

Beyond Minimal Restoration: A Robust Approach to Post Large-Scale Combat Operations

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

Beyond Minimal Restoration: A Robust Approach to Post Large-Scale Combat Operations by MAJ Michael D. Wiehagen, 43 pages

Following a major military conflict, political instability and economic distress can create an environment for insurgencies to thrive, cultivating new and deeper problems and possibly leading to additional conflict. This risk of insurgency makes it critical for the victor to engage in nation-building after the military conflict is over to restore peace and stability and protect its long-term interests in the region. In the past century, the United States has played a powerful role in building nations around the world following substantial conflicts. In recent years, however, the United States has struggled to successfully rebuild nations to ensure the achievement of its long-term goals after it engages in large-scale combat operations, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently, the US military takes a “minimal restoration” approach to nation-building in these areas, which largely relies on the expertise of the State Department and the US Agency for International Development while minimizing its own role. However, the military holds vastly more resources in comparison to the minimal funding of the State Department. This approach has been largely ineffective, and has enabled ideologically-driven insurgencies to thrive in the region.

This monograph evaluates two historical case studies in which the United States successfully nurtured comprehensive nation-building efforts in the Republics of the Philippines and Korea. In these countries, the United States faced a threat that communist-led forces would take over the countries, extending the influence of the Soviet Union. With the goal of building strong democratic countries that could stand as bulwarks against communism, the United States built up both nations’ infrastructure, economy, and political system. Today, both nations remain fully democratic and have top 50 economies in the world. These case studies provide insights into how the United States should approach reconstruction following large-scale combat operations.

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Acronyms

ADP	Army Doctrinal Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrinal Reference Publication
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DPRK	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EDCOR	Economic Development Corps
FM	Field Manual
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GW	Gigawatt
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JP	Joint Publication
KW	Kilowatt
KWh	Kilowatt-hour
MERALCO	Manila Electric Company
MW	Megawatt
NPC	National Power Company
NSC	National Security Council
PACD	President Assistant on Community Development
ROK	Republic of Korea
SIGAR	Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Report
SIGIR	Special Inspector General of Iraq Report
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAMGIK	United States Army Military Government in Korea

USG	United States Government
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Introduction

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

–President Harry Truman, *Speech to Joint Session of Congress*, 12 March 1947

In the months after the Japanese surrendered and ended the Second World War, the United States found itself in a new, bipolar world. On one end the United States led the Free World, and on the other the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) led communist aligned nations. As echoed in the words of President Harry S. Truman, the United States had to chart a course to support the Free World and stem the tide of communism. It was in this context that the concept of nation-building came to the forefront as the victors sought to rebuild war-torn nations to restore peace, create prosperous allies, and ultimately secure their own long-term geopolitical interests.

As a result, the United States heavily involved itself in post-conflict nation-building. Over the years, it employed different strategies ranging from heavily funded, whole-of-government approaches to minimalist, light-touch approaches, which met with varying levels of success. While the threat of communism has subsided since the breakup of the USSR in 1991, other ideologies threatening the free world rose in its place, especially in the form of extremist religious ideologies. Today, the United States faces protracted conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The length of time that the conflicts have continued, and the minimal gains seen in the region, reflect strategic miscalculation prior to the start of the conflicts. Consequently, these conflicts have called into question whether the United States ought to continue to attempt nation-building at all and, if so, the strategy it should follow.

The US struggle to build peaceful, independent nations in Afghanistan and Iraq is based on its strategy of fast and heavy military involvement, followed by a minimalist approach to stability operations. The military strategy began as part of the Revolution in Military Affairs

when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks settled on small force packages supported by technological superiority to conduct quick offensive operations against both the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. In December 2001, a small force of approximately 5,300 US service members established a partnership with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and quickly forced the Taliban to retreat.¹ Likewise, in Iraq, the invasion in March 2003 involved 68,000 service members, but successfully defeated the 479,000-member Iraqi military.² The light-footprint strategy produced the desired aims of quickly defeating both forces. By May 2003, President George W. Bush announced, “Mission accomplished,” from the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln, declaring the end of major combat operations in Iraq.³

In the aftermath of the combat operations, however, the United States did not have the appropriate number of personnel in either Afghanistan or Iraq to adequately govern and protect the populations. As a result, the vacuum of authority and law and order enabled significant insurgencies to emerge. Some of the armed forces went home; some fled to Pakistan, Syria, or Iran; and still others joined insurgencies. In 2004, Iraq’s Fedayeen guerilla forces swelled to over 40,000 members with the addition of Iraqi army forces that chose to challenge the United States through a protracted insurgency.⁴ Furthermore, by 2014, a new insurgency emerged in the form

¹ Donald P. Wright et al., *A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), October 2001-September 2005* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 57–126; Amy Belasco, *Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2009), 9, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40682.pdf>.

² Belasco, *Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues*, 9; World Bank Group, “Armed Forces Personnel, Total,” *The World Bank*, last modified March 13, 2018, accessed March 13, 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?end=2000&start=1985&year_high_desc=true.

³ Office of the Press Secretary, “President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended,” May 1, 2003, accessed March 13, 2018, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html>.

⁴ Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, *The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005: On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 87–138.

of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The new insurgency rapidly gained territory in Syria and Iraq, including Iraq's second largest city of Mosul, to establish a caliphate that terrorized its population through brutal methods of enforcement, including beheadings, beatings, and mass killings.⁵

Afghanistan, mirroring the results in Iraq, saw the ranks of the Taliban swell with the addition of members from religiously inspired groups who sought to conduct armed resistance against Western forces. By 2011, the Taliban counted over 100,000 members in Afghanistan.⁶ At present, the Taliban are now influential and active in approximately seventy percent of Afghanistan.⁷ Furthermore, the Taliban were able to establish a robust poppy industry to fund their operations, accounting for nearly \$200 million in trade value.⁸

In both movements, an overall ideology of strict, autocratic Islamic-inspired rule accompanied the insurgencies.⁹ The ideology filled the void where the United States and its allies could not or would not operate. One of the possible reasons this occurred was because the US military embraced a minimalist approach to post-conflict nation-building that relied on the expertise of the State Department while minimizing the use of the military. Several key doctrinal publications define this strategy, including the Army's 2017 Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, which de-emphasizes robust stability tasks in favor of a minimalist approach: "Army forces

⁵ Zachary Laub, "The Islamic State," *Council on Foreign Relations*, last modified August 10, 2016, accessed March 13, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/islamic-state>.

⁶ Zachary Laub, "The Taliban in Afghanistan," *Council on Foreign Relations*, last modified July 4, 2014, accessed March 13, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/taliban-afghanistan>.

⁷ Reuters Staff, "Taliban Active in 70 Percent of Afghanistan, BBC Study Finds," last modified January 30, 2018, accessed March 13, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-study/taliban-active-in-70-percent-of-afghanistan-bbc-study-finds-idUSKBN1FK03C>.

⁸ Helene Cooper, "U.S. Airstrikes in Afghanistan Take Aim at Taliban Opium Labs," *The New York Times*, November 20, 2017, accessed March 13, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/world/asia/airstrikes-taliban-opium.html>.

⁹ Akhilesh Pillalamarri, "Revealed: Why ISIS Hates the Taliban," *The Diplomat*, last modified January 29, 2016, accessed March 13, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/revealed-why-isis-hates-the-taliban/>.

perform minimum-essential stability tasks to provide security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment when there is no legitimate civil authority present.”¹⁰ FM 3-0 also references Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-07, *Stability Operations*, a 2012 publication that echoes the emphasis on “minimum-essential stability tasks.”¹¹ The ADRP continues by shifting the burden of stability tasks to interagency partners: “stability tasks executed in an operation are best performed by host-nation, foreign, or USG civilian personnel, with military forces providing support as required.”¹² The ADRP nests within the Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Stability*, which also stresses minimization of stability tasks and shifts the burden to the interagency community.¹³ In all three doctrinal publications, the US Army and the military acknowledge that stability tasks are a core mission for the Department of Defense (DoD). However, the DoD quickly establishes that it is not the lead agency, and it solely focuses on minimal repair and restoration of core services such as infrastructure.

