable conflicts and helps explain the eclectic range of African-led operations examined in this report.

African-led missions have usually depended on a network of non-African sources for funding, training, equipping, and some forms of logistical support. These have been supplied by the UN, the EU, and, to a lesser degree, the United States. Some missions also benefit from combat support and counterterrorism operations conducted in parallel by Western countries, notably the United States and France. Such dependencies can add complexity and uncertainty to the conduct of African-led operations because international partners may be slow to make decisions and have shifting priorities.

At the same time, assistance from international partners, both through financial support and in-kind contributions, has enabled

² Laura Freeman, "Environmental Change, Migration, and Conflict in Africa: A Critical Examination of the Interconnections," *Journal of Environment & Development*, Vol. 26, No. 4, September 2017, pp. 351–374.

African-led peace operations to meet shared priorities, such as combating violent extremism. International partners rely on African-led peace operations to undertake difficult missions that would be impractical for other institutions. The collaboration between the international community and African institutions to develop Africa's capacity for peace operations means that African countries and institutions can be more responsible for solving African problems and enables them to contribute to the larger agenda of the international community.

The case studies in this volume illustrate several comparative advantages of African-led missions. They have been able to deploy rapidly and have been willing to accept significant risks. African institutions can possess better insights into conflict dynamics, put peer pressure on local leaders, and constructively involve immediate neighbors. Yet African-led missions are not able to mobilize the same level of resources as the UN or other interveners. Analysts and officials with whom we spoke frequently noted gaps in African command and control, planning, sustainment, training, and doctrine, although they also noted gains in many of these areas.³ African-led missions tended to focus on immediate security needs and have been unable to deploy significant numbers of civilian police or engage in resource-intensive efforts to build democratic governments or encourage economic growth. African institutions have expressed an ambition to use the full suite of conflict management tools, including conflict mediation, stabilization, civilian policing, human rights observation, and SSR. However, international partners have contributed less to the development of this broader suite of African capabilities, and, in the peace operations studied above, these tasks were often undertaken by non-African missions. Gaps in the overall international provision of civil and economic assistance meant that there was generally little progress in non-security challenges and made it more difficult to consolidate security gains.

Regional solidarity is the greatest asset that African institutions bring to the conduct of peace operations. This characteristic is all the more striking when contrasted with the absence of such collaboration among states in the other regions presently burdened with widespread

³ Interviews with analysts and UN officials, New York, December 2017.

civil strife, such as the Middle East. In that region, members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab League, and even the Gulf Cooperation Council are all at loggerheads, often going so far as to support civil strife in neighboring societies rather than cooperating to stamp it down. By contrast, the AU and the subregional organizations are models of collegiality. African countries do not all agree with one another but instead have established effective consultation processes. They are also able to form ad hoc coalitions to pursue the shared interests of countries. The ability of African countries to resolve their differences and create a modicum of regional unity carries over into the wider world. The UNSC acts with a fair degree of unanimity in addressing threats to security throughout sub-Saharan Africa while showing itself powerless to end the multiple conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa.

More needs to be done to marry regional solidarity with greater resources and organizational capacity. This requires continued efforts to strengthen the capability of the AU and the subregional organizations. Interviewed analysts and officials repeatedly identified the lack of funds as the basis for nearly all other problems facing the AU, such as a lack of personnel and bureaucratic capacity problems in the AU's headquarters and the AU's dependence on foreign donors for all but the smallest missions. The AU has, however, agreed upon a clear solution to the problem of funding: the 0.2-percent levy on all imports to the continent. Opposition by the United States has been a principal reason for the failure to implement this tariff. The U.S. government should consider providing a waiver or special authorization by the WTO to allow this funding source to be tapped.

The United States, EU, and UN have repeatedly deployed advisors to work with the AU and subregional organizations to increase bureaucratic capacity. The perception of mixed success has led to some skepticism among UN officials that additional investment in bureaucratic capacity-building would lead to substantial improvements. But there are examples of advisors making progress. Interviewees indicated the need for adopting a longer-term approach, following African priorities rather than perceived Western needs, and identifying ways to articulate African concepts for operations rather than replicating UN

or other Western-informed doctrine.⁴ Even as foreign interlocutors remain dissatisfied with the bureaucratic development within the AU, the AU's overall capacity for peace operations has clearly grown, as it has executed a range of large, complex missions, such as AMISOM.

