

WHAT CAPABILITY GAPS WOULD A MULTI-COMPONENT
CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION ADDRESS BETWEEN
RESERVE COMPONENT AND ACTIVE DUTY?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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2018

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				<i>Form Approved</i> OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 15-06-2018		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2017 – JUN 2018	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE What Capability Gaps Would a Multi-Component Civil Affairs Organization Address between Reserve Component and Active Duty?				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Raymond E. Childress				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER – 9B	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This thesis is a review and comparison of the approaches taken during World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom regarding Civil Affairs and Military Governance to determine if multicomponent units could resolve some of the current capability gaps. This thesis conducts a literature review of relevant military doctrine, military scholar research, and civilian research and case studies to identify capability gaps between Reserve and Active Component Civil Affairs. The capability gaps identified are leadership, integration, and Functional Specialty. The study utilizes a qualitative research method of textual analysis to examine how the military addressed Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs and Functional Specialist capability gaps during World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The research recommends affordable, feasible, and effective solutions to address the capability gaps based on lessons learned from World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Multi-Component, Multi-Compo, Capability Gaps, CA Capability Gaps, Functional Specialty, AC/RC, Force Structure, Civil Affairs, 38A, 38G, USACAPOC, USASOC, Military Governance					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: Unclassified			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 118	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

WHAT CAPABILITY GAPS WOULD A MULTI-COMPONENT CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATION ADDRESS BETWEEN RESERVE COMPONENT AND ACTIVE DUTY? by MAJ Raymond E. Childress, 118 pages.

This thesis is a review and comparison of the approaches taken during World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom regarding Civil Affairs and Military Governance to determine if multicomponent units could resolve some of the current capability gaps. This thesis conducts a literature review of relevant military doctrine, military scholar research, and civilian research and case studies to identify capability gaps between Reserve and Active Component Civil Affairs. The capability gaps identified are leadership, integration, and Functional Specialty. The study utilizes a qualitative research method of textual analysis to examine how the military addressed Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs and Functional Specialist capability gaps during World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The research results in short and long-term solutions within a Multi-Component Civil Affairs organization that are affordable, feasible and effective in addressing current capability gaps based on lessons learned from World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I couldn't have completed this project without the extraordinary support of my beautiful wife, Samantha, who refused to let me quit. My sons, Nolan, Ryan, and Brendan, provided an endless amount of reasons for me to focus on life, keeping me balanced as an Army officer, student and family man.

Special thanks to my mother, Maureen, and sister, Liz, who put up with all the trials and tribulations of my younger years. To my stepdad David for loving and supporting our family. To my Aunts Kathleen, Aileen and Doreen for giving my mother a break from the grind and adventures we wouldn't have been able to do on our own. My father, Grandpa Edward Ryan and Grandma Filo, whose fascinating backgrounds taught me the importance of history, cultural awareness and, most importantly, how good we have it here in America.

Special thanks to my Committee Board for keeping me on track and guiding me through the process. Jesse McIntyre III kept me focused and motivated with his war stories and foreign affairs discussion. Dr. Andrew Harvey for helping me develop a thesis that was tangible while keeping me honest in my writing and research. And LTC Gary Lysaght for supporting me from the beginning with direction and guidance.

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ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
ACP	Army Campaign Plan
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Research Publication
AGR	Active Guard and Reserve
AWFCs	Army Warfighting Challenges
BDE	Brigade
CA	Civil Affairs
CACOM	Civil Affairs Command
CENTCOM	Central Command
CFLCC	Combined Forces Land Combatant Command
CG	Commanding General
COP	Common Operating Picture
DIV	Division
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
FM	Field Manual
MULTI-COMPONENT	Multi-Component
NG	National Guard
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NSS	National Security Strategy
OPTEMPO	Operation Tempo

ORHA	Office Rebuilding and Humanitarian Assistance
PRC	Presidential Reserve Call-Up
RAF	Regionally Aligned Force
RC	Reserve Component
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
ST	Special Text
TPU	Troop Program Unit
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
USACAPOC	United State Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
USAR	United States Reserve Component
USASOC	United States Army Special Operations Command

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Currently, there is no organization where Reserve Component and Active Component Civil Affairs work together to achieve unity of effort for the geographic regions and units they align with. To address this issue, the Army is considering the creation of Multi-Component Civil Affairs organizations consisting of Reserve Component and Active Component personnel. As recently as 2006, both components of Civil Affairs, Reserve, and Active worked for United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) under United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).

In Colonel Hugh Van Roosen's Army War College Strategy Research Project, "Implications of the 2006 Reassignment of U.S. Army Civil Affairs," he discusses the history of what the Civil Affairs community refers to as "The Divorce." His project states that in 2003 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld discussed a greater need for Civil Affairs to support conventional forces during the planned transition phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). At the time, OIF Phase IV - Stability Ops, was struggling and he believed that the conventional forces didn't have enough Civil Affairs capability to facilitate the operations through Phase V – Transition. Mr. Rumsfeld recommended that Civil Affairs be taken away from USASOC to provide more capability to the conventional forces.¹

In 2006, this move became official, and USASOC retained the Active Duty Civil Affairs to continue to support their special operations forces and transferred the Army Reserve Civil Affairs and USACAPOC to Army Reserve Command. Since the

realignment of Civil Affairs, Reserve Component Civil Affairs support Conventional Forces under USACAPOC while Active Component Civil Affairs support Special Operations Forces under USASOC.²




Figure 1. Civil Affairs Force Structure

Source: Samuel L. Hayes and Ken Nguyen, “CA 2025: The Strategic Design of Civil Affairs” (Capstone Project, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2015), 130.

Task Organization

The Reserve Component maintains 74 percent of the Army’s Civil Affairs force structure, task-organized to support conventional forces and regionally aligned to Geographic Combatant Commanders.³ They conduct annual training in 14-29 day increments at least once per year, primarily supporting Theater Cooperation exercises with foreign countries overseas or at the National Training Center (NTC) and Joint

Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations with conventional forces in the Continental United States (CONUS). Their headquarters is commanded by a Major General (O8), the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, also known as USACAPOC. There are four Brigadier General (O7) Commands regionally aligned to United States Pacific Command (PACOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and one is responsible for both Africa Command (AFRICOM) and European Command (EUCOM). Additionally, there are two Reserve Component Civil Affairs Brigades that do not report directly to USACAPOC. Instead, they directly align with their Army Service Component Command, one with United States Army Pacific and the other with United States Army Europe.

Active Component Civil Affairs (AC CA) has 23 percent of the Civil Affairs forces.⁴ They are assigned to USASOC and consist of one Civil Affairs Brigade (CA BDE) supporting Special Operation Forces. Active Component Civil Affairs officers have high operational tempos with occasional broadening opportunities, limited due to the lower density of qualified Civil Affairs officers. Previously, the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade was assigned to support conventional forces aligned to Army Service Combatant Commands and co-located with Army Corps headquarters. Due to cost considerations, it was reduced from a CA BDE to a CA BN. Active Component Civil Affairs units are headquartered at Fort Bragg, NC.

Civil Affairs Qualification Training

AC CA officers complete a two-week Civil Affairs Assessment and Selection before attending the Civil Affairs Qualification Course. Upon selection, they conduct a

three-week introduction to Civil Affairs, 29 weeks of language, cultural and regional training, and 8 ½ weeks of Civil Affairs training. Figure 2 outlines AC CA training:

Introduction to CA 3 Weeks • CA Heritage • CA Organizations and Functions • CA Doctrine • CA Methodology • CA Core Tasks • CA Operations • ARSOF Attributes • Resiliency	Language and Culture 25 Weeks 1 Day • CAT I & II: French, Indonesian-Bahasa, Spanish. • CAT III & IV: Arabic, Chinese-Mandarin, Dari, Korean, Pashto, Persian-Farsi, Russian, Tagalog, Thai, and Urdu • Foundations of Cross-Cultural Competence • Control of Interpreters	Regional Analysis 4 Weeks • National Policy and Strategy • Regional History, Culture, and Characteristics • Operational Variable Analysis • Regional Issues
CA CCC / CA Spec (MOS) 8 Weeks 2 Days • Civil Information Management • CA Planning Exercise • Civil Reconnaissance Exercise • Human Dynamics, Adaptability, Teambuilding • Engagements, Negotiation, Mediation • Combat Skills • CA in Unconventional Warfare	SLUSS-TILLER (CULEX) 3 Weeks 3 Days • Mission Analysis and Planning • Application of Adaptive Thinking and Leadership • Civil Reconnaissance • Assessments • Civil Information Management • Language and Cultural Enhancement • Regimental Affiliation	Graduation Last week of SLUSS-TILLER • Out-Processing • Graduation • Individual Academic Achievement Awards • Awarded 38A (CA Branch) • PCS to Assignment

Figure 2. Civil Affairs Officer (Active Duty) Training Pipeline

Source: 1st Special Warfare Training (Airborne), “Civil Affairs (Active Army) Pathway,” U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2017, accessed March 25, 2018, <http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/1stSWTGCourses.html>.

The 3 ½ week long culmination exercise is defined by the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence website as:

Sluss-Tiller is the culminating event for the CA Team Leader, assessing each student on the application of their knowledge and skill of Civil Affairs. Students demonstrate proficiency in individual tasks, planning and conducting Civil Affairs operations in a contemporary training environment; technical and tactical skills

integral to operations; adaptive thinking and leadership attributes and abilities; and examine the environment and context in which operations take place.⁵

Reserve Component Civil Affairs (RC CA) candidates must complete a four-phase Captain's Career Course consisting of two online phases and two 29-day resident phases. They interact with AC CA in the final two weeks of Sluss-Tiller. RC CA officers training requirements are outlined in Figure 3 below:

CA CCC (RC) Ph 1 Distance Learning • Army Captains Career Common Core	CA CCC (RC) Ph 2 4 Weeks • Army Captains Career Common Core • Regional Analysis
CA CCC (RC) Ph 3 Distance Learning • CA Heritage • CA Organizations and Functions • CA Doctrine • CA Methodology • CA Core Tasks • CA Operations	CA CCC (RC) Ph 4 3 Weeks 6 Days • Civil Information Management • CA Planning Exercise • Human Dynamics, Adaptability, Teambuilding • Engagements, Negotiation, Mediation • CA in Unconventional Warfare • CA Operations (Sluss-Tiller CULEX) • Awarded CA Branch

Figure 3. Civil Affairs Officer (Reserve Component) Training Pipeline

Source: 1st Special Warfare Training (Airborne), “Civil Affairs (Reserve Component) Pathway,” U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2017, accessed March 25, 2018, <http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/1stSWTGCourses.html>.

RC CA does not require language and cultural studies for its officers. However, they do conduct area studies during the third phase of their Captain's Career Course. Upon successful completion of the Civil Affairs course, they are also eligible for over 400 language courses ranging from two-day refresher training in CONUS, a three-month-long OCONUS immersion language training, or the 18-month Defense Language Institute training in residence, and a multitude of interagency and inter-branch language

and cultural studies options in between, their primary limitation is on time and availability. Army Regulation 11-6: The Army Language Program, also known as TALP, funds RC CA language training and explicitly prohibits the utilization of TALP funds for USASOC Civil Affairs Officers as they have separate funding sources and schools for language and regional training.

RC CA soldiers require 30 days notification before being involuntarily mobilized. If the individual Soldier agrees to sign a 30-day notification waiver, this requirement can be waived. RC Soldiers are available for 1 thru 29 days of active duty Annual Training orders but doing so on short notice can potentially place the Soldiers civilian career at risk. RC CA units operate one weekend a month.⁶ RC soldiers can volunteer for active duty operational support (ADOS) orders at any time as long as they meet the requirements for the position. AC soldiers do not require presidential notification for deployments.

Research Question

The primary question is: How can Multi-Component Civil Affairs organizations successfully close capability gaps that exist between the Active Component and Reserve Component Civil Affairs units? The secondary research question will identify what capability gaps currently exist between the Active Component and Reserve Component Civil Affairs units? Also, how were other Multi-Component units successful in closing capability gaps?

Assumptions

This thesis assumes the total number of Civil Affairs personnel and positions won't change. There will be no increase in overall funding available for Civil Affairs. No changes will be made to the current mobilization and notification requirements for Army Reservists. Future organizations will be constrained by current training and administrative requirements. Reservists remain ADCON to Army Reserve, and Regular Army remain ADCON to USASOC.

Definitions

Two primary definitions are required to facilitate the thesis research: Capability Gaps, and Multi-Component Organizations.

Capability Gaps. The inability to meet or exceed a capability requirement, resulting in an associated operational risk until closed or mitigated. The gap may be the result of no fielded capability, lack of proficiency or sufficiency in an existing capability solution, or the need to replace a fielded capability solution to prevent a future gap.

Multi-Component (Multi-Compo) Organization. An organization consisting of multiple Army components (Active Duty, and Reserve or, National Guard).⁷

Limitations

This research focuses on Multi-Component Civil Affairs units and their ability to address capability gaps. The research will be limited to U.S. Army Civil Affairs. The research will be based on records, events, and access to relevant materials that already exist as well as a limited number of interviews. Current military doctrine available for Civil Affairs reviewed in Chapter 2, Literature Review, are largely focused on Stability

Operations and were published before prior to the 2017 updates to the National Security Strategy and Field Manual 3-0 Operations that focuses on large-scale combat operations with emphasis on Divisions and Corps.

The majority of military scholars reviewed come from Active Duty Civil Affairs and reflect that background in their publications. The case studies are focused on large-scale combat operations and limited to Military Governance during World War II, and Military Governance during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Some of the topics that will not be covered due to time constraints include contingency operations, civilian governance support, counter-insurgency operations, shaping operations, theater security cooperation, mobilization, request for forces, active duty for operational support, annual training, legal employment notification requirements, funding, support requirements, rank structure, administrative control.

Delimitations

To reduce the scope of the research, the focus is on Civil Affairs Brigades and above. This thesis identifies capability gaps across the Civil Affairs AC/RC branches as opposed to geographic regions. Primary attention is on Civil Affairs support for Large-Scale combat operations between peer-peer militaries in line with the most recently published FM 3-0 (2017) and National Security Strategy.

Significance of the Study

This research will be significant to the U.S. Army by providing a description of, and insight into, the ability of Multi-Component Civil Affairs units to address capability gaps that will make those units better able to perform critical missions. It will also

illustrate the process of how Multi-Component units address those capability gaps. This will be significant for Civil Affairs Planners, Operators and Integrators at the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Army Service Component Commands (ASCC), Forces Command (FORSCOM), Training Command (TRADOC), United States John F. Kennedy School of Special Warfare, United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), and government agencies involved with Civil-Military and Civil-Affairs Operations throughout all phases of military operations.

Figure 4 identifies Civil Affairs Functions and Capabilities by the level of support, the focus of function and capabilities, operational scope, and interagency coordination:

Level of Support	Focus of Function	Focus of Capabilities	Operational Scope	Interagency Coordination
Geographic Combatant Command—Strategic	• Enable IPI and OGAs • Shape operations • Promote development	• Develop and build capacity of IPI to provide locally sustainable solutions	National to international	• American Embassy • USAID/OGAs • International partners/donors • IGOs/NGOs
Corps—Operational to Strategic	• Short-term civil administration • Stabilization, reconstruction, and development • Planning, assessment, and implementation	• Reconstruction and development • Enable civil administration • Plan/enable/shape/manage • Regionally focused	Subnational to national	• American Embassy • USAID • OGAs • IGOs/NGOs
Division—Tactical to Operational	• Short-term civil administration • Enable HN and OGAs • Stabilization and reconstruction • Planning and assessment	• Conduct stabilization and reconstruction • Enable civil administration • Plan, enable, shape, and manage (execution oriented)	Province or large city to subnational	• USAID • Reconstruction teams • OGAs • IGOs/NGOs
BCT—Tactical	• Plan, assess, and enable local stabilization activities	• Immediate HA to prevent crisis • Enable local civil administration • Plan, enable, shape, manage (execution oriented)	Large city to province	• Disaster assistance response team • OGA • IGOs/NGOs
Legend: HA Humanitarian Assistance USAID United States Agency for International Development				

Figure 4. Civil Affairs Functions and Capabilities

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 1-7.