Where the DoD chooses to not lead in stability and infrastructure missions, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) touts itself as the lead organization. The US government charges USAID with the mission of “Supporting global stability—work that advances democracy and good governance, and helps to promote sustainable development, economic growth, and peace.”¹⁴ With staff trained by its specialty centers on infrastructure and

¹⁰ US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 5–6.

¹¹ US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1–11.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, Stability* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), V–6, F-1.

¹⁴ US Department of State and US Agency for International Development, *Joint Strategic Plan FY 2018 - 2022* (Washington, DC, February 2018), 15.

economic activities, USAID's personnel are highly capable of nation-building. However, USAID lacks the appropriate budget and workforce to enable it to execute its mission.

In the Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 budget, Congress reduced the State Department and USAID's budget to \$37.6 billion—a decrease of \$18 billion from FY 2017.¹⁵ The reduced budget diminishes the capabilities of USAID as it de-scopes current and future projects, reduces personnel, and undermines credibility throughout the international community. In a letter dated 17 February 2017, more than 120 former generals and admirals, including former Chief of Staff of the Army General George Casey and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency General David Petraeus, advocated for the State Department and USAID, stating: “The military will lead the fight against terrorism on the battlefield, but it needs strong civilian partners in the battle against the drivers of extremism—lack of opportunity, insecurity, injustice, and hopelessness.”¹⁶ The letter underscored the importance of USAID and the State Department to rebuilding infrastructure, nation-building, and US national security, but it also emphasized the US military's current desire to shift the burden for infrastructure and nation building to interagency partners.

While the State Department's and USAID's budget and resources continue to shrink, the DoD received a substantial increase in funds. The FY 2018 DoD budget increased to \$639 billion, a \$33 billion increase over FY 2017. The DoD not only has a budget an order of magnitude larger than the State Department and USAID, but its workforce also dwarfs that of the State Department and USAID. DoD currently employs 2.8 million active duty, reserve, national guard, and civilian

¹⁵ US Agency for International Development, “Diplomatic Engagement and Foreign Assistance Request FY 2017 - FY 2019,” February 12, 2018, accessed February 14, 2018, <https://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/budget-spending>.

¹⁶ US Global Leadership Coalition, “Over 120 Retired Generals, Admirals on State and USAID Budget: ‘Now Is Not the Time to Retreat,’” *USGLC*, February 27, 2017, accessed February 18, 2018, <http://www.usglc.org/newsroom/over-120-retired-generals-admirals-on-state-and-usaid-budget-now-is-not-the-time-to-retreat/>.

personnel, while USAID employs 3,059 people and the State Department employs 74,880.¹⁷ The sheer number of personnel within the DoD brings a significant nation-building capability on its own, regardless of training specialty.

The current imbalance between mission, capabilities, budget, and personnel has enabled the ideologically-driven insurgencies to thrive in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the United States continues to struggle in the region, military and political leaders should look to past successful nation-building scenarios, such as in the Republics of the Philippines and Korea following the Second World War. In these countries, the United States faced a similar task to restore peace and stability to secure its long-term interests while combating communist inspired uprisings. To achieve success, the United States employed a comprehensive “whole-of-government approach” that relied on the DoD to provide maximum essential service restoration and improvement while collaborating with experts from the State Department and USAID. These case studies demonstrated that the security situations in both countries required the US military to move beyond a minimal stability approach. The case studies should serve as a model for future post-combat nation-building activities.

Strategic Context

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Allies faced the task of restoring peace and stability to war-ravaged nations while securing their long-term global interests. Based on the lessons learned from Germany following the First World War, the United States recognized that stability operations would be critical. In 1919, the Allies had forced the Germans to accept a punitive peace in the Treaty of Versailles, which imposed economically crippling reparation payments to allied nations, imposed strict limits on the German armed forces, and included

¹⁷ Defense Manpower Data Center, “DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications,” last modified September 2017, accessed December 12, 2017, https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp; US Agency for International Development, *USAID Staffing Report to Congress*, June 2016; US Department of State, “Workforce Statistics,” last modified November 29, 2017, accessed February 15, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/m/dghr/workforce/>.

territorial cessions.¹⁸ As a result, the Germans grew increasingly resentful of the British and French in the 1920s and early 1930s, which helped set the conditions for another world war. Thus, following the Second World War, the United States theorized that a peaceful, stable Europe required a strong center with Germany as the central player.¹⁹ The United States and other Allied European nations undertook a massive effort to rebuild Germany with the goal of avoiding yet another world war. However, the spread of communism from the USSR threatened US attempts to stabilize and rebuild Europe.

By 1947, the United States had become concerned about communist fueled-insurgencies erupting across Europe. In Greece, a civil war was raging between the Greek government army, backed by the United Kingdom and the United States, and the communist Democratic Army of Greece, backed by the USSR. President Truman requested \$400 million from Congress to aid in defeating the communist threat in Greece, which he saw as critical to curbing the growth of communism across Europe.²⁰ Truman outlined a global strategy: “it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” He further emphasized his nation-building vision for accomplishing the global mission: “our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political process.”²¹ Truman’s speech to Congress served as the framework for the Truman Doctrine, which emphasized containing the spread of communism worldwide.

¹⁸ Library of Congress, “Treaty of Versailles, 1919,” June 28, 1919, accessed February 15, 2018, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0043.pdf>.

¹⁹ Michael S. Neiberg, *Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe* (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 183–189.

²⁰ Harry S. Truman, “Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey,” March 12, 1947, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri.

²¹ Truman, “Recommending Assistance to Greece and Turkey.”

A few months later, newly-appointed Secretary of State George C. Marshall presented a plan, subsequently named the “Marshall Plan,” in a speech at Harvard. In his speech, Marshall discussed the tension that European countries experienced while providing for their people and rebuilding after the war: the more Europe subsidized the food supply, the less money it had to rebuild its infrastructure. Likewise, the more it spent money to rebuild its infrastructure, the more people starved.²² The Marshall Plan proposed that the United States subsidize rebuilding Europe to increase the collective security of the United States. Marshall’s theory postulated that as Europe increased its stability, the likelihood of a conflict erupting that would draw in the United States decreased, thereby improving the security of the United States. Soon thereafter, Marshall instituted the Economic Cooperation Administration, and Congress allocated over \$13 billion in funds to assist with rebuilding Europe.²³

In 1948, a year after the implementation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the US strategy seemed to fail on a grand scale. In Germany, the United States and its allies took drastic measures to supply West Berlin as the Soviets cut all allied ground lines of communication to the city.²⁴ The United States undertook a massive effort to relieve the beleaguered city with over 270,000 flights and the delivery of more than two tons of supplies.²⁵ By May 1949, the Soviets agreed to re-open ground lines of communication and regular truck shipments arrived in Berlin. The United States had successfully thwarted Soviet ambitions to annex all of Berlin.

²² George C. Marshall, “Marshall Plan Speech,” The George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, VA, <https://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/marshall-plan-speech/>.

²³ Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, Public Law 472, 80th Cong. 2d sess., (1948).

²⁴ Foreign Policy Studies Branch, *The Berlin Crisis* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1948), 1–4.

²⁵ D. M. Giangreco and Robert E. Griffin, “Blockade Lifted,” in *Airbridge to Berlin: The Berlin Crisis of 1948, Its Origins and Aftermath* (Truman Library, 1988), https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/berlin_a/blockade.htm.

