

NAZI GERMANY'S MASS MEDIA INFLUENCE APPROACH:  
AN INTROSPECTIVE APPLICATION TO TWENTY-  
FIRST CENTURY U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL  
OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
Homeland Security Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

NAZI GERMANY'S MASS MEDIA INFLUENCE APPROACH: AN INTROSPECTIVE APPLICATION TO TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY U.S. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS DOCTRINE, by Major Trey C. Goodwin, 132 pages.

The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a historical, comparative case study between Nazi propaganda and current U.S. Psychological Operations, investigating how they utilize the joint principle of mass to effectively disseminate messages to influence a specific target audience (TA). Nazi Germany propagandists effectively massed multiple media dissemination means to message, saturate, and dominate the German information environment (IE) before and during World War II (WWII). Due to the ever-increasing complexity and number of Information Related Capabilities (IRC) within a given IE, U.S. PSYOP forces need an organized, categorical structure for means of message dissemination. These IRCs and means could then be massed, nested, and mixed to affect an IE for a specific target audience, thus increasing the chance of achieving effects, accomplishing an operational end state, and causing true influence or behavior change.

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## ACRONYMS

ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
ATP	Army Techniques Publication
CMO	Civil Military Operations
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic (element of U.S. national power)
DoD	Department of Defense
EW	Electronic Warfare
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FM	Field Manual
IE	Information Environment
IO	Information Operations
IRC	Information Related Capability
JP	Joint Publication
MILDEC	Military Deception
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
MOE	Measure of Effectiveness
MOP	Measure of Performance
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NS	National Socialist
NSDAP	<i>Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartie</i> (National Socialist German Workers Party)
OE	Operating Environment
PO	Psychological Operations Objectives

PSYACT	Psychological Operations Action
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
RMVP	<i>Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda</i> (Reich Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda)
ROMO	Range of Military Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces
STO	Special Technical Operations
TA	Target Audience
USG	United States Government
UW	Unconventional Warfare
WWII	World War II

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Propaganda in the War was a means to an end, and the end was the struggle for the existence of the German people; consequently, propaganda could only be considered in accordance with the principles that were valid for this struggle.

—Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*

#### Background

The current information environment (IE) is more crowded today than it ever has been. The IE is composed of Information Related Capabilities (IRC) that continuously disseminate messages to a multitude of audiences. IRCs can vary in their methods and scope and often reach the audience in a form they do not recognize. There are numerous ways people receive information that directly influence their decision making, values, beliefs, and behaviors. This received, unnoticed information influences the population and yet they remain completely unaware of certain messages or of their origin. An IE saturated through IRCs, influences specific target audiences (TA) toward desired behaviors designed to invoke action or inaction or to change a fundamental, long held belief, value, or behavior. The crafter and disseminator of the message utilizes means and methods to saturate the shared IE for a specific TA, creating a narrative designed for precision targeted influence. The IE is an environment, thus shared amongst families, communities, and social groups that will inevitably propagate messages through normal, daily interaction. Message dissemination mediums can be non-linear, stochastic, and difficult to trace. In other words, the medium simply becomes the message, as the

message and the medium blend in a symbiotic relationship in which both become one.<sup>1</sup>

The TA often will not know where an idea originated or what force leads them to believe in a concept. An idea may simply form within the TA when it is continually bombarded with messages and information from various locations and different times.

In Germany, during the rise of the Nazi party, an IE began to evolve, new IRCs emerged, inundating the German population with messages designed to influence their beliefs about German nationalistic ideals and how they view the world outside of Germany. This thesis strives to gain an understanding of how Nazi Germany utilized multiple means of message dissemination to influence, and perhaps control and compel the German citizenry. Additionally, this thesis investigates how Nazi Germany organized and categorized those propaganda means to propagate its narrative and spread its messages throughout all levels of German society. The historical case study into Nazi propaganda is to gain insight into the categorical organization developed to use the principle of mass and thus saturate the IE for a specific TA. This categorical organization could be identified and adapted to current IEs, and utilized by U.S. PSYOP as a doctrinal, utilitarian tool for the effective massing of IRCs with the intent to influence. The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a historical comparative case study between Nazi propaganda and current U.S. PSYOP, investigating how they utilize the joint principle of mass to effectively disseminate messages to influence a specific target audience.

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<sup>1</sup> Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media, the Extensions of Man* (Canada: McGraw-Hill, 1964).

The principle of mass is one of twelve principles of joint operations and is “relevant as considerations to how the Armed Forces of the U.S. use combat power across the range of military operations (ROMO).”<sup>2</sup> While the principle of mass is the chief consideration for this study, there are other principles that require acknowledgement and that will present themselves throughout the course of this research. These additional joint principles were chosen to highlight due to their universality and necessity in the conduct of operations. They are easily identified in the conduct of Nazi propaganda and U.S. PSYOP. Furthermore, these principles lend credence to the principle of mass, strengthening its effectiveness and providing it focus. The joint principle of objective is of great importance as it directs every military operation to a “clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.”<sup>3</sup> This is observed in both Nazi propaganda and U.S. PSYOP and is always necessary to understand what mission accomplishment entails and requires. A clearly defined objective will also clarify and assist in defining mission or operational success. While the influence of a foreign TA may have many intricacies that complicate message dissemination, simplicity is required to ensure the probability of success. The principle of simplicity is used to “increase the probability that plans and operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.”<sup>4</sup> Simplicity is required to ensure subordinates clearly understand the intent and end state

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<sup>2</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017), A-1.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., A-3.

of a specific operation, without which leaves understanding open to interpretation. The final principle to be considered concurrently with the principle of mass is the joint principle of unity of command, which “ensures unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.”<sup>5</sup> In Nazi Germany, Adolf Hitler demanded obedience from all echelons of command within the Third Reich. Joseph Goebbels concurrently demanded obedience and knowledge of most propaganda operations conducted with the expectation that he would approve their execution. U.S. PSYOP, while working for many different, sometimes non-military entities, will always be responsible to executing operations approved by a single authority who authorizes and grants permission to execute those operations. These highlighted joint principles, and those not mentioned, require attention and consideration in the conduct of all operations.

#### Research Question

How does U.S. Psychological Operations use the principle of mass for message dissemination, considering and learning from the tactics, techniques, and procedures observed from the strategic propaganda campaigns of Nazi Germany? This thesis investigates Nazi propaganda and the means and methods by which propaganda was disseminated. Additionally, the thesis includes a comparative case study between Nazi Germany’s propaganda and current U.S. PSYOP doctrine, specifically in regards to message dissemination. The comparative case study will attempt to identify whether U.S. PSYOP forces should consider and learn from some of the concepts and look to the

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<sup>5</sup> JCS, JP 3-0, A-2.

principle of mass to control a narrative utilizing multiple means of dissemination to saturate the IE and influence a specific TA?

### Research Sub-Questions

The first research sub-question investigates Nazi propaganda with a focus on means, methods, and message dissemination. Additionally, it investigates the various echelons from which the propaganda was enacted and how the principle of mass was observed and used to achieve effects. Concurrently, the second sub-question examines twenty-first century U.S. PSYOP doctrine and various IRCs that potentially could be used to disseminate a message or messaging to influence and if the principle of mass is being considered for operations. The research sub-questions divide the historical comparative case study to focus analysis on each individual entity to provide due focus and mitigate bias in analysis.

1. Did Nazi Germany use the principle of mass in their strategic propaganda campaigns?
2. Does U.S. twenty-first century Psychological Operations consider the principle of mass for the conduct of influence operations?

### Assumptions

This thesis assumes Nazi propagandists attempted to maximize multiple means of message dissemination with the clear intent to influence the population, both within Germany and internationally. Also, that they intended to influence the German population with the clear purpose of having multiple audiences embrace their ideology and worldview. Additionally, a primary assumption is the IE within Germany was

saturated through the multiple IRCs disseminating information and the successful massing of multiple forms of dissemination against the population. Through these efforts, the population received messages from multiple overt and covert means to influence, compel, and control, while in some cases, the audience was unaware of these messages.

### Terms and Definitions

The following words and terms require additional fidelity as they relate to the topic within this thesis. These definitions highlight how the terms relate to one another to provide clarity as to their intention and true meaning. Furthermore, the differentiation in the manner in which certain terms are defined by U.S. PSYOP forces and Nazi Germany will be made clear.

Propaganda: Information, ideas, truths, falsehoods, or rumors deliberately spread widely to help or harm a person, group, movement, institution, or nation.<sup>6</sup> Propaganda will only refer to Nazi message dissemination. U.S. PSYOP forces do not conduct propaganda operations. Propaganda has also been defined as “a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulation and incorporated in an organization.”<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Dictionary.com, LLC, “Propaganda,” accessed 11 November 2018, <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/propaganda>.

<sup>7</sup> Randall L. Bytwerk, *Bending Spines: The Propagandas of Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic* (Ann Arbor: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 3.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP): Operations conducted to influence the behavior of foreign TA to support U.S. national objectives by conveying selected information and advising on actions that influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of those foreign audiences.<sup>8</sup> PSYOP is only authorized to be conducted on foreign TAs, and is strictly prohibited from being conducted on the U.S. population, even in foreign countries.

Psychological Operations Objective (PO): A general statement of measurable response that reflects the desired behavioral change of foreign TAs. The purpose of a PO is to state the desired behavior changes in selected TAs that will best support the accomplishment of the supported commander's mission.<sup>9</sup> A PO directly corresponds with the joint principle of objective.

Supporting Psychological Operations Objective (SPO): The specific behavioral responses desired from the TA to accomplish a given PO. SPOs are unique for each PO, and each PO always has two or more SPOs.<sup>10</sup>

The Seven-Phase PSYOP Process: A standardized, non-linear framework by which PSYOP are planned and conducted in support of a broad range of missions. The fundamental goal of the PSYOP process is to direct well-crafted and precise PSYOP at

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<sup>8</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 2005), 1-2.

<sup>9</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Special Text (ST) 33-01, *Military Information Support Operations Process* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2014), 1-23.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

the most appropriate foreign TAs to elicit behaviors favorable to U.S. national objectives.<sup>11</sup> ST 33-01 refers to this as the seven-phase MISO process. This thesis will refer to it as the seven-step PSYOP process for clarity and congruency in terminology. It is unknown how the pending TMs will refer to the seven-step process, but whatever the title may be, the steps remain the same and are vital to the conduct of planning and executing effective PSYOP.

Means of Dissemination: Tools, techniques, or actions employed to deliver a specific message to a designated audience.<sup>12</sup> Means of dissemination and dissemination platforms are ways that IRCs utilize their specific capabilities.

Measures of Effectiveness (MOE): An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time.<sup>13</sup> In the conduct of PSYOP, MOE refers to the overall effectiveness of the PSYOP operation in achieving the desired effect on the TA.

Measure of Performance (MOP): An indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.<sup>14</sup> MOP, in the conduct of PSYOP, refers

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<sup>11</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 2007), VIII.

<sup>12</sup> HQDA, ST 33-01, 6-9.

<sup>13</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 149.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

to the message reaching the desired TA in the manner at which was planned and intended.

Military Information Support Operations (MISO): Planned operations convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives.<sup>15</sup> For the purposes of this thesis, MISO will most always be conducted by PSYOP forces; however, there are other Department of Defense (DoD) entities that conduct MISO and operate to achieve effects in the IE.

Information Environment (IE): An aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. This environment consists of three interrelated dimensions, which continuously interact with individuals, organizations, and systems. These dimensions are the physical, informational, and cognitive.<sup>16</sup>

Information Related Capability (IRC): Tools, techniques, or activities employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and

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<sup>15</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017), I-1.

<sup>16</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014), I-1.

operationally desirable conditions.<sup>17</sup> A foundational focus for this thesis is how IRCs are effectively massed together in concert to achieve the desired effect or behavior change.

Extrinsic IRC: Extrinsic IRCs are external capabilities made available through assignment, attachment, or other command or support relationships for specific times or missions.<sup>18</sup>

Intrinsic IRC: Intrinsic IRCs are inherent in a unit's mission and table of organization or modified table of organization.<sup>19</sup>

Mass: The concentration of the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results.<sup>20</sup> For the purposes of this thesis, the term *mass* will refer to the concentration IRCs with the intent to influence, control, or compel a specific TA. Mass is a joint principle considered by all U.S. military forces. While the principle of mass is not specifically identified in PSYOP doctrine, mixing and nesting specific media types for the amplification of arguments or a specific message is. "A good media mix allows the TA to see the same arguments through various media forms, with each subsequent exposure reinforcing the overall PSYOP argument."<sup>21</sup> The proper massing, nesting, or mixing of media or means of dissemination adds legitimacy to an

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<sup>17</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-13, *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army), 1-3.

<sup>18</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-13.1, *Conduct of Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 2018), 3-2.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 3-1.

<sup>20</sup> JCS, JP 3-0, 186.

<sup>21</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.301, 3-6.

argument, increases a TA's exposure to messages, and increases opportunities for a TA to receive the message.

Non-linear: Refers to the randomness from which messages are disseminated and may appear in the IE. The dissemination does not follow a pattern. The TA may not be cognizant of receiving or in what manner the message was received.

Compel: A stability mechanism that means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority.<sup>22</sup> The utilization of the term *compel* describes how Nazi Germany paired violence with mass media to disseminate messages and its will on to the Germany citizenry.

Control: A stability mechanism that involves imposing civil order.<sup>23</sup>

Joint Operations: The primary way the U.S. DoD employs two or more Services (from at least two military departments) in a single operation.<sup>24</sup>

PSYACT: Actions planned and conducted by military forces as part of PSYOP series or supporting program. Any planned activity or action can be a PSYACT that causes a psychological reaction by an audience.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 2017), 2-4.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> JCS, JP 3-0, I-1.

<sup>25</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.301, 2-29.

Effect: The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect.<sup>26</sup> When discussing effects, PSYOP measures the effect a message has upon a target audience and whether or not that effect was desired or unintended. Furthermore, PSYOP defines effects as “the consequences that result from and immediately follow the TA’s current behavior. These consequences can be positive or negative. They can strengthen or weaken a behavior, therefore increasing or decreasing the likelihood of the behavior occurring again.”<sup>27</sup>

### Limitations

Time is the chief limitation in this study due to its limiting of research. Additionally, the amount of previously conducted research studies on Nazi propaganda before and during World War II (WWII) is vast. These volumes cover every aspect of Nazi propaganda leadership, theory, organizational structure, and implementation during this time. While there are many sources, authors have not specifically focused research on the nesting of IRCs with the intent to influence or the principle of mass. The principle of mass is a DoD term and most often would not be found in the historical writings on Nazi propaganda. This thesis has made some educated inferences with regards to the principle of mass and Nazi Germany’s use of multiple means of dissemination to influence, compel, and control.

The thesis classification restrictions also limit the exploration of the full depth of potential IRCs and dissemination means available to U.S. PSYOP forces from which to

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<sup>26</sup> JCS, JP 3-0, GL-8.

<sup>27</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.301, Glossary-6.

conduct influence operations. Chapter 5's recommendations for future research address PSYOP, the principle of mass, and identified limitations. Many of the discussed IRCs in this thesis at the unclassified level have higher classification capabilities and usages while maintaining the same foundational Army and joint doctrine as their governing documents.

A primary limitation, especially in regards to current U.S. PSYOP doctrine, is from a U.S. Army directive to transition from field manuals (FM) to consolidate doctrine and to limit vast collections of different manuals. This affected U.S. PSYOP doctrine by eliminating FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*, and FM 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*. FMs, such as Special Text (ST) 33-01, *Military Information Support Operations Process*, at the time of this writing, have temporarily replaced PSYOP FMs while future technical manuals are being composed. This research considers both the FMs and the ST as valid doctrine and utilizes them in the comparative case study and analysis of the principle of mass.

Finally, the lack of foundational Nazi propaganda doctrine limits the authenticity of a historical comparative case study between Nazi propaganda and U.S. PSYOP doctrine. The Nazi propaganda sources are mostly second-hand writings from various authors and from more recent studies. While some of the writings cited directly from Joseph Goebbels' diary, there is not valid doctrine from which to conduct a true comparison. This limits the thesis's study and validity as Nazi propaganda doctrine may have further alluded to the massing of means for message dissemination.

## Scope and Delimitations

The scope of this thesis will limit the research to the massing of the means for messaging by Nazi Germany propagandists and the methods by which they utilized these means to influence the German population. The thesis will not focus on the degradation of tactics, techniques, and procedures due to effects of combat in WWII and the success of the Allied Forces in the war's later years. Furthermore, there are two primary points that require consideration when making a doctrinal recommendations and considerations for U.S. PSYOP. There may be concern in utilizing Nazi Germany as an example for learning and considering in U.S. PSYOP; however, the research of Nazi Germany is solely due to its seemingly successful saturation of the information environment utilizing multiple means, their surgical use of a myriad of IRCs, and their massing of these IRCs to achieve control and measurable behavior change in a TA. The author does not focus on nor condone Nazi ideology, beliefs, nor the use of psychological operations against the U.S. population. This is merely an educational inquiry and historical comparative case study for the purposes of gaining a deeper understanding of the complexities of behavior change and how TA's respond to different forms of messaging and message dissemination.

