

PROPOSAL OF THE CONCEPT FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

ALES KESIC, MAJOR, SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES
B.A., Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 2003

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2019

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. United States Fair Use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the use of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into the manuscript. This author may be protected by more restrictions in their home countries, in which case further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 14-06-2019		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2018 – JUN 2019	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Proposal of the Concept for Future Development of the Slovenian Armed Forces				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Kesic, Ales				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Slovenia is a small country in Central Europe with a population slightly over two million. It was the most economically developed Republic of former Yugoslavia, had short independence war (1991) and quickly integrated into European Union and NATO (2004). The development of the Defense System is characterized by inconsistent phases and was badly influenced by economic recession (2009-2014). Currently Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) are entrapped with constant transformations, because of unaligned Defense Policy and Military Expenditure. Almost ten years of deprived resources caused structural problems in the SAF, especially in equipping and personnel. From 2013 the SAF was evaluated by the President of the Republic as non-ready for war. The security situation in Europe degraded substantially in 2014. This thesis uses the U.S. Army Design Methodology, framing current environment and problems, and proposing solutions to allow SAF to be capable force for national defense and participation in collective defense.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Slovenian Armed Forces, Defense Policy, Collective Defense, Self Defense, Capabilities					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 154	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Ales Kesic

Thesis Title: Proposal of the Concept for Future Development of the Slovenian Armed Forces

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Kevin E. Gentzler, DMgt

_____, Member
Gregory J. Cook, M.A.

_____, Member
Kenneth E. Long, D.M.

Accepted this 14th day of June 2019 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

PROPOSAL OF THE CONCEPT FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SLOVENIAN ARMED FORCES, by Major Ales Kesic, 154 pages.

Slovenia is a small country in Central Europe with a population slightly over two million. It was the most economically developed Republic of former Yugoslavia, had short independence war (1991) and after independence quickly integrated into European Union and NATO (2004).

The development of the Defense System is characterized by inconsistent phases and was badly influenced by economic recession (2009-2014). Currently Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) are entrapped with constant transformations, because of unaligned Defense Policy and Military Expenditure.

Almost ten years of deprived resources caused structural problems in the SAF. From 2013, the SAF was evaluated from the President of the Republic as non-ready for war. The main reasons for negative evaluations are equipment readiness and capabilities and status of personnel.

Equipment Readiness mostly concerns combat platforms for two medium battalion groups as a main land capability of Slovenia for national and collective defense. In February 2019 the procurement of 8x8 combat platforms was delayed, which means delayed battalion groups and on-going negative readiness evaluation.

Slovenia's limited financial resources over the last decade had an impact on personnel. The long-term program planned for 8,000 active duty and two thousand contractual reserve billets, equaling ten thousand personnel totals for the SAF. At the beginning of 2019 the SAF had 6,562 active duty and 768 contractual reserve (7,330). This shortage is more than $\frac{1}{4}$ of the potential force and the second reason for negative readiness evaluation.

This thesis uses the U.S. Army Design Methodology in framing current environment and problems, and proposing solutions to allow SAF to be capable force for national defense and participation in collective defense.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Complex problems demand innovative approaches and dedicated researchers in order to develop suitable, feasible and acceptable solutions. Lessons learnt in allied armed forces, collaborative dialog with professors and international community on CGSC were crucial for this thesis. Dr. Gentzler and Dr. Long from CGSC faculty dedicated the most energy, time and military expertise to this work, for which I will be always grateful. Mr. Cook was a guarantee that I stayed motivated.

Extensive research demanded substantial time. Unfortunately, my family suffered a lot during that time. Tanya, Lan and Nik, thank you for your continuous support, failure was not an option because of you. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my mother, for everything she has done that I kept my difficult character in line through elementary school, high school, university, and this master's thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ACRONYMS	ix
ILLUSTRATIONS	xi
TABLES	xii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	13
Background	13
Current Situation	16
Slovenian Parliamentary Democracy and Defense Issues	19
Readiness of the Slovenian Armed Forces	20
Purpose and Significance of the Study	22
Primary and Secondary Research Questions	23
Best Practices from U.S. Army Professional Body of Knowledge for Solving Complex Problems	24
Limitations, Scope and Delimitations	25
Assumptions and Initial Personal Recommendation (R1)	27
Assumptions	27
R1 Statement	28
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	30
Security Situation in Europe Since 2014	31
Russian Tolerance and Hybrid Warfare	31
Terrorist Attacks	35
Migration Flows	37
Divided Europe	38
Slovenian Strategic Position and Sources of Risks and Threats	39
Slovenian Strategic Communications and Public Opinion about Security	41
NATO Defense Policy in Changed Security Environment	47
NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP)	55
Slovenian Role in Allied 360-Degree Framework	56
Slovenian Security Policy and Defense Policy and Planning Since Independence	57
First Period (1991-1995)	58
Second Period (1996-2004)	62
Third Period (2005-2010)	67
Last Period (2010-2019)	69
Summary	75
Defense Expenditure	77

Global Trends in Defense Expenditure.....	77
Trends in Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries.....	80
Slovenian Defense Expenditure.....	84
Summary.....	86
Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF).....	87
Mission and Tasks of the SAF.....	87
Readiness of the SAF for National and Collective Defense.....	92
Human Resources of the SAF.....	96
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	100
Purpose of the Research and the Research Questions	100
Research Process.....	101
Qualitative Methodology and Applied Professional Case Study.....	103
Applied Professional Case Study and Research Model of the Thesis	104
CHAPTER 4 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS	108
Introduction.....	108
Findings	109
Sources of Threats and Risks in Europe Since 2014	110
Russian Threats to Eastern Flank of NATO	111
Violent Islamic Fundamentalism Expansion	112
Ability of the Slovenian Strategic Communications to Explain the New Security Environment.....	113
Slovenian Strategic Position and NATO's 360-Degree Framework	115
Slovenian Defense Plan	117
Slovenian Armed Forces Personnel Management Practices.....	119
Army Design Methodology in the SAF	121
Updated Personal Recommendation (R2).....	121
CHAPTER 5 RECOMMENDATIONS.....	123
Recommendations about Findings.....	123
Research Questions for Future Research	124
Personal Reflection	125
APPENDIX A SLOVENIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON SECURITY (2012, 2016)	127
APPENDIX B KEY DECISIONS AND INITIATIVES IN NATO SUMMITS	128
APPENDIX C SLOVENIAN DEFENSE POLICY AND DEFENSE PLAN	133
APPENDIX D ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SAF	136
APPENDIX E MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD	137

BIBLIOGRAPHY	142
--------------------	-----

ACRONYMS

ADM	Army Design Methodology
APCS	Applied Professional Case Study
CGSC	U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
EUR	Euro
GDP	Global Domestic Product
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JLA	<i>Jugoslovanska ljudska armada</i> (Yugoslav People's Army)
KPJ	<i>Komunistična partija Jugoslavije</i> (Communist Party of Yugoslavia)
MORS	<i>Ministrstvo za obrambo RS</i> (Ministry of Defense of RS)
R1	Initial Personal Recommendation
R2	Informed Position
RAP	Readiness Action Plan
RS	Republic of Slovenia
SAF	Slovenian Armed Forces (<i>Slovenska vojska, SV</i>)
SFRJ	<i>Socialistična federativna republika Jugoslavija</i> (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)
SJM	<i>Slovensko javno mnenje</i> (Slovenian Public Opinion)
SLODS	<i>Splošna ljudska obramba in družbena samozaščita</i> (Total People's Defense and Self-Protection of Society)
SURS	<i>Statistični urad RS</i> (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia)
TO	<i>Teritorialna obramba</i> (Territorial Defense Unit)
TRP	<i>Temeljni razvojni programi</i> (Act for financing Main Defense Programs)

UMAR	<i>Urad za makroekonomske analize in razvoj</i> (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development of the Republic of Slovenia)
USD	Unites States Dollar
VJTF	Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Terrorist Attacks in Europe from 2015-2018	35
Figure 2. Chronology of Defense Policy Documents	58
Figure 3. Russian Anti-Access Area Denial Line	112
Figure 4. NATO 360-Degree Approach and Slovenian Strategic Position.....	116
Figure 5. Organizational Structure of the SAF	136

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Analysis of the Question “Do you Feel Safe or Threatened” (2001-2016).....	43
Table 2. Goals of the Defense Strategy	73
Table 3. Ten Countries with the Highest Military Expenditure in 2017	79
Table 4. Trends in Defense Spending 2014-2018.....	80
Table 5. Defense Expenditures of NATO Members.....	82
Table 6. Slovenian Defense Expenditure (2000-2019).....	84
Table 7. Number of Slovenian Troops on Crisis Response Operations	91
Table 8. Human Resources 2009-2019.....	98
Table 9. Army Design Methodology Applied for Slovenian Case.....	105
Table 10. Approach to the conduct of the Research	106
Table 11. Analysis of the Factors which Threaten Slovenia (March-May 2012).....	127
Table 12. Analysis of the Factors which Threaten Slovenia (Nov. 2015-April 2016)	127
Table 13. Key Decisions of NATO Summit in Wales (2014).....	128
Table 14. Smart Defense and Connected Forces Initiative.....	129
Table 15. Assurance and Adaptation Measures of the RAP	130
Table 16. Key Decisions of NATO Summit in Warsaw.....	131
Table 17. Key Decisions of NATO Summit in Brussels	132
Table 18. General Long-Term Program for Development and Equipping of the SAF to 2015	133
Table 19. Investments of the SAF in Infrastructure and Equipment (2005-2010)	135

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Slovenia is a small country (20,271 square kilometers, slightly smaller than New Jersey) with a population slightly more than two million (2.067.284).¹ It was the most economically developed Republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (*Socialistična federativna republika Jugoslavija*), had a short war for independence, and after independence (1991) quickly integrated into the European Union and NATO (2004).² Slovenia suffered badly during the economic recession, the economy shrank 7.8 percent in 2009, recovered in 2014, and currently is experiencing solid economic growth of 4.5 percent annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth in 2018.³

The armed forces that supported independence was built from the Territorial Defense and police units (People's Militia) of Socialistic Republic of Slovenia. Territorial units in all the republics of Yugoslavia were developed after the intervention of the

¹ Government of Republic of Slovenia (GOV RS), "Basic Geographical Data," 16 October 2018, accessed 16 October 2018, www.vlada.si/o_sloveniji/osnovni_geografski_podatki/; Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, "Population," 16 October 2018, accessed October 16, 2018, <https://www.stat.si/StatWeb/en/Field/Index/17>.

² Bogomil Ferfila, *The End of Utopia: Reforms of Former Communist Countries*, (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Delavska enotnost, 1992), 152; Government of the Republic of Slovenia, "History," accessed 16 October 2018, http://www.vlada.si/o_sloveniji/zgodovina/.

³ Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, "SI-Stat Database," 16 October 2018, accessed 16 October 2018, <https://pxweb.stat.si/pxweb/Dialog/statfile2.asp>.

Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia (1968).⁴ To deter or resist aggression against Yugoslavia. Beginning in the 1970s, new doctrine was developed which was called the Total People's Defense (*Splošna ljudska obramba in družbena samozaščita, SLODS*). The SLODS was based on the concept of total war as the only means of unaligned Yugoslavia to resist against Eastern (Warsaw Pact) or Western (NATO) forces. Territorial units were a direct product of SLODS and became a parallel structure to Yugoslav Army, owning their own light weapons and commanded in the language of the Republic.⁵ The Yugoslav People's Army (JLA) was a respective Armed Force in Europe. At the beginning of the 1900s, the JLA had 275,341 soldiers and could quickly mobilize to over one million soldiers. The JLA had its own judicial, medical, and education system. It was also one of the strongest promoters of communist ideology. Almost all the cadre in the professional structure were the members of the Communistic Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ).⁶

Slovenia's Independence war was only ten days long, and resulted in relatively low casualties (64 on both sides) in comparison with other wars on the soil of former

⁴ *Socialistična federativna republika Jugoslavija* (Socialistic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) was composed of six socialistic republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia) and two autonomous regions (Vojvodina, Kosovo). It was never part of Warsaw Pact or NATO, but founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Movement was created in the capitol of Yugoslavia (Belgrade) in 1961, as an alternative to collective defense offered by superpowers.

⁵ Zvezdan Marković, "The Yugoslav People's Army – A Paper Tiger or a True Military Power" *Vojaška zgodovina* 13, no. 1-2 (2017): 29, accessed 25 October 2018, <http://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-SH6KQSQW/7da1ef3b-0bf6-428c-b569-9450421da5ba/PDF>.

⁶ Ibid., 33-37.

Yugoslavia, which ended with the Dayton Agreement in 1995 (Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia), Kumanovo agreement in 1999 (Kosovo, Serbia) and the Ohrid Agreement in 2001 (Albanian minority, Macedonia), and demanded over 200,000 dead.⁷ Main reasons for the short Slovenian war were high ethnical homogeneity (88 percent), determination of Slovenian people on the referendum for independence 95 percent of participating voters chose independence, and successful strategy and tactical action against the Yugoslav Army.⁸

The Slovenian National Defense System developed in phases. First, the Defense System kept the characteristics of former Yugoslav system. There were aspirations to establish a system of armed neutrality similar to Austria and Switzerland. However, in 1994, it was decided that the optimal way for Slovenian defense was to be part of NATO's Collective Defense system. Slovenia began Partnership for Peace actions in 1994. Secondly, Slovenia prepared conditions for accession to NATO. An important part of the reform was abandonment of the conscription system.⁹ Third, Slovenia joined NATO in 2004. At that time Slovenia began to develop capabilities for national and

⁷ Dušan Pirjevec, *Jugoslovanske vojne: 1991-2001* [Yugoslav Wars: 1991-2001] (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Cankarjeva Založba): 23-35, 46-51, 73-79, 99-109.

⁸ Anton Gosar, *Narodnosti Slovenije* [Peoples of Slovenia] (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Anton Melik Geographical Institute, 8 May 2019), accessed 8 May 2019, https://giam.zrc-sazu.si/sites/default/files/gs_clanki/GS_2401_033-050.pdf; National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia (NA RS), "Razglasitev referendumu" [Referendum Decision], 8 May 2019, accessed 8 May 2019, <https://www.dz-rs.si/wps/portal/Home/ODrzavnemZboru/Umetnost/RazstavaRazglasitevPlebiscita/>; Janez J. Švanjcer, *Obranili Slovenijo* (Slovenia Defended), (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Viharnik, 1993), 44-73.

⁹ Anton Grizold, "Izzivi v razvoju nacionalne obrambe Slovenije" [Challenges in the Development of the National Defense System] *Teorija in praksa*, 41, no. 1-2 (2004), accessed 25 October 2018, <http://dk.fdv.uni-lj.si/db/pdfs/tip20041-2grizold.PDF>.

collective defense, and actively participated in Crisis Response Operations. Lastly, economic recession and complacency with the security situation stalled the process of capability building and forced the SAF to adopt to almost a 50 percent budget cut. Unfortunately, after the financial crisis ended Slovenia continued to spend at pre-recession defense spending levels. For the last decade the reduced level of fiscal resources has caused structural problems in the SAF even as the security situation in Europe deteriorated.

Current Situation

The research presented in this Thesis utilized best practices of the U.S. Army's problem solving process for identification and solution development of complex problems. The U.S. Army Design Methodology takes a complex problem and transforms it to a structured problem. For each problem the ADM process allows leaders and planners to describe a current state, desired future state, and problems obstructing transition to desired future state for development of comprehensive solutions.¹⁰ The current situation below is described and structured according to ADM.

When considering the Defense Act and Slovenian Military doctrine the desired future state of the SAF is clear. The Defense Act (Article 2) provides the purpose of Defense forces in Slovenia.¹¹ Current SAF Military doctrine provides the mission of

¹⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012), 7, accessed 18 April 2019, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/adp5_0.pdf.

¹¹ Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, Zakon o obrambi [Defense Act], Vol. XXV, no. 95, 10 December 2015, accessed 28 March 2019,

those forces.¹² The mission could be described as ready and capable SAF, which, in cooperation with allies, is able to deter aggression against Slovenia and contribute to international peace and security. In case of aggression, the SAF is able to defend Slovenian territory independently or through collective defense.

In an attempt to correctly describe the current state and problems obstructing transition of the MoD to the desired future state one must consider a wider context than just internal conditions in Slovenia. The context in which this thesis is situated for analytical purposes is in the future development of the SAF considering the following conditions:

1. Changed security environment in Europe since 2014;
2. Demands of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners for reassurance of commitments for collective defense;
3. Continual political turbulence in Slovenia; and
4. Internal problems of the SAF such as equipping and personnel issues.

The author identified all of the conditions stated above through the literature review process for this thesis. Each condition effects the ability of Slovenia to develop an armed force that is ready and capable of effectively providing for both the Collective Defense required under NATO and national defense to retain Slovenia's sovereignty. Details of each condition follow.

<http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/npbDocPdf?idPredpisa=ZAKO5800&idPredpisaChng=ZAKO532&type=pdf>.

¹² Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia, *Military Doctrine*, 1 June 2006, 24-25, accessed 22 April 2019, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/vojd2006_eng.pdf.

Europe's security situation has deteriorated substantially since 2014. Terrorist attacks in major European cities, increasing migration flows and aggressive acts by Russia all threaten stability in Europe. NATO countries held the Wales Summit in 2014, which was influenced by member states on its eastern flank. This summit began necessary adaptation to the new situation and sought reassurance from NATO members of commitments for collective defense in the organization.¹³

NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, on his visit to Slovenia in October 2018 warned that commitments in Wales approaching 2 percent of the GDP were to be realized in ten years, by 2024, with no extensions. In 2018, NATO leaders expected only eight allies would reach that criteria. At the same time the average country in NATO, without counting the U.S. contributions, was spending 1.5 percent of the GDP for defense. Slovenia increased the defense spending in real terms, however, in 2018 only spent about 1 percent of the GDP for defense. Stoltenberg emphasized, that the difference between 1 percent and 1.5 percent of the GDP is 50 percent, indicating Slovenia's poor provision of required funding. On the other hand, Stoltenberg recognized exemplary participation of the SAF on NATO international missions in the Western Balkans and Baltic states. He also discussed the strategic position of Slovenia within the European continent in enabling rapid deployment of troops as a crucial need of NATO to react in changed security environment.¹⁴

¹³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), "Wales Summit Declaration," 5 September 2014, accessed 26 February 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm#def-exp.

¹⁴ NATO, "Joint Press Conference," 9 October 2018, video, 19:26, accessed 26 February 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dN9ZQcgMdP4>.

Slovenian Parliamentary Democracy and Defense Issues

Slovenia is a Parliamentary Republic and found itself in this international environment with a decade long prioritization of macroeconomic and other problems over defense spending. The proportional electoral system of Slovenia allows fair representation through national elections.¹⁵ Considerably less votes are lost in comparison with the majority system; however, numerous parties are elected in parliament and coalition governments have a harder time reaching consensus or achieving a majority of votes on issues concerning complex problems such as increasing defense spending. Currently, Slovenia has its thirteenth Government and sixteenth Defense Minister since independence in 1991. Only two governments have finished the four-year mandate. The average period of the Slovenian Government is 2.25 years, resulting in twelve governments in the period 1991-2018.¹⁶ This rapid change in elected officials combined with Slovenian public opinion that recognizes Slovenia as a safe country, makes it difficult for the Government to develop the need and vision for increased defense structure or to even justify additional resources for defense to meet current requirements and needs within the SAF.¹⁷

¹⁵ NA RS, “*Volitve in volilni sistem*” [*Elections and the electoral system*], accessed 5 May 2019, <https://www.dz-rs.si/wps/portal/Home/PoliticniSistem/VolitveInVolilniSistem>.

¹⁶ Government of the Republic of Slovenia, “Past Governments,” accessed 26 February 2019, http://www.vlada.si/o_vladi/pretekle_vlade/.

¹⁷ Mitja Hafner-Fink and Marjan Malešič, *Slovensko javno mnenje 2015: Mednarodna raziskava Stališča o delu (ISSP 2015), Mednarodna raziskava Stališča o vlogi države (ISSP 2016), Ogledalo javnega mnenja 2015 in raziskava Stališča o varnosti* [Slovenian Public Opinion 2015: International Survey on Positions on Work (ISSP 2015), International Survey on the Role of the State (ISSP 2016), The Mirror of Public Opinion 2015 and Security Positions Survey] Ljubljana, Slovenia: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv

Since 2010, Slovenia has had five different governments and six defense ministers and did not increase defense spending at 1 percent of the GDP.¹⁸ Currently the Government of the Republic of Slovenia has a mandate from 2019-2022, but it is a minority coalition government composed of five parties.¹⁹ This coalition was elected by a parliament with the support of the sixth leftist party named *Združena levica*, or the United Leftist Party. This party advocates Slovenia's exit from NATO and opposes investing in defense.²⁰ Because the governing coalition needs the United Leftist Party to govern, it will be difficult for the Government to establish conditions required to accomplish necessary defense development of the SAF to meet internal and NATO requirements.

Readiness of the Slovenian Armed Forces

According to the readiness evaluation reports presented annually by the President of the Republic, the SAF has been evaluated as non-ready for war since 2013. Readiness is defined by the Defense Act with criteria determined in the Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme (long-term program).²¹ The main

družboslovnih podatkov, 2016, accessed 23 February 2019, <https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/sjm15/>.

¹⁸ GOV RS, "Past Governments of Slovenia," 15 April 2019, accessed 15 April 2019, http://www.vlada.si/en/about_the_government/governments%20of_the_republic_of_slovenia/.

¹⁹ GOV RS, "Slovenian Government," 15 April 2019, accessed 15 April 2019, http://www.vlada.si/en/about_the_government/members_of_government/.

²⁰ Združena Levica, *Program stranke levica* [Program of the Leftist Party], 15 April 2019, accessed 15 April 2019, <http://www.levica.si/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Levica-volilni-program-2018.pdf>.

