

IMPACT OF JAPAN'S SECURITY STRATEGY AND POLICIES ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

IMPACT OF JAPAN'S SECURITY STRATEGY AND POLICIES ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC., by Sung Keun Hyong, 218 pages.

An implacable and formidable foe during the Second World War, Japan is now one of the United States' most reliable and capable allies in the Indo-Pacific. A region in transition, the Indo-Pacific includes four of the world's nine nuclear powers and the world's three largest economies. Amidst a dynamic and devolving threat environment, the region is struggling to accommodate the dominant rise of China and an increasingly capable nuclear-armed North Korea. Against this unstable security backdrop, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's administration is taking unprecedented post-war actions to ensure Japan's national security and prosperity. This study identified the Abe administration's omnidirectional "Proactive Contribution to Peace" approach to Japan's national security strategy, focusing on its diplomatic, informational, military, and economic policies.

Facing a regional security order increasingly dominated by China and punctuated by DPRK missile launches, Japan is entering a realist period marked by an assertive security mindset. Its anti-war national identity, democratic model of economic success, and military support role within the U.S.-Japan alliance have historically characterized Japan's security outlook. However, Japan's controversial reinterpretation of Article 9 and emerging leadership roles in regional frameworks such as the CPTPP illustrate Japan's modern security awakening. As Japan strives to move past its imperialist wartime legacy and the security dilemma, its regional engagement and security activism may prove consequential for U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific.

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ACRONYMS

A2/AD	Anti-Access/Area Denial
ACM	Alliance Coordination Mechanism
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BDFC	Basic Defense Force Concept
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CPTPP	Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TPP [TPP-11]
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic
DoD	Department of Defense [U.S.]
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea [North Korea]
ECS	East China Sea
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
JMSDF	Japan Maritime Self Defense Force
J-NSS	National Security Strategy [Japan]
JSDF	Japan Self Defense Force
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party [Japan]
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MOD	Ministry of Defense [Japan]
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council [Japan]

NSS	National Security Strategy [U.S.]
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PLA	People's Liberation Army [China]
ROK	Republic of Korea [South Korea]
SCS	South China Sea
SLOC	Sea Line of Communication
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP-12]
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States
USD	United States Dollar
WWII	Second World War

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.

—Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*

The Indo-Pacific region continues to cope with its legacy of territorial strife, ideological differences, and economic disparity. The dynamic diversity of national agendas and interests reinforces the geopolitical stress points throughout the populous region. China continues to develop its power projection capabilities and expand its spheres of influence. Its territorial contentions in the South China Sea (SCS) demonstrate its willingness to impose its national will upon the Indo-Pacific. In addition, the convergence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) nuclear weaponization and missile technology programs remains the foremost security issue in Northeast Asia. As a result, relational power structures between and among the regional powers are increasingly unfixed. In response, Japan has moved towards greater engagement with the international security community. Seeking to improve its security profile in the region, Japan is adopting an assertive realist approach to national security.

The United States (U.S.) is also striving to develop a coherent and viable Indo-Pacific strategy, especially as it confronts the consequences of China's rapid ascension as a regional and global power.¹ However, the U.S. is operating under financial constraints and remains distracted by events outside of the Indo-Pacific. To maintain strategic

¹ Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, "Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China," Council on Foreign Relations, no. 72, March 2015, accessed February 18, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/report/revising-us-grand-strategy-toward-china>.

relevance and manage the variable balance of power, the U.S. is encouraging and supporting Japan's efforts to become a more self-sufficient and active security partner. Due to Japan's historical function as a credible counterbalance against China and its more modern role as a democratic advocate of the U.S.-built rules-based order, the island nation inhabits a pivotal position in the U.S.' strategic calculus. Mounting ambivalence surrounding China's potential ambitions for regional hegemony is intensifying "strategic confusion" in the Indo-Pacific.² Consequently, it has increased regional interest in Japan's ability to do more for the region's security and stability. Especially among the Southeast Asian countries caught in the great power rivalry between the U.S. and China, there has been increasing appeals for Japan to take a more active role in the Indo-Pacific.³

Japan's government, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), has proven receptive to those calls to action. Known as the "Abe Doctrine," Japan's foreign and security policies have "shown a determination to build upon the trajectory of previous administrations in expanding Japan's capabilities that can contribute to U.S.-Japan security cooperation and to further stretch these to new levels."⁴ Despite a sharply divided public, Japan has gradually broadened the

² Peter Drysdale, Shiro Armstrong, Ben Ascione, Amy King, Liam Gammon, Jillian Mowbray-Tsutsumi, and Ben Hillman, "Sorting Out Strategic Confusion in the Indo-Pacific," East Asia Forum, January 29, 2018, accessed March 2, 2018, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/01/29/sorting-out-strategic-confusion-in-the-indo-pacific/>.

³ Jian Yang, "Japan's Decline Relative to China: Scenarios and Implications for East Asia," *Journal of Political Science* 62, no. 2 (May 2, 2017): 163, accessed March 1, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032318710384045>.

⁴ Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's Security Policy in the Context of the US-Japan Alliance: The Emergence of an 'Abe Doctrine'," in *Japan's Foreign Relations in Asia*, eds. James D.J. Brown and Jeff Kingston (New York: Routledge, 2018), 54, accessed January 14, 2018, Google Ebook.

interpretation of its anti-war constitution amid concerns over its diminishing relative power, the threat of DPRK, and the rise of China.⁵ An October 2017 survey of the Japanese public by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute showed “32 percent in favor, 21 percent opposed, and 39 percent unsure” regarding Prime Minister Abe’s proposal to revise Article 9 and legitimize the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) as Japan’s military.⁶ The public’s traditional aversion to overt military activism notwithstanding, the Abe Doctrine seeks to employ Japan’s latent national capacity to more assuredly guarantee its security.

However, the perception of Japan’s increasing militarism and nationalism among its neighbors may feed regional unrest and instability. Japan has yet to fully emerge from the shadow of its historical imperialist aspirations. Enduring mistrust of Japan’s motives, most prominently in China and South Korea (ROK), perpetuates reactive regional politics and heightens the possibility of miscommunication, miscalculation, and armed conflict. Despite their separate alliances with the U.S. as well as their own established security and economic ties, the Japan-ROK relationship has yet to recover from the Second World War (WWII) and reach appreciable rapprochement. Belied by historical concerns such as the “comfort women” issue, revisionist history in Japan, and the maritime dispute over the Liancourt Rocks, called Dokdo by South Korea and Takeshima by Japan, bilateral

⁵ Motoko Rich, “Shinzo Abe Announces Plan to Revise Japan’s Pacifist Constitution,” *The New York Times*, May 3, 2017, accessed November 5, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/03/world/asia/japan-constitution-shinzo-abe-military.html>.

⁶ Linda Sieg, “Japan's Abe to push Pacifist Constitution Reform after Strong Election Win,” *Reuters*, October 22, 2017, accessed January 20, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-election/japans-abe-to-push-pacifist-constitution-reform-after-strong-election-win-idUSKBN1CS0C3>.

improvement remains elusive.⁷ These conflicting and uncompromising narratives of national identity have continuously frustrated U.S. attempts to strengthen the trilateral security framework.

Japan also has a tense territorial dispute with Russia, its uneasy neighbor to the north. Russia sent troops to occupy the southern Kuril Islands in September of 1945, ejecting the Japanese residents in the process.⁸ Japan has since sought the return of those four islands, calling them its “Northern Territories,” and this friction continues to mar Russo-Japanese relations.⁹ Perhaps unsurprisingly, Japan’s most contentious and final territorial dispute is with China. The maritime dispute over the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands, called the Diaoyu Islands in China, revolves around national sovereignty, access to significant maritime resources such as fishing grounds, and enforcement of the economic exclusion zone. Involved in maritime territorial disputes with South Korea, Russia, and China, Japan’s security-seeking behavior may exacerbate these acute geopolitical tensions. Figure 1 shows Japan’s three maritime territorial disputes: Dokdo/Takeshima Island with South Korea, Kuril Islands/Northern Territories with Russia, and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands with China.

⁷ Genron NPO, “The 5th Japan-South Korea Public Opinion Poll,” July 13, 2017, accessed February 19, 2018, http://www.genron-npo.net/en/archives/170721_en.pdf.

⁸ Alexander Bukh, “Japan’s National Identity, Territorial Disputes and Sub-State Actors: Northern Territories/South Kuriles and Takeshima/Dokdo Compared,” *UNISCI Discussion Papers* 32 (May 2013): 173, accessed April 11, 2018, 10.5209/rev_UNIS.2013.n32.44795.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 174.



Figure 1. Map of Japan

Source: Congressional Research Service, *Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress*, by Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mark E. Manyin, Rebecca M. Nelson, Brock R. Williams, and Taishu Yamakawa, RL 33436, February 16, 2017, 5, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf>.

The implementation of Abe's security reforms also face significant domestic headwinds as well. Holding tight to an anti-war ethos, Japan also carries the dual burden of having not only the world's oldest citizenry but also the world's largest debt-to-Gross

Domestic Product (GDP) ratio.¹⁰ As Japan's demographic and labor challenges continue to put pressure on its economy, the inescapable influence of complicating economic ties with China also factors into the Abe administration's intentions and policies. After all, China is Japan's largest trading partner. It constitutes 27 percent of imports and 19 percent of exports, first and second in terms of trade value, respectively.¹¹ Therefore, the extent to which Abe's security policy objectives will come to fruition remain shrouded in doubt. These reservations have muted strategic discussion of Japan's national security strategy and its potential militarization efforts in the U.S.

The U.S.-Japan security alliance is deep-rooted, and both countries have kept a watchful eye on its benefits and costs throughout its existence. However, that relationship now needs to be re-examined and weighted towards a study of an assertive Japan's prospective impact on the region. Rather than retreating into a haven of isolationism, Japan has embarked on a potentially consequential course that may frustrate the U.S.' attempts to contain and manage the effects of a powerful and confident China and an unpredictable DPRK. It is vital for the U.S. to explore these changes and evolving conditions rather than rely on assumptions that may no longer hold true.

Background

Northeast Asian countries have always played pre-defined roles in the American consciousness. Economic and cultural distinctions, rather than military considerations, predominantly labeled the region's environment. These defining characteristics included

¹⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook: Japan*, accessed November 5, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html>.

¹¹ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, "Japan," The MIT Media Lab, 2016, accessed May 3, 2018, <https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/jpn/>.

China's tremendous population and economic potential, DPRK's mercurial temperament and belligerence, South Korea's democratic and technological progress, and Japan's industrious economy and unique culture. The military aspect rarely surfaced past these economic and cultural idiosyncrasies.

However, that is no longer the case. China's pursuit of its territorial claims and its burgeoning military and economic power, DPRK's increasingly credible threats to regional and global security, South Korea's geographic significance and vulnerability, and Japan's strategic role in "island chains" containment have come to dominate the conversation regarding Northeast Asia.¹² "Given a widely perceived worsening regional security environment," the efficacy and endurance of the region's consequence management mechanisms come into question.¹³ Global perceptions and international sensitivity of this region have undergone dramatic change during which military considerations have muscled their way to the fore.

In the decades since Imperial Japan's unconditional surrender in 1945, post-war Japan has achieved startling success as a global economic power. Behind China and the

¹² Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow, "Why Islands Still Matter in Asia: The Enduring Significance of the Pacific 'Island Chains'," Princeton University: China and the World Program, February 5, 2016, accessed September 26, 2017, <https://cwp.princeton.edu/news/why-islands-still-matter-asia-cwp-alumni-erickson-wuthnow>.

¹³ Andrew P. Liff and Andrew S. Erickson, "From Management Crisis to Crisis Management? Japan's post-2012 Institutional Reforms and Sino-Japanese Crisis (In)stability," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 40, no. 5 (2017): 629, accessed January 8, 2018, <http://www-tandfonline-com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2017.1293530?needAccess=true>.

United States, Japan is the third largest economy in the world in terms of nominal GDP.¹⁴ Alongside South Korea, Japan is well-established as a leading model of financial success and peaceful democracy in Northeast Asia, due in large part to its capitalist market economy and an anti-war constitution containing Article 9 that forbids war as a means of settling international disputes.¹⁵ In recognition of its economic power and global influence, many international relations analysts have considered Japan as a great power despite its self-imposed military limitations.¹⁶ However, China's de facto economic dominance and the translation of that influence into military clout threatens to relegate Japan to a middle power status. The comfortable days of being the preeminent Asian power have past and now Japan must contend with the reality of a transforming Asia.

As the dominant power broker in the Indo-Pacific since WWII, the U.S. must also cope with a region in transition. The U.S. has long enjoyed superiority in the regional arena of international relations. Bolstered by mutual security commitments and instrumental relationships with South Korea and Japan, the U.S. is undoubtedly a Pacific power. The U.S.-Japan security alliance plays a key role in underpinning that distinction. Both parties have benefited tremendously since the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the U.S. and Japan was signed on January 19, 1960 and entered into

¹⁴ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, s.v., "The World's Top 10 Economies," 2017, accessed September 21, 2017, <http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/022415/worlds-top-10-economies.asp>.

¹⁵ Government of Japan, *The Constitution of Japan*, Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, November 3, 1946, accessed January 4, 2018, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

¹⁶ Vesna Danilovic, *When the Stakes are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 42–44.

force on June 23, 1960.¹⁷ The relationship remains the backbone of not only Japan's national security but also the security bedrock ensuring peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

However, the U.S. and Japan find themselves both confronting the grim prospect of declining power and influence. In Japan, the mounting pressure of an aging population and struggling economy threatens to submerge the country into mediocrity and a regional relevance increasingly dependent on its relationship with the United States.¹⁸ Japan is the oldest country in the world with a median age of 47.1 years.¹⁹ Since its "people power" peak in the 1990s, Japan's low birth rate of 1.4 children per woman falls short of the 2.1 children required to maintain population levels without assistance from migration.²⁰ That deficit has steadily cut into Japan's workforce, threatening to strangle much of the growth required to sustain the economy. Notable think tanks such as the RAND Corporation and Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) consistently reference these adverse factors in their scrutiny of the country's constrained potential to develop momentum towards its national ambitions. The twin demographic challenges of an aging population

¹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America*, January 19, 1960, accessed August 19, 2017, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html>.

¹⁸ Government of Japan, *Abenomics: For Future Growth, For Future Generations, and For a Future Japan that is Robust*, January 2018, accessed April 11, 2018, <https://www.japan.go.jp/abenomics/index.html>.

¹⁹ Deloitte Insights, "Ageing Tigers, Hidden Dragons," *Voice of Asia*, 3rd ed., September 15, 2017, accessed September 19, 2017, <https://dupress.deloitte.com/dup-us-en/economy/voice-of-asia/sept-2017/demographics-ageing-tigers-hidden-dragons.html>.

²⁰ Ibid.

and a shrinking workforce reverberate through Japan's economy, reinforcing a low growth rate further burdened by a substantial social security system.²¹

Prime Minister Abe's three-pronged economic program, commonly known as "Abenomics," was unveiled in early 2013 and sought to reverse decades of stagnation.²² Surpassed as the second largest economy in the world by China in 2010, Japan has struggled with its lackluster economic growth, deflation, and public debt. Japan's public debt is the largest in the world and remains unsustainable at 239 percent of GDP in 2016, leading to gross financing needs of 54 percent of GDP.²³ The International Monetary Fund projects the debt-to-GDP ratio will reach 255 percent by 2030.²⁴ Despite these persisting challenges, Abenomics has made key advancements towards improving Japan's economic conditions. Unemployment is at 2.8 percent, the lowest in twenty-three years while nominal GDP and corporate ordinary profit are at record highs.²⁵ While China's economy begins to mature and slow down from its previous dramatic gains, Japan's careful and efficient management of its economy will have a decisive impact on current and future implementation of its security policies and programs.

²¹ Japan Ministry of Finance, *Demographic Challenges to Japan's Fiscal Policy*, Policy Research Institute, November 2016, accessed November 6, 2017, https://www.mof.go.jp/pri/research/conference/fy2016/adbi_01_01.pdf.

²² Government of Japan, *Abenomics*, 3.

²³ International Monetary Fund, "2017 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Japan," Asia and Pacific Department, *IMF Staff Country Report* no. 17 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund), July 31, 2017, 57–58, accessed December 2, 2017, <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/07/31/Japan-2017-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-Executive-45149>.

²⁴ Government of Japan, *Abenomics*, 1.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 78.

However, China will unmistakably continue to have the geoeconomic advantage over Japan. Fueled by its prodigious economic engine, China's assertive actions to become a dominant, if not the preeminent, power in the Indo-Pacific have alarmed its neighbors. Their geopolitical anxiety, including that of the U.S., stems from China's strategic opacity and more specifically, its potential aspiration to establish a regional hegemony. In 2011, the Obama administration's "Pivot to the Pacific" and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's "America's Pacific Century" speech acknowledged the rising stakes of this consequential region and sought to reassure U.S.' allies and partners.²⁶ Indicating a fundamental shift in perspective, the Obama administration's "pivot" geographically encompassed much more of the former Asia-Pacific region. It recognized the holistic and complex regional dynamics that must be taken into account to formulate an effective strategy.²⁷ In her "America's Pacific Century" speech, Clinton highlighted the emergence of the Asia-Pacific as the world's strategic and economic center of gravity in the 21st century.²⁸

The U.S.' controversial withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trump administration's transactional approach to U.S. relationships with allies such as South Korea and Japan both indicate a more moderated strategic emphasis on the

²⁶ Congressional Research Service, *Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" Toward Asia*, by Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F. Martin, Ronald O'Rourke, and Bruce Vaughn, CRS R42448, Washington, DC, March 28, 2012, 16, accessed September 25, 2017, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf>.

²⁷ Ibid., 2.

²⁸ Hillary R. Clinton, "American's Pacific Century" (video of speech, East-West Center, Honolulu, HI, November 10, 2011), accessed September 26, 2017, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/11/176999.htm>.

Pacific. In the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), the Trump administration highlights reciprocity, shared responsibility, and “a clear-eyed assessment of U.S. interests,” emphatically declaring that “this National Security Strategy puts America first.”²⁹ At the same time, it promotes the view of this geostrategic region as vital to national interests, namely to promote American prosperity, preserve peace through strength, and advance American influence.³⁰ The 2017 NSS concludes that “sustaining favorable balances of power will require a strong commitment and close cooperation with allies and partners because allies and partners magnify U.S. power and extend U.S. influence.”³¹

A pivotal ally, Japan has helped the U.S. maintain the favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific since WWII. As a primary beneficiary of the U.S.-built regional architecture, Japan has its own interests in the continued soundness of the rules-based order. To that end, the Abe administration is endeavoring to minimize the effects of Japan’s anti-war constitutional limitations. However, its efforts are still fiercely challenged not only politically by opposition parties but also culturally by the Japanese people. Popular domestic support has long been withheld due to fears of entanglement in foreign wars and the lasting trauma of WWII. However, the increasingly plausible threat of DPRK missile attacks has encouraged the cautious appeal of constitutional reinterpretation, if not revision. Nonetheless, doubts persist concerning the probability of

²⁹ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy of the United States, 2017* (Washington, DC: U.S. Printing Office, December 2017), 1, accessed May 9, 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 46.

Japan achieving its goals and regaining the initiative as a regional power. Meanwhile, China inexorably marches towards its “China Dream of national rejuvenation,” grounded in part on the rapid military modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).³² Despite the strategic urgency, Japan’s looked-for potential may go largely unfilled due to its significant domestic constraints.

Historically, and even more so today, the U.S. has had a profound vested interest in the future of Japan. In the U.S., there has been sustained support for Japan’s expansion of its security activities without adequate analysis of the consequences. It’s yet unclear whether Japan’s strategy will exacerbate risks within the parameters of U.S. national interests, or perhaps even introduce new ones. Now more than ever, the right approach to the Indo-Pacific region is critical to U.S.’ national interests.

Problem Statement

Japan’s broadening strategic horizons and the prioritization of its security strategy reveal the unease with which it views the evolving security order. Several grave threats to regional stability continue to define the security environment of the Indo-Pacific. The DPRK nuclear weapons program and China’s maritime claims in the SCS relentlessly disrupt the region’s equilibrium. The escalation of DPRK’s missile launches over Japan as well as the robust and unpredictable responses of the SCS littoral states to China’s territorial ambitions also contribute to the region’s volatility. As Japan attempts to advance and consolidate its domestic security capabilities, this shift in strategic security

³² U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 15, 2017), i, accessed March 5, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF.

strategy potentially has far-reaching implications for the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. In particular, Japan's security developments have stoked concerns in China over its longstanding belief in its intended de facto containment through American, Japanese, and Indian "encirclement," a perceived humiliation and direct impediment to its great power ambitions.³³ South Korea, another key U.S. ally and Japan's nominal security partner, has also expressed reservations over Japan's intentions, accentuated by continuing friction over long-standing historical issues.

Amid this challenging security environment, Japan faces an uncertain future. Japan's efforts to craft an effective national security strategy and manage these difficult security issues are further compounded by a deepening domestic perception of Japan as a state in decline.³⁴ To overcome these vital challenges, Japan is shifting to a more assertive security strategy through confident and integrated diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means. As Japan's only treaty ally and with its own national interests at stake, the U.S. must understand Japan's strategic objectives.

Peace and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific are paramount to U.S. interests, and Japan's transition to a more assertive and regionally engaged security strategy may be in conflict with those security objectives. The U.S. defense community has long viewed Japan's activist approach to regional security and the global security architecture

³³ John W. Garver, "Diverging Perceptions of China's Emergence as an Indian Ocean Power," *Asia Policy*, no. 22 (July 2016): 56–60, accessed January 13, 2018, *Political Science Complete*, EBSCOhost.

³⁴ Yang, *Japan's Decline Relative to China*, 146.

as a critical enabler for U.S.’ own ability to meet regional security challenges.³⁵

However, the shift from a strictly defense-oriented strategy to one based more on power projection may be a volatile addition to the historical tensions and territorial disputes in the region. The specter of the security dilemma still lingers in an increasingly multiplex region occupied by confident and capable states such as China, Japan, and India. The U.S. must review the ramifications of such a fundamental change and ask: will this increase regional instability and frustrate our ability to “manage great power rivalries and power competitions without violent conflict and preserve peace?”³⁶

The 2015 NSS emphatically denied the “inevitability of confrontation” with China, seeking mechanisms to reduce the risk of miscommunication and miscalculation.³⁷ On the other hand, the 2017 NSS lists the “revisionist power of China” alongside other main challengers to the U.S. such as Russia, Iran, DPRK, and transnational threat organizations.³⁸ Highlighting the gravity of China’s revisionist potential, it identifies China’s ambitions to “displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor.”³⁹ As a result, it calls on U.S. allies such as Japan “to modernize, acquire

³⁵ Jeffrey Hornung, “Japan’s Election Matters for U.S. Interests,” RAND Corporation, October 21, 2017, accessed November 8, 2017, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/10/japans-election-matters-for-us-interests.html>.

³⁶ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy, 2017*, 26.

³⁷ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy of the United States, 2015*, Washington, DC: U.S. Printing Office, February 2015, 24, accessed November 1, 2017, <http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf>.

³⁸ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy, 2017*, 25.

³⁹ Ibid.

necessary capabilities, improve readiness, expand the size of their forces, and affirm the political will to win.”⁴⁰

However, in doing so, Japan’s aim of stabilizing and improving its security position runs the risk of heightening the pervasive regional unease already present due to China’s power projection, territorial claims, and expanding PLA naval presence. Japan’s evolving approach to establishing power parity or superiority in relation to its neighbors and rivals may run counter to U.S.’ objectives in the NSS. Despite the historical and strategic relevance of Japan in this dynamic security environment, inadequate research has been conducted on the evolving impact of Japan’s policies on the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. Against this rapidly evolving backdrop, it is imperative for the U.S. to grasp the ramifications of Japan’s security strategy for its own regional security approach. The magnitude of Japan’s changes in strategic direction has not been sufficiently researched and more importantly, its implications for U.S. national interests remain grounded more in speculation than in concrete analysis.

The Research Question

The primary research question is whether or not Japan’s security strategy is detrimental to U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific. The secondary research questions are as follows:

1. What geopolitical and geoeconomic trends are influencing Japan’s perspective of its regional role and power?
2. What are Japan’s national security strategy and policies, and how have they changed?

⁴⁰ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy*, 2017, 28.

3. How will Japan's domestic conditions limit the implementation of its national security strategy?

Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and develop a response to the primary research question: Is Japan's security strategy detrimental to U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific? To facilitate this response, additional secondary questions must be addressed regarding Japan's security objectives, domestic constraints, and internal and external environments. A qualitative approach will apply the framework of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) lines of effort to Japan's whole-of-government national strategy to provide structure and clarify its approach. The 2017 U.S. NSS will be the primary evaluation criteria, supplemented by additional strategic guidance relevant to the Indo-Pacific region.

Key Terms and Definitions

Security Dilemma. American political scientist John H. Herz coined the term "security dilemma" in 1950, essentially describing it as a social construct of competition in which one's concern over its own security drives it to accumulate power and that in turn engenders insecurity in others and compels them to acquire more power as well.⁴¹ Social scientist Robert Jervis expressed the security dilemma in terms of how one state's

⁴¹ John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (January 1950): 157–180, accessed October 1, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009187>.

gain in security will inevitably and often inadvertently threaten the security of others.”⁴²

Among nation-states, he identified the fear of being exploited as the single greatest driver of the security dilemma.⁴³ Jervis also stressed how if “states do not understand that trying to increase one’s security can actually decrease it . . . they will end up, if not in war, then at least in a relationship of higher conflict.”⁴⁴

Power Politics. The international relations framework for the methods used by states to gain power in order to protect their own interests and ensure survival while preventing others from doing the same. Robert Jervis describes it as the overriding imperative for states to maximize its share of world power due to fear of others and unending competition.⁴⁵ States will unrelentingly seek to gain power at the expense of others and prevent their rivals from gaining it at their own expense.⁴⁶

Alliance. Many influential scholars such as Hans J. Morgenthau, Edwin Fedder, Stephen Walt, Robert Keohane, and George Liska have defined or described alliance. However, for the primary purpose of placing the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the most appropriate context, Stefan Bergmann’s definition of alliance will be used in this thesis. An alliance is “an explicit agreement among states in the realm of national security in

⁴² Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 169, accessed September 30, 2017, <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/guide/jervissecdil.pdf>.

⁴³ Ibid., 172.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 182.

⁴⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 1.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 2.

which the partners promise mutual assistance in the form of a substantial contribution of resources in the case of a certain contingency the arising of which is uncertain.”⁴⁷

Instruments of National Power (DIME). The instruments of national power are the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means through which a state can achieve its national strategic objectives. Diplomacy is the principal instrument for engaging with other states and foreign groups to advance a state’s values, interests, and objectives.⁴⁸ Information as an instrument of national power entails the synchronization, alignment, and coordination of programs, plans, themes, messages, and products to engage key audiences.⁴⁹ Military is the coercive ability to compel an adversary through the application or threat of force, or to prevent the adversary from generating a similar effect in return.⁵⁰ Economic is the state’s application of global markets and resources to advance national interests, policies, and objectives.⁵¹

Rivalry. Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz uses an analytical approach to describe rivalry as “a relationship between two states in which both use, with some regularity, military threats and force as well as one in which both sides formulate foreign policy in

⁴⁷ Stefan Bergsmann, “The Concept of Military Alliance,” in *Small States and Alliances*, eds. Erich Reiter and Heinz Gartner, 20–31 (New York: Physica-Verlag Heidelberg, 2001), 29, accessed October 1, 2017, http://www.bundesheer.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/05_small_states_04.pdf.

⁴⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the US* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2013), 40.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 41.

⁵¹ Ibid.

military terms.”⁵² William Thompson defines rivalry as the dyadic relationship a state has with a competitor who is a source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming militarized and thus become an enemy.⁵³

Strategy. The U.S. DoD defines strategy as a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve “theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”⁵⁴ Liddell Hart describes strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”⁵⁵ Dr. Harry R. Yarger expresses strategy as the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, social-psychological, and military powers of the state in accordance with policy guidance to create effects that protect or advance national interests relative to other states, actors, or circumstances.⁵⁶ However, this paper will focus on strategy in terms of national security and will use Richard B. Doyle’s definition for national security strategy: “the nation’s plan for the coordinated use of all the

⁵² Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, *War and Peace in International Rivalry* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2000), 4, accessed September 22, 2017, <https://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472111272.pdf>.

⁵³ William R. Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (December 2001): 557–586, accessed October 1, 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3096060?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

⁵⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2017), 227.

⁵⁵ Basil Henry Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Meridian/Plume, March 1991).

⁵⁶ Harry R. Yarger, “Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy” (Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, February 2006), 2, accessed February 18, 2018, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/20753/Strategic%20Theory%20for%20the%2021st%20Century.pdf>.

instruments of state power—nonmilitary as well as military—to pursue objectives that defend and advance the national interest.”⁵⁷

Assumptions

There are five key assumptions in this thesis. First and foremost, the alliance between Japan and the U.S. will remain intact and continue to underpin Japan’s security outlook and military development. Second, the DPRK’s current regime under Kim Jong-un will remain the single most potent source of instability and potential cause of conflict in the region. Third, China will continue to exert its national power and challenge U.S. influence in the region. Fourth, even if the LDP does not retain control of the Japanese government, the national security strategy molded by Prime Minister Abe will not appreciably change in strategic direction. Lastly, the U.S. will remain committed to the Indo-Pacific region, bolstering its engagement with key allies and partners as well as coming to terms with China and the threat of DPRK.

Scope

In order to focus the research, the scope of this study will be limited to the geographic boundaries of the Indo-Pacific region, primarily focusing on Northeast Asia and the SCS. Research outside of this geographic framework will be included primarily for their relevance to Japan’s strategic interactions and influence in an international context. Notable examples include Japan’s involvement with international security organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty

⁵⁷ Richard B. Doyle, “The U.S. National Security Strategy: Policy, Process, Problems,” *Public Administration Review* 7, no. 4 (July-August 2007), 624–629, accessed September 26, 2017, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00748.x/>.

Organization (NATO), illustrated by its UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations (PKO) in Africa and the Middle East. This study will also explore Japan's global diplomatic influence and economic outreach to place Japan's employment of its national will and great power capabilities into context for the reader.

The historical timeframe for this study will be between May 1947 and May 2018. Beginning with Japan's defeat in WWII and the subsequent implementation of the Yoshida Doctrine, this 71-year span will provide the necessary historical background to help understand Japan's culture, development of national insecurity and militant pride, and its reactions to changes in its security environment and power dynamics. To do so, the study also acknowledges the enduring cultural undercurrents of imperial Japan, such as its ideologies of militarism and nationalism. This includes Japan's struggle to gain foreign recognition of its achievements and achieve equal standing with the West during the Meiji and Taisho periods, embodied by the Meiji slogan *Fukoku kyōhei*, meaning "Rich Country, Strong Army."⁵⁸

Limitations and Delimitations

Due to the language constraint, the research will not cover scholarly documents written solely in Japanese. While the lack of research pertaining specifically to Japanese-only texts may pose a risk of insufficient comprehensive coverage of this topic, it is largely mitigated by the emphasis on English translations in Japan's governmental and academic institutions. The rapidly evolving nature of the Indo-Pacific region is another element to consider in maintaining the accuracy and relevance of this thesis. The paper

⁵⁸ Steven Vogel, ed., *U.S.-Japan Relations in a Changing World* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2002), 67, accessed September 10, 2017, Google Ebook.

will seek to minimize the risk of being outdated by identifying and analyzing the underlying causes when addressing current events.