Furthermore, this thesis will not focus on measures of effectiveness as it relates to Nazi propaganda success. A chief assumption is that Nazi propaganda was supremely effective in influencing its intended TA to achieve certain beliefs and/or behavior change. Additionally, the investigation of the TA analysis by the Nazi propagandists will only be in direct correlation with the discovery of the TA's vulnerabilities and accessibility to mass the IRCs of their time. Comparatively, this thesis's primary focus will be on the

tactics, techniques, procedures (TTP), and IRCs developed and implemented by Nazi propagandists and of their massing to achieve their purpose and overall end state. This thesis will not focus on Nazi Germany's overall propaganda campaign with regards to WWII or any specific battle. Further, it will not investigate the success of one specific means or method of dissemination over another, but instead will identify each and their overall effectiveness executed in concert with one another.

Finally, the focus on the joint principle of mass is a delimitation in this study. Many of the other joint principles deserve consideration in the study of both Nazi propaganda and U.S. PSYOP; however, for the purposes of this study, mass is the sole focus. The principle of mass will rarely be viewed as a sole principle and most often be found in conjunction and utilization with other joint principles in the conduct of operations. For this study, the isolation of the principle of mass allows for the identification and motivation for those involved in the dissemination of messages to consider the massing of all available resources and utilizing them in concert to achieve effects whether they be organic to their organization or externally, requiring synchronization, integration, and coordination.

#### Significance of Study

The study and understanding of Nazi propaganda and its use of the principle of mass with regards to IRCs is significant for twenty-first century U.S. PSYOP in distinct ways. While it is unlikely that U.S. PSYOP will ever have complete control of an IE within an Operational Environment (OE), it is very important to understand historical examples of this extreme condition. U.S. PSYOP never will control all forms of foreign media and message dissemination to utilize to influence potential TAs for behavior

change. Through the conduct of historical research, PSYOP can form a foundational understanding of extreme circumstances where foreign governments and entities maximized the entirety of the IE to influence, compel, and control a population. PSYOP Soldiers will gain perspective on how much more difficult influence operations are without complete operational control of IRCs and freedom of execution within the IE.

U.S. PSYOP operates to change values, beliefs, attitudes, and to change behaviors of audiences who most often are resistant to any form of messaging that appears foreign. PSYOP Soldiers should understand that massing IRCs effectively will lend credence and validity to their arguments and increase the likelihood of achieving desired effects. The clear organization and categorization of IRCs may allow PSYOP Soldiers to nest, mass, mix, and potentially saturate the IE with strategically planned and crafted messages. This historical comparative case study investigates Nazi Germany, their manipulation of the German IE, their effective nesting of numerous IRCs, and the use of those IRCs to effectively disseminate messaging to the intended TA. The study of this extreme case is beneficial to U.S. PSYOP as they conduct operations and seek to mass, nest, and mix multiple forms of message dissemination together in concert to influence a TA and achieve POs.

#### Summary and Conclusion

It is important to understand the methods and means in which Nazi Germany employed the principle of mass and effectively manipulated the IE in order influence, compel, and control the German people before and during WWII. Through the Nazi leadership's understanding of the power of propaganda, they crafted and implemented a strategic propaganda campaign that utilized multiple IRCs and means of message

dissemination. The execution of the Nazi strategic propaganda campaign was in an IE that was highly controlled and readily manipulated to ensure the Nazi message reached the widest audience. U.S. PSYOP forces rarely will operate in an environment where they are free to utilize the entire IE and disseminate messages using all available IRCs. Most often, PSYOP forces find that they have only limited means of dissemination at their disposal along with an audience that is resisting acceptance of the message.

The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a historical comparative case study between Nazi propaganda and current U.S. PSYOP investigating how they utilize the joint principle of mass to effectively disseminate messages to influence a specific target audience. In chapter 2, the research of additional resources explores Nazi propaganda, the different means of message dissemination and their use, and what mid-twentieth century technology was utilized to increase their propaganda dissemination effectiveness. Additionally, the analysis of current and past U.S. PSYOP doctrine enables an understanding of current methods and their effectiveness in regards to message dissemination. Finally, the reference of additional joint publications and other resources identifies other potential IRCs and if they are viable for consideration to effectively shape and affect an IE.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The secret of propaganda is this: to fill a person completely with the ideas of propaganda, without him even noticing that he has been filled with them.

—Joseph Goebbels, *Grassroots Propaganda*

The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a historical, comparative case study between Nazi propaganda and current U.S. Psychological Operations, investigating how they utilize the joint principle of mass to effectively disseminate messages to influence a specific target audience (TA). Nazi Germany propagandists effectively massed multiple media dissemination means to message, saturate, and dominate the German information environment (IE) before and during World War II (WWII). Due to the ever-increasing complexity and number of Information Related Capabilities (IRC) within a given IE, U.S. PSYOP forces need an organized, categorical structure for means of message dissemination. These IRCs and means could then be massed, nested, and mixed to affect an IE for a specific target audience, increasing the chance of achieving effects, accomplishing an operational end state, and causing true influence or behavior change.

The literature review for this thesis separates itself by the two sub-questions identified in chapter 1. Following the identification of the sub-questions, the proceeding literature and its implications will relate to the stated sub question and its link to the research question. At the end of chapter 2, there will be a short synopsis of the overall literature.

Sub-Question 1:  
Did Nazi Germany use the principle of mass  
in their strategic propaganda campaigns?

You can go on shooting up the opposition with machine-guns until they acknowledge the superiority of the gunners. That is the simpler way. But you can also transform the nation by a mental revolution and thus win over the opposition instead of annihilating them. We National Socialists have adopted the second way and intend to pursue it.

—Joseph Goebbels, *Propaganda in War 1939-1945*

There are numerous volumes investigating the Nazi Germany's philosophy with regards to propaganda and its almost surgical use while controlling the IE and the German population. However, there is limited research on the principle of mass and its direct application through the non-linear massing of message dissemination means. Robert Edwin Herzstein, in his treatise, *The War That Hitler Won*, describes Goebbels's philosophy by stating, "methods by which Goebbels and the party disseminated this message involves an analysis of the techniques of totalitarian thought control." Herzstein continues, "it reveals the close relationship between ideology and totalitarian techniques in the transmission of attitudes and ideas."<sup>28</sup> Additionally, *The War that Hitler Won* expounds upon Goebbels's view of himself and his abilities as the Propaganda Minister. Herzstein describes Goebbels as considering himself to be a great propagandist by claiming four distinct and key developments: "1) The creation of a base for National Socialism in the working-class areas of the Rhineland, 2) The conquest of Berlin, 3) The working out of the style and technique of the party's public ceremonies, and 4) The

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<sup>28</sup> Robert Edwin Herzstein, *The War That Hitler Won* (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1978), 17.

creation of the Hitler myth and his eventual deification.”<sup>29</sup> Herzstein deeply investigates Goebbels’s massing of multiple IRCs, task organization of sub-ministerial leaders of different propaganda means, and how their uses were nested in concert. Additionally, this work explores multiple means of message dissemination, their effectiveness, and how they were employed against the German populace.

In *Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War*, author Aristotle A. Kallis conducts a study of Nazi propaganda throughout the entire war and shows its various evolutions and usages in specific battles. Kallis identifies the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (NSDAP – National Socialist German Workers Party) as the forerunner to the Nazi party with Goebbels as a long time member and influencer.<sup>30</sup> Kallis goes on to further describe Goebbels as a “supremely able manager of propaganda, a central agent with clear views and strategies,” who wielded what he referred to as “technologically conditioned, near-complete monopoly of control, in the hands of the party and of the government, of all means of effective mass communication, such as the press, radio, and motion pictures.”<sup>31</sup> Kallis’s work is a comprehensive view of propaganda and explores the concept of totalitarianism. He discusses Goebbels’s constant struggle to assert the broad, totalitarian influence of propaganda activities under the control of the regime and eliminate any organizations that would see to lessen his control

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<sup>29</sup> Herzstein, *The War That Hitler Won*, 47.

<sup>30</sup> Aristotle A. Kallis, *Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 17.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-8.

or that interfered with his effective use of propaganda.<sup>32</sup> Goebbels was masterful and creative in his understanding of propaganda and its uses, but also developed his own principles that directed the wielding of this powerful tool. Kallis also focuses on Goebbels's concern that his influence may be degraded.

Leonard W. Doob, in a 1950 edition of the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, crafted a comprehensive list of Josephs Goebbels's principles of propaganda based primarily on both the published and unpublished portions of his diary.<sup>33</sup> These nineteen principles, while not focusing specifically on the principle of mass and its relation to propaganda dissemination, provides an excellent framework from which to understand Goebbels's overall understanding and propaganda philosophy. Doob admits that while Goebbels dictated this document's material, it does not necessarily indicate the total truth of him as a propagandist. Goebbels crafted his message and delivery based upon the audience that he imagined would be receiving the information.<sup>34</sup> "He always magnified the importance of his work, no doubt to indicate his own significance. The truth of what he dictated in this respect is also irrelevant, inasmuch as the effects of his efforts are not being scrutinized."<sup>35</sup> Of note, Goebbels understood the necessity of linking propaganda and intelligence. Principle number one states, "Propagandists must have access to intelligence

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<sup>32</sup> Kallis, *Nazi Propaganda*, 18.

<sup>33</sup> Leonard W. Doob, "Goebbels' Principles of Propaganda," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (January 1950): 419, accessed 11 September 2018, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2745999>.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 420.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 421.

concerning events and public opinion.”<sup>36</sup> The majority of the preceding principles are based on the understanding of the target audience and the reliance on accurate intelligence from which to craft messaging. In a bold proclamation of his own longing for power, Goebbels asserts his second principle as “Propaganda must be planned and executed by only one authority.”<sup>37</sup>

Jay W. Baird, in *The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945*, primarily focuses on the wartime use of propaganda and does an excellent job of encapsulating the overall Nazi propaganda philosophy. Baird deconstructs what he terms as *The Mythical World*, in which mass communication was controlled and weaponized by analyzing Goebbels in saying, “The peculiar genius of Hitler and Goebbels was to merge the themes of traditional German patriots with Nazi ideological motifs, a course pursued from the days of the earliest Munich rallies in 1919 until 1945.”<sup>38</sup> Goebbels was highly influenced by Hitler, in whose own ideas regarding the use of propaganda were identifiable with Goebbels. “Goebbels shared with Hitler an appreciation for the fundamentals of mass oratory, and they both realized that if they could convince the crowd, they could govern it as well.”<sup>39</sup> Baird compares Hitler’s views on propaganda’s uses and on whom it should be focused, specifically on its use to the uneducated masses,

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<sup>36</sup> Doob, “Goebbels’ Principles,” 422.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 423.

<sup>38</sup> Jay W. Baird, *The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda, 1939-1945* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), 4.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

and not to the questioning intellectuals.<sup>40</sup> Goebbels defined his role as a sole authoritarian controlling and directing propaganda policy and providing strategic plans for others to execute<sup>41</sup> Baird's focus is less on the philosophy behind the propaganda as he is interested how it was used in individual campaigns and battles in WWII. Interestingly highlighted within this work is the conflict that plagued the Propaganda Ministry as WWII began. Goebbels was an absolute fanatic about control and disapproved of even his subordinates to execute without prior approval. This caused conflict and, in some cases, put him, for a time, out of favor with Hitler.<sup>42</sup>

Z.A.B. Zeman, in his 1964 work, *Nazi Propaganda*, offers a sequential investigation into Nazism, the prioritization of propaganda within their National Socialist (NS) ideology, and the development of the NSDAP. Zeman gives as much credit to Hitler for the execution of the Nazi propaganda campaign as he does Goebbels. In his introduction, Zeman highlights Hitler's view regarding the importance of decisive propaganda operations with, "For Hitler, propaganda and organization were closely linked: on a scale of Nazi priorities, the former came first."<sup>43</sup> Zeman makes a differentiation and identifies the overall focus of the NS propaganda philosophy that was the forerunner to the Nazi prioritization of propaganda. "The poverty of their ideology

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<sup>40</sup> Baird, *The Mythical World*, 17.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 27.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>43</sup> Z.A.B. Zeman, *Nazi Propaganda* (London, England: Oxford University Press, 1964), 3.

was marked: National Socialism was basically an open invitation to an elect nation to indulge in the pursuit and the worship of naked power. Propaganda was an instrument of its achievement. It carried no consistent doctrine, but only an amorphous and opportunist set of ideas.”<sup>44</sup> Finally, Zeman highlights that Hitler was not concerned with the content of the Nazi propaganda and was viewed influence as more of a “political salesmanship in a mass market; perceiving the similarity between selling a product and being a politician to the people.”<sup>45</sup>

Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, in a more recent examination of Nazi propaganda titled *Selling Hitler*, proposes a unique vantage, and constructs his own methods and organizational structure of how the Nazis viewed propaganda. O’Shaughnessy identifies four methods that enabled the success of Nazi Propaganda: the deification of Hitler; the manipulation of an existential threat against Germany; the exploitation of the German citizenry who were prone to ethnonationalism; and ensuring that Nazi Germany maintained its benevolent status quo in the eyes of the people.<sup>46</sup> O’Shaughnessy continues with an interpretation of Nazi propaganda through what he refers to as a “conceptual trinity” encompassed by myth, symbolism and rhetoric.<sup>47</sup> “This triumvirate is the conceptual anatomy of all propaganda, via which we are able to condense,

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<sup>44</sup> Zeman, *Nazi Propaganda*, 2.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>46</sup> Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, *Selling Hitler* (London, England: C. Hurst and Co. Ltd, 2016), 4-5.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

organize, and interpret almost every aspect of polemical communication.”<sup>48</sup> He goes into greater detail utilizing his trinity and expounds upon the use of propaganda by the Nazis under each domain. Additionally, he divides his work into two distinct time periods for his analysis of Nazi propaganda philosophy and usage: *Imagining the Reich* (1920-1939) and *A Narrative of Third Reich Propaganda* (1939-1945).<sup>49</sup>

The 2010 article by Randall L. Bytwerk, *Grassroots Propaganda in the Third Reich: The Reich Ring for National Socialist Propaganda and Public Enlightenment*, investigates how the Nazi’s were able to spread propaganda to towns where mass media was not thoroughly saturating. The Reich Ring was created as part of the Nazi party’s efforts to inconspicuously disseminate propaganda to locals at the grassroots level.<sup>50</sup> “The Ring’s goal was to implement the propaganda line in a way less visibly influenced by the party.”<sup>51</sup> In contrast to previously reviewed works, this article highlights that while the use of mass media was greatly successful, it struggled to penetrate all parts of Germany, especially rural areas.<sup>52</sup> This led Goebbels to establish a *Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda* (RMVP) (Reich Ministry of Popular Enlightenment

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<sup>48</sup> O’Shaughnessy, *Selling Hitler*, 11.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-12.

<sup>50</sup> Randall L. Bytwerk, “Grassroots Propaganda in the Third Reich: The Reich Ring for National Socialist Propaganda and Public Enlightenment,” *German Studies Review* 33, no. 1 (February 2010): 94, accessed 08 November 2018, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40574929>.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 93.

and Propaganda) office in each *Gau* or administrative district, which were assigned the following tasks: “assuring that propaganda guidelines from the Reich and Gau levels reached everyone; organizing unified party ceremonies and holidays; resolving frictions and misunderstandings between groups; coordinating propaganda campaigns; holding regular meetings for propagandists; reporting at least quarterly to the national office; each organization had a liaison to the Ring at both the Reich and Gau levels.”<sup>53</sup> “From Goebbels point of view, the Ring was important, but uninteresting. Its purpose was to follow orders, not to contribute to propaganda strategy.”<sup>54</sup> The Ring was to bring propaganda to the interpersonal level, reaching down to the lowest level of the community utilizing friends and neighbors to infiltrate propaganda into normal human relationships.<sup>55</sup> Bytwerk analyses the lowest level of propaganda dissemination and how it worked in concert with the more overt means used nationwide.

David Welch asserts that the “success or failure of propaganda was due not simply to the resources and skill of the Propaganda Ministry and its ability to co-ordinate its campaigns, but also it depended on the prevailing opinions and prejudices of the German public.”<sup>56</sup> In Welch’s article, *Manufacturing of Consensus: Nazi Propaganda*

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<sup>53</sup> Bytwerk, “Grassroots Propaganda in the Third Reich,” 96.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 98.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 104-105.

<sup>56</sup> David Welch, “Manufacturing a Consensus: Nazi Propaganda and the Building of a ‘National Community’ (Volksgemeinschaft),” *Contemporary European History* 2, no. 1 (March 1993): 2, accessed 11 September 2018, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20081463>.