²¹ RS, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Zakon o obrambi* [Defense Act], XXV, no. 95, 10 December 2015; RS, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia,

reasons for the negative evaluations are equipment readiness and capabilities and personnel status. Equipping concerns two medium battalion groups as Slovenia's primary land capability for national and collective defense. The Mid-Term Defense Program, developed in 2018, envisions that SAF will transform two light battalions into medium battalions, and invest 595 million EUR (from 2018 to 2023) for the necessary equipment to outfit the 1st Medium Battalion Group.²² 70 percent of the resources were designated to purchase 8x8 wheeled combat armored vehicles.²³ However, the resignation of the Slovenian Prime Minister in March 2018 and elections in June 2018 stalled the process. In February 2019, the new Defense Minister announced that Slovenia would not procure combat platforms because the tactical study used as the legal basis for procurement was obsolete. Consequently, the development of the medium battalion groups could be delayed for years, resulting in the continuation of negative readiness evaluations.²⁴

Slovenia's limited financial resources over the last decade have had an impact on personnel, too. The long-term program plans for eight thousand active duty and two

Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the SAF, Vol. XIX, no. 99, December 2010, 7, accessed 23 April 2019, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/ReDPROSV25_slo_en.pdf.

²² MoD RS, *Srednjeročni obrambni program Republike Slovenije 2018-2023* [Mid-Term Defense Program of the Republic of Slovenia 2018-2023] (Ljubljana, Republic of Slovenia, Ministry of Defense, 2018), 5-11, accessed 16 October 2018, <http://vrs-3.vlada.si/MANDAT14/VLADNAGRADIVA.NSF/71d4985ffda5de89c12572c3003716c4/709feb255697c4b7c125826e00469436?OpenDocument>.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Radio-Television Slovenia (RTVSLO), "Modernization of the SAF postponed indefinitely, Combat Readiness Remains Low," 21 February 2019, accessed 15 March 2019, <https://www.rtvsllo.si/slovenija/modernizacija-vojske-odlozena-za-nedolocen-cas-obrambna-sposobnost-pa-ostaja-klavrna/480762>.

thousand contractual reserve billets, for a total of ten thousand personnel for the SAF. At the beginning of 2019, the SAF had 6,562 active duty and 768 contractual reserves (7,330).²⁵ This shortage accounts for more than one-fourth of the potential force and is the second reason for the recent negative readiness evaluation.

Purpose and Significance of the Study

The purpose of this thesis is threefold. First, in line with ADM, the author will analyze the current state of SAF using a set of different perspectives. The different perspectives do not focus only on the problems of the SAF, but on the wider political and economic situations in Slovenia. Another perspective is the changes in the international environment leading to new risks and threats to Europe and NATO members. Another perspective is NATO's demands for reassurance from Slovenia that it will meet its continuing requirements for collective defense. The second purpose is to introduce a problem-solving approach used in the U.S. Army as a possible approach to resolve complex problems in the SAF. The third purpose is derived from the previous two purposes and attempts to provide arguments about key concerns for the Slovenian Chief of the General Staff to better prepare military recommendations to the Minister of Defense.

The Slovenian MoD is currently preparing the White Book of Defense, only three years after the Slovenian MoD conducted the last Strategic Defense Review (*Strateški*

²⁵ MoD RS, Slovenian Armed Forces, "About the Slovenian Armed Forces," accessed 22 April 2019, <http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/about-the-slovenian-armed-forces/>.

pregled obrambe 2016).²⁶ The review showed substantial deviations from the goals set in national security and defense policies and the long-term plan. Unfortunately, the review focused mainly on the defense sphere and did not consider stakeholders from the wider Slovenian and international environment. This thesis could contribute to the development of the White Book as a resource describing those stated environments.

Primary and Secondary Research Questions

Complex problems are usually part of complex systems. The U.S. Army is a complex system with the need to bypass, contain, or solve numerous multifaceted problems. Therefore, Army leaders developed an approach known as Army Design Methodology or ADM to help standardize the problem-solving process across the Army and allow smoother transitions from current to a desired end state when the process is used correctly and thoughtfully. ADM was applied as part of the process in the research for this thesis.

Primary Research Question: Can the Army Design Methodology be used to create an operational approach to achieve a reasonable future state for the SAF that meets both NATO and Slovenian security requirements?

Subordinate Questions:

²⁶ RTVSLO, “Pripravljenost Slovenske vojske” [Readiness of the Slovenian Armed Forces], Studio ob 17h, 5 April 2019, accessed 16 April 2019, <https://4d.rtvsl.si/arhiv/studio-ob-17h/174606902>; MoD of RS. *Strateški pregled obrambe 2016* [Strategic Defense Review 2016] (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2016), accessed 2 April 2019, <http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/SPOR2009.pdf>.

What threats and risks have changed the European security environment since 2014?

How does the Strategic Communications of the Slovenian Government inform the Slovenian population about the national and international security environment?

How can Slovenia contribute to NATO's 360-Degree Approach?

How can the MoD develop a sustainable defense plan for the SAF?

How does SAF current human resource management practices contribute to national and collective defense?

Best Practices from U.S. Army Professional Body
of Knowledge for Solving Complex Problems

After twenty-eight years of independence and fifteen years in NATO, the Slovenian defense system is undergoing a serious test. The author's attendance at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in 2018-19 provided time and opportunity to analyze and understand the ADM approach to solving complex problems.

In 2005, the CGSC faculty and senior leaders recognized the need to formalize an approach to help commanders and staff officers understand complex, ill-structured problems, and visualize approaches to solve them. After five years of research, faculty members at CGSC developed a methodology, originally referred to as *design* for solving complex, ill structured problems. The Army and Marine Corps incorporated design into their respective doctrines by 2010. In 2011, the joint community adopted the critical and creative thinking aspects of design, and wrote those concepts into Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*. In 2012, the Army modified its doctrine on design with the publication of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, *The Operations Process*. ADP

5-0 renamed the process as Army Design Methodology (ADM) and integrated it as an equal part of the planning process, along with the Military Decision-Making Process and Troop Leading Procedures. ADM represents conceptual planning, while the Military Decision-Making Process and Troop Leading Procedures represent detailed planning. In 2015, the Department of the Army issued Army Techniques Publication ATP 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology*. This ATP described the ADM process in detail.²⁷

Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them.²⁸

ADM includes interconnected thinking activities that aid in conceptual planning and decisionmaking. By first framing an operational environment and associated problems, ADM enables commanders and staffs to think about the situation in depth. From this understanding, commanders and staffs develop a more informed approach to solve or manage identified problems.²⁹

Limitations, Scope and Delimitations

This paper will not include any confidential or privileged information, but only publicly accessible resources. All proposed solutions are strictly from the author and not representative of the Slovenian MoD or any other official institution. Consequently, some topics cannot be discussed in detail, but can be used to present a general overview of the current situation or the current state of the SAF. To mitigate these limitations, the author

²⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Techniques Publication (ATP) No. 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012), V, accessed 18 April 2019, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/atp5_0x1.pdf.

²⁸ HQDA, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012), 7, accessed 18 April 2019, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/adp5_0.pdf.

²⁹ HQDA, ATP 5-0.1, V.

will provide proposals for further research on some topics, which would enable more detailed framing of the environment and problems, and therefore more detailed solutions.

Another best practice from the U.S. Army used in this thesis to structure and simulate proposed solutions was the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) model. The model describes change or transformation processes used in force structure development. DOTMLPF is important because it allows insight into the primary drivers of transformation. The author considered only doctrine, organization, leadership, and policy from the DOTMLPF elements to shape the research focus. Training, materiel, and facilities will not be explored in detail nor do they present any limitations for this thesis.

Another limitation is the nature of governing policies and laws within Slovenia concerning defense strategy and development of force structure. The Slovenian Defense Act has remained basically unchanged since 1994; the Military Doctrine is unchanged since 2006; the National Security Strategy and the long-term plan are both unchanged since 2010; and the National Defense Strategy was written in 2012 with no subsequent changes. The Slovenian normative framework coincides with the counterinsurgency era and all policies and procedures are influenced by this type of warfare. In 2014, the NATO Summit in Wales shifted the thinking about defense needs of the Alliance toward large scale combat operations, but kept the posture of combating terrorism. The driving factor of the shift was Russian aggression actions in the Ukraine. Even though the current policies and doctrine are not aligned with NATO's interpretation of risks and threats, the author must use existing Slovenian doctrine and policy in the analysis.

Slovenian defense spending decreased 45 percent during the recession (2011-2014) and until today (May 2019), remains under 1 percent GDP. The long-term plan was adopted in 2010 and has not been updated. Budget cuts caused structural problems in the organization. The author must use current budgetary constraints when analyzing the current force structure of the organization.

The electoral process and Slovenia's type of government determines the frequency of government change. Because the Defense Act determines Civilian Control of the Military and defines the roles of political and military leadership in defense system, this is a limitation that must be considered when analyzing the information within this research. Misalignment of defense plans and military spending could show anomalies in leadership, especially concerning frequent government change in Slovenia. Accounting for the effective of frequent changes in government and leadership must occur to fully understand the current state and the potential future state as well as the operational approach necessary to achieve the desired future state.

Assumptions and Initial Personal Recommendation (R1)

Assumptions

Four assumptions and an initial recommendation explain current perceptions and biases of the author, and will therefore guide the research in this thesis.

Assumption 1: The Slovenian people will continue to resist increases to defense spending. The European security environment changed radically after 2014. Slovenian Defense System Strategic Communications did not, nor has it since, sufficiently inform the Slovenian population of these changes. Therefore the Government finds it difficult to

justify necessary investments in defense. This is especially true when other social systems need additional resources, the government funded Health System for example.

Assumption 2: Slovenia occupies a strategic geographic position and will therefore play an important role in NATO's 360-Degree Approach to collective defense. Slovenia's location in Europe allows reception of troops and their rapid deployment to eastern and southeastern strategic locations. Slovenian strategic positioning also poses a threat. Slovenia may not have a vote when stakeholders from the international security environment decide to use Slovenian territory as the only feasible way to achieve collective defense goals.

Assumption 3: NATO cooperation for capability building concepts were not integrated into Slovenian defense policy and plans. Slovenian long-term defense plans from 2004 and 2010 preceded the NATO concepts and were unsustainable when adopted by the National Assembly and remained unrealized by the subsequent Slovenian governments since adoption. NATO's concepts of cooperation on capability-building (Smart Defense, Connected Forces Initiative and Framework Nation Concept) were developed later and allow more effective capabilities for lower costs.

Assumption 4: Difficulty in manning the enlisted lower ranks will continue and the SAF will soon be unable to execute tasks given in law.

R1 Statement

The Applied Professional Case Study method being employed in this thesis will be more fully described in chapter 3. In the following section the author describes the "R1 position" and establishes a pre-research position. In chapter 4, the R1 position will

be compared to the R2 position in which the researcher updates his recommendations based on analysis.

Initial Personal Recommendation (R1): Slovenia should develop an action plan to enable strategic communications, which will enlighten Slovenians about the changed security environment, strategic position of Slovenia, and the importance of the defense system to maintaining the current way of life. This will justify the increase of defense spending and allow capability building.

Slovenia should improve conditions for military mobility by NATO forces and therefore contribute to collective security in a meaningful way outside of providing troops or equipment. Providing host nation support for rapid deployment of NATO troops is as important as the military capabilities of the SAF for collective defense.

Slovenia should update its defense policy, especially the Defense Act, and determine a planning cycle for capability-building synchronized with NATO's Defense Planning Process. NATO's concepts, especially the Framework Nation Concept, should become an integral part of the Slovenian defense policy and be reflected in its defense plans. Slovenia should develop a compensation package to stimulate retention and recruitment to counter the aging SAF and improve SAF's ability to remain a viable, ready force into the future.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review researches different perspectives (stakeholders), which have influence on the development of the SAF. The first part describes the current European security environment and focuses on new sources of risks and threats in Europe since 2014. It is followed by information about Slovenian strategic communications and public opinion about national security. The author's goal for the literature review is to explore the influence of the changed security environment and government strategic messages on of Slovenian perceptions of national security.

The third part of the review focuses on NATO defense plans and policies after the Wales Summit in 2014 as an adaptation of the Alliance to new sources of risks and threats in Europe. This part explores the strategic position of Slovenia in the current NATO framework (360-Degree Approach). A defense expenditure analysis identifies world trends in defense spending and focuses on NATO members, especially Slovenia. It explores burden-sharing in providing a collective defense. The fourth part describes the development of Slovenian defense plans and policies since independence. The main goal is to research correlation with allied defense policies and plans.

The current state of the SAF is researched in the next part and explores crucial parameters of the readiness. The last part summarizes the conclusions of all parts and frames the environment and problems.

Security Situation in Europe Since 2014

Russian Tolerance and Hybrid Warfare

In the last decade, Russia constantly used the tactics of Tolerance Warfare, a style of geopolitical change imposed by status quo disrupters. It is caused by states that are unhappy with the existing international order. These techniques to gain advantage over other nation-states are often blended with cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns and combined with classical instruments of military force.³⁰

Tolerance warfare can be defined as the persistent effort to test the tolerances for different forms of aggression against settled states. It is the effort to push back lines of resistance, probe weaknesses, assert rights unilaterally, break rules, establish new fact on the ground, strip others of initiative and gain systematical tactical advantage over hesitant opponents.³¹

The definition of “tolerance warfare” greatly describes actions of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran; however, Russia must be of specific interest because of its geographical location and their *modus operandi* in achieving limited goals. In 2014, after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine, NATO had a dilemma how to define the problem. Between subversion, invasion, incursion, and ambiguous warfare, the term “hybrid warfare” prevailed.³² The term was used in the Wales Declaration (paragraph 13).

We will ensure that NATO is able to effectively address the specific challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range of overt and

³⁰ ATP 5-0.1, 11-16.

³¹ Ibid., 11.

³² James Hackett, ed., *The Military Balance 2015* (London, England: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018), 57-59.

covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design.³³

The goals of Russian tolerance and hybrid warfare must be identified to explain the danger of Russian actions to European security. From the definitions, assumptions can be made that Russia used overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian actions in a highly integrated design to create an anti-access area denial line from the Arctic to the Mediterranean Sea to prevent massing and sustaining combat power of NATO forces (Preclusion) and assure protection of its modernized armed force (Sanctuary).³⁴ Preclusion and sanctuary allows Russia to deter NATO against intervention when further hybrid warfare is conducted outside the borders of the Alliance.

Three primary Russian activities can be distinguished, which substantiate this assumption. First is geographical, which describes how Russia spread its area of influence by occupying strategic positions in Europe and the Middle East. The war in Georgia (2008), annexation of Crimea, occupation of Donbas (2014), and the Russian intervention in Syria (2015) brought strategic positions for Russian long-range precision fires, air, and coastal defense. Immediately after occupation, Russia deployed its most sophisticated missile systems to the occupied territories. Combined with strategic positions in Russia (Kaliningrad) and foreign bases in Belarus (Hantsavichy, Baranovich, and Vileyka), Armenia (Gyumri), and Moldova (Transnistria), Russia

³³ NATO, "Wales Summit Declaration," 5 September 2014, accessed 26 February 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm#def-exp.

³⁴ HQDA, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2017), 1-11, accessed 25 October 2018, <https://archive.org/details/FM3-0OperationsOctober2017/page/n1>.

created a respective area of influence that can interdict strategic deployment of forces from North America and allow on-going hybrid warfare.³⁵

Second is missile sophistication, which multiplies the value of strategic positions. Russia is developing a new generation of nuclear-capable weapons. In his annual address to Federal Assembly (March 2018), President Putin introduced the new generation of strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles (RS-28 *Sarmat*), air launched ballistic missiles (Kh-47m2 *Kinzhal*), hypersonic glide vehicle (RS-26 *Avangard*), and announced new futuristic weapon systems like cruise missiles powered by nuclear reactors, laser weapons, and underwater drones.³⁶ Currently the most concerning weapon is the ground launched cruise missile, *Novator* 9M729 (SSC-8), which will probably be the reason that America will leave the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. It has an estimated range of 2,500 kilometers.³⁷ Figure 4 (page 116) shows strategic positions in Russia, allied territories (Belarus, Armenia), occupied territories (Georgia, Crimea, Syria), and the anti-access area denial line determined within the range of the *Iskander-K* 9M728, SSC-7 (500 kilometers), and *Novator* 9M729, SSC-8 (2,500 kilometers).

³⁵ European Parliament, “*Russian military presence in the Eastern Partnership Countries*” (Brussels, Belgium: Directorate-General for External Policies, 2016), 7-26, accessed 24 March 2019, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/578021/EXPO_IDAN\(2016\)578021_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/578021/EXPO_IDAN(2016)578021_EN.pdf).

³⁶ Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” 1 March 2018, accessed 24 March 2019, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957>.

³⁷ Arms Control Association, “The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance,” accessed 24 March 2019, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty>.

Third is the modernization of Russian armed forces, establishment of mobile expeditionary units, and massive troop exercises, which represents building combat power in sanctuary. Russia tested more than 160 models of new and modernized weapon systems in Syria, including experimental systems and prototypes that had not yet completed their testing process.³⁸ Modernization of the Russian land forces is based on heavy capabilities. The new main battle tank, T-14 *Armata*, and the *Kurganets* tracked and *Bumerang* wheeled infantry fighting vehicles will finish trials in 2020.

Russia increased contracted service to almost 400,000 professional soldiers in 2017 and equipped airborne units (Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska) with heavier and modernized weapon systems (T-72B3, BMD-4M, BTR-MDM, and 2S25 Sprut), which could mean a development of mobile and expeditionary troops. These forces are ideal for military exploitation of goals achieved by non-military means (information operations, subversions, political influence, cyber-attacks, assassinations).³⁹ In 2018, Russia executed a massive exercise, Vostok (East) 2018, with 300,000 Russian soldiers, 36,000 military vehicles, 80 ships and 1,000 aircraft, helicopters and drones, as well as 3,500 Chinese troops.⁴⁰ Russian threats are not the only reason for change.

³⁸ James Hackett, ed., *The Military Balance 2018*, 172-173.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, "Russian Defence Minister Summarises Vostok 2018 Maneuvers," *News*, 10 October 2018, accessed 24 March 2019, http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12199205@egNews.

Terrorist Attacks

Islamic fundamentalism brought radical changes to European security. Beginning in 2015 throughout 2018, at least eighteen major terrorist attacks occurred in Europe, which took over four hundred lives and caused thousands of wounded. World media analysis on terrorist attacks in Europe is presented on the figure 1 below.




Figure 1. Terrorist Attacks in Europe from 2015-2018

Source: Created by author with information from Reuters, “Factbox: Deadly attacks in Western Europe,” 7 April 2018, accessed 27 March 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-crash-timeline-factbox/factbox-deadly-attacks-in-western-europe-idUSKBN1HE0ND>; 24UR, “Chronology of major attacks since 2004,” 23 May 2017, accessed 27 March 2019, <https://www.24ur.com/novice/svet/kronologija-vecjih-napadov-v-evropi-od-leta-2004.html>; Skynews, “France: A timeline of terror,” 13 May 2018, accessed 27 March 2019, <https://news.sky.com/story/france-a-timeline-of-terror-10787264>.

In fifteen out of eighteen cases, responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syrian (ISIS) terrorist groups. More than one-third of the attacks

happened in France. Its capital (Paris) was also the scene of the most brutal attack, which happened in November 2015 and took 130 lives, causing more than two hundred wounded. Attacks happened simultaneously in six locations in Paris. The deadliest was the attack in the Bataclan concert hall where eighty people were killed.⁴¹

Attacks on Christian churches in Europe rose dramatically in 2018, especially in France and in Germany.⁴² The Notre Dame Cathedral fire in Paris, which caused huge damage, is still under investigation (April 2019), but the fact is that it happened just a few days before Easter, the biggest Christian holiday, will be especially remembered as more than three hundred people have been killed in coordinated suicide bombings in Sri Lankan churches and hotels.⁴³ Responsibility for the attack was claimed by ISIS.

Terrorist attacks on European squares, clubs, media, tourist attractions, and churches are directed on the European way of life, which is a strategic interest of each European nation. Security measures have greatly increased since 2015; however, Europe remains vulnerable for future terrorist acts.

⁴¹ Reuters, "Factbox: Deadly attacks in Western Europe," 7 April 2018, accessed 27 March 2019 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-crash-timeline-factbox/factbox-deadly-attacks-in-western-europe-idUSKBN1HE0ND>.

⁴² Christian Broadcasting Network, "Churches Desecrated in Ongoing Attacks Across Europe," 16 April 2019, accessed 1 May 2019, <http://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2019/april/churches-desecrated-in-ongoing-attacks-across-europe>.

⁴³ RTVSLO, "V Šri Lanki izredne razmere" [Emergency Conditions in Sri Lanka], April 2019, accessed 1 May 2019, <https://www.rtvsl.si/svet/azija-z-oceanijo/v-srilanki-izredne-razmere-in-skupinski-pokop-prvih-zrtev/486186>.

Migration Flows

In July 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel published the statement, “All refugees are welcomed to Germany.” This statement triggered the largest migration flow in Europe after the WWII. Berlin unilaterally suspended the Dublin Convention (1990), which forces refugees to seek asylum in the first European country in which they set foot. After that, the migration flow went out of control.⁴⁴

Hungary (with prime minister Orban) closed the borders with Serbia in July 2015. Migration flow shifted towards Croatia and Slovenia. Almost 0.5 million immigrants crossed Slovenia in 2015. Germany accepted almost 890,000 asylum seekers just in 2015, and realized that it will need assistance from other EU countries. When they refused, Germany asked the EU Commission to introduce quotas that would force countries to accept refugees. That failed too. As the influx of refugees into Germany reached record levels, the rest of Europe became even more convinced they wanted no part in Merkel’s humanitarian mission.⁴⁵

In January 2016, Macedonia closed its borders with Greece. In March 2016, a joint action plan was implemented between Turkey and the EU to stop the irregular immigration via Turkey to the EU.⁴⁶ That stopped migration flow, but enabled illegal migrations.