Significance

In an evolving multiplex world order, the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region has become a dominant concern not only for the United States, but for the international community. Professor Amitav Acharya at the American University in Washington considers how “a multiplex world comprises multiple key actors whose relationship is defined by complex forms of interdependence.”⁵⁹ While the United States remains the world’s only superpower, its comparative advantages in power projection and ability to dictate terms are no longer as assured. Dr. John Ikenberry, a prominent international relations scholar at Princeton University, describes the fading of the American-led liberal hegemony writ large. However, he also points to the reassuring rise of security interdependence due to complex alignments of shared interests among both old great powers and new rising powers.⁶⁰

As this redistribution of regional power takes place, entrenched national interests, unresolved disputes, and the lack of mitigation mechanisms continue to uphold the Indo-Pacific’s potential for conflict. In addition, transnational activities such as cyberwarfare and terrorism as well as the threat of nuclear proliferation add to the fundamental fragility

⁵⁹ Amitav Acharya, “From the Unipolar Moment to the Multiplex World,” Yale Global Online, July 3, 2014, accessed March 10, 2018, <https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/unipolar-moment-multiplex-world>.

⁶⁰ Gilford J. Ikenberry, “The Liberal International Order and its Discontents,” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 38, no. 3 (May 10, 2010): 511–515, accessed April 4, 2018, <http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IntlSec/IntlSecReads/LiberalIntlismIken2010.14p.pdf>.

of the regional security framework. The increased capabilities of both state and non-state actors have not only led to shrinking capability gaps but have also heightened the risks of miscalculation. Dr. Ikenberry suggests the greatest threat to international stability rises from the weakness of states and their inability to enforce law and order within their own societies rather than purely great power security competition.⁶¹ In light of DPRK's provocative missile capabilities and China's aggressive posture as well as non-state threats, this study has taken on increasing urgency and importance. The evolution of Japan's strategic thinking represents an influential disruption to the current regional dynamics, introducing a new layer of capability-based complexity and uncertainty into Japan's relationships with its neighbors. The current U.S. strategic guidance may not yet have adequately taken the implications of this change into account.

Japan's political and military leaders, vocal citizenry, and even foreign allies such as South Korea debate the potential role of Japan going forward in a contested and multiplex security environment. Bridging this gap in understanding is crucial for optimizing the roles of the U.S. and other stakeholders who are deeply invested in the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. To that end, this paper will explore the potential dangers of misaligned strategy through the DIME analysis. In conclusion, this thesis will provide another perspective on the holistic impact of Japan's national security strategy. As a result of its findings, the research may contribute to validation or conversely, a course correction, in the strategic direction of the United States and Japan as they navigate through a precariously transitioning Indo-Pacific region.

⁶¹ Ikenberry, *The Liberal International Order and its Discontents*, 517.

Summary

This thesis will contribute to the strategic policy discussion in the U.S. on the development of Japan's national strategic policies and the resultant impact on U.S.' national interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This region will only become more prominent and dynamic as its residents become more capable and invested in its economic resources, power-sharing arrangements, and the future security environment. Admiral Harry B. Harris, U.S. Pacific Command commander, definitively stated: "the Indo-Asia-Pacific region remains the most consequential area for America's future."⁶² As a regional power with increasing interest and engagement in its security commitments abroad, Japan's influence and ability to bring about change should not be underestimated.

U.S.' strategic priorities and its diverse and evolving relationships within the region must be re-examined to ensure the U.S. remains a relevant power and a stabilizing regional partner in the Indo-Pacific. To that end, this thesis discusses whether or not the U.S. *should* unequivocally support Japan's security policies. Due to the strength and prominence of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan's actions will force strategic adjustments throughout the region with possibly unintended and grave consequences. Acute sources of regional instability, China and the DPRK are exerting greater influence on the security environment in their own respective ways. In response, the U.S. approach to maintain regional stability must act in concert with Japan's national security strategy. This thesis will present an updated evaluation of this essential synergy and the suitability of their respective strategies in managing Indo-Pacific security developments.

⁶² Jim Garamone, "Indo-Asia-Pacific Region Remains 'Most Consequential' to America, PACOM Chief Says," U.S. Department of Defense, November 15, 2016, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1004839/indo-asia-pacific-region-remains-most-consequential-to-america-pacom-chief-says/>.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region.

—U.S. Government Executive Branch, *U.S. National Security Strategy*, 2017

Introduction

The U.S. has long had a keen regard and appreciation for the geopolitical significance of the Indo-Pacific region. In recent years, the ability of the U.S.-Japan alliance to adapt quickly and effectively has become increasingly challenged by this unpredictable and multiplex region. China's rise as a regional power and the DPRK's intensifying threat narrative have only compounded the difficulties. Despite these hurdles, the U.S. remains committed to its Pacific power position and its corresponding responsibilities to shape "the region's long-term trajectory to enhance stability and security" in the region.⁶³ However, the U.S. military continues to operate under "budgetary confusion," and the expected reduction in threat levels in Europe and the Middle East has yet to materialize, forcing an uneasy balancing of strategic priorities and resources around the world.⁶⁴

Therefore, Japan and its national strategy has become increasingly more influential and relevant to the outcome of U.S.' strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific

⁶³ Congressional Research Service, *Pivot to the Pacific?*, 24.

⁶⁴ James N. Mattis, "Remarks by Secretary Mattis on the National Defense Strategy" (speech, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, January 19, 2018), accessed February 8, 2018, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1420042/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-on-the-national-defense-strategy/>.

region. The Obama administration had emphasized Japan's prominence in the U.S.' strategic policies. This was based on its conviction that the center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and economic interests is being realigned and shifting towards Asia, and that U.S. strategy and priorities need to be adjusted accordingly.⁶⁵ The 2017 NSS promulgated by the Trump administration also, albeit less prominently, welcomes and supports the growing leadership role of Japan as a critical ally.⁶⁶ Japan's expanding security stance and assertive approach to its security issues in the region has the potential to substantially change the security environment and alter the balance of power, ultimately influencing the probability of success for the U.S.

The literature review seeks to explore and provide background on the security environment of the Indo-Pacific region and Japan's evolving role within the context of rising security challenges such as China and the DPRK. The first section focuses on the U.S.-Japan security alliance, studying its historical basis and the current security demands and constraints affecting that critical relationship. The second and third sections turn to the respective national strategic guidance and key influential documents within the strategic and defense establishments of the U.S. and Japan. The fourth section documents Japan's strategic security environment and the fifth section focuses on its investments in key capabilities, especially in light of its domestic constraints and ambiguous security future. Section six delves into Japan's complex rivalry with China while section seven explores the antagonistic relationship with its democratic neighbor, South Korea. Section eight features the deepening ties with India, Australia, and the Association of Southeast

⁶⁵ Congressional Research Service, *Pivot to the Pacific?*, ii.

⁶⁶ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy, 2017*, 46.

Asian Nations (ASEAN). Lastly, the final section summarizes the key views, guidance, and positions found in the literature review.

Section I: U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

Although Japan was defeated and occupied by American forces in the aftermath of WWII, it remained a key strategic partner during the Cold War era. As the American Occupation of Japan came to an end on April 28, 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty ensured that substantial U.S. forces remained in place in Japan.⁶⁷ It was revised and renewed in 1960 as the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan. In an attempt to address the evolving post-Cold War security conditions in Asia, the Clinton administration circulated Joseph Nye's "The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region," widely known as the East Asia Strategy Report, in 1995. Critically, it defined the U.S.-Japan alliance as "the linchpin of the United States security policy in East Asia," a crucial recognition amidst the uncertainty following the end of the Cold War.⁶⁸

In 1996, the U.S. and Japan jointly reaffirmed the alliance's status as the foundation of regional security in the Asia-Pacific and more importantly, redefined and

⁶⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security*, 1.

⁶⁸ James J. Przystup, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Review of the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation," Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Perspectives* 18, no. 18 (March 2015): 10, accessed January 10, 2018, <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-18.pdf>.

widened the scope of the alliance to tailor it for the 21st century.⁶⁹ The revised guidelines expanded the purpose of the alliance from a strict defense of Japan to a broader and necessary focus on regional peace and stability. In keeping with its restructured nature, it included a new area of emphasis: “Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” (SIASJ). However, Professor Noboru Yamaguchi, a leading Japanese scholar and former special advisor to the Japanese government, incisively points out how within the SIASJ section of the Defense Guidelines, “one key aspect concerned the geographic area of application which remained only vaguely defined.”⁷⁰

The mutual defense treaty was first formally supplemented with the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1978 and last reviewed on April 27, 2015.⁷¹ Key components of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation include the establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) for strengthened policy and operational coordination as well as the gradual implementation of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. Based on a whole-of-government approach, the newly implemented ACM significantly improved bilateral military coordination in peacetime by

⁶⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century*, April 17, 1996, accessed October 18, 2017, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html>.

⁷⁰ Noboru Yamaguchi, “Balancing Threat Perceptions and Strategic Priorities: Japan’s Post-War Defense Policy,” in *Maritime Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain: From the First Alliance to Post-9/11*, ed. Alessio Patalano (Leiden: Global Oriental, May 16, 2012), 98.

⁷¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation*, April 27, 2015, accessed October 1, 2017, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf>.

removing the previous requirement for an official state of war.⁷² This strategic guidance broadly states that “the Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.”⁷³ In response to an armed attack on Japan, “the United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.”⁷⁴ It specifically allows for the JSDF to respond with military action when an armed attack on a foreign country occurs and as a result, “threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its peoples’ right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.”⁷⁵

On August 17, 2017, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC), otherwise known as the Japan-U.S. “2+2” was held in Washington, D.C. Notably, the SCC “reaffirmed Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and that they oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of these islands.”⁷⁶ This statement bolstered regional perception of the U.S.’ continued commitment to Japan, especially in light of escalating Chinese provocations in the Senkaku Islands’ maritime area and airspace. Furthermore, it

⁷² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation*, 3.

⁷³ Ibid., 7.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 11–14.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 16.

⁷⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (Japan-U.S. “2+2”)*, August 17, 2017, accessed October 9, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/na/st/page3e_000714.html.

“confirmed the significance of the continued engagement of Japan and the United States” in the SCS.⁷⁷

However, a critical tension saturates this strategic relationship due to the inescapable fact that the “United States confronts both the Atlantic and Pacific worlds.”⁷⁸ “Thus, if it is to maintain its position as a great power, it must focus on both” while Japan, “no matter how impressive its military or economy, will remain a regional power with its strategic concern focused on the mainland across from the Sea of Japan.”⁷⁹ Furthermore, the dependence mentality within Japan as well as South Korea on the U.S. security guarantee, fittingly described as a “hub-and-spokes security structure” by Director Yuki Tatsumi, continues to stifle progress towards strategic interoperability and mutual reciprocity.⁸⁰

Director Tatsumi of the Japan Program at the Stimson Center also examines how China views the U.S.-Japan alliance to “possess inherently destabilizing components,” centered around suspicions about “American intentions as the U.S. and allies improve their capacity to mitigate North Korea’s threat.”⁸¹ She delves into the U.S.’ Third Offset

⁷⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee*.

⁷⁸ William Murray and Tomoyuki Ishizu, “Introduction to Japan and the United States,” in *Conflicting Currents: Japan and the United States in the Pacific*, eds. William Murray and Tomoyuki Ishizu (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2010), 16.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Yuki Tatsumi, “Lost in Translation? U.S. Defense Innovation and Northeast Asia,” Stimson Center, July 2017, 17, accessed January 20, 2018, <https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/55821/Lost-In-Translation-V1.3-WEB.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

⁸¹ Ibid., 20.

Strategy and the impact of its emphasis on technological revolutions in military affairs on Japan, as well as South Korea. Director Tatsumi discusses the two allies' mounting concerns over the expanding "technological gap between the U.S. military and its allied counterparts" as well as the divergence in their "perception of prioritization among the security threats that they share with the U.S."⁸² Nonetheless, the 2015 report from the Institute for National Strategic Studies observed that "for the United States, the alliance with Japan is the foundation of its regional and global security strategies."⁸³

In a still-relevant 2007 CSIS report, Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage identifies the U.S.-Japan alliance as the U.S.' "greatest strategic asset in the region."⁸⁴ They address concerns that Japan will become a "middle power at best" and nationalistic at worst, denying the international community Japan's full potential in support of its security and stability.⁸⁵ Focusing on its economic and security aspects, they note that with "global reach and global impact," the alliance will continue to shape Asia's future as it has in the past and be a critical factor in the global equation."⁸⁶

⁸² Tatsumi, *Lost in Translation?*, 33.

⁸³ Przystup, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance*, 4.

⁸⁴ Joseph S. Nye and Richard L. Armitage, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020," Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2007, 15, accessed April 10, 2018, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/070216_asia2020.pdf.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

Section II: Strategic Guidance (Japan)

As an island nation, Japan has long recognized the strategic vulnerability of its dependence on ocean trade and commerce. Dr. Shinichi Kitaoka, President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency, contends Japan's desire for maritime power status and the difficult challenges of achieving autarky are inextricably entwined with the naval expansion required to secure and protect that national vision.⁸⁷ The first postwar prime minister of Japan, Shigeru Yoshida, established a national strategy that hinged on economic prosperity and maritime access to overseas markets. It was closely linked to the recovery of international status and continued limited rearmament, and his policies guided the development of Japan's post-war national strategic thinking. Known as the Yoshida Doctrine, his influential policies "regarded commerce as the cornerstone of Japan's national strategy and focused on what military forces were and are appropriate for achieving the country's commercial objectives."⁸⁸

Rather than "the traditional dualistic approaches contrasting militarism versus pacificism," the Yoshida Doctrine was a realist foreign policy based on the domestic and international constraints of the time.⁸⁹ His strategy was assisted by Japan's geostrategic role in the containment of China and the Soviet Union in the Cold War era.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Shinichi Kitaoka, "The Strategy of the Maritime Nation Japan: From Yukichi Fukuzawa to Shigeru Yoshida," in *Conflicting Currents: Japan and the United States in the Pacific*, eds. William Murray and Tomoyuki Ishizu (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2010), 49.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Hiroshi Nakanishi, "Diplomatic Strategy of a Defeated Nation: Yoshida Shigeru and his Successors," in *Conflicting Currents: Japan and the United States in the*

Furthermore, the Korean War and the Cold War both “underlined the near impossibility of the full-scale use of military force by industrialized countries,” leading to the emphasis on limited objectives and deterrence seen today.⁹¹ Professor Hiroshi Nakanishi at the Kyoto University maintains that those security environmental factors and the U.S.’s consequent emphasis on Japan as a key element of deterrence strategy in East Asia ensured Yoshida’s legacy.⁹² Indeed, Yoshida predominantly defined postwar Japan’s nascent national security strategy in many ways as a hedging strategy against China and other powers. Furthermore, Professor Yamaguchi affirms that the “policy of a lightly armed Japan worked as a positive element by trying to avoid a security dilemma within the international community.”⁹³

Japan’s national culture and strategic principles arose from the foundation set in part by the Yoshida Doctrine. It was further solidified with the wholehearted adoption of the “Fukuda Doctrine” in 1977 under the leadership of Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda. It essentially “outlined the principles forming the framework of its diplomacy towards Asia,” resolving to never again become a military power and instead, become a harmonious neighbor.⁹⁴ In 2008, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda commented on how the

Pacific, eds. William Murray and Tomoyuki Ishizu (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2010), 103.

⁹¹ Nakanishi, *Diplomatic Strategy of a Defeated Nation*, 103.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Yamaguchi, *Balancing Threat Perceptions and Strategic Priorities*, 84.

⁹⁴ Yasuo Fukuda, “When the Pacific Ocean Becomes an ‘Inland Sea’: Five Pledges to a Future Asia that ‘Acts Together’” (speech, 14th International Conference on the Future of Asia, Tokyo, Japan, March 22, 2008), accessed October 16, 2017, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/speech0805-2.html>.

“vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean has come to shrink to the size of the Mediterranean Sea” and that “it will become even smaller in 30 years’ time.”⁹⁵ In his speech, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda emphasized the necessary expansion of the “psychological outlook on the region” and to avoid “short-sighted psychological partitioning,” stressing that the “Fukuda Doctrine is still very much alive.”⁹⁶

Due to the Yoshida and Fukuda Doctrines, Japan has retained this deep-seated suspicion and outright rejection of any attempt at or semblance of re-militarization and return to the role of a military power. As a result, Japan’s ingrained renunciation of any resurgent militarism has gone “a long way to alleviating historic animosities between the peoples of Japan and Southeast Asia.”⁹⁷ However, through Japan’s steady support of ASEAN, the “coalition of the willing,” Dr. Kei Koga argues Japan must “lock in its commitment to the region to prevent any abrupt strategic shifts” and to “transcend the Fukuda Doctrine.”⁹⁸ As a professor and East Asian security scholar at Nanyang Technological University, Dr. Koga supports his proposal by noting that while the “United States long-term interest in East Asia is strong, its frequent shifts in short-term focus tend to create insecurity.”⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Fukuda, *When the Pacific Ocean Becomes an ‘Inland Sea’*.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Kei Koga, “Transcending the Fukuda Doctrine: Japan, ASEAN, & the Future of the Asian Order,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 4, 2017, accessed October 17, 2017, <https://www.cogitasia.com/transcending-the-fukuda-doctrine-japan-asean-the-future-of-the-asian-order/>.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

Japan's current strategic defense principles were largely born out of the Basic Defense Force Concept (BDFC) in the early 1970s. It first appeared in the 1976 annual white paper *Defense of Japan* and stated: "deterrence and defense based on denial capabilities, therefore, are Japan's primary defense strategies."¹⁰⁰ At the time, it "relied on general deterrence and balance of power generated by the U.S.-Japan alliance and other international factors in addressing situations larger than limited and small-scale aggression."¹⁰¹ The BDFC was a non-threat based defense policy that duly considered the security environment at the time, characterized by mutual nuclear deterrence, trend of global stabilization, and the unlikelihood of full-scale military conflict. This climate of détente, along with the Oil Shock of 1973, quickly paved the way for Japan's defense spending to be limited to one percent of GDP in 1976.¹⁰² However, Dr. Narushige Michishita, a senior research fellow and executive assistant at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo, criticizes this limitation as unnecessary and dangerous. Dr. Michishita condemns the "Japanese propensity to avoid defining the threat clearly," and comments on "the reflection of concerns that Japanese citizens have about the adequacy of Japan's defense force in the emerging strategic environment."¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Narushige Michishita, "The 'Basic Defense Force Concept' as Strategy," in *Conflicting Currents: Japan and the United States in the Pacific*, eds. William Murray and Tomoyuki Ishizu (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2010), 138.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 138–139.

¹⁰² Yamaguchi, *Balancing Threat Perceptions and Strategic Priorities*, 87.

¹⁰³ Michishita, *The 'Basic Defense Force Concept' as Strategy*, 140–142.

He questions Japan's avoidance of coercive use of force and whether or not credible deterrence and defense is possible without the ability to punish.¹⁰⁴

Due to the sudden dramatic change in the security environment following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan's defense policy was forced to evolve. Experiences such as the failure of Japan's checkbook diplomacy in the Gulf War in 1991, political and military investment in PKOs overseas, and growing tensions in Northeast Asia shaped the perspective of Japanese policy planners and redefined the Japan-U.S. alliance.¹⁰⁵

Following the end of the Cold War and the revealing stress test of the 1991 Gulf War, Japan's internationally panned actions and outdated security policy prompted national examination. As a result, "The Modality of Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century" report, popularly referred to as the Higuchi Report, emerged. The influential report called for a "more active role in shaping international order," advocating for PKO to be recognized as a principal duty of the JSDF and encouraging enhanced cooperation with the U.S. and more advanced capabilities.¹⁰⁶ Since then, many of the report's recommendations and concerns have been consistently reflected in Japan's institutional reforms, defense white papers, and strategic guidance such as its 2013 National Security Strategy (J-NSS).

As Japan's apprehension over its security environment deepened, a number of key institutional changes were implemented. Among the most important occurred in 2007 when the Japan Defense Agency was upgraded to ministry status, becoming the Ministry

¹⁰⁴ Michishita, *The 'Basic Defense Force Concept' as Strategy*, 142.

¹⁰⁵ Yamaguchi, *Balancing Threat Perceptions and Strategic Priorities*, 93–94.

¹⁰⁶ Przystup, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance*, 8.

of Defense (MOD). Just one year prior, the Joint Staff Office replaced the Joint Staff Council in an effort to integrate military command. Colonel Hiroyuki Sugai, an international security fellow at Brookings Institution, discusses how Japan's policymakers applied a whole-of-government approach to national security through frameworks and legislation. He identifies the Space Basic Plan, Science and Technology Basic Plan, Development Cooperation Charter, and Official Development Assistance (ODA) framework, among others as key government-wide reforms spearheaded by the Abe administration.¹⁰⁷ Prime Minister Shinzo Abe created the National Security Council (NSC) in its current four-minister meeting structure on December 4, 2013. Shortly thereafter on December 17, 2013, the NSC produced the first and still current iteration of the J-NSS.

Key elements of Abe's foreign policy can be seen in the J-NSS and its guiding principle of "Proactive Contribution to Peace." His early conviction in a more assertive Japan can be seen in his 2007 "Confluence of the Two Seas" speech to the Indian Parliament during his state visit as Japan's Prime Minister. He references a "broader Asia" and points out the abilities, responsibilities, and expectations of Japan and India as two democracies equally representing Asia.¹⁰⁸ In 2012, Abe's hawkish views were aptly captured in his "Asia's Democratic Security Diamond" essay. In it, he emphasizes how "Japan's top foreign-policy priority must be to expand the country's strategic horizons"

¹⁰⁷ Hiroyuki Sugai, "Japan's Future Defense Equipment Policy," Brookings Institution, October 2016, 11–12, accessed November 12, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/japans-future-defense-equipment-policy/>.

¹⁰⁸ Shinzo Abe, "Confluence of the Two Seas" (speech, Parliament of the Republic of India, New Dehli, India, August 22, 2007), accessed January 15, 2018, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html>.

by forming a diamond with Australia, India, and Hawaii and moreover, his willingness to “invest, to the greatest possible extent, Japan’s capabilities in this security diamond.”¹⁰⁹

Alluding to the urgent reason for this framework, he then criticizes and rejects the “Chinese government’s daily exercises in coercion around the Senkaku Islands.”¹¹⁰

The NSC’s 2013 J-NSS presents the strategic approach Japan should take to address the challenges to its national security within its security environment. This strategic guidance will guide Japan’s national security policy for the next decade, unified under the theme of “Proactive Contribution to Peace.”¹¹¹ It ensures “when implementing policies in other areas,” the government of Japan will “give due consideration to national security so that Japan can utilize its strengths, such as its diplomatic and defense capability, in a smooth and fully-functional way as a whole.”¹¹² Key components of that policy include building a comprehensive defense architecture, protecting territorial integrity, and ensuring maritime security.¹¹³ Proactive and strategic use of ODA and multilateral frameworks are also notable inclusions in the J-NSS.¹¹⁴ The 2013 J-NSS avoids antagonizing China, instead promoting a “mutually beneficial relationship based

¹⁰⁹ Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond” (essay, Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012), accessed January 15, 2018, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe>.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *National Security Strategy*, December 17, 2013, 1, accessed October 4, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html.

¹¹² Ibid., 2.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

on common strategic interests.”¹¹⁵ Nonetheless, it recognizes how China has been rapidly strengthening and expanding its military capabilities without sufficient transparency.¹¹⁶

Although the J-NSS is relatively recent, Japan first published a defense white paper, the *Defense of Japan* report, in 1971 and began the current annual schedule of publication in 1976. It outlines Japan’s security environment and the adaptive measures needed to improve it. Its 2016 white paper matter-of-factly appreciates the “reality of the current international community . . . that it is not necessarily possible to prevent invasions from the outside by employing only nonmilitary means such as diplomatic efforts, and in the event that the nation was to be invaded it would not be able to remove such a threat.”¹¹⁷ The *Defense of Japan* white paper also reiterated Japan’s steadfast adherence to its Three Non-Nuclear Principles: to not possess, produce, or allow nuclear weapons to be brought into Japan.¹¹⁸ A strong supporter of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Japan passed the Atomic Energy Basic Law in 1955, restricting nuclear energy use to peaceful purposes.¹¹⁹ Nuclear weapons expert Emily Chorley at IHS Janes notes Japan “has the civilian nuclear program, fissile materials, and the weaponization technology necessary . . . to develop a small arsenal of nuclear devices within a year if there was

¹¹⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *National Security Strategy*, 2.

¹¹⁶ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2016* (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Ministry of Defense, 2017), 171, accessed January 22, 2018, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2016.html.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 164.

¹¹⁸ Ministry of Defense, *Defense of Japan 2016*, 167.

¹¹⁹ Nuclear Energy Agency, *Nuclear Legislation in OECD and NEA Countries: Japan*, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2017, 2, accessed March 5, 2018, <https://www.oecd-neo.org/law/legislation/japan.pdf>.

motivation to do so.”¹²⁰ However, as a staunchly nonnuclear state surrounded by nuclear states such as Russia, China, and DPRK, Japan instead firmly depends on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

On the other hand, Japan eased its restrictions on weapons exports in 2014, constituting a monumental change for a decades-old ban on virtually all arms exports. The country’s Cold War-era policy was based on what was known as the ‘Three Principles’: arms exports will be prohibited to *communist bloc* countries, countries subject to arms exports embargo under the UN Security Council’s resolutions, and countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts.¹²¹ Japan’s overhaul of its export policy guidance updated the terminology to better fit the modern security environment. It underscored the industry’s potential to “contribute to peace and international cooperation from the standpoint of proactive pacifism.”¹²² However, Dr. Crystal Pryor and Michael Hadlow at CSIS use the Japanese proverb, 石の上三年, or “three years on a stone,” to illustrate the stagnation of Japan’s cautious and relatively

¹²⁰ Nobuhiro Kubo and Tim Kelly, “Allowing Nuclear Weapons in Japan could Defuse North Korean Threat, Say Some Policy Makers,” *Reuters*, September 6, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-japan/allowing-nuclear-weapons-in-japan-could-defuse-north-korean-threat-say-some-policy-makers-idUSKCN1BH1FO>.

¹²¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan’s Policies on the Control of Arms Exports*, 2014, accessed October 4, 2017, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/policy/>.

¹²² Mina Pollmann, “Japan’s First Steps into the World of Arms Exports,” *The Diplomat*, January 15, 2015, accessed October 8, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/japans-first-steps-into-the-world-of-arms-exports/>.

inexperienced defense industry.¹²³ In light of the “greatest regional arms race since the end of the Cold War,” they underscore the need for Japan’s government to fully support its defense industry to restore foreign buyers’ confidence, leveraging its reputation in dual-use technology.¹²⁴ Specifically, they note corporate reputational risk, governmental emphasis on control versus promotion, and enduring public stigma as key internal challenges for the Abe administration to overcome to prevent Japan from falling behind the DPRK and China.¹²⁵

To that end, Abe is aggressively “courting the establishment of new industrial-military relationships” due to the “changing security situation in East Asia as the primary motivation for Japan’s evolving security role.”¹²⁶ Colonel Sugai addresses ongoing divisive domestic arguments, namely the “merchant of death” accusations, as well as protests from China and South Korea.¹²⁷ He points out the “MOD, under a new strategy and new organization, is now conducting the biggest acquisition reform ever seen in Japan.”¹²⁸ In Colonel Sugai’s view, “acquisition reform is one of the most important

¹²³ Michael Hadlow and Crystal Pryor, “Japan’s Defense Exports: ‘Three Years of Sitting on a Stone’,” Pacific Forum, *Issues and Insights* 18, no. 2 (March 26, 2018): v, accessed April 11, 2018, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/issuesinsights_Vol.9%2018%20WP2_Japan-defense-exports.pdf?UKoLcIbYaKXWBoSCHjmoTW3K561KdHJ7.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 6.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 4.

¹²⁶ Mina Pollmann, “Japan Shops Maritime Arms to Southeast Asia,” *The Diplomat*, June 13, 2017, accessed October 8, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/japan-shops-maritime-arms-to-southeast-asia/>.

¹²⁷ Sugai, *Japan’s Future Defense Equipment Policy*, 29.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 15.

aspects of Japan's need to build up essential capability during a harsh security situation and under tight fiscal constraints.”¹²⁹

Echoing Prime Minister Abe's longstanding calls to remove constitutional limits on Japan's military, the 2016 defense white paper questions whether the development of its robust self-defense capabilities constitutes a “war potential,” which is prohibited under Article 9 of the Constitution.¹³⁰ It suggests that any specific limits should be considered within context of the prevailing international situation, the level of military technologies, and various other factors.”¹³¹ One of the world's foremost Japanese legal scholars, Professor John Haley persuasively argues that the influence of Article 9 has been mainly political rather than legal. He maintains how the 1959 *Sunakawa* decision by Japan's Supreme Court ultimately deferred interpretation and judgement of Article 9 to the political leaders. This enabled enduring political consensus to allow Japan to possess “the most technologically advanced defensive military in East Asia.”¹³² Professor Haley puts forth the argument that “not only does the 2016 Abe military budget seem remarkably moderate, but also Article 9 can be viewed as continuing to play a profound political role in maintaining peace through deterrence.”¹³³

¹²⁹ Sugai, *Japan's Future Defense Equipment Policy*, 19.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 165.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² John O. Haley, “Article 9 in the post-Sunakawa World: Continuity and Deterrence within a Transforming Global Context,” *Washington International Law Journal* 26, no. 1 (January 2017): 1, accessed January 20, 2018, <http://hdl.handle.net/1773.1/1656>.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 15.

Emphasizing the concept of deterrence, the NSC approved Japan's 2013 Five-Year Defense Program for fiscal year (FY) 2014 to FY2018. It reflects the nation's rising recognition of its own strategic security vulnerabilities. Within the BDFC context, it creates a "Dynamic Joint Defense Force" to provide "an effective deterrence and response to a variety of security situations," tacitly acknowledging the increase in gray zone complexity.¹³⁴ The "defense posture of the remote islands" is repeatedly emphasized in this MOD guidance, detailing the need for sufficient amphibious operational capabilities to "enable the JSDF to land, recapture, and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded."¹³⁵ Japan's BDFC-aligned "National Defense Program Guidelines" (NDPG) for FY2014 and beyond emphasizes the Dynamic Joint Defense Force as the "ultimate guarantee of national security" and takes specific note of "gray-zone situations."¹³⁶

Alongside the "Proactive Contribution to Peace" theme outlined in its J-NSS, Japan's foreign policy has also seen major developments in line with the Abe administration's assertive outlook. In April 2017, Japan's new foreign policy strategy, "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy," emphasized "diplomacy that takes a panoramic

¹³⁴ Ministry of Defense, *Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)*, December 17, 2013, 2, accessed January 20, 2018, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹³⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond (Summary)*, December 17, 2013, 1, accessed March 31, 2018, http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/pdf/20131217_e.pdf.

perspective of the world map.”¹³⁷ Departing from a historically reactive and arms-length mindset, this expanded and energetic foreign policy perspective is set on attaining the “peace of the international community in order to ensure the security of Japan and the peace and stability of the region.”¹³⁸ Under Abe’s security umbrella of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” the gradual reinvention of Japan’s strategic approach is becoming increasingly reflected throughout the national security enterprise.