In Asia, the United States faced a tougher battle to contain communism. Immediately following the Second World War, China became the key battleground. However, the United States failed to anticipate the infiltration of communist ideology and forces in China. The communists, led by Mao Tse Tung, had been conducting operations against Chiang Kai Shek's nationalist Kuomintang government since 1927.²⁶ The United States only started to support Chiang Kai Shek's government in 1941 when they officially entered the war against Japan. By 1941, the communists had already been operating in China for fourteen years and had developed a significant base of support among the population and safe havens in mountainous areas.²⁷ Furthermore, by the mid-1930s, the communists had allied with the nationalist forces against the Japanese, which legitimized their position and enabled them to receive supplies and weapons from Allied forces.²⁸ By the time the United States supported Chiang Kai Shek's nationalist forces, Mao Tse Tung's communists had seized the initiative, gained parity in military strength, and received support from the Soviets. In 1949, despite the \$7.5 billion (in constant 2015 US dollars) the United States had invested in Chiang Kai Shek since 1946, Mao's communist forces drove the nationalist forces across the straits to the island of Formosa, now known as Taiwan.²⁹

By June 1949, Mao publicly declared that the People's Republic of China would align with the USSR. A communist dominated China posed a significant risk to US interests throughout Asia, including the Korean peninsula and the Philippine archipelago.³⁰ The setback in

²⁶ Strategy and Policy Department, *Seeing Red: The Development of Maoist Thought on Insurgency* (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 2016), 2.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 62–68.

²⁹ US Agency for International Development, "Foreign Aid Explorer (FAE): Reports," accessed November 6, 2017, <https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports.html>; Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 292–298.

³⁰ Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 298–303.

China greatly increased US reliance on the Republic of Korea (ROK) as a foothold in Asia, and the Philippines as the southern anchor within Truman's containment strategy.

As the United States turned its attention to the Philippines and the ROK, the Truman Administration developed the National Security Council Report (NSC) 68, which laid out four objectives to contain and defeat communism:

...(1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence, and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.³¹

Furthermore, NSC-68 went beyond the Marshall Plan's call for economic and financial assistance. It also underscored the need for military assistance to other countries combatting communist threats worldwide. To support military efforts, NSC-68 also emphasized a forward basing strategy that involved building extensive basing networks throughout Europe, the Middle East, and Asia to defend ground lines of communication, which would facilitate rapid military mobilization in the case of war.³² NSC-68 helped guide US policy containing the spread of communism during the Cold War. Under the policy of containment, the United States put the full weight of its resources behind efforts to build up the nations of the Philippines and the ROK and deter communist influence. In both the Philippines and the ROK, nation-building efforts assisted the countries in becoming independent and democratic.

Case One: The Philippines

Because of its strategic geographic location but relatively small size and power, the Philippine Islands have been the political pawn of more powerful countries for much of its history. As the United States looked to use the Philippines as its own strategic southern anchor to

³¹ National Security Council, "A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68" April 12, 1950, 21-33, President's Secretary's File, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri

³² *Ibid.*, D-1.

contain the spread of communism in the wake of the Second World War, it faced a strong internal opposition from Filipinos who had grown wary of foreign rule. The United States had to build trust and promote economic stability to convince Filipinos that becoming a democratic, capitalist nation would enable them to have a more promising future rather than aligning under Soviet or Chinese influence.

The root of Filipino distrust of the foreign rule began when the Spanish officially designated the Philippines as a colony in 1571.³³ Under Spanish colonialism, the Catholic church created divisions between the Muslim population and the converted population and introduced a bureaucracy that created an elite class in the clergy.³⁴ The Spanish also established the *encomienda* feudal system, which propped-up a landed gentry that benefitted from a burdensome tax collection system. This tax system drove economic disparity and resentment between the Spanish and Filipino gentry and the Filipino peasants.³⁵ These issues festered for centuries and by the end of the nineteenth century, Filipino natives launched a full-scale insurgency against the Spanish. In 1898, before the Spanish could defeat the insurgency, Spain surrendered the Philippines to the United States as part of the negotiated settlement that ended the Spanish-American War.

During the American Colonialism period from 1898 to 1942, the United States attempted to build up the Philippines, investing in the Filipino infrastructure and education system. It built roads, power plants, and schools across the islands. From 1903 to 1909, the United States tripled the number of Filipino schools from approximately 1,300 to more than 4,000 schools.³⁶ Likewise,

³³ Amy Blitz, “The Philippines: The Contested State,” in *Nation Building, State Building, and Economic Development: Case Studies and Comparisons*, ed. S.C.M. Paine (New York: Sharpe, 2010), 48–51.

³⁴ Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989), 435.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 51–54.

³⁶ Blitz, “The Philippines,” 51.

it trained and educated teachers, eventually populating the new schools with more than 8,000 teachers and 400,000 students. As a result, illiteracy fell from 50.8 percent in 1918 to 38.7 percent in 1948.³⁷

During the 1930s, the United States expanded electricity service to the rural areas of the Philippines, working through the American-owned utility company Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). In 1930, MERALCO completed its first hydroelectric dam with a capacity of eight megawatts (MW) just east of Manila that reliably provided power to the city and rural areas of Luzon.³⁸ MERALCO also built small diesel power plants throughout the provinces with an aggregate capacity of three megawatts to reach more rural locations. Prior to the Japanese invasion in 1942, MERALCO serviced 57 municipalities across the country with reliable electricity.³⁹ Electricity production facilitated longer work hours, better education, and industrial development. For a developing nation on the path to independence, these were impressive results. Nevertheless, supplying and distributing electricity outside of the urban areas would continue to prove challenging in the ensuing decades.

Despite making progress on a range of key infrastructure projects, the United States was unable to effectively address a critical issue: land reform. A remnant of Spanish rule, the Catholic Church still owned vast tracts of arable land across the country. Throughout the US colonial period, the United States attempted to reform land ownership several times. It sent representatives to Rome to negotiate the sale of church lands, and passed numerous Congressional laws, including The Philippine (Commission) Act 1120 in 1904, the Rice Share Tenancy Act in 1933,

³⁷ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *Progress of Literacy in Various Countries: A Preliminary Statistical Study of Available Census Data since 1990* (Paris: United Nations, 1953), 122–125.

³⁸ Rodrigo E. Cabrera, *Light Years* (Manila, Philippines: Kalikasan Press, 1992), 6; National Power Corporation, “Botocan Hydroelectric Plant,” accessed March 29, 2018, <https://www.napocor.gov.ph/NPCDams/index.php/our-dams/botocan-hydroelectric-plant>.

³⁹ Cabrera, *Light Years*, 6.

and the Commonwealth Act 4113 in 1934. The laws aimed to resolve the lingering land ownership issues, but consistently failed to impose effective land reform due to weak legislative language and lack of enforcement.⁴⁰ Despite repeated efforts, the US colonial period did not resolve land reform issues in a way that positively impacted the Filipino public's perception of the United States.

In addition to its failure to reform land ownership, the United States cultivated distrust among Filipinos in the pre-war period as it moved to make the Philippines economically dependent on the United States. In 1905, the US Congress passed the Reorganization Act to interconnect the Philippine islands and invest in roads, ports, and agriculture to assist the burgeoning export economy surrounding sugar production.⁴¹ While the bill improved Filipino infrastructure, it also stipulated that American companies must provide the technical work for the projects. The stipulation in the bill further created dependency on the United States for technical and construction expertise. The United States repeatedly imposed these types of conditions, which manifested in other US economic policies like the Rice Share Tenancy, unequally benefiting American companies, Americans living in the Philippines, and Filipino elites.⁴² This strategy fueled discontent among the Filipino peasant class, undercutting US-Filipino relations well into the future.

While the United States attempted to make the Filipino economy dependent on American goods and services, it also implemented limited steps to move the Philippines toward political independence. As the Filipino population became more educated and economically advanced under US rule, it also clamored for political independence. The United States began taking

⁴⁰ Nena Vreeland et al., *Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 550-72, Area Handbook for the Philippines* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 289.