⁴⁴ Politico, “How Merkel Broke the EU,” 11 April 2019, accessed 11 April 2019, <https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-broke-the-eu-migration-crisis-refugees/>.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Nicholas Redman, ed., *Strategic Survey 2018: The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics* (London, England: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018), 293.

In 2019, more people with foreign citizenship live in Germany than ever before. In accordance with the statistics from Federal Statistical Office, 10.6 million people are seeking asylum in addition to migrants from other EU countries. Out of the 82-million people living in Germany, roughly one in every eight is a foreign national. Until today (May 2019), migration quotas are a conflicting part of the EU member states.⁴⁷ According to the UN Refugee Agency, there were almost 45,000 new refugees every day in 2017. While 85 percent of them continued to be hosted by developing countries, for the majority, Europe is their final destination.⁴⁸

Divided Europe

The greatest threat to Europe is Europe, itself, due to political, economic, and security division. Elections in 2018 in several European countries caused political fragmentation and weakening of pro-European governments (Germany) or brought to power anti-establishment Eurosceptic parties (Italy). In 2019, similar trends are expected in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, and Poland. The future of Brexit is unknown. Elections for the European Parliament will be marked with potential division of the greatest European People's Party after Fidesz (party of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban) membership's suspension. It is also expected that Eurosceptic parties will enter the Parliament in sufficient numbers to make an impact in EU's central institutions.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Seraton Sanderson, "More Foreigners Living in Germany Than Ever Before," Deutsche Welle, 1 July 2017, 11 April 2019, accessed 11 April 2019, <https://www.dw.com/cda/en/more-foreigners-living-in-germany-than-ever-before/a-39495808>.

⁴⁸ Redman, 324.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 287.

The migration crisis, terrorism, U.S. tariffs, China's Belt and Road Initiative, Russian hybrid warfare, Brexit, increased nationalism, and Euroscepticism are challenges for the EU.⁵⁰ Unfortunately, the EU is divided, solves critical problems through the policies of member nations, and therefore remains weak in geopolitical relationships with the world powers.

Slovenian Strategic Position and Sources of Risks and Threats

Slovenia has an important strategic position in Europe. It offers the shortest and the most convenient routes from the Central European continental areas to the Adriatic Coast, and from Eastern and South Eastern Europe to the Apennine Peninsula.⁵¹ The strategic position brings advantages, especially in economy, on one side, and disadvantages in criminal activities, terrorism, and overall security on the other.

Economic advantages are especially evident in sea and land transport. Port of Koper operates twelve specialized terminals, handling all types of cargo: containers, cars, various general cargo products, dry bulk and liquid bulk, and passengers.⁵² It is the foremost port in supplying Austrian, Slovak, and Hungarian markets, the leading cargo freight port in the Northern Adriatic, second most important port in vehicle throughput in

⁵⁰ Redman, 287.

⁵¹ RS, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia*, vol. XIX, no. 27, 2 April 2010, 6, accessed 22 April 2019, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/RSNV2010_slo_en.pdf.

⁵² Port of Koper, "Port Info Book," March 2019, 6, accessed 30 April 2019, <https://www.luka-kp.si/libs/download.php?file=/a98c70445bbe432bd01cee02f83658dc>.

the Mediterranean, and the leading port for other cargo types (timber, livestock, soy, alumina, iron products) on the southern route to or from Europe.⁵³

Slovenia has a developed road network (770 kilometers of highways and 38,900 kilometers of other national roads).⁵⁴ Slovenian railroads are obsolete; however, they are still important to support Port of Koper. In 2017, almost 61 million people crossed the border with Slovenia, which is more than thirty times its population.⁵⁵

The disadvantage of the Slovenian strategic position is that Slovenia became a transit country for criminal activities, illegal migration flows, and terrorism. In 2015, more than a half-million migrants crossed Slovenian borders in 2017. The Slovenian police investigated two hundred cases of human trafficking (62 percent more than in 2016), 11,605 cases of illegal migration (46 percent more than in 2016) and confiscated 550 pieces of firearms or ammunition (51 percent more than in 2016).⁵⁶ Migration flows were an opportunity for terrorists to cross the international borders. The Slovenian police

⁵³ Port of Koper, “Summary of Luka Koper d.d. and the Luka Koper Group Business Strategy until 2030 and the Company’s and Group’s Strategic Business Plan 2016-2020,” August 2015, 2, accessed 30 April 2019, <https://www.luka-kp.si/libs/download.php?file=/c540d123aea55aa4394c27047f8a8879>.

⁵⁴ Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, “Road Infrastructure 2014: There were almost 38,900 kilometers of public roads in Slovenia in 2014,” 27 October 2015, accessed 1 May 2019, <https://www.stat.si/StatWeb/en/News/Index/5559>.

⁵⁵ Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia, Police, “Letno poročilo o delu policije za 2017” [Annual Report for 2017], April 2018, 105, accessed 1 May 2018, <https://www.policija.si/images/stories/Statistika/LetnaPorocila/PDF/LetnoPorocilo2017.pdf>.

⁵⁶ Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia, Police, “Letno poročilo o delu policije za 2017” [Annual Report for 2017], April 2018, 107, accessed 1 May 2018, <https://www.policija.si/images/stories/Statistika/LetnaPorocila/PDF/LetnoPorocilo2017.pdf>.

confirmed a CNN news story that two perpetrators involved in the Paris terrorist attack crossed Slovenia as part of a migration flow.⁵⁷

Slovenian Strategic Communications and Public Opinion about Security

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the performance of strategic communications to inform the Slovenian public about the changed security situation in Europe and importance of the defense system. In her article, Nina Raduha researches strategic communications in NATO, separate member countries, and in Slovenia.⁵⁸ She assesses that strategic communications in the Slovenian defense system are still under development, and in too many instances, narrowed only to public relations.

According to Radhua, the current system is composed of the Strategic Communication Service in Ministry of Defense and Service for Public Relations in the SAF. Their primary task is to inform the public through media and preparation of key personnel for media engagements. Both services are quite independent with low cooperation. Furtherly, she analyzed two current problems of the SAF through the prism of strategic communications. Low recruitment rate of the SAF is the first analyzed problem, and conflicts between the local population and the MoD about the SAF's main training area is the second analyzed problem. She assessed the lack of a holistic approach

⁵⁷ Siol.net, "Slovenska policija potrjuje: dva osumljenca terorizma potovala čez Slovenijo" [The Slovenian Police Confirms: Two Suspects of Terrorism Activity Traveled Across Slovenia], 6 September 2016, accessed 1 May 2019, <https://siol.net/novice/svet/cnn-teroristi-v-pariz-potovali-preko-slovenije-425288>.

⁵⁸ Nina Raduha, "NATO's strategic Communications Concept in the Republic of Slovenia with Emphasis on the Slovenian Armed Forces," *Sodobni vojaški izzivi* 18, no. 4 (December 2016): 67-90.

in strategic communications could contribute to the fact that both problems remain unsolved. Finally, she explored strategic documents and reviews (Mid-Term Plan 2016, Defense Review 2016), and suggested the Slovenian Defense System had identified areas for improvement, but there was a clear lack of implementation.

Her research can be substantiated by provisions of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) adopted in 2012. The NDS determined six objectives for the Slovenian Defense Policy to realize the goals of the National Security Strategy. The last goal of the NDS identifies the need to improve informing the population about the importance of the defense system. It is not narrowed to only public relations, but also emphasizes the role of civil-military cooperation and education system.⁵⁹

Because of the changed security environment in Europe, the performance of the Slovenian Strategic Communications can be evaluated by perception of the Slovenians in identifying new sources of risks and threats. This thesis will use the results of the Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre, which has conducted the Slovenian Public Opinion Survey since 1968.⁶⁰

Surveys on national and international security were done in 1994, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2016, and therefore offer chronological perceptions of

⁵⁹ MoD, *Obrambna strategija Republike Slovenije* [Defense Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia] (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 7 December 2012), 9, accessed 22 April 2019, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/predpisi/drugo/obr_strategija.pdf.

⁶⁰ The center's data repository includes indicators of social stratification, quality of life, national identity, political culture, role of government, religion, family and work values, health, political orientations, industrial relations, mass media and others. It is a partner in international cooperation such as International Social Survey Program, World Value Survey, European Social Survey, and others. It also conducts telephone surveys.

Slovenians about security. It is especially important to compare how perceptions of security changed from 2012 to 2016. The analysis is presented in the table below.

Table 1. Analysis of the Question “Do you Feel Safe or Threatened” (2001-2016)				
Question	Poll (MM/YYYY) Populace (N)	Safe	Threatened	I don’t know
If you think about current Social and Political Situation, do you feel Safe or Threatened ?	SJM151 (11/2015-4/2016) N=1024	78.8 %	14.0 %	7.2 %
	SJM121 (3/2012-5/2012) N=1034	68.0 %	22.3 %	9.7 %
	SJM092 (3/2009-5/2009) N=1055	72.0 %	17.2 %	10.8 %
	SJM07 (10/2007-12/2007) N=1010	78.4 %	10.4 %	11.1 %
	SJM052 (03/2005-04/2005) N=1002	81.8 %	9.3 %	8.8 %
	SJM033 (10/2003-11/2003) N=1065	81.9 %	13.8 %	4.3 %
	SJM013 (10/2001-11/2001) N=1093	71.9 %	10.9 %	17.2 %

Source: Created by author with data from Social Science Data Archives SJM15; SJM121; SJM092; SJM07; SJM052; SJM033; SJM013.

According to the surveys, Slovenians felt safer in 2016 (after Russian aggressive actions in Ukraine, terrorist attacks, and mass migrant flows in Europe) than in 2012. In 2009-2014, there was the largest recession in Slovenia since independence in 1991. The Slovenian economy shrank almost 9 percent in that time and caused substantial unemployment (11 percent), which must be considered when interpreting the results.⁶¹ Assumptions can be made from the information. One assumption is that Slovenians only

⁶¹ Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, “SI-STAT Database,” 16 October 2018, accessed 16 October 2018, <https://pxweb.stat.si/pxweb/Dialog/statfile2.asp>.

perceive threats which affect them directly. A second assumption is that defense strategic messages did not properly inform the populace about potential sources of threats and risks.

Assumptions can be substantiated with chronological comparisons of the threats that Slovenians perceive as important. Tables in appendix A show the perception of threats surveyed in 2012 and 2016. Results of the 2012 survey indicate that external threats (military, terrorism, cyber-attacks and refugees) are very marginalized in comparison with internal ones (nature, disasters, traffic accidents, crime, drugs). The migrant flow through Slovenia in 2015 radically changed Slovenian's perception of the threat of illegal migrants and refugees. In the 2012 survey, only 29 percent of respondents believed these factors represented a significant threat. In 2016, the figure rose to 74 percent. Other external threats grew considerably in 2016 in comparison with 2012, but still remained below internal threats (see appendix A).

At least one more factor should be discussed when analyzing influences on the Slovenians' perception of security: Global Peace Index (GPI). The GPI is a report produced by the Australian Institute for Economics and Peace, and is developed in consultation by an international panel of peace experts. The GPI was first launched in May 2007, and it ranked 163 countries in 2018.⁶²

⁶² Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Peace Index 2018: Measuring Peace in a Complex World* (Sidney, Australia, June 2018), 16, accessed 6 April 2019, <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/06/Global-Peace-Index-2018-2.pdf>.

In accordance with the GPI, Slovenia was never ranked lower than 15th safest country in the world (11th in 2018).⁶³ Media in Slovenia pay high attention to the GPI without interpreting the methodology, collective defense perspective, or distinguishing between individual country in current and future security environments.

In summary, Slovenia has a solid normative framework to establish strategic communications in the defense system, but lacks implementation. The need to improve the area was reiterated in 2016 with the Strategic Defense Review and Mid-Term Defense Plan. Currently, strategic communications are focused only on public relations, split between MoD and SAF, and is disconnected from the decision-making process. The polls indicate Slovenians perceive only the security threats which affect them directly.

NATO Defense Policy and Defense Planning Process since 2014

The Western alliance known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established after the World War II in 1949 to guarantee the freedom and security of its members with political and military means. In seventy years of its existence, it successfully deterred the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, responded in crisis management operations of Afghanistan and Iraq, and is currently in the phase of transformation to deter Russian aggressive actions on its eastern flank. At the beginning of 2019, it had twenty-nine members with the Republic of North Macedonia in the accession process.⁶⁴

⁶³ Institute for Economics and Peace, 8.

⁶⁴ NATO, "What is NATO?" 15 April 2019, accessed 15 April 2019, <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html>.

The principles of NATO are written in fourteen articles of the Washington Treaty, known the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949, by twelve founding nations.⁶⁵

For the purpose of this research, two articles are crucial.

Article 3: In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.⁶⁶

Despite the changing security environment, the original treaty was never modified. Each ally has the possibility to implement the text in accordance with its capabilities and circumstances.⁶⁷ This is important for a small country such as Slovenia. When Slovenia joined NATO in 2004, it gained assurance for collective defense, and therefore did not need to develop a wide range of capabilities (fighter jets, long-range air defense, naval capabilities). However, it also got an obligation to share the burden with the Alliance with capabilities for national (Article III) and collective defense (Article V) in accordance with the NATO Defense Policy and Defense Planning Process.

⁶⁵ NATO, "Founding Treaty," 30 January 2017, accessed 15 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_67656.htm.

⁶⁶ NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty," 10 April 2019, accessed 15 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

⁶⁷ NATO, "Founding Treaty."

NATO Defense Policy in Changed Security Environment

Many had expected NATO's September 2014 Wales Summit to be largely administrative and preordained – the Alliance would mark the end of its combat operations in Afghanistan and agree on measures to improve cooperation – but instead NATO's Eastern European members pressed the Alliance for reassurance amid concerns over Russia's action in Ukraine and more widely. Any earlier hopes that some NATO leaders might have had of a post-Afghanistan “strategic holiday” evaporated.⁶⁸

The above quotation illustrates the situation in Europe before the crisis in Ukraine. Defense needs were underestimated over macroeconomic concerns, which led to substantial decreases of defense spending (7.7 percent cumulatively decrease in 2010-2014).⁶⁹ NATO was preparing to end a decade-long effort in Afghanistan, expected consolidation of forces, and established initiatives (Smart Defense, Connected Forces Initiative) which would produce greater output with lower resources. The Russian campaign in 2014 had elements of surprise for NATO. The International Institute for Strategic Studies found that the Alliance initially had a problem even with defining the nature of the challenge.⁷⁰

The methods applied included the use of military and non-military tools in integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages utilizing diplomatic means; sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operation; covert and occasionally overt military and intelligence action; and economic pressure.⁷¹

⁶⁸ James Hackett, ed., *The Military Balance 2015* (London, England: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015), 5.

⁶⁹ NATO, “Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries,” 14 March 2019, accessed 5 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_03/190314-pr2018-34-eng.pdf.

⁷⁰ Hackett, ed., *The Military Balance 2015*, 5-8.

⁷¹ Ibid.

Russia's later actions, labeled as hybrid warfare, included rapid deployment of troops, electronic warfare, locally based amphibious and airborne assault, extensive use of special forces capabilities, and cyber-attacks, all connected to systematic information operations against domestic and foreign audiences.⁷²

With the advent of Russian hybrid warfare, NATO entered a new age. NATO's Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, differentiates three periods of NATO. The first period (1949-1990) covered collective defense in a Cold War setting, and the second period (1990-2014) was characterized by overseas military crisis management and cooperative security. The third period began in 2014 when Russia annexed the Crimea. The main characteristic of the last period is that NATO must combine tasks from first two periods (collective defense and managing crises beyond NATO-member borders).⁷³

This thesis will analyze NATO Defense Policy in a changed security environment through deliveries of NATO summit meetings.⁷⁴ NATO summits provide periodic opportunities for the heads of state and governments of member countries to evaluate and provide strategic direction for Alliance activities, and are therefore the best method to analyze NATO's defense policies through time.⁷⁵ There were three NATO summit

⁷² Hackett, ed., *The Military Balance 2015*, 5-8.

⁷³ Redman, 312.

⁷⁴ Summit meetings are not regular meetings, but important junctures in the Alliance's decision-making process. They are often held at key moments in the Alliance's evolution. Summits are used to introduce new policy, invite new members into the Alliance, launch major initiatives and reinforce partnerships. Since 1949, there have been twenty-eight NATO summits.

⁷⁵ NATO, "Summit Meetings," 19 July 2019, accessed 9 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50115.htm.

meetings since 2014 (Wales, UK, in 2014; Warsaw, Poland, in 2016; Brussels, Belgium, in 2018).

The content of the Wales Summit (2014) was tightly connected with Russian actions in Ukraine and demand of member countries on its eastern flank to reassure commitment to collective defense. The main item from the Wales Summit was the Wales Declaration, which determined the measures to make NATO forces able to respond to the changes in security environment (Readiness Action Plan). The Wales declaration stressed the need to increase defense spending, determined NATO's position about cooperation with Russia, emphasized Alliance's open-door policy for new members, and established NATO's follow-on mission in Afghanistan. Key decisions of the Wales Summit are summarized in appendix B.

The Readiness Action Plan was adopted to make NATO forces more responsive, better trained, and better equipped to respond to the security challenges from the east and south. It is the most significant reinforcement of NATO's collective defence since the end of the Cold War.⁷⁶ Assurance and adaptation measures are key components of the RAP.

Assurance measures are meant for NATO member countries in Central and Eastern Europe to reassure their populations, reinforce their defense, and deter potential aggression. These measures are a direct result of Russia's aggressive actions. They are composed of a series of land, sea, and air activities, which are reinforced by exercises focused on collective defense and crisis management. Assurance measures are flexible

⁷⁶ NATO, "Readiness Action Plan," 21 September 2018, accessed 10 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm.

and scalable in response to the evolving security situation and are kept under annual review by the North Atlantic Council.⁷⁷

Adaptation measures are long-term changes to NATO's forces and command structure in order to prepare the Alliance to react swiftly and decisively to sudden crises. They include tripling the size of the NATO Response Force, the establishment of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), able to deploy on very short notice, and enhanced standing naval forces.⁷⁸ Both measures are furtherly analyzed in appendix B.

Before or in parallel with the RAP, two initiatives were adopted (Smart Defense⁷⁹ and Connected Forces Initiative), which showed the need for cooperation between countries to develop modern and interoperable military capabilities that NATO needs for the future.⁸⁰ Cooperation also decreases the burden on a single NATO member. Both initiatives are explored in appendix B.

The NATO Framework Nation Concept, proposed by Germany in 2013 and adopted by NATO in 2014 in the run-up to the Wales Summit, is very important for the solutions proposed in this thesis. It is still an evolving concept, and is especially

⁷⁷ NATO, "Readiness Action Plan."

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ NATO, "Smart Defense," 22 June 2016, accessed 11 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm?selectedLocale=en.

⁸⁰ NATO, "Connected Forces Initiative," 22 June 2016, accessed 11 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_98527.htm?selectedLocale=en.

important for small countries, which can develop interoperable, and properly equipped and trained multinational units for NATO missions.⁸¹

This initiative aims at forming functional grouping around a larger ally that, as a group, would have an entire military capability as identified in the NATO Defense Planning Process. Such arrangements would give smaller allies an opportunity to contribute their smaller, often specialized capabilities. Groups could easier consolidate three NATO enabling mechanisms (RAP, CFI, and NATO Defense Planning) and provide forces with improved readiness and responsiveness, capable of conducting the full spectrum of missions, notably large-scale combat operations.⁸²

In the light of Russian aggressive actions, the development of Coherent Forces became NATO's overriding priority. Coherent Forces must be understood as forces that are compatible and complementary, as well as capable, by design. Compatibility by design means that forces can be integrated in joint (interservice) and combined (multinational) level with as little friction as possible. Complementary by design means a distribution of roles and responsibilities across the Alliance. Neither compatibility or complementary (by design) are in conflict with sovereignty of Allies to organize and engage forces by national defence policy. In that manner, FNC can be a game changer in NATO's military adaptation.⁸³

⁸¹ Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, *The Framework Nations' Concept: Game-Changer for a New Strategic Era or Missed Opportunity?* Research Paper 132 (Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, July 2016), accessed 12 April 2019, <http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=965>.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

The Warsaw Summit (July 2016) expanded defense policies adopted in Wales. The leaders of the member countries decided to establish enhanced military presence in the east (with four multinational battalions on a rotational basis in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) and in the southeast (around Romanian framework brigade). Further, the decision was made to support Ukraine with a comprehensive assistance package to make their defense and security institutions more effective, efficient, and accountable, and to expand cooperation with EU. Finally, in the counterterror fight against ISIS, they decided to start capacity building in Iraq, sent NATO Airborne Early Warning surveillance planes to support counter-ISIL coalition, and established new maritime security operations in Mediterranean Sea (Sea Guardian).⁸⁴ The key decisions of the Warsaw Summit are furtherly explored in appendix B.

The last NATO summit in Brussels (July 2018) was marked by the U.S. President's warning to European allies that they need to increase defense spending. Only six of twenty-nine countries met the Wales criteria for defense spending (2 percent of GDP, and 20 percent for equipment) in 2018. On the other hand, the U.S. spent almost three times as much as all 27 European NATO members together, which makes his demand for fair burden sharing legitimate.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ NATO, "Warsaw Summit Key Decisions," Factsheet, February 2017, accessed 10 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_02/20170206_1702-factsheet-warsaw-summit-key-en.pdf.

⁸⁵ NATO, "Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries," 14 March 2019, accessed 5 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_03/190314-pr2018-34-eng.pdf.