The case studies highlight the importance of collaboration between African missions and the UN. In some cases, this has occurred sequentially, with an AU mission preparing the way for a UN mission, as in Burundi. In other instances, the UN provides in-kind support to AU operations, as in Somalia, by taking over entire functions, such as logistics. Building on these experiences, the two organizations should develop two or three basic templates for their collaboration from which the most appropriate can be selected and put in place from the beginning, rather than leaving such arrangements to be worked out anew each time, thereby creating uncertainty and delay in response and/or implementation. In particular, more use could be made of the hybrid model exemplified in Darfur, although not necessarily employing the same division of labor. When the mission involves extended combat operations, as in Somalia, it may make more sense for the AU to lead operationally, with the UN providing logistics, police, and other civilian assets.

⁴ In-person and phone interviews with UN officials, U.S. official, and U.S. advisor, New York and Washington, D.C., November–December 2017.

Nation-Building Supporting Data

Tables A.1 through A.7 present supporting data on mission characteristics, troop and police levels, population statistics, casualties, and outcomes for African-, European-, U.S./NATO-, and UN-led missions. This appendix builds on case data collected in three previous volumes of the RAND History of Nation-Building Series:

- James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, and Anga R. Timilsina, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MR-1753-RC, 2003.
- James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga R. Timilsina, *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-304-RC, 2005.
- James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivvis, Andrew Radin, F. Stephen Larrabee, Nora Bensahel, Brooke Stearns Lawson, and Benjamin W. Goldsmith, *Europe's Role in Nation-Building: From the Balkans to the Congo*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-722-RC, 2008.

Where applicable, data have been updated for cases that were ongoing at the time these earlier volumes were published.

Table A.1
Mission Information

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Duration (Years)	Mission Start	Mission End	Mission Name(s)	Ending Event
U.S.	Germany	10	8-May-45	5-May-55	Allied Occupation of Germany	Bonn-Paris conventions ratified
U.S.	Japan	7	2-Sep-45	28-Apr-52	Allied Occupation of Japan	San Francisco Peace Treaty
U.S.	Somalia (I)	3	8-Dec-92	3-Mar-95	UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II, Unified Task Force, Operation Restore Hope, Operation Continue Hope, Operation United Shield	UNOSOM II ends
U.S.	Haiti	2	19-Sept-94	30-Jun-96	UNMIH, Operation Uphold Democracy, Operation New Horizons	UNMIH ends
U.S.	Bosnia (I)	9	14-Dec-95	2-Dec-04	IFOR, SFOR, UNMIBH, UNPREDEP, Operation Essential Fox, Operation Amber Fox, Operation Allied Harmony	EUFOR assumes responsibility
U.S.	Kosovo	19*	3-Jun-99	Ongoing	KFOR, UNMIK, Operation Allied Force	n/a
U.S.	Afghanistan	17*	22-Dec-01	Ongoing	NATO ISAF, Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Freedom's Sentinel, Operation Resolute Support	n/a
U.S.	Iraq	9	1-May-03	15-Dec-11	Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation New Dawn	Operation New Dawn ends
UN	Belgian Congo	4	18-Jul-60	30-Jun-64	ONUC	ONUC ends

Table A.1—continued

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Duration (Years)	Mission Start	Mission End	Mission Name(s)	Ending Event
UN	Namibia	1	1-Apr-89	21-Mar-90	UNTAG	UNTAG ends
UN	El Salvador	4	26-Jul-91	30-Apr-95	ONUSAL	ONUSAL ends
UN	Cambodia	2	16-Oct-91	24-Sept-93	UNAMIC, UNTAC	UNAMIC ends
UN	Mozambique	2	16-Dec-92	9-Dec-94	ONUMOZ	ONUMOZ ends
UN	Eastern Slavonia	2	15-Jan-96	15-Jan-98	UNTAES	UNTAES ends
UN	East Timor	14	25-Oct-99	31-Dec-12	UNTAET, UNMISSET, UNOTIL, UNMIT	UNMIT ends
Europe	Albania	1	15-Apr-97	12-Aug-97	Operation Alba	Operation Alba ends
Europe	Sierra Leone	8	13-Jul-98	31-Dec-05	UNAMSIL, UNOMSIL, Operation Palliser, Operation Barras	UNAMSIL ends
Europe	Macedonia	5	22-Aug-01	15-Dec-05	Operation Essential Harvest, Operation Amber Fox, EU Concordia, EU Police Mission Proxima	EU Police Mission Proxima ends
Europe	Côte d'Ivoire	15	22-Sep-02	30-Jun-17	Operation Licorne, UNOCI, MINUCI, ONUCI, ECOMICI	UNOCI ends
Europe	DRC	19*	30-Nov-99	Ongoing	MONUC, MONUSCO, IEMF/Operation Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo,	n/a