⁴¹ Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 310.

⁴² Vreeland et al., *DA PAM 550-72*, 289.

incremental steps toward Filipino independence with the passage of the Jones Act in 1916, which stipulated: “Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein.”⁴³ The law stated the US purpose to return the government to the Filipino people, but ensured that the United States retained the timeline for independence through its own assessment of Filipino capabilities to self-govern. Through the 1920s and 1930s, US tutelage in the in diplomatic, military, and economic domains, accompanied by domestic and Filipino pressure for independence, increasingly led the United States to the conclusion that the Philippines were ready for self-rule.⁴⁴ By the early 1940s, the Philippines were on a clear course for independence. However, in 1942, the Japanese invasion ended the American colonial era and the Philippines’ bid for independence.

During the war, the Japanese utilized the Philippines as a strategic position to protect its sea lines of communication transporting hydrocarbons from its Southern Resource Area, consisting of parts of Indochina and Indonesia, to the Japanese home islands.⁴⁵ To support their efforts, the Japanese invested in Manila port improvements and maintenance to provide naval basing for the Japanese navy, road improvements to facilitate Japanese military movements throughout the countryside, and other infrastructure improvements aimed at achieving military objectives. While the infrastructure improvements benefited the Philippines, harsh Japanese martial law, including beheadings, beatings, and burnings of Filipinos, occurred frequently, stirring deep resentment.⁴⁶

⁴³ The Jones Law of 1916, Public Law 240, 64th Cong. 1st sess., (1916).

⁴⁴ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 244–245.

⁴⁵ Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, “The Pacific War: The USA at War” (presented at the Strategy and Policy Lectures, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, January 4, 2017).

⁴⁶ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 287–322.

Under the brutal Japanese rule, communist guerillas emerged to contest the Japanese occupation, forming the Hukbong Bayan Laban (National Labor Party), popularly shortened to “Huks.”⁴⁷ The rebels tenaciously fought a guerilla-style war against the Japanese. Meanwhile, the Filipino elite, known as the Sakdalistas, collaborated with the Japanese. By the time Japan surrendered in 1945, a schism opened in Filipino society as the Huks and the Sakdalistas competed for political and social control. In addition to the societal fractures, the battles that drove the Japanese from the islands resulted in the widespread destruction of Manila.⁴⁸ The Philippines and the United States estimated damage to the archipelago at approximately \$11 billion.⁴⁹

After the war, the United States had to contend with a Filipino population both at war with itself and deeply suspicious of foreign control. The United States had to tread carefully in its attempts to rebuild the Philippines into a staunch ally of the Free World while deterring communist influence. As per the Truman Doctrine’s charter to assist countries battling communist influence, the United States chose to align with the Sakdalistas, helping to establish the first fully independent Filipino government in 1947. To contest the efforts of the Huks and bring stability to the archipelago, the United States pledged \$620 million (\$6.6 billion in 2015 dollars) in support of reconstruction efforts.⁵⁰

As the United States began its efforts to build up the newly independent nation, two American personalities had a profound effect on the country. The first was General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who the Filipinos lauded as their “savior” after the liberation from the Japanese. MacArthur maintained close friendships with Sakdalista leaders like Manuel Roxas, the

⁴⁷ Blitz, “The Philippines,” 55–56.

⁴⁸ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 316–322.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 333.; All monetary values are in 2015 values unless otherwise noted.

⁵⁰ Vreeland et al., DA PAM 550-72, 235.

first President of the Philippines.⁵¹ Like other Sakdalista leaders, Roxas' reputation as a Japanese collaborator hurt his standing within the country, but support from the well-respected MacArthur shored up his political support. While MacArthur's approbation propelled Roxas into the presidency and temporarily diminished the Huks' bid for control of the country, Roxas' demands for the Huks to disarm and his efforts to exclude communists from the political process fueled a growing communist insurgency.

Corruption was rife within the Roxas administration and that of his successor, President Elpidio Quirinio, which strengthened the Huks' insurgency. As President Truman grew increasingly frustrated with the Filipino government's corruption and inability to effect change, he decided to send a second key person to the Philippines to wield influence, Air Force Colonel Edward Lansdale. As Lansdale arrived in the Philippines in 1950, the DoD tasked him with finding and mentoring a new leader for the country.⁵²

Lansdale found his candidate in Secretary of Defense Ramon Magsaysay. Magsaysay oversaw the counterinsurgency against the Huks, and he and Lansdale collaborated to end the insurgency by using two approaches. The first approach focused on security. The Filipino army confronted the Huks throughout the main islands of the Philippines and attempted to eliminate safe havens for the Huks in the villages, countryside, and mountains. The second approach addressed the root causes of the insurgency: land reformation and agricultural modernization.⁵³

To implement land reform, Lansdale and Magsaysay instituted broad policy reforms. They established agrarian courts and agriculture credit banks to adjudicate real and perceived inequalities in land distribution and landowner-tenant relationships. Additionally, Magsaysay and

⁵¹ Blitz, "The Philippines," 57–59.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Amy Blitz, *The Contested State: American Foreign Policy and Regime Change in the Philippines* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 90–93.

Lansdale developed the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), which relocated many of the Huks onto the southern island of Mindanao, an area with a large supply of uncultivated, arable land.⁵⁴

The EDCOR program accomplished three things: it separated the insurgents from the rest of the population, it freed up land on the main island of Luzon, and it gave the peasants of Luzon the impression that they could become land owners in Mindanao.⁵⁵ While the physical impacts of the program were minimal, the psychological impacts were large. Out of less than a thousand plots of land in Mindanao reserved for resettlement, former Huks occupied only 246 plots.⁵⁶ The rest of the plots were allocated to close friends, family members, and associates of President Quirinio and Secretary Magsaysay. However, news of the program quickly spread and the peasants, including many Huks, seized on the EDCOR initiative, resulting in a swell of popular support for the government and its efforts to end the insurgency.

Lansdale and Magsaysay also built and improved infrastructure throughout the archipelago in the form of roads, clinics, and schools. From 1951 to 1953, US aid funded approximately \$2.6 billion in infrastructure, including the Lansdale and Magsaysay projects.⁵⁷ The projects helped solidify the local people's faith in the Philippine national government, in Magsaysay, and in US assistance. The US military also provided significant support, especially in shaping Filipino strategy in defeating the Huks through traditional military tactics and economic support.

While Lansdale worked the military and political spectrums inside of the Philippines, the United States worked to develop its strategic overseas forward basing posture. In 1947, the

⁵⁴ Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 108–110.

⁵⁵ Blitz, *The Contested State*, 90–93.

⁵⁶ Immerwahr, *Thinking Small*, 109.

⁵⁷ US Agency for International Development, "FAE: Reports."

United States and the Philippines struck a 99-year lease for two major military installations.⁵⁸ The two bases, Naval Base Subic Bay and Clark Air Base, became critical to the US Cold War strategy. Both bases provided necessary refueling and rearming capabilities to extend the US Navy's and Air Force's operational reach in the Pacific area. From the later 1940s through the early 1950s, the United States attempted to expand both bases. Unfortunately, as the bases grew, they expanded into agricultural areas, which exacerbated Filipino tensions surrounding unequal land ownership and fueled the Huks' information campaign regarding land distribution and inequality in the Philippines.⁵⁹

In 1952, in the midst of Magsaysay's success against the Huks and Quirinio's unpopular military basing deals with the United States, Lansdale positioned Magsaysay to become president. In the 1953 election, Magsaysay beat Quirinio by a 2:1 ratio, earning Lansdale the nickname "Landslide."⁶⁰ In 1954, Magsaysay cemented his presidency by ending the Huk rebellion after the insurgents were driven into the jungles and starved to the point of surrender.⁶¹ The defeat of the Huks and the return of a stable security situation instilled confidence in the Filipino government.