Fair burden sharing was therefore important part of the Brussels Summit, where all allies agreed to redouble their efforts to increase defense spending. NATO leaders also agreed on a major update of the NATO Command Structure, with more than 1,200 additional personnel and two new commands (JFC for Atlantic in Norfolk and Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany). Furtherly they adopted the Readiness Initiative Four Thirties, which emphasizes response and quick reinforcement. Allies committed to have thirty mechanized battalions, thirty air squadrons and thirty combat vessels, ready to use within thirty days or less by 2020. Finally, the NATO Secretary General, Presidents of the European Council, and the European Commission signed a new declaration on NATO-EU cooperation, demonstrating the desire to deepen cooperation. It will be focused on military mobility, response to hybrid threats, and counter terrorism.⁸⁶ Key decisions of the Warsaw Summit are furtherly explored in appendix B.

Military mobility will be a very important EU-NATO project to ensure rapid response of forces. Its goal is to address existing legal, infrastructural, and procedural barriers in the EU to improve mobility of military personnel, materiel, and assets.⁸⁷

In October 2018, the Military Committee meeting in Warsaw delivered a framework, which has been developing since 2015, and was politically affirmed at Brussels Summit: the 360-Degree Defense. It assumes that the Alliance will defend

⁸⁶ NATO, “Brussels Summit Key Decisions (11-12 July 2018),” Factsheet, November 2018, accessed 10 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_11/20181105_1811-factsheet-key-decisions-summit-en.pdf.

⁸⁷ European Commission, “Defending Europe: Improving Military Mobility within and beyond The European Union,” accessed 18 April 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2018_military_mobility_factsheet_0.pdf.

against the threat posed by Russia, address the threats emanating from North Africa and the Middle East (primarily the risks of mass migration and acts of terror), and allow Freedom of Navigation in Atlantic (high North).⁸⁸

In the following points this framework can also be a summary of NATO policies since 2014:

1. The Alliance is about deterrence; if deterrence fails, then it is collective defense. 360-Degree Approach is a current NATO framework to deter or challenge threats in the security environment.
2. Future NATO forces will be trained, equipped, and ready to respond swiftly (Readiness Action Plan).
3. Prepositioned forces (Enhanced Forward Presence) and standing naval forces will be reinforced if needed by thirty ships, thirty aircraft squadrons, and thirty battalions in no more than thirty days (Readiness Initiative, 4x30).
4. Forces will be coherent, compatible, and complementary by design (Connected Forces Initiative, Smart Defense, Framework Nation Concept).
5. Command Structure will enable the framework (NATO Reformed Command Structure).
6. Cooperation with the EU will allow fast movement of second and third echelon troops through Europe (Military mobility).

⁸⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, “NATO Defense Chiefs Build 360-Degree Defense on Maturing Framework, Dunford Says,” 1 October 2018, accessed 19 April 2019, <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1650814/nato-defense-chiefs-build-360-degree-defense-on-maturing-framework-dunford-says/>.

NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP)

The NDPP is the primary means to facilitate the identification, development, and delivery of NATO's present and future capability requirements. It apportions those requirements to each ally as capability targets, facilitates their implementation, and regularly assesses progress.⁸⁹

The aim of the NATO Defense Planning Process is to provide a framework within which national and Alliance defense planning activity can be harmonized without compromising their national sovereignty in order to develop the required forces and capabilities in the most effective way. The NDPP uses a capability-based approach.⁹⁰

In 2016, the NDPP was considerably reformed. The four-year cycle remained, but the planning period was amended and divided into the short terms (0-6 years), the medium term (7-19 years), and the long term (more than twenty years). The NDPP focuses on the short and medium term and is composed of the following five steps:

1. Establish political guidance (determine NATO's Level of Ambitions and required capabilities for its achievement).
2. Determine requirements (develop Minimum Capability Requirements).
3. Apportion requirements and set targets (a. transfer Minimum Capability Requirements to the Allies in Capability Target packages in accordance with fair burden-sharing; b. translation to national planning process).

⁸⁹ NATO, "NATO Defence Planning Process," 28 June 2018, accessed 19 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

4. Facilitate implementation (assists national measures, facilitates multinational initiatives, and directs NATO efforts to fulfil agreed targets).

5. Review results (examines NATO's ambitions and achieved Capability Targets).

Slovenian Role in Allied 360-Degree Framework

The SAF participates in Enhanced Forward Presence since its establishment in 2017. In 2019, the SAF deployed a third rotation with forty-seven troops to Latvia as a part of multinational Battalion Battle Group led by Canada.⁹¹

Slovenia's strategic position plays important role in NATO's 360-Degree approach, especially concerning military mobility. Former SAF's Force Commander (and former deputy director of Plans and Policy Division of Military Committee in NATO), General Miha Škerbinc, claims that Slovenia's position and developed infrastructure allows quick transportation of troops and materiel to eastern and southeastern strategic directions.⁹² He argues that distances from Slovenian Port of Koper to Suwalki Gap (key terrain in between Kaliningrad and Belarus in eastern strategic direction) are similar to those from Ports of Rotterdam, Netherlands, or Bremerhaven, Germany; however, Port of Koper is much closer to the Black Sea coast. In 2019, the concept of military mobility

⁹¹ MoD RS, Slovenian Armed Forces, "Enhanced Forward Presence – eFP," accessed 20 April 2019, <http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/international-cooperation/international-operations-and-missions/latvia/#c3328>.

⁹² MoD RS, MORStudio, "Novinarska konferenca: Predstavitev medijem letošnjih vojaških vaj" [Press conference: Presentation of This Year's Military Exercises to the Media], 22 March 2019, accessed 28 April 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9XKk1X6mQg>.

will be tested during the U.S. Army Europe military exercise, Immediate Response 2019, which Slovenia has hosted since 2014.

Slovenian Security Policy and Defense Policy and Planning Since Independence

This chapter explores national security and defense policies as a guidance for defense planning. Current state (chapter 1) indicates guidance, plans, and defense spending are not in alignment. It is crucial to identify and frame the problem through the short history of Slovenia in order to develop solutions for the future.

There are four periods of Slovenian security and defense policy development. The first period came immediately after its independence (1991-1995) and focused on establishment of the National Security System of Slovenia. The second period (1996-2004) was connected to activities to achieve full membership in NATO. The third period (2005-2010) was the development of capabilities and the active participation of the SAF in crisis response operations. The final period (2010-2018) is characterized with unaligned defense policy and military spending, and also a period of frequent reorganizations and transformations. The chronology of policy documents is depicted in the figure below.




Figure 2. Chronology of Defense Policy Documents

Source: Created by author.

First Period (1991-1995)

From 1991 to 1993, Slovenian security and defense policy derived from former Yugoslavia. The main goal was to develop professional structure and establish conscription. In that time, the Territorial Defense had 87,000 personnel, more than 90 percent in strategic reserve.

From 1993 to 1994, focus was on development of branches and transforming the Territorial Defense into the Slovenian Armed Forces. The military shrank to 76,000 (a majority are still in strategic reserve). Three security and defense policy documents were adopted during that period: Resolution on the Starting-Points for a National Security Plan

(basis for security strategy), the Defense Act, and the Act for Financing Main Defense Programs (defense plan).⁹³

Resolution on the Starting-Points for a National Security Plan (*Resolucija o izhodiščih zasнове nacionalne varnosti*) defined national security as a condition in which the Republic of Slovenia can protect human rights, enable economic, social, and cultural development, and allow functioning of democracy of the sovereign Republic of Slovenia. The resolution reconfirmed crucial articles of the Constitution.⁹⁴

In January 1994, the Correction (not Annex) was adopted to Resolution, which stated that Slovenia will engage towards full membership in NATO.⁹⁵ Until that point there was strong political support in Slovenia for the idea of Armed Neutrality, such as in Switzerland or Austria. The Resolution therefore unified the efforts of Slovenian Defense and Exterior Policy soon after Slovenia joined Partnership for Peace (1994).⁹⁶

The Defense Act (*Zakon o obrambi*) was adopted in 1994. This Act transformed the Territorial Defense forces into the Slovenian Armed Forces, and determined their mission and tasks, defined readiness and roles of the political institutions during the

⁹³ Anton Grizold, "Challenges in the development of the National Defense System," *Teorija in praksa*, 41, no. 1-2 (2004): 448-459, accessed 25 October 2018, <http://dk.fdv.uni-lj.si/db/pdfs/tip20041-2grizold.PDF>.

⁹⁴ Official Gazette of RS, *Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia*, 1373-1386.

⁹⁵ Official Gazette of RS, *Correction of the Resolution on the Establishment of Security Strategy*, Vol. IV, No. 2, 14 January 1994, 57, accessed 28 March 2019, https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/1993/Ur/u1993071.pdf.

⁹⁶ Grizold, 448-452.

defense of the state, and civil control over the military.⁹⁷ The Constitution determines that the Defense Act is adopted by a two-third majority of the vote in the National Assembly. The Defense Act was annexed in 1997 and 1998, solving the status of armed forces members in 2002 and 2004, when Slovenia was accessing NATO, and in 2015 giving extraordinary powers to the SAF for a border protection mission when the migration flow reached Slovenia. The majority of the content remained unchanged until today (May 2019).

The Slovenian Defense Act emphasizes Civil Control over the military. The Minister of Defense holds all crucial responsibilities, even those strictly connected to military expertise. In accordance with the Defense Act, the Minister of Defense determines the area of operation on operational level (Article 39-Command Post Organization), Military Occupational Specialty codes, Tables of Organization and Equipment (Article 40-Organization), insignias of the SAF (Article 41-Insignias), and names of commanding officers of autonomous battalions and higher (Article 45-naming of commanding officers).⁹⁸

Some responsibilities of the Minister in peacetime are very close to commanding the military. In accordance with Article 42 (Leading the military), the Minister of Defense determines developmental, organizational, technical, other measures, and guidance, which are executed by military commanders. Other measures and guidance are a very broad term, which can have elements of direct commanding with the military. On

⁹⁷ Official Gazette of RS, *Defense Act*, 5029-5044.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

the other hand, Article 43 (Commanding the Military) does not give the Minister any jurisdiction in commanding. The Commander in Chief of the SAF is the President of the Republic; however, he is without command authority. The President in peacetime evaluates readiness of the SAF and promotes general officers. In wartime, the President has responsibilities only if the National Assembly cannot meet. The government is responsible for execution of the military and civil defense in wartime or states of emergency.⁹⁹

The Chief of the General Staff is responsible for the readiness of the SAF. Readiness in peace and wartime is explored in a further chapter. At this point it is important to note that the Minister is responsible to establish the conditions for readiness and the Chief of the General Staff is responsible for achievement of readiness. Responsibility is clearly upon the Minister, which leads to the assumption that the Defense Act does not empower or enable military commanders to find the solutions in times of limited resources.

The Act for Resourcing Main Defense Programs 1994-2003 (*Zakon o zagotavljanju sredstev za realizacijo temeljnih razvojnih programov OS RS, TRP*) provides resources to establish the capabilities determined in the Resolution and Defense Act. TRP designated 8.8 billion Slovenian Tolars per year (approximately 40 million EUR) for anti-armor, air defense and coastal defense systems.¹⁰⁰ All three documents were therefore aligned. In 1995, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) had a budget of

⁹⁹ Official Gazette of RS, *Defense Act*, 5029-5044.

¹⁰⁰ Exchange rate 239.64 SIT per 1 EUR gives only approximate results. Slovenia adopted the EURO in 2006 with the state's exchange rate.

197.5 million EUR. 40 million EUR represented additional 20 percent resources for investments to build the SAF in accordance with strategic documents.

In 1995, the Doctrine of Military Defense (*Doktrina vojaške obrambe*) was adopted by the government, and the Conscription Act (*Zakon o vojaški dolžnosti*) by the Parliament. Doctrine further elaborated joint tactical and operational units determined by the Defense Act. The Conscription Act implemented alternative service for conscientious objectors.¹⁰¹

Second Period (1996-2004)

In the second period, Slovenia prepared conditions for full membership in NATO. In 1998, the government adopted the Strategy of Military Defense, and Parliament adopted the Strategy of Integration into NATO. Former Defense Minister Grizold claims that the transformation process of the SAF was slow and ineffective.¹⁰² In 2000, a group of experts led by U.S. General Garret evaluated Slovenian defense and military systems and proposed transformation of the MoD and the SAF for integration into the system of Collective Defense. On the basis of the evaluation, Parliament adopted the General Long-Term Program for Development and Equipping of the SAF (*Splošni dolgoročni program razvoja in opremljanja SV*), and the government subsequently adopted the proposed Defense Strategy (*Obrambna strategija RS*).¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Grizold, 448-452.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 453-455.

The General Long-Term Program, adopted in 2000, was the first Slovenian long-term plan. It described organization of the forces, branches, peace and wartime structure, and size of the SAF.¹⁰⁴ The program also analyzed the current status of the SAF in year 1999, determined goals and timeline of its transformation, and set priorities.¹⁰⁵

Each of the next two Governments, Defense Minister Grizold presiding in both (2000 to 2004), reevaluated previously adopted documents and developed a complete normative framework for Slovenian accession to NATO. The following acts and strategies were developed or annexed:

1. Resolution on the Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (*Resolucija o strategiji nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije*), 2001;
2. Defense Strategy, 2001;
3. General Long-Term Program for Development and Equipping of the SAF, 2001;
4. Annexed Act for the Resourcing of Main Defense Programs, 2001;

¹⁰⁴ Official Gazette of RS, *General Long-Term Program for Development and Equipping of the SAF*, Vol. X, No. 32, 13 April 2000, 3834-3843, accessed 28 March 2019, https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2001/Ur/u2001056.pdf.https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2000/Ur/u2000032.pdf. Maneuver forces represented one third and territorial forces represented two thirds of the SAF. In year 2000 the SAF had peace and wartime organization. In the Peacetime Organization, there was up to 9,500 personnel, including 4,200 active duty and 4,000-5,500 conscripts. The Wartime Organization was composed of 67,000 members (93.7% strategic reserve and conscripts, 6.3% active duty).

¹⁰⁵ SAF in 1999: 1) Too many characteristics of the Territorial Defense, especially in personnel, technology, mobilization, and sustainment which made the SAF incomparable with developed Western armed forces; 2) Quick Reaction Forces were without proper fire support and had minimal maneuver capability; 3) Eight hundred officers did not have proper education. Three hundred officers did not have proper language skills.

5. Doctrine of Civil Defense (*Doktrina civilne obrambe*), 2002;
6. Annexed Defense and Conscription Act, 2002; and
7. General Long-Term Program for Development and Equipping of the SAF, 2004.

The Resolution on the Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia determined essential and strategic interests of RS, security environment with the emphasis on the strategic position, sources of threats, the National Security Policy, and the National Security System.¹⁰⁶ The resolution became a crucial document of for national security. The General Long-Term Program (2001) enveloped security and defense strategy. It explored anomalies of the SAF (more in detail than the program from 2000) and gave priority to the active duty organization and development of the branches needed for functioning in NATO.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ Official Gazette of RS, *Resolution on the Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia*, Vol. XI, No. 56, 6 July 2001, 5,738-5,743, accessed 28 March 2019, https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2001/Ur/u2001056.pdf. Essential interests of RS were preserving the National Identity and Independence, Sovereignty, and Territorial Integrity of RS. Strategic interests of RS were functioning of Democracy, enabling Rule of Law, protecting human rights, enabling economic development, and integrating into European Union and NATO. National Security policy was composed of Exterior, Defense, Interior, Economic Policy, Disaster Relief Policy, and Environmental Policy.

¹⁰⁷ Identified anomalies of the SAF in 2001: 1) Combat Readiness of Peacetime Organization allowed only limited action in peace (Combat Missions, International Military Cooperation and Disaster Relief). 2) Peacetime Organization was fragmented, which had negative effects on Combat Readiness. 3) Extensive infrastructure demanded substantial resources for its maintenance. 4) Planned Wartime Organization was too large in accordance with potential threats and abilities of RS. 5) Human Resources Management had major anomalies (inappropriate civilian and military education, unbalanced ratio of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers, undefined Career Path, anomalies in pay grades, high age of Active Duty members). 5) Ratio in-between Active Duty and Reserve was 1 to 10, ratio in-between Active Duty OFs and NCOs was 1 to 1.4, and in-between NCOs and enlisted grades E1-E4 was 1:0.5. 6) Anomalies in conscription service (conscientious objectors, health condition for service). Official Gazette of RS,

Analysis of the SAF in long-term plans (2000 and 2001) brought the crucial political decision to abolish conscription and transfer to an all-volunteer force (annexed Defense Act and Conscription Act). The Conscription Act determined that the draft be abolished no later than 31 December 2003, conscription no later than 30 June 2004, and duty to serve in a reserve capacity no later than 31 December 2010.¹⁰⁸

The Transition to Professional Armed Forces Complemented with Contractual Reserve–PROVOJ project was started to transform the SAF into a modern all-volunteer force.¹⁰⁹ It was an ambitious project with seventeen subprojects, which enabled professionalization of the SAF.¹¹⁰ There was an awareness that radical transformation of the SAF could not happen in a year (the Conscription Act was adopted on 12 December 2002, and abolishment of Conscription was determined for 30 June 2004 and executed in

General Long-term Program for Development and Equipping of the SAF, Vol. XI, No. 97, 4 December 2001, 9,365-9,370, accessed 28 March 2019, https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2001/Ur/u2001097.pdf.

¹⁰⁸ Official Gazette of RS, *Conscription Act*, Vol. XII, No. 108, 12 December 2002, 12,874-12,884, accessed 30 March 2019, https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2002/Ur/u2002108.pdf.

¹⁰⁹ Igor Kotnik, “Professionalization of the Slovenian Armed Forces – a goal or a path,” *Contemporary Military Changes*, 14, no. 1 (May 2012): 21-23. Accessed 30 March 2018. http://www.slovenskavojska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojska/pdf/vojaski_izzivi/svi_14_1.pdf.

¹¹⁰ Subprojects of the PROVOJ: 1) Project leadership; 2) Management; 3) Recruitment; 4) Manning; 5) Retention; 6) Benefits; 7) Exit; 8) Education and Training; 9) Equipping; 10) Adjustment of Legislation; 11) Adjustment of the Infrastructure; 12) Resourcing; 13) Establishing the Military Profession and Occupation; 14) Cooperation with Other Ministries; 15) SAF and the Civilian Environment; 16) Leadership; 17) Cooperation with Economy.

October 2003), but it would prove to be a long-term process far beyond the date of abolishment of Conscription.

In 2003, Slovenia finished negotiation with NATO. In a 23 March referendum, 66.08 percent of voters supported membership in NATO. On 26 March the Permanent Representatives of the nineteen NATO member states signed a protocol on Slovenia's accession to NATO. On 24 February 2004, the Slovenian National Assembly ratified the Washington Treaty and with the deposition of the ratification documents on 29 February 2004, Slovenia became a full member of the Alliance.¹¹¹

With the assistance of foreign experts, the MoD executed a Defense Review in 2003 as a basis for the General Long-Term Program for Development and Equipping of the SAF, and Parliament adopted the recommendations in July 2004.¹¹² The program determined development of the SAF in 2015 and stated critical conditions for the success of defense reform.

This package of acts, strategies, and doctrine from that period was the most complete normative framework in the history of Slovenia. It enabled radical changes in the organization of the SAF and prepared Slovenia for full membership in NATO. There was a clear alignment of the security environment with a solidly resourced Defense Policy. Long-term plan (2004). All of this is explored in appendix C of this document.

¹¹¹ Ministry of Defense of RS, Annual Report 2003, 2004, 5-9, accessed 1 April 2019, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/letno_porocilo_2003.pdf.

¹¹² Official Gazette of RS, *General Long-term Program for Development and Equipping of the SAF*, Vol. XIV, No. 89, 12 August 2001, 9,365-9,370, accessed 31 March 2019, https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2004/Ur/u2004089.pdf.

The Slovenian Parliament adopted three long-term plans between 2000 and 2004, which successfully identified critical parameters for needed transformation of the SAF, determined a viable timeline, and set priorities.

Third Period (2005-2010)

The third period was characterized by active participation of the SAF in Crisis Response Operations, the highest level of investment to infrastructure and equipment, and, unfortunately, it resulted in a stalemate of the defense reform.

On 1 June 2006, the Government of RS adopted the Military Doctrine of RS.

The Military Doctrine defines principles on the organization, employment and operation of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) in providing military defence of the state and carrying out other missions, through which the defence strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (RS) is implemented. The doctrine lays down fundamental principles by which the Slovenian Armed Forces or its components guide their action in the defence and security area to support national interests and objectives. The doctrine supports the transition of the Slovenian Armed Forces through a period of transformation, which dictates new ways of thinking and the reformation of the armed forces to face new challenges and threats.¹¹³

It is the first document in Slovenia that translated defense strategy to military action. In many ways it was a modification of FM 3-0 *Operations* (2001 edition) with Slovenian specifics. Its purpose was to be a basis for any other Field Manual within SAF. This document has not been updated from the original publication date.