Section III: Strategic Guidance (U.S.)

U.S.’ aims in the Indo-Pacific region have consistently emphasized economic, military, and political access. Crafted by the Trump administration, the 2017 NSS affirms that “U.S. interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back to the earliest days of our republic.”¹³⁹ Notably, this marks the first time the term “Indo-Pacific” is used in the U.S. National Security Strategy and denotes recognition of the region’s rising importance to American security interests. Taking a more candid tone than its 2015 predecessor, the 2017 NSS categorically defines China as a “revisionist power” seeking to “shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests.”¹⁴⁰ Somewhat more cautiously, the Obama administration had also noted China’s rise, India’s power potential, Russia’s aggression

¹³⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Priority Policy for Development Cooperation FY2017*, April 2017, accessed January 13, 2018, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000259285.pdf>.

¹³⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2017*, June 2017, accessed January 15, 2018, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2017/html/index.html>.

¹³⁹ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy, 2017*, 25.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

as factors that will “all significantly impact the future of major power relations” due to competing and gradually growing spheres of influence.¹⁴¹

In addition, the 2015 NSS alluded to the shifting power dynamics among great and emerging powers, stating there are “both opportunities and risks for cooperation, as some states have been more willing than others to assume responsibilities commensurate with their greater economic capacity.”¹⁴² However, the newly promulgated 2017 NSS goes a step further and stresses that “allies and partners must also contribute the capabilities, and demonstrate the will, to confront shared threats.”¹⁴³ It highlights Japan’s leadership role and quadrilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region; more pointedly, it also specifies missile defense with Japan and South Korea as part of a “strong defense network.”¹⁴⁴

The unclassified synopsis of the *National Defense Strategy* (NDS) released in January 2018 reinforces the central themes contained in the Trump administration’s 2017 NSS. It describes the “reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers” to be the primary challenge to U.S. national security.¹⁴⁵ Of particular note, the NDS decries China’s all-of-nation long-

¹⁴¹ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy*, 2015, 4.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy*, 2017, 26.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 47.

¹⁴⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Printing Office, January 2018), 2, accessed February 5, 2018, <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

term strategy to become the Indo-Pacific regional hegemony, displacing the United States in the process.¹⁴⁶ Echoing Japan's national security premise of "a free and open Indo-Pacific," the NDS prioritizes strengthening alliances and partnerships "in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains."¹⁴⁷

Elaborating on the NDS, U.S. Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis unequivocally states "great power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of U.S. national security."¹⁴⁸ There are five major U.S. national security challenges: China, Russia, DPRK, Iran, and violent extremist organizations. The NDS prioritizes the first two, situated at the top of the spectrum of conflict. However, Secretary Mattis starkly declares "our competitive edge has eroded in every domain of warfare."¹⁴⁹ Discussing the NDS' second line of effort regarding old alliances and new partnerships, Secretary Mattis goes on to point out South Korea and Japan as "two nations that are doing a lot for their own defense."¹⁵⁰ He states the U.S. has "carried a disproportionate share of the defense burden for the democracies in the post-World War II era. The growing economic strength of today's democracies and partners dictates they must now step up and do more."¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy*, 2.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 9.

¹⁴⁸ Mattis, *Remarks by Secretary Mattis on the National Defense Strategy*.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

Currently unsynchronized with the Trump administration's 2017 NSS, the 2015 *National Military Strategy* (NMS) nonetheless explicitly recognizes that "the probability of U.S. involvement in interstate war with a major power is assessed to be low but growing."¹⁵² As the U.S.' unipolarity fades and a global multiplex world order gradually takes its place, the NMS points out the growing need for stability and mitigation mechanisms among the great powers. To that end, it encourages China to become a partner for greater international security while at the same time, admonishing it for tension-laden actions in the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁵³ The NMS identifies several national security interests relevant to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region such as the "security of the global economic system," the "security, confidence, and reliability of our allies," and the "preservation and extension of universal values."¹⁵⁴

Aligned with the 2015 NMS, the 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) emphasizes "contributions to the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, seeking to preserve peace and stability in a region that is increasingly central to U.S. political, economic, and security interests."¹⁵⁵ The QDR points out that as "nations in the region continue to develop their military and security capabilities, there is greater risk that

¹⁵² U.S. Department of Defense, *National Military Strategy*, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: U.S. Printing Office, June 2015), 4, accessed November 5, 2017, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁵⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: U.S. Printing Office, March 4, 2014), viii, accessed October 15, 2018, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.

tensions over long-standing sovereignty disputes or claims to natural resources will spur disruptive competition or erupt into conflict.”¹⁵⁶ It specifically addresses the ambitious scale of China’s military modernization and more importantly, “the relative lack of transparency and openness from China’s leaders regarding both military capabilities and intentions.”¹⁵⁷ The QDR stresses how strategic stability is the much-sought goal in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as its fragility which can easily be disrupted by the unilateral actions of any one country.

The 2017 *Defense Posture Statement* by the Secretary of Defense acknowledges the return of great power competition with Russia in Europe and China in the Asia-Pacific.¹⁵⁸ The then Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Ashton B. Carter, emphasized how investments in the DoD budget underscored the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region. He also highlighted efforts to support and strengthen a regional security architecture, including new posture initiatives and bolstering ties with ASEAN.¹⁵⁹ He further acknowledged that “the U.S.-China relationship will be complex as we continue to balance our competition and cooperation.”¹⁶⁰ He pointed to China’s investment in capabilities that can “counter third-party—including the United States—intervention

¹⁵⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*, 4.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *2017 Defense Posture Statement*, February 2017, 4, accessed January 21, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017DODPOSTURE_FINAL_MAR17UpdatePage4_WEB.PDF.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

during a crisis or conflict,” which holds significant implications for the U.S.’ ability to act in the Indo-Pacific region.¹⁶¹ The *Defense Posture Statement* also reaffirmed that the DoD remained “fully capable of fulfilling U.S. treaty commitments to our allies in the event of a North Korean attack.”¹⁶²

In 2015, the U.S. DoD outlined its maritime security strategy for the Asia-Pacific region in its report, *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy*, recognizing the urgent need as “tensions in Asia rise and the security situation becomes more complex.”¹⁶³ It states that “rapid military modernization across the Asia-Pacific region has significantly increased the potential for dangerous miscalculations or conflict in the maritime domain.”¹⁶⁴ Although China has undeniably undertaken the largest military law enforcement modernization effort in Asia, Japan is also improving its JSDF deterrent abilities, realigning assets to the Senkaku Islands area, and developing capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and amphibious assault.¹⁶⁵ It highlights the trend towards the use of non-military vessels such as law enforcement and Coast Guard ships to advance territorial and maritime claims.

¹⁶¹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *2017 Defense Posture Statement*, 21.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 22.

¹⁶³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy*, July 2015, 32, accessed November 27, 2017, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_Security_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

On November 23, 2013, China imposed a controversial Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea while also sending Coast Guard ships on “harassment operations” around the Senkaku Islands.¹⁶⁶ More so than the exclusive economic zone, the correlation of the ADIZ concept to coastal state security advances China’s legal and practical claims of ECS sovereignty.¹⁶⁷ Since 2012, the Chinese Coast Guard has maintained a persistent presence around the Senkaku Islands.¹⁶⁸ In response, the DoD’s *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy* acknowledges China’s recent activities and maintains its resolute stance that the U.S. “will continue to oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration.”¹⁶⁹ Figure 2 displays China’s ADIZ and its contentious overlap with those of South Korea and Japan.

¹⁶⁶ Congressional Research Service, *Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O. Roarke, CRS R42784, Washington, DC, April 26, 2018, 35, accessed May 5, 2018, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf>.

¹⁶⁷ Kimberly Hsu, “Air Defense Identification Zone Intended to Provide China Greater Flexibility to Enforce East China Sea Claims,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Report, January 14, 2014, 2, accessed May 3, 2018, <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20ADIZ%20Staff%20Report.pdf>.

¹⁶⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy*, 14.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.




Figure 2. Air Defense Identification Zones (East China Sea)

Source: Hans Binnendijk, “Friends, Foes, and Future Directions: U.S. Partnerships in a Turbulent World: Strategic Rethink,” RAND Corporation, 2016, 102, accessed February 2, 2018, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1210/RAND_RR1210.pdf.

PACOM commander Admiral Harris emphasizes the significance of the U.S. military’s sustained presence in underwriting peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. At the fourth Japan-U.S. Military Statesmen Forum in July 2017, he named DPRK’s nuclear capabilities, Chinese aggression in the SCS, and the growing presence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in the Philippines as the “three major challenges facing

the Pacific community.”¹⁷⁰ Emphasizing that trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea was “a partnership with a purpose if there ever was one,” Admiral Harris also points out China as a “strategic competitor for the United States and Japan.”¹⁷¹ Bruce Jones, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, articulates the uneasy balance between the U.S.-led faction, including Japan, and China’s gradually expanding spheres of influence. He further argues that there is an undeclared arms race between the United States and China, modest and “kept in check by comity between the top leaders, economic ties, and cooperation on global issues.”¹⁷² Given this struggle to manage the evolving balance of power in the region, Admiral Harris determinedly promotes the “clear benefits of a 'democracy quadrilateral' that enhances security cooperation between India, Australia, Japan and the U.S.”¹⁷³ It meaningfully echoes Abe’s dormant concept of the Democratic Security Diamond.

The *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy* report accentuates that the cornerstone of the U.S. forward presence will continue to be in Japan, comprised of approximately 50,000 military personnel.¹⁷⁴ It also highlights the U.S. Navy Seventh

¹⁷⁰ Jim Garamone, “PACOM Commander Lists Threats, Discusses Strategy in Indo-Asia-Pacific,” U.S. Pacific Command, July 31, 2017, accessed April 5, 2018, <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1263040/pacom-commander-lists-threats-discusses-strategy-in-indo-asia-pacific/>.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Bruce Jones, “The New Geopolitics,” Brookings Institute, November 28, 2017, accessed February 24, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/11/28/the-new-geopolitics/>.

¹⁷³ Garamone, *PACOM Commander Lists Threats*.

¹⁷⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy*, 22.

Fleet and the only forward-stationed Carrier Strike Group in the world as well as the U.S. Marine Corps III Marine Expeditionary Force and significant Air Force assets.”¹⁷⁵ The U.S. has also focused on augmenting Japan’s amphibious capabilities for island defense and its ability to monitor the maritime domain and airspace around the country, which has quickly grown in significance due to Chinese incursions.¹⁷⁶

Released in February 2018, the U.S. *Nuclear Posture Review* (NPR) reiterates the U.S.’ belief in a deteriorating and uncertain international security environment, amplified by increasingly explicit nuclear threats from potential adversaries.¹⁷⁷ It highlights U.S. nuclear capabilities as a unique and essential contribution to preventing great power war with Russia and China.¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, it stresses the importance of nuclear assurance and the credibility of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for allies and partners, thus enabling “most to eschew possession of nuclear weapons.”¹⁷⁹ In sharp contrast to its 2010 predecessor, the 2018 NPR emphasizes flexibility and diversity of the U.S. nuclear triad and non-strategic nuclear capabilities to enhance deterrence and meet the emerging security requirements of U.S. strategy.¹⁸⁰ Quickly welcomed by the Abe administration, the 2018 NPR reestablishes the U.S.’ vigorous commitment to the “employment of

¹⁷⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy*, 22.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁷⁷ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review*, February 2018, 1, accessed March 2, 2018, <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-nuclear-posture-review-final-report.pdf>.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners.”¹⁸¹ Despite the geographic disadvantages compared to other regional competitors and the “America First” policy, the U.S. NPR underscores deterrence-based strategy to counter the risk of marginalization in the Indo-Pacific.

Section IV: Japan’s Strategic Security Environment

At this point, it is necessary to examine the international and regional trends and developments shaping the domestic debate within Japan and playing key roles in defining the country’s strategic objectives. Primarily driven by China’s adventurism, conflicting spheres of influence in the dynamic and diverse Indo-Pacific region have become more prominent and contentious. Reflecting these increasingly severe strategic factors, the Indo-Pacific region will remain the driving force behind long-term growth in global defense spending.¹⁸² In *Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific*, author Robert D. Kaplan states that rather than “fascism or militarism . . . every state in East Asia is increasingly defined by the persistence, the rise even, of old-fashioned nationalism.”¹⁸³ A renowned foreign policy thinker and widely published author on Japan, Kaplan goes on to describe how “nationalism is leading to the

¹⁸¹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review*, 4.

¹⁸² IHS Markit, “Global Defense Spending to Hit Post-Cold War High in 2018, Jane’s by IHS Markit Says,” December 18, 2017, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://news.ihsmarkit.com/press-release/aerospace-defense-security/global-defence-spending-hit-post-cold-war-high-2018-janes-i>.

¹⁸³ Robert D. Kaplan, *Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific* (New York: Random House, 2014), 16.

modernization of militaries—navies and air forces especially—in order to defend sovereignty, with which to make claims for disputed maritime resources.”¹⁸⁴

He argues that “East Asia is a seascape” and since the last phase of the Cold War, the “demographic, economic, and military axis of the earth has measurably shifted” there, where the “spaces between the principal nodes of population are overwhelmingly maritime.”¹⁸⁵ The geopolitical and geoeconomic influence of the sea is hardly new. In his seminal work, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660–1783*, Alfred Thayer Mahan accentuated the role of sea power in maritime trade to secure economic prosperity. His influential strategic principles underscore the relevance of maritime power to the “extent of dominion or in political power.”¹⁸⁶ Dr. Gurpreet S. Khurana, executive director of the National Maritime Foundation in New Delhi, coined the term “Indo-Pacific” in 2007 to address the evolving strategic import of this maritime awareness.

Indicating China’s politico-military assertiveness, Dr. Khurana proposes this geopolitical perspective may be the “most useful conceptual frame within which to address the fault lines among the great powers.”¹⁸⁷ Kaplan suggests “true military multipolarity benefits the state that is most geographically central to the region in

¹⁸⁴ Kaplan, *Asia’s Cauldron*, 16.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 5.

¹⁸⁶ Alfred T. Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1890), 91.

¹⁸⁷ Gurpreet S. Khurana, “Trump’s New Cold War Alliance in Asia is Dangerous,” *The Washington Post*, November 14, 2017, accessed April 30, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2017/11/14/trump-asia-trip/?utm_term=.8fa6c2699bc7.

question: namely China in East Asia.”¹⁸⁸ Against this severe international security backdrop, he describes Japan’s momentous steps to actively manage its security environment and engage its neighbors in order to preserve its security and advance its own national interests.

Dr. Haruo Tohmasu, a Japanese scholar on international relations, examines the shared threat perception of Russia in East Asia as the basis for the Anglo-Japanese alliance in the late 20th century. He argues Japan realized the limitations of “an emerging regional power in the international politics of great power imperial competition in Asia,” which necessitated the “linking of its own interests to that of an influential state actor.”¹⁸⁹ He then discusses how the strategic relationship changed as “the strategic reach and mobility that had made naval power so crucial to the alliance was to become a key factor in reciprocal threat perceptions.”¹⁹⁰ As the naval ability to project power grew dramatically, it also began to undermine Professor John Mearsheimer’s view of the sea as a “stopping force” that severely limits states in the ability to wage war across vast water masses.¹⁹¹ International relations scholars Jack Levy and William Thompson posit that maritime powers pose “significantly weaker threats to the territorial integrity of other states, particularly to other great powers, but greater threats to each other than to leading

¹⁸⁸ Kaplan, *Asia’s Cauldron*, 27.

¹⁸⁹ Haruo Tohmatsu, “Sea Power and Anglo-Japanese Military Relations, 1863-1923,” in *Maritime Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain: From the First Alliance to Post-9/11*, ed. Alessio Patalano (Leiden: Global Oriental, May 16, 2012), 44–45.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 57.

¹⁹¹ Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 30.

land-based powers.¹⁹² Given the proliferation of economic and security activities in the ECS and SCS by maritime powers, the dwindling mitigating influence of the sea now conversely exacerbates continuing maritime disputes. Figure 3 geographically displays the territorial and maritime disputes near Japan; number 5 denotes the location of the Senkaku Islands.



Figure 3. Disputed Territories in Asia

Source: Emma Graham-Harrison, “Islands on the Frontline of a New Global Flashpoint: China v Japan,” *The Guardian*, February 4, 2017, accessed February 23, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/05/china-v-japan-new-global-flashpoint-senkaku-islands-ishigaki>.

¹⁹² Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally Against the Leading Global Power?” *International Security* 35, no. 1 (Summer 2010): 33, accessed March 20, 2018, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00001.

The late Professor Desmond Ball, former head of the Australian National University's Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, consistently emphasized that "the North-East Asian nuclear arms race is now far more complex and dangerous than the Cold War."¹⁹³ He discusses the undeniable ambiguity and fluidity of the Northeast Asian strategic security environment, increasingly dominated by not only China's expansionism but also heightened sensitivity on the Korean peninsula. He identifies key indicators of action-reaction dynamics taking place in Northeast Asia: major naval capabilities, long-range ballistic and cruise missiles and ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems, electronic warfare, and information warfare and cyber-warfare capabilities.¹⁹⁴ For example, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system was installed in South Korea due to the threat of DPRK missiles. Figure 4 illustrates the significant increase in the range of DPRK's missile systems, especially that of its newest and most powerful intercontinental ballistic missile, the Hwasong-15.

¹⁹³ Shar Adams, "Asian Cold War: Escalating Conflict in North-East Asia Bigger Threat Than War on Terror," *Epoch Times*, October 13, 2014, accessed November 19, 2017, https://www.theepochtimes.com/asian-cold-war-escalating-conflict-in-north-east-asia-bigger-threat-than-war-on-terror_1014683.html.

¹⁹⁴ Desmond Ball, "Asia's Naval Arms Race: Myth or Reality?" (paper, 25th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Canberra, Australia, May 30, 2011), 4, accessed November 16, 2017, http://www.isis.org.my/files/25APR/paper_cs_2_desmond_ball.pdf.



Figure 4. DPRK Missile Launches

Source: Missile Defense Project, “Missiles of North Korea,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 20, 2017, accessed January 21, 2018, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/>.

Notably, Professor Ball distinguishes between the past modernization period and the more recent elements of competition that have emerged based on threat assessments of neighbors. Professor Ball argues that “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile systems is now proceeding more rapidly and extensively in Asia than in any other part of the world.”¹⁹⁵ He points out that the “combination of increasing

¹⁹⁵ Ball, *Asia’s Naval Arms Race*, 9.

capabilities and action-reaction is the essence of arms-racing” and furthermore, highlights the lack of mechanisms to “constrain escalatory processes and promote crisis stability.”¹⁹⁶ Meanwhile, Dr. Theresa Claire Smith, a quantitative international relations expert, explains how slow arming can allow economic conditions and political attitudes to accommodate higher levels of military funding over time. In the case of Japan’s moderate defense spending, it can enable arms race leeway “to drift (or ‘run’) away from equilibrium” and propagate an unstable system.¹⁹⁷ The increasing prominence and impact of Asia’s geopolitical issues on countries in the Indo-Pacific region has seen a corresponding rise in their military expenditures. Director Shingo Yamagami from the Japan Institute of International Affairs remarks on how China’s publicly announced 2016 defense budget increased by 4,100 percent in the past 27 years, now 3.3 times larger than Japan’s.¹⁹⁸ Figure 5 captures the significant changes in military expenditure in Asia and Oceania from 2015 to 2016, outstripping the other regions.

¹⁹⁶ Ball, *Asia’s Naval Arms Race*, 15.

¹⁹⁷ Theresa C. Smith, “Arms Race Instability and War,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, no. 2 (June 1980): 262, accessed February 5, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/173853>.

¹⁹⁸ Shingo Yamagami, “Japan’s New National Security Policy: Proactive Contribution to Peace,” *Review of International Law and Politics* 12, no. 2 (Summer 2016): 23–31, accessed January 20, 2018, EBSCOhost.




Figure 5. Changes in Military Expenditure by Region, 2015-2016

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Military Expenditure,” 2017, accessed January 20, 2018, <https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-spending/military-expenditure>.

As individual countries continue to develop military capabilities to safeguard national interests and deter aggression, regional sensitivity to Japan’s future military role and expanding endeavors remain an enduring concern. A 2015 report by the Atlantic Council notes the importance of Japan’s efforts to “assure other countries in the region that these increases do not threaten their legitimate security interests.”¹⁹⁹ As Japan becomes more comfortable in its position as a regional security leader under the Abe

¹⁹⁹ Roger Cliff, “Japan’s Security Role and Capabilities in the 2020s: Japan as a Regional Security Leader,” Atlantic Council, November 2015, accessed January 20, 2018, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/japan-s-security-role-and-capabilities-in-the-2020s>.

administration, the Atlantic Council report argues that this is “in the interest of Japan’s neighbors and the United States.” As part of Abe’s ambitious approach to Japanese and regional security, he has “positioned the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue to challenge China’s growing dominance across the region.”²⁰⁰ Nonetheless, emotionally charged regional disputes continue to frustrate Abe’s ability to successfully advocate for regional alignment with Japan’s neighbors, particular South Korea. Figure 6 demonstrates how the acrimonious Japan-South Korea relationship remains heavily influenced by historical and territorial issues.

²⁰⁰ Michael Stutchbury and Angus Grigg, “Shinzo Abe’s Ambitious Indo-Pacific Agenda,” *Financial Review*, January 19, 2018, accessed January 20, 2018, <http://www.afr.com/brand/business-summit/shinzo-abes-ambitious-indopacific-agenda-20180119-h0l6g6>.




Figure 6. Opinion Poll: How to Improve Japan-South Korea Relations

Source: Genron NPO, “The 5th Japan-South Korea Public Opinion Poll,” July 2017, 9, accessed February 10, 2018, http://www.genron-npo.net/en/archives/170721_en.pdf.

Professor Andrew Oros, the Associate Dean for International Education at Washington College, studies the international relations aspect in his work, *Japan's Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics in the Twenty-First Century*. He describes the evolution of Japan's security strategy as the product of a new level of pragmatism among both elites and the general public as they adjust to new power realities in the region.²⁰¹ Although the antimilitarist culture is still apparent in both security

²⁰¹ Andrew L. Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance: New Policies and Politics for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 4.

debates and social commentary, Japan's willingness to consider updates to its constitution and military activities overseas has appreciably grown.

Professor Oros points to the interaction of two trends, Japan's relative decline in regional power and a heightened perception of security threats, to show how it has led to the "security renaissance."²⁰² This security renaissance has transformed how Japan is viewed by its neighbors and security partners around the world. However, Dr. Koga argues that Professor Oros' security renaissance represents an aberration because Japan is engaged in only "one type of hedging—security hedging—vis-à-vis the risk of U.S. commitment reduction to East Asia."²⁰³ Aside from this deviation, Koga considers Japan to have consistently balanced against China while militarily bandwagoning with the United States. He contends Japan has modified its security posture against China by primarily conducting internal balancing, "doing so not by increasing its material military capabilities but by relaxing its own political limitation on defense capabilities."²⁰⁴

Dr. Paul Midford, director of the Japan Program at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, also rejects claims of Japan's military "normalization" and sweeping embrace of power politics. He believes Tokyo is far more likely to continue securing its interests through traditional, although expanded, policy tools such as

²⁰² Ibid., 16.

²⁰³ Kei Koga, "The Concept of 'Hedging' Revisited: The Case of Japan's Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia's Power Shift," *International Studies Review* vix059 (December 29, 2017): 1, accessed March 3, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix059>.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., 23.

multilateral security cooperation and economic assistance to other states.²⁰⁵ In fact, he suggests the Abe administration has done little more than continue and extend the previous administration's policies of diplomatic and military exchanges as well as non-lethal military aid.²⁰⁶ Nevertheless, Professor Oros investigates this delicate balancing act between the benefits of Japan's activist mindset towards security and the not insignificant drawbacks. He takes note of Japan's military capabilities and its readiness, especially how they continue to improve and steadily keep pace with its active contributions to global security. Specifically, he emphasizes an increased potential to provoke China and the raised stakes for escalation due to miscalculation.²⁰⁷ In the past, the fear of entangling alliances was a key Japanese concern; Oros aptly notes it has now become an American one as well.²⁰⁸

Researcher Andrew R. Capistrano from the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation and Dr. Shuhei Kurizaki, Associate Professor at Waseda University, argue in their study that those drawbacks mentioned by Professor Oros are significant and cast considerable doubt on Japan's strategic approach to generating security for the country. They suggest that Japan's evolving defense posture is designed to simultaneously signal resolve and reassurance; moreover, they recognize the difficulty of accomplishing both aims in the

²⁰⁵ Paul Midford, "Japan's Approach to Maritime Security in the South China Sea," *Asian Survey* 55, no. 3 (May-June 2015): 526, accessed May 2, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2015.55.3.525>.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 545.

²⁰⁷ Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance*, 119.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 47.

current strategic environment.²⁰⁹ Their argument takes into consideration the under-appreciated consequences of deepening mutual strategic mistrust and Japan's evolving role in the U.S.-Japan alliance on security dilemma dynamics in the region.²¹⁰ Specifically, they highlight the dangerous ambiguity of the reinterpretation of Article 9 as it introduces a level of unpredictability and regional suspicion heretofore unseen. They stress that Prime Minister Abe's constitutional perspective "may usher in arguably the most dramatic restructuring to the U.S.-Japan strategic role in the region since 1960."²¹¹ Notably, they posit that the primary benefit of Japan's evolving security posture is improved alliance cohesion through the ACM, along with the caveat that its realistic ability to enhance deterrence is unlikely.²¹² Notwithstanding their skepticism towards the value of the ACM, their overriding concern remains the potential impact on the persisting security dilemma(s) in the Indo-Pacific.

Professor John Ferris, a prominent scholar of military and strategic studies at the University of Calgary, reframes their inferences to show how Japan's role in regional unpredictability and strategic ambiguity can promote conflict. He maintains that leading up to 1945, Japan "sought to redefine it [Asia-Pacific region] through force but that force, pre-eminently resting on maritime strength, was not meant to support a wider economic

²⁰⁹ Andrew R. Capistrano and Shuhei Kurizaki, "Japan's Changing Defense Posture and Security Relations in East Asia," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 14, no. 1 (April 2016): 77–104, accessed November 2, 2017, <http://dx.doi.org/10.14731/kjis.2016.4.14.1.77>.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 79.

²¹¹ Ibid., 88.

²¹² Ibid., 91–92.

system.”²¹³ He then points out “in a multilateral system, power constantly fluctuates, as do perceptions of it” and “periods of transitions in power—when a preponderance collapses, or several states race to maximize their strengths, in a pattern of challenge and response—are conducive to crisis and war.”²¹⁴

Professor Shiping Tang at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs in Fudan University, Shanghai relates Professor Ferris’ views on the transition of power to the security dilemma. He identifies the three essential aspects of the quintessential security dilemma: “anarchy (which leads to uncertainty, fear, and the need for self-help for survival or security), a lack of malign intentions on both sides, and some accumulation of power (including offensive capabilities).”²¹⁵ Professor Charles L. Glaser, a leading international relations scholar on defensive realism, notes the fundamental cause of the security dilemma is a state’s uncertainty of its adversary’s motives due to a lack of confidence in its pure security objective.²¹⁶ Contributing to the security dilemma discussion, Professor Robert Gilpin’s influential work on hegemonic war discusses the

²¹³ John Ferris, “The Fulcrum of Power: Britain, Japan, and the Asia-Pacific Region, 1880-1945,” in *Maritime Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain: From the First Alliance to Post-9/11*, ed. Alessio Patalano (Leiden: Global Oriental, May 16, 2012), 38.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 39.

²¹⁵ Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” *Security Studies* 18, no. 3 (October 2009): 595, accessed November 20, 2017, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636410903133050>.

²¹⁶ Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” *World Politics* 50, no. 1 (October 1997): 184, accessed April 27, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054031>.

repercussions of a discrepancy between power and prestige.²¹⁷ He underlines the disequilibrium that results from a rapid improvement in an upstart's power and the lingering fall of the incumbent state's prestige. In such a dynamic power flux, Professor Tang underscores the increased possibility of anarchy, miscalculations, and unintended outcomes. Figure 7 shows Professor Tang's portrayal of the causal relationship between initial conditions and outcomes, often unintended and counterproductive.

²¹⁷ Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 197–208.




Figure 7. The Causal Link from Anarchy to the Security Dilemma and War

Source: Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis," *Security Studies* 18, no. 3 (October 2009): 596, accessed November 26, 2017, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636410903133050>.

Compounding traditional security dilemma concerns, scholars and geopolitical analysts continue to reference Mahan to help justify the ‘pearl of strings’ theory in the Indo-Pacific region. First seen in the 2004 Booz Allen Hamilton report: “Energy Futures in Asia,” the provocative concept has reinforced negative perceptions of China’s growing energy network along the Indian Ocean littoral. The consequent threat of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) due to Chinese structural investments and capabilities has become a recurring military concern in Japan as well as the U.S. Discussing China’s focus on building an energy-based regional security architecture, Dr. Christina Lin from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy asserts it is rooted in the fundamental view of energy security as a core geopolitical and strategic issue.²¹⁸ However, India joins in American skepticism, considering China’s string of pearls to be thinly veiled military expansionism.²¹⁹

Due to these emerging great power maritime rivalries, maritime strategy scholar Dr. Toshi Yoshihara highlights the rising prospect of zero-sum interactions in the Indo-Pacific.²²⁰ The string of pearls’ military and A2/AD potential roughly parallels the Cold War “First Island Chain” and U.S.-led “Archipelagic Defense” concept of deterrence

²¹⁸ Christina Lin, “The New Silk Road: China’s Energy Strategy in the Greater Middle East,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, *Policy Focus* 109 (April 2011): xvi, accessed April 28, 2018, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus109.pdf>.

²¹⁹ Hankwon Kim, “The Implications of the Chinese ‘String of Pearls’ for the U.S. Return to Asia Policy: The U.S., China, and India in the Indian Ocean,” *Journal of Global Policy and Governance* 2, no. 2 (November 2013): 203, accessed April 5, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40320-013-0032-5>.

²²⁰ Toshi Yoshihara, “Chinese Views of India in the Indian Ocean: A Geopolitical Perspective,” *Strategic Analysis* 36, no. 3 (May 8, 2012): 491, accessed April 28, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2012.670446>.

through denial.²²¹ However, Dr. David Brewer from the Australian National University questions the inevitability of a Sino-India security dilemma in the Indian Ocean as a result of Chinese energy security investments.²²² Moreover, other notable scholars such as Dr. Khurana remain unconvinced of the concept's merits as a substantiated theory.²²³ Regardless, the trend of China's "dual-use civilian-military facilities" along the littorals of the Indo-Pacific demonstrates the strategic sway of energy security and maritime power in the region.²²⁴

Japan's strategic security environment, predominantly in the maritime domain, is under pressure from tremendous geostrategic factors. As Professor Acharya explained through his theory of the multiplex world, the open regionalism of the Indo-Pacific includes an "ever widening range of actors and issues."²²⁵ In an article for the *East Asia Forum Quarterly*, Senior Economist Ponciano Intal at the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia examines the ongoing contest for regional leadership between

²²¹ Andrew F. Krepinevich, "How to Deter China: The Case for Archipelagic Defense," *Foreign Affairs* 94, no. 2 (March-April 2015): 78, accessed May 1, 2018, <https://lumen.cgsccarl.com/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1658669009?accountid=28992>.