Despite progress toward a more stable government and improved US-Filipino relations, the 99-year Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base leases, additional small US bases in the Philippines, and the stationing of approximately 10,000 US service members remained outstanding contentious issues.⁶² The leases angered many Filipinos, especially considering their colonial heritage and mistreatment under previous Spanish and Japanese rule. As a result,

⁵⁸ Frank C. Nash, "United States Overseas Military Bases," December 1957, 124-125, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Box 27, Folder 1, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas.

⁵⁹ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 362-363.

⁶⁰ Blitz, "The Philippines," 57.

⁶¹ Blitz, *The Contested State*, 90-91; Karnow, *In Our Image*, 354.

⁶² Nash, "United States Overseas Military Bases," 124.

Magsaysay and the United States began the renegotiation of the Military Bases Agreement to cut the US bases' leases to 25 years and reduce their acreage by 110,000 acres.⁶³ In 1957, before the Philippines and the United States completed the Military Bases Agreement revisions, President Magsaysay perished in a plane crash on a flight from Mindanao to Manila.⁶⁴ Magsaysay's vice president, upon ascending to the presidency, completed the agreements for the shorter leases, relieving some of the population's suspicions about US attempts at recolonization.

From 1947 through President Magsaysay's death in 1957, the US military utilized infrastructure both as an operational tool to combat the communist Huks and as a strategic tool to provide forward basing to contain communism in the South China Sea. The operational impacts of the infrastructure fell along three main categories. First, it degraded support for the Huks as peasants saw their conditions improve under Magsaysay's land reform policies. Second, it removed a recruiting source for the Huks as the improved conditions for peasants made them less willing to die for the Huk cause. Finally, it removed safe havens for the Huks to operate from as the peasants did not want to risk their villages as potential battle grounds between the communists and the government.

At the strategic level, Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base extended the operational reach of the US military in south east Asia. Both bases provided the required fuel, rearmament, maintenance, and basing to extend the distance and duration of US forces.⁶⁵ The US force posture in the region contained the Chinese communists from extending their influence south.

During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations (1945 through 1961), the macro scale of rebuilding the Philippines occupied a major line of effort, with a focus on generating

⁶³ Vreeland et al., *DA PAM 550-72*, 236; Nash, "United States Overseas Military Bases, December 1957," 124.

⁶⁴ Karnow, *In Our Image*, 438.

⁶⁵ US Army, FM 3-0, 1-22 thru 1-23.

electricity. The United States and the Philippines jointly sought to develop the hydroelectric power potential of the main islands of Luzon and Mindanao. In 1947, the Filipino government, the National Power Company (NPC), and MERALCO sought to survey the hydroelectric power potential within the Philippines. The three entities, funded by US economic aid, hired an American company, Westinghouse, to survey its hydro dam potential for power generation throughout the islands. Out of the survey came a comprehensive power generating plan, which called for the construction of major and micro hydro generation plants.⁶⁶ By 1956, NPC's and MERALCO's capacity totaled 1.8 gigawatts (GW), with 600MW coming from hydropower.⁶⁷ While the power program still did not fully meet Filipino demands, it showed the population that significant improvements to the system was happening, which further reinforced the Filipino government's legitimacy.

The dam projects provided necessary electricity, and they also supplied irrigation to improve and modernize agriculture.⁶⁸ USAID attempted to revolutionize and modernize agriculture across the Philippines with access to reliable water sources that fed rice paddies, corn, sugar plantations, and coconut groves. In turn, these crops fed the population and became profitable exports for the Philippines. The agricultural modernization programs were effective in reducing undernourishment and malnourishment throughout the Cold War, which helped to stem a key recruitment tactic for the Huks. The Americans and Filipinos hoped was that a well-fed populace would prove resistant to communist propaganda and recruiting efforts.

While USAID was effectively building infrastructure at the macro level, the United States was also supporting the Philippines in its experiments to take a micro-level community

⁶⁶ Cabrera, *Light Years*, 6–8.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁶⁸ Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 109.

development approach for smaller projects. In 1954, President Magsaysay held a United Nations (UN) conference on community development that included the ROK, India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, the United States, and Great Britain.⁶⁹ The conference generated excitement in the United States that micro-level community development could yield big results toward the larger goal of fostering a stable, democratic country. In 1956, President Magsaysay formed the Presidential Assistant on Community Development (PACD) agency. The PACD program, partially funded by USAID, brought college-educated Filipinos to the villages to help implement and fund community development projects, including agriculture, transportation, water, and electrical projects.⁷⁰ To encourage local communities to complete and maintain the projects, the program was based on a cost-sharing model in which PACD funded 35 percent of the project costs and the local communities covered the remaining 65 percent.⁷¹

By 1966, community-PACD partnerships completed more than 31,100 projects.⁷² While the program effectively modernized many villages, it did not fully achieve a change in Filipino society. For example, while the macro projects from USAID successfully electrified many of the larger parts of the Philippines, the PACD program struggled to bring electricity to rural areas, reaching only 10% of users for just a few hours during the day. Thus, despite high hopes for the micro-level community development, it failed to effectively improve village life. Rather the PACD program enabled the semi-feudal, two-class system to remain uncontested. By 1980, USAID acknowledged that the promises of the community development projects had failed to deliver meaningful results.⁷³

⁶⁹ Immerwahr, *Thinking Small*, 111–112.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 112–113.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 222.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Immerwahr, *Thinking Small*, 119.

Notably, the shortcomings of the program did not stem from the projects, but the program model. The leaders of PACD that went into communities did not study technical skills that could benefit the villages with infrastructure and modernization. Rather, they studied community team building. The result was that PACD would hold community meetings to address issues, but they would fail to meet more than once or follow through on promises made. Furthermore, the village leaders knew the village needs. Village leaders found little use in the PACD attempts to facilitate discussion and astutely pointed out that the salaries that the PACD representatives received could easily be repurposed to provide the material infrastructure and modernization many of the villages required.⁷⁴ Thus, it became clear that while US efforts to invest in robust projects worked at the macro level, the community-based attempts were less successful.




Figure 1. US aid to the Philippines and Philippine GDP. Created by author, data adapted from US Agency for International Development, “Foreign Aid Explorer (FAE): Reports,” accessed November 6, 2017, <https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports.html>.; World Bank Group, “Philippines Data Set,” accessed November 2, 2017, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>.

⁷⁴ Immerwahr, *Thinking Small*, 118.

Despite some of the USAID program failures, many of the projects succeeded, especially the macro level projects and US military projects led by Colonel Lansdale. Today, the Philippines stands as a wholly independent nation that ranks as the 37th largest economy in the world and continues to be a key American ally.⁷⁵ The success clearly shows that US investments in building infrastructure in the wake of the Second World War, as evidenced by figure 1, were a major factor in forging economic stability and growth and keeping the country within the American orbit. While it required an investment of more than \$10 billion and a comprehensive, whole-of government approach, the US robust approach to nation-building successfully created a stable, independent nation in the Philippines and prevented the country from falling under the sway of communist ideology.

Case Two: The Republic of Korea

As a nation that had long been a pawn or an afterthought for more powerful countries, the ROK is a prime example of the US ability to modernize nations and nurture them into powerful, independent economies. The ROK represents one of the clearest successes of US nation-building, demonstrating how a robust approach that relies on the DoD, in conjunction with the State Department and USAID, can restore and modernize essential services and produce a powerful, independent economy allied to American interests.

Historically, Korea had enjoyed many centuries of peace as an independent nation, but it has often come under the influence and protection of larger nations, particularly China. For centuries, China exerted a vast influence over the peninsula, to the point where Korea was essentially a vassal to the Chinese Empire. By the end of the 19th century, Korea struggled to keep pace with stronger and more modernized nations and, during the 1890s and 1900s, China, Russia, and Japan fought two wars involving the Korean peninsula. In the first war, known as the

⁷⁵ International Monetary Fund, “Report for Selected Countries and Subjects,” accessed February 28, 2018, www.imf.org; Vreeland et al., DA PAM 550-72, 237.