SAF began modernization according to the specifics in the General Long-Term Program which moved the SAF towards a professional armed force capable of

¹¹³ Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia, *Military Doctrine 2006*, (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 1 June 2006), accessed 22 April 2019, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/vojd2006_eng.pdf.

functioning in NATO. Major infrastructure projects and equipment procurements began in 2004. The MoD prioritized extensive infrastructure use or replacement from the former Yugoslav Army force structure and determined which was potentially useful, and which would be sold to other countries. Then it started modernization of infrastructure to allow training and education, host nation functions, and administration. Simultaneously, the main process for equipping the new SAF began (see table below in appendix C).¹¹⁴

Several areas, such as the procurement system, had to be developed from scratch. Beginning with nothing brought the risk of initial mistakes. Investments in infrastructure and equipment showed major anomalies because the administration apparatus was not prepared to conduct change on such a massive scale. Strategic Defense Review 2009 identified deficiencies in the process of procurement and investment documentation, lack of experts, and inappropriate jurisdiction of organizational units, which often led to a longer finalization of investment or even cancelation of some of the necessary changes.¹¹⁵

Unfortunately, corruption occurred in the process too. The main investment for equipment to outfit the medium battalion group, (medium armored vehicles 8x8 Svarun, Patria AMV) was a major corruption and political scandal in the history of Slovenia, and lasted from 2006 to 2014 without completing the process. The vehicle contracts between

¹¹⁴ Ministry of Defense, *Annual Report 2003, 2004*, 37-41, accessed 1 April 2019, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/LP_MO_2010.pdf.

¹¹⁵ Ministry of Defense, "Strategic Defense Review," October 2009, accessed 2 April 2019, 33-34, <http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/SPOR2009.pdf>.

Finish Patria and RS were dissolved in 2012 with only thirty of the 135 vehicles procured.¹¹⁶ Accordingly, Slovenia could not reach its force goals to develop two medium battalion groups and forced the RS to deviate from commitments to NATO.

Last Period (2010-2019)

The last period was characterized by large cuts in the defense budget, a break in the connection between strategies and defense spending, and constant transformations of the SAF to adjust to the new reality. In this period, the following strategic documents were developed and adopted:

1. Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia (2010);
2. Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the SAF to 2025 (2010);
3. The Strategy of the Participation of the Republic of Slovenia in International Operations and Missions (2010); and
4. Defense Strategy (2012).

For the purpose of this research, it is very important to note as of May 2019, the MoD has not updated strategic documents published in the period of 2010-2012. This is a point of concern, considering the fact that security environment has changed substantially since 2014.

¹¹⁶ RTVSLO, “Pogodba s Patrio prekinjena, Rotis potegnil kratko” [Contract with Patria Dissolved], 5 September 2012, accessed 2 April 2019, <https://www.rtvsl.si/slovenija/pogodba-s-patrio-prekinjena-rotis-potegnil-kratko/290823>.

The Resolution on the National Security Strategy provides guidance in the field of national security, defines national interests, and lays out national security objectives. Furthermore, it describes threats and defines the policy of responding to them. The National Security Strategy from 2010 remains in effect and is the highest strategic document for overall national security.¹¹⁷ The Global and Transnational Sources of Threat and Risk (see appendix C), correctly predicted the events after 2014 and offers a good basis for a necessary update. Response to the recognized threats, however, is general and does not reflect current activities. For example, the Response to Illegal Migration is described as:

The RS will implement policy on the prevention of illegal migration and migration management in general in accordance with the national legislation and the documents, standards and guidelines of the European Union and the United Nations.¹¹⁸

Authors of the NSS could not predict the increase in migration into Europe. Neither could they predict that EU leaders would not be able to implement policies to handle the migration leaving the nation states to adopt various measures based on each countries own national interests. Other problems were not foreseen when the Response to Illegal Migration was published. Examples of these unforeseen issues are the need for extraordinary powers for the SAF to assist the police in migration flow; technical obstacles are necessary on the border to prevent illegal migration; continued illegal

¹¹⁷ Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Resolucija o strategiji nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije* [Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia], Vol. XI, No. 56, 06 July 2001, accessed 28 March 2019, https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2001/Ur/u2001056.pdf.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 36.

migration after the nation's borders were closed; and migration flows facilitate terrorism in the final state and in the crossing state.

Resolution on Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the SAF up to 2025 set very ambitious goals.¹¹⁹ These goals are aligned to the Defense Act criteria for readiness of the SAF (see further in chapter below).

In the national context, the SAF will be capable of forming task-force tactical units up to brigade level. For operations outside the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, a battalion-level unit will be set up, trained and capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations in up to one-year long rotations. This will be achieved by generating at least four infantry battalion sized combat cores. Against this background the Slovenian Armed Forces will, in addition to the existing motorized infantry' battalion group, develop a medium infantry battalion group by 2020 at the latest.¹²⁰

The resolution set high goals in defense spending. The resolution established long term defense expenditure of the Republic of Slovenia is oriented towards 2 percent of GDP. An amendment to the resolution changed the feasibility date for the level of spending to 2025. This change represents clear incompatibility with original goals, which was to achieve 2 percent spending by 2020.

The Strategy of the Participation of the Republic of Slovenia in its International Operations and Mission (*Strategija sodelovanja Republike Slovenije v mednarodnih operacijah in misijah*) was adopted in 2010 and, like the others, was never updated.¹²¹ It

¹¹⁹ Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the SAF up to 2025*, 7 December 2010, accessed 23 April 2019, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/ReDPROSV25_slo_en.pdf.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Strategija sodelovanja Republike Slovenije v mednarodnih operacijah in misijah* [Strategy of Republic of Slovenia in International Operations and Missions], 12 March 2010, accessed

elaborates the provisions of the National Security Strategy and describes the strategic interests of RS in international operations and missions.

Strategic interest of RS regarding international operations and mission are determined by geographical position, by political, security, economical and humanitarian interests, and by commitments regarding international agreements. Strategical interests of RS are in southeastern Europe, in eastern Europe and Caucasus, in Mediterranean, and in the Middle East.¹²²

The Defense Strategy (*Obrambna strategija Republike Slovenije*) was published in 2012 and was based on the National Security Strategy.¹²³ The goals are well defined; however, there is a clear lack of ways and means to achieve those ends. The goals are summarized in the table below.

06 April 2018, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/strategija_sodelovanja_RS_MOM.pdf.

¹²² Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, Strategy of Republic of Slovenia in International Operations and Missions, 9.

¹²³ Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia, *Obrambna strategija Republike Slovenije* [Defense Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia], 7 December 2012. Accessed 22 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/predpisi/drugo/obr_strategija.pdf.

Table 2. Goals of the Defense Strategy	
Goal	Description
Defense of Slovenia	Development of capabilities for effective defense of Slovenia. Capabilities will be interoperable with NATO and dual-purpose, which will allow disaster response.
Collective defense	Defense of national territory through collective defense. Develop capabilities to participate in the NATO's pool of forces if article V will be activated.
Defense Planning	Defense planning which will prepare Slovenia to respond with NATO and EU in peacetime crisis or war.
International Cooperation	International cooperation in defense with other allied countries and through UN, NATO, EU, OSCE.
Crisis Management	Cooperation in international community to assure peace and stability, especially in southeastern Europe.
Strategic Communication	Inform Slovenian public about purpose of the Slovenian Defense System.

Source: Created by author using Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia, *Obrambna strategija Republike Slovenije* (Defense Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia), 7 December 2012, 3-8.

The quotation below substantiates the assertion that ends, ways, and means are misaligned.

Defense budget will be development-driven and will aim to achieve the NATO recommended 2 percent of GDP spending for defense with a ratio of 50:30:20 between personnel, operating and equipping.¹²⁴

Seven years later (2019), Slovenia is further away from the stated goals than it was at the time of adoption (2012). The strategy, however, was never updated. From 2012, Slovenia did not develop a single strategy or long-term program, which is surprising, considering the security environment changed substantially since 2014. NATO reacted immediately to the drivers of the changes (see Security Situation in

¹²⁴ Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia, Defense Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia, 12.

Europe and Wales Summit). Unfortunately, Slovenia did not follow many NATO countries, which increased defense spending after Russian aggressive actions and the Wales commitment. In 2014, the defense spending decreased to less than 1 percent (0.97 percent) and remains around 1 percent as of May 2019 (see Defense Expenditure).

The government adopted Mid-Terms Defense Programs in 2013 (2013-2018), 2016 (2016-2020), and 2018 (2018-2023). It was almost impossible to plan on the mid-term without proper resources and very ambitious long term-plan. The Mid-Term Defense Program 2016-2020 (*Srednjeročni obrambni program*) was adopted in February 2016.¹²⁵ The program recognized the situation on defense spending, and therefore delayed capability building (medium battalion group) for collective defense until after 2020.

Decrease of the defense spending will be stopped in 2017 at 0.91% GDP. From 2018 on the defense spending will increase for 0.04% per year and will reach 1.03% of GDP in 2020.¹²⁶

Financial resources for modernization of the SAF don't allow realization of ambitions from Long-Term Program and NATO Force Goals. For that the SAF would need additional 218 million EUR, which means that after 2020 Slovenia will have to keep the trend of increasing the defense spending. Thereafter current Mid-Term Program cannot determine planning frame for the most complex defense capabilities.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia. *Srednjeročni obrambni program Republike Slovenije 2016-2020* [Mid-Term Defense Program of the Republic of Slovenia 2016-2020] (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 17 February 2016), accessed 16 October 2018, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/predpisi/obramba/SOPR2016_2020.pdf.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 45.

The Mid-Term Defense Program 2018-2023 (*Srednjeročni obrambni program*), adopted in April 2018 was much more ambitious towards achieving the decision of the Slovenian Government (2017) to increase the defense spending to reach NATO Capability Targets for RS.¹²⁸

The Government has stopped decreasing the defense spending in nominal figures. In the period from 2018 to 2023 the spending will increase and in 2023 reach 1.11% of GDP. There is a goal to reach 1.2% in 2025. The Mid-Term program is oriented towards development, which means that the ratio of spending for investments, operations, and maintenance will increase.¹²⁹

As written in chapter 1, the plan was stalled and Slovenian readiness remained low.¹³⁰

Summary

Slovenian normative framework was developed systematically when accessing NATO (second period 1994-2004). National and defense policies were solidly aligned with financial resources. Slovenia abolished conscription and in that way deviated from previous territorial concepts. It has to be noted (from today's perspective) that the plans were very ambitious and could hardly be sustainable, even if Slovenia would reach 2 percent of the GDP for defense.

¹²⁸ Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia. *Srednjeročni obrambni program Republike Slovenije 2018-2023* [Mid-Term Defense Program of the Republic of Slovenia 2018-2023] (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 12 April 2018), accessed 16 October 2018. <http://vrs-3.vlada.si/MANDAT14/VLADNA GRADIVA.NSF/71d4985ffda5de89c12572c3003716c4/709feb255697c4b7c125826e00469436?OpenDocument>.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Radio-Television Slovenia. "Modernization of the SAF postponed indefinitely, Combat Readiness remains low," *Slovenija*, 21 February 2019, accessed 15 March 2019, <https://www.rtvlo.si/slovenija/modernizacija-vojske-odlozena-za-nedolocen-cas-obrambna-sposobnost-pa-ostaja-klavrna/480762>.

In the third period, Slovenia followed the policies. The SAF gained a lot of experience on crisis response operations and proved that it could deploy a battalion that was capable of operating in its own area of operation in Kosovo for six months. In that period, Slovenia deployed almost 20 percent of its active duty personnel. Major investments and equipment procurement happened and Slovenia learned a valuable lesson that military investments are a complex process. Towards the end of the period, however, the first round of deviations from the policies and plans became evident.

In the last period, Slovenia prioritized macro-economic concerns over security. The normative package consisting of the National Security Strategy, Long-Term Program, and the Defense Strategy (2010-2012) was not aligned with financial resources. Policy documents were developed during an economic recession, but kept high ambitions. None of the documents have been updated. The SAF had a major reorganization in 2010 (consolidating its personnel), and two major transformations in 2012 and 2018 to adopt to the new reality. However, Slovenia had to delay its force goals and commitments to the Alliance.

Dr. Young suggests that the model policy documents (e.g., National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy) have been counterproductive in Post-Communist NATO countries for the reason that their focus was on producing nicely written strategies instead of producing coherent military capabilities.¹³¹ He also discusses the concept of Honest Defense and recommends that post-Communist countries should deviate from

¹³¹ Thomas-Durell Young, "The Challenge to Defense Reform in Central/Eastern Europe, with Reference to Slovenia," *Contemporary Military Challenges* 18, no. 4 (December 2016): 20, accessed 3 March 2019, http://www.slovenskavojska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojaska/pdf/vojaski_izzivi/2016/svi_18_4.pdf.

former concepts and prepare defense policy which contains clear guidance on developing military capabilities. Any defense plan which follows must be properly resourced and sustainable for the long term.

In the second period, Slovenia proved that it can connect defense policies with defense plans. Dr. Young is exactly on the spot for the last period. Slovenia had a neatly prepared normative framework with clearly determined goals, but did not have a defense plan to accomplish them.

Defense Expenditure

This subchapter supports the previous two subchapters with quantitative analysis on defense spending. It describes global trends, trends in the Alliance, and focuses on Slovenian defense expenditures. Its main purpose was to establish misalignment between the national policies and execution of the defense plan.

Global Trends in Defense Expenditure

World military expenditure is estimated to reached 1739 billion US dollars (USD) in 2017, which is the highest level after the end of the cold war. This represents 2.2 percent of global domestic product (GDP) or 230 USD per person. Total global expenditure in 2017 was marginally higher compared with 2016, up by 1.1 percent in real terms.¹³²

Because the U.S., as the world's largest spender, did not increase defense spending in 2017 (at 610 billion USD, it remained unchanged from 2016) and Russia lowered its expenditure by almost 20 percent (66.3 billion USD), it is interesting to

¹³² Ian Davis, ed., *SIPRI Yearbook 2018* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2018), 149.

analyze the trends in the regions. The changes can be characterized by examining three regions: Asia and Oceania, Europe, and the Middle East.¹³³

Asia and Oceania defense budgets rose by 3.6 percent (477 billion USD), almost entirely as a result of the continued increase of China. Central Europe had the highest percentage increase of all subregions (12 percent). However, Europe's overall expenditure declined by 2.2 percent (342 billion USD) because of the considerable drop of Russia. The Middle East increased by 6.2 percent (151 billion USD).¹³⁴

The table below shows the ten largest spenders in 2017 (shaded cells for Europe) and the trend from 2008. The data indicates the U.S. spent more than the next eight countries combined. There are four European countries in the top ten; however, China spends more than all of them together. China has more than doubled military spending since 2008 (110 percent increase) and narrowed the gap with the U.S. (14 percent decrease in same period).

¹³³ Davis, *SIPRI Yearbook 2018*, 149-161.

¹³⁴ Estimation based on available data in SIPRI Yearbook 2018.

Table 3. Ten Countries with the Highest Military Expenditure in 2017						
Rank		Country	Military spending (billion USD) *	Share of GDP (%) *	Share of world military spending (%)	Change 2008-2017 (%) **
2017	2016					
1	1	USA	610	3.1	35	-14
2	2	China	228 (est.)	1.9 (est.)	13 (est.)	110
3	4	Saudi Arabia	69.4 (est.)	10 (est.)	4.0 (est.)	34
4	3	Russia	66.3	4.3	3.8	36
5	6	India	63.9	2.5	3.7	45
6	5	France	57.8	2.3	3.3	5.1
7	7	UK	47.2	1.8	2.7	-15
8	8	Japan	45.4	0.9	2.6	4.4
9	9	Germany	44.3	1.2	2.5	8.8
10	10	South Korea	39.2	2.6	2.3	29
* current prices and exchange rates. ** constant prices and exchange rates (2016)						

Source: Ian Davis, ed., *SIPRI Yearbook 2018* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018), 158.

IISS published the numbers for 2018, which are represented in the table below.

There are two reasons to use the data of IISS (in addition to SIPRI). The first is a control mechanism to emphasize the complexity of defense expenditure evaluation on a global level (especially China and Saudi Arabia), and the second is to observe the latest U.S. trends, which increased spending by 44.5 billion USD in 2018.

Table 4. Trends in Defense Spending 2014-2018						
Rank 2018	Country	Military spending (Billion USD, current prices)				
		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
1	USA	581.0	597.5	604.5	602.8	643.3
2	China	129.4	145.8 (314)	145.0	150.5	168.2
3	Saudi Arabia	80.8	81.9	56.9	76.7	82.9
4	Russia	70.0	65.6	58.9	61.2	63.1
5	India	45.2	48.0	51.1	52.5	57.9
6	UK	61.8	56.2	52.5	50.7	56.1
7	France	53.1	46.8	47.2	48.6	53.4
8	Japan	47.7	41.0	47.3	46.0	47.3
9	Germany	43.9	36.7	38.3	41.7	45.7
10	South Korea	34.4	33.5	33.8	35.7	39.2

Sources: Created by author. Information gathered from James Hackett, ed., *Military Balance 2015* (London, England: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015), 21; James Hackett, ed., *The Military Balance 2016* (London, England: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016), 19; James Hackett, ed., *The Military Balance 2017* (London, England: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017), 19; James Hackett, ed., *The Military Balance 2018* (London, England: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018), 19; James Hackett, ed., *The Military Balance 2019* (London, England: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019), 19.

Trends in Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries

Europe reaped the so-called “peace dividend” and politically prioritized macroeconomic concerns over defense until the situation in Ukraine in 2014 made it clear that defense can no longer be regulated to a subsidiary concern.¹³⁵

The NATO Summit in Wales (September 2014) was in direct response to the illegal Russian annexation of the Crimea and its support to the separatists in eastern

¹³⁵ Nicholas Redman, ed., *Strategic Survey 2018: The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics* (London, England: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018), 318.

Ukraine. In the Wales Summit Declaration, there were also paragraphs about defense expenditure (paragraphs 14 and 15).

We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, . . . agree to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets, to make the most effective use of our funds and to further a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities. . . . Allies currently meeting the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence will aim to continue to do so. Likewise, Allies spending more than 20% of their defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research & Development, will continue to do so.

Allies whose current proportion of GDP spent on defence is below this level will: halt any decline in defence expenditure; aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows; aim to move towards the 2% guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and filling NATO's capability shortfalls.

Allies who currently spend less than 20% of their annual defence spending on major new equipment, including related Research & Development, will aim, within a decade, to increase their annual investments to 20% or more of total defence expenditures.¹³⁶

In the table below, there are data about Defense Expenditure of NATO members.

¹³⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Wales Summit Declaration," 5 September 2014, accessed 26 February 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm#def-exp.

Table 5. Defense Expenditures of NATO Members									
	Defense expenditure*	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018 (est.)	Change 2011-18**	Share for Equipment (%)	
Albania	Million USD	178	132	131	144	181	m USD	-17.82	2014: 16.65
	% GDP	1.35	1.16	1.10	1.11	1.16	%	-9.5	2018: 10.72
Belgium	Million USD	5,192	4,202	4,315	4,504	5,029	USD	-192.4	2014: 3.52
	% GDP	0.98	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.93	%	-3.8	2018: 9.80
Bulgaria	Million USD	747	633	671	723	937	m USD	191.7	2014: 1.03
	% GDP	1.32	1.26	1.26	1.24	1.43	%	28.2	2018: 20.30
Croatia	Million USD	1,064	883	837	924	1,057	USD	156.9	2014: 5.56
	% GDP	1.84	1.78	1.62	1.67	1.71	%	16.5	2018: 9.45
Czech R.	Million USD	1,975	1,921	1,866	2,255	2,754	m USD	499.9	2014: 6.53
	% GDP	0.95	1.03	0.96	1.04	1.11	%	22.1	2018: 12.39
Denmark	Million USD	4,057	3,364	3,593	3,780	4,279	USD	107.7	2014: 10.99
	% GDP	1.15	1.11	1.15	1.15	1.21	%	2.5	2018: 13.43
Estonia	Million USD	513	463	497	540	627	m USD	190.5	2014: 22.15
	% GDP	1.93	2.02	2.07	2.03	2.07	%	54.12	2018: 18.15
France	Million USD	51,940	43,474	44,191	46,036	51,200	USD	2,685.8	2014: 24.64
	% GDP	1.82	1.78	1.79	1.78	1.82	%	5.3	2018: 23.66
Germany	Million USD	46,102	39,813	41,590	45,580	50,199	m USD	3,366.9	2014: 12.94
	% GDP	1.18	1.18	1.19	1.19	1.23	%	7.4	2018: 14.13
Greece	Million USD	5,226	4,517	4,635	4,748	4,924	USD	-854.9	2014: 8.17
	% GDP	2.20	2.30	2.37	2.34	2.22	%	-13.2	2018: 12.40
Hungary	Million USD	1,210	1,132	1,289	1,468	1,820	m USD	467.5	2014: 7.76
	% GDP	0.86	0.92	1.02	1.05	1.15	%	33.6	2018: 20.35
Italy	Million USD	24,448	19,566	22,373	23,852	25,371	USD	-3,186.0	2014: 10.92
	% GDP	1.08	1.01	1.12	1.15	1.15	%	-11.5	2018: 21.12
Latvia	Million USD	293	281	403	530	711	m USD	384.4	2014: 7.55
	% GDP	0.94	1.04	1.45	1.74	2.03	%	150	2018: 31.37
Lithuania	Million USD	427	471	636	816	1,071	USD	672.8	2014: 14.06
	% GDP	0.88	1.14	1.48	1.72	2.00	%	215.9	2018: 30.59
Luxembourg	Million USD	253	249	236	325	378	m USD	142.96	2014: 22.61
	% GDP	0.38	0.44	0.40	0.52	0.54	%	67.9	2018: 41.77
Montenegro	Million USD	69	57	62	66	85	USD	3.84	2014: 7.46
	% GDP	1.50	1.40	1.42	1.36	1.55	%	5.13	2018: 9.66
Netherlands	Million USD	10,332	8,668	9,108	9,788	12,817	m USD	2,175.1	2014: 10.68
	% GDP	1.13	1.11	1.14	1.15	1.35	%	20.4	2018: 24.93
Norway	Million USD	7,337	5,816	6,064	6,463	7,222	USD	1,401.0	2014: 21.17
	% GDP	1.51	1.46	1.54	1.55	1.62	%	21.5	2018: 26.69
Poland	Million USD	10,104	10,596	9,405	9,938	12,817	m USD	4,132.5	2014: 18.84
	% GDP	1.85	2.22	1.99	1.89	2.05	%	49.3	2018: 26.54
Portugal	Million USD	3,003	2,644	2,615	2,702	3,267	USD	-185.7	2014: 8.43
	% GDP	1.35	1.33	1.27	1.23	1.35	%	-5.3	2018: 12.97
Romania	Million USD	2,691	2,581	2,645	3,643	4,678	m USD	2,096.7	2014: 15.77
	% GDP	1.31	1.45	1.40	1.72	1.92	%	95.3	2018: 34.36
Slovak R.	Million USD	997	986	1,003	1,053	1,316	USD	368.3	2014: 11.12
	% GDP	0.99	1.13	1.12	1.10	1.21	%	36.9	2018: 22.27
Slovenia	Million USD	486	401	449	476	558	m USD	-65.3	2014: 0.66
	% GDP	0.97	0.93	1.01	0.98	1.02	%	-10.4	2018: 8.22
Spain	Million USD	12,614	11,090	9,971	11,864	13,506	USD	1,143.5	2014: 13.49
	% GDP	0.92	0.92	0.81	0.90	0.93	%	8.6	2018: 23.04
Turkey	Million USD	13,583	11,957	12,649	12,972	13,898	m USD	6,312.6	2014: 25.08
	% GDP	1.45	1.39	1.46	1.52	1.64	%	45.2	2018: 31.55
United Kingdom	Million USD	65,658	59,492	56,154	55,672	61,622	USD	1,962.5	2014: 22.82
	% GDP	2.16	2.05	2.11	2.12	2.15	%	3.3	2018: 24.14
NATO Europe	Million USD	270,430	235,336	237,326	250,862	281,665	USD	24,036	
	% GDP	1.44	1.42	1.44	1.46	1.51	%	9.05	
Canada	Million USD	18,150	18,685	17,711	22,467	21,601	USD	3,228.74	2014: 13.03
	% GDP	1.01	1.20	1.15	1.41	1.23	%	15.8	2018: 13.05
United States	Million USD	653,942	641,253	656,059	685,957	706,063	m USD	-120,588	2014: 25.97
	% GDP	3.76	3.55	3.55	3.34	3.39	%	-16.6	2018: 25.27
NATO Total	Million USD	942,263	895,059	911,692	958,711	1,013,406	USD	-93,323	
	% GDP	2.48	2.39	2.39	2.32	2.36	%	-9.2	
* current prices ** constant prices and exchange rates (2010); m = million Green: 1.9% of BDP and higher, 20 % for equipment; Orange 1.0% of GDP or lower, less than 10% for equipment									

Source: Created by author using data from North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries,” 14 March 2019, accessed 5 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_03/190314-pr2018-34-eng.pdf.