²²² David Brewster, "Beyond the 'String of Pearls': Is there really a Sino-Indian Security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean?" *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region* 10, no. 2 (June 17, 2014): 133, accessed April 25, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2014.922350>.

²²³ Gurpreet S. Khurana, "China's 'String of Pearls' in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications," *Strategic Analysis* 32, no. 1 (February 27, 2008): 2, accessed April 24, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700160801886314>.

²²⁴ Robert Kaplan, *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power* (New York: Random House, 2010), 11.

²²⁵ Acharya, *From the Unipolar Moment to the Multiplex World*.

China, Japan, and the United States. He asserts “that the existing architecture, coupled with the ‘ASEAN way’ of dialogue, consultations, consensus and non-interference, remains the most robust regional means of managing East Asia’s changing security landscape.”²²⁶ Along similar lines, Dr. Christian Wirth from the German Institute of Global and Area Studies argues the “constellation of interlocking, confrontational national interests pursued in bilateral relations provide space for cooperative frameworks at the regional level.”²²⁷

Section V: Japan’s Capabilities

Professor Yamaguchi conducts a comprehensive analysis of Japan’s defense policy and its potent evolution since the end of the Cold War as a direct result of changes in the security environment. He keenly notes how changes in threat perception and strategic priorities “triggered an evolution in defense affairs that required Japan to reach beyond the borders of the archipelago.”²²⁸ Furthermore, it emphasized the critical question at hand: how to strike the right balance between homeland defense and participation as a deeply invested international stakeholder.²²⁹ He defines the hallmark of Japan’s 21st century military dilemma as a “question of balance between forces for

²²⁶ Ponciano Intal, “The Institutions behind East Asia’s Transformation,” *East Asia Forum Quarterly* 9, no. 1 (January-March 2017): 6, accessed April 15, 2018, <http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n2429/pdf/book.pdf>.

²²⁷ Christian Wirth, “‘Power’ and ‘Stability’ in the China-Japan-South Korea Regional Security Complex: The Simultaneity of Conflict and Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” *The Pacific Review* 28, no. 4 (February 2015): 3, accessed April 25, 2018, 10.1080/09512748.2015.1012538.

²²⁸ Yamaguchi, *Balancing Threat Perceptions and Strategic Priorities*, 101.

²²⁹ Ibid.

regional and homeland defense and capabilities for expeditionary mission.”²³⁰ Professor Leif-Eric Easley at Ewha University agrees, pointing to the stark differences between Japan’s active participation in the current U.S.-led War on Terror and its roundly criticized checkbook diplomacy during the 1991 Gulf War.²³¹ Professor Easley concludes Japan is following a “Normal Japan” path, based on consistent commitment to multilateralism, incremental change, and balancing between pacificism and overt use of force.²³²

Dr. Chiyuki Aoi, a professor of international politics in Tokyo with extensive experience within the UN focusing on Japan’s contributions to PKO, explores the strategic impact of instability and contingency scenarios on national security in the post-Cold War security environment. She states Japan has “achieved a middleweight expeditionary capability” with the “potential in terms of military might to develop major expeditionary capabilities.”²³³ She argues Japan’s ambivalence towards properly defining its national security strategy in light of its long-standing security dilemma has led to a

²³⁰ Yamaguchi, *Balancing Threat Perceptions and Strategic Priorities*, 3.

²³¹ Leif-Eric Easley, “Japan’s Evolving Defense Posture,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 71, no. 1 (January 4, 2017): 63–87, accessed April 10, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2016.1181148>.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Chiyuki Aoi, “Punching Below its Weight: Japan’s Post-Cold War Expeditionary Mission,” in *Maritime Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain: From the First Alliance to Post-9/11*, ed. Alessio Patalano (Leiden: Global Oriental, May 16, 2012), 133.

growing disparity between Japan's principles and the requirements of the international security architecture today.²³⁴

Japan's efforts to avoid the dangers of the security dilemma trap are reflected in its development of expeditionary capabilities. Dr. Aoi distinguishes between power projection, which is expressly forbidden by Japan's constitution, and expeditionary capabilities, which lack major power projection potential.²³⁵ Key UN PKOs such as Golan Heights and East Timor significantly developed Japan's "peace-building diplomacy."²³⁶ She underscores the emergence of expeditionary missions, virtually unthinkable in the Cold War era, as a telling sign of the monumental shift in defining the elements of Japan's national security. There are not only the legal restrictions and outdated doctrinal guidance that still remain in Japan's framework for expeditionary operations, but also a lack of political will to become more involved in conflicts abroad. Based on these factors, Dr. Aoi surmises that "low-cost 'international peace cooperation' based on obsolete principles and doctrine reflects the lowest common denominator for both pacifists and realists in Japan."²³⁷

Dr. Aoi's focus on Japan's expeditionary development is especially enlightening considering the highly politicized nature of expeditionary operations. Prominent naval historian and author, Dr. Geoffrey Till, highlights the "sheer diversity and complexity . . . that make expeditionary operations usually seem substantively different from

²³⁴ Aoi, *Punching Below its Weight*, 133.

²³⁵ Ibid., 135–136.

²³⁶ Ibid., 138.

²³⁷ Ibid., 156.

conventional military operations and yet so difficult to define.”²³⁸ Dr. Till emphasizes three consequences for the conduct of expeditionary operations as a result of increased disorder and globalization: first, they are usually politicized in origin, style, and consequence; second, they are campaigns of choice because forces can always sail away; and third, they are often conducted under UN or similar international approval.²³⁹

Dr. Guibourg Delamotte, a professor specializing in international relations and politics in the Japanese studies department at the French Institute of Oriental Studies, accentuates the leading role that the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and naval considerations have taken in laying the groundwork for the transformation of Japan’s national security policies. Factors such as the demand for expeditionary capabilities and the undeniable necessity of defending sea lines of communication (SLOCs) helped move Japan into the “uncharted waters of international security by presenting a desirable combination of high strategic and political impact with a comparatively low risk of danger and costs.”²⁴⁰

Any discussion of Japan’s national security must also explore its foundation in maritime security and the influence of the sea in shaping the island nation’s identity and capabilities. Describing Southeast Asia as a region in which “the land divides but the sea unites,” Dr. Nguyen Hung Son from the Asan Institute for Policy Studies establishes

²³⁸ Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A guide for the Twenty-First Century*, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2013), 254–255.

²³⁹ Ibid., 256.

²⁴⁰ Guibourg Delamotte, “The Political and Normative Constraints to Japan’s National Security,” in *Maritime Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain: From the First Alliance to Post-9/11*, ed. Alessio Patalano (Leiden: Global Oriental, May 16, 2012), 174.

Japan's pivotal maritime security interests in the region.²⁴¹ He notes 80 percent of Japan's crude oil imports flows through Southeast Asian sea routes such as the Strait of Malacca and in the SCS.²⁴² Dr. Alessio Patalano, a specialist in Japanese naval history from King's College London, draws parallels between Japan and Great Britain by investigating the insularity of the sea as a formative strategic influence on national security in both nations. He discusses Japan's conscious decision to use Great Britain as its national model, which then offered "Japanese elites a valuable template regarding the options open to an island nation," especially to one set on becoming the "Britain of the Far East."²⁴³

As a result, Japan viewed the sea as "a geophysical defensive shield, as a platform for the exercise of deterrence and, if necessary, as an enabling network of far-reaching waterways available to project power to preserve vital economic and security interests."²⁴⁴ Dr. Patalano uses a comparative case study of these two maritime nations, representing relatively limited military capabilities but global economic interests, to

²⁴¹ Nguyen H. Son, "ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership in Southeast Asia: Maritime Security and Cooperation," in *Beyond 2015: ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity in Southeast Asia*, eds. Rizal Sukma and Yoshihide Soeya (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2013), 219, accessed April 10, 2018, <http://www.jcie.org/japan/j/pdf/pub/publst/1451/full%20report.pdf>.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Alessio Patalano, ed., *Maritime Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain: From the First Alliance to Post-9/11*, ed. Alessio Patalano (Leiden: Global Oriental, May 16, 2012), 4.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 5.

address how they can “employ their respective military power to fulfill the requirements of both national defense and international stability.”²⁴⁵

Section VI: Japan-China Rivalry

Although the modern Sino-American rivalry currently dominates the Asian security sphere, the overshadowed relationship between China and Japan has been of far longer duration. In her book *Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China*, author Sheila Smith explores the great power rivalry that has simmered between Japan and China for centuries. A senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Smith identifies China’s disruption to the global order as a fundamental challenge to Japan’s postwar success.²⁴⁶ Nationalist activism in Japan and reactive popular politics in China have shaped the public perception of the Japan-China relationship in both countries. For example, China’s enduring dissatisfaction with Japan’s war apologies and “apology fatigue” within Japan both continue to “bedevil Sino-Japanese relations.”²⁴⁷ In its 2015 *China’s Military Strategy* white paper, China accuses Japan of overhauling its military presence and security policies to “dodge the post-war mechanism,” causing regional unrest among its neighbors.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁵ Patalano, *Maritime Strategy and National Security in Japan and Britain*, 13.

²⁴⁶ Sheila Smith, *Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Policies and a Rising China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 263.

²⁴⁷ Shogo Suzuki, “Will Japan’s War Apologies ever satisfy China?” East Asia Forum, November 5, 2015, accessed January 9, 2018, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/11/05/will-japans-war-apologies-ever-satisfy-china/>.

²⁴⁸ The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, *China’s Military Strategy*, Chinese Ministry of National Defense, May 26, 2015,

Japan's domestic debate over how to frame its response to China's rise in regional and global power has been moderated by its deepening economic ties with China. Rather than a one-dimensional military dilemma, adapting to China's rise has forced a "broader and more reflective debate over Japan's ability to compete in a global economy increasingly shaped by China."²⁴⁹ While largely dismissive of broader claims regarding Japan's "resurgence," Dr. Midford does acknowledge Japan's willingness to get involved in the SCS territorial disputes by "actively promoting ad hoc counter-balancing coalitions against China."²⁵⁰ He specifically links this to Japan's belief that SCS outcomes will affect future handling of the Senkaku Islands issue.²⁵¹

In his study of the Indo-Pacific region, Kaplan maintains emphasis on the roles China has played historically with its neighbors, which continue to evolve in concert with an increasingly capable military and economy. Of note, according to David Shambaugh at George Washington University, China spends around ten billion USD annually on "soft power" to complement its military and economic strength.²⁵² The trend of China's expanding use of soft power and economic influence has accelerated under Xi Jinping's

accessed April 17, 2018, <https://news.usni.org/2015/05/26/document-chinas-military-strategy>.

²⁴⁹ Smith, *Intimate Rivals*, 250.

²⁵⁰ Midford, *Japan's Approach to Maritime Security in the South China Sea*, 547.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² *The Economist*, "China is spending Billions to make the World love It," March 23, 2017, accessed March 3, 2018, <https://www.economist.com/news/china/21719508-can-money-buy-sort-thing-china-spending-billions-make-world-love-it>.

presidency, one that looks to continue unabated with the unexpected removal of the two-term limit on the Chinese presidency.²⁵³

Even as Trump's administration appears increasingly eager to unload the burden of global leadership, President Xi has embraced the concept of a "community of common interests."²⁵⁴ The dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University and one of China's top strategic thinkers, Yan Xuetong asserts that China adheres to the principle of peaceful competition and has no interest in ideological confrontations.²⁵⁵ On the other hand, Professor Brahma Chellaney of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research examines China's "debt-trap diplomacy" and uses the term "creditor imperialism" to denote the dangers of China's infrastructure-based approach to soft power and economic expansion.²⁵⁶

Japan's adept use of ODA as an "important diplomatic tool to forge significant international contribution" strategically juxtaposes Japan's 2016 *Development*

²⁵³ Wang Xiangwei, "How Long does China's President Xi Jinping plan to hold Power? Here's the Magic Number," *South China Morning Post*, March 3, 2018, accessed March 6, 2018, <http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2135206/how-long-does-chinas-president-xi-plan-hold-power-heres-magic>.

²⁵⁴ Yan Xuetong, "Trump can't Start a Cold War with China, even if He wants to," *The Washington Post*, February 6, 2018, accessed April 4, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/06/china-trump/?utm_term=.c51218c779ca.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Brahma Chellaney, "China's Creditor Imperialism" (essay, Project Syndicate, December 20, 2017), accessed April 4, 2018, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-sri-lanka-hambantota-port-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-12?barrier=accessreg>.

Cooperation Policy with China's exploitative economic policies.²⁵⁷ Under the guise of economic assistance to developing countries, Japan and China nevertheless embody starkly competing philosophies in their divergent policies. Dr. June Teufel Dreyer at the University of Miami highlights both the LDP's recent supermajority in Japan's House of Representatives and President Xi's surging consolidation of power within the Communist Party of China (CCP). Based on these developments, she believes these two strong leaders will pursue hardline policies that will exacerbate frictions or conversely, that they will have the backing to reach compromises.²⁵⁸

Focusing on the South China Sea as the geopolitical epicenter of the Indo-Pacific region, Kaplan states that it "signifies more than just a system of territorial disputes; it is the crossroads of global maritime commerce, vital to the energy needs of South Korea and Japan."²⁵⁹ In addition, in order to control the "Asian Caribbean" and expand the country's influence, the PLA Navy seeks to "break through the straitjacket of the American-dominated First Island Chain in the Western Pacific."²⁶⁰ Regarding China, Kaplan argues against the concept of containment, declaring it is "the wrong word that unfortunately harbors a great truth: that because China is geographically fundamental to

²⁵⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *White Paper on Development Cooperation 2016*, March 2017, iii, accessed April 22, 2018, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000282089.pdf>.

²⁵⁸ June T. Dreyer, "Managing a Fragile Relationship," *Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations* 19, no. 3 (January 2018): 93, accessed March 15, 2018, http://cc.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/1703_Japan-China.pdf.

²⁵⁹ Kaplan, *Asia's Cauldron*, 61.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 41.

Asia, its military and economic power must be hedged against to preserve the independence of smaller states in Asia that are U.S. allies.”²⁶¹ Lastly, he states that “Beijing’s goal is not war—but an adjustment in the correlation of forces that enhances its geopolitical power and prestige.”²⁶² Nevertheless, he underscores the fact that despite China’s natural and altogether long-expected rise as a regional power, the “very disturbance of the status quo caused by the ascendancy of a new power has throughout history raised the risk of hostilities.”²⁶³

Professor Andrew S. Erickson from the Strategy Department at the U.S. Naval War College has written extensively on Japan’s security strategy and crisis management. Focusing on Japan’s institutional reforms, Professor Erickson and his colleague Professor Andrew P. Liff highlight the escalation of risk and uncertainty over the Senkaku Islands issue with China and the conspicuous lack of bilateral firebreaks regarding the “most volatile flashpoint between the world’s second and third largest economies.”²⁶⁴ The Senkaku Islands are strategically located near major shipping lanes and offer access to significant fishing grounds and other natural resources. Although under Japan’s administrative control, the Senkaku Islands have seen a dramatic escalation in overt Chinese presence and activities at sea and in the air. Of the 1,168 scrambles in 2016, the most since records began being kept in 1958, 851 scrambles or 73 percent were due to

²⁶¹ Kaplan, *Asia’s Cauldron*, 166–167.

²⁶² Ibid., 178.

²⁶³ Ibid., 180.

²⁶⁴ Liff and Erickson, *From Management Crisis to Crisis Management?*, 604.

Chinese flights.²⁶⁵ Figure 8 shows the considerable rise in Japan's fighter jet scrambles against Chinese aircraft from 2001 to 2015.




Figure 8. Japan's Jet Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft

Source: Ministry of Defense, "China's Activities surrounding Japan's Airspace," 2017, accessed January 14, 2018, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/ryouku/.

Their critical and systematic assessment of Japan's internal and external crisis management capabilities holds increasingly relevant policy implications for those with

²⁶⁵ Jesse Johnson, "Japan's Fighter Jet Scrambles set New Record in 2016 amid Surging Chinese Military Activity," *The Japan Times*, April 14, 2017, accessed January 15, 2018, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/04/14/national/japans-fighter-jet-scrambles-set-new-record-2016-amid-surging-chinese-military-activity/#.Wl0MJJM-dE4>.

vested interests in the continued stability of the ECS. Since the Japanese government's purchase, or "nationalization," of three of the islands in September 2012, China has intensified its efforts to advance its own island claim. In November 2013, China established its first ADIZ in the ECS, controversially including the Senkaku Islands as "integral parts of China's territory."²⁶⁶ By attempting to "change behavioral norms to strengthen their claim to the Senkaku Islands" using the ADIZ, China has increased the risk of miscalculation.²⁶⁷ Dr. Scott Harold, Associate Director at the Center for Asia Pacific Policy, notes China's increasingly capable use of gray zone tactics as part of its regional political-military strategy, capitalizing on such risk and dangerously eroding the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.²⁶⁸ RAND researchers Michael S. Chase and Arthur Chan point out that similar to the U.S., the PLA emphasizes the "military element of China's overall strategic-deterrence posture as critical because it is the strongest and most direct means of strategic deterrence."²⁶⁹

Liff's and Erickson's study underscores how Abe was able to capitalize on growing realization among the Japanese elite that the current "security and institutional

²⁶⁶ Edmund J. Burke and Astrid S. Cevallos, "In Line or Out of Order? China's Approach to ADIZ in Theory and Practice," RAND Corporation, 2017, 6, accessed January 14, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2055.html.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., 23.

²⁶⁸ Scott W. Harold, Yoshiaki Nakagawa, Junichi Fukada, John A. Davis, Keiko Kono, Dean Cheng, and Kazuto Suzuki, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Detering Grey Zone Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and Space Domains," RAND Corporation, 2017, 1, accessed February 4, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF379.html.

²⁶⁹ Michael S. Chase and Arthur Chan, "China's Evolving Approach to 'Integrated Strategic Deterrence'," RAND Corporation, April 7, 2016, accessed February 10, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1bz3vx1.8>.

status quo were unsustainable.”²⁷⁰ They are coming to terms with the changing distribution of power within East Asia. Mounting awareness of China’s threatening behavior and potentially misplaced reliance on America’s willingness to fight for them have deepened in Tokyo. In turn, this emerging cognizance has created the political space for Abe to enact major security reforms such as establishing the NSC.²⁷¹ Liff and Erickson note that Japan’s NSC represents a historic breakthrough and major institutional innovation in national security and civil-military coordination. However, they also highlight “noxious political relations” and how “the absence of basic, much less robust, crisis management mechanisms between Tokyo and Beijing exacerbates the possibility of miscalculation or escalation in a possible fast-moving political-military crisis.”²⁷²

Dr. Kenneth Pyle, a leading Japanese historian and professor emeritus at the University of Washington, is widely respected in Japan and has received numerous honors including the Order of the Rising Sun by the Japanese government. In his seminal work *Japan Rising*, he discusses the “awakened Japanese security consciousness,” the Japanese elite’s “impatience with the low political profile,” and Japan’s return “to great-power politics.”²⁷³ Professor Christopher Hughes at the London School of Economics and Political Science also notes this shift in Japan’s strategic thinking, informally calling

²⁷⁰ Liff and Erickson, *From Management Crisis to Crisis Management?*, 624.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Ibid., 633.

²⁷³ Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 2–3.

this new posture “Resentful Realism.”²⁷⁴ Dr. Pyle describes six characteristics that define this realist approach: attentiveness to power, pragmatism and the weakness of transcendent and universal ideals, adaptation and accommodation, autonomy and regional hegemony, emulation and innovation, and rank and honor.²⁷⁵ In fact, he uses this framework to explain Japan’s puzzling decision to go to war with the United States in WWII despite the U.S.’ significantly greater power potential. Tellingly, he states that the American threat to Japan’s standing as a great power in the world, an essential aspect of its national identity, ultimately forced Japan to make that fateful choice.²⁷⁶

Based on his model of Resentful Realism, Professor Hughes agrees with Dr. Pyle’s assessment of Japan’s rising sensitivity. However, as a counterpoint, he also argues that such changes will “actually make Japan a destabilizing rather than stabilizing presence in the regional security landscape.”²⁷⁷ Dr. Michael Swaine, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies, concurs and stresses the counterproductive nature of Japan’s free and open Indo-Pacific concept. He believes this U.S.-endorsed approach will unnecessarily provoke Beijing, alarm other Asian nations, and ultimately

²⁷⁴ Christopher Hughes, “Japan’s ‘Resentful Realism’ and Balancing China’s Rise,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9, no. 2 (April 28, 2016): 109–150, accessed February 25, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pow004>.

²⁷⁵ Pyle, *Japan Rising*, 42–65.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 65.

²⁷⁷ Hughes, *Japan’s ‘Resentful Realism’ and Balancing China’s Rise*, 109.

drive the region towards a highly tense, zero-sum competition.²⁷⁸ He acknowledges the comprehensive scope of Abe's support for the free and open Indo-Pacific concept. However, he lists Sino-Japanese economic interdependence and public opposition to constitutional revision as critical stumbling blocks which will moderate Japan's actions and instigate hedging behavior.²⁷⁹

Dr. Kenneth Pyle argues that Japan's perception of China as a strategic threat and fears over its expansionist ambitions were the primary motivation behind Japan's cultural borrowing and reformations during the 660s.²⁸⁰ Interestingly, he suggests that this constitutes a compelling precedent for Japan's actions in the future. Although the extent of strategic change is still unknown, Dr. Pyle acutely points out the "historic, lightning-like changes of Japanese national policy," going on to state that "among the world's great civilizations, it is *sui generis*."²⁸¹ He argues that Japan's seemingly mercurial and often paradoxical behavior is due to Japan's extraordinary responsiveness and "sensitivity to the configuration of power in the international system."²⁸² Pointing to China's

²⁷⁸ Michael D. Swaine, "Creating an Unstable Asia: the U.S. 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' Strategy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2, 2018, accessed April 25, 2018, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/02/creating-unstable-asia-u.s.-free-and-open-indo-pacific-strategy-pub-75720>.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Pyle, *Japan Rising*, 36.

²⁸¹ Ibid., 1213.

²⁸² Ibid., 19.

ascendancy, he emphasizes Japan has “sweepingly revised its domestic order to meet the needs of new configurations of the international order.”²⁸³

Section VII: Japan’s Frenemy – Republic of Korea

South Korea occupies a crucial strategic role in terms of Japan’s own security, wielding considerable influence over the DPRK issue on the volatile Korean peninsula. Indeed, shared concerns over North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs have served as a key impetus to strengthening relations between Japan and South Korea. Under the post-Cold War umbrella of the U.S. alliance system, concrete bilateral security contacts between Japan and South Korea have contributed to maturing political and security relations.²⁸⁴ The landmark 1998 reconciliation agreement between the ROK President Kim Dae-jung and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi sought to unshackle the relationship from the lingering legacy of WWII. This agreement announced a joint pledge of a “future-oriented relationship,” leading South Korea to end its national ban on Japan’s cultural influence while Japan issued another formal apology.²⁸⁵ The establishment of the U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group in March 1999 built upon this bilateral progress and gave rise to trilateral defense cooperation.²⁸⁶

²⁸³ Pyle, *Japan Rising*, 21.

²⁸⁴ Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson, *Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics, and Security* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 209.

²⁸⁵ Scott Snyder, “South Korea Struggles with the Asian Paradox,” *World Politics Review*, May 20, 2014, accessed February 21, 2018, <https://worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13791/south-korea-struggles-with-the-asian-paradox>.

²⁸⁶ Hook, Gilson, Hughes, and Dobson, *Japan’s International Relations*, 209.

However, lasting differences over historical issues, territorial disputes, and Japan's revisionist attempts have limited the potential of the Japan-ROK relationship. Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Pacific Forum at CSIS, and Scott Snyder, senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, discuss the "puzzle of persisting tensions" in this strategic and fraught relationship between these two democratic allies.²⁸⁷ Scott Snyder notes South Korea's central role in the so-called Asian Paradox, unwillingly thrust into the "confluence of great power interests in the region."²⁸⁸ As a result, South Korea continues to strategically balance between China and the United States. Japan, on the other hand, has greater leeway and the willingness to more consistently support U.S. priorities and policies. To illustrate this point, Snyder points to the public China-ROK reconciliation under the Park administration, buoyed by shared concerns toward Japan's historical revisionism and similar beliefs in a gradualist approach to DPRK denuclearization.²⁸⁹ He incisively underscores the difference between South Korea's hedging mindset and Japan's balancing behavior in their respective approaches to China.²⁹⁰

This difference in strategic perception extends to the Indo-Pacific states. Unlike Southeast Asia's consideration of Japan as a major geopolitical power, middle power South Korea is "viewed first and foremost as a regional actor limited mostly to Northeast

²⁸⁷ Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder, *The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 3–4.

²⁸⁸ Snyder, *South Korea Struggles with the Asian Paradox*.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

Asia” and thus “not envisioned to have a role in Southeast Asia’s strategic challenges.”²⁹¹ Unfettered by historical issues and aided by perceived cultural similarities, South Korea’s middle power engagement initiatives have resonated with ASEAN. However, although its non-revisionist and status-quo attributes contribute to a potential bridging role, the “Sino-Japanese competition does not seem to have greatly enhanced Korea’s middle power standing among Southeast Asian countries.”²⁹² Even as differing geopolitical views of China further characterize the Japan-ROK relationship, past efforts to broker political agreements have failed to end the recursive chain of accusations on both sides.

Even President Park Geun-hye’s landmark 2015 agreement with Japan over the comfort women issue was unsuccessful in lifting the bilateral relationship out of the historical quagmire. When her embattled presidency ended in impeachment on March 10, 2017, it further delegitimized the controversial settlement and contributed to broad public disapproval in both countries. 75 percent of South Koreans and 53 percent of Japanese felt the issue remains unresolved, despite the 2015 agreement declaring it be a “final and irreversible resolution.”²⁹³ President Moon Jae-In’s administration conducted a review of the 2015 agreement to restore governmental transparency and in January 2018,

²⁹¹ Sarah Teo, Bhubhindar Singh, and See Seng Tan, “Southeast Asian Perspectives on South Korea’s Middle Power Engagement Initiatives,” *Asian Survey* 56, no. 3 (May-June 2016): 577, accessed April 13, 2018, <http://as.ucpress.edu/content/56/3/555.full.pdf+html>.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Naotaka Fujita, “Survey: 75% of S. Koreans think ‘Comfort Women’ Issue Unresolved,” *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 27, 2017, accessed April 11, 2018, <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201707270041.html>.

announced that Seoul would not renegotiate the deal.²⁹⁴ Professor Celeste Arrington at George Washington University notes the agreement's review was largely driven by domestic politics, a delicate balancing act by President Moon's government between "regional security and promoting reform and transparency at home."²⁹⁵

Senior fellow McDaniel Wicker at the Wilson Center illustrates the pervasive insecurity shared by both nations, pointing out how South Korea's lack of firm commitment exacerbates Japan's sense of vulnerability to China.²⁹⁶ Snyder notes "South Korea's strategic focus has been on the desire to avoid making a choice between China as its main economic partner and the United States as its main security partner."²⁹⁷ Glosserman and Snyder argue that the influential confluence of public opinion and political leadership in both democratic states have been underestimated by scholars and analysts. Identifying the Japanese right and South Korean left as the political causes of the tense relationship, they optimistically suggest the potential for meaningful reconciliation between "Moon, a progressive, and Abe, a conservative."²⁹⁸ Given that

²⁹⁴ Celeste Arrington, "South Korea ended its Review of its 'Comfort Women' Deal with Japan. Here's What You Need to Know," *The Washington Post*, January 11, 2018, accessed April 11, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/11/south-korea-ended-its-review-of-its-comfort-women-deal-with-japan-heres-what-you-need-to-know/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a2420131a0f9.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ McDaniel Wicker, "Security in Unity Between the United States, South Korea, and Japan," Wilson Center, April 14, 2016, accessed April 28, 2018, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/completing-the-triangle>.

²⁹⁷ Snyder, *South Korea Struggles with the Asian Paradox*.

²⁹⁸ Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder, "Prospects for Japan-South Korea Cooperation Under Moon Jae-in," Council on Foreign Relations, June 2, 2017, accessed

“the roots of national identity for each state hinder deeper cooperation between them,” Brad Glosserman nonetheless cautions that skepticism towards any substantial improvement is still warranted.²⁹⁹

Section VIII: Japan’s Emerging Partnerships with India, Australia, and ASEAN

Japan’s move to “normalize” its security posture has in turn driven formal and informal cooperation with regional partners such as India, Australia, and ASEAN. Dr. John Nilsson-Wright is a respected scholar and lecturer on contemporary regional security issues in the Indo-Pacific region. He describes how these fledgling partnerships are largely the result of regional states’ efforts to hedge against growing uncertainty. Examining key factors contributing to that uncertainty, he brings up mounting doubts over the U.S.’ reliability as a security guarantor, relentless expansion of PLA capabilities, territorial disputes, rise of populist politics, competition over scarce resources, climate change, and a nuclear North Korea.³⁰⁰

Additionally, he calls out Japan’s increased foreign policy activism under Abe as an instrumental catalyst for driving recent trilateralism among Japan, India, and Australia.

April 12, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/prospects-japan-south-korea-cooperation-under-moon-jae>.

²⁹⁹ Brad Glosserman, “Japan-South Korea: So Close, Yet So Far,” *The Diplomat*, February 28, 2018, accessed April 13, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/japan-south-korea-so-close-yet-so-far/>.

³⁰⁰ John Nilsson-Wright, “Creative Minilateralism in a Changing Asia: Opportunities for Security Convergence and Cooperation Between Australia, India, and Japan,” Asia Programme, Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2017, 2, accessed November 5, 2017, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/images/2017-07-28-Minilateralism.pdf>.

Dr. Nilsson-Wright assesses Abe's ambitions to be defined by a "pragmatic desire to expand Japan's regional and global influence and status, but also by a strong strand of identity politics."³⁰¹ The unifying theme of pragmatic convergence directs the Japan-India-Australia security relationship. Lastly, he underlines the oft overlooked power of individual leadership, specifically pinpointing Japan's Abe and India's Modi as "unusually pragmatic and energetic leaders, facing few immediate political challenges at home."³⁰²

In 2013, Australia Prime Minister Tony Abbott declared Japan to be "Australia's closest friend in Asia."³⁰³ In July 2014, Abe became the first Japanese prime minister to address the Australian Parliament and establish a special strategic partnership with Australia. The late Paul Dobb, the foremost architect of Australian post-Cold War foreign policy, strongly believed the resumption of Sino-Japanese rivalry to be one of the greatest strategic risks posed by U.S. retrenchment from Asia.³⁰⁴ In their authoritative discussion of Dobb's legacy, Professor Desmond Ball and Dr. Sheryn Lee explore the rationale and strategic impetus behind Australia's middle power approach and pragmatic cultivation of

³⁰¹ Nilsson-Wright, *Creative Multilateralism in a Changing Asia*, 7.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, 20.