Problem Statement

The problem statement that this paper will seek to address supports the Army Capabilities Integration Center's (ARCIC) Warfighting Challenge #2/3, "Shape the

Security Environment.” The ARCIC website identifies the lead for this challenge as the Mission Command Center of Excellence. The challenge is defined as: How does the Army influence the security environment and engage key actors and local/regional forces in order to consolidate gains and achieve sustainable security outcomes in support of Geographic Combatant Commands and Joint requirements. Specifically, this paper will address the following Learning Demands listed under Warfighting Challenge #2/3⁸:

1. How can the Army develop a common operating picture of security cooperation activities among the components, including special operations forces and UA partners, to ensure unity of effort for activities that mutually support the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) and GCC goals?
2. How does the Army improve training and educational effectiveness to advance the proficiency and readiness of Host Nation (HN) forces?
3. How can the Army better enable ASCCs to identify supporting objectives, identify requirements, set priorities for countries and resources, and assess the activity and its impact on the theater security objective?
4. How does the Army generate and sustain forces to support the GCC’s Security Forces Assistance requirements for developing relationships and strengthening partner land forces, while also conducting bilateral/multi-national exercises and unexpected contingencies?
5. What are the Army force structure requirements that best enable sustained partner activity operations necessary to develop shared aims, goals, and objectives?

Summary

Chapter 1 introduced the current state of Civil Affairs branch. It discusses the split between Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs in terms of organization, function, units supported, and training requirements. Definitions for Multi-Component and capability gaps were provided to highlight the goal of this thesis and explain how those terms are used within the context of the research and analysis. Assumptions, limitations and delimitations were identified to provide boundaries and scale the thesis and research to something reasonably accomplished by a single author. And finally, it explains the significance of this thesis for the Joint Forces, the United States Army, Civil Affairs branch and our Inter-agency partners.

Chapter 2 conducts a literature of current national security documents, the Army's field manual for Operations, applicable Civil Affairs doctrine and finally a review of related scholarly research. Chapter 3 follows the literature review with the foundation for the research method utilized, while Chapter 4 provides the analysis of the research. Chapter 5 discusses the results of my analysis, unexpected findings, and future recommended topics for related research.

¹ Hugh C. Van Roosen, "Implications of the 2006 Reassignment of U.S. Army Civil Affairs" (Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2009), 17-18.

² Ibid., 18.

³ Joseph J. Malizia, Tony Lieto, James Cooney, and Elizabeth Woodworth, "Risks Created By Reduced CA Capacity (Abridged Version)" (Unpublished Report, United States Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 2017), 12.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), “Civil Affairs (SLUSS - TILLER) (5D-F13/011-F123),” U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2017, accessed March 25, 2018, <http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/1stSWTGCourses.html>.

⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Regulation (AR) 135-200, *Active Duty for Missions, Projects, and Training for Reserve Component Soldiers* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2017).

⁷ U.S. Army, “Organization: Who We Are,” 2018, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://www.army.mil/info/organization>.

⁸ Army Capabilities Integration Center, “Army Warfighting Challenges,” U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, accessed October 30, 2017, www.arcic.army.mil/initiatives/armywarfightingchallenges.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review begins with a review of the National Security Strategy and military doctrine as it relates to Civil Affairs role in large-scale combat operations, identifying Capability Gaps between AC and RC components. Secondary research will analyze related publications by military experts, military schools of higher learning, civilian experts, and think tanks on Multi-Composition Civil Affairs organizations and their role in consolidating gains during the large-scale combat operations of World War II, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Strategic Documentation

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States identifies Peer/Near-Peer adversaries, notably Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, along with terrorism as the great strategic threats to our nation. It emphasizes a synchronized government effort in the form of diplomatic, information, military, and economic tools to address strategic problems. The NSS discusses four pillars as vital to national interests. Pillar three, “Preserve peace through strength,” articulates the need for a modern and ready military force in addition to utilizing military strength as leverage for our diplomacy efforts. Pillar four, “Advance American influence,” highlights the importance of building international partnerships with developing and fragile states, respecting cultures, and synchronizing diplomacy, economics and military instruments of power to achieve lasting results.¹

The Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations nests the Army’s role as part of the military tool of our government. The FM 3-0 published in 2017 shifts the Army’s focus

away from stability and counter-insurgency operations and back towards large-scale combat warfare against conventional forces of Peer and Near-Peer adversaries. The introduction highlights consolidation of gains and “describes corps and divisions as formations (headquarters and subordinate units) rather than just headquarters.”² The Civil Affairs operations highlighted in FM 3-0 are:

1. Integrate: Theater Army’s receive support from Reserve Component Civil Affairs Commands; Civil Affairs Brigades support Corps; Civil Affairs Battalions support Divisions
2. Military Governance: involve the application of Functional Specialty (FXSP) skills normally the responsibility of civil government
3. Availability: CA operations may occur before or during military operations or post-conflict

Chapter 1, Overview of Army Operations, para 1-6 discusses the importance of understanding and nesting within the political purpose of operations, and how “failure to effectively consolidate gains in relation to the enemy and the population reduces options for senior leaders and policymakers and contributes to indecisive long-term results.”³

Chapter 2, Army Echelons, Capabilities and Training, links Civil Affairs organizations to their echelon of support. Reserve Component Civil Affairs Commands (CACOM) support theater Armies, Joint Task Forces (JTF), and component commands or senior Army forces headquarters. They are apportioned to Theater Armies and “provide theater-level planning, coordination, policies, and programs in support of geographical combatant command’s (GCC) regional civil-military operations strategy and stabilization, reconstructions and development efforts.”⁴ Civil Affairs Brigades

support Corps and Civil Affairs Battalions task-organized to support Corps or Divisions. This chapter also discusses Civil Affairs core competencies of CA activities, supported activities and military government operations that facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives.⁵ It further identifies the need for Civil Affairs integration into routine training and exercises to provide their expertise in consolidating gains and sustainable outcomes.⁶

Chapter 3 highlights the importance of interdependence, interoperability, and integration of conventional and special operations forces. At Theater level, this is done between Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and GCC staff. In country, Special Operation Forces and Conventional Forces collaborate through trip reports, after action reports and other reports at or below theater echelons. Corps design exercises integrating CF and SOF.

Chapter 8 hits on a re-occurring theme throughout the 3 case study comparisons in this thesis of “initially, it is likely that Army forces will be responsible for integrating and orchestrating consolidate gains activities. As the situation improves, forces may transition to support of other organizations such as the United Nations.”⁷ Threats to the consolidation of gains include enemy information warfare and lack of cultural understanding by U.S. forces.

Civil Affairs Doctrine

Army Field Manual 3-57 defines Civil Affairs Operations, task organization of Civil Affairs AC/RC units, and the training pipeline differences between the Active and Reserve Civil Affairs Officers. Figure 5 from Sam Hayes and Ken Nguyen’s “CA 2025: The Strategic Design of Civil Affairs,” shows Civil Affairs training and force structure:




Figure 5. Civil Affairs Training Force Structure

Source: Samuel L. Hayes and Ken Nguyen, “CA 2025: The Strategic Design of Civil Affairs” (Capstone Project, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2015), 50.

Task Organizations vary between Regular Army and Army Reserve depending regional alignment. However, the Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) are only authorized in the Reserve Component.

Civil Affairs Operations

FM 3-57 was published in 2011 and states that the Army authorized an expansion “a total of 5 CA battalions and 25 CA companies. Each Battalion will be regionally aligned to a GCC. Future force structure includes the activation of an additional CA brigade HQ, associated battalions, and companies to create a dedicated Regular Army

capacity to support conventional forces.”⁸ As of 2 April 2018, the additional CA Brigade HQ dedicated to Regular Army capacity was activated and deactivated, and referenced in the Civil Affairs Training Force Structure chart as the 85th CA BDE.

USASOC’s 95th Civil Affairs Brigade does not have a Functional Specialty (FXSP) Team but does have a limited Rule of Law, Veterinary, and Public Health capability. If required, a USAR Civil Affairs Brigade or CACOM would augment with a Functional Specialty Team.⁹

The following Army Techniques Publications (ATP) address Civil Affairs Operations during Large Scale Combat Operations: ATP 3-57.10 Population & Resource Control, ATP 3-57.30 Nation Assistance, ATP 3-57.50 Civil Information Management, ATP 3-57.60 Civil Affairs Planning, ATP 3-57.70 Civil Military Operations Center. Relevant to Civil Affairs and in particular, Phase 0 (Shaping) operations, but excluded in this thesis, are ATP 3-57.80 Civil-Military Engagement which is specific to Special Operations focused on counter-terrorism as a subsidiary to nation assistance, and ATP 3-57.20 Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance which places special emphasis on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations. All of the publications are dated before the most recent FM 3-0 and National Security Strategy publication year (2017) and focus primarily on non-Large Combat Operations.

Population and Resource Control

ATP 3-57.10, Civil Affairs Support to Population & Resource Control, consists of three chapters and three appendices.¹⁰ Chapter 1 provides historical examples and application of population and resource controls and potential priorities and tasks during various phases of conflict (contingency, crisis response, and major operations and

campaigns). Chapter 2 dedicates itself to general Population Control terms and planning. Chapter 3 focuses on Resource Control planning considerations. The first appendix outlines the Appendix to Annex K (Civil Affairs) format for both Population Control and Resource Control. The second appendix focuses on techniques for displaced civilian operations. The third appendix focuses on techniques for non-combatant evacuation operations. Non-combatant evacuation operations, in particular, discuss the importance of integration, “CA planners assigned to the GCC staff, CA planning teams augmenting these staffs, and civil-military support elements deployed to various embassies throughout the GCC’s area of responsibility contribute to the planning process.”¹¹

Nation Assistance

ATP 3-57.30 Civil Affairs Support to Nation Assistance focuses on Phase 0 (Shape) and Phase 1 (Deter) of operations.¹² Nation Assistance chapter 1 discusses the overall character of Nation Assistance. Chapter 2 gets more in-depth on Foreign Internal Defense, programs available, and techniques for SOF and Conventional Civil Affairs. Chapter 3 focuses on Security Assistance, and how SOF and Conventional Civil Affairs contribute to it. Chapter 4 lists Nation Assistance Title 10 programs and funding. The first appendix provides a Nation Assistance format for Annex K (Civil Affairs) of an OPLAN or OPORD. The second appendix “describes the various authorities and appropriations under 10 USC that provide the legal basis and funding used by DOD to conduct NA operations.”¹³

Integration - Special emphasis is placed on integrating Civil Affairs during planning (development of PMESII-ASCOPE, Area Studies) and as trainers for HN forces.¹⁴

Civil Information Management

ATP 3-57.50, Civil Affairs Support to Civil Information Management (CIM), provides an overall concept of Civil Information management and details the CIM steps of planning, collecting, collating, processing, analyzing, producing and disseminating civil component information critical to successful military operations.¹⁵ Chapter 1 is an introduction to CIM. Chapter 2 details planning and integration of CIM into the intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Chapter 3 discusses ways to collect the information required. Chapter 4 hits on integration and training requirements for Civil Affairs units conducting CIM. Integration is coordinating with G9/S9 to determine timelines and specific information requirements; identify systems and software to utilize downrange; identify proper reporting formats; collaborate with other staff sections to determine relevant information and reporting requirements¹⁶

Civil Affairs Planning

ATP 3-57.60, Civil Affairs Planning, provides additional guidance, techniques, and planning considerations than what was previously mentioned in FM 3-57.¹⁷ Chapter 1 discusses civil considerations and operational variables to determine centers of gravity during planning, in addition to the six steps of Civil Affairs planning methodology. Helpfully, the chapter also discusses measures of effectiveness and lines of effort and provides sample charts and spreadsheets for both. This chapter also highlights Functional Specialists. Chapter 2 identifies how to utilize Troop Leading Procedures (TLP) as a planner. Chapter 3 discusses Civil Affairs planner role during the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Chapter 4 focuses on Civil Affairs planning during the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP). Chapter 5 provides techniques and procedures for

the Civil Affairs contribution to Phase 5 (Transition) of operations. Key observations are:

1. Integration: Civil Affairs is a critical part of operations planning from conception through transition.
2. Functional Specialty: Chapter 1 highlights “the six Civil Affairs Functional Specialist areas (rule of law, governance, infrastructure, economic stability, public education and information, and public health and welfare) coincide with the systems approach to OE awareness of the civil component. CA Functional Specialists have successfully used systems analysis to develop CA area assessments and area studies and to contribute to the identification of COGs and decisive points.”

Civil Military Operations Center

ATP 3-57.70, Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), provides techniques and guidance on establishing, integrating and running a Civil Military Operations Center with special emphasis on stability operations.¹⁸ Chapter 1 explains to the reader how Civil Affairs supports unified land operations through the five Civil Affairs core tasks during offensive and defensive tasks. Chapter 2 discusses its role within the Warfighting Function of Mission Command. Chapter 3 focuses on how the CMOC supports the operations process. Chapter 4 breaks down CMOC task requirements.

Chapter 5 discusses relationships between Civil Affairs organizations and their supported units, as represented in Figure 6 –Civil Affairs Support Relationships, below.




Figure 6. Civil Affairs Support Relationships

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication 3-57.70 *Civil-Military Operations Center* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2014b), 76.

Chapter 6 delves into CMOC section roles, responsibilities and organization to include the Functional Specialty cell. Chapter 7 discusses security, location, and mobility considerations for the CMOC. The following graphic shows the types of relationships between Civil Affairs organizations and the organizations they are tasked to support:

1. Leadership: CACOMs are Army Reserve specific organizations that support GCC, ASCC and Corps or Division JTF HQ, but not the TSOC.
2. Integration: ATP 3-57.70, Chapter 5 also explains that CA Brigades for both Active and Reserve Component are structured to support Special Operations

Forces and Conventional Forces.

3. Functional Specialty: Chapter 5 states “Brigade CMOCs may be augmented by CACOM Functional Specialties.” Chapter 6 states that “Functional Specialty cell resides only in the USAR CA force structure within the CACOM, CA brigade, and CA battalion. The Functional Specialty cell provides technical expertise and staff assistance in planning, coordinating, and executing CAO in support of CMO.”¹⁹

Review of Scholars

Implications of 2006 Reassignment of U.S. Army Civil Affairs

While attending the United States Army War College, Class of 2009, Army Reservist COL Hugh Van Roosen wrote a strategy research project titled, “Implications of the 2006 Reassignment of U.S. Army Civil Affairs.”²⁰ This project analyzes strategic leadership decision making, implementation, and consequences for the period 2003-2006 and the effort to reassign USACAPOC from USASOC to Army Reserves, known in the Civil Affairs community as “the Divorce.” He also proposes a strategy that benefits both the Army Reserve and Active Duty Civil Affairs support to Special Operations and Conventional Forces.