*and the Building of a National Community (Volksgemeinschaft)*, he submits that propaganda has a higher likelihood of success when the propagandist is reinforcing existing values, prejudices, beliefs, and behaviors.<sup>57</sup> This is contrasted with an audience to which the propagandist desires to change current values, beliefs, and behaviors, which can be cumbersome and require long periods of time. Welch reinforces the status of the German citizenry highlighting that “they were still suffering from a deep sense of national humiliation and weakened by inflation, economic depression and mass unemployment, and were attracted to a NS revival that proclaimed that it could integrate disparate elements under the banner of national rebirth for Germany.”<sup>58</sup> Once Goebbels established the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda (RMVP), it focused on the reeducation of the German citizenry based on the ideals and benefits of a NS society, which took its roots in the *volkisch* doctrine.<sup>59</sup> “The major themes that recur in Nazi propaganda during this period reflect the roots and antecedents of *volkisch* thought: 1) appeal to national unity based upon the principle “the community before the individual” (*Volkegemeinschaft*); 2) the need for racial purity; 3) a hatred of enemies which increasingly centered on Jews and Bolsheviks; and 4) charismatic leadership (*Fuhrerprinzip*).”<sup>60</sup> Nazi propaganda’s aim and central goal was to replace the prevailing class, religious and sectional loyalties with a heightened sense of national unity and

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<sup>57</sup> Welch, “Manufacturing a Consensus,” 2.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

allegiance to NS's ideals and values.<sup>61</sup> "In order to manufacture this consensus and sense of pure community (*volk*), Nazi propaganda urged the citizenry to place the community before the individual and place their faith in slogans like, "One People! One Reich! One Fuhrer!"<sup>62</sup>

Randall L. Bytwerk wrote a compare and contrast of propaganda techniques of National Socialism and Marxism-Leninism. Within *Bending Spines: The Propagandas of Nazi Germany and the German Democratic Republic*, Bytwerk considers that totalitarian propaganda is a quasi-religious phenomenon and many of the terms, slogans, and themes used in propaganda have strong religious undertones.<sup>63</sup> Bytwerk continues to analyze the deification of Hitler, how he was portrayed in the media, and how the country was expected to hold him as their Fuhrer and supreme leader. Comparatively and in contrast to many of the previous literature reviewed, Bytwerk speaks of the failures of Nazi propaganda and the messaging that directly contradicted what the German citizenry witnessed firsthand. "The principle that the Fuhrer or the party was infallible forced the system to say things that were not true and that contradicted the direct experience of those who received the propaganda."<sup>64</sup> Bytwerk highlights the many successes of Nazi propaganda, especially in maintaining the support of the half-hearted believers, however concludes his work by stating that it failed completely in truly compelling and controlling

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<sup>61</sup> Welch, "Manufacturing a Consensus," 3.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>63</sup> Bytwerk, *Bending Spines*, 11.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 55.

the population.<sup>65</sup> He concludes that ultimately the Nazis asked propaganda for more than it could do, and it was the total claims of truth that made the propaganda deceitful and unbelievable.<sup>66</sup>

In the 1944 work, *German Radio Propaganda: Report on Home Broadcasts During the War*, Ernst Kris and Hans Speier give a wholistic analysis of the use of radio as a primary tool used by the Nazi party for propaganda dissemination. Kris and Speier divide the book into three distinct parts that disclose how the radio formed a firm foundation from which other means of propaganda dissemination rested: the propaganda stage, the actors, and the situations.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, *German Radio Propaganda* explores the complex organizational structure not only under the Reich Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, but also the structure governing the systematic and precise use of radio broadcasting to compel and control the German population. “While the Propaganda Ministry exercises the supreme direction and supervision of the content of radio propaganda, three of its divisions are immediately concerned with radio activities: the Radio Division, the Propaganda Coordinating Division, and the Troops Entertainment Division.”<sup>68</sup> This work provides a timely analysis of the use of radio as the primary means employed in the strategic Nazi propaganda machine and how it was employed with great success.

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<sup>65</sup> Bytwerk, *Bending Spines*, 157.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 160-161.

<sup>67</sup> Ernst Kris and Hans Speier, *German Radio Propaganda: Report on Home Broadcasts During the War* (London, England: Oxford University Press, 1944), 51.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

Michael Balfour, in *Propaganda in War, 1939-1945, Organizations, Policies and Publics in Britain in Germany*, investigates both British and German propaganda operations throughout WWII. Balfour continues his exploration and further divides his work by focusing on the efforts during peace and wartime for both countries. The division of efforts for Nazi Germany is especially important as the years preceding WWII allowed Nazi propaganda to prepare the information environment and citizenry for the upcoming war and make them accustomed to the flow of pro-Nazi and Hitler messaging. Balfour continues by identifying the different divisions under the Propaganda Ministry and speaks to their overall task, purpose, and overall role within the propaganda strategy. Balfour focuses on the foundational beginnings of Goebbels and Nazi propaganda by quoting an entry from Goebbel's diary, stating:

What we are thinking of is a Ministry of Public Education in which film, radio, new educational establishments, art, culture, and propaganda will be combined. A revolutionary organization which will be under central control and will above all embody unmistakably the idea of the Reich. A really big project such as the world has never seen before. I am to start at once working out the bases of this Ministry.<sup>69</sup>

Balfour continues to analyze wartime propaganda by individual battles and significant moments within the years of warfare. This work, while providing a comparison and contrast between the two nations' influence campaigns, additionally provides a sharp contrast on the difference between a totalitarian government propaganda philosophy and a country using information, not for the control of its population, but for projection of calm and unification of a people on the brink of total fear.

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<sup>69</sup> Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War: 1939-1945: Organizations, Policies, and Publics in Britain and Germany* (London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1979), 12.

Sub-Question 2:  
Does twenty-first century Psychological Operations doctrine consider the principle of mass for the conduct of influence operations?

Neither a comprehensive, consolidated collection nor exhaustive list of IRCs exists in any DoD doctrine, nor should there be as available IRCs depend upon many variables unique to the specific operating environment. The second sub-question will encompass doctrines from the U.S. Army and the Joint force in the literature review. The U.S. Army doctrine will include past and current PSYOP manuals, information operations doctrine, and U.S. Army operations doctrine. The Joint doctrine will primarily analyze individual IRCs and the doctrine that governs their task, purpose, and how they doctrinally should be planned for and employed. The principle of mass and all available IRCs should be a foundational consideration in planning for operations in the IE. This literature review will only consider IRCs that are unclassified and while there are compartmentalized capabilities that need to be considered, they are not within the scope of this thesis.

U.S. Army Psychological Operations Doctrine

FM 3-05.30, *Psychological Operations*, is the primary doctrinal reference and the keystone publication for the principles and conduct of PSYOP.<sup>70</sup> “This manual explains the PSYOP fundamentals, unit functions and missions, command and control capabilities, and task organization.”<sup>71</sup> As a foundational manual, it should be linked to and considered

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<sup>70</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.30, V.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

with additional doctrinal principles to fully encompass all aspects of PSYOP and its employment in the IE and OE.<sup>72</sup> FM 3-05.30 identifies the six core tasks required of PSYOP Soldiers as:

1. Develop: “Development involves the selection of PSYOP objectives (PO) and supporting PSYOP objectives (SPO), the conceptualization of multiple PSYOP series, the development of specific product ideas within a series, and the recommendation of actions that will influence the beliefs and attitudes of TAs and ultimately modify their behavior.”<sup>73</sup> During the develop task, PSYOP Soldiers conceptualize how they will accomplish the mission, understand the TA, and go through multiple steps of analysis and in the creation of PSYOP products.<sup>74</sup>
2. Design: The technical task of the conceptualization in the develop task and create an audio, visual, or audiovisual prototype.<sup>75</sup>
3. Produce: The transformation of approved PSYOP product prototypes into various media forms that will reach the identified TA in a way that they are accustomed.<sup>76</sup>
4. Distribute: The movement of completed PSYOP products from the production source to the point of dissemination.<sup>77</sup> This is especially important depending on

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<sup>72</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.30, V.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 1-5.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

the IRC being utilized as it could require additional coordination between multiple organization, agencies, and entities.

5. Disseminate: This task is the delivery of the PSYOP product to the TA.<sup>78</sup> Singular or multiple means of dissemination may accomplish this.
6. Evaluate: The final task integrates multiple capabilities in order to determine the effectiveness of the PSYOP product on the TA. The PSYOP Soldiers will synchronize with other assets to measure the effectiveness of a disseminated product and determine if additional effects occurred.<sup>79</sup>

FM 3-05 goes further in identifying PSYOP's role within the Elements of National Power (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) and how it is to be utilized.<sup>80</sup> Finally, the FM expounds upon current and potential PSYOP organizations, command and control execution and integration, and how PSYOP is to be employed in a multi-national environment where it is necessary to coordinate with other country's PSYOP elements.<sup>81</sup>

FM 3-05.301 *Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* and ST 33-01 *Military Information Support Operations Process* act as implementation guides based on the guidance presented in FM 3-05.30 *Psychological*

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<sup>78</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.30, 1-5.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 1-6.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 2-1.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 4-1.

*Operations.*<sup>82</sup> ST 33-01 is a transitional publication that is updated with current terminology, references, and changes in Army doctrine.<sup>83</sup> An identified research limitation in chapter 1, ST 33-01 acts as transitional doctrine until future PSYOP technical manuals are approved and released. Both manuals describe the requirements, inputs, and outputs of the PSYOP process, which are a standardized, non-linear framework by which PSYOP are planned and conducted in support of a broad range of missions.<sup>84</sup> “The PSYOP process is a methodology focused on developing a series of products and actions designed to change the behavior of foreign TAs, support national objectives, and is composed of seven phases:”<sup>85</sup>

1. Planning
2. Target Audience (TA) Analysis
3. Series Development
4. Product Development and Design
5. Approval
6. Production, Distribution, and Dissemination
7. Evaluation

ST 33-01 elaborates on each of the seven phases and identifies how PSYOP Soldiers must conduct the phase, specific phases require who and what, and what the

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<sup>82</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.301, VII.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, IX.

identified output of each phase should be. Additionally, this a very technical manual that analyzes PSYOP TTPs, products, and seeks to inform PSYOP Soldiers on what constitutes success in regard to proper message dissemination.

FM 3-05-302, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, focuses primarily on the conduct of PSYOP at the tactical level. The tactical level of war is the lowest level in full spectrum operations and most often requires direct interaction with the local populace.<sup>86</sup> “Tactical PSYOP have the ability to interact with foreign audiences at the point where behavior is most effectively changed and evaluated.”<sup>87</sup> FM 3-05.302 continues to identify the nuances of tactical level PSYOP by identifying the different command and organization structures, mission sets, and tactical level supported units. Additionally, the FM takes the seven phases of the PSYOP process and identifies the difference in executing the phases at the tactical level and some unique planning considerations for the PSYOP Soldier to consider for conducting tactical PSYOP.<sup>88</sup>

ATP 3-53.1 *Military Information Support in Special Operations* highlights how PSYOP forces conduct and enable SOF core activities such as unconventional warfare (UW), counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense (FID) across the range of military operations (ROMO). MISO identifies as a SOF core activity and PSYOP forces conduct

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<sup>86</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-05.302, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 2005), 1-4.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, IX.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 6-1.

operations as part of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Special Warfare capability. ATP 3-53.1 identifies PSYOP command structure, planning considerations, and the proper employment of PSYOP forces for the conduct of MISO. Unique to this ATP is the focus on PSYOP's role in conducting tactical deception (TAC-D) in support of Special Operations. "TAC-D seeks to exploit situations confronting the adversary decisionmaker. To accomplish this objective, TAC-D employs physical, technical, and administrative means."<sup>89</sup> Additionally highlighted is the incorporation of TAC-D into MISO in direct support of the overarching special operation's objectives and directed operational end state. Ultimately, PSYOP forces conduct TAC-D and other capabilities to disrupt and confuse an enemy decisionmaker across the ROMO and to shape an operational environment to provide a tactical advantage.<sup>90</sup> Finally, ATP 3-53.1 discusses how PSYOP forces integrate, support, and conduct MISO in direct support to other SOF entities and how PSYOP forces are most effectively task organized to maximize effectiveness.

#### U.S. Army Doctrine

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0 is a foundational U.S. Army doctrine specifically focusing on roles and responsibilities in the conduct of Unified Land Operations (ULO). ULO is defined as "the simultaneous offensive, defensive, and

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<sup>89</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-53.1, *Military Information Support to Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 2015), 9-6.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 9-1.

stability or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains to prevent conflict, shape the operational environment, and win our nation's wars as part of unified action.”<sup>91</sup> ADRP 3-0 discusses the mission, purpose, roles, and core competencies of the U.S. Army in five distinct chapters.<sup>92</sup> These chapters discuss U.S. Army operations, operation art and framework for planning, the operational concept of ULO, and combat power.<sup>93</sup> Stability mechanisms have direct significance to the conduct of PSYOP. “A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace.” Similarly, as with IRCs, “combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms alone.”<sup>94</sup> The four stability mechanisms are:

1. Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority.<sup>95</sup>
2. Control involves imposing civil order.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> HQDA, ADRP 3-0, VI.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, V.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-3.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

3. Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy targets and audiences through messages, presence, and actions.<sup>97</sup>
4. Support means to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively.<sup>98</sup>

Finally, ADRP 3-0 is a doctrinal reference primarily for commanders and staffs to utilize in planning in conjunction with other key U.S. Army doctrine in the conduct of ULO.<sup>99</sup>

FM 3-13 *Information Operations* (IO) is the overarching doctrinal reference for the conduct of information operations in an operational environment. The definition of IO is the “integrated employment, during military operations, of IRC in concert with other lines of operation (LOO) to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.”<sup>100</sup> FM 3-13 identifies primary tasks of IO including the following:

1. Integration and synchronization of IRCs.<sup>101</sup>
2. Planning, preparing, execution, and assessment.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> HQDA, ADRP 3-0, 2-3.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., III.

<sup>100</sup> HQDA, FM 3-13, 1-2.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

3. Capability and capacity ensure the accomplishment of IO, to include the units and personnel responsible for its conduct.<sup>103</sup>

Primarily, IO integrates and synchronizes IRCs, and PSYOP forces rely on and coordinate with IO entities to understand the IE and IRCs that are available for potential use in the conduct of MISO. FM 3-13 offers a list of IRCs that is not comprehensive, but gives framework to the creation of a more exhaustive list. FM 3-13 identifies how IO integrates across ROMO and the identified functions of IO in planning, in concert with the other elements of combat power, and in the joint environment. FM 3-13 identifies the IE requiring understanding by commanders and staffs and it is incumbent on those Soldiers operating in the IE to assist in providing that understanding.<sup>104</sup> FM 3-13 separates the IE into three distinct dimensions that must be considered and effects planned within each: physical, informational, and cognitive.<sup>105</sup> FM 3-13 does discuss opportunities in planning for the opportunities to mass IO effects across units identifying mutually beneficial effects.<sup>106</sup> Finally, FM 3-13 covers how IO is integrated into planning, preparation, and execution along with its role in the targeting process and IO responsibility in the assessment of IE.

ATP 3-13.1, *The Conduct of IO*, “provide[s] U.S. Army leaders and IO professionals with essential information necessary to integrate IO effectively into their

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<sup>103</sup> HQDA, FM 3-13, 1-2.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 5-2.

unit's operations and guides leaders to synchronize IRCs effectively.”<sup>107</sup> ATP 3-13.1 focuses on how the IO Soldiers effects the IE by identifying specific roles and responsibilities in Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), the determination of available assets, the identification, synchronization, and allocation of IRCs, and the coordination of intelligence support and integration of IO into the targeting process.<sup>108</sup> Unique to ATP3-13.1 is the focus on social media in its role of an emergent IRC and its likely potential to be a power tool for IO due to its ability to integrate with other IRCs.<sup>109</sup> Especially relevant to PSYOP forces is IO's ability to request non-organic IRCs or capabilities that are not on hand but may support effects generation.<sup>110</sup> ATP 3-13.1 provides comprehensive guidance on how IO integrates into a staff, and provides the commander with an accurate picture of the IE and how it may be affected to meet intent and achieve their overall operational end state.

#### U.S. Joint Doctrine

IO is inherently joint in nature and thus PSYOP and the conduct of MISO is joint.<sup>111</sup> PSYOP forces must operate in the joint environment and take opportunities to learn and understand how to navigate and communicate successfully within that

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<sup>107</sup> HQDA, ATP 3-13.1, IX.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, I.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, 3-9.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>111</sup> HQDA, FM 3-13, 1-5.

environment. There is a myriad of IRCs within the joint force that can and must be utilized to great effect by PSYOP forces to affect the operational and informational environment. The absence of a clear understanding of the joint force’s capabilities limits PSYOP’s effectiveness and value. Ultimately, joint doctrine “standardizes terminology, training, relationships, responsibilities, and processes among all U.S. forces free joint forces commanders (JFC) and their staffs to focus their efforts on solving strategic, operational, and tactical problems.”<sup>112</sup> This subsection of the literature review will focus on U.S. joint doctrine from a variety of specialties and how these specialties can be used by PSYOP forces as IRC’s for the potential dissemination of messaging. The utilization of many of these joint doctrines only have a limited capability as an IRC; however, they are relevant when considering the principle of mass and maximizing all available resources towards a PSYOP objective. The division of this subsection into the following four subsections is for the purpose of organization and ease of understanding: foundational joint doctrine, PSYOP/MISO joint doctrine, joint doctrine governing IRCs, and additional relevant joint doctrine.

### Foundational Joint Doctrine

JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, is the foundational military doctrine that provides fundamental principles for the employment of U.S. military forces toward a common objective, identifies command and control of joint

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<sup>112</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017), I-1.

operations, and is an introduction to the fundamentals of joint planning.<sup>113</sup> This publication is fundamental to an understanding of the joint force and provides necessary insight into how the U.S. military functions as a joint force. JP 1 also highlights how policy links to doctrine, which drives the conduct of military operations. JP 1 directs how the joint force will conduct operations as well as the development of the joint force. Finally, JP 1 provides overarching guidance how many of the plans and programs within the U.S. military execute operations and support the service members.

JP 3-0, *Operations*, and JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, are fundamental joint doctrines that dictate and direct the planning and execution of joint operations. Joint operations are comprised of twelve distinct principles: mass, objective, offense, surprise, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, simplicity, resilience, perseverance, and resiliency.<sup>114</sup> Joint operations are preceded by joint planning, which is a “deliberate process of determining how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve objectives (the ends) while considering the associated risks.”<sup>115</sup> JPs 3-0 and 5-0 are used in concert with JP 1 in the conduct of joint operations and must be considered and utilized in all phases of a joint planning and operations.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> JCS, JP 1-0, I-1.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017), I-1.