³⁰³ Mark Kenny, "Tony Abbott says Japan is Australia's 'Closest Friend in Asia'," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, October 9, 2013, accessed February 9, 2018, <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/tony-abbott-says-japan-is-australias-closest-friend-in-asia-20131009-2v8ty.html>.

³⁰⁴ Raoul Heinrichs and William T. Tow, "Hard Power and Regional Diplomacy: The Dobb Legacy" in *Geography, Power, Strategy and Defence Policy*, eds. Desmond Ball and Sheryn Lee (Australia: Australian National University Press, May 18, 2016), 183–203, 195, accessed February 10, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/lumen.cgscarl.com/stable/pdf/j.ctt1dgn5rx.19.pdf?refreqid=search%3A118e04d1d7e54225189943ca4e6903e4>.

trust-based relations with Japan as well as “Asia-Pacific security cooperation in all dimensions.”³⁰⁵ Australia’s *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper* firmly identifies “promote an open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region” and “promote and protect the international rules that support stability and prosperity” among its five objectives of fundamental importance to Australia’s security and prosperity.³⁰⁶

More developed and perhaps holding greater strategic potential than the Japan-Australia relationship, the Japan-India economic and defense partnership marks a significant development in regional dynamics and security architecture. Dr. Lavina Lee from Macquarie University discusses the strategic import of India’s transition from a “Look East” Policy to an “Act East” Policy. She argues India’s greatest security potential lies in its soft balancing act against China, a significant departure from its traditional concept of non-alignment and autonomy.³⁰⁷ Dr. Lee states Japan’s substantial ODA and foreign direct investment in India dovetails with Prime Minister Modi’s desire to increase India’s economic influence and integration.³⁰⁸ She also notes Japan’s strategic interest in India’s naval capacity to defend the “regional order in the Indian Ocean and potentially

³⁰⁵ Heinrichs and Tow, *Hard Power and Regional Diplomacy*, 195.

³⁰⁶ Australian Government, *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, November 2017, 3, accessed February 28, 2018, <http://dfat.gov.au/news/news/Pages/opportunity-security-strength-the-2017-foreign-policy-white-paper.aspx>.

³⁰⁷ Lavina Lee, “India as a Nation of Consequence in Asia: The Potential and Limitations of India’s ‘Act East’ Policy,” *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 29, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 2015): 67, accessed April 4, 2018, <https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P3-4042504221/india-as-a-nation-of-consequence-in-asia-the-potential>.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 78.

further afield in the South and East China Seas.”³⁰⁹ Prime Minister Modi’s recent “Security and Growth for All in the Region” speech at the commissioning ceremony for a new generation attack submarine in December 2017 recognizes the international attention on India’s maritime and naval interests in the Indian Ocean.³¹⁰

Dr. Monika Chansoria, a Senior Visiting Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, notes the strategic implications of the Indo-Pacific’s transcendence of traditional geographic boundaries. She points out the convergence of Indian and Japanese ideals, rendering “the prospects for collective and cooperative regional security mechanisms more deliverable than ever before.”³¹¹ On the other hand, both India and Japan remain acutely aware of the need to “tread carefully to avoid unduly alarming China and destabilizing the region.”³¹² Dr. John W. Garver is a Professor Emeritus in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology and specialist in China’s foreign relations. He believes that despite India’s best efforts to communicate its benign intentions towards China, its attempts at reassurance will likely

³⁰⁹ Lee, *India as a Nation of Consequence in Asia*, 91.

³¹⁰ C Uday Bhaskar, “Will China Sign Up for Narendra Modi’s SAGAR vision?” *IAPS Dialogue*, December 18, 2017, accessed February 25, 2018, <https://iapsdialogue.org/2017/12/18/will-china-sign-up-to-narendra-modis-sagar-vision/>.

³¹¹ Monika Chansoria, “Regional Cooperative Security in the Indo-Pacific: Synergizing Consultative Mechanisms across the Indian Ocean, East China Sea, South China Sea, and the Western Pacific,” *Japan Review* 1, no. 2 (Winter 2017): 13, accessed May 1, 2018, https://www.jiia-jic.jp/en/japanreview/pdf/JapanReview_Vol1_No2_03_Monika%20Chansoria.pdf.

³¹² Tan Ming Hui and Nazia Hussain, “Japan and India: Concerted Efforts at Regional Diplomacy,” *The Diplomat*, April 1, 2017, accessed September 5, 2017, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/japan-and-india-concerted-efforts-at-regional-diplomacy/>.

fall flat. To support his assertion, he specifies rising “Chinese concerns about Indian participation in U.S.-Japanese schemes to ‘encircle’ China.”³¹³ He also observes how “India’s expanding maritime cooperation with Japan, Australia, Vietnam, and the United States is linked to China’s steady rise as a leading naval power.”³¹⁴

A 2017 Observer Research Foundation (ORF) report by the Macdonald-Laurier Institute notes that in the absence of American leadership, “only Japan and India have the strategic weight, economic heft, and shared values and interests in a liberal world order to counterbalance prospects of Chinese strategic predominance.”³¹⁵ Dr. Garver points out that “although neither Japan nor India is party to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, vital strategic and commercial stakes have led both countries to increase their engagement with the region.”³¹⁶ It aligns with the ORF report’s conclusion that only the Japan-India axis as an independent multilateral foundation “for enduring liberalization and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific” can effectively deal with the rise of China.³¹⁷

In addition to Australia and India, Japan has also successfully nurtured a multifaceted strategic relationship with the ASEAN nations on the basis of shared values and

³¹³ Garver, *Diverging Perceptions of China’s Emergence as an Indian Ocean Power*, 59.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Brian Crowley, Shuvaloy Majumdar, and David McDonough, “Responding to China’s Rise: Japan and India as Champions for the Rule of Law in the Indo-Pacific,” Observer Research Foundation, August 2017, accessed January 20, 2018, http://cf.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/ORF-MLI_OccasionalPaper_IndiaJapan.pdf.

³¹⁶ Garver, *Diverging Perceptions of China’s Emergence as an Indian Ocean Power*, 59.

³¹⁷ Crowley, Majumdar, and McDonough, *Responding to China’s Rise*, 18–19.

concerns. On December 12, 2003, Japan's Junichiro Koizumi laid the foundation when he jointly announced the "Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN Partnership in the New Millennium."³¹⁸ In 2011, the Bali Declaration reaffirmed and advanced the ASEAN-Japan strategic partnership by centering it on the "ASEAN Community."³¹⁹ At the recent Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting on November 13, 2017, Abe reinforced Japan's commitment to a "more integrated collective by strengthening the initiatives under the 'four pillars of partnership' announced at the 2013 ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit Meeting."³²⁰ Guided by these four pillars of partnership: "Partners for Peace and Stability, Partners for Prosperity, Partners for Quality of Life, and Heart-to-Heart Partners," the ASEAN-Japan strategic partnership has seen "strengthening cooperation in the face of new developments in the region."³²¹

Executive Director Rizal Sukma from CSIS, Indonesia and Professor Yoshihide Soeya from Keio University, Japan describe how Japan's economic contributions to regional integration in Southeast Asia has led to political democratization and social

³¹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN Partnership in the New Millennium*, December 12, 2003, accessed April 7, 2018, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/year2003/summit/tokyo_dec.pdf.

³¹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Joint Declaration for enhancing ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Prospering Together (Bali Declaration)*, December 12, 2003, accessed April 7, 2018, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/year2003/summit/tokyo_dec.pdf.

³²⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting*, November 13, 2017, accessed April 11, 2018, http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page3e_000791.html.

³²¹ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, *ASEAN, Japan to take Partnership to New Heights*, June 27, 2016, accessed April 10, 2018, <http://asean.org/asean-japan-to-take-partnership-to-new-heights/>.

stability.³²² Through such economic and diplomatic initiatives, they argue Japan has largely managed to extricate itself from its bitter historical legacy in the region. Dr. Kei Koga contends Abe has been able to reassure Southeast Asia through Japan's steadfast commitment to the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, characterizing Japan's "heart-to-heart" approach as "strategic coordination."³²³ Moreover, he states Japan has rightfully refrained from pushing Southeast Asia to embrace a completely unified approach towards maritime issues, instead adopting a "politically cautious" stance on the rule of law in the SCS.³²⁴

However, Dr. Takeshi Yuzawa from Hosei University states the risk of ASEAN disunity has increased in recent years. He attributes this to Japanese and Chinese counterbalancing minilateral approaches to Southeast Asia based on an ASEAN+1 framework.³²⁵ He further argues that while ASEAN has historically profited handsomely from the Sino-Japanese rivalry, the emerging power politics and strategic tension will now undermine the credibility of ASEAN and ASEAN-based institutions.³²⁶ Dr. Euan

³²² Rizal Sukma and Yoshihide Soeya, eds., "Beyond 2015: ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity in Southeast Asia" (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2013), 23, accessed April 10, 2018, <http://www.jcie.org/japan/j/pdf/pub/publst/1451/full%20report.pdf>.

³²³ Kei Koga, "Japan's 'Strategic Coordination' in 2015: ASEAN, Southeast Asia, and Abe's Diplomatic Agenda," *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2016): 67, accessed April 12, 2018, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/627451/pdf>, Project Muse.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ Takeshi Yuzawa, "ASEAN in the Era of Japan-China Tensions: Diplomatic Opportunities or Strategic Dilemmas?" in *International Security in the Asia-Pacific: Transcending ASEAN towards Transitional Polycentrism*, ed. Alan Chong (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 149–173, accessed April 9, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60762-7_7.

³²⁶ Ibid.

Graham from the Lowy Institute uses the unfulfilling outcome from the SCS dispute between China and the Philippines to demonstrate the multilateral vulnerability of ASEAN. On July 12, 2016, the Hague's landmark SCS verdict against China and in favor of the Philippines firmly established the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the primary legal reference for resolving SCS disputes.³²⁷ Rejecting the ruling, China successfully used a divide-and-conquer strategy to splinter ASEAN solidarity and dilute the Philippines' legal victory.³²⁸ Acknowledging the unavoidable complications that arise from economic interdependence with China, Dr. Tatsumi suggests the concept of a middle power coalition while avoiding an excessively anti-China focus.³²⁹ She points out Japan's coalition-building success in the SCS, especially with the economically vulnerable ASEAN states, in managing economic reliance on China while downplaying the hedging and balancing elements of cooperation.³³⁰

³²⁷ Richard J. Heydarian, "The Day After: Enforcing the Hague Verdict in the South China Sea," Brookings Institute, July 25, 2016, accessed April 7, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-day-after-enforcing-the-hague-verdict-in-the-south-china-sea/>.

³²⁸ Euan Graham, "The Hague Tribunal's South China Sea Ruling: Empty Provocation or Slow-Burning Influence?" Lowy Institute for International Policy, Council of Councils, August 18, 2016, accessed April 11, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global_memos/p38227.

³²⁹ Yuki Tatsumi, ed., "Japan's Global Diplomacy: Views from the Next Generation," Stimson Center, March 2015, 29, accessed April 27, 2018, <https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Japans-Global-Diplomacy-WEB.pdf>.

³³⁰ Ibid.

Section IX: Literature Review Summary

The literature review reveals there has been extensive research and discussion on the evolution of Japan's security environment and policies. Since Japan's defeat in WWII and the end of U.S. military occupation, the overarching Yoshida Doctrine framework of the post-war pacifist constitution has remained remarkably intact. However, scholars such as Professor Andrew Oros, Robert Kaplan, and Dr. Kenneth Pyle aptly note the geopolitical tension in the Indo-Pacific is forcing Japan to develop a modern national strategic security framework. At the same time, author Graham Allison writes on the ever-looming threat of the U.S.-China Thucydides trap and its long shadow over Japan's increasingly dangerous neighborhood.³³¹

Dr. John Nilsson-Wright discusses how Japan's fledgling partnerships with Australia and India represent a strategic hedge against that danger of entanglement as well as the rise of China. Professor Andrew Erickson concurs with Dr. Nilsson-Wright's argument that the Abe administration's whole-of-government effort to build a regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific is a historic development with substantial implications for regional power dynamics. Downplaying the restrictive legal aspects of Article 9, Professor Haley convincingly frames Article 9 in a political and positive context. His conclusion suggests the subordination of Article 9's theoretical constitutional limitations to Abe's ability to influence public opinion and maintain political power. Professor Easley analyzes Japan's historical security trend to

³³¹ Graham Allison, "The Thucydides Trap," *Foreign Policy*, June 9, 2017, accessed April 7, 2018, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/>.

demonstrate how its policy changes remain focused on defense and deterrence.³³² He goes on to state that based on such body of evidence, all neighboring parties should be “reassured that worst-case assumptions about the trajectory of Japan’s defense posture are unwarranted.”³³³

However, other notable scholars remain skeptical on a number of fronts, pointing to the significant legal, fiscal, and cultural barriers to Japan’s security modernization. Dr. Chiyuki Aoi contends national ambivalence and historical lack of political will greatly restrain Japan’s trend of “normalization.” Commenting on Japan’s security interest and role in the SCS, Dr. Midford asserts reinforced constitutional limitations have effectively blocked the possibility of any direct military action for the foreseeable future.³³⁴ The research conducted by Capistrano and Kurizaki supports Dr. Aoi’s argument, specifically remarking on Japan’s uncertain ability to generate national security while simultaneously reassuring its neighbors due to historical strategic mistrust. Professor Hughes questions the underlying intent of Japan’s security policy adjustments and echoing concerns from Japan’s wary East Asian neighbors, casts doubt on Japan’s ability to generate national security through its evolving security policies.

Amidst this varied spectrum of expert opinions, Japan’s own strategic guidance continues to embody an increasingly assertive approach to national and regional security. Abe’s proactive multilateral initiatives and domestic restructuring of long-standing policies have taken on newfound significance in light of the Trump administration’s

³³² Easley, *Japan’s Evolving Defense Posture*.

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Midford, *Japan’s Approach to Maritime Security in the South China Sea*, 527.

unswerving “America First” focus on equitable burden-sharing with U.S. allies. The prevalent uncertainty and divergence found in the literature review only underscores the rising distinction of Japan’s decisive role in the Indo-Pacific security order. Professor Ryo Sahashi at Kanagawa University pronounces the increasingly prominent role given to security in Japan’s Asian diplomacy to be “the defining development of the last decade.”³³⁵ Therefore, Japan’s security strategy and its impact on the U.S.-Japan alliance poses vital geopolitical implications for U.S.’ national security interests.

³³⁵ Ryo Sahashi, “Japan’s Vision for the East Asian Security Order,” East Asia Forum, February 26, 2016, accessed January 20, 2018, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/02/23/japans-vision-for-the-east-asian-security-order/>.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

There is no arc of history that ensures America's free political and economic system will automatically prevail. Success or failure depends on our actions.
— U.S. Government Executive Branch, *U.S. National Security Strategy*, 2017

The research design section introduces the qualitative approach for developing responses to the primary and secondary questions posed in this thesis. The purpose of this study was to determine whether or not Japan's security strategy is detrimental to U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Through primary sources from the U.S. and Japanese governments as well as from international organizations and institutions, the study sought to develop comprehensive context and understanding. It explored the changes in Japan's role in the dynamic regional security architecture and the resultant implications for U.S.' interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Theories of international relations such as the security dilemma and realist power politics were used to inform the analysis and provide a conceptual perspective. This study used a three-phased research approach to develop a systematic framework to produce the data set, generate findings, and provide responses to the research questions.

Phase One

The first phase focused on Japan's policies and programs in support of its national security interests. The strategic framework of Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME) was applied to understand and describe Japan's whole-of-government approach. In his thesis from the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army Colonel John Krenson explains the concept of integrating "DIME within a whole-of-government

approach of engaging and securing development” as the best means of advancing national interests.³³⁶ Without discounting its continued development of military capabilities, Japan has undertaken an effective and ambitious agenda across all dimensions of national power. The DIME analysis captures those changes and moreover, the priorities demonstrated by Japan’s strategic initiatives within the regional security architecture.

Japan’s soft, hard, and smart power initiatives are categorized through DIME to delineate how they affect the regional security environment and dynamics with other states. By organizing the study’s research and understanding of Japan’s whole-of-government security strategy this way, each category of DIME can then be analyzed using the evaluation criteria. Japan’s end states were derived from its national strategic documents such as the 2013 J-NSS, 2016 *Defense White Paper*, 2017 *Diplomatic Bluebook*, and 2016 *ODA White Paper*. During this phase, the study’s initial research results were categorized using the DIME framework to facilitate responses for the three secondary research questions. Therefore, phase one results will review and incorporate 1) geopolitical and geoeconomic trends affecting Japan’s perspective of its regional role and power, 2) Japan’s national security strategy and policies, and 3) how Japan’s domestic conditions will limit the implementation of its J-NSS.

Phase Two

The second phase establishes the study’s evaluation criteria analysis using the relevant diplomatic, informational, military, and economic objectives promulgated in the

³³⁶ John G. Krenson, “On Strategy: Integration of DIME in the Twenty-first Century” (Master’s thesis, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, February 12, 2012), 20, accessed October 20, 2017, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a561308.pdf>.

2017 U.S. NSS. The U.S. NSS unequivocally declares that the U.S. will “compete with all tools of national power to ensure that regions of the world are not dominated by one power.”³³⁷ It goes on to say the U.S. will “compete for positive relationships around the world,” it will “seek strong partners, not weak ones,” and it “welcomes and supports the strong leadership role of its critical ally, Japan.”³³⁸ Within this overarching framework, phase two provides the specific evaluation criteria necessary to assess the impact of Japan’s security strategy and policies on U.S. regional objectives in the Indo-Pacific. This phase systematically focuses on the priority actions and national objectives identified in the 2017 NSS. At the end of this phase, the study’s evaluation criteria are clearly identified and described.

U.S. Diplomatic Objectives: Advance American Influence

1. Encourage fair sharing of the burden of responsibility to protect against common threats.
2. Achieve complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and preserve the non-proliferation regime in Northeast Asia.
3. Deepen strategic partnership with India and support its leadership role in Indian Ocean security and throughout the broader region.
4. Help South Asian nations maintain their sovereignty as China increases its influence in the region.
5. Increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India.³³⁹

³³⁷ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy, 2017*, 4.

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, 38–46.

³³⁹ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy, 2017*.

U.S. Informational Objectives: Protect the American Way of Life

1. Create a network of states that advance our common interests and values.
2. Demonstrate a positive alternative to political and religious despotism.
3. Continue to champion fundamental individual liberties as the foundation of enduring alliances.³⁴⁰

U.S. Military Objectives: Preserve Peace through Strength

1. Enhance layered missile defense focused on North Korea and Iran without undermining strategic stability or disrupting longstanding strategic relationships with Russia or China.
2. Maintain a forward military presence capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating any adversary.
3. Encourage the development of a strong defense network with our allies and partners.³⁴¹

U.S. Economic Objectives: Promote Prosperity

1. Compete and lead in multilateral organizations so that American interests and principles are protected.
2. Work with partners to build a network of states dedicated to free markets and protected from forces that would subvert their sovereignty.
3. Preserve and modernize the rules of a fair and reciprocal economic order.

³⁴⁰ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy, 2017*.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

4. Strengthen economic ties as a core aspect of relationships with like-minded states and use economic expertise, markets, and resources to bolster states threatened by competitors.³⁴²

Phase Three

In the third and final phase, the study evaluates the strategic interaction between Japan's security policies and U.S. security objectives within the DIME framework. Given the answers to the three secondary questions in phase one and the established evaluation criteria in phase two, phase three then focuses on the primary research question: Is Japan's security strategy detrimental to U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific region? It assesses the level of strategic alignment between the U.S. and Japan based on their respective identified intentions, implemented policies, and proposed future actions.

A three-tiered scale system is used to guide analysis and support a response to the primary research question. This system runs along a continuum from Opposing (O) to Neutral (N) to Supporting (S). Opposing reflects holistic conditions in which contradiction and conflict exists between Japan's security policies and the U.S.' security interests. Neutral reflects holistic conditions in which a passive status-quo state exists between Japan's security policies and the U.S.' security interests. Supporting reflects holistic conditions in which strategic alignment and active mutual affiliation exists between Japan's security policies and the U.S.' security interests. The three-tiered scale system is applied to the four categories of DIME: Diplomatic (D), Informational (I), Military (M), and Economic (E).

³⁴² U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy*, 2017.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

A vast expanse of sea stretches from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. Since ancient times the people of this region have enjoyed affluence and prosperity from this large and free body of water. Freedom of navigation and the rule of law form their bedrock. We must ensure that these waters are a public good that brings peace and prosperity to all people without discrimination into the future. To this end we will promote the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.

—Shinzo Abe, *Policy Speech to the 196th Session of the Diet*

This chapter addresses the three secondary research questions by discussing Japan's national security policies and strategic engagement with the regional security structure. It analyzes the Abe administration's efforts to manage change in Japan's security environment while also improving its regional relevance. It examines the concept of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" as the basis for Japan's national security strategy and how it encompasses key lines of effort across DIME. This chapter determines why and how Japan is employing its instruments of national power to proactively shape its regional security environment. Chapter four addresses these issues and questions in three primary sections, followed by the chapter summary.

The first section analyzes Japan's national security strategy through the framework of DIME, distinguishing its uses of national power. This section addresses the three secondary questions and concludes Japan is meticulously and comprehensively employing the full spectrum of its national power. It identifies key geopolitical and geoeconomic trends such as a growing preference for regionalism, usage of national power weighted towards economic influence, particularly infrastructure assistance and ODA, and increased hedging and balancing activities for security and insurance. It also focuses on Japan's specific responses to adapt to those changes and threats, including an

emphasis on shared values and multilateral frameworks, gradual reformation of the domestic debate, and a persuasive blend of minilateral diplomacy grounded in concrete economic and defense cooperation. Lastly, this section notes the longstanding domestic conditions that may constrain those efforts, such as the cultural distaste for an outsized military role, inescapable demographic and financial challenges, and an unbowed anti-war constitution. The section separates these conditions and assessments into their respective diplomatic, informational, military, and economic categories.

The second section describes the study's evaluation criteria. It uses the 2017 National Security Strategy as the primary strategic guidance for U.S. national interests and objectives. Due to the Trump administration's timely promulgation of the NSS in December 2017, the study sources relevant and updated U.S. national security objectives for the Indo-Pacific from this preeminent strategic document. It guides the study's evaluation criteria metrics and supersedes any contradictory policies or statements from previous administrations or even from within the current administration.

In the third section, the DIME-component findings were analyzed against the evaluation criteria to decide if they represent an opposing condition with negative impact, a neutral status with no discernible impact, or a supporting condition that actively protects and promotes U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. It concludes there is a high degree of correlation between Japan's policies and U.S. interests in the region's security order. Japan is highly aligned with the U.S. in its strategic security approach, promoting a mutually beneficial understanding of the Indo-Pacific security environment, challenges, and opportunities. However, it will also need to maintain regional credibility by reducing informational friction caused by nationalist and

historical revisionist sentiments. In addition, it will need to maintain momentum in military modernization efforts to progress towards strategic equality in the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Lastly, the summary reviews the key findings on Japan's national security strategy and the study's responses to the three secondary questions. It encapsulates Japan's employment of national power and the extent to which it has been successful. This lays the foundation to draw conclusions from the research to date, and it forms the basis for tentative conclusions and the study's comprehensive response to the primary research question in Chapter 5.

Section I: DIME Analysis (Japan)

DIME analysis seeks to identify and delineate lines of effort based on the type of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, or economic. A line of effort to achieve a national objective may incorporate all four categories, and indeed, often do. However, the strategic weight of effort determines its placement in the four categories of DIME. This section seeks to establish the security environment and trends, Japan's security policies, and domestic limitations pertaining to each category of DIME. In considering Japan's whole-of-government approach from the DIME perspective, this section can fully address the three secondary research questions.

Diplomatic (Japan)

Japan has embarked on wide range of vigorous diplomatic initiatives to counter China's influence and secure its own national interests and influence throughout the Indo-Pacific. Departing from its post-WWII international security stagnation, Japan is assertively refuting China's hegemonic ambitions through various values-based

campaigns. Beginning with the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” in 2007 to the short-lived “Democratic Security Diamond” in 2012, Japan has now settled on the current concept of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.” In this latest iteration, Abe broadly expands and redefines the scope of Japanese diplomacy to augment Japan’s international reputation and foreign relations throughout the region.

First and foremost, Japan has steadfastly improved its diplomatic and security relations with the U.S., its ally and security sponsor. Under President Obama and Prime Minister Abe, the U.S.-Japan relationship notched several historic diplomatic successes. Shinzo Abe was the first Japanese prime minister to address a joint meeting of Congress and visit the *USS Arizona* memorial in Pearl Harbor while President Obama was the first sitting U.S. president to visit Hiroshima.³⁴³ In a February 2017 visit to Washington, Abe quickly secured the newly elected President Trump’s official commitment to defend the Senkaku Islands under the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty.³⁴⁴

Abe quickly reciprocated by reaffirming Japan’s support for the U.S.’ position on the DPRK issue, avowing “we consistently support the stance of the United States: that ‘all options are on the table’.”³⁴⁵ In an address to the UN General Assembly, Shinzo Abe emphatically declared, “We must make North Korea abandon all nuclear and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner. What is needed to do

³⁴³ Congressional Research Service, *Japan-US Relations*, 6.

³⁴⁴ Steve Holland and Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Trump says U.S. Committed to Japan Security, in Change from Campaign Rhetoric,” *Reuters*, February 10, 2017, accessed February 24, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-japan/trump-says-u-s-committed-to-japan-security-in-change-from-campaign-rhetoric-idUSKBN15P17E>.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

that is not dialogue, but pressure.”³⁴⁶ Despite his reputation for nationalism and past revisionist sentiments, Abe has upheld and promoted the integrity and desirability of Japan’s deep ties with the U.S.

While Japan has taken steps to become a more active and equitable alliance partner, it has also put substantial energy into hedging against the risk of U.S. abandonment. Abe’s minilateral approach to local security cooperation underscores “Tokyo’s ambition to strengthen the regional dimension of Japanese diplomacy.”³⁴⁷ He became the first Japanese leader to visit all ten ASEAN members within his first year in office, a historic and symbolic demonstration of his commitment to the ASEAN community. Based on shared values and rules, Japan has actively worked to reinforce ASEAN and APEC as the foundation of the Indo-Pacific’s regional architecture.

Furthermore, Japan’s diplomatic leadership of the CPTPP is a marked departure from its past preference for narrowly-focused multilateral frameworks. Despite the U.S.’s conspicuous absence, the CPTPP’s current membership of Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam represents a nascent, perhaps even ‘hegemonic,’ diplomatic framework in the Indo-Pacific.³⁴⁸ Still in development, Japanese leadership is becoming an increasingly reliable feature of the regional landscape.

³⁴⁶ Shinzo Abe, “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe” (speech, Seventy-Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York City, NY, September 20, 2017), 6, accessed March 3, 2018, https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/72/jp_en.pdf.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 26.

³⁴⁸ Alan Chong and Shang-su Wu, “Asia Pacific History trumps Indo-Pacific Fantasy,” East Asia Forum, March 13, 2018, accessed April 24, 2018,

Specifically, as part of Japan's leading "defense diplomacy," maritime security cooperation has become one of its most influential and desirable characteristics. To secure its SLOCs and defend regional freedom of the seas, Japan has strengthened its maritime relationships with key states such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines.³⁴⁹ Japan's military diplomacy efficiently reinforces strategic diplomatic imperatives such as freedom of navigation and maritime commerce. For example, the momentous and widely publicized 2017 deployment of Japan's helicopter destroyer, *JS Izumo* (DDH-183), in the SCS is emblematic of Japan's new defense diplomacy.³⁵⁰

The vicissitude of the regional security order is emboldening Abe's concerted campaign to woo ASEAN from China's influence. To do so, he is using a proactive form of diplomacy, backed by hard military capabilities, naval presence, and maritime security capacity-building. Regarding the SCS disputes, Japan has diplomatically promoted the resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with legal international rulings. Especially through maritime security cooperation, Japan has refurbished its reputation as a capable provider of regional commons.

However, Abe has also been careful to avoid the coercive and inflammatory aspects of hard power diplomacy. Recognizing the danger of resurgent historical tension,

<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/03/13/asia-pacific-history-trumps-indo-pacific-fantasy/>.

³⁴⁹ Michael Hart, "Japan's Maritime Diplomacy Mission in S.E. Asia," *The Japan Times*, August 29, 2017, accessed February 25, 2018, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/08/29/commentary/japan-commentary/japans-maritime-diplomacy-mission-s-e-asia/#.WpMiJJM-dE4>.

³⁵⁰ Nobuhiro Kubo and Tim Kelly, "Southeast Asia Officers board Japanese Ship for South China Sea Tour," *Reuters*, June 19, 2017, accessed February 10, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-asean-defense/southeast-asia-officers-board-japanese-ship-for-south-china-sea-tour-idUSKBN19A0ZT>.

Abe has cautiously and successfully dampened the negative connotations of Japan's military-based potential for influence. Economist and Nobel laureate, Professor Thomas Schelling, notes that such influence was "based on the harm it can do; used as a bargaining power, it is part of diplomacy—the uglier, more negative, less civilized part of diplomacy—nevertheless, diplomacy."³⁵¹ Despite Chinese accusations of Japanese jingoism, the littoral states in the SCS have been receptive to Japan's diplomatic overtures. As it sheds its "passive partner" persona to take on a more active one, Japan is not neglecting its hard power capabilities as part of a broader strategy to increase its diplomatic prestige and influence.³⁵² However, while it has long been a necessary component of Japan's external balancing against China, its hard power has not been assigned much more relevance or significance beyond that role.

In addition, Abe has maintained Japan's steady bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In a speech before the UN General Assembly on September 29, 2015, Abe confidently reaffirmed Japan's determination to "transform the United Nations into a body appropriate for the 21st century, and then, as a permanent member of the Security Council, carry out its responsibilities in making still greater contributions towards world peace and prosperity."³⁵³ Under the Abe administration, this determined

³⁵¹ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), vii.

³⁵² David Envall, "Japan: From Passive Partner to Active Ally," in *Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century*, ed. Michael Wesley (Australia: ANU Press, 2017), 29–30.

³⁵³ Shinzo Abe, "Address by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan" (speech, Seventieth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York City, NY, September 29, 2015), accessed March 3, 2018, https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_JP_en.pdf.

propensity for greater global engagement is bearing fruit. The Soft Power 30 report shows that Japan's global soft power reached 6th in 2017, significantly outmatching China at 25th while the U.S. has fallen to 3rd place.³⁵⁴ In the report, Yoichi Funabashi, chairman of the Asia Pacific Initiative, notes how Japan's main tool for exerting global influence has historically been soft power and describes its modern three pillars of international relations centered on soft power: hard infrastructure assistance, capability building for maritime peace, and the rule of law.³⁵⁵ Japan's diplomatic initiatives unfailingly incorporate at least one of these elements, if not all. Its well-deserved reputation for soft power and economic assistance has helped endear the island power to most of its neighbors, especially in the SCS.