Almost five years after the Wales Summit, only seven members have reached or maintained the 2 percent GDP criteria for defense (Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, UK, and USA), and another one is very close (Romania). Among these eight countries, only six spend 20 percent of the defense budget for equipment (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, UK, and USA).

Excluding the UK and the U.S. (which constantly maintain high defense expenditure), a logical deduction can be made that countries closest to the Russian border perceive the external threat as serious, and therefore increased spending. This stated deduction can be substantiated by the fact that all those countries have increased spending since 2014 (Latvia and Lithuania by almost 150 percent).¹³⁷

In 2018, the European part of NATO spent 281,665 billion USD (40 percent of the U.S. spending), which represented 1.51 percent of common GDP. There were six European NATO countries that spent at least 1.5 percent of GDP for defense (among them, four spent 20 percent for equipment); three countries spent around 1.4 percent; six country around 1.2 percent; one country around 1.1 percent; and four countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain) spent around 1 percent or less. Six European countries (Belgium, Croatia, Greece, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovenia) spent more than 70 percent of their defense budget for personnel and four countries (Belgium, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia) spent less than 10 percent for equipment.¹³⁸

¹³⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organizaton, “Wales Summit Declaration.”

¹³⁸ Ibid.

Slovenian Defense Expenditure

The table below shows crucial data about Slovenian defense expenditures from 2000-2019. The first three rows represent governments that led Slovenia in the analyzed time period; the next six rows represent data on defense expenditure; and the last three rows represent data on the overall Slovenian economy. Figures on defense expenditure are from the MoD and verified by NATO reports.

Table 6. Slovenian Defense Expenditure (2000-2019)																				
# GOV, Prime minister, Coalition Parties	5 Bajuk SLS+SKD SDS	6 Drnovšek LDS, SLS, ZLSD, DeSUS, SMS	7 Rop LDS, SLS, ZLSD, DeSUS, SMS	8 Janša SDS, NSi, SLS, DeSUS	9 Pahor SD, Zares, DeSUS, LDS	10 Janša SDS, DeSUS, NSi, SLS	11 Bratovič PS, SD, DL, DeSUS	12 Cerar SMC, SD, DeSUS	13 Šarec LMS, SD, SMC, DeSUS, (Levica)											
Defense Minister	Janša	Grizold	Grizold	Erjavec				Jehlič			Hojs	Jakič	Veber	Katič	Erjavec					
Mandate	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018a	2019b
Defense Expenditure (% of GDP)	1.12	1.3	1.39	1.4	1.43	1.41	1.54	1.44	1.49	1.59	1.61	1.3	1.17	1.05	0.97	0.93	1.01	0.98	1.02a	1.02b
Defense Expenditure (m of EUR)	247	303	347	369	397	413	486	506	566	575	583	479	423	382	366	361	406	422	466a	504b
Defense Expenditure (m of USD)						76325 318a	87879 377a	367	394	388	392	474	416	370	352	344	384	393	424a	
Personnel (% of Defense Expenditure)								59.8	62.2	67.1	61.7	74.6	78.9	80.5	82.3	82.2	76.0	75.4	72.4a	
Equipment (% of Defense Expenditure)								10.8	7.4	8.5	18.0	5.7	1.2	1.3	0.7	1.9	1.0	4.0	8.2a	
Operations, other (% of Defense Expenditure)								24.8	25.5	21.2	17.6	17.1	17.9	16.9	16.4	15.3	21.8	20.1	18.9a	
GDP of RS (m EUR)	18,902	21,147	23,622	25,668	27,673	29,227	31,555	35,153	37,951	36,166	36,252	36,896	36,076	36,239	37,603	38,863	40,357	43,000	45,938	49,611b
RS GDP Growth (%)	27,888	28,711	29,812	30,659	31,994	33,274	35,156	37,597	38,837	35,809	36,252	36,488	35,514	35,112	36,148	36,981	38,116	39,976	41,770	
RS GDP Growth (%)	4.2	2.9	3.8	2.8	4.4	4.0	5.7	6.9	3.3	-7.8	1.2	0.6	-2.7	-1.1	3.0	2.3	3.1	4.9	4.5	3.4b

GOV- sequential number of Slovenian Government since independence in 1991 (in year 2000 there was the 5th Slovenian Government); **BLACK color** – right center coalition; **YELLOW color** – left center coalition.
 a-estimated (NATO report), b-planned (Rebalance of the Budget 2019, Spring forecast of economic trends 2018, * – current prices, ** – constant prices and exchange (2000, 2010), m-million.
 s-Slovenian Tolars transformed to EUR (239.64 SIT = 1 EUR)

Source: Created by author using: Government of the Republic of Slovenia, *Past Governments*, accessed 26 February 2019, http://www.vlada.si/o_vladi/pretekle_vlade/. Official Gazette of RS, *Rebalance of the Budget of RS*, vol. 19, no. 19, 29 March 2019, p.2013, accessed 06 April 2018, https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2019/Ur/u2019019.pdf. Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development, »Spring forecast of economic trends 2018,« *Spring Forecast*, 27 March 2018, accessed 06 April 2019, <http://www.umar.gov.si/en/forecasts/spring-forecast/>. NATO, “Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries.” Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia, Mid-Term Defense Program of the Republic of Slovenia 2018-2023.

From 2000 to 2019, Slovenia has had nine governments and ten defense ministers. In average, each government served for less than two years. It is reasonable to assume that this could be one reasons for inconsistent defense spending.

Among all ministries of the Slovenian Government, the Defense Ministry was affected the most during the recent economic recession. From 2010 to 2016, the defense budget decreased by almost 45 percent, from 1.61 percent GDP in 2010 to 0.93 percent in 2016.¹³⁹

In 2014, the Slovenian economy started to recover and reached 4.9 percent GDP growth in 2017; however, defense spending did not increase, staying below 1 percent of the GDP. In 2018, defense spending nominally increased to 466 million EUR and exceeded 1 percent of the GDP for defense.

Before the recession (2009), Slovenia had a GDP of 38,837 million EUR; in 2018 it increased to 41,770 million EUR (both in constant prices), which means that Slovenia reached and exceeded GDP before the recession. That is not the case for defense spending, which stays below the levels before the recession (627 million USD in 2011, and 562 million USD in 2018).

The structure of the Slovenian defense budget is even more problematic. Slovenia traditionally spends a high ratio on personnel. From 2007 to 2018, the lowest share for personnel was 59.8 percent of the defense budget (2007) and the highest was 82.3 percent

¹³⁹ Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia, *Srednjeročni obrambni program Republike Slovenije 2018-2023* (Mid-Term Defense Program of the Republic of Slovenia 2018-2023) (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 13 April 2018), 14-16, accessed 16 October 2018, <http://vrs-3.vlada.si/MANDAT14/VLADNAGRADIVA.NSF/71d4985ffda5de89c12572c3003716c4/709feb255697c4b7c125826e00469436?OpenDocument>.

(2014). On average, it was 68.7 percent. Consequently, the share for equipping is traditionally low, and reached almost 0 percent at the peak of recession, on average 5.7 percent from 2007 to 2018. Slovenian engagement in crisis response operations is high, which causes a relatively high share of the defense budget for operations. The lowest was in 2015 (15.3 percent) and the highest in 2007 (24.8 percent), on average of 17.9 percent in the 2007-2018 time period.

Summary

Following trends and characteristics will be the starting points of chapter 4, which will be the basis for analysis of the correlation between the Slovenian defense policy, defense expenditure, and military capabilities:

1. In 2018, the European part of NATO spent 285,742 billion USD for defense (40 percent of the U.S. spending), which represented 1.5 percent of common GDP.
2. Only six out of twenty-nine NATO countries in 2018 satisfied (or were close to) the criteria for defense expenditure established in the Wales Summit Declaration (2 percent of the GDP and 20 percent share for equipment).
3. Central Europe had the highest percentage increase of all world subregions in 2017 (12 percent). Countries close to the Russian border perceive the external threats as serious, and therefore increased spending (Latvia and Lithuania for almost 150 percent).
4. Four countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain) spent around 1 percent of the GDP or less for defense in 2018. Six countries (Belgium, Croatia, Greece, Montenegro, Portugal, and Slovenia) spent more than 70 percent of the defense budget for personnel and four (Belgium, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia) spent less than 10 percent of the defense budget for equipment.

5. Macroeconomic trends were highly prioritized over defense in Slovenia during economic recession. Among all ministries of the Slovenian Government, the Defense Ministry was affected the most (45 percent decrease between 2010 and 2016).

6. Slovenian GDP in 2018 was greater than it was before the recession (2009); however, defense spending stayed below the levels before recession.

7. In 2018, Slovenia spent 1.02 percent of the GDP for defense (fourth from last in NATO). The share for personnel was 72.4 percent of the GDP (the highest in NATO), and 8.2 percent for equipment (lowest in NATO). In the Mid-Term Defense Program of the Republic of Slovenia 2018-2023, Slovenia plans to increase defense spending up to 1.11 percent in 2024, ten years after the Wales Summit commitment.

8. In 2019, the average level of defense spending in NATO (without the USA) is 1.5 percent GDP.

Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF)

Mission and Tasks of the SAF

The military doctrine adopted by the Slovenian government in 2006, according to the Defence Act (2004), determines mission, mission essential, and other tasks of the SAF.

The mission of the SAF is to deter military aggression against the Republic of Slovenia in cooperation with the Alliance and to contribute to international peace and stability within and outside the borders of the Alliance. In the event of military aggression, the SAF carries out, independently or in cooperation with its allies, the military defence of the Republic of Slovenia with the objective to resist and deter the enemy and to re-establish the national sovereignty on the entire territory of Slovenia.

The mission essential tasks of the SAF that derive from its mission are the maintenance of readiness, activation and mobilization of forces, deployment of

forces to the area of operation, conduct of defensive and offensive operations and the sustainment of the forces.

Through other tasks, the SAF contributes to international peace, security and stability and supports the government and public institutions in ensuring the safety and welfare of Slovenian citizens.¹⁴⁰

The Defense Act allows use of the SAF in national territory for disaster relief and border protection under very strict conditions, expressed in decision authority, autonomy, and powers. In both cases, the decision authority is the government. The SAF never intervenes independently, but supports civil protection in disaster relief, and police in border protection. In the latter case, the SAF does not have police powers.¹⁴¹

Strict limitations of the SAF in domestic affairs are enforced for a whole structure, including Contractual Reserve (contrary, for example, to the U.S. Posse Comitatus Act, which exempts National Guard forces under state authority).¹⁴² The former Chief of the Slovenian Uniformed Police, Pavle Čelik, claims that such restrictions in border protection missions are a consequence of negative experiences from former Yugoslavia, where the Yugoslav People's Army was responsible for protection of

¹⁴⁰ Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia, *Military Doctrine* (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 1 June 2006), 24-25, accessed 22 April 2019, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/vojd2006_eng.pdf.

¹⁴¹ Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Zakon o obrambi* [Defense Act], vol. XXV, no. 95, 10 December 2015, 15, accessed 28 March 2019, <http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/npbDocPdf?idPredpisa=ZAKO5800&idPredpisaChng=ZAKO532&type=pdf>.

¹⁴² Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, "Appendix D: Overview of the Posse Comitatus Act," in *Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 243-244, accessed 23 April 2018, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251/MR1251.AppD.pdf.

the border outside official border crossings.¹⁴³ He explains the Yugoslav regulation in the so called Green Border Protection emphasizes extraordinary powers of the armed force; namely, lethal force was authorized after three warnings. The illegal border crossing was an infraction by law punishable by fine or up to thirty days in prison, which shows a clear disproportion between authorized use of force and the committed offense.¹⁴⁴

After independence, the Slovenian police took over border protection and the Defence Act enforced strict limitations for the SAF. In 2015, however, SAF powers were not sufficient to control the mass migration flow. The Defense Act was amended at the peak of the crisis with additional powers to the SAF and now (under certain conditions) authorizes autonomous operation of the SAF to use warnings, direction, temporary restriction of movement, and crowd control. The extraordinary powers, however, can only be authorized for maximum three months by two-thirds majority of vote in the National Assembly. Currently (2019), the SAF assists police in border protection with sixty troops without extraordinary powers (e.g., patrolling in conjunction with police). SAF is also responsible to maintain more than 150 kilometers of technical obstacles on the Croatian border in 2015.¹⁴⁵ Former Chief of the General Staff, General Alan Geder, warned that daily engagement of the SAF in border protection is company-plus sized

¹⁴³ Pavle Čelik, *Stražarji državne meje v Sloveniji: 1918-2013* [State Border Guards in Slovenia: 1918-2013] (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Modrijan, 2013), 276-278.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ministry of Defense, MORStudio, “Novinarska konferenca načelnika Generalštaba SV” [Press Conference of the Chief of General Staff of the SAF], 7 March 2018, accessed 28 April 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wCWAiWcRbmg&feature=youtu.be>.

element (sixty soldiers for each of three shifts).¹⁴⁶ This is a substantial burden, considering current SAF personnel problems, and the fact that this is not a primary task of the armed force.

The Defence Act does not consider engagement of the SAF in counterterrorism missions in Slovenia. After terrorist attacks in France and Belgium, authorities used armed force to support the police.¹⁴⁷ Members of regular armed forces conducted presence patrols and securing national institutions and critical infrastructure. The changed security environment forced European countries to adjust and use the armed forces in internal affairs, which was also used by the Slovenian as an ad-hoc solution during the migration crisis. The Defense Act does not assign that task to the SAF. Any necessary future use would be made in emergency conditions and on an ad-hoc basis.

It is essential to emphasize the SAF's extensive experience in patrolling, crowd control, key infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism gained over the last twenty-two years participating in crisis response operations. Six years after independence, in 1997, SAF deployed the first troops on Operation Alba in Albania. This is probably the main reason that the SAF did not experience more problems while executing border

¹⁴⁶ Ministry of Defense, MORStudio, Press Conference of the Chief of General Staff of the SAF.

¹⁴⁷ Radio-Television Slovenia, "Francoske ulice varuje tudi vojska, v državi vedno več napadov na muslimane" [The French Streets are Guarded by the Army, There are More and More Attacks on Muslims in the Country], 12 January 2015, accessed 19 April 2019, <https://www.rtvsl.si/svet/francoske-ulice-varuje-tudi-vojska-v-drzavi-vedno-vec-napadov-na-muslimane/355615>; Radio-Television Slovenia, "Tudi Belgija na ulice pošilja vojsko" [Belgium Also Sends Troops to the Streets], 17 January 2015, accessed 19 April 2019, <https://www.rtvsl.si/svet/tudi-belgija-na-ulice-posilja-vojsko/356075>.

protection missions in 2015. In 2019, Slovenia participated in ten international operations and missions with its focus on the western Balkans.¹⁴⁸ The table below shows an average number of deployed personnel in time period 2002-2017.

Table 7. Number of Slovenian Troops on Crisis Response Operations								
2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
69	174	199	238	284	542	456	512	459
2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017		
442	424	402	300	419	402	300		

Source: Ministry of Defense, data gathered in MoD Annual Reports 2010-2017.

On average, the SAF deployments were six months long, which means the stated numbers in the above table would be doubled. Thus, in 2007 when Slovenia deployed a battalion in Kosovo Force (as the largest unit of the SAF ever deployed), 1,245 personnel were engaged on crisis response operations, and an additional 157 soldiers were in readiness for NATO Response Force or European Union Battlegroup Mission (total 1,502). In 2007, the SAF had 7,056 active duty personnel, which means that Slovenia deployed one-fifth of its active force (18 percent or 21 percent with troops in readiness).¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ Ministry of Defense, Slovenian Armed Forces, “International Cooperation,” accessed 22 April 2019, <http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/international-cooperation/>.

¹⁴⁹ Ministry of Defense, *Letno poročilo za leto 2007* [Annual Report 2007] (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2008), 23, 38, accessed 2 April 2019, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/LP_MO_2007.pdf.

Readiness of the SAF for National and Collective Defense

The SAF is a small armed force, consisting of 6,562 personnel (May 2019).¹⁵⁰ It does not have services, but consists of branches: infantry, armored units, aviation, navy, artillery, air defense, engineers, radiological, chemical and biological defense, and signal.¹⁵¹ The General Staff represents strategic level, Force Command is the operational level, the tactical level is composed of two maneuver brigades, logistical brigade, aviation regiment, special forces regiment, naval regiment, military schools, and a combined training center. The organizational structure is available in Appendix D.¹⁵²

The SAF does not have fighter jets or assault aviation. Air operations are provided through NATO.¹⁵³ A small air element has twenty-four transport and training airplanes (*Falcon*, *Turbolet*, *Pilatus PC-6*, *PC-9*), and sixteen transport and training helicopters (*Bell 412*, *Eurocopter Cougar*). The Slovenian Naval element has two patrol boats (*Svetlyak*, *Super Dvora*).¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰ Ministry of Defense, Slovenian Armed Forces, “About the Slovenian Armed Forces,” accessed 22 April 2019, <http://www.slovenskavojaska.si/en/about-the-slovenian-armed-forces/>.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 17.

¹⁵² Ministry of Defense, *Letno poročilo za leto 2017* [Annual Report 2017] (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2018), 9, accessed 14 April 2019, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/javne_objave/2018/LETNO_POROCILO_MO_2017.pdf.

¹⁵³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Air Policing,” accessed 18 April 2019, <https://ac.nato.int/page5931922/-nato-air-policing>.

¹⁵⁴ James Hackett, ed., *The Military Balance 2018* (London, England: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018), 147.

Since accession to NATO in 2004, the SAF has continued to have problems to achieve desired level of readiness.¹⁵⁵ From 2013, the SAF is evaluated by the President of the Republic as non-ready for war. Former Chief of the General Staff, General Dobran Božič, assessed that there are two main reasons for a negative evaluation in 2013.¹⁵⁶ The first is material and closely connected to financial resources to procure equipment, and the second is the lack of personnel. The Defence Act defines readiness as the ability of the SAF to execute all tasks determined by the law.¹⁵⁷

Readiness measures shall be the entirety of organizational, personnel, technical and other measures and activities to assure a planned, timely and organized increase of readiness for defence of the state and the organized transition to a state of war.¹⁵⁸

Demanded Readiness is a condition determined by the Minister of Defense with a two-year plan and considers peacetime structure of the SAF. Required Readiness (also

¹⁵⁵ Radio-Television Slovenia, “Pripravljenost vojske je boljša” [The Readiness of the Army is Better], 26 October 2005, accessed 3 April 2019, <https://www.rtv slo.si/slovenija/pripravljenost-vojske-je-boljsa/44946>.

¹⁵⁶ Slovenska vojska, Uradni blog, “Po preoblikovanju bo SV bolj vključena v prostor” [After the Transformation, the SAF Will Be More Involved in the Area], 7 May 2013, accessed 3 April 2019, <http://slovenskavojska.blogspot.com/2013/05/pogovor-z-nacelnikom-gssv-brigadirjem.html>.