First Sino-Japanese War from 1894-1895, the Chinese and Japanese fought over the Korean peninsula. Even though the Japanese forces triumphed, diplomatic intervention by Russia ensured that the Korean peninsula remained under Chinese influence. However, the defeat of Russian forces in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War placed the Korean peninsula under Japanese influence. By 1910, Japan formally designated Korea as a colony.⁷⁶

During the Japanese colonial period, Japan's economic and public works programs for Korea focused on the exploitation of the peninsula's human and natural resources. It looked to Korea for raw resources, basic industrial capacity, and access to continental Asia. Japan's industrialization program in Korea concentrated heavily in the north, where ample supplies of coal, potential dam sites, and other natural resources were conducive to building power plants. The power plants, in turn, provided the energy Japan needed to convert raw resources into materials to supply the Japanese war industry, including building tanks and ships, refining fuel, and producing other war material. Associated with the exploitation of raw materials, the Japanese constructed roads and improved ports to facilitate the movement of goods to the home islands.⁷⁷

In conjunction with its industrialization of Korea, Japan required a semi-skilled workforce to operate equipment and support their efforts of economic exploitation. As a result, Japan realized it must provide a base level of education. However, Japan wanted to suppress Koreans' sense of their own national identity, so it exported its language and culture into the existing school system and built additional schools. In a bid to erase Korean identity, the Japanese replaced Korean teachers with Japanese teachers and imposed a curriculum that emphasized

⁷⁶ S. C. M. Paine, *The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 13-48.

⁷⁷ Andrea Matles-Savada and William Shaw, *South Korea: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1992), 29.

Japanese language and culture.⁷⁸ Every action that the Japanese took primarily served the home islands, the war effort, and supplanting Korean culture with Japanese culture.

Japan's efforts to eradicate the culture and identity of the Koreans caused the Allies to believe that Korea was not prepared to survive as an independent nation in the immediate aftermath of World War II. At the Cairo Conference in 1943 and the Potsdam Conference in 1945, the Allies deemed Korea, like most of the Japanese colonies, unable to self-govern and in need of a trustee government to guide it toward becoming a stable, productive country within the international order.⁷⁹ However, both United States and the Soviet Union sought influence over the peninsula. The deal brokered at the conferences dictated that the Soviets accept Japanese surrender north of the 38th parallel and that the Americans accept Japanese surrender south of the parallel.

In September 1945, US Army Lieutenant General John Hodges arrived in Korea to receive the Japanese surrender and establish the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK).⁸⁰ The news that the Americans had arrived in Korea and would establish a trustee government came as an unwelcome surprise to the war-weary South Koreans. Nonetheless, they realized that they were not in position—militarily, economically, culturally, or financially—to oppose the trustee government. Hodges' vague instructions were: “to further national policies and to fulfill the obligation of the occupying forces under international law.”⁸¹

Syngman Rhee, a Princeton-educated leading proponent of Korean independence, arrived the following month on the peninsula and almost immediately set up opposition to USAMGIK. In

⁷⁸ Matles-Savada and Shaw, *South Korea: A Country Study*, 20–24.

⁷⁹ David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 121.

⁸⁰ E. Grant Meade, *American Military Government in Korea* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), 43–52.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 47.

the north, Kim Il Sung, another proponent for Korean independence who fought with Mao's communist forces against the Japanese, also returned in September to head the Korean communist party and set the conditions for the northern and southern halves to go to war.⁸² With two native Koreans—Rhee in the South and Kim in the North—espousing support for a united Korean peninsula under their control, the march to war on the peninsula commenced.

Although the conditions for war were brewing among opposing forces in Korea, the civil war in China overshadowed the strategic importance of Korea as the United States supported the Chinese Kuomintang government in its fight against Mao.⁸³ With US officials focused on China, Hodges worked to reestablish basic services for the country and jump start the economy and government.

Hodges encountered three major challenges as the military governor. The first challenge involved the large migration of forcibly displaced Koreans returning home from China and Japan, which created a greater demand for resources. At the same time, well-trained Japanese professionals went back to their home islands, which accentuated the need for the Korean education system to build up an educated class of professionals. The second challenge was the lack of energy in South Korea as most of the industry, including the power plants, were located north of the 38th parallel. The third challenge included Syngman Rhee's rising political star within Korea, which presented a problem for initial US efforts. Rhee's demands to return the government to the Korean people had backing from the population but did not align with American pessimism about Korea's capabilities to defend and govern itself. With limited resources from the US government, Hodges struggled to overcome resource deficiencies, shortages of educated and trained professionals, and growing calls for Korean independence.

⁸² Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 234–235.

⁸³ Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 115.

The influx of more than one million Koreans returning home from China and Japan in the years following the Second World War put a tremendous strain on resources. As the countryside was inhospitable to Koreans who no longer had familial ties to the land, many of those returning ended up in cities, triggering mass urbanization. At the same time, 700,000 Japanese businesspeople left the peninsula.⁸⁴ Because Japan had dismantled the Korean education system to create mostly industrial workers for its own benefit, the population lacked educated professionals capable of building and maintaining needed infrastructure in the country. Although Hodges began to rebuild the Korean education system, it would take decades to produce appreciable results. Until an educated generation of Koreans could fill the necessary positions, USAMGIK and, subsequently, the ROK, relied on expertise from the United States.

The influx of people also exacerbated the second problem: the lack of electricity. The Japanese-built plants in Korea produced approximately 5.7 billion kilowatt-hours (KWh) a year, but the North produced 98.5 percent of the amount. From 1945 until Kim Il Sung cut off the South's electricity in 1948, the South depended on the North for electricity. In 1948, the two sides completed an agreement for the South to buy the North's electricity, but it rested on an uncertain foundation as the two governments competed for control of the peninsula. It was merely a matter of time before the North leveraged its advantages in electricity production over the South to subvert the ROK's ability to supply essential services to its population.

The trickle of electricity from North Korea made it difficult for the South to produce crop fertilizer, prompting a severe food shortage and rampant inflation. Fertilizer use dropped from 41.3 pounds per acre in 1944 to 18.3 pounds per acre during USAMGIK's governance. Hodges attempted to offset rising food prices by importing fertilizer and allowing the use of "night soil," a term referring to human excrement, to boost food production.⁸⁵ The gap measures taken by

⁸⁴ Matles-Savada and Shaw, *South Korea: A Country Study*, 29.

⁸⁵ Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 129.

USAMGIK and the Koreans helped the situation minimally, but the real solution laid with domestic power production that could enable the chemical production industry. Hodges brought in a naval power barge, the *Impedance*, to help produce electricity. The *Impedance* and other power barges eased the situation, but the power levels never reached the threshold required to produce enough fertilizer.⁸⁶

While Hodges continued to battle rising food costs and power shortages during his tenure, he also worked diligently to rebuild Korea's infrastructure. Bringing in American engineers to replace the Japanese who had left, he focused on building and improving highways, water resources, city planning, and surveys.⁸⁷ Additionally, he upgraded and repaired reservoirs that improved Korean access to quality drinking water. Finally, he utilized his engineers to survey and repair the dike systems to prevent flooding, especially after the particularly severe 1946 flood season.⁸⁸ Ultimately, Hodges' infrastructure building campaign had minimal impacts as USAMGIK suffered significant problems in strategic direction and lack of resources from the United States. However, his efforts did help set up the ROK for independence.

In May 1948, USAMGIK returned the government to the Korean people, which established the ROK. Soon afterwards, the ROK elected Syngman Rhee as president. Simultaneously, the Soviets established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) with Kim Il Sung installed as the premier in September.⁸⁹ Kim declared all of Korea under his control, and the political conditions joined the economic conditions for future military conflict.