On the other hand, Japan's security ties with South Korea remain stalled over unresolved WWII issues, namely due to lingering bitterness over the Imperial Japanese Army's enslavement of "comfort women" before and during the war.³⁵⁶ The ROK's continual rebuff of Japan's apologies, despite the efforts of several Japanese prime ministers, prevents any serious progress in mending bilateral ties. The literature review noted the enduring animosity between the two nominal security partners and its spoiling effect on U.S. security goals for the region. In an October 2017 interview, U.S. Chairman

³⁵⁴ Jonathon McClory, "The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017," 2017, accessed March 3, 2018, <https://softpower30.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/The-Soft-Power-30-Report-2017-Web-1.pdf>.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., 76.

³⁵⁶ Binnendijk, *Friends, Foes, and Future Directions*, 111.

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dunford acknowledged the severe difficulties in the military-to-military relationship between Korean and Japanese forces.³⁵⁷

The General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was signed in 2016 between South Korea and Japan, replacing the indirect Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement framework. It was a notable diplomatic achievement which produced a long overdue overhaul of the antiquated military information exchange system. However, unabated historic antagonism between the two countries curtails GSOMIA's full potential. Abe has judiciously refrained from making overtly inflammatory remarks, despite his well-known exasperation with apology fatigue. However, his realpolitik strategy to improve bilateral defense relations has yet to overcome the simmering historical tension. Maintaining South Korea's distance from a trilateral military alliance, the Moon administration has strictly limited the scope of GSOMIA to DPRK's nuclear and missile program.³⁵⁸

Conducting diplomatic hedging between China and the U.S., President Moon Jae-in has resisted U.S. pressure to develop the trilateral cooperation into a military alliance. To restore Sino-South Korean relations after China's economic retaliation over THAAD, South Korea assured China it will abstain from additional THAAD deployments, other

³⁵⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, *Dunford Hosts Trilateral Meeting with South Korean, Japanese Military Leaders*, October 30, 2017, accessed February 3, 2018, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1356965/dunford-hosts-trilateral-meeting-with-south-korean-japanese-military-leaders/>.

³⁵⁸ Yeo Jun-Suk, "South Korea refuses to share Military Intelligence with Japan: Report," *The Korea Herald*, November 19, 2017, accessed February 1, 2018, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20171119000240>.

U.S. missile defense systems, and a trilateral alliance with the U.S. and Japan.³⁵⁹

Furthermore, President Moon pointedly cautioned Japan against using “any of North Korea’s nuclear activities as an excuse to pursue the path of development into a military power.”³⁶⁰ The two East Asian democracies share the threat of missile attacks from North Korea and other security concerns emanating from the northern half of the Korean peninsula. However, imperfect strategic alignment and South Korea’s social obstinacy obstruct Abe’s endeavors to deepen the cooperative relationship “for a new era with a future-oriented perspective.”³⁶¹

With the cautious exception of South Korea and China, Japan’s relationships with other Indo-Pacific states, the U.S., and the European Union have appreciably improved in recent years. Taking a “panoramic view of the world map,” Abe initiated Japan’s first 2+2 (comprised of defense and foreign ministers) meetings with France and England.³⁶² In addition, Abe became the first Japanese prime minister to visit NATO, the preeminent security organization in Europe in 2006. More recently, a deepening Japan-NATO

³⁵⁹ Ankit Panda, “China and South Korea: Examining the Resolution of the THAAD Impasse,” *The Diplomat*, November 13, 2017, accessed May 1, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/china-and-south-korea-examining-the-resolution-of-the-thaad-impasse/>.

³⁶⁰ Seong Yeon-cheol, “President Moon reiterates Opposition to Trilateral Military Alliance with US and Japan,” *The Hankyoreh*, November 4, 2017, accessed February 3, 2018, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/817468.html.

³⁶¹ Shinzo Abe, “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe” (speech, 196th Session of the Diet, Tokyo, Japan, January 22, 2018), accessed March 22, 2018, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/201801/_00002.html.

³⁶² Hana Rudolph and Yuki Tatsumi, “Report: Japan’s Global Diplomacy,” Stimson Center, March 2015, accessed April 4, 2018, <https://www.stimson.org/content/japans-global-diplomacy->.

relationship was reflected by the Joint Political Declaration in April 2013 and the launch of the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme the year after.³⁶³ Abe's strategic interest in strengthening ties with Europe can be seen in his efforts to establish a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the European Union.³⁶⁴

At the same time, Abe has pursued closer diplomatic relations with Russia, especially in the context of balancing against China. He initiated Japan's first 2+2 meeting with Russia in November 2013 and more importantly, agreed upon a "framework for a comprehensive partnership on security affairs."³⁶⁵ Despite Russia's annexation of Crimea and lackluster support for human rights, Japan held the second 2+2 meeting on March 20, 2017.³⁶⁶ In his first speech of 2018, Abe emphatically announced "the relationship between Japan and Russia has the most potential of any bilateral relationship."³⁶⁷ The bilateral diplomatic initiatives, "Japan Year in Russia" and "Russia Year in Japan," further highlights improvements in security collaboration and cross-cultural ties.³⁶⁸

³⁶³ Tatsumi, *Japan's Global Diplomacy*, 45.

³⁶⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement*, June 13, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018, http://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/ep/page22e_000707.html.

³⁶⁵ Tatsumi, *Japan's Global Diplomacy*, 59.

³⁶⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan-Russia Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultation ('2+2' Ministerial Meeting)*, March 20, 2017, accessed April 5, 2018, http://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/rss/northern/page4e_000593.html.

³⁶⁷ Abe, *Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe*.

³⁶⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan-Russia Summit Meeting*, November 10, 2017, accessed December 5, 2017, http://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/rss/northern/page1e_000193.html.

Although India has traditionally championed the foreign policy of non-alignment, Abe's appeal for greater Indian participation in regional affairs is striking a chord with Modi and his desire for strategic autonomy. Underlying Abe's personal affinity with Modi, the Japanese prime minister's unfailing support for considerable foreign direct investment in India has further incentivized the two states' strong diplomatic ties. Taking into account India's habitual avoidance of overt power politics and the danger of entrapment, Japan's diplomatic inducements hold geopolitical risk. There is little doubt that Abe's active diplomacy is partly, if not mostly, directed at counterbalancing China and its gradual accumulation of power in the Indo-Pacific.³⁶⁹ However, views of China diverge between Japan and other regional actors such as Australia, and to a significant extent in some cases.³⁷⁰ In light of Japan's increasingly assertive security policies, concerns of entanglement have injected caution and moderation into Japan's state-to-state initiatives in the region. Acknowledging such trepidations, Abe sought to ease concerns by jointly announcing a "fresh start" with President Xi during the APEC summit in November 2017.³⁷¹

Basing his diplomatic enterprises on shared values, protection of regional commons, and economic willingness, Abe has improved Japan's diplomatic profile in the region and around the world. In his January 2018 speech to the Diet, Abe highlighted his visits to 76 countries and regions and over 600 summit meetings since his rise to the post

³⁶⁹ Tatsumi, *Japan's Global Diplomacy*, 35.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.

³⁷¹ "Abe hails 'Fresh Start' to Japan-China Ties after Xi Meeting," *Reuters*, November 11, 2017, accessed May 2, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apec-summit-japan-china/abe-hails-fresh-start-to-japan-china-ties-after-xi-meeting-iduskbn1db0hu>.

of prime minister.³⁷² Under an unusually active and charismatic leader, Japan has emerged as a poised, well-traveled, and increasingly popular diplomatic power. Noting the “security environment surrounding Japan is the most severe in postwar history,” Abe reasserted the strategic necessity for Japan to boldly engage with like-minded states to ensure the peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.³⁷³

Informational (Japan)

More than any other instrument of power, Japan’s informational lines of effort have enabled its national strategy to gain regional power, mitigate strategic mistrust, and influence domestic and foreign discussion on its security policies. Through decades of peaceful behavior and an impressive record for economic aid and shared values, memories of Japan’s wartime legacy have slowly faded throughout the Indo-Pacific. Especially among the littoral states of the SCS, the Abe administration has moved decisively to capitalize on this good will to push forth its security initiatives and exploratory drive for regional leadership. Acknowledging the rise of state-sponsored influence operations, led by China and Russia, Japan has elevated the importance of the information domain to “influence the social, political, economic, and military behavior of human beings . . . in the support of national security objectives.”³⁷⁴

³⁷² Abe, *Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe*.

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Dennis Murphy and Daniel Kuehl, “The Case for a National Information Strategy,” *Military Review* (September-October 2015): 80, accessed May 1, 2018, http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20151031_art013.pdf.

Perhaps more so than any other Japanese prime minister in modern history, Shinzo Abe has burnished his reputation as a strong, expansive, and determined leader of the country. Addressing an audience at CSIS, the newly elected prime minister declared “Japan is not, and will never be, a tier-two country . . . I am back, and so shall Japan be.”³⁷⁵ He affirmed Japan’s role as a “leading promoter of rules,” “guardian of global commons,” and “an effective ally and partner to the U.S. and other democracies.”³⁷⁶ Despite favoritism scandals and popular frustration with his heavy-handed administration, the nationalist leader has nonetheless succeeded in significantly reworking Japan’s national identity since his political return in December 2012. Demonstrating an adept appreciation for information and perception, he has promoted public awareness of Japan’s severe security environment. Aided by the unnerving frequency of DPRK’s missile launches, Abe is adroitly shaping the national security and constitutional revision debates at home.

In January 2018, Abe pronounced the dual threats of a rapidly aging society and decreasing birthrate a “national crisis” and compared it to the threat of technologically advanced Western powers during the new Meiji era.³⁷⁷ Addressing these severe demographic challenges amidst a deteriorating security environment, he confidently claimed that “now is precisely the time for us to create a new Japan.”³⁷⁸ Augmenting

³⁷⁵ Shinzo Abe, “Japan is Back: Policy Speech” (speech, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, February 22, 2013), accessed April 25, 2018, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/us_20130222en.html.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Abe, *Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe*.

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

Abe's political influence over Japan's security debate in the Diet and its post-war culture among the public, a sense of exigency is rising within the democratic society and the political establishment. It has also contributed to the political rise and survival of Shinzo Abe. Empowered by a chronic lack of serious political opposition, his party's October 2017 victory over Tokyo's popular governor, Yuriko Koike, and her Party of Hope demonstrated the voters' desire for stability and protection.³⁷⁹ The foremost architect of Japan's security resurgence and perhaps the longest-serving post-war prime minister in November 2019, Abe has forced a critical reexamination of the country's traditional and outdated security policy.

The Abe administration is also leveraging the media and other information channels to advance its strategic agenda and develop mass influence domestically. Japan is successfully adapting its national strategy to take advantage of the possibilities inherent in the dynamic information spectrum. Extending his control over the fourth estate, a political appointee heads Japan's flagship public broadcaster, NHK.³⁸⁰ He also enjoys the support of several leading national newspapers such as the conservative *Sankei Shimbun* and Japan's largest newspaper, *Yomiuri Shimbun*.³⁸¹ Recent polls show these initiatives have found some success among Japan's public. A Genron poll conducted in July 2017 showed there is "growing support for Japan taking on a more active role and leadership in

³⁷⁹ Motoko Rich, "Japan Election Vindicates Shinzo Abe as His Party Wins Big," *The New York Times*, October 22, 2017, accessed February 2, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/world/asia/japan-election-shinzo-abe.html>.

³⁸⁰ Nakano Koichi, "Contemporary Political Dynamics of Japanese Nationalism," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 14, no. 20 (October 15, 2016): 9, accessed February 11, 2018, <http://apjpf.org/2016/20/Nakano.html>.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

the international community.”³⁸² Notably, 38.1 percent expressed a desire to reduce reliance on the U.S.-Japan alliance and instead normalize relations with other major powers.³⁸³ A Pew Research Center poll in 2016 found Japan has a “greater sense of public commitment to the rest of the world than in any of the other major nations.”³⁸⁴ On the other hand, although an overwhelming majority of the Japanese people endorse global economic engagement, there has been just a slight increase in support for a more active military role.³⁸⁵

Relatively unknown outside of Japan, the Nippon Kaigi organization has also been a dominant actor in Japan’s domestic information domain. The largest right-wing organization in Japan, the Nippon Kaigi has not only developed an extensive conservative grassroots movement but also represent sixteen out of twenty ministers in Abe’s Cabinet in the government.³⁸⁶ Immensely influential and well-connected, it is an underappreciated informational enabler within the Abe administration’s strategic messaging. Tawara Yoshifumi, a prominent educator and secretary general of Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21, has struggled to bring attention to the political

³⁸² Genron NPO, *The 5th Japan-South Korea Public Opinion Poll*.

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Bruce Stokes, “Japanese divided on Democracy’s Success at Home, but value Voice of the People,” PEW Research Center, October 17, 2017, accessed February 11, 2018, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/10/17/japanese-divided-on-democracys-success-at-home-but-value-voice-of-the-people/>.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Tawara Yoshifumi, “What is the Aim of Nippon Kaigi, the Ultra-Right Organization that Supports Japan’s Abe Administration?” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 15, no. 21 (November 1, 2017): 1–23, accessed February 10, 2018, <http://apjpf.org/2017/21/Tawara.html>.

influence and powerful network of the Nippon Kaigi. Yoshifumi rightly points out Nippon Kaigi's alarming influence on Japan's governmental policies and its social sway, contending "it has taken political control of Japan."³⁸⁷

While concerns over Japan's prospective return to revisionism and jingoism continue to appear in international media, the Abe administration's efforts have spurred change in Japan's domestic anti-war identity, albeit slowly. Abe's "education rebuilding" agenda and cultivation of "morality" and "patriotism" are key priorities in the government's dynamic societal engagement efforts to increase support for his security policy proposals. To foster "children who care about the good of society," the government is mandating ethics "as a compulsory subject in all elementary schools."³⁸⁸ Although lambasted by outside observers as inherently revisionist and nationalist, the Abe administration's ideological policies seek to fundamentally shape the nature of public discourse and social preconceptions in the Japanese people.³⁸⁹

On the international front, Japan has made great strides in crafting a cohesive and unifying information campaign. Its values-based diplomacy, proactive economic outreach, and declarations of regional solidarity have made inroads among its neighbors, despite the lingering handicap of its historical legacy. As Abe cautiously crafts a regional reputation for strength and power, he is cognizant of the simultaneous and problematic need for reassurance. As a result, Professor Jian Yang at the University of Auckland

³⁸⁷ Yoshifumi, *What is the Aim of Nippon Kaigi*, 22–23.

³⁸⁸ Abe, *Policy Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe*.

³⁸⁹ Erin Blakemore, "Japan Will Allow Its Schools to Use a Controversial 19th-Century Imperial Text," *The Smithsonian*, April 10, 2017, accessed February 11, 2018, <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/japan-will-allow-its-school-controversial-19th-century-imperial-text-180962825/>.

unfavorably compares Japan's muddled national identity to China's determination and clear vision.³⁹⁰ Undeterred, the Abe administration remains committed to a sustained information campaign to win over its regional neighbors. By integrating consistent themes and messages within its initiatives, Japan has been able to parlay regional anxiety over China's rising influence and ambitions into concrete diplomatic gains.

Abe's long-held aspiration for a quadrilateral security dialogue, mentioned in the U.S.' 2017 NSS, continues to show potential for fulfillment as concerns over China continue to develop. Even in the limited role of a consultative mechanism, it creates more informational space for Japan and its partners to raise costs for China, constrain its behavior, and force it to externally adjust its strategic calculus. Under the umbrella of regional solidarity and hedging against uncertainty, Japan has built strategic channels with fellow democratic partners such as India and Australia. The revitalization of the "Quad" demonstrates the convergence of values and interests among its members, indicating informational alignment based on their unique yet overlapping concerns.³⁹¹ Through its promotion and implementation of confidence-building measures such as official dialogue, information sharing, and consultative frameworks, Japan is preserving conditions of stability and the status quo while gaining regional goodwill in the process.

Investing deeply in minilateral initiatives, Abe has also focused more broadly on maintaining the integrity and functionality of the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. As a result, it has become increasingly seen as a stalwart champion of the post-WWII rules-

³⁹⁰ Yang, *Japan's Decline Relative to China*, 151.

³⁹¹ Jesse B. Gale and Andrew Shearer, "The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative," Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2, 2018, accessed May 2, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/quadrilateral-security-dialogue-and-maritime-silk-road-initiative>.

based order, especially when juxtaposed against China's efforts to rewrite the regional power architecture. This comes at a pivotal time due to the perception of democratic recession, a term coined by political scientist Larry Diamond from Stanford University.³⁹² Calling it "Asia's year of regression," the 2017 Democracy Index ranks Japan (23) as a flawed democracy, along with South Korea (20) and the United States (21).³⁹³ In addition, the Eurasia Group, a New York-based political consultancy, named China and its drive to fill a global power vacuum as the top risk of 2018. Highlighting the gradual global erosion of the perceived attractiveness of Western liberal democracies since 2008, the report explicitly references the Chinese model as an increasingly viable and plausible alternative.³⁹⁴ Under President Xi Jinping's historic consolidation of domestic power, China's efforts and success in the information domain have only become more pronounced.

Seeking to maintain the rules-based order and balance of power, Japan has consistently framed "the Japan-U.S. alliance as an international public good that guarantees not only the defense of Japan but also the defense of South Korea and the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region."³⁹⁵ Even as the Abe administration seeks to

³⁹² Larry Diamond, "Facing up to the Democratic Recession," *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 1 (January 2015): 142, accessed April 22, 2018, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/565645/>.

³⁹³ The Economist Intelligence Unit, "Democracy Index 2017," *The Economist*, January 31, 2018, 5–11, accessed February 23, 2018, http://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy_Index_2017.pdf.

³⁹⁴ The Eurasia Group, "Top Risks 2018: China loves a Vacuum," January 2, 2018, accessed March 1, 2018, <https://www.eurasiagroup.net/issues/top-risks-2018>.

³⁹⁵ Institute for International Policy Studies, "The Trump Administration and Japan: Challenges and Visions for Japan's Foreign and Security Policy in the New Era,"

elevate Japan's role in the region, it also upholds the integrity of the alliance and Japan's strategic alignment with U.S. national interests in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S.' alliances with Japan and South Korea have remained at the forefront of a rapidly shifting relative-power configuration in the Indo-Pacific. However, they share a sense of compromised sovereignty, a pervasive mainstay of South Korean and Japanese cultural discontent with the U.S. More strategically complementary and willing to balance than the U.S.-ROK alliance, the U.S.-Japan alliance embodies both stable and evolving asymmetries and a shift towards aspirations for a more values-based alliance partnership.³⁹⁶ Figure 9 aptly captures Japan's overwhelming prioritization of its relationship with the U.S., in stark contrast to South Korea.

January 2017, 3, accessed January 30, 2018,
<http://www.iips.org/en/research/usjr2017en.pdf>.

³⁹⁶ Institute for International Policy Studies, *The Trump Administration and Japan*, 57.




Figure 9. Opinion Poll: Countries I Think are Important to My Country's Future

Source: Genron NPO, "The 5th Japan-South Korea Public Opinion Poll," July 2017, 13, accessed February 10, 2018, http://www.genron-npo.net/en/archives/170721_en.pdf.

Of the regional countries affected by Japan's war actions, China and South Korea exhibit the greatest sensitivity to Japan's apparent efforts to normalize its security profile. Dr. Youngshik Bong from the Asan Institute for Policy Studies states South Korean policymakers are increasingly viewing China as a "stabilizing and influential player on the Korean Peninsula," primarily because Beijing prioritizes stability and behavioral change while Washington prioritizes confrontation, isolation, and coercion.³⁹⁷ Despite Japan's apologies, mutual anti-Japanese sentiment due to Japan's brutal war legacy and

³⁹⁷ Youngshik Bong, "Continuity Amidst Change: The Korea-United States Alliance," in *Global Allies: Comparing U.S. Alliances in the 21st Century*, ed. Michael Wesley (Australia: ANU Press, 28 June 2017), 48.

respective territorial disputes have contributed to closer Sino-South Korean ties.³⁹⁸ As a result, South Korea has not significantly upgraded its security infrastructure or “engaged in either external or internal balancing behavior against the rise of China.”³⁹⁹ This runs counter to Japan’s more pessimistic view of a strategically unpredictable and ominous China and its balancing-focused actions. Despite the international community’s initial hopes for China’s gradual integration into the rules-based order, those expectations have started to fade. Endangering state sovereignty throughout the Indo-Pacific, China’s pursuit of power politics and off-putting mercantilist economic approach puts regional stability at risk.

However, rather than challenging China outright, Japan has cautiously yet firmly sought to constrain it instead. To promote regional stability and with due regard to Sino-Japanese economic interdependence, Japan has strenuously sought to avoid any misconstrued notions of its security objectives. Professor Glaser uses the rational spiral model to explain how a rational adversary will appreciate a state’s desire for adequate defense capabilities, as long as it’s perceived to be based on a security premise rather than one of greed.⁴⁰⁰ To that end, Japan has meticulously refrained from any mention of a containment policy or expansionist intent. Even with the SCS littoral states and proposed security quadrilateral partners, Japan has rigorously managed its strategic messaging and informational campaigns to allay China’s concerns over geostrategic issues such as containment and energy insecurity. While the Indo-Pacific countries recognize and

³⁹⁸ Bong, *Continuity Amidst Change*, 50.

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., 179.

respect the influence of the United States on the region's future peace and stability, they "also consider Sino-Japanese ties to be of critical importance for Asian stability in the short and long term."⁴⁰¹

Japan's renewed focus on its at-risk national security interests, exemplified by its proactive approach to peace, signals a broad reorientation in political-economic thinking among Japanese policymakers. Perception of a deteriorating threat environment during his tenure has only solidified Abe's determination to challenge Japan's internal view of its traditional geopolitical role and force self-assessment and critical inquiry. The urgency of this change is compounded by the rapid rise of China and the ominous prospect of the United States as a mercurial Pacific power in retreat. In response, Japan continues to expand the appeal of shared values, regional solidarity, human security, and mutual economic prosperity within the Indo-Pacific.

By emphasizing these fundamental concepts, the linkages between Japan's economic policies and programs with strategic and diplomatic endeavors have become more explicitly recognized, defined, and endorsed. Furthermore, Dr. Shinichi Kitaoka discusses how Japan's long-term commitment to human security and experience in health and education are two areas in which the country has contributed internationally.⁴⁰²

These positive developments have eased concerns in the region that Japan's eagerness for

⁴⁰¹ Michael Auslin, "China vs Japan: Asia's Other Great Game," *The National Interest*, October 17, 2017, accessed February 8, 2018, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-vs-japan-asias-other-great-game-22769?page=show>.

⁴⁰² Shinichi Kitaoka, "Sustainable Development Goals and Japan's Official Development Assistance Policy: Human Security, National Interest, and a More Proactive Contribution to Peace," *Asia-Pacific Review* 23, no. 1 (2016): 32–41, accessed February 7, 2018, <https://doi-org.lumen.cgsccarl.com/10.1080/13439006.2016.1195951>.

more geopolitical responsibility may be a resurgence of Japan's Meiji Restoration in 1868, a development that led to Japanese imperialism in WWII.⁴⁰³ Building upon these modest successes, Japan is productively demonstrating its proficient application of informational power as "an essential, perhaps indispensable, foundational component and enabler for the creation and exercise of all other forms of power."⁴⁰⁴

Military (Japan)

Despite a post-war constitution that continues to adhere staunchly to its pacifist principles, Japan incongruously has one of the most capable forces in the world. In its 2018 Military Strength Ranking of Asian-Pacific powers, Global Firepower ranks Japan sixth while China and India rank third and fourth, respectively.⁴⁰⁵ It has traditionally avoided the trappings of a normal military power, instead conducting military bandwagoning with the U.S. as the dominant Pacific power. During the Cold War era, Japan's Yoshida Doctrine emphasized Article 9 to reduce the risk of entrapment and resist U.S. pressure to contribute more as an ally.⁴⁰⁶ By forgoing outright pursuit of military power, Japan was then able to accelerate its economic progress while still benefiting from the transfer of advanced military technology from the U.S.

⁴⁰³ Robert E. McCoy, "The Disconcerting Role Japan will Increasingly Play as Key US Ally in East Asia," *Asia Times*, January 22, 2018, accessed February 2, 2018, <http://www.atimes.com/disconcerting-role-japan-will-increasingly-play-key-us-ally-east-asia/>.

⁴⁰⁴ Murphy and Kuehl, *The Case for a National Information Strategy*, 72.

⁴⁰⁵ Global Firepower, *2018 Military Strength Ranking*, 2018, accessed February 10, 2018, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>.

⁴⁰⁶ Envall, *Japan: From Passive Partner to Active Ally*, 17–18.

However, due to an increasingly contested security order in the Indo-Pacific, the limitations of the Yoshida Doctrine and its hedging basis have become markedly evident to the Japanese political and military establishments. As they explored options to ensure national security, key trends such as the rise of regional piracy helped pave the way for Japan's increased yet still limited use of naval and maritime security assets. In the spring of 2000, Japan hosted the "Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships," the world's first multilateral counter-piracy conference.⁴⁰⁷ Japan's leadership role in regional counter-piracy activities, requiring it to project power in waters far from its shores, slowly altered regional perception and acceptance of JMSDF presence and activities.

The Abe administration was able to successfully reverse the trend of decline in defense spending and engineer considerable adjustments in national security policies, organization, and doctrine. The most symbolic yet controversial change was the July 2014 reinterpretation of Japan's constitution to permit collective self defense. Adapting to public resistance to constitutional revision, the Abe administration reconvened the Yanai Commission to analyze the current security environment and sanction the JSDF's ability to defend its allies and partners.⁴⁰⁸ In 2015, the Abe administration passed security laws that permitted the JSDF to defend U.S. naval ships in international waters when those ships are protecting Japan, intercept ballistic missiles targeting the U.S. and U.S. Pacific

⁴⁰⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Japan's Efforts to Combat Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships*, November 2001, accessed May 1, 2018, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/relation/piracy.html>.

⁴⁰⁸ Brittney Washington and Kangkyu Lee, "Abe's Push to Change Japan's Defense Strategy," *Japan Today*, April 30, 2018, accessed May 2, 2018, <https://japantoday.com/category/politics/abe%E2%80%99s-push-to-change-japan%E2%80%99s-defense-strategy>.

bases, and defend and logistically support allied forces during PKOs.⁴⁰⁹ Professor Hughes calls the approval of collective self-defense a watershed moment in Japan's "radical security trajectory."⁴¹⁰ Nonetheless, subject to key constraints such as the requirement for an identified risk to Japan's survival, collective self-defense is a positive yet restrained step towards military normalization.

The NDPG of FY2014 and beyond sets out Japan's approach to defense capability for the next decade. Recognizing the inherent island vulnerability and regional A2/AD challenges, it categorically states the JSDF "will develop full amphibious capability."⁴¹¹ Dr. Midford points to China's controversial possession of Mischief Reef in the SCS as a key influence on Japan's defense planners.⁴¹² In April 2018, the JSDF established the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB). Similar to other countries' amphibious rapid response marine units, the ARDB represents Japan's first activated marine unit since WWII and is implicitly geared towards the defense of islands contested by China.⁴¹³ The ARDB also reflects the JSDF's revised strategic posture that prioritizes air and maritime threats from China rather than the Cold War-era focus on a Russian attack

⁴⁰⁹ Washington and Lee, *Abe's Push to Change Japan's Defense Strategy*.

⁴¹⁰ Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's Strategic Trajectory and Collective Self-Defense: Essential Continuity or Radical Shift?" *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 43, no. 1 (Winter 2017): 93, accessed May 1, 2018, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/646942>.

⁴¹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *National Defense Program Guidelines*, 8.

⁴¹² Midford, *Japan's Approach to Maritime Security in the South China Sea*, 542.

⁴¹³ Ankit Panda, "Japan Activates Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade," *The Diplomat*, April 9, 2018, accessed May 1, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/japan-activates-amphibious-rapid-deployment-brigade/>.

from the north.⁴¹⁴ In the face of China's irredentist efforts in the ECS, Japan's joint dynamic defense force has made great strides in its amphibious capabilities within a broader expeditionary and naval context.

With respect to its most capable force, the JMSDF, the NDPG increases the destroyer fleet from 48 to 54, including two additional Aegis BMD-equipped destroyers.⁴¹⁵ Due to high demand for BMD capabilities, the JMSDF recently procured the U.S.-developed Cooperative Engagement Capability system to enhance interoperability against the threat of DPRK missiles.⁴¹⁶ The JMSDF took possession of its second *Izumo*-class helicopter destroyer, *JS Kaga*, in March 2017; the *Izumo*-class is a potent symbol of "Abe's push to give the military a bigger international role."⁴¹⁷ Japan's capable submarine fleet expands from 16 to 22 boats, augmented by the advanced Sōryū-class submarine platform.⁴¹⁸ Known for its quiet propulsion and iterative design, the

⁴¹⁴ Harold, et al., *The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Deterring Grey Zone Coercion in the Maritime, Cyber, and Space Domains*, 18.

⁴¹⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *National Defense Program Guidelines*, 13.

⁴¹⁶ Kosuke Takahashi, "JMSDF to install CEC System on Future Aegis-equipped Destroyers," *IHS Jane's Defence Weekly*, January 15, 2018, accessed March 5, 2018, <http://www.janes.com/article/77057/jmsdf-to-install-cec-system-on-future-aegis-equipped-destroyers>.

⁴¹⁷ Nobuhiro Kubo and Tim Kelly, "Japanese Navy boosts Overseas Force Projection Capability with Second Big Helicopter Carrier," *Reuters*, March 22, 2017, accessed September 10, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-navy-carrier/japanese-navy-boosts-overseas-force-projection-capability-with-second-big-helicopter-carrier-idUSKBN16T0FJ>.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Sōryū-class headlines Japan's status as the sixth largest submarine power in the world.⁴¹⁹ JMSDF's consistent procurement of its indigenous P-1 platform, a highly capable maritime patrol aircraft, significantly improves Japan's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Japan's emphasis on these capabilities reflects its understanding of its vulnerable SLOCS, especially after the the success of U.S. submarines during WWII. Additional expected acquisitions include 42 F-35A fifth generation fighters, C-2 transports with a 6,500-kilometer range, and advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for coastal patrols.⁴²⁰

Furthermore, Japan's historic 2018 defense budget of 5.19 trillion yen sets aside funding for long-range missile programs such as the Joint Strike Missile by Kongsberg Gruppen ASA of Norway and Lockheed Martin Corp.'s Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM).⁴²¹ In addition, 137 billion yen is earmarked for BMD, bolstering Japan's layered structure of the land-based Aegis Ashore system, ship-based Aegis system, and ground-based PAC-3.⁴²² In December 2017, the Japanese Diet approved the purchase of additional Aegis Ashore systems to augment its existing BMD infrastructure. The following month, the U.S. Department of State approved the possible sale of four

⁴¹⁹ Global Firepower, *Total Submarine Strength by Country*, 2018, accessed May 5, 2018, <https://www.globalfirepower.com/navy-submarines.asp>.

⁴²⁰ Hughes, *Japan's Security Policy in the Context of the US-Japan Alliance*, 52.