Van Roosen begins with discussing how in 1987, all CA forces, except a Brigade Headquarters assigned to PACOM, were assigned to SOCOM as a unified combatant command under USACAPOC, led by a two-star Major General. The force structure was focused on Special Operations support, although conventional forces had permanent party Civil Affairs personnel appointed to each Corps and Division G9/S9, while

battalions and brigades maintained an authorization for the position on their table of organization and equipment, augmented as needed.

By 2003, 47 percent of the Civil Affairs reservists were nearing the end of their mobilization period with stabilization operations not going according to plan and the Brigade Combat Teams expecting the same level of Civil Affairs support as they had received up to that point in time. In 2004, the Army developed three force structure courses of action to satisfy OEF/OIF requirements: the recommended course of action was to keep USACAPOC under USSOCOM and complete transformation in Army Force Design Update (FDU) 08-13 to support Army modularity; the other two were reassigned USACAPOC to Joint Forces Command (JFCOM); and, split USACAPOC to support both SOF and conventional forces, which is what ultimately happened.²¹

During the surge, Active Duty Civil Affairs units deployed for 90 days in support of Brigade Combat Teams which was enough time for the Army Reserve Civil Affairs units to mobilize, deploy and conduct relief-in-place with them.²² The following issues were identified between the Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs units in his paper:

1. Integration: SOCOM did not provide active duty Civil Affairs units to the conventional forces for more than 90 days in duration.²³
2. Leadership: CA Branch proponentcy is under USASOC while the vast majority of Civil Affairs capability is under USARC. USACAPOC wanted to tailor the Civil Affairs training pipeline towards Army Reservist timelines and support to conventional forces while USASOC wanted to increase the

requirements tailored to Special Operations support requirements.²⁴ Van

Roosen states there are three options:

- a. Maintain current split between Active and Reserve Civil Affairs (not recommended)
 - b. Army assumes CA proponentcy: establish ‘Center of Excellence’ schoolhouse, re-assign all CA to include 95th CA; SOCOM would request CA capability through the Joint Staff
 - a. Reassign USACAPOC back to USASOC, change the doctrine that directs active duty CA capability to support only SOF, and correct apportion of CA capabilities against conventional force requirements.
3. Availability: it takes 90 days for Army Reserve Civil Affairs units to involuntarily mobilize and deploy in support of operations.²⁵
 4. Functional Capability: The Department of State established a Civilian Response Corps consisting of 100 active members and 500 on-call members to make up for the shortage of active duty Civil Affairs capability; Department of State established Civilian Reserve Corps consisting of 2000 non-government civilian experts.²⁶

CA 2025: The Strategic Design of Civil Affairs

Samuel Hayes and Ken Nguyen published a capstone project for the Naval Postgraduate School titled, “CA 2025: The Strategic Design of Civil Affairs.”²⁷ The report focuses on redesigning the Civil Affairs regiment, so it meshes with the Army’s 2025 Vision. It conducts analysis and develops prototypes for CA identity, strategic

messaging, branding, human resource management (e.g., recruitment, selection, training, and professionalization) and force structure.

Chapter 3 prioritizes the problem themes for the Civil Affairs regiment as: CA Identity; CA Strategic Messaging and Branding; CA Human Resource Management; and CA Force Structure. CA identity refers to a lack of common identity amongst the disparate Civil Affairs organizations. CA Strategic messaging talks about the need for leadership to influence key decision makers and ensure they understand Civil Affairs utility. CA Human Resource management discusses differences in training requirements between AC/RC, that lack of familiarity breeds failure of unified efforts, and Functional Specialty teams. CA Force Structure highlights instead of an integrated force, the disparate CA organizations has created an “us versus them” culture between the 85th and 95th Active Civil Affairs soldiers and Active Component versus Reserve Component.²⁸

After Hayes and Nguyen identified the problem, they provide a comprehensive analysis of potential solutions. Of particular note are their proposals for a Multi-Composition Civil Affairs organization that unifies the Reserve and Active Component organization through a “Civil Affairs Command” led by a Major General, supported by geographically aligned Brigades consisting of two Active Duty and three Reserve Battalions. They also propose an alternate Multi-Component unit where the integration happens at the Battalion level with two active duty and three reserve companies. After developing proposals, the project produced feedback received from senior leaders, mid-level officers and enlisted, to include their recommendations as well.²⁹ Gaps identified within the context of this project include:

1. Leadership – three separate Civil Affairs organizations do not have unity of command, lack unity of effort and have separate training, mission and personnel requirements which makes it difficult to educate conventional forces on Civil Affairs capabilities
2. Integration – outside of Civil Affairs qualification course, Active Component and Reserve Component do not conduct training or operations together on a routine basis
3. Functional Specialty – lack of Functional Specialties at the Active Component hinders their ability to influence ongoing SOF operations during Phase 0 (Shaping)

Friends with Benefits: Optimizing Civil Affairs for Future Engagements

As their Naval Postgraduate School Master's Capstone Project, "Friends With Benefits: Optimizing Civil Affairs For Future Engagements," Clay Daniels and David Foster focus on improving the Civil Affairs branch focused on Phase 0 (shaping) operations.³⁰ Their paper consists of six chapters and an appendix. Chapter 2 provides a historical review of Civil Affairs during World War II, Korean War, Vietnam War, Grenada, Panama, Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Chapter 3 deep dives into Civil Affairs as an influencing organization with definitions of influencing theories by Cialdini and Watkins. Chapter 4 articulates the training of Civil Affairs branch, capability gaps, and proposed solutions to close the gaps. They view credentialing as extremely important. Chapter 5 identified the current Civil Affairs career track and proposes an improved one. The issues most relevant to the new FM 3-0 large-scale combat operations and Multi-Component organization include:

1. Integration: The conclusion of Chapter 2 emphasizes the need to integrate Civil Affairs during the planning stages of major combat operations instead of misutilization as a consequence not doing so.
2. Leadership: Multiple Civil Affairs organizations (95th Civil Affairs BDE reports to USASOC, 85th Civil Affairs BDE reports to FORSCOM, 322nd Civil Affairs Brigade reports to 9th MSC under USARPAC, 361st Civil Affairs Brigade reports to 7th CSC under USAREUR, USACAPOC and subordinate organizations report to USARC) contribute to distinct organizations instead of a unified Civil Affairs force and effort. In Chapter 5, they state that there should be an “experienced, educated, and effective CA colonel serving as the primary advisory to the GCC commander and his staff while synchronizing CA operations across the theater,” a billet and responsibility that is currently designated for the Army Reserve’s Civil Affairs Command, led by a Brigadier General Civil Affairs Officer.
3. Functional Specialty: Chapter 5 targets the limited career mobility of Active Duty Civil Affairs Officers and recommends ways to improve them with a proposed career track. Of particular note, the authors recommend sending Active Duty Civil Affairs officers to civilian schooling for Master Degrees in Functional Specialty career fields in addition to more opportunities for Training with Industry, internships with relevant international Civil Affairs type organizations and interagency fellowships.

Revisiting a School of Military Government

Rebecca Patterson at the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation focuses her research on the Functional Specialist skills for Civil Affairs as a critical issue. She identifies the following capability gaps and solutions in her report:³¹

1. Functional Specialty: Provide all CA personnel with a basic level of expertise in the areas of law, economics and entrepreneurship, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. There is a need for an institutional training organization, like the School of Military Government, to ensure that the Army has the cadre of professional CA and Military Governance experts required to achieve success.
2. Integration: Establish a School of Military Governance equivalent to serve as a repository of lessons learned and provide subject matter expertise to CA generalists and commanders in the field.

Review of Case Studies

Civil Affairs Soldiers Become Governors

“Civil Affairs Soldiers Become Governors” focuses on the European and North African Operations during World War II.³² The literature highlights the struggles civilian departments had with essential service related tasks leading to the formalization of Civil Affairs and Civil-Military Operations as the responsibility of the US Army and Allied command. Within this discussion and research, it identifies multiple capability gaps, the thought process in trying to bridge them and the results of their solutions.

Civil Affairs in World War II

Cristen Oehrig of the Center for Strategic and International Studies published a historical case study titled, “Civil Affairs in World War II.”³³ While a relatively short read at only 12 pages long, her analysis discusses the ends, ways, and means that the Army Civil Affairs community was able to accomplish its military objectives in the liberated territories of Europe and Japan in World War II. Her analysis includes the reasoning behind the establishment of the Civil Affairs Division as a way to integrate Civil Affairs capability into the conflict plans, creating the University of Virginia’s School of Military Governance to enhance the Army’s capability for Functional Specialists, as well as how utilization of Civil Affairs differed between geographic regions.

Glad to See Them Come, Sorry to See Them Go

Stanley Sandler published “Glad to See Them Come, Sorry to See Them Go: A History of U.S. Army Tactical Civil Affairs/Military Government, 1775-1991.”³⁴ This publication reads like a history book with Chapters 1-7 focused on Civil Affairs type operations before the official establishment of the branch. Chapter I includes various CONUS events such as the American-Indian War, the War of 1812, westward expansion, Lewis and Clark Expedition. Chapter II focuses on US Military Governance during the Mexican War. Chapter III and IV touch upon Civil-Military operations during the American Civil War and Reconstruction. Chapter V focuses on the Western Frontier and Alaska. Chapter VI, titled “In the Age of Empire,” discusses American CMO in the Spanish-American War with subsequent Military Governance in Cuba and Puerto Rico, followed by our efforts in The Philippines and Caribbean. Chapter VII discusses

operations during World War I in Germany and Siberia. Chapters X - XIII provide historical context for Civil Affairs during the Korean War, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama and the Gulf War.

Chapters VIII-IX of Sandler's work will be utilized in Chapter 4 as part of the case study for World War II Civil Affairs capability gaps analysis. Chapter VIII focuses on World War II efforts to include Civil Affairs planning, Military Governance in Germany, Italy, France, Luxembourg, and Japan; Civil Affairs as a Functional Specialty, training pipelines, force structure, leadership, trials and tribulations. Chapter IX focuses on post-WWII efforts in Germany, Austria, and Japan.

Capability Gaps

In summary, the following issues identified between AC/RC Civil Affairs in the literature review will form the foundation for Chapter 3's Research Methodology and the subject of Chapter 4's Analysis.

1. Leadership: AC lacks strategic leadership in key positions. RC has one Major General (MG, O-8) billet (USACAPOC), and multiple Brigadier General (O-7) billets, most notably as Commanders for the four Civil Affairs Commands (CACOM). The CACOM Commanders also serve as the various Geographic Combatant Commanders' primary Civil Affairs advisor as stated in FM 3-57. Senior positions and ranks contribute to the positional power and influence the Civil Affairs branch has with the organizations it works with.
2. Integration: RC units don't train with the Conventional Forces they are tasked to support. AC CA provides one CA battalion to support Conventional Forces. RC CA units are aligned to a GCC, but not to specific countries or

Conventional Forces until the year of availability. No formal organization integrates efforts between AC and RC CA units.

3. Functional Specialty: All Functional Specialties reside in the RC Civil Affairs, there is no equivalent position in AC Civil Affairs. World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrate the importance of having Functional Specialists available to limit the civilian impact during all phases of military operations.

Summary

As a result of FM 3-0's focus on large scale combat operations with peer/near-peer threats and expected mass casualties and impact on the civil environment, this thesis reviews if and how AC/RC Civil Affairs capability gaps were addressed during historical periods of Military Governance during World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom. World War II Germany represents a peer threat with a relatively homogenous society whose society, government, infrastructure and military were totally decimated requiring a high concentration of Civil Affairs centric Military Governance. For the most recent example of Military Governance, the thesis will use Operation Iraqi Freedom historical case study to represent a near-peer threat with a heterogeneous society whose government, infrastructure and economy were tremendously influenced by multiple internal and external threats.

¹ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (NSS) (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017), accessed 15 January 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>, 39-40.

² Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2017), xi.

³ Ibid., 1-3.

⁴ Ibid., 2-6.

⁵ Ibid., 2-33.

⁶ Ibid., 2-57.

⁷ Ibid., 8-2.

⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2011), 2-2.

⁹ Director, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013).

¹⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.10, *Civil Affairs Support to Populace and Resources Control* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2013), iv.

¹¹ Ibid., 91.

¹² Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.30, *Civil Affairs Support to Nation Assistance* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2014), iv.

¹³ Ibid., B1-B4.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.50, *Civil Affairs Civil Information Management* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2013), v-vi.

¹⁶ Ibid., 4-1 – 4-4.

¹⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.60, *Civil Affairs Planning* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2014), v.

²⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.70, *Civil-Military Operations Center* (Washington, D.C.: Army Publishing Directorate, 2014), v.

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- ¹⁹ Ibid., 5-1 - 5-3.
- ²⁰ Van Roosen, “Implications of the 2006 Reassignment of U.S. Army Civil Affairs.”
- ²¹ Ibid., 25.
- ²² Ibid., 19.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ Ibid., 22-23.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 19.
- ²⁶ Ibid., 24-25.
- ²⁷ Samuel L. Hayes and Ken Nguyen, “CA 2025: The Strategic Design of Civil Affairs” (Capstone Project, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2015).
- ²⁸ Ibid., 132-134.
- ²⁹ Ibid., 89-111.
- ³⁰ Clay Daniels and David Foster, “Friends with Benefits: Optimizing Civil Affairs for Future Engagement” (Capstone Project, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2014), v.
- ³¹ Rebecca Patterson, “Revisiting a School of Military Government: How Reanimating a World War II-Era Institution Could Professionalize Military Nation Building,” *Expeditionary Economics*, no. 3 (June 2011): 3-21.
- ³² Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, United States Army in World War II, Special Services, Vol. CMH Pub 11-3, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1964), IX-XIV.
- ³³ Cristen Oehrig, “Civil Affairs in World War II” (Case Study, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, DC, 2009), 12.
- ³⁴ Stanley Sandler, *Glad to See them Come and Sorry to See them Go: A History of US Army Civil Affairs and Military Government* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command History and Archives Division, 1994).

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Overview

The research methodology provides an understanding of the framework for this study. I used the qualitative research method of textual analysis to examine how capability gaps identified in Chapter 2 were addressed during historically significant Civil Affairs operations. The primary focus for the research compares how Civil Affairs approached the capability gaps between the Active and Reserve Component during World War II (Military Governance), and Iraqi Freedom (Military Governance).

Purpose of the Research

The purpose of this research is to identify the historical examples of Multi-Component Civil Affairs organizations closing various capability gaps and the utility of using those methods in future operations. This paper will review historical examples of how the AC/RC Civil Affairs capabilities were integrated (or not) and how Multi-Component Civil Affairs organizations fared on closing the capability gaps described in Chapter 2 of this paper. The primary research question is: How can Multi-Component Civil Affairs organizations successfully close capability gaps that exist between the Active Component and Reserve Component Civil Affairs units? The secondary research question is: what capability gaps currently exist between the Active Component and Reserve Component Civil Affairs units? Also, how were other Multi-Component units successful in closing capability gaps?

Methodology

The methodology used for this study is a qualitative method of research using textual analysis. The research will look at both primary and secondary sources of information. The capability gaps identified in chapter 2 provide a means for comparing how those were addressed during Military Governance episodes. The historical episodes examined are: World War II (Military Governance), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Military Governance).