Table A.1—continued

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Duration (Years)	Mission Start	Mission End	Mission Name(s)	Ending Event
Europe	Bosnia (II)	14*	2-Dec-04	Ongoing	EUFOR/Operation Althea	n/a
Africa	Burundi	7	27-Oct-01	31-Dec-06	SAPSD, AMIB, ONUB	ONUB ends
Africa	Central African Republic	16*	4-Dec-02	Ongoing	FOMUC, MICOPAX, MISCA, MINURCA, MINURCAT, MINUSCA, EUFOR RCA, Operation Boali, Operation Sangaris	n/a
Africa	Darfur	14*	30-Jul-04	Ongoing	AMIS, UNAMID	n/a
Africa	Comoros	3	16-Apr-06	30-Oct-08	AMISEC, MAES, Operation Democracy in the Comoros	MAES ends
Africa	Somalia (II)	12*	20-Feb-07	Ongoing	AMISOM	n/a
Africa	Lake Chad Basin	4*	29-Jan-15	Ongoing	MNJTF	n/a

* Indicates that these cases are ongoing; data for these missions were current as of mid-2018.

Table A.2
Troop Information

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Lead Country or Organization	Peak Number of Troops	Peak Year	Peak-Year Population (millions)	Peak Troops per 1,000 Inhabitants
U.S.	Germany ^a	U.S.	1,622,000	1945	18.2	89.3
U.S.	Japan	U.S.	354,675	1945	72.2	4.9
U.S.	Somalia (I)	U.S.	37,000	1992	6.5	5.7
U.S.	Haiti	U.S.	21,000	1994	7.3	2.9
U.S.	Bosnia (I) ^b	U.S./NATO	60,000	1995	3.4	17.5
U.S.	Kosovo	U.S./NATO	43,728	2000	2.3	19.3
U.S.	Afghanistan	U.S./NATO	132,000	2011	4.4	29.7
U.S.	Iraq	U.S.	183,000	2007	28.4	6.4
UN	Belgian Congo	UN	19,828	1961	15.9	1.3
UN	Namibia	UN	4,493	1989	1.3	3.4
UN	El Salvador	UN	368	1992	5.3	0.1
UN	Cambodia	UN	15,991	1993	10.7	1.5
UN	Mozambique	UN	6,576	1993	14.8	0.4
UN	Eastern Slavonia	UN	5,104	1996	0.1	35.3
UN	East Timor	UN	8,387	2000	0.9	9.6
Europe	Albania	EU	7,024	1997	3.1	9.8
Europe	Sierra Leone (I) ^c	UK	4,500	2000	4.5	1.0
Europe	Sierra Leone (II) ^c	UN	17,368	2002	4.9	3.5
Europe	Macedonia	EU	4,800	2001	2.0	2.4
Europe	Côte d'Ivoire (I) ^c	France	3,800	2007	18.8	0.2
Europe	Côte d'Ivoire (II) ^c	UN	9,417	2011	20.9	0.5
Europe	DRC (I) ^c	EU	2,500	2006	56.5	0.04

Table A.2—continued

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Lead Country or Organization	Peak Number of Troops	Peak Year	Peak-Year Population (millions)	Peak Troops per 1,000 Inhabitants
Europe	DRC (II) ^c	UN	19,567	2014	73.7	0.3
Europe	Bosnia (II) ^b	EU	5,700	2005	3.9	1.5
Africa	Burundi (I) ^b	AU	3,128	2004	8.3	0.4
Africa	Burundi (II) ^b	UN	5,400	2005	8.4	0.6
Africa	CAR (I) ^c	AU	5,100	2014	4.5	1.1
Africa	CAR (I) ^c	UN	10,337	2016	4.6	2.2
Africa	Darfur (I) ^b	AU	5,874	2006	6.2	0.9
Africa	Darfur (II) ^b	UN/AU	17,778	2012	7.7	2.3
Africa	Comoros	AU	1,800	2008	0.7	2.7
Africa	Somalia (II)	AU	22,564	2017	14.3	1.6
Africa	Lake Chad Basin ^d	MNJTF	8,700	2016	NA	NA

Table A.2—continued

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Lead Country or Organization	Peak Number of Troops	Peak Year	Peak-Year Population (millions)	Peak Troops per 1,000 Inhabitants

^a Germany (1945) includes only U.S. troops deployed in the U.S. zone.