⁴²¹ Isabel Reynolds, "Japan Approves Record Defense Budget as North Korea Looms," *Reuters*, December 21, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-22/japan-approves-record-defense-budget-amid-north-korea-tensions>.

⁴²² *Ibid.*

Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA missiles to Japan, valued at 133.3 million USD.⁴²³

Focused on the DPRK threat, the SM-3 Block IIA missile was jointly developed by Japan and the U.S. as part of a bilateral effort to improve BMD and interoperability. Figure 10 delineates the gradual increase in Japan’s defense-related expenditures up to the now-approved budget request for FY2018. The gradual uptick beginning with FY2012 coincides with the return of Shinzo Abe as Japan’s prime minister.




Figure 10. Japan’s Defense Expenditures

Source: Ministry of Defense, “Defense Programs and Budget of Japan,” August 2017, 3, accessed January 14, 2018, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/291222.pdf.

⁴²³ U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Japan–Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA Missiles*, January 9, 2018, accessed February 24, 2018, <http://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/japan-standard-missile-3-sm-3-block-ia-missiles>.

Key security partners and regional powers have tacitly or publicly encouraged Japan's continued modernization and development of military power. For example, Australia's 2017 defense white paper affirmed its support for Japan's defense and strategic policy reforms as well as "Japan's efforts to improve its security capabilities and to play a more active role in the security of the region."⁴²⁴ In 2015, India and the U.S. welcomed Japan as a permanent participant in the annual Malabar naval exercise, marking a "deepening regional awareness of the importance of offsetting China's strategic rise."⁴²⁵ Professor Hughes highlights how "Japanese policymakers have for the first time in the post-war period begun to doubt seriously whether the USA possesses the necessary military power" to counter China and its A2/AD, especially regarding territorial disputes and maintaining SLOCs.⁴²⁶ As the military dynamics of the regional security environment slowly invalidate the strategic post-war bargain between Japan and the U.S., Japan's insecurity is manifesting through its experimentation with active balancing.

However, Professor Hughes argues it may not restore equilibrium and stability in the region to match China's rise, but in fact become a source of unpredictability and instability.⁴²⁷ China's recent flexing of naval power projection only exacerbates Japan's sense of unpreparedness in security policy. China's 2015 *Military Strategy* white paper stresses the "strategic requirement of offshore waters defense and open seas

⁴²⁴ Australian Government, *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper*, 41.

⁴²⁵ Bhaskar, *Will China sign up for Narendra Modi's SAGAR vision*, 18.

⁴²⁶ Hughes, *Japan's 'Resentful Realism' and Balancing China's Rise*, 137.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, 150.

protection.”⁴²⁸ It adds the strategic function of “open seas protection” to the PLA Navy’s traditional “offshore waters defense” responsibilities.⁴²⁹ On April 12, 2018, China held the largest naval parade in the country’s history in the SCS, demonstrating its rapid transformation from a defensive brown-water force to a significant blue-water fleet.⁴³⁰ As China aptly demonstrated, power projection and strategic depth in the Indo-Pacific remains predominantly founded on maritime control and sea spheres of influence.

Critical of China’s claims of peaceful aims, Sir Gerald Howarth, former undersecretary of state at the UK Ministry of Defense, warns that “what matters is not intentions, but capabilities because intentions can change overnight, capabilities cannot.”⁴³¹ Operating under the constitutional ban on offensive weaponry, the JSDF presents a moderate yet growing suite of capabilities well-suited for its specialized national requirements. Professor Glaser points out the influence of the security dilemma in forcing expansion to increase the state’s sense of security.⁴³² However, despite a slow and steady rise in the defense budget under the Abe administration, Japan has yet to demonstrate the significant increases in military research, expenditure, and capacity-building that would generally accompany an arms race with China. Figure 11 shows U.S.

⁴²⁸ People’s Republic of China, *China’s Military Strategy*.

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ Li Gang, “China shows off Naval Might in Warning to Taiwan,” *The Times*, April 13, 2018, accessed April 13, 2018, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/china-shows-off-naval-power-in-taiwan-strait-5bfh5glmz>.

⁴³¹ Latika Bourke, “‘Intentions can change Overnight’: Ex-Minister’s Warning on China’s Vanuatu Plan,” *The Canberra Times*, April 13, 2018, accessed April 14, 2018, <http://www.canberratimes.com.au/world/intentions-can-change-overnight-ex-minister-s-warning-on-china-s-vanuatu-plan-20180412-p4z9c1.html>.

⁴³² Glaser, *The Security Dilemma Revisited*, 177.

dominance in military spending, followed distantly by China while Japan trails behind with the eighth largest defense budget.




Figure 11. The World's Top 10 Defense Spenders (2017)

Source: IHS Markit, “Global Defence Spending to Hit Post-Cold War High in 2018, Jane’s by IHS Markit Says,” December 18, 2017, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://news.ihsmarkit.com/press-release/aerospace-defense-security/global-defence-spending-hit-post-cold-war-high-2018-janes-i>.

While arms races in the past have been mostly or completely dyadic in nature, the regional trend of rising military spending in the Indo-Pacific complicates traditional arms race modeling. The ongoing discussion on the potential conversion of the *Izumo*-class helicopter destroyer into a “true” aircraft carrier, a continual point of controversy in Japan’s defense establishment, underscores Japan’s interest in security through military means.⁴³³ Such interest in the aircraft carrier, a platform not seen since Japan’s defeat in

⁴³³ Ankit Panda, “Japan Plans to Convert the *Izumo*-class Into a True Aircraft Carrier?” *The Diplomat*, January 7, 2018, accessed April 2, 2018,

1945, within the MOD reflects rising tension due to “China’s maritime expansion and North Korea’s missile and nuclear development.”⁴³⁴ Considered the “amalgamation of power project at its foremost” the Carrier Strike Group is a dominant aspect of U.S. military presence in the region.⁴³⁵ Other countries, including China, have viewed Japan’s *Izumo*-class with suspicion, with some calling it an aircraft carrier-in-disguise and perhaps rightly so. Regardless of their classification, the number of aircraft carriers or equivalents and the number of Indo-Pacific countries operating them will likely expand over the next decade.⁴³⁶

Refraining from overt reliance on military power to achieve Japan’s national security, the Abe administration is cautiously balancing military readiness against the perception of militarism. Abe’s policy success in enabling partial use of collective self-defense and the JSDF’s increasing capabilities, especially through amphibious and naval assets, demonstrate Japan’s return to an increasingly normal military state. That is not to say the strategic bargain, semi-characterized by Japan’s reliance on American hard power, is null. However, the fluid and multiplex security environment is necessitating Japan’s reexamination of its own military potential. Driven not only by BMD

<https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/japan-plans-to-convert-the-izumo-class-into-a-true-aircraft-carrier/>.

⁴³⁴ Nobuhiro Kubo and Tim Kelly, “Japan Considers Refitting Helicopter Carrier for Stealth Fighters: Government Sources,” *Reuters*, December 26, 2017, accessed April 3, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defence-carrier/japan-considers-refitting-helicopter-carrier-for-stealth-fighters-government-sources-idUSKBN1EK0CF>.

⁴³⁵ Richard A. Bitzinger, “The Aircraft Carrier: An Idea that Refuses to Die,” *RSIS Publications CO18027*, February 20, 2018, accessed April 4, 2018, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co18027-the-aircraft-carrier-an-idea-that-refuses-to-die/#.WsV2BdPwZE4>.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*

requirements due to North Korea and the implications of the burgeoning Sino-American military rivalry, Japan's own unwillingness to be militarily marginalized by China is a key consideration. In its carefully considered employment of JSDF capabilities, Japan is incorporating a deeper appreciation for the role of its military potential into a smart power approach, "combining the tools of both hard and soft power."⁴³⁷

Economic (Japan)

Ever since the Yoshida Doctrine essentially traded military development for economic growth, Japan has emphasized the geoeconomic aspect of its national power. The benefits of this post-war trade-off is becoming only more apparent and pivotal as vibrant economic transformation in the region reshapes the regional distribution of power in the Indo-Pacific. The region comprising Asia and the Pacific has seen its share of global GDP increase from 25 percent in 2000 to 33 percent in 2016.⁴³⁸ Demonstrating the qualified success of Abenomics in Japan, the International Monetary Fund projects 1.2 percent GDP in FY2018, continuing the Japanese economy's promising trend of above average growth over the past eight consecutive quarters.⁴³⁹ The Bank of Japan concurred in its April 2018 report, stating "Japan's economy is likely to continue growing at a pace

⁴³⁷ Joseph S. Nye, "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 4 (July-August 2009), accessed November 10, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-07-01/get-smart>.

⁴³⁸ World Bank, *Database: World Development Indicators*, 2018, accessed April 1, 2018, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>.

⁴³⁹ Ting Yan, "Asia and Pacific Department Press Briefing" (transcript, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, April 20, 2018), accessed April 25, 2018, <http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/04/20/sm18-tr042018-transcript-of-asia-and-pacific-department-press-briefing>.

above its potential in FY2018.”⁴⁴⁰ Primarily predicated on the strength of its economic relationships and resources along with its diplomatic influence, the Lowy Institute’s influential Asia Power Index ranks Japan third, behind only the U.S. and China.⁴⁴¹

However, the continuation of Japan’s economic power remains in some doubt, beset by a multitude of significant challenges. Key concerns arise from Japan’s “widening primary deficit and very high government debt,” as well as from the unsatisfying progress of Abenomics’ third arrow, structural reforms.⁴⁴² A burdened social security system and lack of corporate governance reform are additional prohibitive considerations. Despite its longest growth stretch in decades, domestic factors such as a shrinking labor force will affect Japan’s strategic ability to draw on its economic power and influence through ODA and other means. At the very least, these significant limitations will force the Abe administration to adjust its strategic calculus in its geoeconomic efforts to shape and influence its regional security environment.

However, more so than any other Asian power, including the U.S. and China, Japan wields greater influence than is expected from its resources.⁴⁴³ It has signed Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with fourteen countries, including India and

⁴⁴⁰ Bank of Japan, *Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices*, April 2018, 1, accessed May 1, 2018, <http://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor1804b.pdf>.

⁴⁴¹ Lowy Institute, “Country Profile: Japan,” 2018, accessed April 18, 2018, <https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries.php?profile=114>.

⁴⁴² United Nations, *Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2018*, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, May 7, 2018, 16, accessed May 8, 2018, http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Chapter1_Survey2018.pdf.

⁴⁴³ Lowy Institute, *Country Profile: Japan*.

Australia, as well as a Comprehensive EPA with ASEAN.⁴⁴⁴ Furthermore, Japan continues to negotiate an EPA with the European Union and a Free Trade Agreement with China and South Korea.⁴⁴⁵ Although Japan was overtaken as the second largest economy by China in July 2010, Japan remains the most diverse and sophisticated economy in the world as of 2016.⁴⁴⁶ As economic interaction and relations gain influence and emphasis in power politics, Japan has demonstrated a confident willingness to exercise regional leadership over economic activities and frameworks.

Alongside the U.S.-led World Bank, Japan uses the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as the primary regional platform for wielding its economic influence. With 15.6 percent of shares each, Japan and the U.S. have controlled the institution's agenda and guided the ADB towards "inclusive economic growth, environmental sustainability, and regional integration" for the past fifty years.⁴⁴⁷ Japan has unfailingly held the presidency of the regional development bank since its inception in 1966, reflecting Japan's virtual monopoly of the ADB's management. Japan's persistent efforts to develop influence in the ADB and other multilateral forums such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

⁴⁴⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)*, April 13, 2018, accessed April 20, 2018, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/index.html>.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁶ Center for International Development at Harvard University, "Country Complexity Rankings (ECI) 2016," *Atlas of Economic Complexity*, 2016, accessed March 4, 2018, <http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings/>.

⁴⁴⁷ Titli Basu, "Asian Development Bank at 50 and Japan's Puzzle," *East Asia Forum*, June 9, 2017, accessed October 4, 2017, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/09/asian-development-bank-at-50-and-japans-puzzle/>.

(APEC) reflect the country's traditional pride in its long-held status as the Asian model of economic prosperity.

In response to emerging regional economic threats such as the Washington-backed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as well as contemporary ones like the Japan-dominated ADB, China formed the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and its own regional framework, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Professor Saori Katada from the University of Southern California underscores how these varying forms of economic statecraft are nonetheless based on the same geoeconomic principle: “the desire to secure the rules of economic exchange in the region.”⁴⁴⁸

In fact, once the U.S. withdrew from the TPP in January 2017, it offered a unique opportunity for Japan to “step into a trade leadership role in the region.”⁴⁴⁹ The U.S.’ withdrawal from TPP and its “America First” doctrine accelerated efforts by allies and close trading partners in Asia to advance regional economic integration while it stands on the sidelines.⁴⁵⁰ As a result, Abe has put forth Japan as the primary architect of TPP-11, the replacement to the original TPP framework. Otherwise known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership” (CPTPP) and excluding the

⁴⁴⁸ Saori N. Katada, “East Asia’s Rising Geoeconomics and the Strategy for Japan,” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, January 24, 2018, 4, accessed February 11, 2018, <https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/east-asias-rising-geoeconomics-and-strategy-japan>.

⁴⁴⁹ Aurelia G. Mulgan, “Japan’s Rush to Conclude TPP-11,” *The Diplomat*, November 11, 2017, accessed February 12, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/japans-rush-to-conclude-tpp-11/>.

⁴⁵⁰ Ryan Hass, “Time to rethink U.S. Trade Strategy in Asia,” Brookings Institute, February 20, 2018, accessed March 4, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/20/time-to-rethink-u-s-trade-strategy-in-asia/>.

U.S., it represents 14 percent of global GDP compared to RCEP's 24 percent.⁴⁵¹

Nevertheless, Japan has strategically positioned the CPTPP as a rules-based economic structure and attractive alternative to China's power-based frameworks, namely the AIIB, RCEP, and its overarching economic-political initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Ironically, it took Japan nearly three years to overcome domestic opposition and join the original TPP.⁴⁵² However, it is now the foremost champion of the CPTPP, occupying a unique position between the U.S. and China to influence Indo-Pacific geoeconomics. In addition, Japan and other CPTPP members have kept the door open for the U.S. to rejoin. Executive Director Deborah Elms at the Asian Trade Centre notes the TPP-11 countries chose to suspend the U.S.-championed provisions rather than cancel them.⁴⁵³ Spearheaded by Japan, the CPTPP's regional willingness to work with the U.S. underscores the continued attraction and influence of the U.S.-led system of free markets and rules-based economic order.

⁴⁵¹ *The Straits Times*, "6 Things to Know about the Trans-Pacific Trade Pact CPTPP," January 23, 2018, accessed February 11, 2018, <http://www.straitstimes.com/world/6-things-to-know-about-the-trans-pacific-trade-pact-cptpp>.

⁴⁵² Saori N. Katada, "At the Crossroads: The TPP, AIIB, and Japan's Foreign Economic Strategy," East-West Center, *AsiaPacific Issues*, no. 125 (May 2016): 1–2, accessed February 11, 2018, <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/api125.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=356>.

⁴⁵³ Fathin Ungku and Charlotte Greenfield, "Trump says U.S. could rejoin TPP if Deal Improved. How Hard would it be?" *Reuters*, April 16, 2018, accessed April 25, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-tpp-explainer/trump-says-u-s-could-rejoin-tpp-if-deal-improved-how-hard-would-it-be-idUSKBN1HN0TW>.

The Abe administration has recognized that many of its ambitious national security initiatives ultimately rest on the success of the country's economy. While Abe continues to expand the capabilities and scope of Japan's military, he has demonstrated a sharpened regard for geoeconomics as a crucial element of Japan's overarching national security strategy. The prominent emergence and consequence of regional economic frameworks such as the CPTPP, RCEP, and AIIB only underscore the relevance of geoeconomics in the Indo-Pacific region. By seeking to cement the ADB's and CPTPP's higher standards as the economic templates for the Indo-Pacific, Japan is enhancing its regional reputation for the provision of public goods. In the wake of retreating U.S. commitment, Japan's ability to navigate an increasingly complex regional geoeconomic landscape will be instrumental to maintaining the relevance of the CPTPP and ADB against competing economic institutions and frameworks.

With infrastructure financing becoming progressively translated into geopolitical influence, Japan's prospective role and leadership in the ADB, CPTPP, APEC, and other economic organizations is vital to furthering its strategic objectives. Finance Minister Taro Aso reiterates Japan's commitment to quality infrastructure, noting that it is "critical to utilize infrastructure in an open, transparent and non-exclusive manner to enhance its connectivity."⁴⁵⁴ Professor Hidetaka Yoshimatsu at the Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University describes Japan's export of infrastructure systems to major Asian countries as a calculated attempt to counter China's regional influence through strengthened

⁴⁵⁴ Taro Aso, "Statement at the 50th Annual Meeting of the ADB" (speech, 50th Annual Meeting of the ADB, Yokohama, Japan, May 6, 2017), accessed December 11, 2017, https://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/mdbs/adb/2017st.htm.

relationships.⁴⁵⁵ In April 2018, the Second Public-Private Sector Roundtable Discussion on U.S.-Japan Cooperation on Third Country Infrastructure underscored their mutual geoeconomic understanding of linking infrastructure assistance to broader regional goals.⁴⁵⁶ While Japan continues to gain goodwill through traditional humanitarian aid and infrastructure development projects, its focus on “capacity-building programs” has taken on newfound strategic importance.⁴⁵⁷ In the influential realm of infrastructure assistance, the soft power context of Japan’s infrastructure financing and governance compares favorably against the hard power nature of China’s economic policies.

The issue of regional economic governance is a prominent feature of not only Asia’s security environment but also the great power rivalry between the U.S. and China.⁴⁵⁸ With its expertise and historical reliance on economic power for exercising regional influence, Japan occupies a unique role in the Indo-Pacific geoeconomic environment. Japan was conspicuously present during India’s May 2017 announcement of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), a calculated attempt to counterbalance China’s BRI. Japan’s involvement in this latest India-backed AAGC illustrates its

⁴⁵⁵ Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, “Japan’s Export of Infrastructure Systems: Pursuing Twin Goals through Developmental Means,” *Pacific Review* 30, no. 4 (January 11, 2017): 494–512, accessed February 10, 2018, <http://www.tandfonline-com.lumen.cgsccarl.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2016.1276953>.

⁴⁵⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Joint Statement of the Second Public-Private Sector Roundtable Discussion on U.S.-Japan Cooperation on Third Country Infrastructure*, Office of the Spokesperson, April 23, 2018, accessed April 27, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/04/281141.htm>.

⁴⁵⁷ Walter Sim, “The Changing Face of Japan-ASEAN Aid,” *Straits Times*, August 15, 2016, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/the-changing-face-of-japan-asean-aid>.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.

strategic reservations regarding the BRI as well as the appeal of its infrastructure expertise to India and regional partners.⁴⁵⁹ As the region's leading proponent for non-military security, Japan has developed a well-deserved reputation for reliability and integrity as an economic partner and international creditor.

Indeed, Japan's use of financial and development aid as a foreign policy tool has become an increasingly prominent and vital part of its national security strategy. Its 2016 Development Cooperation Charter champions the use of ODA as a principal means of bolstering Japan's national interests in the Indo-Pacific. Professor Purnendra Jain from University of Adelaide argues that more explicitly than ever before, "Japan has redefined its aid orientation to serve its geostrategic and national interests, largely due to the changes in the global geostrategic environment in the wake of China's rise."⁴⁶⁰ Japan has positioned ODA as a key component of its "Proactive Contribution to Peace" strategy in order to achieve the "medium- to long-term national interests of Japan."⁴⁶¹

Already ASEAN's single largest source of investment and its third-largest trading partner, Japan continues to expand the scale of its ODA and economic diplomacy in the region.⁴⁶² Commenting on the robust Japan-ASEAN relations in April 2017, Japan's

⁴⁵⁹ Jagannath Panda, "The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor: An India-Japan Arch in the Making?" Institute for Security and Development Policy, *Perspective & Analysis* 2, no. 21 (August 21, 2017) 2, accessed April 24, 2018, <http://isdpeu/content/uploads/2017/08/2017-focus-asia-jagannath-panda.pdf>.

⁴⁶⁰ Purnendra Jain, "Japanese Foreign Aid: What's in it for Japan?" East Asia Forum, July 21, 2016, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/21/japanese-foreign-aid-whats-in-it-for-japan/>.

⁴⁶¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *White Paper on Development Cooperation 2016*, 10–11.

⁴⁶² Angel Versetti and Adam Heal, "Japan-ASEAN Economic Partnership: Prospects for 2015 and Beyond," UN ESCAP, *Trade Insights*, no. 5 (February 2015): 1,

Ambassador to Singapore Kenji Shinoda announced a 2 trillion yen ODA package for ASEAN community-building as well as deeper integration with ASEAN through a new 100 million USD Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund.⁴⁶³ In charge of administering Japan's ODA, the Japan International Cooperation Agency wryly notes Japan "is not necessarily very good at bringing armed conflicts to an end."⁴⁶⁴ Instead, President Dr. Kitaoka highlights Japan's unique approach to peacebuilding, pointing to the Tokyo International Conference on African Development meetings as representative of Japan's critical role in maintaining the system of international cooperation.⁴⁶⁵ As a result, there has been rising appreciation within Japan for ODA's utility in improving the country's standing in the international community, and by extension, ensuring its peace and prosperity. The Abe administration has explored the deliberate and strategic use of ODA to achieve Japan's national security interests. Figure 12 shows Japan was the fourth largest contributor of development assistance in the world in 2016 with 10.37 billion USD in net ODA total volume.

accessed April 6, 2018, <http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Trade%20Insights%20-%20Issue%20No%205.pdf>.

⁴⁶³ Kenji Shinoda, "ASEAN-Japan Relations: Past and Present," *The Business Times*, April 26, 2017, accessed April 5, 2018, <http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/hub/asean-japan-special/asean-japan-relations-past-and-present>.

⁴⁶⁴ Japan International Cooperation Agency, *JICA 2017 Annual Report*, November 2017, 11, accessed May 5, 2018, https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/2017/c8h0vm0000bws721-att/2017_all.pdf.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., 8.




Figure 12. Official Development Assistance by Total Volume in 2016

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Official Development Assistance 2016*, 2017, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://www2.compareyourcountry.org/oda?cr=oced&lg=en>.

Japan's use of ODA is primarily focused on economic development, especially among the littoral states of the SCS and Strait of Malacca.⁴⁶⁶ Its traditional basis lies in quality growth and human security, layered with a high level of economic governance and transparency. In line with its Development Cooperation Charter, Japan has maintained "the principle of avoiding any use of development cooperation for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts."⁴⁶⁷ Instead, the Abe administration has reframed defense cooperation to ease restrictions on the ability for Japan to supply

⁴⁶⁶ Midford, *Japan's Approach to Maritime Security in the South China Sea*, 527.

⁴⁶⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *White Paper on Development Cooperation 2016*, 10.

other nations with military equipment and engage in security and military capacity-building. Japan's 2017 donation of two TC-90 trainer airframes to Manila marked the "first instance of Japan transferring excess defense equipment to another country free of charge following ongoing changes in its domestic laws."⁴⁶⁸ Japan's largesse to the Philippines, including the expedited procurement of multi-role response vessels, has in turn sparked requests from other ASEAN states.⁴⁶⁹

Despite the good will that comes with military donations and the 2014 relaxation on arms exports restrictions, Japan's defense industry has yet to show little success. Japan has yet to ink any significant defense export deals despite its global stature as an export powerhouse, ranked fourth in global exports with 645 billion USD in 2016.⁴⁷⁰ Japan's failed bid for Australia's 2014 submarine tender deal marked a "major setback for Abe's push to develop an arms export industry as part of a more muscular security agenda after decades of pacifism."⁴⁷¹ Professor Jain attributes this to Tokyo's inexperience and lack of

⁴⁶⁸ Prashanth Parameswaran, "New Military Aircraft Puts Japan-Philippines Defense Ties in the Spotlight," *The Diplomat*, March 23, 2018, accessed April 13, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/new-military-aircraft-puts-japan-philippines-defense-ties-in-the-spotlight/>.

⁴⁶⁹ Ridzwan Rahmat, "Japan mulls over Requests for Defence Equipment from Southeast Asia," *IHS Jane's Defence Weekly*, March 9, 2018, accessed April 13, 2018, <http://www.janes.com/article/78472/japan-mulls-over-requests-for-defence-equipment-from-southeast-asia>.

⁴⁷⁰ World Trade Organization, *World Trade Statistical Review 2017*, World Trade Statistical Review, 2017, 102, accessed April 23, 2018, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2017_e/wts2017_e.pdf.

⁴⁷¹ Tim Kelly, Cyril Altmeyer, and Colin Packham, "How France sank Japan's 40 Billion Australian Submarine Dream," *Reuters*, April 29, 2016, accessed November 18, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-submarines-japan-defence-in/how-france-sank-japans-40-billion-australian-submarine-dream-idUSKCN0XQ1FC>.

solid marketing strategies, attractive costing, and negotiating skills.”⁴⁷² To gain a foothold in the competitive international arms market and streamline its policies, the Abe administration established the Acquisition Technology and Logistics Agency inside the MOD.⁴⁷³ However, Japan, like many Indo-Pacific militaries, remains dependent on foreign suppliers such as the U.S. for imports of advanced weaponry and platforms.⁴⁷⁴

As an island nation in the Pacific, energy security is an inescapable socioeconomic aspect of Japan’s national security. Geographically isolated and driven by persistent energy security concerns, Japan is keenly aware of the vulnerability of its SLOCs. Japan must import over 90 percent of its energy requirements, of which 80 percent of its oil and 20 percent of its natural gas comes from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz.⁴⁷⁵ A critical socioeconomic issue for China, the Malacca Dilemma certainly applies to Japan as well. Therefore, the pro-nuclear Abe administration faces a complex challenge: how to obtain energy security in the face of strong anti-nuclear sentiment among the public? Of Japan’s 48 existing nuclear reactors, only four were in operation as of January 2017.⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷² Purnendra Jain, “Japanese Arms for Sale,” East Asia Forum, February 16, 2017, accessed April 12, 2018, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/02/16/japanese-arms-for-sale/>.

⁴⁷³ International Trade Administration, *Japan–Defense Procurement*, U.S. Department of Commerce, September 25, 2017, accessed April 12, 2018, <https://www.export.gov/article?id=Japan-Defense-Procurement>.

⁴⁷⁴ Richard A. Bitzinger, “Asian Arms Industries and Impact on Military Capabilities,” abstract, *Defence Studies* 17, no. 3 (July 31, 2017): 295–311, accessed April 4, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2017.1347871>.

⁴⁷⁵ World Nuclear Association, *Nuclear Power in Japan*, March 2018, accessed April 4, 2018, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/japan-nuclear-power.aspx>.

⁴⁷⁶ Congressional Research Service, *Japan-U.S. Relations*, 17.

Following the Fukushima disaster in March 2011, Japan has endeavored to diversify its energy supply and reduce its dependence on nuclear power.⁴⁷⁷ Japan leads global liquefied natural gas (LNG) demand, representing 83.3 metric tons and 32.3 percent by global market share in 2016.⁴⁷⁸ In fact, Japan tops the world's five largest LNG importers, all located in Asia and collectively representing roughly 70 percent of globally traded LNG.⁴⁷⁹ Japan notably received its first import of liquefied shale gas in January 2017 from the contiguous United States, a rising energy provider expected to be the world's top LNG exporter by 2022.⁴⁸⁰ Given its rising trade surplus with the U.S., 51.6 billion USD in 2011 to 62.6 billion USD in 2016, Japan's interest in American LNG also helps assuage U.S. geoeconomic concerns.⁴⁸¹

Despite a long history of economic cooperation with the U.S., Japan warily prepares to blunt the Trump administration's preference for bilateral free trade

⁴⁷⁷ Tomo Uetake and Nobuhiro Kubo, "Exclusive: Japan considers buying more U.S. Energy as Abe prepares to meet Trump," *Reuters*, February 2, 2017, accessed April 8, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-japan-lng-exclusive/exclusive-japan-considers-buying-more-u-s-energy-as-abe-prepares-to-meet-trump-idUSKBN15H0NJ>.

⁴⁷⁸ International Gas Union, *2017 World LNG Report*, 2017, accessed February 18, 2018, https://www.igu.org/sites/default/files/103419-World_IGU_Report_no%20crops.pdf.

⁴⁷⁹ Henning Gloystein, "U.S. Exports fill Asia's LNG Demand Gap as Market Tightens," *Reuters*, January 19, 2017, accessed February 24, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-lng/u-s-exports-fill-asias-lng-demand-gap-as-market-tightens-idUSKBN1540EK>.

⁴⁸⁰ Jefferson Caves, "IEA: U.S. Could Be World's Top LNG Exporter by 2022," Independent Petroleum Association of America, July 13, 2017, accessed April 24, 2018, <https://www.energyindepth.org/iea-u-s-could-be-worlds-top-lng-exporter-2022/>.

⁴⁸¹ John Miller, "The Trade Numerologist: The Japan Solution," IHS Markit, November 7, 2017, accessed April 23, 2018, <https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/the-trade-numerologist-the-japan-solution.html>.

agreements. In addition, “Japan's continued efforts to ‘multilateralize’ concerns about China's maritime ambitions” and increase its own energy security remain works-in-progress.⁴⁸² It is also still vulnerable to energy and resource manipulation, evidenced by China’s 2010 halt on exports of rare earth minerals to Japan due to geopolitical tensions.⁴⁸³ In this acutely sensitive and interdependent economic landscape, modern power politics is now increasingly defined and described by economic statecraft “as the foreign policy of choice for great powers.”⁴⁸⁴

Section II: Evaluation Criteria (U.S. National Security Interests)

A sequential DIME analysis of this study’s findings from the U.S. perspective delivers key insights into Japan’s security policies and intentions while shedding light on their ramifications for U.S. national interests. The recent NSS promulgated by the Trump administration in December 2017 underpins the evaluation criteria to be used in analyzing Japan’s DIME findings. This strategic document puts forth an array of instructive and key objectives across the dimensions of national power. Consequently, the strategic guidance lends itself well to the provision of relevant metrics for this study’s evaluation criteria.

The U.S.’ 2017 NSS lays out a comprehensive strategy for reaching U.S. national objectives on an “America First” premise. It underscores a whole-of-government

⁴⁸² Jonathon B. Miller, “Japan must Respond to China's Growing Naval Power,” *Nikkei Asian Review*, April 12, 2018, accessed April 20, 2018, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Japan-must-respond-to-China-s-growing-naval-power2>.

⁴⁸³ Keith Bradsher, “Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan,” *The New York Times*, September 22, 2010, accessed September 5, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html>.

⁴⁸⁴ Katada, *East Asia’s Rising Geoeconomics and the Strategy for Japan*, 1.

approach to securing its national interests, emphasizing relationships with regional partners and allies. It notes the return of great power politics, a geostrategic structural transformation that may presage the imminent shift from unipolarity to multipolarity, or to a multiplex order. In the Indo-Pacific region, this holds particular implications for Japan as the U.S.’ most reliable and capable ally.