Data Collection Method

Data was collected from scholarly writings, books, journal articles, and reports published from 1943 through 2017. The majority of this material was collected through Fort Leavenworth's Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library's Reference Team. The CARL Reference Team combed multiple research databases and provided a myriad of material for review. Most of their recommendations were in the form of scholarly writings, reports and field manuals. Each scholarly writing had a published bibliography which I utilized to identify additional references. The reports and doctrinal material that was included in the Reference Team's list provided doctrinal references for historical Civil Affairs Field Manuals published in different eras.

Organization of the Research Process

The research process consisted of three main phases. The collection and selection of data and information were developed in the first phase. The second phase establishes methods, criteria, and metrics of comparison between cases of Civil Affairs operations. In

the final phase, collected data and information is compared and analyzed to formulate a clear and concise conclusion.

Data Analysis Method

Using textual analysis, significant military operations and how Civil Affairs capability gaps were addressed during the time period are compared. This data analysis method is commonly used in scholarly research sources and provides context on different approaches to closing the Civil Affairs capability gaps in support of different military operations. In Chapter 4, the data is analyzed to determine how Civil Affairs capability gaps can be addressed through the lens of today's FM 3-0 focus on peer-vs-peer warfare and Multi-Component organizations.

Criteria and Metrics

The following gaps identified in chapter 2, provide criteria that can be used to examine the historical examples.

Leadership is defined for this thesis as the hierarchal status of Civil Affairs organizations within the Geographic Combatant Command, Joint Forces, the Army, theater or operation, access to leadership and rank of key leadership.

Integration: units were or were not integrated with the organizations they were supporting in theater prior deployment, specifically as it relates to planning and coordination.

Functional Specialist: the capability to provide governance expertise in the consolidation area during large-scale combat operations. This criterion focus on how each operation addressed capability requirements to FM 3-57's definition of expertise in six

Functional Specialty areas—rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information.

Validity and Limitations

The validity of this case study is limited in that it explores only unclassified data for a few historical examples. Applicability of the conclusions beyond the examined cases requires further research.

Summary

Using the qualitative method of textual analysis of historical Civil Affairs case studies for World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the thesis determines how Civil Affairs has historically addressed capability gaps of leadership, integration and Functional Specialties. Chapter 4 will analyze the case studies through FM 3-0's focus on peer-vs-peer warfare and how the capability gaps will or will not be addressed by a Multi-Component Civil Affairs organization.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Overview

Chapter four conducts the comparative analysis between the Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs capability gaps identified from Chapter two's literature review and chapter three's research methodology. The analysis focuses on how Civil Affairs organizations in World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom addressed current capability gaps in leadership, organization-integration and personnel.

Gaps in leadership suffer from a lack of unity of command, impacting the ability to provide a unified vision of Civil Affairs utilization during all phases of military operations and conflicting messaging to senior leadership. The lack of a unified leadership contributes to conflicting policies, training and utilization of Civil Affairs between the Active and Reserve Component. The organization and integration gap highlights the lack of unity of effort that currently exists between Active and Reserve Components of Civil Affairs, which compounds the lack of coordination to link Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs capabilities, resulting in duplication of effort, under-utilization of resources and limits our ability to achieve positive long term civil-military efforts.

Table 1 provides an overview of the current Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs forces capability gaps identified in Chapters 2 and 3.

Table 1. Overview of AC/RC Civil Affairs Capability Gaps			
	Leadership	Organization – Integration	Functional Specialty (FXSP)
Current	Lack unity of command	Minimal integration between AC/RC Civil Affairs Limited integration between Civil Affairs and Conventional Forces	Minimal FXSP capability with AC Civil Affairs Lack of FXSP operational training

Source: Created by author.

Capability Gap: Leadership

In “Civil Affairs Become Governors,” Mr. Harry Coles and Alan Weinberg explain how civilian agencies during World War II were having difficulties running civil supply in the war zones of North Africa, which began impacting the military operations. The War Department established the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) to serve as a unifying Civil Affairs organization since “CA Functions are scattered helter skelter all over the Pentagon.” President Roosevelt (referring to Civil Affairs and Military Governance (MG)) stated that “the Army would have to assume the initial burden of CA/MG until civilian agencies [were] ready to carry out the long range program.”¹

Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight D.

Eisenhower, discussed the need for an eventual Civil Affairs Chain of Command:

We have in mind that when operations have ceased and the territory is on a garrison basis, the general officer commanding Force 141, as Military Governor, with the approval of the Commander in Chief, should be free to establish lines of authority running directly to him and to his CCAO [Chief Civil Affairs Officer] to whom he might delegate certain of his functions.²

During the lead up to the invasion of Sicily, the allies had established one Civil Affairs Headquarters with each Task Force (British General Montgomery's Eighth Army was Force 545 and General Patton's I Armored Corps was Force 343) in addition to a “main” Headquarters known as Task Force 141. Task Force 141 was the codename given to the Algiers based planning cell responsible for planning the Allied invasion of Sicily, led by General Sir Harold Alexander. General Alexander served as the allied ground forces commander and deputy to the Supreme Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.³ The intent was that once a large amount of territory was occupied, the three task forces would merge and General Alexander would serve as the military governor for territories administered by the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory.⁴

Field Manual 27-5, published 1943, describes the three primary organizations responsible for Civil Affairs during World War II as:

1. Civil Affairs Division, led by a Major General: “in the Office of the Chief of Staff, informs and advises the Secretary of War on all matters within the purview of the War Department other than those of a strictly military nature in areas occupied as a result of military operations. This Division has as its responsibility the formulation of broad War Department policies with regard to military government, and the planning and coordination of Civil Affairs in areas occupied as a result of joint Army and Navy operations.”
2. Provost Marshall General: responsible for selection and training of Civil Affairs and Military Governance personnel
3. Office of Occupied Areas (Chief of Naval Operations): charged with the planning, training of personnel, and preparation of materials for military

government in areas of paramount naval interest, and in coordination with the War Department in areas of joint interest.

In 1943, to prepare for negotiations with governments in exile and governance in occupied territory, the Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) established the United States-British Civil Affairs Division as part of its general staff. This division served as the COSSAC's Civil Affairs staff and was tasked to:

clearly define political policies in the preparation of Civil Affairs plans . . . it was decided that military government would not operate in Allied countries. This necessitated early combined planning for Civil Affairs in liberated territories. Here for the first time, the distinction between Civil Affairs and military government was clearly made.⁵

During the lead up to the Normandy landing, there were multiple Civil Affairs organizations established. In addition to the Civil Affairs Division and Civil Affairs Training Schools that were based in the continental United States, the UK and US created the British and US Civil Affairs Center and School in England, along with the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) Civil Affairs G-5 General Staff Separate Section, Country units (Germany, France) of SHAEF, and the European Civil Affairs Division. Country units for liberated territories would conduct Civil Affairs operations, while the units in occupied territories would conduct Military Governance.⁶

In "Civil Affairs Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946," the historians detail the development, task organization, employment and evolution of G-5 staffs, Civil Affairs, and Military Governance from 22 December 1943 – 30 June 1946.⁷ Of particular relevance is their description of the SHAEF G-5 establishment.

First, was the General Staff, SHAEF Division G5: led by Assistant Chief of Staff. Advises Supreme Commander on Civil Affairs policy, issue Civil Affairs directives,

outline plans, reviews detailed plans, exercises general supervision over execution of plans and policies. Serves as the coordinating body for Civil Affairs with Fiscal, Legal, Supply, Economics, Civil Affairs Operations, Staff Duties sections.⁸

Second was the Special Staff, SHAEF Division G5: led by the Deputy Chief of Civil Affairs. Located and functioned outside of SHAEF Headquarters. Responsible for organization of country sections, preparation of detailed plans, and training of personnel. Supervised 2 training schools for Civil Affairs and Military Governance (1 US, 1 UK), 5 Allied country sections (Civil Affairs operations for liberated territories of France, Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark), 1 Axis country section (Military Governance operations for occupied territory of Germany); and Commanded the rear echelon of G-5. Above all else, the prevailing theme for the Special Staff was that “ALL STAFFS and ORGANIZATIONS will be integrated. You will avoid, whenever this is possible, setting dual heads to branches, sections or missions.”⁹

The various Civil Affairs organizations morphed throughout the World War II theater campaigns. When the war concluded, the Department of the Army updated the Civil Affairs / Military Governance Field Manual in 1947¹⁰ to update responsibilities for the following organizations:

1. Civil Affairs Division (Department of Army)
 - i. Formulating policy and preparing plans for the conduct of CA/MG activities.
 - ii. Expediting handling within the Department of the Army of theater CA/MG problems in occupied areas.

- iii. Collecting and distributing CA/MG information to appropriate agencies of the Government.
 - iv. Providing representation on the
 - 1. Joint Civil Affairs Committee of JCS.
 - 2. Combined Civil Affairs Committee of CCS [sic].
 - 3. European and Far Eastern Subcommittees of State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC).
 - v. Providing advice, guidance and assistance to the United States Representatives on FEC [sic].
 - vi. Formulating broad plans and policies for training CA/MG personnel, both military and civilian, and preparing informational documents, manuals, etc., to be used in the instruction and training of all personnel on the subject of CA/MG policies and procedure.
2. Office of the Island Governments and the Office of Politico Military Affairs (Department of Navy equivalent to Civil Affairs Division)
- i. Formulating policy and preparing plans for the conduct of CA/MG activities.
 - ii. Expediting the handling within the Department of the Navy of CA/MG matters.
 - iii. Collecting and distributing *CA/MG* information to appropriate agencies.
3. Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Department of State)

- i. Be the State Department member of the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) on all matters of occupation policy.
- ii. Refer to SANACC, or to any appropriate subcommittee thereof, such policy matters as may require concerted study, consideration, or action.

During World War II, the need to identify a unified command voice for Civil Affairs and Military Governance was further exemplified by the direct interest placed on it by the Secretary of War, Supreme Allied Commander and the President of the United States. Leaders of the organization held appropriate levels of rank and position according to the level of support they provided. Ultimately, the leadership was responsible to provide common purpose and avoid duplication of effort with overlapping branches, missions and sections. While developing various Civil Affairs organizations that could differ in their operational approach by region, it was imperative that they were unified with a common purpose and focus in providing Civil Affairs support to liberated and friendly territories and Military Governance in occupied territories.

The next case to examine is the Civil Affairs leadership gap in Operation Iraqi Freedom. During the lead up to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), multiple cells conducted planning for the consolidation of gains and stability phase of OIF. According to MAJ Jim Brown, as a Civil-Military planner of the Combined Forces Land Component Commander's (CFLCC), their "planning did take into account that we were going to build on the existing structures that were already there. But we were kind of overruled in that when CFLCC turned over transition of authority to JTF-7 and V Corps."¹¹ Central

Command J5 staff's plan served as the basis for General Shinseki's statement that it would take several hundred thousand troops to stabilize a country the size of California with multiple internal and external malign influences.¹²

Department of State, Department of Defense Headquarters, and endless numbers of think tanks and planning cells conducted similar detailed planning. Ultimately, the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, designated retired brigadier general Ben Garner, to lead an organization known as the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. That organization would take the lead before handing efforts to the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA), led by Paul Bremer, for the stabilization and transition phases of the operation.¹³ The following is a summary of significant leadership for Civil Affairs and civil-military operations during Phase III of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

1. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) (ASD[SO/LIC]). Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, states ASD[SO/LIC] shall work "within the interagency process as appropriate, translate national security policy objectives into specific defense policy objectives achievable through Civil Affairs activities [and] supervise the formulation of DOD Civil Affairs activities in plans and policies." Additionally, the ASD(SO/LIC) shall act as the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) POC for DOD to "coordinate Civil Affairs activities as they relate to the activities of other U.S. Government Agencies, international, nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations and the private sector, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations."¹⁴

2. United States Special Operations Command. “As the Army’s senior level command of CA units, USASOC has the responsibility, in conjunction with USCINCSOC, to recruit, organize, train, equip, mobilize, and sustain Army CA forces.”¹⁵
3. United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC): 2000’s Field Manual for Civil Affairs Operations, FM 41-10, defined the “USACAPOC is a major subordinate command of USASOC and commands the Army’s CA and PSYOP units. USACAPOC alerts CA elements for operational missions and validates USAR CA units during mobilization.”¹⁶
4. Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). National Security Presidential Directive 24 published in January 2003 “designated the DOD as the lead agency for the reconstruction of Iraq but did so through the creation of the new, civilian-led Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), which would be responsible for reestablishing basic services, “reshaping the Iraqi military,” and supporting the transition to Iraqi-led authority over time.”¹⁷

The Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was designated as the lead for restoring essential services in Iraq but was not integrated with the combatant commander or resourced with equipment and manpower to execute their task. They required additional support from the Combatant Commander to establish enough security in order for them to employ contractors to execute the jobs that needed to be done.

Ben Garner also discussed the requirement for transportation to distant locations which helicopters could provide, but since ORHA was not formally a part of the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), they were not a priority for resources. Garner states he actually worked with the CFLCC commander very well, but personal relationships aren't the same as being an organizational part of the Command.¹⁸ Furthermore, the bulk of their security plan relied on utilization of Iraqi security and military personnel. As they were about to implement their plan and recall Iraqi military and security personnel, the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) took over responsibilities formerly held by the ORHA. In "War and the Art of Governance," the author describes a:

continued separation of responsibilities with the CPA responsible for governance and the military responsible for security. The CPA's ability to undertake activities and in Iraq was fundamentally limited by the fact that it was understaffed and was not an "expeditionary" organization that could implement plans and connect tactical accomplishments to strategic goals. The CPA lacked the capability to secure areas and establish security and the conditions for reconstruction and stability tasks.¹⁹

Based on the analysis of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Civil Affairs leadership was unified under USACAPOC, but the unified leadership failed to provide common purpose and avoid duplication of effort with overlapping branches, missions and sections, in relation to influencing the interagency objectives with ORHA and CPA. The research indicated multiple organizations had identified potential problems of who was going to lead the consolidating gains effort once the Iraqi Army was defeated, but they were not resolved prior to ORHA taking over governance responsibilities.

The leadership difference in World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom are profound. During World War II, within the continental United States, our executive and

military leaders acknowledged their need to be prepared for Military Governance and Civil Affairs activities in combat zones, both during and after kinetic operations. They established the Civil Affairs Division to work out policy issues and created schools to provide forces to the combatant command / task forces. They worked closely with their interagency counterparts, most notably the Department of State, and their allies in theater. Operation Iraqi Freedom had a Multi-Component Civil Affairs leadership in the form of USACAPOC, but based on the research, they were unable to coordinate unity of command and effort for deploying civil-affairs and governance operations.

Capability Gap: Organization – Integration

The current capability gap for organization-integration refers to the current un-unified effort between Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs organizations and between the integration of Civil Affairs with the maneuver forces. The Civil Affairs and Military Governance field manuals of War World II identified the pro's and con's of two types of integration for Civil Affairs forces. First, Civil Affairs personnel are Operationally controlled by the field commander. Second, Civil Affairs personnel can have a separate Civil Affairs / Military Government theater chain of command. The following is a summarized breakdown of pro's and con's as defined in FM 27-5 published in 1943:²⁰

1. Operational Control - Commander is responsible for all operations, supply and evacuation.
 - i. Pros: All activities are coordinated in support of commander's operations. Obviates friction and misunderstanding between independent officers with overlapping responsibilities

- ii. Cons: Commanders concerned with training, supply and evacuation for combat operations, will overlook Civil Affairs requirements, diplomatic and economic objectives. Combat units waste manpower on topics they are unfamiliar with. Frequent personnel changeover results in policy variations. Civil Affairs responsibilities take away from the Commander's focus on combat operations. Commander's lack of training in Civil Affairs is minimally offset by Civil Affairs attached personnel. Civil Affairs responsibilities restrict combat units to specific areas making their mobility and availability difficult to support developing military situations.