<sup>116</sup> JCS, JP 3-0, I-1.

JP 3-05.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*, provides doctrinal guidance in the conduct, planning, and execution of joint special operations task force (JSOTF) operations across the ROMO.<sup>117</sup> Unique to JP 3-05.1 is its Appendix A, “Psychological Operations in Support of Special Operations,” that highlights some of key roles and responsibilities of PSYOP forces in the conduct of SOF core activities: UW, FID, special reconnaissance (SR), direct action (DA), and counterterrorism (CT).<sup>118</sup> JP 3-05.1 is the foundational doctrine in the conduct of joint special operations and encompasses PSYOP forces and the execution of MISO. Additionally, it provides additional command, control, and organizational structure for SOF and how it nests within and contributes to the overall joint operating force.

#### IO/PSYOP/MISO Joint Doctrine

JP 3-13, *Information Operations*, is the joint doctrine for the conduct of information operations in the joint environment. Like the U.S. Army’s FM 3-13, *Information Operations*, JP 3-13 begins by defining the IE, IRCs, and the proper execution of IO by the joint force. This publication continues by describing how IRCs integrate into the joint planning process (JPP) and how they should synchronize and coordinate. Unique to JP 3-13 are the multinational considerations of IO and how it utilizes multi-national partners for the conduct of IO in the joint operating area. It

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<sup>117</sup> JCS, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001), I.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, A-1-2.

continues with recommendations for the successful integration, coordination, and synchronization with multinational partners and what capabilities they may be able to contribute to the operation.<sup>119</sup> JP 3-13 also identifies how important it is to understand multi-national partner IO vulnerabilities and what IRCs they have at their disposal.<sup>120</sup>

JP 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations (MISO)*, is the joint doctrine that “provides guidance for the planning, execution, and assessment of MISO in support of joint, multinational, and interagency activities across the ROMO.”<sup>121</sup> JP 3-13.2 issues direction on the MISO command control structure, authorities to conduct MISO, the joint MISO process, and the employment of MISO in the joint operating area.<sup>122</sup> This publication highlights some enablers that may augment efforts in the conduct of MISO and their potential contributions. It identifies unique intelligence requirements, communications challenges, and logistics requirements that are unique to forces conducting MISO.<sup>123</sup>

JP 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, is very similar to JP 3-13.2 and shares much of the same information. JP 3-53 uniquely focuses on the conduct of

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<sup>119</sup> JCS, JP 3-13, V-2.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, V-3.

<sup>121</sup> JCS, JP 3-13.2, I.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, V.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, VII-1.

PSYOP across the ROMO and its different mission sets along the conflict continuum.<sup>124</sup> Additionally, the publication addresses the role of PSYOP in the targeting process and where it contributes. Finally, JP-53 highlights some of the interagency coordination that PSYOP forces may experience in the conduct of operations, especially when operating in and around U.S. embassies.<sup>125</sup>

JP 3-13.4, *Military Deception* (MILDEC), is the publication that provides operational framework for the conduct of MILDEC in the joint operating area. The JP defines the purpose of MILDEC as “intended to deter hostile actions, increase the success of friendly defensive actions, or to improve the success of any potential friendly offensive action through the misleading of adversaries as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended mission of friendly forces.”<sup>126</sup> JP 3-13.4 identifies the three categories of MILDEC supporting joint operations:

1. Joint MILDEC: planned and conducted in a theater of operations to support military campaigns and major military operations.<sup>127</sup>
2. Deception in Support of Operational Security (DISO): a MILDEC activity that protects friendly operations, personnel, programs, equipment, and

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<sup>124</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2003), VI-1.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, IV-16.

<sup>126</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.4, *Military Deception* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2012), I-1.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, I-2.

other assets against foreign intelligence and security services (FISS) collection.<sup>128</sup>

3. Tactical Deception (TAC-D): deception activities planned and conducted to support battles and engagements.<sup>129</sup>

JP 3-13.4 continues to identify the MILDEC principles, fundamentals, roles, and responsibilities of the MILDEC planner, and MILDEC as a capability of IO.<sup>130</sup> Finally, MILDEC utilizes a “see, think, do,” methodology that requires the deception to end in an action, or inaction of an adversary that support the joint forces commander’s operational plan.<sup>131</sup>

#### Joint Doctrine for IRCs

The review of the proceeding joint doctrine publications is due to their potential as an IRC that PSYOP forces could utilize to affect an OE and IE. While the identified IRCs will not be available in all OEs the PSYOP Soldier needs to have a general understanding of their existence, the owner of the IRC, the doctrine that governs their employment, and the IRC’s capabilities and limitations. With a working knowledge of the aforementioned items, the PSYOP Soldier could potentially integrate capabilities towards achieving effects on a TA and achieve an operational end state. This section of the literature review will only highlight content that is applicable for PSYOP and the

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<sup>128</sup> JCS, JP 3-13.4, I-2.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid., VIII.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., XI.

discipline's potential use as an IRC. An assumption is that the proceeding joint doctrine will provide: authorities, guidance on employment, strategic task organization, command and control constructs, and general guidance for the proper employment of the identified joint capability.

JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*, governs the military's operations that occur within the cyberspace domain. JP 3-12 identifies the three types of cyberspace missions; offensive cyber operations (OCO), defensive cyber operations (DCO), and Department of Defense information network (DODIN) operations. "Cyberspace is wholly contained within the IE and can be integrated with other information activities and capabilities to create effects in the IE in support of joint operations."<sup>132</sup> JP 3-12 identifies cyberspace as a domain from which other IRCs may operate and it specifically identifies the conduct of MISO and MILDEC in cyberspace to leverage information and change enemy behavior.<sup>133</sup>

"Manipulation, is a form of cyberspace attack, that can control or change information, information systems, or networks in gray or red cyberspace to create physical denial effects, using deception, decoying, conditioning, spoofing, falsification, and other similar techniques using an adversaries information resources for friendly purposes."<sup>134</sup> JP 3-12 identifies the role of cyberspace operations within the joint

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<sup>132</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), I-7.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

function of information and states that “cyberspace is a medium in which specific IRCs may be employed, but are still synchronized, integrated, and deconflicted with other capabilities to gain and maintain an advantage.”<sup>135</sup> Integration and synchronization must remain consistent throughout operations in the IE to avoid redundant or conflicting information activities, wasted time, and loss of resources.<sup>136</sup> PSYOP’s reliance on cyberspace operations will continue to increase as the IE becomes more and more reliant on the cyberspace domain for the passing and processing of information.

JP 3-14, *Space Operations*, governs the military’s operations that occur within the space domain, their employment, and the DoD entities that govern their employment and their maintenance. Additionally, JP 3-14 identifies the specific DoD space mission areas.<sup>137</sup>

1. Space Situational Awareness
2. Space Force Enhancement
3. Space Support
4. Space Control
5. Space Force Application

“Offensive space control (OSC) are measures taken to prevent an adversary’s hostile use of a U.S. or third-party space capabilities or offensive operations to negate an

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<sup>135</sup> JCS, JP 3-12, II-14.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, *Space Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), V.

adversary's space capabilities used to interfere with or attack U.S. or allied space systems.”<sup>138</sup> Specifically under OSC is a form of negation named manipulation. “Manipulation are those measures designed to mislead an adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the adversary to react in a manner prejudicial to their interests.”<sup>139</sup>

JP 3-13.1, *Electronic Warfare*, introduces and discusses operations conducted within the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and the electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE). “The military requirement for unimpeded access to, and use of, the EMS is the key focus for joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO), both in support of military operations and as the focus of operations themselves. Electronic warfare (EW) is essential for protecting friendly operations and denying adversary operations with the EMS throughout the OE.”<sup>140</sup> EW has a direct role in the conduct of MISO, as PSYOP forces often use the EMS to disseminate messaging to TAs using available EW platforms.<sup>141</sup> EW activities support MISO by providing the means to deliver a message to a TA via the EMS, offer unique and necessary planning considerations from the conduct of MISO in the EMS, and advise on potential threats and reactions to MISO broadcasts and other activities.<sup>142</sup> Close coordination between EW

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<sup>138</sup> JCS, JP 3-14, II-8.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>140</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.1, *Electronic Warfare* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2012), I-1.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, IV-4.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*

and PSYOP forces should occur throughout an operation as each entity views the EMS from a different vantage and gain specific insight to their discipline that may affect the other. Due to the comprehensive nature of the EMS, EW forces often become a nexus for different IRCs as many will be conducting operations through the EMS. Synchronized working groups and boards mitigate redundant efforts, deconflict potential points of friction, and synchronize tasks as to be mutually beneficial when able.

JP 3-16, *Multination Operations*, governs multination operations, which defines these actions as “operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance.”<sup>143</sup> Multinational operations have multiple considerations for the conduct of operations in the IE. Levels of classification, information and TTP sharing, and need to know must be considering when conducting operations with multinational partners. “Multination IO depend on a systemic understanding of the IE, cooperative arrangements with the aim of full coordination and integration of options, and flexibility and adaptability to mission and requirements.”<sup>144</sup> Multinational partners may have control over IRCs unknown to PSYOP forces or those which would not be available due to lack of access and placement. The conduct of MISO in conjunction with multinational partners should always be a consideration as it may widen the assortment of IRCs and thus potentially increase the means of dissemination available for use.

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<sup>143</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, *Multinational Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), I-1.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, III-30.

JP 3-57, *Civil Military Operations*, “are the activities performed by military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI).”<sup>145</sup> Due to the access and placement in EMBASSIES and semi-permissive environments, the units that conduct civil military operations (CMO) are able to reach key leaders and local populations and can act as effective IRCs in the dissemination of themes and messages.<sup>146</sup> CMO’s access and placement can potentially collect MOP and MOE of MISO conducted in certain areas. MISO can act as an enabling operation for CMO and CMO can concurrently enable MISO.<sup>147</sup> Finally, CMO forces can act as a liaison between governmental and non-governmental entities and PSYOP forces.

JP 3-13.3, *Operational Security (OPSEC)*, governs the conduct of OPSEC by U.S. and multinational forces to reduce vulnerabilities and deny adversaries the ability to exploit critical information.<sup>148</sup> OPSEC directly involves denying or degrading adversary intelligence collection activities and protects the force through the incorporation of countermeasures designed to reduce exploitation vulnerabilities.<sup>149</sup> OPSEC is designated as an IRC and has multiple implication with the conduct of MISO, MILDEC, and other

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<sup>145</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), I-1.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, I-1.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, II-4.

<sup>148</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.3, *Operational Security* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2016), I-1.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*

IRCs. “OPSEC, as an IRC, denies the adversary the information needed to correctly assess friendly capabilities and intentions while hampering their use of their own information systems and processes.”<sup>150</sup> IO, MIDLEC, and OPSEC planners, in close coordination and collaboration, are able to develop supporting operations called deception in support of OPSEC to further augment the protection of the force and affect an adversary’s decision making.<sup>151</sup> OPSEC and additional IRCs should work in close proximity to ensure information and communication infrastructure is properly protected and monitored for risks of exploitation by adversaries or potential adversaries.

#### Additional Relevant Joint Doctrine

The proceeding doctrine is relevant due to the inclusion of the conduct of MISO by PSYOP forces and its effect on how IRCs are utilized and messaging disseminated. The review and consideration of this doctrine is advantageous due to its unique environmental and operational considerations, targeting implications, and its effects on the conduct of MISO and its ability to potentially mass IRCs. The literature review for this sub-section will focus primarily on the doctrine’s implication for the conduct of MISO and not on the doctrine’s primary purpose or discipline and thus not reviewed.

JP 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare (UW)*, is a For Official Use Only (FOUO) document that governs the conduct of UW. MISO, MILDEC, and EW as IRCs play a significant role in all phases of UW operations. While this thesis is unable to expound upon the specifics in regards to PSYOP forces and the conduct of MISO in UW due to

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<sup>150</sup> JCS, JP 3-13.3, I-4.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

classification, the potential to utilize the indigenous population in a country as a potential IRC remains a viable option through careful planning and coordination. “As UW is a struggle over legitimacy, influencing relevant populations through the employment of IRCs is critical to USG and partner legitimacy.”<sup>152</sup>

JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*, directs the synchronization, integration, and employment of lethal and non-lethal joint fires to affect the OE and achieve the operational end state.<sup>153</sup> MISO is employed as a non-lethal fire to create effects within the OE and IE, limit collateral damage, reduce risk to civilians, and potentially reduce opportunities for enemy exploitation of friendly forces actions.<sup>154</sup> “Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.”<sup>155</sup> PSYOP forces take an active role in the joint targeting process in conjunction with IO entities in the recommendation of potential non-lethal targets and the creation of specific desired effects for the achievement of objectives.<sup>156</sup>

JP 3-06, *Joint Urban Operations*, govern the conduct of joint operations in an urban environment, which is described as a complex man-made physical domain

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<sup>152</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015), III-18.

<sup>153</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-09, *Joint Fire Support* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014), I-1.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, III-10.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, I-3.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*

composed of a population of significant size and density, multiple multi-storied structures, and is dynamic and in a constant state of motion.<sup>157</sup> Most significant to PSYOP forces in the conduct of urban operations is the density of population and potential TAs, the overly complex IE, and the high concentration of IRCs.<sup>158</sup> This can be an advantage or a disadvantage as “media hostile to U.S. can misrepresent or lie about results of military operations, further their agenda, or shape perceptions about operations through the use of a myriad of means.”<sup>159</sup> Psychological effects may be achieved through the use of denying public resources or promoting civil unrest amongst the population to achieve desired effects. Required not to lose the disseminated message in the IE’s noise and ensure message saturation is a detailed target audience analysis and an understanding of how information moves within the IE.

JP 3-25, *Countering Threat Networks*, governs the operational understanding of threat networks, their transcendence above geographic and operational boundaries, their multi-faceted nature, and some considerations for planning operations to achieve effects against them.<sup>160</sup> The United States Government (USG) takes a whole of government approach to countering threat networks as “the intelligence community maintains watch on those identified factors in the OE, the Department of State, DOD, and interagency

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<sup>157</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-06, *Joint Urban Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), I-3.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, I-7.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>160</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-25, *Countering Threat Networks* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2016), I-1.

partners consider their relative equities to determine if action is warranted.<sup>161</sup> PSYOP forces in the conduct of MISO have a large responsibility in countering threat networks as the IE is not confined by operational boundaries. During the initial shape phase IO and PSYOP entities must understand the OE and IE, and how potential “IRCs can be integrated as part of the whole-of-government approach to effectively shape the IE and to achieve the information objectives.”<sup>162</sup> JP 3-25 continues to identify special technical operations (STO), MISO, cyber operations, MILDEC, and EW especially relevant during initial operational phases in shaping adversaries and potential adversaries perceptions and affect their decision making process.<sup>163</sup> Finally, PSYOP forces, in conjunction with mission and interagency partners, can conduct social and communications network analysis on threat networks, target potential nodes and linkages, and cause effects on their primary means of communication. JP 3-25 highlights the extreme importance of open communication within the community of interest and bringing all capabilities together to reach a shared operational end state.

JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*, “describes the joint force’s coordination with various external organizations that may be involved with, or operate simultaneously with, joint operations, and include USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations (NGO); and the

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<sup>161</sup> JCS, JP 3-06, I-1.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, 3-25-26.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, 3-25.

private sector.”<sup>164</sup> PSYOP forces, especially those operating in U.S. embassies, need to understand basic systems utilized by many governmental and NGOs in order maximize operations. Additionally, through proper coordination and planning many of these organizations could be potential IRCs for the conduct of MISO and also provide insight that could improve overall effectiveness. “Mission partners are agencies, organizations, or entities that the U.S. military works with in a specific situation or operation, based on an agreement, commitment, or willing arrangement to advance mutual interests.”<sup>165</sup>

JP 3-08 identifies the organizational environment as most important for military forces to understand in an interorganizational environment and highlights vital areas for the conduct of operations.<sup>166</sup>

1. The nature of interagency coordination
2. Building a common operating picture
3. Unified department of defense position
4. Establishing unifying goals
5. Mutual needs and interdependence
6. Long and short-term objectives

Finally, intergovernmental cooperation plays a significant role in joint forces planning and needs to including in all phases to ensure unity of effort. This whole-of-

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<sup>164</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2016), I-1.

<sup>165</sup> JCS, JP 3-06, I-3.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, I-14.

government approach will enable operations and assist in the achievement in an operational end state.

### Literature Review Summary

This is a summary of chapter 2 of this thesis, which is a literature review of collected publications and composed works directly related to the primary research question and the two specified sub-questions. The division and organization of Chapter 2 by individual sub-questions eliminates confusion and ensure continuity with the two distinct research methodologies identified in chapter 1 and expounded upon in chapter 3. The literature collected and reviewed for the first sub-question—did Nazi Germany use the principle of mass in their strategic propaganda campaigns?—were historical books and journal articles primarily focused on Nazi Germany’s strategic propaganda campaigns in the pre and the inter-WWII era, specifically on the use of multiple means of message dissemination. The doctrine collected and reviewed for the second sub-question—does twenty-first century psychological operations doctrine consider the principle of mass for the conduct of influence operations?—was composed of U.S. Army, PSYOP, and Joint force doctrine specifically focused on IRCs and the inclusion, planning, and execution of MISO by PSYOP forces. For each piece of literature for each sub-question a short, general abstract was given highlighting some dominating relevant themes found within the individual piece reviewed.