^b In three cases, leadership transitioned between continuous lead actors: In Bosnia in 2004, the EU (EUFOR) assumed responsibility from the U.S./NATO (IFOR/SFOR); in Burundi in 2004, the UN (ONUB) assumed responsibility from the AU (AMIB); and in Darfur in 2008, the UN/AU hybrid mission (UNAMID) assumed responsibility from the AU (AMIS). In Bosnia, US/NATO forces deployed under IFOR/SFOR peaked at 60,000 in 1995, while those deployed under the EU mission (EUFOR) peaked at 5,700 in 2005. In Darfur, AU forces deployed under AMIS peaked at 5,874 in 2006, while those deployed under the joint AU-UN mission (UNAMID) peaked at 17,778 in 2012. In Burundi, AU military troops deployed under AMIB peaked at 3,128 in 2004, while those deployed under the UN mission (ONUB) peaked at 5,400 in 2005.

^c In four cases, European or African forces operated coincidentally with—but as distinct missions from—an ongoing UN operation: In Sierra Leone, UK forces operated alongside UN forces; in Côte d'Ivoire, French forces operated alongside UN forces; in the DRC, EU forces operated alongside UN forces; and in CAR, AU forces operated alongside UN forces. In each of these cases, the UN forces (and, indeed, total forces) peaked years after the European or African forces did. Note that, in Sierra Leone, the peak UK troop level occurred in 2000, while the peak UN troop level occurred in 2002; the total troop level peaked in 2002 when approximately 100 UK troops were deployed alongside some 17,368 UN troops. In Côte d'Ivoire, the peak French troop level occurred in 2007, while the peak UN troop level occurred in 2011. In the DRC, the peak EU troop level occurred in 2006, while the peak UN troop level occurred in 2014. And in CAR, the peak AU troop level occurred in 2014, while the peak UN troop level occurred in 2016.

^d Note that the 8,700 troops deployed under the MNJTF in 2016 were nationally led contingents operating primarily on their own soil alongside other national counterparts; they were thus not all deployed in Nigeria and so per capita peak troop deployments could not be calculated in a meaningful way.

SOURCES: Dobbins et al., 2008; Center on International Cooperation, 2008; International Peace Institute, undated; tables in preceding chapters.

Table A.3
Civilian Police Information

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Lead Country or Organization	Peak Number of Police	Peak Year	Peak-Year Population (millions)	Peak Police per 1,000 Inhabitants	Peak Police per 1,000 Troops
U.S.	Germany	U.S.	0	NA	NA	NA	NA
U.S.	Japan	U.S.	0	NA	NA	NA	NA
U.S.	Somalia (I)	U.S.	42	1993	6.3	0.01	1
U.S.	Haiti	U.S.	874	1996	7.5	0.12	42
U.S.	Bosnia (I) ^a	U.S./ NATO	2,047	1997	3.5	0.59	34
U.S.	Kosovo	U.S./ NATO	4,731	2002	2.0	2.38	108
U.S.	Afghanistan	U.S./ NATO	0	NA	NA	NA	NA
U.S.	Iraq	U.S.	0	NA	NA	NA	NA
UN	Belgian Congo	UN	400	1965	17.7	0.02	20
UN	Namibia	UN	1,500	1990	1.4	1.07	334
UN	El Salvador	UN	315	1992	5.3	0.06	856
UN	Cambodia	UN	3,359	1994	11.1	0.30	210
UN	Mozambique	UN	1,087	1995	15.9	0.07	165
UN	Eastern Slavonia	UN	457	1998	0.1	4.35	90
UN	East Timor	UN	1,626	2007	1.0	1.56	194
Europe	Albania	EU	241	1997	3.1	0.08	34
Europe	Sierra Leone (I) ^b	UK	0	NA	NA	NA	NA
Europe	Sierra Leone (II) ^b	UN	87	2004	5.3	0.02	5
Europe	Macedonia	EU	410	2002	2.0	0.20	85
Europe	Côte d'Ivoire (I) ^b	France	0	NA	NA	NA	NA
Europe	Côte d'Ivoire (II) ^b	UN	1,611	2013	17.3	0.07	136
Europe	DRC (I) ^b	EU	26	2006	56.5	0.00	0
Europe	DRC (II) ^b	UN	1,426	2013	71.3	0.02	73
Europe	Bosnia (II) ^a	EU	1,133	2005	3.9	0.29	199