¹⁵⁷ Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Zakon o obrambi* [Defense Act], vol. XXV, no. 95, 10 December 2015, 2-3, accessed 28 March 2019, <http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/npbDocPdf?idPredpisa=ZAKO5800&idPredpisaChng=ZAKO532&type=pdf>.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

Readiness for War) is the ability of the SAF to achieve increased or full readiness in accordance with the plans for operating in crisis, emergency conditions, and war.¹⁵⁹

The resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Program of the Slovenian Armed Forces to 2025, adopted in 2010, is the current reference document for Demanded Readiness. Combined with the Defense Policy (NSS, NDS), these documents determine the goals and military capabilities necessary to reach those goals. Unreached goals mean a negative Required Readiness evaluation (non-ready for war).¹⁶⁰

The SAF will conduct joint operations as part of task generated capabilities. In the national context it will be able of forming task-force tactical units up to brigade level. For operations outside the territory of Slovenia, a battalion level unit will be set up, trained and capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations in up to a one-year long rotations.

In addition to the existing motorized battalion group, the SAF will develop medium infantry battalion group by 2020 by latest.¹⁶¹

The SAF started to develop medium (Stryker type) battalion groups immediately after the accession to NATO according to the Long-Term Program adopted in 2004. Between 2006 and 2010, Slovenia procured thirty of the 135 planned 8x8 Patria AMV *Svarun* armored vehicles. The contract was canceled in 2012 because of budget

¹⁵⁹ Ministry of Defense, Slovenska vojska, "Slovenska vojska: pregled 2016, načrti 2017" [Slovenian Armed Forces: Review 2016, Plans 2017], 13 March 2017, accessed 26 April 2019, http://www.slovenskavojska.si/uploads/media/NOV_KON_13MAR17.pdf.

¹⁶⁰ Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the SAF*, vol. XIX, no. 99, 7 December 2010, 5, accessed 23 April 2019, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/ReDPROSV25_slo_en.pdf.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 18.

limitations and corruption scandals, leaving the SAF with only two equipped companies.¹⁶²

Financial crises and radical decrease of defense spending totally halted further development of the SAF, lowering equipment parts of the budget to less than 3 percent. In 2018, after the recession and the beginning of a new NATO planning cycle, the government adopted the Mid-Term Defense Program 2018-2023. It determined that the SAF will transform two light battalions to medium battalions, and invest 595 million EUR (from 2018 to 2023) for equipping of the 1st Medium Battalion Group.¹⁶³

Most of the resources (70 percent) were planned for 8x8 armored vehicles.¹⁶⁴ For that reason, Slovenia joined the Organization for Joint Armament Co-operation (OCCAR), and planned to procure “Boxer” 8x8 multi-role armored vehicles (MRAV).¹⁶⁵ The resignation of the Slovenian Prime Minister (March 2018) and elections (June 2018) stalled the process again. In February 2019, Defense Minister Erjavec announced that Slovenia would not procure Boxer MRAVs because a tactical study used as the legal

¹⁶² Radio-Television Slovenia, “Pogodba s Patrio prekinjena, Rotis potegnil kratko” [Contract with Patria Dissolved], 5 September 2012, accessed 2 April 2019, <https://www.rtv slo.si/slovenija/pogodba-s-patrio-prekinjena-rotis-potegnil-kratko/290823>.

¹⁶³ Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia, *Mid-Term Defense Program of the Republic of Slovenia 2018-2023* (Ljubljana, Republic of Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2018), 5-11, accessed 16 October 2018, <http://vrs-3.vlada.si/MANDAT14/VLADNAGRADIVA.NSF/71d4985ffda5de89c12572c3003716c4/709feb255697c4b7c125826e00469436?OpenDocument>.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

basis for procurement became obsolete. Consequently, medium battalion groups development could be delayed for years to come.¹⁶⁶

In summary, the main problem of negative required readiness evaluations is the inability to develop battalion groups in accordance with the Long-Term Program. The financial aspect is researched in chapter Defense Expenditure. Personnel aspects is currently the biggest problem of the SAF, and is analyzed in the following subchapter.

Human Resources of the SAF

The Long-Term Program plans for eight thousand active duty and two thousand contract reserve personnel. Under specific circumstances, and in accordance with the concept of the Strategic Reserve, the size and structure of the SAF can be augmented in longer time periods by up to 25,000 troops.¹⁶⁷ Currently, Slovenia has 6,562 active duty and 768 contractual reserve personnel, which means that it lacks 1,438 regular and 1,232 reserve soldiers (27 percent of the force).¹⁶⁸ This is the second reason for the negative Required Readiness evaluation.

¹⁶⁶ Radio-Television Slovenia, “Modernizacija vojske odložena za nedoločen čas, obrambna sposobnost pa ostaja klavrna” [Modernization of the SAF Postponed Indefinitely, Combat Readiness Remains Low], 21 February 2019, accessed 15 March 2019, <https://www.rtvsl.si/slovenija/modernizacija-vojske-odlozena-za-nedolocen-cas-obrambna-sposobnost-pa-ostaja-klavrna/480762>.

¹⁶⁷ Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the SAF*, vol. XIX, no. 99, 7 December 2010, 13, 25, accessed 23 April 2019, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/ReDPROSV25_lo_en.pdf.

¹⁶⁸ Ministry of Defense, Slovenian Armed Forces, “About the Slovenian Armed Forces,” accessed 22 April 2019, <http://www.slovenskavojaska.si/en/about-the-slovenian-armed-forces/>.

The problem is even bigger considering the trend which shows a negative trajectory for the future. According to the data in table 8 below, the SAF loses personnel at a rate of 342 soldiers every two years since 2009 and has 73 percent of needed personnel determined by the long-term plan. Regular forces lost 1,038 personnel (14 percent of the force) and Contract Reserve lost 944 personnel (45 percent) in the period 2009-2019. This is especially concerning because of the decreasing number of soldiers in E1-E4 paygrades. The trend of E1-E4 soldiers increased until 2011, reaching 3,340. But since 2011, the SAF lost 810 soldiers or 24.2 percent of E1-E4 troops. In the last seventeen months (1 January 2018 – May 2019), the SAF lost 356 personnel in those paygrades, which is almost three times more than in the two-year period, 2015-2017.

Low recruitment and retention of young soldiers also caused the SAF to become an aged organization. The MoD Annual Report for 2017 stated the average age of the SAF's members grew from 36.5 years to 40.9, and the average age of E1-E4 soldiers from 26.62 to 34.1 years in the period of 2010-2017.¹⁶⁹ Former Chief of Staff, General Geder, warns that if the trends continue, in two years the SAF will not have enough soldiers to execute tasks determined by law.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ Ministry of Defense, *Letno poročilo za leto 2017* [Annual Report 2017] (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2018), 87, accessed 14 April 2019, http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/javne_objave/2018/LETNO_POROCILO_MO_2017.pdf.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

Table 8. Human Resources 2009-2019

Year	Total		Contract. Reserve	Regular					
	Status	% of LTP*		Σ	OF	NCO	E1-E4		Other***
							Status	Dif.**	
5/2019	7,330	73%	768	6,562	1,070	1,944	2,530	-356	1,018
2017	7,812	78%	892	6,920	1,061	1,960	2,886	-131	1,025
2015	7,915	79%	860	7,055	1,060	1,961	3,017	-157	1,017
2013	8,408	84%	1,048	7,360	1,136	2,002	3,174	-166	1,013
2011	9,221	92%	1,621	7,600	1,157	1,993	3,340	+264	1,110
2009	9,359	94%	1,712	7,647	1,245	2,018	3,076	-	1,308

*- Relative difference with required personnel in accordance with the Long Term Programme; **-difference with previous two years; ***-military employees, civilians.

Source: Created by author using data from official Slovenian Armed Forces website, accessed 5 May 2019 (<http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/about-the-slovenian-armed-forces/>) and Annual Reports of the MoD 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017.

General Geder analyzed the personnel situation in the SAF.¹⁷¹ He warns that since 2003, when Slovenia abandoned the conscription system, the SAF acts as an equal partner in the labor market. In his opinion, salary is one of the most important aspects for successful recruitment and retention. He describes the trend of pay in the SAF by comparing starting salaries of SAF member against average pay on the national level. In 2008, starting payment of the soldier in E1 paygrade meant more than 90 percent of average payment on the national level. In 2018, the average E1 salary was only 55 percent of the national average for the same age and skill level. He uses examples of other European and NATO nations, which had problems with recruitment, and substantiates his thesis about importance of the salary. Croatia equaled the starting

¹⁷¹ Ministry of Defense, MORStudio, “Novinarska konferenca načelnika Generalštaba SV” [Press Conference of the Chief of General Staff of the SAF], 7 March 2018, accessed 28 April 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wCWAiWcRbmG&feature=youtu.be>.

payment of the E1 soldier with the average payment on the national level; the Czech Republic increased it to 126 percent and Lithuania to 111 percent. Neither of these countries have problems with recruitment anymore.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Purpose of the Research and the Research Questions

Purpose of the thesis is to address a complex and ill-structured problem that Slovenia has with its defense force by using army design methodology to inform the Chief Decision Maker. The purpose is not in developing a detailed plan, but to provide a concept, which visualizes solutions. Significance of the research is backed by the fact that the Slovenian MoD is developing the White Book of Defense, which will have to confront a similar set of problems as this thesis.¹⁷²

The problem is described in chapter 1 and restated here in the following narrative: How to address new sources of threats and risks in Europe, Slovenian commitments to collective defense, obstacles of continued political turbulence in Slovenia, and structural problems of the SAF as a result of decade-long resources deprivation, in order to allow operational approach for development of a capable and ready armed force that will meet national and international (NATO) security requirements.

The primary research question is focused on the best practices of the U.S. Army professional body of knowledge applied to solving complex problems. The army design methodology is a professional model, developed by CGSC faculty, and is the current doctrinal approach of the joint community, Army, and the Marine Corps.¹⁷³ Exploiting

¹⁷² RTVSLO, “Pripravljenost Slovenske vojske” [Readiness of the Slovenian Armed Forces], 5 April 2019.

¹⁷³ HQDA, ATP 5-0.1, May 2012.

the opportunity to be a student at the CGSC, the ADM will be applied to address the situation in Slovenia. The primary research question therefore shapes the focus of the thesis on the operational design to identify, understand, and confront problems to allow transition of the SAF from its current state to the desired future state.

To answer the primary research question, five secondary research questions were developed. They are focused on the following set of problems which the Government, Mod, and the SAF will have to confront adaptation to the new sources of the threats and risks in Europe; reach public consensus about changed security environment and the importance of the defense system; understand the role of the Slovenian strategic position in NATO's 360-Degree operational framework; and development of the affordable defense plan and continuity in its execution; Improvement of the recruitment and retention.

Research Process

The first secondary research question is how did sources of threats and risks change European security environment since 2014? To answer this, the author conducted research on the background of the European security environment based on applied professional case study methods. With the wide range of sources, research was narrowed to the new sources of threats and risks in Europe after 2014. The sources used were doctrine, annual publications of recognized world institutes, statistical data of governments, and world media coverage of the events. A variety of sources guaranteed that the process was studied from more than one point of view and eliminated possible biases. The same approach applies for other questions.

The second question is do the strategic communications of the Slovenian Government properly inform Slovenian population about the national and international security environment? The question verified the performance of the Slovenian strategic communications in informing the population about changed security environments in Europe. The sources used were Slovenian policy documents and studies to explain the role of the strategic communications and public opinion surveys to identify perceptions of the Slovenians about security in different time periods.

The third question is how can Slovenia contribute to NATO's 360-Degree Approach? To answer, the author conducted extensive research of NATO defense policy and planning processes. The research was narrowed to adaptations of the Alliance after Russian aggression actions in Ukraine (2014) as a basis to explore Slovenian strategic positions in a newly developed framework. Sources used were unclassified NATO publications, studies of the NATO War College, Slovenian policy documents, and press conferences of the SAF.

The fourth question is how can the MoD develop a sustainable defense plan for the SAF? The purpose of the question is to identify if the Slovenian defense policy (i.e., the Defense Act and national strategies) can be adjusted to change with the European security environment and provide sufficient guidance to develop an affordable defense plan. Extensive research included a vast majority of the Slovenian defense policy documents, plans, and reports adopted since its independence in 1991.

The last question is how does SAF's current human resource management practices contribute to national and collective defense? The purpose of the question was to identify structural problems of the SAF after almost ten years' deprivation of the

financial resources. Sources used were annual MoD reports over the last ten years and the press conference of the Chief of the General Staff. To support questions 2-4, separate analysis was done on the defense expenditure comparing world trends, NATO-members' defense spending and Slovenian defense spending. Sources used were annual publications of recognized institutes, NATO, and Slovenian MoD annual reports.

Qualitative Methodology and Applied Professional Case Study

Qualitative methodology is appropriate for this research. According to Creswell, case studies are a qualitative method and are useful for conducting research about problems that are human-centric, dynamic, volatile, and contain a mix of stakeholders, interests, variables, and information concepts that demand a deep understanding of context in order to produce informed policy choices.¹⁷⁴

Case studies are appropriate and useful when the goal of the research is to inform or persuade policy makers about the rich and deep context of a setting associated with complex human issues where the goal is to take informed action to improve the situation. They make an explicit trade-off in favor of making informed policy choices in a strictly defined setting over the purpose of generating broad theoretical knowledge that has a wide applicability beyond the boundaries of the chosen setting.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁴ John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*, 4th edition, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc), quoted in Kenneth Long, *Emerging Best Practices from Professional Case Study Research*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, September 2016), 1.

¹⁷⁵ Dawson R. Hancock, Bob Algozzine, *Doing case study research: A practical guide for beginning researchers*, 2nd edition (New York: Teachers College Press); Yves-Chantal Gagnon, *The case study as research method: A practical handbook*. (Quebec, Canada: Presses de l'Universite du Quebec), quoted in Kenneth Long, *Emerging Best Practices from Professional Case Study Research*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC, September 2016), 1.

Dr. Kenneth Long, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, developed a method that meets research and professional standards. It is aimed at practical making improvements in the professional domain, and it is persuasive to chief decision makers. Long calls this method, “applied professional case study” (APCS) and explains that the method follows qualitative research tradition and improves theoretical concepts and practices. It is informed by action research (learning by doing in the self-directed community of practice), by mixed methods (gather the data with an appropriate method respecting norms and standards), and uses professional models.¹⁷⁶

Applied Professional Case Study and Research Model of the Thesis

In accordance with the Defense Act, the Chief of the General Staff is the highest military authority in Slovenia, responsible for the readiness of the SAF. Criteria for the readiness are determined in the Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme (long-term defense plan). The Minister of Defense, however, is responsible to provide the conditions (human, materiel, and financial resources).

In accordance with the current situation (see chapter 1), a key concern of the Chief of the General Staff is how to persuade the Minister to provide the minimal conditions that would allow the SAF to reach required readiness (by the instrument of military advice). The APCS informs decision-making by providing descriptions and recommends a policy by persuasion, reason, and evidence that incorporates professional

¹⁷⁶ Kenneth Long, “Research Methods Seminar: Case Studies in the MMAS Program,” (lecture, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2015)

models (ADM), and therefore represents the ideal methodology for this thesis, which its purpose is to inform the Chief of the General Staff.¹⁷⁷

Army design methodology (ADM) is a process for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. It allows changing a complex problem into a structured problem. It consists of determining the current state, the desired future state, problems that prevent transition directly to the future state, approaches to bypass problems, and moving to the future state.

Table 9. Army Design Methodology Applied for Slovenian Case		
Current State	Problem	Future state
Chapter 1	Changed security environment in Europe since 2014 Reassurance to collective defense Continued political turbulence in Slovenia Internal problems of the SAF	Ready and capable force which will meet national and collective defense security requirements
Operational Approach		

Source: Created by author.

One of the features of the APCS is the iterative nature of the research. The researcher and the committee go through a series of iterative checks that allow for a review and an update of the research questions of the preliminary findings, initial insights, and the possibility for other excursions for the research to follow. The APSC

¹⁷⁷ Long, “Research Methods Seminar: Case Studies in the MMAS Program.”

offers two formal opportunities for the committee to evaluate the critical thinking skills and preferences of the researcher. The researcher describes the pre-research position in chapter 1 (R1). This enables the committee to look for biases and assumptions that could affect the research. The committee uses that to ensure the literature review and subsequent analyses challenge the pre-research bias and assumptions in order to improve the research process. In chapter 4, the R1 position will be compared to the R2 position, in which the researcher updates his recommendations based on analysis.¹⁷⁸ The following approach to conduct the research was developed by the author.

Table 10. Approach to the conduct of the Research				
Ch. 1 Introduction	Ch. 2 Literature Review	Ch. 3 Methodology	Ch. 4 Findings	Ch. 5 Recommendation
Background, Starting Position	Starting position evaluated through security environment, strategic communications, and public opinion, commitments to NATO, mission of the SAF, readiness of the SAF, defense spending		Informed position	
R1 Initial Personal Recommendation	Persuasive professional relevant sources	Applied professional case study	R2 The updated individual recommendation compared to R1	Recommendation for findings Research questions for future research Reflective learning

Source: Created by author.

¹⁷⁸ Long, “Research Methods Seminar: Case Studies in the MMAS Program.”

In summary, this chapter provides the background and description of the APSC used to answer the primary and secondary research questions. It explains the rationale behind the selection of the army design methodology and main themes of the literature review of chapter 2. Finally, this chapter lays out the framework that leads to the analysis chapter.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

Introduction

This research was conducted using two different processes used by the U.S. Army. One is a true research methodology. The other is used as a problem solving approach for complex, ill-defined problems. The first is known as the Applied Professional Case Study (APCS). One of the characteristics of APCS is it was designed as an iterative, discovery-learning approach to inquiry and is specifically tied to the other process which is Army Design Methodology (ADM). Because ADM is used for complex uncertain problems, it is not unusual to see reshaping and refocusing of various aspects of the inquiry combined with coordination between the researcher and the committee. This can take many forms such as adding sections to the literature review, changing the description of the current state, refining the problem statement as various operational approaches are assessed, or even changing the desired future state. This was the experience of the researcher for this thesis.

During one iteration with the committee it was determined that the problem statement had to be updated based on the literature review. After that change to the problem statement it became apparent that no operational approach that was suitable, feasible and acceptable existed as a solution to the revised problem statement. What began in this research as a straightforward tactical level problem morphed into a complex strategic level multi-threaded problem. The problem statement morphed as more and more complications were revealed through an expanded literature review. After several hundred hours of analysis, the researcher could not find a reasonable operational

approach to address the newly emerged problem statement to achieve the working definition of the reasonable future state. In the assessment of the committee and the researcher, what had been defined as a reasonable future state should be revisited through a whole-of-government approach that addressed all of the elements of national power and avoided continued adoption of incremental tactical military design solutions. The committee decided that the researcher should pursue a deeper understanding and description of the operational environment rather than working on the tactical margins. Each of the ADM elements therefore underwent considerable update and revision through the course of this research.

Findings

Based on the information above an important and, perhaps central, finding of this thesis is the need for an updated definition of the problem statement because the committee deemed all conventional operational approaches were designed to solve strictly military problems and updated problem statement expanded this research out of the military only sphere. The four-part updated problem statement therefore is an important finding and recommendation from this research.

The complex set of challenges that rendered conventional operational approaches insufficient is an additional important set of findings in the opinion of the committee. Each of these challenges individually represents one variable that should be or could be addressed at the national strategic level to reassess the reasonable future state. Taken in combination, the collection of variables meets the definition of a complex problem that, in the opinion of the committee and researcher, could be appropriately addressed through another round of design methodology or similarly expansive transformational problem-

solving process. These variables, uncovered by and supported by the analysis of the literature include: the economic challenges of increasing spending to NATO standards; willingness of NATO to relax spending goals for member nations; challenges with growing the GDP sufficiently to accommodate required spending levels to meet a two Battalion task force structure; the budgetary facts that the national defense budget is €450 million while the required two Battalion task forces require €1.2 billion just to meet those NATO force structure needs; the civilian populations' satisfaction with the current level of defense readiness in spite of the real challenges driven by an increased rate of legal and illegal immigration and border crossing; the lack of continuity among political leaders at the national level; the frequency of turnover of senior military and defense leaders at the national level. Taken collectively these variables present a challenge greater than can be solved through conventional tactical military redesign approaches. The rest of chapter 4 addresses these findings in detail as supported by the literature review.

This typical iterative and emerging approach, described above, is characteristic of the APCS and is further discussed in an appendix provided by the committee.

Sources of Threats and Risks in Europe Since 2014

The security situation in Europe has changed significantly in the last 5 years and, if unaddressed, has the potential to seriously endanger the European way of life and possibly escalate to Large Scale Combat Operations. Three specific sources of threats and increased risks to Europe have escalated since 2014. Those threats and risks are: Russian Tolerance Warfare and Hybrid Warfare; a shift of violent Islamic fundamentalism from the Middle East to Europe's major cities; and mass migration flows with potential to threaten the way of life of European nations.

Russian Threats to Eastern Flank of NATO

An external military threat from Russia on the eastern flank of the Alliance significantly disturbed international peace, stability, and security. During NATO's engagement in counterinsurgency operations (2001-2014), Russia built a respectable military apparatus which outguns, outreaches and outnumbers the Alliance's military capabilities. Russian actions, often just short of war, were aimed to change existent World order and increase Russia's sphere of influence. This is known as Tolerance Warfare. Russian strategy is based on neutralizing NATO's conventional deterrence and the systematic use of military, paramilitary and civilian means to increase its influence on the eastern flank of NATO. These actions are known as Hybrid Warfare. Modern Russian armed forces with professionalized and modernized airborne troops can be recognized as an attempt to form expeditionary units which are ideal to invade countries after Hybrid Warfare prepared the conditions for successful Russian incursions.¹⁷⁹

There is a high probability of continued Russian Tolerance and Hybrid warfare, which will further threaten European peace, security and stability. Outside the borders of the Alliance there is also a high probability that Russia will use military means for limited objectives if those objectives cannot be achieved by non-military means. Russia may pursue the goal of increasing the area of influence. If this situation is unaddressed, it could escalate to Large-Scale Combat Operations through ambivalence to Russian aggression in the beginning stages. This would create a new set of problems for NATO and the member nations.