As identified in the research question, the principle of mass as defined in joint doctrine is the primary focus of this thesis. Both sub-questions identified the principle of mass and the question regarding its inclusion in the two distinct arenas. In the review of literature specifically focused on Nazi strategic propaganda, the principle of mass is not

used due to its modernity and use by the U.S. military. While much of the literature reviewed for sub-question 1 speaks of the Nazis utilizing multiple means together in concert, the distinct principle mass is never utilized or specified. As identified in limitations, inferences of when mass was used and planned for had to be made and identified within the literature.

Concurrently, sub-question 2 and the principle of mass found in current U.S. PSYOP doctrine poses similar challenges as with sub-question 1. The principle of mass in joint doctrine is not found within the past and current PSYOP doctrine reviewed, however, both IO and PSYOP doctrine do promote and encourage the use of combined and synchronized IRCs to achieve desired and identified effects. Additionally, as disclosed with the vast amount of joint doctrine needed to consolidate multiple unclassified IRCs into one document, there is not a single piece of doctrine that effectively organizes and categorizes IRCs in a utilitarian way for PSYOP forces to reference. This poses challenges for PSYOP forces directed to affect an IE when having to reference multiple doctrines to understand what IRC they have at their disposal and with whom they reside.

Finally, this study is needed for the continuation of effective PSYOP due to the ever-increasing complexity of the IE and the increasing availability of IRCs that can affect it. The principle of mass needs to be considered in planning for the conduct of MISO. If the principle of mass is not considered and multiple IRCs with respective means of dissemination are not utilized, then individual messaging will be lost in the ever increasingly noisy IE with limited effect on a TA. PSYOP forces must have doctrine that

references and effectively organizes and categorizes all potential IRC's doctrine in an organized way from which they can plan considering the principle of mass.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a historical comparative case study between Nazi propaganda and current U.S. PSYOP, investigating how they utilize the joint principle of mass to effectively disseminate messages to influence a specific target audience. This research uses qualitative methodology and a research design of historic comparative case study. Additionally, this case study research explores multiple bounded systems as it researches historic Nazi propaganda and compares it to current U.S. PSYOP.<sup>167</sup> Concurrently, this thesis uses an embedded analysis as it investigates very specific aspects of Nazi propaganda and U.S. PSYOP in relation to the joint principle of mass.<sup>168</sup> This qualitative methodology systematically uses the various resources to answer the research question, how does U.S. PSYOP use the principle of mass for message dissemination, considering and learning from the tactics, techniques, and procedures observed from the strategic propaganda campaigns of Nazi Germany? This historical comparative case study analyzes the thesis research and divides it into four steps: the literature review in chapter 2; the analysis of sub-question 1 in chapter 4; analysis of sub-question 2 in chapter 4; and the conclusions in chapter 5. Additionally, recommendations for further study and any unexpected findings found during the research process are offered in chapter 5. The following paragraphs expand upon the

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<sup>167</sup> John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, California. Sage Publications, 2007), 73.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*, 75.

steps to add fidelity to the thesis research methodology and to identify the types of resources that are utilized within each step.

Step 1 of this research is the literature review contained within chapter 2. The literature review is organized by research sub-question to consolidate, organize, and grant necessary focus to each. The sub-questions identify and follow the literature that corresponds to its query. The sub-questions are as follows:

1. Did Nazi Germany use the principle of mass in their strategic propaganda campaigns?
2. Does U.S. twenty-first century PSYOP doctrine consider the principle of mass for the conduct of influence operations?

The research for sub-question 1 explores books, journal articles, and historical references regarding Nazi propaganda, the means for dissemination, and the dissemination of messages to the German population. These resources are not Nazi doctrine and are therefore second-hand researched accounts of how the Nazis were executing their strategic propaganda campaign against the German population. The research for sub-question 2 reviews joint, army, and specifically PSYOP doctrine investigating different IRCs and how these resources consider the principle of mass in regards to influence operations and the dissemination of messages.

Step 2 of this case study is the historical investigation of sub-question 1 in the analysis of Nazi propaganda during the pre and inter-WWII period. The investigation of Nazi propaganda is as it relates to the use of different means for message dissemination and the identification of the principle of mass within execution and organization of their means. Additionally, analysis of how the Nazis viewed propaganda is critical to seeing

why certain means were favored or if it was due to their environments. The investigation of sub-question 1 identifies the various dissemination means, their use, and their perceived effect on influencing, compelling, and controlling the German populace. Step 3 of the literature review researches doctrine directly related to sub-question 2 and U.S. PSYOP. This analysis provides framework for the comparative case study between Nazi propaganda and current U.S. PSYOP doctrine.

Step 3 encompasses the researching of current U.S. PSYOP, U.S. Army, and Joint doctrine as it relates to potential IRCs and the principle of mass. In the analysis of sub-question 2, the purpose is the examination of current doctrine as to its efficaciousness and organization for PSYOP forces to utilize for potential message dissemination. The research for this sub-question examines current U.S. Army, PSYOP, and Joint doctrine that directly relate to IRCs and means for the dissemination of messages. Furthermore, this comparative case study analyzes how current PSYOP doctrine categorizes IRCs and if they are organized in a way that is easily used in reference for operating within various IEs. Current U.S. PSYOP doctrine is analyzed in addition to past, outdated manuals that may lend credence to how TTPs have evolved over the years. The research of joint publications may determine their validity in expressing how the massing of IRCs and providing PSYOP forces with additional options for dissemination may be beneficial in the conduct of influence operations.

Data presentation and analysis encompass step 4 of the historical comparative case study and chapter 4 of the thesis. The analysis investigates and analyzes how the principle of mass was apparent in the propaganda dissemination of Nazi Germany and if the consideration of some of the principles would be advantageous in twenty-first century

PSYOP. Chapter 4 largely focuses on the historical investigation consolidating the key contributions and insights from the literature review. Chapter 4 analyzes the findings from the historical investigation and from the review of current doctrine to shape the conclusions and recommendations for further study found in chapter 5. Furthermore, the comparative study analyzes current PSYOP IRCs, PSYOP's role in different joint operations, and how they relate to the use of the principle of mass in the OE and IE. Furthermore, the IRCs identified within the analysis are placed within the IRC category table (reference table 1) and organized as to whether the IRC is intrinsic or extrinsic to the executing organization. The analysis of both Nazi Germany and U.S. PSYOP using this table will determine how both entities organize their means of message dissemination, the level of integration required with outside entities, and additional means required for successful execution.

Finally, step 5 concludes the thesis within chapter 5, conclusions. This final step summarizes the findings, highlights any identified applications, and recommends further research for both Nazi propaganda and U.S. PSYOP. Additionally, chapter 5 analyzes any conclusions found during analysis and proving or disproving of the research question and sub-questions. The summary and findings from the IRC table are found within chapter 5 and is primarily used for the comparison between Nazi propaganda and U.S. PSYOP IRCs.

The utilization of the following table is to act as a foundational organizational construct in which to categorize and organize IRCs in a way that is efficacious for planning and as an organizational tool. This provides a construct to analyze both Nazi Germany and current U.S. PSYOP IRCs and means of message dissemination. In

comparing Nazi propaganda and PSYOP IRCs within the table’s parameters the reader can ascertain how the IRCs were organized within and external to the organization. Additionally, the table highlights and discloses how much synchronization, integration, and collaboration is required based upon the IRCs that are organic to the executing organization. For organizations that have many intrinsic, organic IRCs, minimal outside coordination with enablers is required. Contrastingly, organizations with minimal intrinsic IRCs may require extensive coordination with enablers to execute operations.

Table 1. Information Related Capabilities Table				
Category	Intrinsic IRCs	Extrinsic IRCs		
	Organic Means	Host Nation	Mission Partners	Technical and Compartmentalized Tools/ New Technology
Information Related Capability (IRC)				

Source: Created by author.

This historical comparative case study is transferable and advantageous to all entities desiring to achieve effects within specific IEs. Detailed analysis of available IRCs and means of dissemination require attention and consideration if one is to truly achieve true influence of a TA. As the IE increases in complexity it becomes more important to have a clear understanding of the IRCs available and of the responsible entity for which they fall. As seen in chapter 2, considering and affecting the IE is included in multiple different operations, and it is vital to have a full knowledge of all available IRCs that may

affect potential TAs within that IE. Chapter 4 analyzes the findings for the research question and sub-questions, the applicability for the principle of mass for each, and its potential ramifications for current use by U.S. PSYOP forces.

## CHAPTER 4

### DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Propaganda must therefore always be essentially simple and repetitious.

—Joseph Goebbels, *The War That Hitler Won*

#### Introduction

Chapter 4 presents and analyzes the data collected through the chapter 2 literature review to answer the primary research question and subsequent sub-questions. The division and organization of Chapter 4 is by research and sub-questions to ensure organization, readability, and flow. The primary research question is answered generally while the sub-questions are analyzed in regards to specific IRCs, means, and methods identified from the research. The table presented in chapter 3 analyzes all identified IRCs for each sub-question in relation to their categories and whether or not they are intrinsic or extrinsic to the organization.

For the analysis of sub-question 1—did Nazi Germany use the principle of mass in their strategic propaganda campaigns?—the analysis of Nazi strategic propaganda is reviewed, followed by an analysis of the predominant IRCs and the utilization of individual dissemination means. Additionally, included is an analysis of the Nazi propaganda methods, philosophy, and their applicability to twenty-first century U.S. PSYOP. Finally, the Nazi IRCs will be inputted and categorized into the chart provided in chapter 3.

The analysis of sub-question 2—does twenty-first century psychological operations doctrine consider the principle of mass for the conduct of influence

operations?—will be composed of an analysis of the various doctrines and IRCs identified in chapter 2 along with the consideration of the principle of mass in the foundational U.S. Army and PSYOP doctrine. Additionally, the identified IRCs will be inputted into the chart found in chapter 3. Finally, an analysis will be conducted regarding the principle of mass in relation to the doctrine reviewed and for its applicability.

The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a historical comparative case study between Nazi propaganda and current U.S. PSYOP, investigating how they utilize the joint principle of mass to effectively disseminate messages to influence a specific target audience. Nazi Germany propagandists effectively massed multiple media dissemination means for the purposes of saturating and dominating the German information environment in pre and intra-WWII. Per the literature review, the current organization of U.S. PSYOP dissemination doctrine does not explicitly identify the principle of mass for the massing of IRCs to ensure the effective influence of a specific TA. This thesis argues that a lack of an organized, efficacious, methodical means or methods categorical system makes it difficult to understand how to employ multiple dissemination means to conduct effective influence operations. Due to the complexity and number of IRCs within a given IE, findings from this research suggest and propose that U.S. PSYOP forces need to consider an organized categorical structure of dissemination means. The massing, nesting, and mixing of IRCs and means could potentially affect an IE with targeting messages for a specific TA increasing the opportunity for true influence or behavior change.

Sub-Question 1 Analysis:  
Did Nazi Germany use the principle of mass  
in their strategic propaganda campaigns?

Dr. Joseph Goebbels assumed the role as Minister of RMVP in 1933, and stated, “in itself propaganda does not possess any set of fundamental methods. It has but one goal, and in politics this goal always revolves around one point: the conquest of the masses.”<sup>169</sup> Nazi Germany effectively maximized its resources to disseminate its message to the German citizenry to push its socialist agenda and totalitarian ideology. The strategic propaganda campaign implemented the massing of multiple different means of dissemination for the combined purpose of striving for IE saturation, and the TA received the messages from multiple completely different means. “Nazi ideologists and propagandists employed the enormous party propaganda apparatus and the directly or indirectly state-controlled mass media for intensive campaigns, blanketing the whole country with a single message.”<sup>170</sup> The propagandists of the party-and-state controlled the mass media and means of public expression through which the Nazi and NS message could be disseminated to the broad German citizenry.<sup>171</sup> “The media included film, radio, the illustrated and word press, books, posters, placards, leaflets, brochures, coordinated campaigns by party speakers, and even whisper or word-of-mouth propaganda.”<sup>172</sup> In addition to the aforementioned means was the use of powerful oration from Nazi

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<sup>169</sup> Herzstein, *The War that Hitler Won*, 47.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

leadership, including Hitler and Goebbels, which reinforced and amplified the message already being received by the German population. What aided in the effectiveness of the massing of media against the German population was the in-depth knowledge the Nazis had of their TA. The Nazi knew their TA, how they received their information, to what messages they would be most vulnerable, and would assume at least a minimal acceptance of the ideological themes and messages that dominated the mass media.<sup>173</sup>

The careful use of specific means in concert maximize saturation of the TA to ensure ultimate effectiveness. This massing of individual means of dissemination became standard for a German citizen's daily life and interaction. The inundation with deliberate propaganda themes and messages became the new normal.

In 1943, a typical German civilian might awaken to radio propaganda, look at a calendar covered with the same slogans, get dressed, have lunch after reading a menu covered with propagandistic phraseology then board a train covered with posters and placards. When he reached his destination, he might hear a loudspeaker blaring forth the Wehrmacht report of the day while he peered through store windows at fewer consumer goods and more display window posters.<sup>174</sup>

The effective use of the modern joint principle of mass incorporated means of dissemination that may not have been most effective on their own. These means, however, nested with other more overt propaganda, created an environment where the Nazi ideology became difficult to avoid. This is a quintessential example of the principle of mass in the execution of strategic propaganda.

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<sup>173</sup> Herzstein, *The War that Hitler Won*, 21.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, 214.

In addition to the means of message dissemination utilized by the Nazis, they also effectively tasked organized governmental organizations primarily responsible for propaganda operations at different levels in society. These national and local level organizations synchronized and integrated through close coordination, ensuring unity of effort and propaganda campaigns and messaging. These organizations, especially in rural areas, would ensure messages were disseminated to communities not within coverage of national press and radio.<sup>175</sup> Success depended upon the concentrated efforts of the Nazi party officials at the “municipal branch, district, and Gau level.”<sup>176</sup> At these local levels, more covert means of dissemination were utilized, such as whisper campaigns and using trusted local leaders and family members to disseminate Nazi messages to increase reliability and believability. Propaganda was not merely a military or governmental operation; it was the way the Nazi government operated and sought to compel and control the German population. While in some instances, poor coordination between responsible offices degraded propaganda effectiveness, the multi-echelon approach to propaganda dissemination increased the availability of the messages and increased nationwide message saturation. In addition to multi-level official organizations, there were also more clandestine operations employing unofficial actors to add credence to messages disseminated to the population. “There were groups to strengthen rumors, groups to spread graffiti, and the breadth of propaganda mediums—from sculptures to weaponry—

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<sup>175</sup> Herzstein, *The War that Hitler Won*, 215.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*

and the mediatization of all artifacts were possibilities that had never been realized before, nor have they been realized since.”<sup>177</sup>

### Nazi Germany Strategic Propaganda Means

This section seeks to identify, research, and explain the primary means utilized by the Nazis to disseminate messaging to the German population throughout its rise and peak of power. Exploring the means of dissemination may shed light on how prevalent the Nazi ideology was throughout the country and how difficult it would have been to avoid receiving the message daily from various locations and through different means. Furthermore, the exploration of the means should provide additional weight to the recognition of the principle of mass found within the Nazi strategic propaganda campaign. Immediately following this section, the IRC table found in chapter 3 will identify, categorize, and organize the highlighted means of dissemination.

#### Radio

Nazi Germany preferred radio as a primary mean of message dissemination as it favored the spoken word to the written word. This was also apparent from their proclivity for long orations and speeches from the party’s leadership. Beyond the preference to the spoken word, radio provided “for close participation in events and allows for the creation of starred personalities who gain followers through the attraction of their voices.”<sup>178</sup> The radio became the primary source of exalting the Nazi party, elevating its status to the

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<sup>177</sup> O’Shaughnessy, *Selling Hitler*, 10.

<sup>178</sup> Kris and Speier, *German Radio Propaganda*, 51.

people, and ensuring that the population knew the party was providing and protecting them from the universal enemy outside of Germany's borders. Nazi propagandists knew radio was not only useful in disseminating messaging, but also luring the population into a sense of reliance as it became the center of gravity within the local community to receive news and provide for social interaction.

Radio allows for double control. Not only can the experts plan what is said and how it is said and adapt their material to the changing requirements of policy, but they can even, to some extent, supervise listening. As a rule, everyone reads for himself, but listening can be done collectively. Since individuals may not tune in when they are supposed to listen to the speech of a leader or to other events of "nationwide" importance, group listening, which "forces the individual to subordinate his will to that of the community," is organized on solemn occasions.<sup>179</sup>

Nazi party members at the local or Gau level, assigned to the local villages, further enforced this by mandating compliance with, and in some cases, attending and listening to the oration of leaders.

In July of 1939, the country of Germany accounted for 15,309,613 radio sets and 16,004,391 in 1941 with a calculated sixty-four million German listeners or four listeners per radio set.<sup>180</sup> Goebbels is quoted as saying, "The reader was supposed to get the impression that the writer was in reality a speaker standing next to him and wanting to convert him to his opinion."<sup>181</sup> It was the desire of Nazi propagandists to unite the German citizenry, welding them into one single listening community with one common

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<sup>179</sup> Kris and Speier, *German Radio Propaganda*, 51-52.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*

purpose, and ensure that they received the same common message.<sup>182</sup> Nazi propagandists would issue a “radio alarm,” issuing a rallying cry for the German population to tune into their radios to ensure specific messaging was received and some deed of glory by the German Army was announced.<sup>183</sup>

The radio broadcast was the most important instrument of propaganda to Goebbels and the Nazis. Goebbels viewed the radio as the “first and most influential intermediary between movement and nation, between idea and man . . . we want a radio that marches with the nation, a radio that works for the people.”<sup>184</sup> The effective use of the radio provided a firm foundation from which all other propaganda means would be utilized and nested under.