Table A.3—continued

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Lead Country or Organization	Peak Number of Police	Peak Year	Peak-Year Population (millions)	Peak Police per 1,000 Inhabitants	Peak Police per 1,000 Troops
Africa	Burundi (I) ^a	AU	0	NA	NA	NA	NA
Africa	Burundi (II) ^a	UN	97	2005	8.4	0.01	18
Africa	CAR (I) ^b	AU	880	2014	4.5	0.2	173
Africa	CAR (II) ^b	UN	2,037	2016	4.6	0.4	197
Africa	Darfur (I) ^a	AU	1,456	2006	6.2	0.23	248
Africa	Darfur (II) ^a	UN/AU	5,228	2011	7.7	0.68	294
Africa	Comoros	AU	15	2008	0.7	0.02	8
Africa	Somalia (II)	AU	562	2017	14.3	0.04	25
Africa	Lake Chad Basin ^c	MNJTf	0	NA	NA	NA	NA

^a In three cases, leadership transitioned between continuous lead actors: In Bosnia in 2004, the EU (EUFOR) assumed responsibility from the U.S./NATO (IFOR/SFOR); in Burundi in 2004, the UN (ONUB) assumed responsibility from the AU (AMIB); and in Darfur in 2008, the UN/AU hybrid mission (UNAMID) assumed responsibility from the AU (AMIS). In Bosnia, US/NATO police deployed under IFOR/SFOR peaked at 2,047 in 1997, while those deployed under the EU mission (EUFOR) peaked at 1,133 in 2005. In Darfur, civilian police deployed under AU's AMIS mission peaked at 1,456 in 2006, while police deployed under the much larger follow-on UN/AU hybrid mission (UNAMID) peaked at about 5,228 in 2011. No civilian police were deployed to Burundi under the AU's AMIB mission; subsequently, 97 police deployed under the UN's ONUB mission in 2005.

^b Indicates four cases in which European or African forces operated coincidentally with—but as distinct missions from—an ongoing UN operation: In Sierra Leone, UK forces operated alongside UN forces; in Côte d'Ivoire French forces operated alongside UN forces; in the DRC, EU forces operated alongside UN forces; and in CAR, AU forces operated alongside UN forces. In the first two (Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire), all civilian police deployed were from the UN, not European-led missions. In the DRC, the EU deployed a small police contingent of a few dozen personnel alongside the much larger UN one; the UN police presence in the DRC peaked in 2013. In CAR, civilian police deployed under AU's MISCA mission peaked at 880 in 2014, while police deployed under the much larger follow-on UN mission (MINUSCA) peaked at about 2,037 in 2016.

^c Data for the MNJTf operating in the Lake Chad Basin were not readily available, but no civilian police are believed to be operating alongside the nationally led military contingents that comprise the joint task force.

SOURCES: Dobbins et al., 2008; Center on International Cooperation, 2008; International Peace Institute, undated; and tables in preceding chapters.

Table A.4
Refugee Data

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Refugees Returned After 5 Years (%)	Change in Refugees Per Capita After 5 Years	Maximum Refugees per 1,000 Inhabitants (first 2 years)	Maximum Refugees (first 2 years)	Start Year (Year 0)	Number of Refugees per 1,000 Inhabitants					
							Year 0	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5
U.S.	Somalia	25.6	31.3	125	817,113	1992	125.3	89.6	99.7	101.2	100.2	94.0
U.S.	Haiti	38.4	0.9	2	13,925	1994	1.5	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.1
U.S.	Bosnia (I)	52.2	167.8	291	993,868	1995	225.2	291.3	243.4	176.9	147.9	123.5
U.S.	Kosovo	100.0	96.7	97	166,400	1999	96.7	81.2	74.3	NA	NA	NA
U.S.	Afghanistan	45.1	87.2	171	3,835,859	2001	171.3	112.1	92.9	88.3	89.1	84.1
U.S.	Iraq	-416.4	-48.9	16	424,009	2003	15.8	11.4	9.4	50.9	80.3	64.7
UN	Namibia	99.9	55.0	55	73,729	1989	55.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0
UN	El Salvador	44.8	3.4	7	35,599	1991	6.8	5.8	4.8	5.5	4.2	3.4
UN	Cambodia	82.4	29.7	35	353,070	1991	35.1	2.8	0.9	0.8	5.4	5.3
UN	Mozambique	97.9	110.8	113	1,604,272	1992	112.8	79.4	15.3	7.9	2.1	2.0
UN	Eastern Slavonia	73.5	NA	603	85,510	1996	591.4	602.7	703.4	NA	NA	NA