In 1949, the Kuomintang government lost the Chinese civil war, retreating to Taiwan as Mao's communist forces seized control. With the fall of China to Mao, the ROK suddenly

⁸⁶ Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission*, 129–131.

⁸⁷ Meade, *American Military Government in Korea*, 147.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 148–149.

⁸⁹ Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 152–189.

became more important to the United States in its efforts to contain communism in Asia. The United States rapidly increased its military and economic aid to the ROK. The total aid package from the United States to the ROK increased from \$56 million in 1946 to \$1.1 billion by 1949.⁹⁰ The nearly twenty-fold increase in aid correlated with the US shift in focus from China to the ROK as the ideological battle between the United States and the Soviet Union ramped up.

In 1950, as US aid dollars flowed to the ROK, DPRK forces invaded the ROK, pushing the ROK's forces back to the Pusan Perimeter. By the end of 1950, the United States, the ROK, and United Nations forces broke out of the Pusan Perimeter, reaching as far north as the Yalu River, only to stabilize around the 38th parallel when Mao's forces intervened late in the year to assist the DPRK.⁹¹

The Korean War reinforced Syngman Rhee's attempts to forge a homogenous ROK national identity below the 38th parallel. With troops from the United States and the UN traveling throughout the country, many long-isolated villages encountered modern armies and foreign cultures for the first time.⁹² The ROK army also recruited from these villages, which further integrated rural Koreans into a modern, multicultural experience. The exposure to new cultures helped to convince Koreans that a stronger national education system was necessary to modernize the country. Furthermore, the war's sheer destruction bound the society together.⁹³ As the Chinese, US, UN, and both Korean armies wrought destruction across the peninsula, displaced Koreans found themselves living together in cities, further amalgamating the population. As a result, when the Korean War ended in an armistice in 1953, the ROK gained a distinct national

⁹⁰ US Agency for International Development, "FAE: Reports."

⁹¹ Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, 254–288.

⁹² Matles-Savada, Shaw, and Library of Congress, *South Korea: A Country Study*, 35.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 35–36.

identity forged in blood and sacrifice that would prove useful to Syngman Rhee as he sought to modernize and unify the country.

In the aftermath of the Korean War, US foreign aid to the ROK skyrocketed from \$722 million in 1951 to \$5.9 billion by 1956.⁹⁴ However, while the United States invested heavily in the ROK as a democracy and ally, Syngman Rhee continued to amend the ROK constitution to allow himself to retain power indefinitely, justifying it on the continued threat of the DPRK.⁹⁵ Syngman Rhee’s autocratic tendencies complicated the US strategic vision for the peninsula as a democratic stronghold in Asia.

Meanwhile, the United States faced the task of building the infrastructure and economy the ROK would need to remain an independent nation. When President Truman’s term ended in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the presidency. Initially an opponent of US foreign aid, Eisenhower attempted to implement a “trade, not aid” policy, but the United States deemed the status of the Korean economy and the threat of communism too grave to do anything less than fully invest in building a strong ROK. In the wake of the Korean War, the United States




Figure 2. ROK literacy rate (1945-2015). Created by author, data adapted from Karen Wong, “Diversity and Access to Education,” Middlebury Institute for International Studies, Education in South Korea, accessed December 1, 2017, <http://sites.miis.edu/southkoreaeducation/>.

⁹⁴ US Agency for International Development, “FAE: Reports.”

⁹⁵ Matles-Savada, Shaw, and Library of Congress, *South Korea: A Country Study*, 33–34.

diagnosed the same issues in Korea that had Hodges assessed in 1945: reform the education system, increase electrification, and modernize the economy. With the help of USAID funding, the ROK launched a campaign to build schools and send students overseas for higher education opportunities.⁹⁶ From 1953 to 1970, the ROK's literacy rate rose from just over forty percent to eighty-eight percent, as seen in figure 2. The increased levels in education spurred an educated, professional class to help rebuild the ROK in the ensuing decades.

In the electricity sector, the ROK leveraged US economic aid to boost its generating capacity from 84MW in 1953 to 192.5MW by 1959.⁹⁷ Despite more than doubling capacity, the lack of electricity hampered economic growth as the Koreans attempted to industrialize and modernize every aspect of the economy. Figure 3 shows the strong correlation between the electricity produced and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in the ROK. As the ROK increased its electricity production, a corresponding growth in GDP occurred. It took sixteen years, but by the end of 1969 electricity supply and demand balanced.

As electricity was in short supply until 1969, food prices grew at unreasonable rates due to the lack of fertilizer. Fertilizer, much like before the war, still influenced the price of food. While the ROK built its chemical plants to produce fertilizer, the United States filled the gap through trade deals underwritten by itself. Essentially, the ROK required fertilizer, so the United States sold it fertilizer. However, the ROK did not have the money to buy the fertilizer, so the United States provided economic aid to purchase the fertilizer.⁹⁸ While the US-ROK fertilizer deal was complicated, it helped ease food inflation prices.

⁹⁶ Matles-Savada, Shaw, and Library of Congress, *South Korea: A Country Study*, 35–36.

⁹⁷ Hapdong News Agency, *Korea Annual 1970* (Seoul: Hapdong News Agency, 1970), 198.

⁹⁸ Dennis A. Fitzgerald, "Telephone Conversation to Mr. Coate, 10 February 1961," Fitzgerald, Dennis A.: Papers, 1945-1969, Box 30, Folder 2, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas.




Figure 3. ROK electricity production versus GDP. Created by author, data adapted from Hapdong News Agency, Korea Annual 1970, Seoul, Korea: Hapdong News Agency, 1970.; US Energy Information Administration, “Republic of Korea International Energy Statistics,” last modified March 8, 2018, accessed March 8, 2018, <https://www.eia.gov/>; World Bank Group, “Republic of Korea Data Set,” accessed February 4, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/>.

From 1961 through 1979, the Korean economy grew exponentially. The GDP increased from \$2.4 billion to \$66.5 billion, a 2,700 percent increase.⁹⁹ Simultaneously, US economic aid to the ROK steadily decreased, correlating with the ROK’s growing economic independence.¹⁰⁰ By 1980, the physical reconstruction of Korea was complete, and the nation was economically independent of the United States. While the 1980s witnessed a period of political instability as the ROK Army took control of the government early in the decade, the ROK implemented full, free, and fair elections in 1988, completing the ROK’s journey to democracy. In 2016, the ROK’s GDP has grown to over \$1.4 trillion, placing it 11th worldwide, just behind Canada and ahead of the Russian Federation.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ World Bank Group, “Republic of Korea Data Set,” accessed February 4, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=KR>.

¹⁰⁰ US Agency for International Development, “FAE: Reports.”

¹⁰¹ World Bank Group, “GDP Ranking,” last modified 2016, accessed December 11, 2017, <https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table>.

In Korea, the US military utilized a mixture of direct repair and rebuilding efforts during the USAMGIK period. It then adopted an interagency approach by using USAID for economic aid until 1979, when the ROK economy no longer required US assistance. The US military and USAID approached rebuilding the ROK not with minimal efforts, but rather with a flood of resources for almost thirty years to contain communism on the Korean peninsula and display US nation-building prowess. Figure 4 shows the rapid release of US aid to Korea from 1945 until 1980 when economic aid ended. These efforts produced a stable, independent nation over the course of forty years and helped create a model democracy in Asia. Additionally, the ROK forged a strong national identity, a unity which it further evolved by investing in a robust education system that has resulted in literacy rates increasing to near 100 percent, the establishment of major universities, and globally competitive students who travel to the United States and across the world to prestigious universities. The ROK further used US economic aid to rebuild its infrastructure, most notably its electrical infrastructure. The boost in electricity enabled them to produce the fertilizer needed to grow sufficient food. With American support, the ROK's




Figure 4. US aid to the ROK versus ROK GDP. Created by author, data adapted from US Agency for International Development, “Foreign Aid Explorer (FAE): Reports,” accessed November 6, 2017, <https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports.html>; World Bank Group, “Republic of Korea Data Set,” accessed February 3, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=KR>.

approach to building a modern infrastructure has resulted in a GDP today that is more than 3.5 times the DPRK's \$40 billion GDP.¹⁰² The ROK's success testifies to a robust, whole-of-government approach to nation-building in which the US military's efforts are closely coordinated with interagency efforts.