2. Territorial Control

- i. Pros – Effective and economical use of manpower. Greater continuity of policy and personnel. Facilitates use of Functional Specialists and Civil Affairs trained personnel.
- ii. Cons – Unity of command is not established.²¹

The utilization of both forms of control and chains of command were practiced. The Operational Control by commanders was utilized during offensive and defensive operations, while Territorial Control was practiced during the consolidation of gains. The following quotes from World War II correspondence illustrate the integration of Civil Affairs personnel with maneuver units:

Civil Affairs officers will be sent ashore "as soon as possible after the assault has consolidated any territory containing inhabited centers."²²

“About one-hundred military government and Civil Affairs officers landed with the First, Third and Forty-Fifth Divisions, the Seventh Army, and the Eighth Army.”²³

“Officers were landed from D to D+2 in 8th Army Assault areas”.²⁴

In Nadia Schadlow’s book, “War and the Art of Governance,” she states:

The pressures of managing mobile military governments while keeping an eye on governance needs in expanding rear areas resulted in the division of AMGOT...a mobile American Military Government (AMG), attached to Fifteenth Army Group, accompanied field armies through Italy and could be more responsive to the needs of military combat units. A static AMG headquarters in Palermo administered rear areas.²⁵

Upon arrival into the Sicily theater, the Civil Affairs units embedded with assault forces approached responsibilities differently. 45th Division’s Civil Affairs team stayed with the assault forces headquarters and focused on “mobile, hit and run Civil Affairs.” This consisted of entering a city, establishing a presence at the City Hall (or similar governing building) hoisting the American/British Flag, notify local civilians of military policies, seize money and records at banks, post office, insurance headquarters protected by a guard, discussed local issues with religious leaders and used them to assist in screening trustworthy local police and town officials. The embedded Civil Affairs team would make initial appointments, re-emphasize the rules and notify everyone that follow on Civil Affairs Officers would arrive in a few days to establish continuous supervision and control.²⁶

In “Soldiers Become Governors,”²⁷ it highlights two distinct 1943 lessons learned memorandums, once by Civil Affairs Officers and the other by Army Commanders, on the experiences in Italy:

1. Civil Affairs Officers:

- i. During the planning stage, opportunities should be given for putting all concerned in the picture as regards the role which (Civil Affairs) is to play in the operation.
 - ii. Officers should join their units well in advance of D Day.
 - iii. Civil Affairs should be present in invaded cities at the time of capture.
2. Army Commanders
- i. In the planning stage, it was somewhat difficult to convince the combat commanders of the necessity of an adequate number of military government officers in the assault and follow-up stages.
 - ii. Both the Commanders of the Seventh and Eighth Armies, as well as the Commanding General, 15th Army Groups . . . are fully convinced that adequate numbers of [Civil Affairs] officers . . . in the earlier stages were essential [to restoring governance]
 - iii. The only criticism from either Army Commander has been that there were not enough Civil Affairs Officers

In the lead up to the invasion of Germany, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEP) authorized “General staff status for CA/MG staffs and the offices of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 in the headquarters of Armies and Corps. Field Army’s could determine whether or not to establish G-5 at Division.”²⁸

Modifications were made to the G-5 division by the Chief of Staff, SHAEP, in a memorandum addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, SHAEP G-5, on 14 March 1944 stating:

Based on the experience in the Mediterranean operations, Civil Affairs staffs should be closely integrated with the normal military staff throughout the entire chain of command; Civil Affairs headquarters unrelated to a military headquarters should be avoided; any Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory (AMGOT) organization should be avoided.²⁹

This meant that governance and Civil Affairs would not be handled separately by the Civil Affairs personnel, but it was to become a major responsibility for the combat commander and his forces as a major objective of the Supreme Commander. See Appendix C of this thesis for the G-5, Military Government, Detachments and Administrative Unit Strength numbers on V-E day.

Based on the lessons learned from theater campaigns, the 1947 updated Field Manual for Civil Affairs and Military Governance includes integration as:³⁰

1. Corps and army military government headquarters and headquarters companies will be activated in the zone of interior. Such units will train with their respective headquarters and will accompany them to the theater of operations.
2. MG companies will be given field training with divisions, corps, and armies in the zone of interior.

The research shows that the process of integrating Civil Affairs and Military Governance into maneuver units became more prevalent as the European campaign progressed from Italy to Western Europe and finally to Germany. They made Civil Affairs in allied territories and Military Governance in occupied territories responsibilities of the combat commander by getting away from parallel civil affair chains of command as indicated by the change in integration in the 1943 iteration of FM 27-5 to the 1947 publication of FM 27-5.

The United States integrated Civil Affairs into G-5 staffs down to the Division level so combat forces had the capability with them to achieve unity of effort in support of the combat commander, and also to ensure that Civil Affairs and Military Governance requirements were adequately addressed. They successfully closed the capability gap of integration by ensuring unity of effort throughout the entire theater through Civil Affairs integration on staffs, regionally focused training and policies, and continuous correspondence and communication through all levels of Civil Affairs unit support.

The lessons learned from World War II on the importance of unity of effort and integration of Civil Affairs and Military Governance capabilities from combat operations through consolidation of gains and stabilization tasks were lost during the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

During the lead up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Reserve Component Civil Affairs units were aligned with conventional forces in war plans, but did not train with them on a continuous basis.³¹ In Major Darrell Martin's thesis titled, "The Restructuring of the United States Civil Affairs," he states;

In the AC of the Army, there is only one battalion of CA soldiers. All CA soldiers in the active army come out of the 96th CA Battalion. These soldiers habitually support the Special Operations Forces exclusively, though they may support conventional forces as well depending on the mission. The five companies are regionally oriented, as are the Special Forces (SF) groups and the CACOMs, to the combatant command regions of the world. All noncommissioned officers on Civil Affairs A-teams (CAT-As) within the 96th CA Battalion (other than support) are Special Forces soldiers. That means they have had extensive schooling in civil military operations, insurgencies, counter-insurgencies, host nation support, regional orientation, language and a variety of other subjects, which will prepare them for CA operations.³²

The Concept of CA Employment figure is important to note as it Active Component Civil Affairs forces will deploy prior to the Reserve Component becoming available for mission.

Figure 7, derived from the 2003 Field Manual for Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, illustrates the process for employment of Civil Affairs:




Figure 7. Concept of CA Employment (2003)

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2003), 535.

This means that unity of effort between Active and Reserve Component will be integral to the civil-military environment as Active Component units assess and begin Civil Affairs projects that, when mobilized, the Reserve Component follows up and completes. Based off the research, the integration between reserve and Active Component Civil Affairs and their conventional force counterparts was not optimal during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The 2000 publication of Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, discusses integration considerations between reserve and Active Component:

5-48 The successful integration of reservists into the AC force, quickly and effectively, requires an understanding of the similarities and differences of the AC and RC systems. The AC force must constantly review the subtle differences, particularly differences in personnel, finance, logistics, and training.

5-49. The amount of time an RC soldier has to transition from citizen to fulltime soldier varies from operation to operation. The normal amount of time is 3 weeks from alert notification to awaiting entrance into the theater of operations from the power projection platform (PPP).

5-50. AC commanders must understand that the transition from Reserve systems in personnel, medical, finance, and logistics management often occurs in an unscheduled, geographically dispersed area.³³

The Army acknowledged that integration between Active and Reserve Component may be difficult, but it was also very necessary to achieve unity of effort and understanding CA capabilities. Unfortunately, the inability to integrate the Active and Reserve Component more effectively both prior to and during Operation Iraqi Freedom exacerbated tensions between both components that led to “The Divorce” between the components discussed in Chapter 1. Civil Affairs units that are unable to integrate with conventional force partners prior to deployment spend the first several months gaining

their trust while also learning how to do the Civil Affairs jobs in the context of the Operational Environment, since the Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs transitions were not an effortless continuation to resolving ongoing problem sets.³⁴ The result is duplicity of effort, by service and branch, which was exactly the problems that World War II identified and proactively sought to avoid.

Capability Gap: Functional Specialty

A notable difference in approach between Operation Iraqi Freedom and World War II was the under-utilization of the Functional Specialist capability in Iraq to facilitate the restoration of essential services and governance immediately upon cessation of hostilities. In Stanley Sandler's "Glad to See Them Come and Sorry to See Them Go", he discusses the Army's doctrinal foresight of dealing with consolidation areas in occupied territories leading up to World War II:

In 1939, the Army Judge Advocate's Office published FM 27-10, The Rules of Land Warfare, which carried a substantial section on Military Government, some of it using experience from the Rhineland Occupation. Then, in July 1940, nearly eighteen months before Pearl Harbor, the War Department Judge Advocate General published the first edition of its Manual of Military Government and Civil Affairs (FM 27-5).³⁵

In addition to the Military Government Field Manual, the Army established several schools focused on Civil Affairs and Military Governance, starting with the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia followed by multiple Civil Affairs Training Schools. It is important to note Civil Affairs officers and Functional Specialists received additional training on how their skills apply in combat operations. The following breakdown provides a synopsis of the difference between the School of Government and the Civil Affairs Training School in terms of locations, leadership,

curricula summary, target audiences and purpose in order to understand how the schools distinguished themselves from each other and emphasise the importance to the

Department of Defense in educating their Civil Affairs and Functional Specialty forces:

1. School of Military Government – University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA.

- i. Leadership: School of Military Government

1. Commandant - Regular Army, Brigadier General

2. Director – Civilian or an Officer commissioned from civil life

- ii. 16-week long course (curricula in Appendix B): Course focused on all general and special skills required to a complete Civil Affairs organization: public works and utilities, public safety, fiscal, economics, public health and sanitation, public welfare, education, public relations, communications, legal and government administration.

- iii. Target Audience: Primarily Active Duty officers with backgrounds in engineering (electrical, civil, and sanitation), accountants, lawyers, economists, sociologists. Reserve Officers eligible to attend.

- iv. Purpose: To produce officers for top planning and general administrative levels.

2. Civil Affairs Training Schools

- i. Locations:

1. Harvard University, Cambridge Massachusetts

2. Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

3. University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois

4. Northwestern University, Chicago, Illinois
 5. Stanford University, Stanford, California
 6. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan
 7. Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts
 8. University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
 9. University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin
 10. Western Reserve (Case Western Reserve University),
Cleveland, Ohio
 11. Columbia University, New York City, New York (Department
of Navy)
 12. Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey
 13. Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts
- ii. Duration: Over 18 months in totality, but conducted in monthly increments.
 - iii. Audience: Specialists Pool - Reserve Officers with Functional Specialty skill sets, who would “revert to an inactive status upon the completion of the training period.”³⁶
 - iv. Curricula: Appendix C breaks down Civil Affairs Training Course (dated from 1950-1970) by functional areas.

World War II’s Department of Defense identified that utilizing the civilian skill sets that Functional Specialists had without any additional training was not an effective planning consideration for large scale combat operations. They invested the time and money to ensure that Functional Specialties could operate as effectively as possible

before, during, and after combat operations. They also understood the importance of developing courses that were accessible to the army reserve Functional Specialists so as not to place an unnecessary burden on their full-time civilian lives. Establishing appropriate course curricula based off of historical case studies ensured Functional Specialists understood their potential utilization during combat operations. Having the School of Governance also ensured their active duty Civil Affairs counterparts understood the utility and capability of the Functional Specialists for seamless integration in World War II operational planning. Unlike World War II, Operation Iraqi Freedom provided no regular or regionally focused Functional Specialty training and unity of effort was not achieved.

Although multiple plans from various groups concerning consolidation of gains activities existed within the Department of Defense, Department of State, and Central Command, the actual Operation Iraqi Freedom plan that was executed was ad hoc. In “The Art of War and Governance,” author Natalia Schadow writes:

Even well after US forces were engaged, US military and civilian leaders did not resource the requirements for the political consolidation of combat gains nor did most fully understand the operational problems for the challenge. Yet, as in the past, the need to restore basic order and undertake some reconstruction arose in tandem with combat operations. And the military was the only agency with the scale and the logistical capacity to carry out these tasks. The phased approach to the war separated combat operations (Phase III) from postwar stabilization (Phase IV) and reinforced the view that “postwar” problems were not integral to the war itself.³⁷

As in World War II’s North Africa experience, the US government had planned to rely on civilian-led organizations to conduct governance tasks. Unfortunately, the result was the same in that the civilian-led organizations were neither resourced nor capable of performing the requirements in a hostile environment.

In 2004, the Combat Studies Institute in conjunction with the US Army Command and General Staff College conducted a symposium titled “Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations After the Campaign.” One of the speakers at the symposium was the director of the ORHA, Ben Garner, and he conducted a brief on his efforts as the ORHA director, followed by a question and answer session. In his brief Garner discusses the purpose of his organization:

We needed to go into immediate reconstruction. That was an incredible problem because we don’t do postwar stuff in the military or the government. We hire to have it done. We don’t have an organization to do post-war things . . . Our plan was to immediately bring back the public service in 20 of 23 ministries . . . Health, education, Police, Agriculture, etc . . . We were going to bring them back immediately and start the Public Works function to get the country functioning again . . .³⁸

He concludes his brief by listing his ten things that need to happen in Iraq for the United States to be successful, summarized and attached as Appendix D. One attendee asked a question in response to the ORHA dilemma of restoring governance functions:

Sir, being a former Civil Affairs Officer, I’m still a little bit puzzled. Civil Affairs-military government – was created during World War II to do, not just planning, but doing quasi-civilian occupation job. Over the years . . . it lost its way in terms of any kind of involvement with civil administration. It was driven out of training. It was driven out of practice, really, within the organization. And yet, you’re implying that there ought to be an organization right behind the troops to perform that halfway function of emergency relief and to do the occupation type of role. I guess I’m puzzled exactly what the role was in your organization, as well as in the CFLCC and CENTCOM. Not just in planning, but in execution.³⁹

Mr. Garner responded:

I didn’t have anything to do with planning for Civil Affairs . . . That was done by J5 and CFLCC . . . they planned well, by the way . . . they have immense potential there to do things, and we’re not using that potential now . . . I think the Civil Affairs organization should work with whoever is going to be the civilian administrator working for the CINC . . . They provide the initial input to do things until you can get the civilians pushed in there to take over. What happened to us in Iraq was that we uncovered a place but immediately the Shiite were in there,

and they filled that vacuum pertaining to human needs – schools, medical, public works, that type of thing. We need the Civil Affairs guys to come in there and fill that need. They have the talent to do it. They have the training to do it. They have the organization to do it. We just don't let them do it.⁴⁰

This exchange is important as it highlights an opportunity wasted to utilize the military's Functional Specialist and Civil Affairs assets with ORHA's requirements to re-establish governance functions. Mr. Garner's response also reiterates the need for friendly forces to monopolize governance functions before adversarial groups do.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, both Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs units had Functional Specialties assigned. The 2003 Field Manual 3-05.401, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures states:

While CA specialists are assigned based on their civilian background and expertise, they may not necessarily routinely perform the tasks they will perform when deployed. CA specialty teams are expected and must be prepared to accomplish their wartime missions on short notice. They will not have lengthy "train up" periods before deployments. Affiliations with local groups, membership in professional organizations, and subscriptions to professional publications and journals associated with the Functional Specialty are viable, often overlooked, tools to keep CA specialists current or certified in their operational role.⁴¹

Unfortunately, the Field Manual puts all of the onus on the Functional Specialist to research and provide for their training. It lists affiliations and professional organizations associated with Functional Specialties which is attached as Appendix E in addition to the Functional Specialty capability that resided in each Civil Affairs organization.