Table A.4—continued

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Refugees Returned After 5 Years (%)	Change in Refugees Per Capita After 5 Years	Maximum Refugees per 1,000 Inhabitants (first 2 years)	Maximum Refugees (first 2 years)	Start Year (Year 0)	Number of Refugees per 1,000 Inhabitants					
							Year 0	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5
UN	East Timor	100.0	162.0	162	127,655	1999	162.0	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0
Europe	Albania	−99.7	−1.7	2	5,389	1997	1.7	1.7	1.4	2.2	2.5	3.5
Europe	Sierra Leone	85.6	97.9	112	488,869	1998	95.7	111.7	89.3	38.3	28.9	13.8
Europe	Macedonia	100.0	46.6	47	94,012	2001	46.6	3.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Europe	Côte d'Ivoire	21.8	0.5	2	33,637	2002	1.4	1.9	1.3	1.0	1.4	1.4
Europe	DRC	18.8	2.3	8	461,042	2003	8.4	8.3	7.5	6.8	6.3	6.1
Europe	Bosnia (II)	69.4	41.8	59	231,262	2004	59.2	28.1	50.6	20.7	19.8	18.7
Africa	Burundi	28.4	28.6	81	574,557	2001	80.5	81.0	73.2	65.0	58.4	51.9
Africa	CAR	−292.0	−17.3	9	35,000	2002	6.6	9.1	8.0	10.9	17.9	23.9
Africa	Darfur (Sudan)	49.7	11.8	20	731,000	2004	21.2	19.7	18.9	14.1	11.0	9.4
Africa	Comoros	−486.1	−0.5	0	376	2006	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.6

Table A.4—continued

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Refugees Returned After 5 Years (%)	Change in Refugees Per Capita After 5 Years	Maximum Refugees per 1,000 Inhabitants (first 2 years)	Maximum Refugees (first 2 years)	Start Year (Year 0)	Number of Refugees per 1,000 Inhabitants					
							Year 0	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5
Africa	Somalia (II)	–35.0	–15.2	132	1,550,000	2007	90.6	112.3	132.4	121.4	117.6	105.8

NOTES: Germany and Japan are excluded because all refugees were stranded as a result of offensive operations by a state military or deliberate government colonization, not civilians fleeing a conflict. The Belgian Congo is excluded because there were insufficient data. The Lake Chad Basin is excluded because of the difficulty of attributing refugee flows from multiple countries to the armed conflict against Boko Haram. Data on refugee returns specific to Darfur were not readily available, although there is variable availability of data for the number of IDPs, as indicated in Table 4.3. The figures presented here for Sudan include refugees from all of Sudan, including those associated with the South Sudan conflict.

SOURCE: UNHCR, 2017; Dobbins et al., 2008; IMF, I2017; World Bank, 2018b.

Table A.5
Indicators of State Stability and Democracy

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Sustained Peace (2017)	Freedom Rating (2018)	Freedom House Score (2018)	Polity IV Democracy Score (2017)	Polity IV Composite Score (2017)
U.S.	Germany	Yes	Free	1	10	10
U.S.	Japan	Yes	Free	1	10	10
U.S.	Somalia (I)	No	Not free	7	5	5
U.S.	Haiti	Yes	Partly free	5	6	5
U.S.	Bosnia (I)	Yes	Partly free	4	---	---
U.S.	Kosovo	Yes	Partly free	3.5	8	8
U.S.	Afghanistan	No	Not free	5.5	1	-1
U.S.	Iraq	No	Not free	5.5	6	6
UN	Belgian Congo	No	Not free	6.5	1	-3
UN	Namibia	Yes	Free	2	6	6
UN	El Salvador	Yes	Free	2.5	8	8
UN	Cambodia	Yes	Not free	5.5	0	-4
UN	Mozambique	Yes	Partly free	4	6	5
UN	Eastern Slavonia	Yes	Free	1.5	9	9
UN	East Timor	Yes	Free	2.5	9	8
Europe	Albania	Yes	Partly free	3	9	9
Europe	Sierra Leone	Yes	Partly free	3	8	7
Europe	Macedonia	Yes	Partly free	3.5	9	9
Europe	Côte d'Ivoire	Yes	Partly free	4	5	4
Europe	DRC	No	Not free	6.5	1	-3
Europe	Bosnia (II)	Yes	Partly free	4	---	---
Africa	Burundi	Yes	Not free	6.5	2	-1
Africa	CAR	No	Not free	7	7	6

Table A.5—continued

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Sustained Peace (2017)	Freedom Rating (2018)	Freedom House Score (2018)	Polity IV Democracy Score (2017)	Polity IV Composite Score (2017)
Africa	Darfur/Sudan	No	Not free	7	0	−4
Africa	Comoros	Yes	Partly free	3.5	9	9
Africa	Somalia (II)	No	Not free	7	5	5