Conclusion

The purpose of the US Army is to “win the nation's wars.”¹⁰³ However, wars do not always end at a ceasefire or treaty-signing. Thus, the Army's mission must fully encompass the entire spectrum of conflict, including stability operations. The minimalist approach put forth in contemporary Joint and Army doctrine may not work in the wake of future large-scale combat operations in the Middle East.

As shown in the examples of the Republics of the Philippines and Korea, the US military did not always approach the restoration and modernization of essential services in conjunction with nation-building as it does today. In the wake of the Second World War, the US military recognized that it had to approach nation-building with a robust, whole-of-government approach in line with the containment policy. The United States also knew that stamping out an ideology would require it to provide a viable and attractive alternative. The US military viewed the rebuilding of both countries not with a minimalist approach to reestablishing essential services or by shifting the burden to USAID and the State Department as current military doctrine recommends. Rather, it took an active role in rebuilding both countries by concentrating forces, money, and establishing unity of effort with interagency actors. In all, the United States spent almost \$60 billion to rebuild and modernize both countries.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook - Korea, North,” accessed February 4, 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html>.

¹⁰³ US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1–8.

¹⁰⁴ US Agency for International Development, “FAE: Reports.”

In the case of the Philippines, the United States made great strides in infrastructure projects at the macro level, yielding impressive results with dam projects that simultaneously provided irrigation and electricity that helped modernize agriculture and industry. Under the direction of Colonel Lansdale, the United States also wielded infrastructure as a weapon to combat the Huk insurgency, enabling land reform that solidified the trust and confidence of Filipinos as they saw their quality of life improve. Had the US military and interagency partners embraced a minimal approach to nation-building in the Philippines, it is likely that the communist Huks could have flourished, tilting the broader balance of power in favor of communism.

In the case of the ROK, the US military embraced an even more active role, especially in the wake of the Korean War. The lack of electrical infrastructure in the ROK led to food shortages since chemical plants did not have electricity to produce crop fertilizer. The US military both approved the use of alternative fertilizers and worked with interagency partners like USAID to assist the ROK in building modern electrical infrastructure. The US military, under the threat of the DPRK and the spread of communism in the region, utilized a whole-of-government approach to rebuild the country.

The US approach to nation-building in the Philippines and the ROK stands in stark contrast to the current operating environments in Iraq and Afghanistan where the minimalist approach of the US military may have contributed to years of protracted conflict. From General Tommy Franks' refusal to plan for a post-conflict Iraq to the "light footprint" strategy of General George Casey, the minimalist approach in Iraq displayed the military's reticence in tackling nation building.¹⁰⁵ Likewise, in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's hypothesis that small teams backed by overwhelming air power could rapidly win in a hostile environment,

¹⁰⁵ Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 55–74; Michael Kirk, "Endgame," *Frontline* (Public Broadcasting Station, June 19, 2007), accessed March 9, 2018, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/endgame/themes/rumsfeld.html>.

yielded impressive battlefield results but lacked a viable post-conflict plan to stabilize and rebuild a country.¹⁰⁶

The lack of a comprehensive plan in both countries has meant that many well-intentioned projects have failed to meet objectives. Both the Special Investigator General Afghanistan Reports (SIGAR) and the Special Investigator General Iraq Reports (SIGIR) cite multiple examples of US government projects in which poor planning and lack of follow-through undermined success. For example, in the Herat province in Afghanistan, the United States built twenty-five schools, intended to help improve literacy and education. However, when SIGAR followed up on the project, it found that the local population utilized only eleven of the schools.¹⁰⁷ The unused schools suffered from poor construction and lack of students, teachers, and community support.

Road infrastructure in Afghanistan represents another failure in which the minimal, uncoordinated approach from the United States resulted in a failure to meet the needs of the local and national governments. As of 2009, the United States had spent more than three billion dollars on road infrastructure across Afghanistan. The United States built the roads with good intentions, believing that with better transportation networks Afghans would have better access to markets, interconnectivity with other communities, and better opportunities to flourish. However, the effects of the project did not align with the intent. For example, the United States built roadways across privately held lands, which required eminent domain to gain the land.¹⁰⁸ Regardless of the money paid to the landholders, the local people perceived the action as “stealing land.” Another example is a road built to Bamiyan, east of Kabul, where the United States built a road to the

¹⁰⁶ Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 3–23.

¹⁰⁷ John F. Sopko, *SIGAR-17-12-SP - Review: Schools in Herat Province: Observations from Site Visits at 25 Schools* (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, November 2016), 17.

¹⁰⁸ J. Unruh and M. Shalaby, “A Volatile Interaction between Peacebuilding Priorities: Road Infrastructure (Re)Construction and Land Rights in Afghanistan,” *Progress in Development Studies* 12, no. 1 (January 2012): 52.

remote village in the hopes of increasing the village's economic opportunities.¹⁰⁹ However, the United States failed to consider the road also brought the Taliban to the village. The US presence set up a battleground between itself and the Taliban as the two vied for control of the area. Prior to the road, Bamiyan had low insurgent levels due to the lack of American and Taliban access to the village. The road brought accessibility to both belligerents and, subsequently, violence erupted in the village.

US efforts in Iraq experienced similar failures in infrastructure projects by the US misunderstanding the needs and wants of Iraq. The electrical infrastructure within the country is one such example. From 2003 to 2008, the United States, in conjunction with the Iraq government, only provided 4,000MW of power.¹¹⁰ However, the demand for power in Iraq, driven by consumer, commercial, and industrial forces, doubled in that period from 5,000MW to 10,000MW. Even after the US and Iraqi investment in power availability doubled to 8,000MW from 2008 to 2010, demand outpaced availability by increasing another 150% to 15,000MW.¹¹¹ As the United States had learned from its experience in Korea and the Philippines, the failure to generate electricity on pace with demand stunts a nation's recovery.

The US mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan largely stem from a lack of coordinated efforts and clear policy guidance. The pivot away from stability operations and advocating for the restoration of the minimum essential services undermines the creation of a robust, comprehensive effort required to secure long-term interests in a region following protracted military conflicts.

¹⁰⁹ Joshen-Martin Gutsch, "The Road to Bamiyan: A Public Works Debacle That Defines Afghanistan," *Spiegel Online*, accessed May 10, 2017, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/afghanistan-road-project-tells-story-of-taliban-violence-and-failure-a-994569.html>.

¹¹⁰ Luay Al-Khatteeb and Harry Istepanian, "Turn a Light On: Electricity Sector Reform in Iraq" (Brookings Doha Center, March 2015), accessed May 5, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Alkhatteeb-Istepanian-English-PDF.pdf>.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1–3.

Whether future conflicts consist of small-scale or large-scale combat operations, the US military must embrace a robust, well-funded post-conflict plan if it intends to be victorious in the long run. Furthermore, the post-conflict plan must acknowledge the US military's initial leading role. The service members occupy the land, therefore having access to the population, the infrastructure, and security. The State Department and USAID may have the required expertise, but they require the military's resources to make any meaningful impact on national policy objectives, as demonstrated in the Republics of the Philippines and Korea. The initial investment in restoring and modernizing essential services will be large after future combat operations, but it will pale in comparison to long-term military commitments.

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