Fighting for Intelligence: Preparing Division Intelligence Operations for Large Scale Combat
Abstract
The last seventeen years of counterinsurgency operations saw many of the Army's division-level intelligence analysts and equipment remain in static, centralized tactical operations centers to facilitate intelligence support to ground operations. The recently published Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (October 2017), shifts the Army's focus from counterinsurgency to large scale ground combat operations. These operations bring with them the requirement for divisions to be able to establish multiple forward command posts (CPs) that are survivable and able to facilitate mission command in degraded and contested domains. To support large scale combat, intelligence sections must rebalance personnel, capabilities, and equipment across all CPs a division is capable of establishing to enable the survivability of the division's Intelligence Warfighting Function. This requires moving personnel and intelligence specific equipment out of the Main Command Post and the Tactical Command Post to support the Support Area/Early Entry Command Post and the Mobile Command Group if desired by the commander. To account for US peer threat adversaries' ability to contest the US Army's access to the space domain through electronic and cyber-attack, this reorganization also requires adjustments in the division's communication plan to account for analog communication.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 23, 2019
- Accession Number
- AD1087492
Entities
People
- Brian D. Chavis
Organizations
- School of Advanced Military Studies