The U.S. Army and the Battle for Baghdad: Lessons Learned-and Still to Be Learned
Abstract
This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Lessons Learned from 13 Years of Conflict: The Battle for Baghdad, 20032008, sponsored by the Office of Quadrennial Defense Review, U.S. Army. The project was intended to capture key lessons to help the U.S. Army and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) retain institutional knowledge and capabilities, as well as to serve as a history of the U.S. Army's efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to 2016. The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD146863. This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2019
- Accession Number
- AD1086701
Entities
People
- Agnes Gereben Schaefer
- Brenna Allen
- David E. Johnson
- Gian Gentile
- James Hoobler
- Jerry M. Sollinger
- Michael Schwille
- Raphael S. Cohen
- Sean M. Zeigler
Organizations
- RAND Corporation