Summary of Analysis

The analysis shows that approaches to the capability gaps differed during World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Table 2 summarizes these differences:

Table 2. Summary of Capability Gaps by Case Study			
	Leadership	Organization - Integration	Training – FXSP
WWII	Civil Affair Division reports directly to Secretary of War (Secretary of Defense equivalent) SHAEF Division G5 General Staff SHAEF Division G5, Special Staff Unity of Command achieved	No integration with supported units until en route to or boots on the ground in theater. AC & RC CA-MG trained at “Country House” in theater Stayed overseas until reassigned or the war ended Unity of Effort and Integration essential to reduce duplication of effort	School of Military Government established Civil Affairs Training Schools established to educate FXSP on utilization during combat operations Theater schools established to educate utilization of skills in particular regions FXSP deployed to areas of most need
OIF	ORHA, reported directly to DOD USACAPOC served as force provider Minimal planning between ORHA and CMO/CAO prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom Unity of Command not achieved	RC CA aligned with conventional units on War Plans AC and RC supported maneuver commanders directly. No coordinated consolidation of gains for Civil Affairs and Military Governance during combat operations Unity of effort not achieved	No training provided concerning utilization of FXSP skills during combat operations. FXSP relied only on civilian skill sets. List of FXSP related civilian associations and organizations provided in field manual.

Source: Created by author.

In World War II, solutions were made easier through common understanding, based on hard lessons learned in previous wars and the North Africa campaign, that during operations the military would have the lead in conducting civil-affairs operations and Military Governance as the civilian agencies did not have the capacity, resources or security required.

The leadership solutions in World War II were prioritized with supporting conventional warfare operations with a unified focus on what the end state should look like, after much deliberation. The leadership during the European campaign also morphed based off of conditions on the ground. Operation Iraqi Freedom had a unified chain of command, but lacked the support of the interagency and Secretary of Defense to avoid duplication of efforts. The multiple plans from multiple organizations that were developed never materialized into something the ORHA, Secretary of Defense, CFLCC or Civil Affairs agreed on prior to the operation.

World War II was not successful at integration, at least not initially. Civil Affairs and Military Governance didn't train with the units they were tasked to support prior to the deployment. They did however have longer lasting relationships for longer durations in World War II than our current Civil Affairs organizations do. They were effective in creating a unified effort through establishing regionally focused Civil Affairs and Military Governance organizations that avoided duplication of effort. Operation Iraqi Freedom was not as effective in integration due to political and operational constraints.

¹ Sandler, *Glad to See them Come and Sorry to See them Go*, 174.

² Harry Coles and Albert Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History U.S. Army, 1964), 169.

³ Lida Mayo, CMH Pub 10-11, *The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefield*, United States Army in World War II, The Technical Services (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1966), 152.

⁴ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 183.

⁵ Office of the Chief Historian European Command, Training Packet No. 51, *Military Government Training Packet Occupation Forces in Europe Series*, Civil Affairs Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946 (Frankfurt, Germany: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1947), 3.

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- ⁶ Ibid., 8.
- ⁷ Ibid., 6-7.
- ⁸ Ibid., 6.
- ⁹ Ibid., 7.
- ¹⁰ Departments of the Army and Navy, Field Manual (FM) 27-5, *United States Army and Navy Manual of Civil Affairs Military Government* (Washington, DC: Departments of the Army and Navy, 1947), 31-33.
- ¹¹ Brian M. DeToy, *Turning Victory into Success: Military Operations after the Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 25.
- ¹² Ibid., 186-187.
- ¹³ Ibid., 264-267.
- ¹⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, Subject: Civil Affairs, Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, June 27, 1994.
- ¹⁵ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2000), 4-2.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., 4-2.
- ¹⁷ Nadia Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 242.
- ¹⁸ DeToy, *Turning Victory into Success*, 264.
- ¹⁹ Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory*, 244.
- ²⁰ Departments of the Army and Navy, Field Manual (FM) 27-5, *United States Army and Navy Manual of Civil Affairs Military Government* (Washington, DC: Departments of the Army and Navy, 1943), 23-35.
- ²¹ Departments of the Army and Navy, FM 27-5 (1943), 23-35.
- ²² Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 183.
- ²³ Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 100-108.
- ²⁴ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 195.

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- ²⁵ Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 100-108.
- ²⁶ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 194.
- ²⁷ Ibid., 203.
- ²⁸ Sandler, *Glad to See them Come and Sorry to See them Go*, 187.
- ²⁹ Office of the Chief Historian European Command, *Civil Affairs Occupation Forces in Europe Series*, 8-9.
- ³⁰ Departments of the Army and Navy, FM 27-5 (1947), 45-47.
- ³¹ Darrell Martin, "The Restructuring of the United States Army Civil Affairs" (Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004), 14-15.
- ³² Ibid., 3-4.
- ³³ HQDA, FM 41-10, 5-13.
- ³⁴ Van Roosen, "Implications of the 2006 Reassignment of U.S. Army Civil Affairs."
- ³⁵ Sandler, *Glad to See them Come and Sorry to See them Go*, 168.
- ³⁶ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 79.
- ³⁷ Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 239.
- ³⁸ DeToy, *Turning Victory into Success*, 258-259.
- ³⁹ Ibid., 275.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., 275-276.
- ⁴¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2003), B-1.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The research identified current Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs capability gaps. Textual analysis was used to compare and contrast how those capability gaps were addressed during World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Chapter 1 introduced the current state of Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs in terms of force structure, relationships, and training. It identified the research questions the paper set out to answer and framed why the problem is important. Chapter 2 conducted review of the National Security Strategy, Army Field Manual 3-0, current doctrine, and scholarly papers to define the current Active and Reserve Component capability gaps. This review answers the thesis' secondary research question: identify what capability gaps currently exist between the Active Component and Reserve Component Civil Affairs units. Chapter 3 introduced the research methodology of qualitative textual analysis. Chapter 3 defined the capability gaps to be examined as Leadership, Integration and Functional Specialty. Chapter 4 is the analysis of World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom's approaches to address the capability gaps identified in Chapter 3, while also answering the secondary question of whether other Multi-Component organizations were successful in bridging the current capability gaps.

Chapter 5 answers the primary research question of "how can a Multi-Component Civil Affairs organization successfully close capability gaps that exist between the Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs units," and is outlined into four sections. The Introduction restates the purpose of the research, and briefly summarizes the findings

from Chapter 4. The second section interprets the findings described in Chapter 4 and extracts meaning from the results, implications of the findings and identifies unexpected findings. The third section focuses on recommendations for further study, unanswered questions, things that could have been approached or done differently and finally recommendations for action. The fourth section ends with the summary and conclusions based on the research.

Purpose of Research

The purpose of this research is to identify the historical examples of Multi-Component Civil Affairs organizations closing various capability gaps and the utility of using those methods in future operations. The initial secondary question that needed to be answered was, “What capability gaps currently exist between the Active Component and Reserve Component Civil Affairs units?” This was addressed through the literature review conducted in Chapter 2. Chapter 4’s textual analysis of World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom answered the secondary question, “Were other Multi-Component units successful in closing capability gaps?” The primary thesis question, “How can Multi-Component Civil Affairs organizations successfully close capability gaps that exist between the Active Component and Reserve Component Civil Affairs units?,” is answered in the “recommendations” section of Chapter 5.

Brief Summary of Chapter 4

Chapter 4 utilized the qualitative research method of textual analysis to compare and contrast World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom approaches to the capability gaps of Leadership, Integration and Functional Specialty. The results of Chapter 4 lay the

foundation on which the findings of this research paper can make recommendations based on previous experiences to fix capability gaps within a Multi-Component Civil Affairs organization.

Interpretation of Findings in Chapter 4

During World War II the Army established a Major General led Civil Affairs Division that reported to the Secretary of War. Although, it failed at integrating Civil Affairs and Military Governance units prior to the invasion, it succeeded in achieving unity of effort through direct communication and duration of employment in theater. For the Functional Specialty capability gap, the Army established multiple schools for Reserve Component Functional Specialists focused on how to utilize their skill sets in liberated and occupied territories, and for the Active Component, they made sure they understood the full capability that the Reserve Component can bring to bear in a campaign.

Operation Iraqi Freedom achieved unity of command with an integrated organization of Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs but failed to coordinate with the appropriate leadership and agencies to achieve unity of effort. While integration between Reserve and Active Components of Civil Affairs is acknowledged in doctrine at the time, it was not common enough to provide unity of effort. Finally, the Functional Specialists were acknowledged to be of importance in the doctrine at the time, but no training was provided to operationalize the capability and skill sets.

What Do the Results Mean?

The results for leadership show that a Multi-Component Major General level headquarters for Civil Affairs will probably not be enough to achieve unity of effort on par with what was achieved in World War II. The establishment of a Civil Affairs Division may be necessary to achieve the type of singular focus and necessary strategic support to successfully consolidate gains in theater. The larger problem may lie in the fact that utilization of Civil Affairs in large scale operations requires a greater focus on supporting conventional forces than what a Special Operations branch proponent is willing to commit to. If the National Defense Strategy is serious about focusing on “Near Peer” warfare and getting back to winning wars, there is no getting away from the fact that the military needs to be ready to provide the governance capability until such a time that a non-military entity can operate freely and resourced enough to get results. This is clearly the point of Chapter 8, “Operations to Consolidate Gains,” of the new 2017 FM 3-0. Consolidation of gains describes activities designed to make the achievement of the military objective enduring and takes place in portions of the AO where large scale combat operations are not occurring.

For integration, the lesson learned from World War II is that integration through training and planning might be good enough for Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs. The key takeaway from the World War II case study is the need for a longer deployment timeline for Civil Affairs to conduct effective restoration of governance, coupled with appropriate level of a constabulary-type forces to provide security. Operation Iraqi Freedom integration needed to happen between military forces and their civilian counterparts. If the political decision is made to have civilians in charge of

restoring governance, then the military capabilities required need to immediately be linked with the appropriate interagency partners to achieve the desired end states. Training and planning for this possibility needs to start well in advance of execution and incorporated into theater campaign plans at the Geographic Combatant Command levels in addition to the operation planning and resourcing at Theater Armies and below.

Functional Specialists were trained and utilized in World War II with great success. The Army identified appropriate civilian skill sets, educated the Active Component on how to incorporate those skills in their Civil Affairs and Military Governance planning and provided education and training for the Functional Specialists on how they could expect to utilize their skills during combat operations. Operation Iraqi Freedom identified the need for Functional Specialists, but provided no training for them in addition to not integrating them into the planning and execution of the operation. Implications are profound, but the military solutions are remarkably simple to achieve with the forces and funding currently available.

What are the Implications?

The larger problem may lie in the fact that utilization of Civil Affairs in large scale operations requires a greater focus on supporting conventional forces than what a Special Operations branch proponent is willing to commit to. If the Department of Defense is serious about focusing on “Near Peer” threats, there is no getting away from the fact that the military will need to be ready to provide governance capability until such a time that a non-military entity can operate freely and is resourced enough to get results.

World War II provides a way ahead, as unity of command for just Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs isn’t going to be enough to have the influence required

to get serious about translating the victory of battles into the winning of wars. Based off of lessons learned in Iraq, the military needs leadership involved at the highest levels of the interagency responsible for consolidation of gains relevant to Civil Affairs and Military Governance. Repeating the methods used in Operation Iraqi Freedom won't resolve this problem.

Neither World War II nor Operation Iraqi Freedom provide good examples of integration. World War II does provide a way ahead for understanding each other's capabilities with continuous joint training available to both Active and Reserve Components. Researching the historical approaches to overcome these obstacles resulted in some unexpected findings.

Unexpected Findings

The most unexpected and significant finding was the "Special Text" school curricula for Military Governance specialists concerned with Price Control and Rationing, Military Government, Legal, Displaced Persons, Public Finance, Civil Supply, Public Works, Public Communications, and Monuments. These certainly serve as an excellent starting point for anyone interested in learning the roles and responsibilities of Military Governance specialists from the past. I'll be reaching out to the Institute of Military Governance, Civil Affairs Branch, Civil Affairs units, GCCs, TSOCs, and most importantly Functional Specialists to provide them a frame of reference in which to build on for future training, planning and integration of Functional Specialists in all phases of military operations. These documents, while outdated, developed recommendations to set the basis for future course curricula on Military Governance specialties.

Recommendations

To answer the primary thesis question, “How can Multi-Component Civil Affairs organizations successfully close capability gaps that exist between the Active Component and Reserve Component Civil Affairs units?,” the recommendations are categorized by capability gaps (Leadership, Integration, Functional Specialty) and again by time required for implementation. Short term recommendations are things that can be accomplished within 0-2 years at almost no additional costs or change to force structure. Longer term recommendations are estimated to have 2-5 years required for implementation. These longer times are due to significant changes in force structure.

Leadership

0-2 years: Utilize the current interagency apparatus to identify related regional civil-military operation efforts to achieve unity of effort. This process cannot be done in a vacuum and should include relevant interagency partners, along with Active and Reserve Component planners. Identify chain of command and timelines for all consolidation area participants, to include civilian agencies, in OPLANS. Issues need to be addressed as early as possible in the planning stages.

2-5 years: Establish a Joint/Interagency Civil Affairs Division to set policies and unify efforts amongst all stake holders for Civil Affairs and Military Governance type operations, modelled after World War II’s Civil Affairs Division. This will facilitate the achievement of unity of effort and deconflict the types of leadership and capability problems experienced in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Unify Army Civil Affairs components under a Multi-Component 2-star headquarters, modeled after USACAPOC in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Integration

0-2 years: Achieve unity of effort in planning by conducting a monthly brief with geographically aligned TSOC, CACOM, ASCC, Active Component CA BN and CO, and geographically aligned Reserve Component Brigades and Battalions. This will ensure a common operational picture on theater campaign plans and highlights issues for research and planning.

Introduce Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs organizations to each other. This can be achieved via a conference call, email exchange, video-teleconference, setting up a MilSuite or Sharepoint site on NIPR and SIPR to discuss regional issues and solutions, or site visits. There is no reason both organizations shouldn't be communicating with each other. With the monthly briefs on issues in the region, the Active and Reserve Component organizations can identify subject matter experts that could begin working on solutions.

Establish long-term relationships between Civil Affairs battalions and above with conventional forces divisions and above. For annual training, conduct multi-component CMOC training and Civil Affairs Planning for upcoming exercises or real-world operations.

Ensure Civil Affairs Planners train and integrate with conventional forces during combat operation exercises, particularly during the planning phase and are providing input to consolidation of gains problem sets.

2-5 years: Officially align Civil Affairs units with their Active Component Conventional Forces counterparts. Formalize Civil Affairs Multi-Component organizations down to the battalion level. This ensures unity of command, unity of effort

and removes duplication of processes. The multi-component Civil Affairs Commands and Brigade headquarters would be located on major military installations with the Theater Armies, Special Forces Groups and Corps Headquarters they are tasked to support. Battalion and below units should be located inside major metropolitan areas, near population densities of ethnicities native to their regional alignment. This serves as a source of regional expertise and language to work on regional problem sets, but also as a resource for a high density of Functional Specialists. Ideally this multi-component organization would also include NGB and interagency CA/MG capabilities, or develop formal relationships with their regionally aligned interagency counterparts.