NOTES: The Lake Chad Basin case has been excluded from this table because scores for multiple countries could not be aggregated in a meaningful way. Freedom House scores range from 1 (free) to 7 (not free). Polity IV democracy scores range from 0 (undemocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). Polity IV composite scores are calculated by subtracting autocracy scores from democracy scores; the resulting combined scores range from −10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). Freedom House and Polity IV scores were not available for the subnational regions of Eastern Slavonia and Darfur, so those for Croatia and Sudan, respectively, have been used as proxies. Bosnia is given a Polity score of −66, implying a case of “foreign interruption,” and is thus treated as “system missing.” As of the end of 2017, intrastate conflict remained active in six of the countries contained in this table: Afghanistan, CAR, Darfur/Sudan, the DRC, Iraq, and Somalia. Additionally, although the Lake Chad Basin case does not appear in this table, armed conflict by and against Boko Haram continues there. By definition, these countries have not experienced sustained peace. Additionally, it should be noted that two countries (Burundi and Haiti) are also at peace at the time of this writing, but they experienced brief returns to violence after the departures of U.S.-led and African-led peacekeeping missions in 1996 and 2004, respectively.

SOURCES: Dobbins et al., 2008; Freedom House, 2018a; Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jagers, “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2017 dataset,” Center for Systemic Peace, accessed on July 26, 2018; Marshall, Gurr, and Harff, 2017.

Table A.6
International Assistance Data

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Average Annual Per Capita Assistance Over First 2 Years (in 2000 U.S. Dollars)	Start Year (Year 1)	Annual Per Capita Assistance (in 2000 U.S. Dollars)	
				Year 1	Year 2
U.S.	Germany*	\$128.87	1946	\$118.13	\$139.61
U.S.	Japan	\$25.52	1946	\$23.58	\$27.46
U.S.	Somalia (I)	\$136.60	1992	\$116.03	\$157.17
U.S.	Haiti	\$98.62	1994	\$91.15	\$106.09
U.S.	Bosnia (I)	\$277.37	1995	\$293.49	\$261.25
U.S.	Kosovo	\$576.84	2000	\$587.72	\$565.95
U.S.	Afghanistan	\$60.39	2002	\$55.75	\$65.02
U.S.	Iraq	\$116.71	2003	\$78.64	\$154.77
UN	Belgian Congo	\$19.97	1960	\$21.98	\$17.95
UN	Namibia	\$80.24	1989	\$55.58	\$104.90
UN	El Salvador	\$77.51	1991	\$67.07	\$87.94
UN	Cambodia	\$16.43	1991	\$10.55	\$22.30
UN	Mozambique	\$104.42	1992	\$118.80	\$90.04
UN	Eastern Slavonia	\$310.37	1996	\$294.74	\$325.99
UN	East Timor	\$239.59	1999	\$198.16	\$281.01
Europe	Albania	\$73.52	1997	\$56.37	\$90.67
Europe	Sierra Leone	\$21.48	1998	\$25.78	\$17.18
Europe	Macedonia	\$125.11	2001	\$119.70	\$130.51
Europe	Côte d'Ivoire	\$36.34	2002	\$59.12	\$13.56
Europe	DRC	\$61.86	2003	\$93.86	\$29.85
Europe	Bosnia (II)	\$141.89	2004	\$159.80	\$123.98
Africa	Burundi	\$22.70	2001	\$20.80	\$24.60

Table A.6—continued

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Average Annual Per Capita Assistance Over First 2 Years (in 2000 U.S. Dollars)	Start Year (Year 1)	Annual Per Capita Assistance (in 2000 U.S. Dollars)	
				Year 1	Year 2
Africa	CAR	\$13.45	2002	\$14.70	\$12.20
Africa	Darfur (Sudan)*	\$32.00	2004	\$23.50	\$40.50
Africa	Comoros	\$51.60	2006	\$44.10	\$59.10
Africa	Somalia (II)	\$42.80	2007	\$30.00	\$55.60

NOTES: Per capita aid to Germany is aid to the U.S. sector only. Subnational data for the Darfur region were not available, so national data for Sudan have been used as a proxy. The Lake Chad Basin case has been excluded due to the difficulty of attributing aggregated assistance to multiple countries to the armed conflict against Boko Haram. ODA in current dollars has been converted to constant 2000 U.S. dollars using the GDP deflator.

SOURCES: Dobbins et al., 2008; World Bank, 2018b.