### Cinema

Goebbels stated, “We are convinced that films constitute one of the most modern and scientific means of influencing the masses. Therefore, a government must not neglect them. The Third Reich commissioned or approved over 1,300 films in the twelve years of its life.”<sup>185</sup> Cinema, as a new technology, was exciting and highly sought after for a form of entertainment. This provided the Nazi regime a perfect platform from which to project messages in blatant “propaganda” films. Some were far more covert, inserting hidden messages within their content. As with radio, cinema provided the citizenry a public

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<sup>182</sup> Kris and Speier, *German Radio Propaganda*, 59.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, 59.

<sup>184</sup> Herzstein, *The War that Hitler Won*, 176.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, 272.

forum from which to convene, discuss, and become a single viewing community united by entertainment, but simultaneously receiving the Nazi's intended message. Goebbels addressed the German film industry upon his appointment as propaganda minister with an enthusiasm for film's potential and its understood effects that it can potentially have upon a population. Goebbels proclaimed that "German films can become a force in the world, with limitless opportunities for development. . . . If the film industry starts to exercise a dangerous influence, then it is the duty of the state to step in and exercise control."<sup>186</sup> This foreboding statement was merely a foreshadow of the Nazi control that would completely take control of all media means of dissemination for the purpose of population compellation and control. Cinema quickly became a favorite means to project national symbology highlighting values, beliefs, subliminal messaging, and artifacts, all necessary to appeal to the mass German audience and achieve true acceptance as legitimate content.<sup>187</sup> Goebbels recognized that the German populace did not want propaganda slammed down their throats in a venue in which they were to be entertained. "Goebbels's solution lay in what were described as *Tendenz Filme*, i.e. feature films produced by the experts of the industry and reflecting Nazi values without sacrificing artistic or entertainment ones."<sup>188</sup> Film was also successfully utilized to educate the citizenry on news from the front line through newsreels that were primarily used to tout on the battlefield successes of the *Wehrmacht*, or German Defense forces.

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<sup>186</sup> Kallis, 19.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>188</sup> Balfour, *Propaganda in War*, 39.

### Print Products (Books, Leaflet, Poster, Newspaper)

The power of the written word and emotional pictures remained powerful tools in the Nazi assortment of propaganda means. Joseph Goebbels viewed printed products, especially the book, as crucial to the compelling of the citizenry to provide them with an “understanding of the background of the conflict, and that it should provide strength and relaxation in the difficult weeks and months of the war.”<sup>189</sup> Goebbels additionally viewed the book as a cornerstone of the German culture stating, “We Germans can scarcely picture a life devoid of books.”<sup>190</sup> While cinema was a new and exciting form of entertainment, Nazi propagandists knew the effectiveness of tried and true methods of disseminating information would ensure emotional and psychological responses. The propaganda ministry “made vast use of books, pamphlets, brochures and leaflets, window displays and slide shows, posters and placards, even postage stamps and cancellation marks.”<sup>191</sup> The principle of mass was more visible within the sphere of print products than any other mean of dissemination used by the Nazi propagandists. The production and circulation of the vast amount of print products assured that the German populace could not go a day without taking in the Nazi message and being bombarded with related material. This also took the form of literature meant for entertainment, much like the effective use of cinema. The utilization of print literature regarding the promotion of rallies, orations, and festivals was highly effective. “By the winter of 1941 the Reich

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<sup>189</sup> Herzstein, *The War that Hitler Won*, 187.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*

Propaganda Central Office claimed to have distributed two million wartime brochures, seven million placards, more than sixty million magazines, bulletins for public display, and handbills, as well as sixty-seven million leaflets. It had sponsored about thirty thousand slide presentations, and two-hundred thousand meetings, demonstrations, and factory rallies.”<sup>192</sup> Concurrently, while the RPL was disseminating all of its content, a censorship division was also reviewing upwards to four thousand titles a year in order to discard questionable or objectional books, articles, and pamphlets focused primarily on political or military affairs.<sup>193</sup> All these products combined to form a strong sense of German nationalism and moved to form unity against the many enemies the Nazis wanted the citizenry to fear. Goebbels quickly moved to utilize print products in close integration and synchronization with the press and the use of the newspaper. Goebbels is said to have viewed propaganda as an orchestra. Goebbels stated that “the press should be in the hand of the government like a piano . . . on which the government can play and a tremendously important instrument of mass influence . . . that can serve the government in its significant work.”<sup>194</sup> Print products provided a fundamental, predictable foundation from which all other Nazi propaganda could be projected. While other means were less reliable or limited, print materials could almost ensure IE saturation.

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<sup>192</sup> Herzstein, *The War that Hitler Won*, 196.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, 197.

<sup>194</sup> Kallis, *Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War*, 27-28.

## Oration

The spoken word, issued from the elevated personas of Hitler and Goebbels, was a powerful and moving propaganda tool. It issued instant credence to the other means of propaganda and provided realism, personality, and passion to the Nazi message. Hitler and Goebbels were natural orators and built instant rapport with German audiences. After his release from prison in 1924, public speaking became Hitler's primary propaganda weapon, and he wielded it with precision.<sup>195</sup> Goebbels, especially was a naturally gifted orator, who commanded the attention and respect of his audience through his superior use of inflection and oration skills, which he carefully wielded with precise delivery. Joseph Goebbels's effectiveness as a speaker was based on a whole package of abilities: a deep, projecting voice, careful articulation, a rich, relatable vocabulary, and emotions that were always under control.<sup>196</sup> "Hitler believed that all great revolutions owed their origins and success to the spoken word." Nazi party speakers were divided into two distinct categories, the "political speaker," whose function it was to carry the Nazi ideology to the people and explain the measures of the regime to them, and the "specialized speaker," who was provided by Nazi branch and affiliated organizations for the purpose of speaking on a specific subject.<sup>197</sup> Oration became a primary means of message dissemination at the Gau level, ensuring those difficult to reach population groups received the intended message and its purpose. This focus on oration also manifested

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<sup>195</sup> Zeman, *Nazi Propaganda*, 10.

<sup>196</sup> Peter Longerich, *Goebbels: A Biography* (New York: Penguin Random House LLC, 2010), 82.

<sup>197</sup> Herzstein, *The War that Hitler Won*, 144.

itself in the form of rallies, meetings, and various functions where the NS ideology could propagate to the masses and then reinforce messages using the other forms of media dissemination. The Nazi's held these events at all echelons of society, from national and throughout the separate Gaus.

### Word of Mouth

“In order to manufacture a consensus where one did not previously exist, the Nazi propaganda machine would constantly urge the population to put the community before the individual and to place their faith in slogans like ‘One People! One Reich! One Fuhrer!’”<sup>198</sup> Nazi propaganda bombarded the urban citizen with messages on every corner and in every facet of normal life, unlike the district level which did not receive the messages with that ferocity. German citizens that dwelled in more rural areas were targeted by the Nazi district propaganda offices through more covert means that involved more simple, tried and true methods of disseminating information, namely word of mouth from trusted members of their communities. These localized agents could appeal to the citizen's sense of nationalism and pride while amplifying their sense of “national humiliation and pride weakened by inflation, economic depression and mass unemployment.”<sup>199</sup> Local leaders would use local citizens with referent power, respected within in the Gaus, to disseminate pro-Nazi messaging. This was extremely effective considering the source. Many times, coerced local leaders, to keep themselves and their families safe, would spread the Nazi message by intimidation and through the force of

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<sup>198</sup> Welch, “Manufacturing a Consensus,” 4.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid., 3.

local Nazi leaders. The Ministry of Propaganda also “reached down to Gau and the lowest level of society, and involved people who did not wear the party badge. They were friends and neighbors, not the ‘little Hitlers’ of the party, who were a standard target of popular muttering.”<sup>200</sup> The point of this localized propaganda, using known persons of the community with no official Nazi relationship, was to “infiltrate propaganda into what seemed normal human relationships.”<sup>201</sup> The Gau offices also contained “speaker corps” consisting of talented, experienced, and passionate advocates who would reach the citizenry with their personal presence and would provide more detailed information that was would not normally reach the population through the mass media.<sup>202</sup> Additionally and like other dissemination means, the utilization of this public declaration of information would be to ensure the citizenry would receive the same message at the same time. This was effective as communal gatherings in less advanced areas were extremely popular and used for community fellowship. The ministry provided these Gau speaker systems monthly talking points for oral propaganda dissemination in line with current themes and messages the party wanted disseminated to the citizenry.<sup>203</sup> Whisper messaging and available media means at the Gau reinforced these talking points. Finally, rumor ceding also had its place in the effective use of word of mouth dissemination with the intent of achieving psychological effects. “Every single propaganda plan or action

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<sup>200</sup> Bytwerk, “Grassroots Propaganda,” 104-105.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, 107.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, 108.

prepared during the war contained lengthy references to the content and timing of word of mouth propaganda and rumors would be circulated in parallel to the regime's official propaganda output."<sup>204</sup> Word of mouth was truly a foundational support to all levels of propaganda and added credence and legitimacy to messaging while contributing to massing means of dissemination.

### Organizations

Organizations, composed of men fiercely devoted to Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party, provided perfect content to display to the German population of how a proud Nazi should appear and how they should be in service to the Reich. While not an intrinsic IRC to the Propaganda ministry, these organizations certainly were highlighted in products and as a mean of dissemination, and they most definitely and effectively caused psychological effects within Germany. The Hitler Youth was an organization specifically designed to mobilize thousands of German boys ingrained with undying fealty to Hitler, the Reich, and Germany. In one powerful instance in 1944, a German newsreel "captured a mood of youthful idealism and pathos as thousands of boys stood in military formation, loudspeakers in a public square intoned statistic about the huge numbers of teenagers who had declared their readiness to fight for Fuhrer and fatherland." "I can die, but to be a slave, to see Germany enslaved, that I cannot accept!" was their cry.<sup>205</sup> The Hitler Youth became an ultimate symbol of German sacrifice. Additionally, for the majority of

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<sup>204</sup> Kallis, *Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War*, 139.

<sup>205</sup> Herzstein, *The War that Hitler Won*, 240.

German youth, “Nazi propaganda offered comradeship and a pioneering role: the ideology of National Socialism represented the triumph of a rejuvenated Germany, liberated from outdated fallacies of bourgeois liberalism or Marxist class warfare.”<sup>206</sup> Additional organizations were formed to include other age and societal classes including the League of German Girls (Hitler Youth female counterpart) and the Nazis Teachers League.<sup>207</sup> These organizations assisted in promoting community before the individual, instilled ownership in the overall success of the German war effort, and “by turning large sections of the population into passive consumers, the Nazi technique of organization and atomization led to a gradual process of depoliticization which effectively achieved the desired population’s consent.”<sup>208</sup> These organization, while requiring propaganda to mobilize, provided Nazi propagandists a powerful tool from which to rally nation wide acceptance of the Nazi message, national socialism, and a shining example a nation standing united, mobilized for total war.

### Intimidation and Violence

In order to truly control and compel the German population, violence was a necessary partner to propaganda, always adding weight and demanding adherence to its powerful message. “Propaganda and the graduated use of violence have to be employed together in a skillful manner. There is never absolute opposition to one other. The use of

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<sup>206</sup> Welch, “Manufacturing a Consensus,” 13.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid., 12-13.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., 15.

violence can be a part of propaganda.”<sup>209</sup> Nazi Germany had been using violence to evoke psychological effects since its humble beginnings in the early 1920s through the powerful use of the *Sturmabteilung* and *Schutzstaffel*. The *Sturmabteilung* and the *Schutzstaffel* were originally paramilitary organizations and often used as stormtroopers to enforce and carry out orders from Nazi leadership and provide security and protection at rallies and events. The *Sturmabteilung* and other organizations previously mentioned had their own propaganda departments, and each were mutually beneficial, contributing its own internal education and sometimes their own propaganda agendas.<sup>210</sup> Nazi propagandists moved to stimulate emotion and violence, and to benefit from their interaction, not to appeal to the perceived reason of the masses.<sup>211</sup> It was the dangerous mix of propaganda and violence that disguises the true effectiveness of the dissemination of Nazi messages. Violence and the threat of violence amplify propaganda’s effects.

#### Nazi Germany Propaganda Information Related Capabilities Table

When placing the identified Nazi means into the IRC table, it becomes clear that Nazi Germany primarily utilized intrinsic IRCs for its propaganda dissemination. While the extrinsic IRCs primarily come from mission partners, they are more of secondary means, enabling and reinforcing the messages disseminated through the primary intrinsic capabilities. Interestingly, due to the intrinsic nature of the Nazi’s organic means, none of their IRCs appear in the Host Nation category. Due to the totalitarian nature of the Nazi

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<sup>209</sup> Zeman, *Nazi Propaganda*, 16.

<sup>210</sup> Bytwerk, “Grassroots Propaganda,” 94.

<sup>211</sup> Zeman, *Nazi Propaganda*, 37.

government, most of all means of message dissemination were organic to the Propaganda Ministry and did not require external coordination. This more than likely streamlined approval, authorization, and permission to execute. The most timely aspect seems to be the deconfliction, synchronization, and integration between the different levels of societal dissemination.

Table 2. Nazi Information Related Capabilities				
Category	Intrinsic IRCs	Extrinsic IRCs		
	Organic Means	Host Nation	Mission Partners	Technical and Compartmentalized Tools/ New Technology
Information Related Capability (IRC)	-Radio -Cinema -Print Products -Oration		-Organizations -Word of Mouth -Intimidation -Violence	-Cinema

Source: Created by author.

Sub-Question 2 Analysis:

Does twenty-first century Psychological Operations doctrine consider the principle of mass for the conduct of influence operations?

In today's Information Age, there is an increasing reliance on sophisticated, near-real time media dissemination. Information, or sometimes the withholding of information, is power. The state or entity most able to effectively control or manage information, especially managing the perception of particular TAs, will be the most influential.

—U.S. Department of the Army. *Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*

Current and past PSYOP doctrine does not specifically identify the principle of mass for consideration for the employment in the conduct of PSYOP with the purpose of influencing a foreign TA. Within FM 3-05.301, *PSYOP Process, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, while discussing Phase III PSYOP Series development, it does mention determining correct media types to be employed and an example of when the correct mix

of media is successful.<sup>212</sup> This small portion of PSYOP doctrine, while highlighting effective nesting and mixing of media, it does not provide lengthy analysis to the idea of massing IRCs with the clear task and purpose of changing behavior or influencing a potential TA. With the increasing number of IRCs that could potentially cause effects within the IE, a PSYOP Soldier should consider the principle of mass in planning to increase the opportunity of reaching a potential TA by the disseminated message, and that the message can effectively cause the desired effect. SOF and specifically PSYOP must understand the OE and, most importantly for PSYOP, the IE. It becomes most important to understand the available IRCs and maximize their usage to the achievement of the Commander's intent and of the operational end state.

The principle of mass and the conduct of PSYOP is not only important in influence operations, but PSYOP additionally supports operations throughout all elements of U.S. national power seen in the acronym DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). "The instruments of national power are exercised continually by the USG to promote U.S. policy worldwide and PSYOP supports many DIME measures to help the USG achieve its objectives."<sup>213</sup> In the execution of PSYOP beyond the military, the principle of mass remains vital as more IRCs may become relevant and available while conducting operations in support of the other elements of national power. It is incumbent for PSYOP Soldiers to understand these potentially available IRCs, their

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<sup>212</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.301, 3-6-3-7.

<sup>213</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.30, 2-5.

capabilities, who governs their utilization, and how to utilize them towards the accomplishment of the mission and achievement of the overall end state.

New complexities within the IE challenge the effective dissemination of messages and messaging by PSYOP Soldiers. The noise caused by the consistent onslaught of information can deaden a potential TA to messages, especially if the message receipt is not through a medium well known by the TA. A thorough TA analysis may disclose the vulnerabilities and accessibilities of a potential TA and give focus to the PSYOP Soldier's planning for message dissemination. While a potential TA may possess differing levels of vulnerabilities, the consideration of multiple IRCs is crucial if a behavior change is a desired end state of a TA. The assumption must not be made that one IRC's dissemination will cause behavior change or influence while competing with the modern IE and all its distractions and competing messages. PSYOP Soldiers should consider utilizing the principle of mass in planning for both its intrinsic and extrinsic IRCs to achieve the desired psychological effect and operational end state.

In addition to intrinsic and extrinsic IRCs, U.S. PSYOP Soldiers should always be aware of the level of war in which they are conducting operations and to what level they are striving to achieve effects. There are three distinct levels of war: tactical, operational, and strategic. "The levels of warfare model the relationship between national objectives and tactical actions" and PSYOP can achieve effects in all and sometimes at the same time, during the same execution.<sup>214</sup> The different combinations of IRCs, based upon which level or levels of war in which effects are desired, determine the utilization.

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<sup>214</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 2017), 1-5.

PSYOP Soldiers should consider and understand the variety of available IRCs and their capabilities, limitations, and how they are properly employed to reach the operational end state.

### Psychological Operations IRCs

As with sub-question 1, the following section identifies current doctrinal IRCs that are available to the PSYOP Soldier for consideration in planning and potential operational execution. The analysis identifies the capabilities and status of each IRC as it relates to an organic capability at the PSYOP Soldier's disposal, or if it is extrinsic and requires the Soldier to coordinate with extrinsic entity for its implementation. Following the analysis of each IRC, they are inputted into the IRC table to show where each fit in regards to categorization and organization. This should disclose where PSYOP Soldiers should focus planning efforts in the effective concert of IRCs to reach and influence a potential TA. As with all means of dissemination, careful planning by the PSYOP entity is required to understand the IE, TA, and the proper means, place, and time with which to disseminate, and also, with which combination of IRCs and means will be most successful.