U.S. Diplomatic Objectives

Throughout the NSS, the diplomatic emphasis remains consistently on the importance of allies and partners to maintain and promote U.S. interests and “magnify American power.”⁴⁸⁵ The Trump administration’s 2017 iteration states that through U.S. leadership in multilateral political and security institutions, “diplomacy is indispensable to identify and implement solutions to conflicts in unstable regions of the world short of military involvement.”⁴⁸⁶ To do so, it specifically emphasizes quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India. It echoes Abe’s ambitious call for a regional security infrastructure with the inherent capabilities to match China’s potential and ensure security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. Among its descriptions of key U.S allies in the region, the NSS expressly notes the leadership role of Japan and the emerging global power stature of India.⁴⁸⁷

The NSS also contains the oft-repeated rhetoric on equitable burden-sharing, while simultaneously highlighting the need for allies and “the collective resources of like-

⁴⁸⁵ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy, 2017*, 4.

⁴⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 46.

minded nations and organizations to address shared problems.”⁴⁸⁸ This underpins the strategic recognition that “changes in a regional balance of power can have global consequences” and complicate the U.S.’ ability to contain threats.⁴⁸⁹ These threats expressly include DPRK’s nuclear regime and China’s geopolitical aspirations. To address them, the NSS reasserts the U.S.’ stance on “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula” and the preservation of “the non-proliferation regime in Northeast Asia.”⁴⁹⁰ It also endorses U.S.’ efforts to bolster the vulnerable sovereignties of South Asian states against China’s “economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats.”⁴⁹¹

U.S. Informational Objectives

The NSS pointedly asserts the U.S. must “compete for positive relationships around the world,” implicitly referencing strategic competitors such as Russia and China.⁴⁹² It positions American influence and values as a “positive alternative to political and religious despotism.”⁴⁹³ Despite carrying faint undertones of “American exceptionalism,” the 2017 NSS and its fundamental America First principle also adds the proviso that the U.S. will abstain from imposing those values on others.⁴⁹⁴ Furthermore,

⁴⁸⁸ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy, 2017*, 33.

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁴⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁴⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 46.

⁴⁹² *Ibid.*, 38.

⁴⁹³ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁴⁹⁴ Joshua Zeitz, “How Trump Is Making Us Rethink American Exceptionalism,” *Politico*, January 7, 2018, accessed April 22, 2018,

the NSS advances the concept of a contested information domain as an accelerant in political, military, and economic competitions. It further proclaims “states throughout the region are calling for sustained U.S. leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence.”⁴⁹⁵ In order to do so, the U.S. must “create a network of states that advance our common interests and values.”⁴⁹⁶ To serve as the foundation of this rules-based system, the NSS underscores the necessity of fundamental individual liberties.⁴⁹⁷

U.S. Military Objectives

The NSS emphasizes the concept of peace through strength, delivered through two primary means: 1) A forward military presence capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating any adversary; 2) Development of a strong defense network with our allies and partners.⁴⁹⁸ For the first, the NSS stresses the strategic significance of the nuclear deterrence extended to more than 30 allies and partners, thus assuring their security while reducing their need to possess their own nuclear capabilities.⁴⁹⁹ Nested within the U.S. whole-of-government pursuit to prevent nuclear proliferation in East

<https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/07/trump-american-exceptionalism-history-216253>.

⁴⁹⁵ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy*, 2017, 46.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 30.

Asia, modernized nuclear deterrence remains the “foundation of U.S. strategy to preserve peace and stability by deterring aggression.”⁵⁰⁰

For the second, the U.S. NSS requires allies to modernize, acquire necessary capabilities, improve readiness, expand the size of their forces, and affirm the political will to win.⁵⁰¹ This latest NSS consciously recognizes the vulnerabilities and gaps in the U.S.’ global capabilities and security requirements. This strategic realization informs the NSS’ consistent call on allies and partners to contribute and moreover, demonstrate the willingness, to confront dangerous and mutual threats. At the same time, it stresses the need to enhance layered missile defense focused on North Korea and Iran while simultaneously upholding strategic stability and longstanding strategic relationships. Lastly, the NSS notes expanded defense and security cooperation with India, labeled a Major Defense Partner of the United States.⁵⁰²

U.S. Economic Objectives

Based on the principles of economic fairness & reciprocity, the 2017 NSS carries forth the concept of competition to global geoeconomic statecraft. Reiterating its focus on allies and partners, the NSS highlights the economic aspect of free markets and meaningfully links it to protection from forces that would subvert their sovereignty.”⁵⁰³ In addition, the NSS notes prosperous states are also stronger security partners who are then able to share the burden of confronting common threats. The NSS puts forth the

⁵⁰⁰ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy, 2017*.

⁵⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, 47.

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*, 38.

requirement to “compete and lead in multilateral organizations so that American interests and principles are protected.”⁵⁰⁴ It also reinforces the objective to “shape and reform international financial and trade institutions.”⁵⁰⁵ The goal of adopting “new trade and investment agreements and modernizing existing ones” while “countering unfair trade practices” are complementary priority actions.⁵⁰⁶

The NSS highlights access to the geostrategic Indo-Pacific markets in order to expand U.S. trade and investment opportunities while increasing the market base for U.S. goods and services. It specifically underscores the potential of U.S. economic power and relationships to “bolster states threatened by competitors.”⁵⁰⁷ By upholding the rules of a fair and reciprocal economic order, the NSS argues it will not only “benefit all with equal levels of market access and opportunities for economic growth” but also enhance U.S. security.⁵⁰⁸ In the NSS, economic ties are extolled not only for market access but also for their ability to advance common political and security interests through deepening relationships. It accentuates the role of geoeconomics in the U.S.’ foreign policy and power politics engagement with other states, as well as its influence on U.S. national interests both at home and abroad.

⁵⁰⁴ U.S. Government Executive Branch, *National Security Strategy, 2017*, 4.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 40.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

Section III: Evaluation Criteria Analysis

The evaluation criteria table displays the DIME interaction between Japan's policies and U.S. interests from a national security perspective. The level of symmetry between the U.S. and Japan across all instruments of national power will inform the overall degree of security integration in the Indo-Pacific. The three-tiered scale system in Table 1 demonstrates the strategic alignment between U.S.' national security objectives and Japan's national security policies. Categorized within the DIME framework, the scale runs along a continuum from Opposing (O) to Neutral (N) to Supporting (S). Based on each category of national power, the table notes the degree of agreement between Japan's policies and the U.S.' objectives. The desired outcome is "Supporting" in most, if not all, of the four categories while avoiding any "Opposing." This third section forms the foundation for this study's conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 5. Table 1 presents the following results:

Table 1. Evaluation Criteria Table	
U.S National Security Objectives	Japan National Security Policies
Diplomatic	Supporting
Informational	Supporting
Military	Neutral-Supporting
Economic	Supporting

Source: Created by author.

According to the table, there are no opposing conditions in any of the categories of national power. This indicates there is minimal contradiction or conflict between Japan's security policies and the U.S.' security interests. However, a neutral to supporting state exists in the military category between the U.S. and Japan. It considers the U.S.'

support for the Abe administration's drive to normalize military power as an instrument of national power and policy. It also notes Japan's moderate successes in military modernization through constitutional reinterpretation, policy and organizational updates, and achievement of key JSDF objectives. On the other hand, it recognizes the inhibitive impact of domestic opposition and the JSDF's burdened shift from the molasse of its traditional status quo. The "Neutral-Supporting" reflects the continual capability gap between the Abe administration's U.S.-supported ambitions for regional power normalization and its historical risk-averse role as a passive military alliance partner.

Section IV: Summary

While maintaining the strength and necessity of its military alliance with the U.S., Japan is simultaneously establishing its preference for a more equitable, multilateral, and reliable security framework for the Indo-Pacific. Japan's firm pivot to its concept of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" indicates a restless perspective of the current outdated hub-and-spoke alliance structure. Confronting the realization of how untenable its security may become if left on its current course, Japan is striving to gain greater control over its own future. Japan's ambitious minilateral diplomacy, evolving national identity, progressive military modernization, and energetic economic outreach collectively frame its security strategy for the post-American Century threat environment. Its omnidirectional national security strategy acknowledges the historical, geoeconomic, and geopolitical conflicts of interests simmering within the Indo-Pacific and seeks a strategic approach to overcome those challenges.

Although the dynamic nature of the region's security environment poses difficulties for policy formulation and long-term strategic thinking, it also offers

opportunities for Japan and the U.S. to jointly reshape the Indo-Pacific security landscape. Dr. Khurana aptly notes that as the “U.S. seeks to maintain its influence in the region in face of the Chinese challenge, it also seeks to prop up India’s influence eastwards of the Malacca Straits and Japan’s influence in the Indian Ocean.”⁵⁰⁹ Based on U.S. national security interests gleaned from its 2017 NSS, Japan’s national security strategy is mutually beneficial for both allies.

Unwilling to relinquish its status as a Pacific power, the U.S. is striving to maintain its relevance and the viability of the rules-based order it helped create in the Indo-Pacific. Based on Professor Gilpin’s study of hegemonic war, China may be driving a phase of delegitimization, otherwise renounced as revisionism in the 2017 U.S. NSS. As this instigates new rounds of rebalancing and hedging throughout the Indo-Pacific, Japan is leading a thorough and well-calibrated regional response to manage change in the balance of power. Therefore, these multilateral security evolutions bode well for a strengthened set of collective and cooperative regional security mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific.

⁵⁰⁹ Mercy A. Quo, “The Origin of ‘Indo-Pacific’ as Geopolitical Construct: Insights from Gurpreet Khurana,” *The Diplomat*, January 25, 2018, accessed April 29, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/the-origin-of-indo-pacific-as-geopolitical-construct/>.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This strategy is guided by principled realism. It is realist because it acknowledges the central role of power in international politics, affirms that sovereign states are the best hope for a peaceful world, and clearly defines our national interests. It is principled because it is grounded in the knowledge that advancing American principles spreads peace and prosperity around the globe.

—U.S. Government Executive Branch, *U.S. National Security Strategy*, 2017

Introduction

This study sought to develop a response to the primary research question: whether or not Japan's security strategy is detrimental to U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This primary research question relied on three secondary research questions, which were answered in Chapter 4. The secondary research questions prompted the study to view Japan's distinctive whole-of-government approach to its national security through the DIME framework. As a result, Chapter 4 described Japan's bold and exploratory use of its instruments of national power and sought to determine how Japan's national security policies will aid or conversely, thwart U.S. national interests in the Indo-Pacific.

This study makes the argument that Japan's security strategy is *not* detrimental to U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Rather, Japan's security policies are highly complementary with U.S. national security interests. Despite some moderate shortfalls in the military domain of national power, Japan is strategically well-aligned with U.S. security objectives in the region. With that said, Japan's unique constraints on its military potential contributes to its greater flexibility to adopt a regionally reassuring and moderated security approach. Its limitations are an integral

aspect of its strategic smart power aspect, although that may frustrate U.S. hopes for a significantly increased JSDF presence in the Indo-Pacific.

It is important to recognize Japan as not only the U.S.' most critical ally in the Indo-Pacific but also a significant regional power in its own right. Now more than ever, it has the innate disruptive potential to significantly shape the regional security environment for better or worse. The dominant shadow of the U.S.-Japan military alliance and the sanctity of the U.S. security commitment to its regional partners and allies have been the bedrock of Indo-Pacific peace and prosperity. While this alliance structure has remained remarkably intact till now, Japan's strategic calculations are forcing it to revise its role in the alliance in light of rising threats. Dr. Corey Wallace describes this as a "dual hedge" because of Japan's embrace of "renewed US commitment to the region while initiating comprehensive strategic partnerships in military, economic, and political spheres with nations 'south' of its traditional domain of strategic interest."⁵¹⁰

While the American security guarantee freed Japan to pursue economic prosperity after the war, the U.S. gained geostrategic bases in Japan and solidified its relationship with its most important ally and friend in the region. However, the U.S.' recent appetite to police the world has noticeably shrunk, and it is increasingly hesitant to become embroiled in any more costly conflicts. At the same time, the reemergence of great power politics threatens to upset the regional unipolar status quo. Therefore, the U.S. will increasingly rely on Japan to support its efforts to engage with and influence the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S.' delegation of responsibility and insistence on burden-sharing

⁵¹⁰ Corey J. Wallace, "Japan's Strategic Pivot South: Diversifying the Dual Hedge," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 13, no. 3 (July 19, 2013): 479, accessed April 11, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lct011>.

merges with the Abe administration's desire to manage, circumvent, or overcome its domestic limitations so that Japan can achieve greater control over its own geopolitical destiny.

Key Findings

The strategic framework of DIME lends credence to Japan's regional security alignment with the U.S. Reaffirming the legitimacy of this strategic military alliance, it provides a necessary measure of reassurance against the backdrop of a rapidly complicating security environment and global challenges. In addition, a unified and transparent strategic security approach to the Indo-Pacific and China helps mitigate the geopolitical risk of the security dilemma. It does so by reducing the potential for misunderstandings and clarifying existing cultural, historical, and political biases.

As China's long-ported rise rapidly became self-evident, the international relations debate on competition versus cooperation decisively occupied academic and national security discussions on U.S.-China relations. Overshadowed by this prevailing strategic rivalry, the dormant yet ever-present false dichotomy gradually reemerged at the forefront of Japan-China relations. When Dr. Khurana coined the term Indo-Pacific, his original intent was to illustrate how commercial and strategic maritime cooperation can help preserve global and regional stability rather than as a "geopolitical framework that divides Asia into friends and enemies."⁵¹¹ Despite the expected return of great power competition, the current regional multiplexity is a far cry from the multipolar power dynamics of the Cold War. The dominant degree of security interdependence in today's

⁵¹¹ Khurana, *Trump's New Cold War Alliance in Asia is Dangerous*.

regional security order refutes the competition versus cooperation dichotomy and instead requires a much more complex understanding and complex systems approach.

Given China's strong political leadership, economic dominance, and military competence, outmoded proposals for containment of China's expansionist ambitions are misleading at best. Robert Blackwill, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, argues China is and will remain the most significant competitor to the U.S. for decades to come and moreover, its future success will further undermine U.S. national interests.⁵¹² Given this projection, Japan occupies a geographically critical position on China's periphery with the ability and will to frustrate and delay China's accumulation of comprehensive national power. Indeed, Japan plays a key role in constraining China's actions in the Indo-Pacific. Alongside speculative security quadrilateral partners such as India and Australia, Japan can influence power-sharing arrangements in favor of the U.S. and its allies and partners in the region.

China's irrefutable rise runs parallel alongside increasingly unreliable regional equations to determine the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Directly affecting the U.S.' strategic calculus in the Indo-Pacific, the opacity of China's decision-making apparatus and unreliable strategic intent is deepening security dilemma concerns with Japan as well as with India. However, Japan's minilateral activism and balanced use of its national power moderates the regional instability caused by Chinese adventurism, DPRK volatility, and other emergent threats. From the holistic perspective of DIME, Japan has understated its military reforms while concentrating on well-publicized diplomatic initiatives, consistent informational campaigns, and energetic economic outreach. By

⁵¹² Blackwill and Tellis, *Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China*, 6.

doing so, it seeks to sidestep the potential pitfalls of the security dilemma.

Japan has proven remarkably adept at navigating the complex currents of international affairs, in spite of security partners such as a recently capricious U.S. and a perennially suspicious South Korea. Adapting to international vagaries, Japan has confidently moved to strengthen ties around the world, including economic partnerships with Europe as well as with Mexico and Canada within the CPTPP framework. The Trump administration's familiar "burden-sharing" refrain is providing Abe a justifiable rationale to pursue his security agenda. Far from an unwilling participant bowing to U.S. pressure, Abe is taking advantage of the strategic uncertainty to realize a secure, prosperous, and rising Japan. China's unnerving territorial assertions and economic coercion have heightened regional sensitivity and facilitated Japan's overtures to an increasingly receptive ASEAN. India and Australia have made tentative yet incremental steps towards the security quadrilateral first described by Abe and now promoted in the U.S. NSS.

In light of its considerable global engagement and regional leadership, Japan's status as a great power versus a middle power is up for debate. Far more importantly, however, Japan's evolving role and significance to the Indo-Pacific is unquestionable. In addition, the political and media furor surrounding constitutional revision, let alone the recent narrow reinterpretation, is misleading. The projected trend of low-intensity and gray-zone activities will largely preclude the prospect of active JSDF intervention or involvement in SCS conflicts. Without unnecessarily discounting Japan's constitutional issue and other domestic limitations, it is important to recognize the impact of the Abe administration's national security accomplishments. Under Shinzo Abe, Japan has

demonstrated its willingness to take up the mantle of regional leadership in the Indo-Pacific, emboldened by a rising preference for multilateral frameworks and a steady series of minilateral successes.

Rather than U.S. military power and U.S.-centric alliances, regionalism may offer a more stable and inclusive basis for the Indo-Pacific security order. It promotes a shared view of the Indo-Pacific's future and incorporates a sturdier sense of security that can withstand the inherent strategic ambiguity of a region containing both China and the DPRK. Professor Evelyn Goh from the Australian National University points out Japan's three key security contributions: 1) anchoring the U.S. in East Asia through the security alliance; 2) responsibly constraining the excesses of growing Chinese power, and 3) promoting economic and political regionalism.⁵¹³ Rather than an unwieldy reliance on the U.S. military presence, represented by over 39,000 active-duty U.S. troops in Japan in 2017, a more diffused structure would promote regional equilibrium.⁵¹⁴ In large part through Japan's regional leadership, the region can circumvent the prospect of a polarizing Sino-American strategic split in the Indo-Pacific. Regionalism, rather than a system dominated by one or a few powers, presents the best way to avoid a debilitating and counterproductive Cold War-style security milieu.

⁵¹³ Evelyn Goh, "How Japan Matters in the Evolving East Asian Security Order," *International Affairs* 87, no. 4 (July 2011): 887, accessed May 1, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.01009.x>.

⁵¹⁴ Greg Price, "U.S. Military Presence in Asia: Troops Stationed in Japan, South Korea, and Beyond," *Newsweek*, April 26, 2017, accessed April 11, 2018, <http://www.newsweek.com/us-military-japan-north-korea-asia-590278>.

Unexpected Findings

Based on the traditional role of hard power in the security dilemma and media attention on Japan's controversial attempts at constitutional revision, initial research expectations were focused on Japan's defense "normalization" and a hard power approach to regional security. However, the research found a holistic application of the instruments of national power and an encompassive national security strategy. Although Japan has long been a regional powerhouse, the Abe administration demonstrates a great power's keen appreciation for the potential and effectiveness of the whole-of-government mindset, demonstrated through its meticulous execution of smart power. Its creative and in-depth security policies, such as defense diplomacy, infrastructure-backed ODA initiatives, and values-based strategic messaging, reflect a security strategy that stretches across all domains of national power.

Recommendations for Further Study

First, the 2016 electoral victory of President Donald Trump and the volatility of his administration's first year was an unavoidable yet influential aspect of this study. The study duly considered the initial policy breaks and strategic shifts that departed from those of the previous Obama administration. However, a closer examination of the Trump administration's views and policies is warranted, especially as they continue to mature going forward. A study of the Trump administration's transactional approach to strategic relationships and its impact on induced strategic uncertainty and Japan's consequent balancing and hedging behavioral patterns would be informative.

Second, a geoeconomic study would contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of how energy security concerns and requirements drive national security

policies in the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific states have prominent geoeconomic considerations such as maritime sensitivity to climate change, the pervasive Malacca Dilemma, Arctic economic potential, and the nuclear energy and environmental debates. In addition, the region is seeing the emergence of multilateral economic frameworks and mega-initiatives such as the AIIB, RCEP, CPTPP, and AAGC. Vying for influence and stakeholders in the region, the possibility of competitive geoeconomic polarization will only continue to grow.

Third, extensive international research has been conducted on the trilateral structure of the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, along with its enduring historical challenges. However, the region has seen a recent resurgence of the security quadrilateral concept as an increasingly viable security structure. Using a qualitative data analysis tool such as NVivo, the study can evaluate the progression of this concept since its inception as Abe's "Democratic Security Diamond" in 2012. A beneficial research topic could analyze how a similar structure would replace not only the U.S.' traditional trilateral approach to Northeast Asia but its entire hub-and-spoke alliance architecture in the region.

Lastly, a cooperative security model applied to the security quadrilateral in the Indo-Pacific would help clarify how the proposed framework would adapt to the region's security idiosyncracies. Introduced by Immanuel Kant, the concept of cooperative security is reflected in organizations such as NATO. More recently in 1994, former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans notably described it "to connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than

unilateralism.”⁵¹⁵ A study of Japan’s evolution of proposed security frameworks, based on a modified cooperative security model for the Indo-Pacific, would contribute to the field of international relations.

Recommendations for Action

First and foremost, the U.S. must take action to shore up Japan’s confidence in the U.S. security guarantee. Surrounded by nuclear threats such as China and DPRK, allies such as South Korea and Japan may increasingly view the development of nuclear weapons as a strategic imperative if they lose confidence in the U.S. security commitment. A sense of insecurity will raise the likelihood of the U.S.’ gradual exclusion from the regional community, nationalist and militaristic security policies, and risky security seeking behavior. Japan’s confidence in the U.S. has ebbed dramatically in recent years. Support for the U.S. in Japan is at the lowest level since 2008, with only 24 percent of the Japanese people trusting U.S. President Trump to do the right thing in world affairs, hovering just above their trust in South Korea at 17 percent.⁵¹⁶ Figure 13 depicts a July 2017 poll of the Japanese public regarding the impact of the Trump administration on the two countries’ relationship.

⁵¹⁵ Gareth Evans, “Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 96 (Autumn 1994): 3, accessed April 28, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149213>.

⁵¹⁶ Stokes, *Japanese divided on Democracy’s Success at Home*.




Figure 13. Opinion Poll: Impact of Trump Administration on U.S.-Japan Relations

Source: Genron NPO, “Japanese Public Opinion on American Leadership and the Role of Japan,” July 2017, 3, accessed February 10, 2018, http://www.genron-npo.net/en/archives/170721_en.pdf.

Second, the U.S. must become a foundational member of the Indo-Pacific “security diamond,” otherwise known as the “security quadrilateral.” Strategically, such a role would re-invigorate the perception as well as the reality of the U.S. as a Pacific power. It would also increase its influence and leverage over Japan’s policies, as well as those of India and Australia. Dr. Chansoria proclaims the trilateral arrangement among Japan, Australia, and India will prove to be one of the “most significant vehicles for shoring up regional stability, norms, and institutions,” and perhaps rightly so.⁵¹⁷ In which case, it is imperative for the U.S. to occupy a central role in this promising and potentially dominant security architecture. This will usher in a long-overdue reform of

⁵¹⁷ Chansoria, *Regional Cooperative Security in the Indo-Pacific*, 23.

the current hub-and-spoke alliance structure and further cement essential security cooperation relationships with key regional allies. Simultaneously, it reduces the perception of U.S. retrenchment, a geopolitically damaging assessment that shifts regional momentum and initiative to other states such as China and Russia.

Third, the U.S. must prioritize economic integration with the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. is now excluded from the CPTPP as well as the RCEP, which will soon be the world's largest trade bloc in terms of population, making up 46 percent.⁵¹⁸ In order to maintain influence over the most significant economic region in the world, the U.S. must assure its inclusion in these economic frameworks. In its newfound leadership role within the CPTPP and with its acknowledged expertise in infrastructure development and capacity building assistance, Japan has accumulated considerable credibility in the region. Alongside an influential and proactive Japan, the U.S. should use the CPTPP to reinforce “omnibus diplomatic, economic, and security regionalisms.”⁵¹⁹

Lastly, the U.S. must increase strategic emphasis on rapprochement between Japan and South Korea as a critical component of U.S. regional security strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. Despite the recent strategic tilt towards the security quadrilateral, the U.S. must not lose sight of South Korea's geopolitical significance and maintain its close relations with this critical security partner. Its geostrategic location on the Korean peninsula and proximity to China assigns the Asian middle power a unique significance.

⁵¹⁸ The Straits Times, *6 Things to Know about the Trans-Pacific Trade Pact CPTPP*.

⁵¹⁹ Alan Chong and Wu Shang-Su, “‘Indo-Pacific’ Vs ‘Asia-Pacific’: Contending Visions?—Analysis,” *Eurasia Review*, March 3, 2018, accessed May 12, 2018, <https://www.eurasiareview.com/03032018-indo-pacific-vs-asia-pacific-contending-visions-analysis/>.

To reflect the dynamics of the evolving security environment, the U.S. should promote South Korea's adoption of Japan's minilateral approach. It facilitates burden-sharing and increased perceptions of equality among both parties through reduced dependence on the antiquated hub-and-spoke structure. In addition, it helps manage South Korea's economic vulnerability to Chinese pressure through deeper integration in economic and security frameworks founded on the rules-based system.

Summary

The replacement of the traditional term "Asia-Pacific" with the broader and more appropriate "Indo-Pacific" label signifies growing global awareness and recognition of the region's prominence as the most dynamic area of the world. As both geopolitical and geoeconomic constructs, the Indo-Pacific region has become increasingly authoritative and influential in the international community. Meanwhile, concern over American retrenchment has led to insecurity among its Indo-Pacific allies and forced those countries to take an increasingly realistic and expansive approach to their own foreign policies. Deep-rooted economic relations with China further force these states into difficult strategic positions. As strategic volatility promulgates throughout the region, the risk of miscalculation and misperception heightens the risk of conflict and a comprehensive decline in net security. Given established U.S. regional interests, the continuation of the American Century depends a great deal on the stability of the Indo-Pacific region's economic and security infrastructure.

To that end, Japan's evolving strategic role and intent has yet to be fully defined or understood by regional stakeholders. Nevertheless, they recognize that Japan is at a strategic crossroads. Based on its own security assessment of the severe threat

environment, Japan intends to dispute China's rising hegemonic influence while hedging against possible U.S. retrenchment. Under Shinzo Abe's assertive leadership, Japan is navigating the modern multiplex order and committing wholeheartedly to its omnilateral "Proactive Contribution to Peace" strategy. However, as historian Michael Howard judiciously pointed out, reassurance of allies and deterrence of adversaries are mutually reinforcing and equally critical.⁵²⁰ Japan is cautiously proving it can successfully walk that geopolitical tightrope. In the end, Japan's success or failure will have grave implications not only for its own national security interests in the Indo-Pacific, but also for those of the U.S. as well.

⁵²⁰ Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs* 61, no. 2 (Winter 1982): 309–310, accessed March 1, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20041437>.

GLOSSARY

- Abandonment. Defection in various forms: to realign with the adversary; to merely nullify the arrangement; fail to fulfill explicit commitments; or fail to provide support when expected.⁵²¹
- Alliance. An explicit agreement among states in the realm of national security in which the partners promise mutual assistance in the form of a substantial contribution of resources in the case of a certain contingency the arising of which is uncertain.⁵²²
- Arms Race. Sharp acceleration in military capabilities due to simultaneous abnormal growth in military outlays of two or more great powers or local powers of comparable military standing in the same region.⁵²³
- Article 9. “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”⁵²⁴
- Balancing. The state’s attempt to maintain their position in the system through internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one).⁵²⁵

⁵²¹ Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 466, accessed November 4, 2017, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010183>.

⁵²² Bergsmann, 29.

⁵²³ Michael D. Wallace, “Arms Race and Escalation: Some New Evidence,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23, no. 1 (March 1979): 6, accessed February 6, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/173649>.

⁵²⁴ Sayuri Umeda, “Japan: Amendment of Constitution, Article 9,” The Law Library of Congress, February 2006, 2, accessed March 28, 2018, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php>.

⁵²⁵ Kenneth A. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010), 118–126, accessed February 15, 2018, Google Ebook.

Containment. Policy of adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of the adversary's policy.⁵²⁶

Deterrence. Discouragement of military aggression by the threat (implicit or explicit) of applying military force in response to the aggression.⁵²⁷

Entrapment. Involuntary involvement in a conflict over an ally's interests that one does not share or shares only partially because one values the preservation of the alliance more than the cost of fighting for the ally's interests.⁵²⁸

Grey Zone. Use of techniques to achieve a nation's goals and frustrate those of its rivals by employing instruments of power – often asymmetric and ambiguous in character – that are not direct use of acknowledged regular military forces.⁵²⁹

Great Power. When a state could pursue its vital interests, regardless of the wishes or forces of foreign countries; a nation that could not do so merely existed on the good will, or sufferance, of others.”⁵³⁰

Hedging: Geopolitical insurance strategy that maintains strategic ambiguity to reduce or avoid the risks and uncertainties of negative consequences produced by balancing or bandwagoning alone.⁵³¹

Indo-Pacific. Region ranging from the eastern Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean connected by Southeast Asia, including India, North Asia, and the United States.⁵³²

⁵²⁶ U.S. Department of State, *Kennan and Containment, 1947*, Office of the Historian, last updated mid-2016, accessed April 9, 2018, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/kennan>.

⁵²⁷ Glenn H. Snyder, “Deterrence and Power,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 4, no. 2 (June 1, 1960): 167, accessed April 8, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002200276000400201>.

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*, 467.

⁵²⁹ U.S. Department of State, *International Security Advisory Board: Report on Gray Zone Conflict*, by Rose E. Gottemoeller, January 3, 2017, accessed February 4, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/isab/266650.htm>.

⁵³⁰ Ferris, 34.

⁵³¹ Koga, *The Concept of 'Hedging' Revisited*, 6.

⁵³² Australian Government, *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper*, 119.

Minilateralism. Replacement of traditional, formal international frameworks with alternative forms of collective action, typified by voluntary, often ad hoc, disaggregated, trans-governmental, regional, multi-level and multi-stakeholder-based participation.⁵³³

Official Development Assistance. Grants, loans, etc. with concessional conditions that are given to developing countries and regions, mainly for the purpose of contributing to the improvement of economic development and welfare.⁵³⁴

Rivalry. Dyadic relationship with a competitor who is a source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming militarized and thus become an enemy.⁵³⁵

Security Dilemma. Social construct of competition in which one's concern over its own security drives it to accumulate power and that in turn engenders insecurity in others and compels them to acquire more power as well.⁵³⁶

Strategy. The nation's plan for the coordinated use of all the instruments of state power - non-military as well as military - to pursue objectives that defend and advance the national interest.⁵³⁷

Third Offset Strategy. U.S. DoD's efforts to preserve and revitalize its conventional deterrence capability by adapting to the countermeasures to key U.S. capabilities that near-peer competitors have built up in recent years and are continuing to develop.⁵³⁸

⁵³³ Stewart M. Patrick, "Making Sense of 'Minilateralism': The Pros and Cons of Flexible Cooperation," Council on Foreign Relations, January 5, 2016, accessed November 6, 2017, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/making-sense-minilateralism-pros-and-cons-flexible-cooperation>.

⁵³⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, *White Paper on Development Cooperation 2016*, v.

⁵³⁵ Thompson, *Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics*, 557–586.

⁵³⁶ Herz, *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma*, 157–180.

⁵³⁷ Doyle, *The U.S. National Security Strategy*, 624–629.

⁵³⁸ Jesse Ellman, Lisa Samp, and Gabriel Coll, "Assessing the Third Offset Strategy," Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2017, 2, accessed January 20, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessing-third-offset-strategy>.

Whole-of-Government. An approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of a government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁹ United States Institute of Peace, *Whole-of-Government Approach*, accessed April 23, 2018, <https://www.usip.org/glossary/whole-government-approach>.

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