Table A.7
GDP Growth Data

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Average Annual Per Capita GDP Growth Over First 5 Years (%)	Start Year (Year 0)	Annual GDP Growth (%)				
				Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5
U.S.	Germany	14.4	1946	23	19	16	14	10
U.S.	Japan	6.4	1945	9	8	15	7	10
U.S.	Haiti	1.5	1994	4	3	3	2	3
U.S.	Bosnia (I)	20.3	1995	61	30	18	10	5
U.S.	Kosovo	7.2	2000	16	1	3	3	2
U.S.	Afghanistan	8.3	2002	16	8	14	8	6
U.S.	Iraq	13.4	2003	47	-1	6	1	8
UN	Belgian Congo	0.5	1960	1	2	4	6	4
UN	Namibia	1.5	1989	8	6	7	-2	7
UN	El Salvador	5.4	1991	12	12	6	7	2
UN	Cambodia	3.4	1991	7	4	9	7	5
UN	Mozambique	3.5	1992	7	7	3	7	11
UN	East Timor	-2.7	2000	17	-7	-6	0	2
Europe	Albania	6.3	1997	8	7	8	6	3
Europe	Sierra Leone	5.6	1998	-8	4	18	27	9
Europe	Macedonia	2.8	2001	1	3	4	4	4
Europe	Côte d'Ivoire	-0.9	2002	-2	2	1	1	2
Europe	DRC	3.0	2003	7	6	5	6	6
Europe	Bosnia (II)	5.0	2004	5	6	6	6	-3
Africa	Burundi	-0.3	2001	4	-1	5	1	5
Africa	CAR	0.4	2002	-5	6	1	5	5

Table A.7—continued

Nation-Building Volume	Country	Average Annual Per Capita GDP Growth Over First 5 Years (%)	Start Year (Year 0)	Annual GDP Growth (%)				
				Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5
Africa	Comoros	−0.8	2006	1	0	2	2	3

NOTES: Reliable GDP data were not available for Somalia, so it is not included in this table. Subnational/regional data were not available for Eastern Slavonia or Darfur, so they are excluded from this table. Data pertaining to the countries in the Lake Chad Basin could not be aggregated in a manner relevant to the MNJTF’s efforts to defeat Boko Haram, so this case has been excluded as well.

SOURCE: Dobbins et al., 2008; IMF, 2017; World Bank, 2018b.

Performance Indicators

Each case study features a table examining various performance indicators for their peace operations. This appendix provides sources and references that can be consulted for more-detailed information on how these indicators are defined and data were collected.

- At-peace data are drawn from Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Barbara Harff, “PITF-State Failure Problem Set: Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955–2016 Data Set,” Center for Systemic Peace, revised June 21, 2017. It is a measure of whether an intrastate war was ongoing in that year.
- Government effectiveness data are drawn from the World Bank World Governance Indicators project. It is an aggregate measure of more than 50 variables capturing “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.” For a more-detailed definition and information on the underlying variables and sources, see the codebook at World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators: Documentation,” 2019.
- Freedom index data are drawn from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index. It is an aggregate measure of ten political rights indicators grouped into three subcategories (electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government), as well as 15 civil liberties indicators grouped into four subcategories (freedom of expression and belief, associational

and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights). For more information on the methodology, see Freedom House, "Methodology 2019," 2019.

- HDI data are drawn from the UNDP HDI. HDI is an aggregate measure of average achievement in three key dimensions of human development: health, education, and standard of living. The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth; the education dimension is measured by mean years of schooling for adults age 25 and up and expected years of schooling for children of school-entering age; the standard of living dimension is measured by GNI per capita. For more information on the methodology, see UNDP, "Calculating the Indices," undated.
- The economic data in the tables are drawn from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and the IMF's International Financial Statistics databases.

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Three previous RAND volumes examined the record of American-, United Nations (UN)-, and European-led peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and postconflict stabilization operations. This volume considers similar missions by the African Union and several subregional African organizations. These missions range from mediation and traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement and extended counterinsurgency campaigns. This report contains case studies of six of these missions in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Darfur, the Comoros, Somalia, and the Lake Chad Basin. The case studies are followed by a statistical comparison of U.S., UN, European, and African missions. The report concludes with recommendations for the relevant African institutions, the UN, and other organizations and governments interested in peace and security in Africa.

Of the six missions examined, two were ultimately successful, and three have shown some progress. What is most remarkable and commendable about Africa's institutional role in regional peace operations is the level of cooperation generally achieved among the states most directly affected by these conflicts. African countries do not all agree with one another but instead have established effective consultation processes. They are also able to form ad hoc coalitions to pursue their shared interests. African-led peace operations have shown the flexibility to undertake a range of different types of tasks, up to and including high-intensity combat, under different subregional or continent-wide institutions, supported by varying partners. African institutions will likely develop new capabilities for peace operations, especially if new funds become available.

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