#### Face to Face

Face-to-face engagement and communication utilized by tactical PSYOP elements are one of the foundational means of message dissemination. This tactic ensures that a TA receives the message, has time to respond, and ask questions that are answerable and can that be made clear in real time. This tactic, while completely overt, can increase rapport, credibility, and trust between PSYOP Soldiers and a foreign

audience. Face-to-face communication in conjunction with the dissemination of print products additionally adds credibility to the products if the communicator or organization is known and respected. This requires the PSYOP Soldier to respect the population, their culture, and to know how to effectively communicate both verbally and non-verbally. Additionally, PSYOP Soldiers can gain instant reception of feedback on the products and insight to their potential effectiveness with the TA at large. “PSYOP Soldiers can obtain valuable information from this feedback and may immediately identify product content that is culturally or politically insensitive to the TA.”<sup>215</sup> Face-to-face communication is foundational to a PSYOP Soldier’s effectiveness and transfers into all future PSYOP planning and executions.

#### Psychological Operations Action (PSYACT)

“PSYACTs are conducted by military forces that are planned and conducted as part of a PSYOP program or operation.”<sup>216</sup> PSYACTs influence TAs in conjunction with PSYOP by utilizing the psychological effects generated through the military action. The conducting of the correct action takes synchronization, integration, and coordination with the executing element and in depth, detailed planning. Doctrine identifies three distinct ways that PSYACTs influence a TA: modifying conditions, exploiting identified vulnerabilities, and building rapport.<sup>217</sup> PSYACTs can give legitimacy to the messaging

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<sup>215</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.302, 7-14-15.

<sup>216</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.301, 2-29.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid.

and reinforce previously received messaging by the TA. Like with face-to-face engagements, PSYACTS can generate immediate feedback as to the acceptability of a message and if it will result in a change in the TA. PSYOP Soldiers are able to “capitalize on the success of the action and use that success in the conditioning or behavior modification of the TA.”<sup>218</sup>

### Loudspeaker

Loudspeakers are an organic, intrinsic capability found at the lowest level of the PSYOP task organization. The consideration of the uses of the loudspeaker as an extension of a face-to-face engagement at the tactical level achieves, most often, immediate effects and have an immediate impact on a TA.<sup>219</sup> “Loudspeakers transmit speeches, music, or sound effects to the audience using tapes, minidisks, CDs, and various forms of digital media which produce superior audio quality.”<sup>220</sup> FM 3-05.302, *Tactical PSYOP TTPs*, identifies some specific advantages to the usage of the loudspeaker to influence a TA: flexibility, mobility, exploitation or target, range of transmission, effectiveness with an illiterate audience, ability to pinpoint targets, and the gaining of immediate feedback from the TA.<sup>221</sup> Loudspeaker variants may be carried or mounted on a vehicle, and there are different sized variants that are able to cover a wider area for message dissemination. The loudspeaker remains a primary, organic, intrinsic

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<sup>218</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.301, 2-29.

<sup>219</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.302, 7-7.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-8, 7-9.

capability. Loudspeaker operations are very overt in their implementation and the size of the TA can limit the speaker's effectiveness. Loudspeaker operations are most often conducted at the tactical level in precise ways to achieve local effects, however, could potentially achieve some operational effects. However, PSYOP Soldiers highly trained in loudspeaker operations can easily employ loudspeakers for precise, fast message dissemination to a local TA.

#### Leaflet, Poster, Handbill, Flyer, Novelty Item

Print products are a simple way to disseminate a desired message to a potential TA and PSYOP Soldiers, host nation entities, mission partners, or contracted means can disseminate. In permissive or semi-permissive environments, PSYOP Soldiers often will disseminate products and concurrently conduct face-to-face engagements with the local populace. This method of dissemination potentially lends credence to the product and reinforce the message.<sup>222</sup> Through a thorough TA analysis, PSYOP Soldiers will utilize themes, pictures, colors, and verbiage that resonate with the desired TA. Also, the PSYOP Soldier, through the developing of a clear understanding of the TA, will ascertain which is the most desirous method to disseminate the printed products, ensuring successful receipt. There are two identified methods for the distribution of printed products: handing out products and posting or leaving products. Special consideration is made when posting and leaving products in areas of sensitivity, like religious buildings or governmental areas; however, these areas may be the proper place for placement based

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<sup>222</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.302, 7-11.

upon the accessibility and normal behaviors of the TA.<sup>223</sup> Additionally, leaving products in a location does not ensure the TA receives the message or that the print product is not confiscated by opposition elements. Aerial dissemination is also an option for print products, especially leaflets. PSYOP Soldiers can conduct coordination with air assets to ensure the products and message reach the identified TA in the correct area.

The dissemination of printed products is unique due to the availability of dissemination through multiple means extrinsic to the organic PSYOP entity. PSYOP Soldiers should consider and plan for other entities to disseminate messaging to increase the likelihood of TA receipt and, in some cases, hide the fact that the message is originating from U.S. forces. Other options include contracted distribution where agreements for delivery on a weekly, biweekly, or a monthly basis, add a level of consistency and redundancy to dissemination.<sup>224</sup> Additionally, the use of local national assets and non-governmental organizations (NGO) should be considered as means of print product dissemination. NGOs are also a means of gathering information on potential TAs and whether the TA is responding to a message or messaging. When able, PSYOP Soldiers, through close coordination with the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), can vet and utilize potential NGOs as a dissemination option for print products and for the collection of atmospherics.

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<sup>223</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.302, 7-13.

<sup>224</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.301, 6-8.

## Broadcast Dissemination

Some PSYOP forces have organic radio broadcast capabilities while others require extrinsic means to disseminate messaging over radio platforms. Regardless of the origination of means, the consideration of radio dissemination as a foundational IRC to achieve effects within an IE is a viable option. “Radio provides entertainment, news, and instructions along with the desired PSYOP message . . . radio broadcasts reach local audiences, cross international boundaries, and reach behind enemy lines.”<sup>225</sup> Local capabilities, such as radio stations, may be utilized depending upon the operating environment and may be a legitimate platform for local influencers, area commanders, and leaders to be interviewed or to disseminate messaging. PYSOP Soldiers can include these messages during already scheduled programs like sporting events or political event coverage to ensure mass listenership. Advantages of radio dissemination include speed, wide dissemination coverage, ease of perception, versatility, emotional power, and availability of receivers.<sup>226</sup> Radio is an excellent means of dissemination in which to nest and mix other means. The TA perceives the regularity, repetition, and the use of known cultural nuances during radio dissemination as legitimate. Additionally, the application of the principle of mass solely to radio is evident as the message is repeated and disseminated through different ways, on different frequencies, and different on-air personalities.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>225</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.301, 6-13.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid., 6-14.

“Television is a proven means of persuasion worldwide and is a vital asset in PSYOP dissemination as it appeals to a number of senses, making it the closest medium to face-to-face communication.”<sup>228</sup> TV and radio, unconstrained by boundaries, can achieve effects at all levels of war and be utilized across the ROMO. TV is immediate, makes use of sight and sound, and is an all-encompassing mass communication medium.<sup>229</sup> PSYOP Soldiers and planners must take careful consideration of content disseminated by TV due to the familiarization of a potential TA with TV content in their area. Miscalculations in TV messaging will result in a TA immediately identifying a message as contrived and dismiss its legitimacy. Furthermore, due to mass quantity of TV channels, satellite versus hardline cable, and the saturation of content, PSYOP entities must understand how a potential TA uses TV to receive their information. “Popular programs provide models for PSYOP TV products and help keep the message subtle . . . PSYOP Soldiers should ensure that they research the information about a nation’s popular TV programs and shows” to ensure proper program placement.<sup>230</sup> Finally, TV audiences most often view what they see as fact, so the careful inclusion in popular TV programming will give the message legitimacy. With consistent repetition, the message may be linked with that TV program and be viewed as factual information.

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<sup>228</sup> HQDA, FM 3-05.301, 6-14.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*, 6-15.

## Cellular Communications and Short Message Service (SMS) Text

Cellular communications, while not heavily mentioned in Joint or Army doctrine, are a viable means to disseminate messages to mass groups or singular cellular devices. PSYOP forces do not possess organic assets from which they can utilize cellular infrastructure to effectively disseminate messages over cellular networks; however, this potential obstacle is overcome through the use of contracted, host nation, or multinational partners. With many nations having viable cellular infrastructure, access to cellular devices, and already receiving and communicating via SMS text messaging, cellular message dissemination demands consideration in the conduct of PSYOP. Additionally, the manipulation of identified cellular networks through coordination with mission partners ensure communications over desired networks for potential intelligence collection or message dissemination. Mass SMS messages may be disseminated to identified audiences and, like radio, continually be disseminated daily, weekly, or monthly based on objectives. Due to the high saturation of cellular devices, there is a high probability of the message reaching the intended audience. Furthermore, pre-recorded messages may be utilized for actual calls to receivers within the cellular network. While this is an option, it should be utilized sparingly as not to annoy the TA to the point where they cease utilizing their cellular device, thus eliminating a potential means of message receiving. PSYOP forces, during TA analysis, identify potential cellular service carriers used by a potential TA and plan how to effectively use that network to reach them with the desired message. A SMS message alone might not change a behavior in a TA; however, it is a viable tool to consider when nesting, mixing, and when attempting to mass IRCs.

Multi-National Operations/Foreign Internal Defense (FID)/Unconventional Warfare (UW)/Security Forces Assistance (SFA)

Special Operations Forces (SOF) consistently work by, with, and through indigenous forces and other nation's militaries to conduct the SOF core activities. PSYOP Soldiers operate and train with these forces in the conduct of MISO, FID, UW, and SFA. PSYOP entities should ensure that all "MISO, regardless of national origin, are coordinated."<sup>231</sup> In a multi-national OE, MISO planning for the utilization of IRCs at the operation's onset must begin early to enable the development of necessary communication channels.<sup>232</sup> During the conduct of FID, SFA, and all other training and partner capacity building operations, PSYOP Soldiers can provide information and messages to foreign militaries and entities. PSYOP forces can utilize this opportunity to message TAs or to receive feedback on MOE from current MISO in that country. PSYOP entities "advise, train, and assist host and partner nation counterparts and government agencies to develop and implement effective activities in the IE."<sup>233</sup> Message dissemination via partner nation or host nation entities requires detailed planning, close coordination, and an understanding of what methods of dissemination those entities currently employ. Furthermore, PSYOP Soldiers need to ensure they can monitor the dissemination of messages and messaging by these partner entities to ensure unity and congruency of the message. Partner and host nations may also possess different IRCs and

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<sup>231</sup> JCS, JP 3-16, III-31.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid.

<sup>233</sup> JCS, JP 3-13.2, VI-3.

means of dissemination at their disposal that may not be available to U.S. PSYOP forces. Special approval will need to be gained as these foreign IRCs will be disseminating the message into the IE and that will require deconfliction with other entities' dissemination operations. In some instances, coordination with other nation's PSYOP entities may lead to mutually beneficial operations within the IE. These entities, especially those trained by U.S. PSYOP, may possess knowledge of the proper conduct of MISO in their native country. which mitigates operational language barriers and may facilitate smooth operational tempo.

### Interagency Operations

PSYOP entities are often sent to different countries to conduct operations out of that country's U.S. Embassy. These PSYOP Soldiers directly support that Embassy's Ambassador or Chief of Mission through the conduct of MISO. The Ambassador's Mission Guidance Letter (MGL) highlight their goals and objectives from which the PSYOP entity that is supporting will nest their operations. PSYOP entities assigned to embassies are most often given the title of Military Information Support Teams (MIST) and support the Ambassador's objectives in concert with military objectives. Access and placement inside of a U.S. Embassy gives PSYOP Soldiers unique opportunities to interact with interagency organizations and assist with non-military operations.

Interagency entities may possess IRCs that could potentially be beneficial and the utilization by PSYOP entities could achieve both the MGL objectives and U.S. Military objectives. Unity of effort is achieved as PSYOP entities "interact with interagency stakeholders and gain a mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and civilian actions and to identify ways in which military and

civilian capabilities best complement each other.”<sup>234</sup> PSYOP entities may have to search these capabilities out and network to meet those responsible for the employment of a specific IRC. This can form a mutually beneficial relationship for the conduct of operations that directly support multiple lines of effort and lends to the accomplishment of multiple civilian and military objectives. Furthermore, it is vital for PSYOP entities operating in interagency environments to participate in collective interagency working groups to discover how best they can support other entities and contribute to the community of interest. This collaboration and willingness to contribute may allow the interagency to understand the PSYOP abilities and limitations, how best to employ the assigned PSYOP element, and potentially offer additional resources or capabilities to the achieving of PO. PSYOP entities may also find that through the conduct of operations inside the embassy that MGL objectives often directly correlate to military objectives and are easily nested. These operations are often mutually beneficial, but may require the PSYOP Soldier to articulate effects differently to properly articulate MOE depending on the MGL tasks. The PSYOP Soldier should know how to communicate in both environments to properly discuss current operations, their effects, and how they contribute to the overall interagency or military operational end state. Finally, when operating in the interagency environment, the consideration of conducting operations through the massing of these additional interagency IRCs and organic means may potentially achieve great effects.

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<sup>234</sup> JCS, JP 3-08, I-1.

Cyber/Space/Special Technical Operations (STO)/Electronic Warfare (EW)/Special Access Program (SAP)

Highly compartmentalized and classified IRCs are not always available for use by PSYOP entities and approval timelines are often extended due to their sensitive nature and level of approval authority. A general knowledge of these capabilities, the entities that govern their employment, and their usage may contribute to a wholistic and massed approach to the conduct of PSYOP. The accomplishment of advanced planning accounts for timely approval for a capability's employment. Nested compartmentalized capabilities with more traditional means of message dissemination maximize the effectiveness of all means involved. Additionally, while PSYOP entities may have a general understanding of a tool's usage, capabilities, and limitations, the requesting of effects is preferred as there may be a more suitable capability or means unknown to the PSYOP Soldier. The knowledge of a specific execution and its effects may not be known when a PSYOP entity requests an effect from a highly classified or compartmentalized program. The PSYOP entity needs to ensure a suitable collection plan to observe for effects is in place to collect MOP and MOE ensuring the TA received the intended message and if the desired effect was achieved. Additional control measures may be taken that further limit a PSYOP entity's access to certain capabilities. "Special Access Programs (SAP) are sensitive acquisition, intelligence, or operations and support programs that impose need-to-know and access controls beyond those normally provided for access to confidential, secret, or top-secret information."<sup>235</sup> "Integrated joint special technical operations

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<sup>235</sup> HQDA, ATP 3-13.1, 3-4.

(IJSTO) are classified operations that harness specialized technical capabilities to gain a decisive advantage over an enemy or adversary and can be information related or compliment IO efforts.”<sup>236</sup> Soldiers may be granted compartmentalized access to some of these programs through pre-planning and close coordination by PSYOP prior to an operational deployment and enable them to utilize some additional capabilities.

Space, cyberspace, and EW operations have direct correlation to information operations, the conduct of PSYOP, and have psychological implications. They have direct implications for PSYOP, can affect the IE, and are considered viable IRCs in IO and PSYOP doctrine. Through the utilization of space control operations, capabilities exist to “to deny communication systems and propaganda tools, such as satellite television and satellite radio, to enemy leadership.”<sup>237</sup> Cyberspace and EW operations enable U.S. forces to effect cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. These operations have direct implication for PSYOP and the IE. These IRCs, while highly compartmentalized and classified, can enhance PSYOP and achieve effects on a designated TA. They should be massed and nested with other IRCs to achieve the desired effects and rarely be used solely due to their very specific utilization and effects.

### Social Media

The social media landscape has become an unmistakable and non-ignorable portion of the IE with currently unmeasurable capabilities in the conduct of influence

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<sup>236</sup> HQDA, ATP 3-13.1, 3-4.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid.

operations. While PSYOP should consider how to operate in and around the social media environment, there are many aspects that require additional attention and consideration. The IO community and doctrine still consider social media an emergent IRC with the potential to become a powerful capability for IO and PSYOP.<sup>238</sup> There are many implications for IO and PSYOP, and social media has many uses: media channel for radio, newspapers, and television; an interactive medium for exerting influence; a means to communicate with an established network or networks, and as a near real-time sensor-to-sensor network.<sup>239</sup> While the uses are many, considerations must be made for protection of those operating on social media. The capability and the operational use of social media is still too emergent to understand the most efficacious method to conduct PSYOP via this means. Additionally, it is not currently known if the use of social media is as influential as other means, considering the vast amount of messaging that already saturates a single user's preferred and most often visited websites. Currently, the use of social media for operational purposes is highly compartmentalized, classified, with strict authority and permissions. Authority and permission are only granted to select entities for very specific operations and purposes. PSYOP should consider, understand, and gain insight from social media, but never rely upon its use to influence a specific TA. Many questions remain on how to effectively plan for and account for MOP and MOE in the conduct of PSYOP via social media.

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<sup>238</sup> HQDA, ATP 3-13.1, 3-9.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid.*

U.S. PSYOP IRCs Table

The IRC categories table for PSYOP shows a complex collection of IRCs that must be planned, synchronized, integrated, and coordinated if PSYOP entities are going to maximize capabilities and dissemination effectiveness. The table also discloses that most of the IRCs available to PSYOP entities are extrinsic and must be sought and leveraged by, with, and through external entities and enablers. PSYOP Soldiers, in order to be effective and to achieve required effects, should possess the ability to work, communicate, and coordinate with other entities, leverage their capabilities, and mass these capabilities to achieve objectives in an ever increasingly complex IE.