Functional Specialist

0-2 years: The easiest recommendation that should be implemented immediately is to send out the Student Texts from the old Civil Affairs Training Schools to all Functional Specialists on the books for Department of Army. Since no formal training for them currently exists, it provides a great starting point to educate the force on how their civilian skills translate during historical operation problem sets. Utilize reservists annual training days, by Functional Specialty, to review and if necessary, to update the Student Texts. Once the texts have been reviewed, regroup the Functional Specialists by regional alignment and conduct meetings with the TSOC and GCC to plan in support of OPLAN or ongoing theater issues.

2-5 years: Long term, the military needs Functional Specialty capability in as many organizations as possible. Provide advanced CMOC course for all civil-military operations planners (Active and Reserve Component) focused on historical cases, similar to the Army Command and General Staff College's Advanced Civil Affairs course. This

course should not be relegated to only Civil Affairs and Functional Specialists but made available to any organization interested in sending personnel that would be responsible for coordinating consolidation of gain efforts. These would be conducted regionally at the multi-component CACOM or CA BDE with a focus on regionally specific scenarios. Similar to the Joint Knowledge Online courses, establish a distance learning Military Governance training, by Functional Specialty, available to all components and all MOS using the old School of Military Government and Civil Affairs Training School course curricula as a basis. Again, the need to have as many personnel familiar with civil-military, Civil Affairs and Functional Specialty operations capability at all levels of combat is of utmost importance. If personnel are interested in learning its applicability for their unit, let them do so. A resident course could be established that focuses on working real-world problems and interacting with their interagency counterparts. It doesn't have to be an online course, it could just as easily be a readily accessible Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, by Functional Specialty, downloaded off the Army Publication Directorate.

For all incoming officers and enlisted, HRC should identify civilian occupations and automatically assign relevant 38G as secondary, or tertiary MOS. As in World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom, if they are not already a part of a Civil Affairs or Functional Specialty organization, they could still be identified within a combat unit as someone who can provide an initial capability before the Civil Affairs or Functional Specialists arrive to assist.

Formalize the interagency level Civil Affairs training and incorporate problem sets with USAID, DOS, DIA, CIA, OSD, Department of Agriculture, Department of

Commerce, etc., utilizing annual training. This will educate the force with operational experience, allows the interagency exposure to the Functional Specialist capability and fosters networks and knowledge either side (Interagency partners, Functional Specialist) would not have had otherwise.

Further Study

1. What are the implications for the Army assuming Title 10 Civil Affairs responsibilities for Department of Defense?
2. What are the implications of turning Civil Affairs Army Reserve TPU (Troop Program Unit) positions into IMA (Individual Mobilization Augmentee) positions?
3. What are the implications of placing Civil Affairs units in the National Guard?
4. What impact would a Multi-Component Civil Affairs organization have on AGR and Active Duty Officers? Enlisted?
5. Would establishing regionally aligned interagency Civil Affairs/Military Governance/Foreign Affairs organization with State Department, USAID, CIA, OFDA, DEA, Department of Treasury, USDA, etc., synchronize US foreign policy goals, training and unity of effort more effectively?
6. Is the training pipeline for Army Civil Affairs officers and enlisted as efficient and productive as possible? Should the Civil Affairs component train to the Special Operations standards when 85 percent of the community is aligned with Conventional Forces? What training distinguishes between Special Operations Forces and Conventional Force Civil Affairs?
7. What is the best way to train Army Reserve Civil Affairs units for annual training? Is it National Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center rotation focused on

Phase 3 operations? Are there Civil-Military Engagements less than 29 days in duration that could integrate Army Reserve and Active Duty Civil Affairs units?

8. Could Civil Affairs units conduct “internships” during Annual Training with interagency/federal/state/local government organizations?
9. How can Army Reserve Officer training and recruiting be optimized to increase qualified Civil Affairs and Functional Specialist positions?

Unanswered Questions

Why don't we have a Civil Affairs Division? The Civil Affairs Division in World War II developed and coordinated policies with the interagency in Washington, D.C. This helped unity of effort and deconfliction between the military and civilian agencies. This simply didn't happen in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In World War II the executive leadership of the Presidency, State Department and Military learned during the North Africa campaign that it was necessary to settle on a unified effort to prevent negative impact on military operations and restoration of governance. Planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom was conducted by various military and civilian agencies and working groups, but efforts were stove-piped and the research shows that agencies didn't talk to each other on the same level as they did in World War II.

As the military focuses away from counter-terrorism and onto large-scale combat operations in accordance with the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, history shows that winning the war requires a focused effort to plan for consolidation area activities. Will the interagency discuss consolidation and stabilization activities to achieve unity of effort and command that was so important to winning World War II? If the shift to large-scale combat operations continues to happen, should Special

Operations Command and the Undersecretary of Low Intensity Conflict continue to be the Civil Affairs branch proponent?

Different Research Approach

Quantitative analysis could have been utilized comparing the number of Civil Affairs officer and Functional Specialists assigned to appropriate organizations in both case studies to determine if personnel assigned had a measurable effect on the areas they were assigned to during the course of the wars. If a correlation in the number of personnel required to address Civil Affairs and Functional Specialist operations was determined, recommendations to specific number of assigned personnel to future force structure could be implemented and incorporated into future planning efforts.

In conjunction with the Center for Army Analysis, a targeted survey could be conducted focused on the current population of Civil Affairs officers from Active and Reserve Components as well as civil-affairs and Functional Specialty related organizations such as the interagency, Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), geographic Army Service Combatant Commands (ASCC), Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), Joint and Service Civil Affairs Branch proponents, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade and regionally aligned battalions, United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) and their regionally aligned Civil Affairs Commands (CACOM), 85th Civil Affairs, National Guard Bureau (NGB), and Theater Armies, Corps and Divisions. Results could then be categorized by component, organization, function, geographic alignment, and echelon of support. The survey could include recommendations to address the capability gaps and an analysis comparing recommendations by organization or geographic region could be conducted.

This research paper could also have utilized qualitative analysis to determine current capability gaps between Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs by way of interviewing partners who have a stake in the success or failure of civil-affairs and Functional Specialty capabilities within the interagency, GCC, geographic ASCC, TSOC, Joint and Service Civil Affairs Branch proponents, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade and regionally aligned battalions, USACAPOC and their regionally aligned CACOMs, 85th Civil Affairs, NGB, and Theater Armies, Corps and Divisions.

In order to identify how these problems were addressed in World War II, interviews with historians would be appropriate. Identifying how current capability gaps were addressed during Operation Iraqi Freedom, interviewing civil-affairs and Functional Specialty related leaders and planners within Department of Defense, Coalition Provincial Authority, Officer of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, Central Command, V Corps, Combined Forces Land Component Commander, Iraqi Sunni, Iraqi Kurd and Iraqi Shiite organizations that filled the governance gaps would also have been appropriate.

For Action

As discussed in the recommendations portion of this chapter, there are 3 things that can be done immediately to help resolve the capability gaps between Active and Reserve Component:

1. Utilize the current interagency apparatus to identify related regional civil-military operation efforts to achieve unity of effort.

2. Conduct a monthly brief with geographically aligned TSOC, CACOM, ASCC, Active Component CA BN and CO, and Reserve Component Brigades and Battalions.
3. Introduce Active and Reserve Component Civil Affairs organizations to each other.
4. Immediately send out relevant Student Texts from the old Civil Affairs Training Schools to all Functional Specialists (referenced in Appendix C).

Summary

The research indicates capability gaps that currently exist between AC and RC Civil Affairs have been around since World War II. In terms of the capability gap in leadership, the original belief was that World War II solved this issue by establishing the Civil Affairs Division as a unified command structure. During the course of the research, the author discovered that the Civil Affairs Division didn't command anything and was more of a "branch proponent" involved with policy making and interagency dealings with Military Governance and Civil Affairs.

During World War II, various theaters of operation at various times had various Civil Affairs structures. It was actually more like today than originally thought. In terms of command and control, Military Governance C2 versus combat forces commander C2 differed depending on the phase of operations each town/village/city was under. Consistent throughout World War II was establishing a coordinated consolidation of gains response under the combatant commander. This is highlighted in FM 27-5, both in the draft dated 1943 and subsequent updates through 1947.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the leadership of Civil Affairs for consolidation of gains responsibilities was divergent, as highlighted by the Director of ORHA, Ben Garner's recommendation that; "I think the Civil Affairs organization should work for whomever is going to be the civilian administration working for the CINC. As you uncover territory, I think the Civil Affairs guys go in there and they shape the future environment."¹

In terms of integration, the Civil Affairs and Military Governance specialists were not trained and integrated with the units they supported prior to deployment in either World War II or Operation Iraqi Freedom. While some were incorporated into the planning of the deployment, most of the interaction was done on a boat while en route to the theater or once in theater. For Operation Iraqi Freedom, the author had believed Civil Affairs units were not part of the Operations Planning. However, the research indicated they were deeply involved with consolidation of gains planning, but due to political constraints (unable to utilize the Iraqi military or anyone associated with the Baath party) and fast operations tempo of the offensive campaign, they lacked the security forces and time to consolidate gains. If ORHA was going to be the lead organization for civil-affairs and civil-military operation efforts, they should have been designated the lead early on in the planning phases and integrated within the CFLCC organization to ensure they would be properly resourced and their efforts synchronized with military and political objectives.

Finally, in terms of the Military Governance capability gap, the assumption prior to conducting the research was the School of Military Governance was the only method in which governance specialists were created. Instead, the military had a larger pool of

volunteers and draftees they could select from, and they established multiple Civil Affairs Training Schools across the country at universities, specifically for Reservists, to familiarize them with their projected functional role in anticipated locations of service overseas. There were also differences in how Civil Affairs and Military Governance specialists were regionally trained as some personnel received additional country and language training after they had been assigned and arrived to a theater.

During the lead up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, just like today, no Army schools were available to educate our Functional Specialists on how their skill sets could be applicable during combat operations. Operation Iraqi Freedom identified Active Component Functional Specialty skill sets, but training on applying their skills in operations were unavailable. Our inability to effectively nurture and leverage the Functional Specialty capabilities the military has, as demonstrated in Operation Iraqi Freedom, continues to inhibit our ability to fill governance vacuums caused by military conflict and prevent the environment for malign influences from forming in the first place.

Functional Specialty in World War II had the correct approach that should be implemented in any future Multi-Component Civil Affairs organization. Educate the Active Component on what the Functional Specialty capabilities are and how they can be utilized. Educate the Reserve Component on how Functional Specialty skills are applicable in operations and get them communicating with their regionally aligned active duty Civil Affairs counterparts.

The research revealed Civil Affairs evolved throughout World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom that varied by phase and theater of the war. The common thread

during World War II was the leadership of the military, Department of State and President of the United States worked together to ensure Civil Affairs and Military Governance achieved unity of effort. The common thread with Operation Iraqi Freedom was that the evolution of Civil Affairs never achieved the same consensus or unity of effort for all parties involved. Terminology used and reasoning for solutions during World War II is uncannily similar to the environment described in FM 3-0 published in 2017.

Had there been an equivalent to the Civil Affairs Division that functioned during World War II, to coordinate policy and discuss issues with the Interagency in Washington, D.C., perhaps Functional Specialists and Civil Affairs could have integrated with ORHA and offset some of the governance vacuums, or at the very least, coordinated efforts and resources supporting the theater objectives. Had there been an integration of Civil Affairs assets with the conventional forces prior to deployment, perhaps the importance of implementing governance functions immediately may have prevented malign influenced militias from filling the vacuums and planting the seeds for today's Middle East problems, most notably ISIS and Iranian influence.

Luckily historical records are readily available to explain the how and, most importantly, the “why” of each evolution of Civil Affairs and Military Governance during World War II. How these capability gaps were addressed during World War II and Operation Iraqi Freedom should serve as a guideline to how we can address them for future conflicts.

Conclusions

This research will assist in better execution of significant tasks associated with the new doctrine “Operations to Consolidate Gains.” Chapter 8, “Operations to Consolidate Gains,” of the new FM 3-0 describes activities designed to make the achievement of the military objective enduring and takes place in portions of the AO where large scale combat operations are not occurring.

The U.S. Army has always been required to consolidate gains. It did so with varying degrees of success in the Indian Wars, after the Civil War during Reconstruction, after the Spanish American War, during World War II, Korea and Vietnam, and more recently in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq. How successful its efforts to consolidate gains were informed how the outcomes of those wars can be viewed today. Each conflict was unique and involved an Army role in the governance of an area for periods of time that were not predicted beforehand. As such, planning to consolidate gains is essential to any operation.²

Based off of the lessons learned from the past, the recommendations made in this thesis will contribute to the training, planning and readiness of Civil Affairs Officers and Functional Specialists tasked to execute Consolidation of Gains’ stability tasks (Establish Civil Security, Establish Civil Control, Restore Essential Services, Support Governance, Support Economic and Infrastructure Development) in support of future operations.³

Peer vs. Peer large-scale combat operations requires robust CA capability and integrated efforts sooner than later to bridge the current capability gaps. The Department of Defense needs to establish routine and integrated training to exercise unity of effort for all. Some issues can be addressed immediately at minimal expense and no change to organizational structures currently in place.

¹ DeToy, *Turning Victory into Success*, 275-276.

² HQDA, FM 3-0, Operations, 8-1.

³ Ibid., 8-11 – 8-12.

APPENDIX A

CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT

STRENGTH ON V-E DAY (WWII)

The following figures show the personnel strength of Civil Affairs and Military Governance assigned to G-5 staffs, detachments and administrative units on V-E Day:

<u>Staff</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
SHAEF--G-5 Section	120	5	148
SHAEF Missions to Liberated Countries	156		107
COM Z--G-5 Section	31		39
Base Sections--G-5 Sections	63		77
12th Army Group--G-5 Section	67	1	82
First U.S. Army--G-5 Section	31		44
Third U.S. Army--G-5 Section	24	1	40
Ninth U.S. Army--G-5 Section	28	1	47
Fifteenth U.S. Army--G-5 Section	32	1	31
Corps--G-5 Sections	39		43
Divisions--G-5 Sections	201		267
6th U.S. Army Group--G-5 Section	40	1	107
Seventh U.S. Army--G-5 Section	18		20
First French Army--G-5 Section	8		10
Corps (Seventh Army)--G-5 Section	12		20
Divisions (Seventh Army)--G-5 Section	72		96
Corps (First French)--G-5 Liaison	2		2
Division (First French)--G-5 Liaison	5		5
TOTAL	949	10	1,185

Figure 8. --G-5 Strength on V-E Day (WWII)

Source: Office of the Chief Historian European Command, Training Packet No. 51, *Military Government Training Packet Occupation Forces in Europe Series*, Civil Affairs Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946 (Frankfurt, Germany: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1947), 36.

<u>Detachments and Administrative Units</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
12th Army Group Detachments	922	49	1,473
12th Army Group Administrative Units			
a. 2d Regt, (2 ECAR) including head- quarters service companies	47	6	299
b. Headquarters company	33	2	284
6th Army Group Detachments	514	29	721
6th Army Group Administrative Units			
a. 3d Regt (3 ECAR)	17		121
b. Headquarters company	14		122
COM Z Detachments	156	12	389
COM Z Administrative Units			
a. 1st Regt (1 ECAR)	10	1	94
b. Headquarters company	9		105
ECAD Headquarters and Service Units	216	14	1,087
Special Detachments (Berlin, Bremen)	96	5	203
	<u>2,034</u>	<u>118</u>	<u>4,898</u>
Overstrength allowed	<u>850</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>1,500</u>
TOTAL	2,884	193	6,398

Figure 9. Detachments and Administrative Unit Strength on V-E Day (WWII)

Source: Office of the Chief Historian European Command, Training Packet No. 51, *Military Government Training Packet Occupation Forces in Europe Series*, Civil Affairs Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946 (Frankfurt, Germany: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1947), 37.