Table 3. U.S. PSYOP Information Related Capabilities				
Category	Intrinsic IRCs	Extrinsic IRCs		
	Organic Means	Host Nation	Mission Partners	Technical and Compartmentalized Tools/ New Technology
Information Related Capability (IRC)	-Face-to-face -Loudspeaker -Print Products (Reach back)	-Face-to-face -Print Products -Radio -TV -Cellular (SMS) -FID -Multi-national Operations -UW	-Face-to-face -PSYACT -Print Products -Cellular (SMS) -Interagency Dissemination	-Social Media -Cyber -Space -STO -SAP -EW

*Source:* Created by author.

There appear obvious identifiable differences when comparing Nazi Germany and U.S. PSYOP IRCs in the analysis of tables 1 and 2. Nazi propaganda primarily utilized intrinsic IRCs for nationwide dissemination while U.S. PSYOP organic, intrinsic IRCs

are limited in reach and potential effect. Furthermore, U.S. PSYOP has a more robust selection of potential IRCs from which to integrate and utilize in the conduct of influence operations. The table disclosed that Nazi propaganda really had no identifiable extrinsic host nation IRCs that they utilized for message dissemination. Due to most of the Nazi IRCs being controlled by the propaganda ministry and thus intrinsic, they had little need for extrinsic host nation dissemination enablers. Most of the identified Nazi extrinsic mission partner IRCs were focused towards the intimidation and violence of the German population, augmenting propaganda efforts. Finally, the compartmentalized and new technology available to U.S. PSYOP exceeds that of Nazi Germany. While Nazi Germany used cinema to great effect, the available tools to PSYOP entities is far greater. Overall, it appears to be incumbent on U.S. PSYOP to coordinate with extrinsic enablers to effectively influence a potential TA and achieve effects within an IE.

Research Question Analysis: How does U.S. Psychological Operations use the principle of mass for message dissemination, incorporating tactics, techniques, and procedures from the strategic propaganda campaigns of Nazi Germany?

In the analysis of the two sub-questions, the principle of mass was analyzed as it relates to the dissemination of messages, messaging, and its usage by Nazi Germany and current U.S. PSYOP forces. The primary research question asks whether U.S. PSYOP should consider and learn from the tactics, techniques, and procedures utilized by Nazi Germany in current PSYOP doctrine and if their inclusion in operations would lead to greater effects within the IE in which they are operating. While Nazi Germany effectively massed its organic means of message dissemination, their TTPs pose distinct challenges for the conduct of twenty-first century PSYOP. Through the analysis of the two sub-questions, three distinct reasons why Nazi propaganda TTPs should not be utilized

became apparent: Nazi propaganda was paired with violence and intimidation to compel and control, not only influence; Nazi propaganda was not a military operation, but a totalitarian government activity; and Nazi propaganda was focused primarily on messaging the German citizenry, not a foreign TA.

Nazi propaganda being most often paired with acts of intimidation and violence makes the use of its TTPs for current U.S. PSYOP extremely problematic. U.S. PSYOP seeks to persuade, change, and influence foreign TAs through the planned, precise, and focused use of media and means of information dissemination. The inclusion of violent acts into these influence techniques would discredit and weaken the disseminated themes and messages; the TA would reject the message based up the inclusion of violence and in some cases would move to discredit such messaging. U.S. PSYOP does not seek to coerce TAs into supplication and obedience, but seeks true behavior change through subtle and well-crafted message dissemination utilizing methods from which the TA most often receives information. PSYOP encompasses the art of understanding the potential TA and the IE in which they occupy.

PSYOP is an U.S. Army Special Operations entity that is charged with the conduct of psychological operations. In Nazi Germany, propaganda and message dissemination was an elevated and required element within the government's normal operations and functions. The RMVP was a government, non-military institution charged with the creation, dissemination, analysis, and monitoring of propaganda and its effectiveness. Hitler, based upon his experience in World War I, prized propaganda as a necessary capability and one that Germany failed in execution during the First World War. The RMVP, through its multi-echelon organizational structure, ensured message

dissemination throughout the entirety of Germany to the smallest level of community, the Gau. U.S. PSYOP conducts its tasks as part of a military operation and to accomplish an identified military operational end state in support of clearly defined military objectives. Nazi Germany's propaganda TTPs were developed under the governmental construct, not military, that drove its planning and implementation.

The preponderance of Nazi propaganda was not a military operation tasked with influencing a foreign TA to change a behavior, value, attitude, or belief. The majority of Nazi propaganda was executed against its own population with the clear intent to influence, compel, and control its citizenry to blindly follow the party and support its malevolent ambitions. This inward focus of message dissemination with the intent to compel and control is in direct contrast to any mission that U.S. PSYOP would undertake. The Nazi propagandists also had an intimate knowledge of its citizenry, their customs, fears, language idiosyncrasies, and how to best manipulate them. U.S. Code forbids U.S. PSYOP forces from conducting psychological operations on any U.S. citizen. This remains true even when conducting PSYOP in a foreign country, and requires consideration and planning to ensure no U.S. citizen will receive such messaging. Nazi propaganda, in all its power and influence, focused on compelling and controlling the citizenry within Germany. Concurrently, Nazi Germany sought to unify the country through deception and fear through deliberate propaganda dissemination paired with violence, intimidation, misinformation, and disinformation.

Chapter 4 was an analysis of Nazi Germany's and current, twenty-first century U.S. PSYOP and their conduct of message dissemination through their various means and IRCs. Through the identification, organization, and categorization of these means, it can

be deduced how the Nazis and U.S. PSYOP applied the principle of mass to achieve effects in their respective information environments. Additionally, each entity's means and IRCs were placed into the table identified in chapter 3. This clearly showed that Nazi Germany relied on intrinsic means of dissemination, while U.S. PSYOP relies on extrinsic, non-organic IRCs to accomplish its mission. While U.S. PSYOP has many more IRCs available, they require increased coordination and knowledge of how to best utilize and integrate these IRCs into their operations.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS

#### Conclusions

The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a historical comparative case study between Nazi propaganda and current U.S. PSYOP, investigating how they utilize the joint principle of mass to effectively disseminate messages to influence a specific target audience. Nazi Germany propagandists effectively massed multiple media dissemination means for the purposes of saturating and dominating the German information environment. Per the literature review, the current organization of PSYOP dissemination doctrine does not effectively guide or express the massing of IRCs to ensure the effective influence of a specific TA. This thesis argues that due to the lack of an organized, efficacious, methodical means or methods, a categorical system makes it difficult to understand how to employ multiple dissemination means to conduct effective influence operations. Due to the complexity and number of IRCs within a given IE, findings from this research suggest and propose that PSYOP forces need an organized categorical structure of dissemination means and should always consider massing, nesting, and mixing IRCs towards the influence of the designated TA. The nesting and massing of these IRCs and means could affect the IE for a specific TA, increasing the chance of true influence or behavior change.

Chapter 4 highlights three distinct reasons as to why current U.S. PSYOP should not consider and utilize aspects of the TTPs used by Nazi Germany in the conduct of their propaganda operations. The primary research question asks whether U.S. PSYOP should consider and learn from the TTPs utilized by Nazi Germany in current PSYOP doctrine

and if their inclusion in operations would lead to greater effects within the IE in which they are operating. While Nazi Germany effectively massed its organic means of message dissemination, the majority of their TTPs should not be considered in the conduct of twenty-first century PSYOP. Through the analysis of the two sub-questions, three distinct reasons why Nazi propaganda TTPs should not be considered or utilized became apparent: Nazi propaganda was paired with violence and intimidation to compel and control, not only influence; Nazi propaganda was not a military operation, but a totalitarian government activity; and Nazi propaganda was focused primarily on messaging the German citizenry, not a foreign TA.

Chapter 5 expounds upon applications, highlights unexpected findings, and recommends future research for both methodologies. Chapter 5 is organized as to provide a comprehensive review of the entire document and give personal insight from the author to show challenges, biases, and areas for improvement.

Appendix A is a comprehensive graphic representation for this thesis highlighting all five chapters and certain unique aspects within each. The appendix is organized by chapter and depicts the logical flow of the research throughout the historical comparative case study. The purpose of the appendix is to provide additional fidelity for the reader to increase understanding of the author's intent by chapter and how each chapter is organized.

### Application

Nazi Germany executed their strategic propaganda campaign against their citizens with the clear intent to influence, compel, and control them. Their propagandists effectively nested and massed their intrinsic means of message dissemination with

violence and intimidation to achieve their desired effects. U.S. PSYOP, while not adopting the Nazi TTPs, should consider the principle of mass in regards to maximizing the available IRCs with the intent to influence a foreign TA. With the ever-increasing complexity of the world's IE and various OEs, PSYOP entities should utilize all available means to achieve a successful operational end state. This fact dictates that PSYOP Soldiers become more educated on potential IRCs, their effects, and their purveyors to allow for synchronization, integration, and coordination for the entire community of interest. PSYOP entities should be regulars at working groups and boards where these different IRCs are present to facilitate open dialogue and where mutually beneficial interests can properly be articulated and explored. Lethal and non-lethal targeting boards within the joint targeting process, where potential targets are identified and resources are allocated to achieve effects is a prime place for PSYOP entities to collaborate and understand how best they can contribute to the overall mission. While PSYOP's organic, intrinsic means of dissemination are few, through their knowledge, access, and placement, they have the ability to cause great effects within the IE and OE. These extrinsic IRCs and capabilities should be an initial planning consideration in the conduct of influence operations to maximize the PSYOP operation's potential and the eventual influence of the TA.

While PSYOP doctrine is currently in transition from the classic FMs to TMs, being bridged by a ST, the foundational precepts on the conduct of PSYOP remain the same. The idea of mixing, nesting, and massing IRCs and means of dissemination is not a strong focus of the current doctrine, and leaves much in the way of properly utilizing IRCs to the creativity of the PSYOP entity executing operations and disseminating

messages. There are far too many available IRCs and means of dissemination at a PSYOP Soldier's disposal not to consider how to properly nest and mass them to increase the likelihood of success in influencing a potential TA. Utilizing multiple IRCs will shape the IE to be more conducive to the conduct of PSYOP, even while the IRCs selected may not always be the means in which the TA is completely vulnerable. This requires clear operational understanding and patience as influence operations and shaping of an IE and the overall narrative take time.

The PSYOP IRC table categorizes and organizes unclassified intrinsic and extrinsic IRCs into four distinct categories: organic means, host nation, mission partners, and technical and compartmentalized tools and new technology. It is the author's view that, based on the research and findings from this study, the consideration of these four distinct categories are an efficacious way to identify available IRCs and organize them to aid in planning to mix, nest, and mass them to achieve effects in an IE. While this table is uncomprehensive, it provides a PSYOP Soldier with a framework from which to begin to identify IRCs and other means of message dissemination from which to begin to shape their own mission's capabilities to influence designated TAs within an IE. Also, it provides higher echelons of leadership and command with a current operational picture of available capabilities from which to assist and guide operational PSYOP entities in planning, coordination, and IRC integration.

Table 4. Applied U.S. PSYOP Information Related Capabilities				
Category	Intrinsic IRCs	Extrinsic IRCs		
	Organic Means	Host Nation	Mission Partners	Technical and Compartmentalized Tools/ New Technology
Information Related Capability (IRC)	-Face-to-face -Loudspeaker -Print Products (Reachback)	-Face-to-face -Print Products -Radio -TV -Cellular (SMS) -FID -Multi-national Operations -UW	-Face-to-face -PSYACT -Print Products -Cellular (SMS) -Interagency Dissemination	-Social Media -Cyber -Space -STO -SAP -EW

Source: Created by author.

### Unexpected Findings

The author discovered personal, confirmation bias during the course and conduct of research. The bias centered around the idea of the necessity of massing IRCs while conducting influence operations based on previous operational PSYOP experience. This primarily contributed to a biased view while researching the Nazi propaganda campaigns against the German citizenry and in the research of current PSYOP doctrinal TTPs. The development of the IRC table and research mitigates this bias and confirms preconceived notions regarding the massing and mixing of IRCs for message dissemination. While confirmation bias exists, the author does not believe that it affected the research and stands by the findings of this thesis as genuine and founded.

Through the course of this research, a previously unknown synergistic relationship became clear between the TA, the themes and messages, and the selected

IRCs. The author believes that at the initiation of research, the selected, potential TA solely dictates the selection of specific IRCs and the desired behavior dictates the subsequent themes and messages. During the conduct of this thesis' research, it became clearer that while the potential TA's vulnerabilities and accessibilities are a prime consideration, the choice of specific IRCs and the careful crafting of proposed themes and messages are as important in the planning of influence operations. The affecting of the designated TA drives the operation; however, the IRC and the themes and messages chosen are just as important, and require as much detailed planning and comprehensive understanding for their potential effects. This does not diminish the necessity of identifying IRCs that will have most impact on the TA; however, other IRCs require consideration to nested and mixed. Themes and messages are somewhat dictated by the chosen IRC's capabilities, but are also dictated by the TA's vulnerabilities and accessibilities. This synergistic relationship need only provide perspective to the PSYOP planner and facilitate equal consideration for the TA, IRC, and the themes and messages during the TA analysis and further planning.

Figure 1 depicts the shared importance of the TA, IRC, and chosen themes and messages. On the left-hand side of the figure, there are many variables that require consideration and planning to ensure the TA, IRCs, and themes and messages are valid. These operational and mission variables, along with civil considerations, assist in providing situational understanding for a potential OE and IE. Planners take in to account these variables along with identified vulnerabilities, accessibilities, and capabilities as they are direct links to the TA, IRCs, and themes and messages. A common understanding of the OE and IE are of primary importance as it will have direct influence

over future planning. Finally, directed variables are those constraints and mission orders that require accomplishment to achieve an overall operational end state or a desired effect.




Figure 1. PSYOP Synergistic Relationship

Source: Created by author.

The final unexpected discovery from this research is that both Nazi propaganda and current U.S. PSYOP's consideration of the principle of mass could have themselves been individual case studies. During research, most of the literature and available information were large enough to warrant individual research efforts. Nazi Germany's propaganda campaigns have been well documented, examined from multiple different perspectives, and provided many resources from which to research the principle of mass.

While the principle of mass is a more modern concept and is not widely considered in the research of Nazi propaganda, the information is available through focused research and educated inference. Concurrently, there are many potential IRCs from which PSYOP entities may leverage and utilize in the conduct of influence operations. There are also many ways and circumstances to leverage and creatively maneuver these IRCs. Both Nazi propaganda and U.S. PSYOP warrant further exploration and research which would benefit the profession of arms. A chief limitation was the merger of researching these two entities; however, the author felt it necessary to provide a prime historical example of the principle of mass in execution and on a strategic scale to offer perspective.

### Recommendations for Further Research

#### Nazi Propaganda

The author recommends additional research focusing on grassroots Nazi propaganda and the execution of whisper campaigns at the Gau or local level. This could be useful for the conduct of tactical PSYOP and the operational use of indigenous populations as a means of dissemination. The Nazi employment of a decentralized command and control apparatus provided local level propagandist's great freedom to operate under the conditions within their individual OE and IE. This allowed for operationalizing individual citizens with identified referent power to disseminate and amplify desired messages within their familiar communities and social networks.

A chief limitation in this research was the lack of true Nazi propaganda doctrine to compare with current U.S. PSYOP doctrine. While there are excerpts from Joseph Goebbels' diary explaining his ideas regarding propaganda, the author found no Nazi propaganda doctrinal references from which to truly explore solidified TTPs and

methods. Additional research into these diary entries or the discovery of doctrinal documents would strengthen the comparison and add credence to the research.

## U.S. PSYOP

Another chief limitation for this research was the classification restrictions placed upon this thesis. Due to that restriction, potential IRCs that could be categorized into the table for consideration were omitted. These IRCs classified at higher levels are extrinsic to PSYOP elements and will most likely require high levels of coordination, approval, and planning; however, their consideration for inclusion will only improve PSYOP in amplifying the message or messaging being disseminated. PSYOP Soldiers should become generally familiar with these and other compartmentalized IRCs and whose control and approval for usage they reside under.

While the joint principle of mass was the primary focus of this research, additional research into the remaining joint principles and how they directly affect the conduct of PSYOP deserves time and additional consideration. While active duty PSYOP most often conducts operations with SOF and interagency entities, being able to doctrinally articulate capabilities and effects in the joint environment to conventional forces will only enable operations, synchronization, integration, and coordination. This also facilitates and aids in conventional commanders understanding how PSYOP could potentially augment and enable their operations and may precipitate additional, mutually benefitting resource allocation.


The final recommendation for future research on current U.S. PSYOP is to continue to explore the synergistic relationship between IRCs, TAs, and themes and messages. This unexpected finding deserves concentrated focus and further development.

Dedicating study to the shared importance of these three distinct items may increase focus during PSYOP detailed planning and in the execution of influence operations. If IRCs are considered as important as the themes and messages, then strategically selecting the correct mix of IRCs for the identified TA should be of prime consideration. The basis for the correct selection of IRCs is on the TA analysis and a TA's identified vulnerabilities and accessibilities.

APPENDIX A

THESIS OVERVIEW GRAPHIC

Nazi Germany's Mass Media Influence Approach: An Introspective Application to Twenty-First Century U.S. PSYOP Doctrine



Source: Created by author.

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