APPENDIX B

SCHOOL OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT CURRICULA (13 MAY 1942)

- I. *Introduction and orientation: text material and bibliography:* Distinguishing military law, martial law and military government; clarifying the nature, scope and general phases of the latter; outlining the general objectives of the course.
- II. *The organization and operation of the War Department and the Army:* A general outline of the organization of the War Department; military organization (tactical and territorial); relation of the War Department to the Army; official correspondence, etc.
- III. *The international law of military government:* The relevant conventions; the rules of land warfare; growth and general survey.
- IV. *The American regulations:* A survey and study of War Department regulations (FM 27-5), presenting the basic policies and mechanics of military government.
- V. *American experiences in military government:* Study of illustrative techniques in previous experiences. Application to objectives in: (1) liaison in friendly situations and (2) the Atlantic Charter.
- VI. *Other experiences.* The experiences and practices of other countries in military government.
- VII. *Public administration.* General principles of public administration, including local and state government; public finance; public health and sanitation; communications; utilities and public works; education; public safety; public welfare; economic problems.

- VIII. *Introduction to politico-military backgrounds.* Discussing American Constitutional Government, the Atlantic Charter, Nazi ideology and other political philosophies.
- IX. *Politico-military backgrounds—general.* Races and racial theories; general or comparative historical geography; geo-politics.
- X. *Politico-military backgrounds—special.* (Three selected political or geographical areas) Political histories; economic histories; systems of government; social psychology; geography; legal systems.
- XI. *Liaison.* Liaison functions; correlation of problems of military government and friendly liaison. Study of selected areas and special features relating thereto.¹

APPENDIX C

CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING SCHOOL, SPECIAL TEXT CURRICULA FOR MILITARY GOVERNANCE -FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTY (AS OF 1970)

Table 3. Civil Affairs Training School, Special Text Curricula
for Military Governance -Functional Specialty (1970)

Subject Number	Title	Date
ST 41-150	CA Command and Staff Relations	1960
-151	Legal	1960
-152	Public Safety	1968
-153	Public Health	1960
-154	Public Welfare	1960
-155	Public Finance	1959
-156	Public Education	1960
-158	Economics	1959
-159	Commerce -id Industry	1961
-160	Food and Agriculture	1960
-161	Price Control and Rationing	1959
-162	Property Control	1959
-163	Civilian Supply	1959
-164	Public Works and Utilities	1960
-165	Public Communications	1960
-166	Public Transportation	1960
-167	Civil Information	1960
-168	Displaced Persons	1959
-169	Arts, Monuments and Archives	1959
-170	History of Civil Affairs	1969
-171	Principles of Government	
-173	Scientific Investigation in the Ryukyu Islands (Yaeyama)	
-174	"Operation Mercy" (The Resettlement of Hungarian Refugees)	
-175	Civic Action Training Aids	1964
-176	Civil Affairs Relationships	1964
-177	Military Government with Combat Troops	1965
-178	Area Study - "Composite Province"	1965
-179	Personal Response Project Lecture/Discussions	1966
-180	Project Resources Materials-Supplement VN to Acquaint Chaplains in VN	
-181	USAID VN Assistance Program - Report to the Ambassador	
-183	JUSPAO Vietnam General Briefing Book	
-184	Counterinsurgency Revisited - The Guerrilla and His World: PSYOP Aspects of Guerrilla Warfare	1969

ST 41-10-52	American Military Government Courts in Germany	1961
-70	Handbook for Military Government in Germany	1944
-185	The Country Team (Department of State)	
-186	Advisor Communication Data 1968	
-187	CINVA-RAM - "A Tool of Civic Action"	
-188	Health Data Publications (WRAI of Research)	1966
ST 41-10-62	Planning for the Occupation of Germany	--
-90	Tactics and Techniques in Counterinsurgencies	1962
-100	Command and Staff Guidelines for Civic Action	1964
-101	Working Effectively Overseas	1961
-102	Training Manual for Village Level Workers	1962
-103	Village Technology Handbook	1963
-104	Civic Action Plan for the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces	1963
-105	Cultural Facts and Fancies	1964
-106	Technical Cooperation and Cultural Reality	1964
41-20-50	The Bizonal Economic Administration of Western Germany	1962
41-26-59	Financial Policies and Operations	1950
41-30-1	Manual for Rural Community Health Worker (Thailand)	1962
41-50-60	Press Reorientation	1947
RBI	The Development of U.S. Protection of Libraries and Archives in Europe During World War II	1964
USACAS PAM 550-55	CA Area Study for RVN - Prepared by CORDS	1968
RF 5930	The Viet Cong Infrastructure	1969

Source: US Army Civil Affairs School, *Civil Affairs Developments, 1970* (Fort Gordon, GA: US Army Civil Affairs School, 1970), 40-41.

APPENDIX D

ORHA'S BEN GARNER'S 10 KEYS TO SUCCESS IN
IRAQ (14-16 SEPTEMBER 2014)

1. Adopt a foreign policy that negates Iran's influence.
2. Influence the development of the future government of Iraq, and corresponding national elections, to prevent a nationwide Shia ruling majority.
3. Guarantee the rights of minorities.
4. Share the wealth of Iraq with the people of Iraq, and the wealth of Iraq is oil.
5. Employ the unemployed youth.
6. Rapidly stimulate the Iraqi economy.
7. Provide electricity 24/7.
8. Remove the head of the family of each terrorist organization involved in terrorism in Iraq.
9. Increase international support to block financial aid for global terrorism.
10. Develop a strategy right now for an independent, autonomous, and U.S. supported Kurdistan.²

¹ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 79-81.

² DeToy, *Turning Victory into Success*, 268-271.

APPENDIX E

AFFILIATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

ASSOCIATED WITH THE FUNCTIONAL SPECIALTIES

GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS

INTERNATIONAL LAW

- *The American Society of International Law*
www.asil.org
- *The International Law Commission*
www.un.org/law/ilc
- *Public Int'l Law by Associate Professor Francis Auburn*
www.law.uwa.edu.au/intlaw

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

- *The American Society for Public Administration*
www.aspanet.org
- *Public Administration and Management: An Interactive Journal*
www.pamij.com

PUBLIC EDUCATION

- *Public Education Network*
www.publiceducation.org
- *The Center for Commercial-Free Public Education*
www.commercialfree.org
- *Public Education & Business Coalition*
www.pebc.org
- *Public Education Center*
www.publicedcenter.org

PUBLIC HEALTH

- *American Public Health Association*
www.apha.org
- *UNC School of Public Health*
www.sph.unc.edu

PUBLIC SAFETY

- *Tennessee Department of Safety*
www.state.tn.us/safety
- *The Public Safety Executive Association, Inc.*
www.policechief.com
- *U.S. Department of the Interior Office of Managing Risk and Public Safety*
www.mrps.doi.gov
- *American Society for Industrial Security*
www.asisonline.org

PUBLIC FACILITIES FUNCTIONS

PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS

- **Kwantlen Public Safety Communications**

www.kwantlen.bc.ca/pscm/pscm.htm

- **CIA Public Affairs - Public Communications**

www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/public.html

- **Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials International**

www.apcointl.org

TRANSPORTATION

- **Transitnet Home**

www.ncdot.org/transit/transitnet

- **City of High Point, NC**

www.high-point.net/hitrans

PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES

- **American Society of Civil Engineers**

www.asce.org

- **City of Newton, North Carolina Public Works and Utilities**

www.ci.newton.nc.us/PW/index.htm

- **Electrical Generating Systems Association**

www.egsa.org

- **Public Works and Utilities**

www.comfortsystem.ws

- **Public Works/Utilities Discipline Instructors**

www.fema.gov/emi/publicdiscipline.htm

National Public Works Organizations

- **U.S. Army Corps of Engineers monthly newspaper**

www.hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/pubs/update.htm

ECONOMICS AND COMMERCE FUNCTIONS

CIVILIAN SUPPLY

- **Defense Supply Center Columbus**

www.dscc.dla.mil

- **National Contract Management Association**

www.ncmahq.org

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

- **Local Economic Development Board**

- **National Congress for Community Economic Development (NCCED)**

www.ncced.org

- **Central Carolina Economic Development Alliance**

www.cceda.org

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

- **International Forum on Globalization**

www.ifg.org

□ *National Policy Association*
www.npal.org

SPECIAL FUNCTIONS

CIVIL INFORMATION

□ *U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases*
www.usamriid.army.mil

□ *U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine*
www.usariem.army.mil

□ *Media Resource Service*, 99 Alexander Drive, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709; 919/547-5259; Fax: 919/549-0090
E-mail: mediaresource@sigmaxi.org

CULTURAL RELATIONS

□ *Racial, Ethnic, and Cultural Relations*
www.uwci.org/council/index.htm

□ *The Society for the Preservation of Natural History Collections*
<http://www.spnhc.org>

DISLOCATED CIVILIANS

□ *Local American Red Cross Chapter*
www.redcross.org

EMERGENCY SERVICES

□ *National Emergency Management Association*
www.nemaweb.org/index.cfm

□ *International Association of Emergency Managers*
www.iaem.com

□ *Association of Contingency Planners (ACP)*
www.acp-international.com

□ *The Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Response Association, International*
www.disasters.org

□ *The Online Emergency Services Resource*
www.jems.com

□ *Rowan County (NC) Emergency Services*
www.co.rowan.nc.us/es

□ *Federal Emergency Management Agency*
www.fema.gov

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

□ *U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management*
www.em.doe.gov

□ *Urban Environmental Management*
www.gdrc.org/uem

□ *INEM - International Network for Environmental Management*
www.inem.org¹

¹ HQDA, FM 3-05.401, B-1 - B-4.

APPENDIX F

CIVIL AFFAIRS TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES LIST OF FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIST CAPABILITIES (2003)

CACOM Government Team	Sanitary Engineer
Team Chief	Team Sergeant
Public Administration Officer	Civil Affairs NCO
Public Education Officer	Civil Affairs Specialist
Public Safety Officer	Tactical CA Battalion Public Administration Team
Public Health Officer	Team Chief
Veterinary Preventive Medicine Officer	International Law Officer
Assistant Public Administration Officer	Public Administration Officer
Assistant Public Education Officer	Team Sergeant
Assistant Public Safety Officer	Civil Affairs Specialist
International Law Officer	CA Battalion (SO) Civic Action Team
Environmental Science Officer	Dentist
Sanitary Engineer	Physician Assistant
Team Sergeant	Veterinary Service Officer
Civil Affairs Specialist	Preventive Medicine NCO
CA Brigade Government Team	Animal Care NCO
Team Chief	CA Battalion (Active Army) Civic Action Team
Public Administration Officer	Battalion Surgeon
Public Education Officer	Battalion Veterinarian
Public Safety Officer	Staff Judge Advocate
Public Health Officer	Public Health Advisor
Veterinary Preventive Medicine Officer	Operations Law Officer
Assistant Public Administration Officer	Public Health Team
Assistant Public Education Officer	Team Chief (Preventive Medicine Officer)
Assistant Public Safety Officer	Sanitary Engineer
International Law Officer	Veterinary Preventive Medicine Officer
Clinical Nurse	Medical NCO
Environmental Science Officer	Professional Services NCO

Figure 10. CA Teams That Perform Government Functions

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2014), 3-16.

CACOM Economics and Commerce Team	Assistant Economics Development Officer (Labor)
Team Chief	Assistant Economics Development Officer (Finance)
Food and Agriculture Officer	Assistant Economics Development Officer (Projects)
Economics Development Officer (Commerce)	Assistant Civilian Supply Officer (Property Control)
Economics Development Officer (Labor)	Assistant Civilian Supply Officer (FNS)
Economics Development Officer (Finance)	Team Sergeant
Civilian Supply Officer (Price Control)	Civil Affairs NCO
Civilian Supply Officer (Property Control)	Civil Affairs Specialist
Assistant Food and Agriculture Officer	CA Battalion (SO) Civic Action Team
Assistant Economics Officer	Veterinary Service Officer
CA Brigade Economics and Commerce Team	Preventive Medicine NCO
Team Chief	CA Battalion (Active Army) Civic Action Team
Food and Agriculture Officer	Battalion Veterinarian
Economics Development Officer (Commerce)	Public Health Advisor
Economics Development Officer (Labor)	Team Medic
Economics Development Officer (Finance)	Tactical CA Battalion Civilian Supply Team
Economics Development Officer (Projects)	Team Chief
Civilian Supply Officer (Price Control)	Civilian Supply Officer
Civilian Supply Officer (Property Control)	Team Sergeant
Civilian Supply Officer (FNS)	Civil Affairs NCO
Assistant Food and Agriculture Officer	Civil Affairs Specialist
Assistant Economics Development Officer (Commerce)	Material Contracting/Accounting Specialist (2)

Figure 11. CA Teams That Perform Economics and Commerce Functions

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2014), 3-19.

CACOM Public Facilities Team	Assistant Public Transportation Officer
Team Chief	Assistant Public Works Officer
Public Transportation Officer	Team Sergeant
Public Works Officer (Utilities)	Civil Affairs NCO
Public Works Officer (Facilities)	Tactical CA Battalion Public Works and Utilities Team
Public Communications Officer	Team Chief
Assistant Public Transportation Officer	Public Works Officer (Utilities)
Assistant Public Works Officer	Public Works Officer (Facilities)
Team Sergeant	Team Sergeant
Civil Affairs Specialist	Power Plant Operator
CA Brigade Public Facilities Team	Civil Affairs NCO
Team Chief	Civil Affairs Specialist
Public Transportation Officer	CA Battalion (SO) Civic Action Team
Public Works Officer (Utilities)	Construction Engineer
Public Works Officer (Facilities)	CA Battalion (Active Army) Civic Action Team
Public Communications Officer	Team Engineer

Figure 12. CA Teams That Perform Public Facilities Functions

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2014), 3-20.

CACOM Special Functions Team	Civil Affairs NCO (3)
Team Chief	Civil Affairs Specialist (4)
Emergency Services Officer	CA Battalion (SO) Civic Action Team
Environmental Management Officer	Dentist
Cultural Relations Officer	Physician Assistant
Dislocated Civilians Officer	Construction Engineer
Assistant Emergency Services Officer	Veterinary Service Officer
Assistant Civil Information Officer	Senior Medical NCO
Assistant Dislocated Civilians Officer	Senior Engineer Officer
Assistant Cultural Relations Officer	Preventive Medicine NCO
CA Brigade Special Functions Team	Team Leader
Team Chief	Team Sergeant
Emergency Services Officer	Civil Affairs Specialist
Environmental Management Officer	CA Battalion (Active Army) Civic Action Team
Cultural Relations Officer	Battalion Surgeon
Dislocated Civilians Officer	Battalion Veterinarian
Assistant Civil Information Officer	Public Health Advisor
Assistant Dislocated Civilians Officer	Logistics Advisor
Team Sergeant	Operations Law Officer
Civil Affairs NCO	Team Leader
Tactical CA Battalion Dislocated Civilians Team	Team Sergeant
Team Chief	Team Engineer
Dislocated Civilians Officer	Team Medic
Team Sergeant	

Figure 13. CA Teams that Perform Specialty Functions

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2014), 3-22.

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