¹⁷⁹ Research and References in chapter 2 (Security Situation in Europe since 2014, Russian Tolerance and Hybrid Warfare).



Figure 3. Russian Anti-Access Area Denial Line

Source: Created by author (map from Google Maps).

Violent Islamic Fundamentalism Expansion

Violent Islamic fundamentalism has moved from the Middle East to Europe.

Brutal terrorist attacks have shocked people in European cities with more than 400 people killed, and thousands injured since 2014. In the last five years there were multiple attacks of different forms and on different targets including the media, town squares and sport stadiums. These attacks were attacks on freedom of speech, public gathering and free movement. In the last two years multiple attacks have occurred against the Christian churches, especially in France and Germany. These attacks are attacks on freedom of religion. All of these attacks are against European and Western values linked to human

rights. Respect and protection of fundamental human rights are the basis of the European societies and characterize the way of life of the European nations. Protecting the way of life is a fundamental national interest. Currently the European way of life is seriously endangered.¹⁸⁰

Mass migrations from the Middle East and Northern Africa have changed the demographics of the European nations. German population grew by more than 4 million in the last four years and currently foreign citizens represent more than 10% percent of the population of 82 million people. Integration of the migrants is and will be a genuine problem.¹⁸¹ EU politics about migrations, especially quotas, is not respected by several member nations. Because of the various migrations over this four-year period nationalist movements developed, and rightist political parties have gained political power.¹⁸² Marginalization of the migrants could further encourage hatred and increase tensions, criminal activities, and terrorism.

Ability of the Slovenian Strategic Communications to Explain the New Security Environment

In a previous chapter the assumption was confirmed that the security environment in Europe changed significantly after 2014. The logical question follows: How successful were Slovenian government strategic communications at explaining the new security

¹⁸⁰ Research and References in chapter 2 (Security Situation in Europe since 2014, Terrorist Attacks).

¹⁸¹ Research and References in chapter 2 (Security Situation in Europe since 2014, Migration Flows).

¹⁸² Research and References in chapter 2 (Security Situation in Europe since 2014, Divided Europe).

environment and the importance of the defense system to the Slovenian people? This is an important question because the defense system suffered radical budget cuts since 2010. The Slovenian GDP is currently (May 2019) higher than it was before the economic crisis. However, the defense budget did not return to pre-recession levels (see Table 6).

The performance of strategic communications was analyzed through Public Opinion Surveys done in 2012 and 2016. The results are concerning. In general, Slovenians felt safer in 2016 than in 2012 even after the aggressive actions of the Russians in 2014, the most brutal terrorist attacks in 2015, and the migration of refugees in 2015.¹⁸³ In 2016 76% of Slovenians believed that migration flows were a serious threat to national security as opposed to only 27.2% of respondents in 2012. However, a majority of Slovenians still perceived external military threats and terrorism as not significant (see Appendix A).

This analysis indicates the Slovenian Government and defense system must improve at explaining the nature of the changed security environment. All plans to mitigate new sources of threats and risks must be communicated to the Slovenian public in advance of changes to the military structure or budget. Since public consensus influences politicians and government spending, Slovenians must understand the threats to Slovenian, European and North Atlantic security. The sources of risk and security threats must be addressed nationally and through fair partnership in the Alliance. Credibility of the nation is seriously challenged at the current spending levels.

¹⁸³ Analysis of Public Surveys is available in chapter 2 (Slovenian Strategic Communications and Public Opinion about Security)

Slovenian Strategic Position and NATO's 360-Degree Framework

In the current security environment Slovenia has an important strategic position due to geography. Slovenia offers the shortest and the most convenient routes from Central Europe to the Adriatic Coast. It is also the best route from eastern and south eastern Europe to the Apennine Peninsula. Accordingly, Slovenia's strategic position plays a key role in NATO's 360-Degree Framework. The geography of Slovenia allows rapid transportation of troops and materiel to eastern and south-eastern strategic directions. The distances from the Port of Koper to the Baltics are similar to those from Ports of Rotterdam (Netherlands) or Bremerhaven (Germany). However, the Port of Koper is much closer to the coast of the Black Sea.¹⁸⁴

Slovenian participation in collective defense should be equally focused on development of military capabilities and Host Nation Support functions in situations where rapid deployment of the allied troops is necessary. Host Nation Support functions are even more important considering the latest open source information indicates Slovenia cannot reach its military capability targets until 2030. Slovenia could capitalize on this situation. After the Brussels Summit the EU has an important role in military mobility during any conflict. Because of this expanded role and need for mobility Slovenia could gain substantial EU resources for development of its transportation

¹⁸⁴ Research and References in chapter 2 (Security Situation in Europe since 2014, Slovenian Strategic Position and NATO Defense Policy and Defense Planning Process, Slovenian Role in Allied 360-Degree Framework).

infrastructure, especially railroad networks, in support to NATO's 360-Degree Framework.¹⁸⁵




Figure 4. NATO 360-Degree Approach and Slovenian Strategic Position

Source: Created by author (map from Google Maps).

Strategic Communications will be essential for Slovenia to provide the best possible Host Nation Support in a crisis situation. The Government should clearly explain that promoting NATO's military mobility is not degrading Slovenia's sovereignty but enhancing the partnership and the collective defense of the alliance. By using the Port of

¹⁸⁵ Research and References in chapter 2 (NATO Defense Policy and Defense Planning Process, NATO Defense Policy in Changed Security Environment, Slovenian Security Policy and Defense Policy and Planning since Independence).

Koper for military transports and simultaneously developing the railroad network (with EU resources) the changes would boost the Slovenian economy while contributing to international defense through NATO.

Slovenian Defense Plan

The recent economic recession weakened the defense systems of the European NATO members. Macroeconomic concerns took priority over defense. In 2014, however, European members became aware that weakened defense cannot deter Russia. In Wales (2014), the leadership of member nations committed to revert the decreasing trend of the defense spending. Two years later (in Warsaw), under pressure from the USA, they committed again to redouble their efforts to increase financial resources for defense. The majority of NATO members increased spending, and at the end of 2018 defense expenditure of the average European NATO member equaled 1.5% of the GDP. Unfortunately, Slovenia didn't follow the trend. Its defense spending in 2018 equaled 1.02% of the GDP, which is the fourth lowest in the Alliance. Slovenia's 8.2% share for equipping is the lowest in NATO.¹⁸⁶

Strategic Communications will be important to reach public consensus that NATO is about deterrence, if deterrence fails, NATO will rely on collective defense. Deterrence can only work if member states will reach minimal levels of ambitions set by the Alliance. In accordance with the principle of fair burden sharing, minimal ambitions are translated to capability targets and become part of the national defense plans.

¹⁸⁶ Research and References in chapter 2 (Defense Expenditure, Trends in Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries and Slovenian Defense Expenditure).

Thereafter it is the commitment of the member nation to reach stated capability targets.

The credibility of Slovenia depends on accomplishing commitments and therefore appropriate resources will be needed for capability building.

The National Security Strategy was adopted in 2010, the National Defense Strategy in 2012 and the Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2025 (long-term defense plan) in 2010.¹⁸⁷ Slovenian national and security defense policy should be updated to contemporary security environment. Policy needs to provide guidance to develop affordable defense plan.

The Defense Act adopted in 1994 (ten years before accession of Slovenia to NATO) doesn't have a mechanism for implementation of the Defense Plan. The Parliament adopted a long-term defense plan in 2010, at the beginning of the recession in Slovenia. The governments after 2010 adopted mid-term plans, which were resource driven and delayed capability building. In accordance with the long-term defense plan two battalion groups are the Slovenian commitment for national and collective defense. Unfortunately, due to the budget constraints Slovenia couldn't reach its capability targets.¹⁸⁸

The Defense Act needs to be updated and provide an implementation mechanism for the defense plan, which will allow continuity in-between governments. It is important

¹⁸⁷ Research and References in chapter 2 (Slovenian Security Policy and Defense Policy and Planning since Independence, Fourth Period).

¹⁸⁸ Research and References in chapter 2 (Slovenian Security Policy and Defense Policy and Planning since Independence).

that Slovenian defense planning is synchronized with the NATO Defense Planning Process. Accordingly, the Defense Act should determine four years cycles which would plan for 7-19 years (Mid-term NATO Planning). In that way, political commitments in NATO would be translated to the defense plan, adopted by the Slovenian Parliament on every four years pursuing mid and long-term capability targets. The execution (resourcing) of the defense plan place an obligation on all succeeding Slovenian governments.

Slovenian Armed Forces Personnel Management Practices

In 2018, Slovenia spent 72% of the defense budget for personnel (salaries, pensions), which is the highest in NATO. Unfortunately, that resources seem insufficient to recruit or retain young soldiers. In 2011 the SAF had more than 3,340 soldiers in paygrades E1-E4, in May 2019 only 2,509, which means that the armed force lost 1/4 of young soldiers in the last 8 years. The trend is even more concerning. In the last 17 months (1 January 2018 – May 2019) the SAF lost 356 personnel in analyzed paygrades, which is almost 3 times more than in the two-year period 2016-2017. Low recruitment and retention of young soldiers also caused the SAF to become an old organization. The average age of the SAF's members grew from 36.5 to 40.9 years and the average age of E1-E4 soldiers from 26.62 to 34.1 years in 2010-2017 time period.¹⁸⁹

The main reason for low recruitment and retention is probably the salary. In 2008 starting payment of the Slovenian soldier in E1 paygrade meant more than 90% of the

¹⁸⁹ Research and References in chapter 2 (The Slovenian Armed Forces, Human Resources of the SAF).

average payment on the national level, in 2018 pay equity shrank to only 55% of the national average. The assumption about the salary can be substantiated by a fact that NATO members with similar size of the armed force as Slovenia (Croatia, Lithuania) had to increase the starting payments of the E1 soldiers to improve recruitment and retention.¹⁹⁰

Personnel and equipping issues are the main reason for negative Readiness evaluation of the SAF in the last 6 years¹⁹¹ and should establish a sense of urgency among politicians, defense and military experts. General increases of the salaries will be difficult because members of the SAF are part of the unified payment system of the Slovenian Public Service. Payment increases of certain cohorts (for example SAF's members) cascades into demands for increases of other cohorts (for example police and custom officers, medical personnel, teachers, etc.) The Defense Act needs to be updated and determine financial benefits in addition to the basic payment or even separate the SAF from unified payment system. Competencies and achieved standards of the soldiers should be rewarded. If the competencies and standards were directly connected to capability targets, multiple effects could be achieved: higher recruitment and retention, motivation and combat readiness of the unit. Other financial benefits already determined by the Act should be reevaluated and determined transparently in order to promote recruitment and retention.

¹⁹⁰ Research and References in chapter 2 (The Slovenian Armed Forces, Human Resources of the SAF).

¹⁹¹ Readiness is explored in chapter 2 (The Slovenian Armed Forces, Readiness of the SAF for National and Collective Defense)

Army Design Methodology in the SAF

Army Design Methodology is an ideal model for Slovenia to develop an operational approach which will allow transition of the SAF to the desired future state. There should be multiple independent teams from different parts of the defense and education system which would apply the method along with creative and critical thinking to develop operational designs. Each design would be reported in a conference, which would allow collaborative dialog among the researchers and establish a basis for development of a common design. The common design could be a proposal for the White Book of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia.

Updated Personal Recommendation (R2)

R1 (Initial, chapter 1): Slovenia should develop an Action Plan to enable Strategic Communications, which will enlighten Slovenians about the changed security environment, strategic position of Slovenia and the importance of the defense system. This will justify the increase of defense spending and allow capability building.

R2 (Updated): Strategic communications will be the Center of Gravity of the defense reform needed to develop ready and capable SAF, which will meet all national and NATO security requirements.

Public consensus will be needed in the following areas:

1. Acknowledging the fact that European security is seriously endangered and could lead to large scale combat operations or threaten the European way of life.
2. Slovenia needs to be a credible partner in the Alliance. In accordance with fair burden sharing, Slovenia must reassure commitments of collective defense.

3. NATO's 360-Degree framework is an opportunity for Slovenia to exploit its strategic position and gain EU resources for its transportation infrastructure.

R1 (Initial, chapter 1): Slovenia should improve conditions for military mobility and therefore contribute to collective security. Host nation support, which will allow rapid deployment of NATO troops, is as important as military capabilities of the SAF for collective defense. Slovenia should update its defense policy, especially the Defense Act, and determine a planning cycle for capability-building, which would be synchronized with NATO's Defense Planning Process. NATO's concepts, especially the Framework Nation Concept, should become integral part of the Slovenian defense policy and reflected in its defense plans. Slovenia should develop a package of norms to stimulate retention and recruitment.

R2 (Updated): Complexity of the problem is so high that individual actions mitigating one side of the problem cannot contribute to the desired future state. The White Book of the Defense must be the basis for a defense reform, which would establish capable and ready armed forces of a small nation and a credible partner in the Alliance.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations about Findings

The purpose of this Thesis is to inform the Chief of the General Staff. Findings and Analysis could be important in military advice to the Minister of Defense for the White Book. Key concern of the Chief of Defense is readiness of the force which cannot be reached under current personnel, materiel and financial conditions. Those resources must be provided by the Government in accordance with the defense plan adopted by the Parliament. The White Book will also be adopted by the politicians.

There must be an awareness that the White Book of Defense could (in degraded security environment in Europe) recommend lowering the ambitions of the defense plan and therefor artificially establish the conditions for positive readiness evaluation. By the Constitution the Defense Act is adopted by 2/3 majority of the vote in the Parliament. Defense Act determines that the Chief of the General Staff is the highest military expert authority in Slovenia and therefor main stakeholder in decision what is the capable force for national and collective defense.

This Thesis recommends ADM as a method of developing the White Book. It also visualizes certain solutions. Small team composed of the Author and the Committee cannot validate the solutions, however, recommended method as a doctrinal model for solving a complex problem should pass the scrutiny of the decision-makers in Slovenia.

Research Questions for Future Researcher

The Thesis provides one possible operational approach which visualizes solutions to allow the SAF to transition to the desired future state. It is a concept and not detailed plan. Scope is wide and will need additional conceptual planning. Two problems are especially important: complacency of Slovenians about security environment and failure of the Slovenia to reach the commitments to the Alliance. Two research questions are therefore proposed for further research:

1. How can the Slovenian Ministry of Defense inform the population about the degraded security environment in Europe and reach public consensus about the importance of the defense system?
2. How can Slovenia exploit its strategic position to act as a credible partner in the Alliance and promote military mobility in EU?

Slovenia is a small country, with a strategic position in Central Europe and complex, in majority restricted terrain. The mission of the SAF is to execute military defense independently or in cooperation with the allies. Current state guides to the assumption that development of separate capabilities for national and collective defense is not affordable. Accordingly, two researched questions can be proposed for follow-on research:

1. How can Slovenian Armed Forces meet the capability requirements for national defense and meet collective defense international agreements within the current fiscal environment?
2. How can Slovenia use NATO Framework Nation Concept and with a larger ally form a Coherent Forces compatible and complementary by design?

Personal Reflection

Author graduated on Defense Studies (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana) in 2003 and finished Officer School in 2004. From 2004 – 2014 he worked on a tactical level and during that time finished a couple of tactical and career courses in Slovenia and in the USA (Airborne School, Ranger School, Mortar Leader Course, Maneuver Captains Career Course and Joint Firepower Course). From 2014 to 2017 he worked on Strategic Level (General Staff) and from 2017 till reported to CGSC on the Operational Level (Force Command). Defense budget cuts began in 2011, which means that he was able to observe influence of the decreased defense spending on all three levels of the organization.

In 1996, he served as a conscript in the SAF. From 2004 – 2014 he led conventional and unconventional units to the company level and had staff positions in battalion, brigade, Force Command and General Staff. Author's officer career coincides with the Slovenian membership in NATO. In 2006 he was deployed to Afghanistan. Accordingly, from 1996 he was able to observe all four periods of the Slovenian defense policy and planning.

Attending the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) proved very important for the author. The U. S. Army has clear expectations about the role of Field Grade Officers and the school curriculum is focused on the competencies needed to successfully perform that role. The last four years of his career the Author spent at the strategic and operational level, where his focus was on the live fire training of the SAF. As a leader of a small team, he was forced to think critically and creatively in developing

standards, ammunition tables, ranges, and solving other problems. Problem solving, however, was limited to action research (document learning by doing).

The CGSC provided the framework for systematical critical and creative thinking in solving complex problems, which can be summarized in the following points:

1. Difference between conceptual and detailed planning.
2. Identifying and understanding the problem as an essential element of problem solving.
3. Case studies of previous problems connected to historical examples.
4. Applying best practices from the profession knowledge body.
5. Development of the solutions, which are system and process oriented.

This Thesis reflects lessons learned in the CGSC. The researched problem is complex and addressed with different approaches in the last 10 years, unfortunately, it is still unsolved. The research tries to analyze the problem from different perspectives and offers an operational approach in order to visualize solutions.

The Author had a privilege to serve with extraordinary people in the Special Forces, 1st Brigade, Force Command and the General Staff. He learned a lot from them, especially from Non-Commissioned Officers, who had to execute the tasks with very limited financial, materiel and human resources. Critical and creative thinking was first learned from them, and only improved by the CGSC. Many ideas in this Thesis were developed as a result of their competencies and especially common sense. This Thesis is therefore tribute for their work. The Author is confident that the problem will be solved by many competent people in the SAF and for the sake of the Slovenian national security.

APPENDIX A

SLOVENIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON SECURITY (2012, 2016)

Table 11. Analysis of the Factors which Threaten Slovenia (March-May 2012)						
Question		Significantly	Medium	Little	Nothing	I don't know
How much the following factors threaten Slovenia	Military Threats	1,8%	7,6%	21,0%	64,0%	5,5%
		9,5%		85,0%		5,5%
	Terrorism	3,6%	11,9%	30,0%	50,0%	4,5%
		15,5%		80,0%		4,5%
	Cyber Attacks	8,5%	28,8%	33,9%	11,3%	17,4%
		37,3%		45,3%		17,4%
	Refugees and Illegal Immigrants	7,8%	19,3%	41,9%	24,6%	6,4%
		27,2%		66,4%		6,4%
	Destruction of Nature	29,8%	44,2%	21,5%	2,9%	1,6%
		74,0%		24,4%		1,6%
	Natural and Technological Disasters	16,8%	41,2%	32,5%	7,4%	2,1%
		58,0%		39,8%		2,1%
	Privatization of Public Property	49,6%	27,2%	14,1%	3,5%	5,6%
		76,8%		17,6%		5,6%
	Traffic Accidents	25,5%	42,2%	24,7%	4,8%	2,8%
		67,7%		29,5%		2,8%
	Criminal, Corruption	62,5%	27,0%	7,3%	1,3%	2,0%
		89,5%		8,5%		2,0%
	Drugs	33,9%	34,8%	23,3%	3,2%	4,7%
		68,8%		26,5%		4,7%

Source: Created by author using data from Social Science Data Archives, SJM121.

Table 12. Analysis of the Factors which Threaten Slovenia (Nov. 2015-April 2016)						
Question		Significantly	Medium	Little	Nothing	I don't know
How much the following factors threaten Slovenia	Military Threats	14,8%	30,4%	38,7%	15,0%	1,1%
		45,2%		53,7%		1,1%
	Terrorism	16,5%	31,3%	38,0%	13,2%	1,0%
		47,9%		51,2%		1,0%
	Cyber Attacks	8,6%	29,1%	34,3%	11,4%	17,6%
		37,7%		45,7%		17,6%
	Refugees and Illegal Immigrants	33,9%	42,1%	20,2%	3,2%	0,6%
		76,0%		23,4%		0,6%
	Destruction of Nature	10,6%	38,0%	39,6%	11,4%	0,4%
		48,6%		51,0%		0,4%
	Natural and Technological Disasters	13,7%	34,6%	40,0%	10,7%	1,0%
		48,2%		50,8%		1,0%

Source: Social Science Data Archives, SJM121.

APPENDIX B

KEY DECISIONS AND INITIATIVES IN NATO SUMMITS

Table 13. Key Decisions of NATO Summit in Wales (2014)	
NATO READINESS (READINESS ACTION PLAN)	The Readiness Action Plan was adopted to make NATO forces more responsive, better trained and better equipped to respond to the changes in security environment. Reassurance measures will strengthen Alliance's commitment to collective defence and will be stepping up efforts in areas such as cyber defence and maritime security.
RENEWED COMMITMENT TO FUNDAMENTAL VALUES AND PRINCIPLES	Reiterated commitment to fundamental principles and core values laid out in the Washington Treaty, especially the principle of collective defence (Article 5) and the need to maintain and develop capacity to resist armed attack (Article 3). Basis for that are adequate financial resources for military capabilities in addition to already adopted initiatives which reduced running costs.
THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE AND RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA	All practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia suspended, while leaving channels open for dialogue on the situation in Ukraine. Intensified cooperation with Ukraine.
RELATIONS WITH PARTNERS AND NATO'S OPEN DOOR POLICY	Preserve the benefits of the experience gained in working together during the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan. In the context of NATO enlargement, NATO reiterated the right of each country to choose its own security arrangements.
AFGHANISTAN – NATO'S LONGEST COMBAT MISSION	From 2015, NATO will remain committed to Afghanistan through the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership (2010), the Afghan National Army Trust Fund and a follow-on mission – Resolute Support.

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Wales Summit Guide,” 3 September 2014, accessed 10 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20141008_140108-SummitGuideWales2014-eng.pdf.

Table 14. Smart Defense and Connected Forces Initiative	
SMART DEFENSE	Initiative was launched because of global recession and cuts in Defense Spending. It's about generating modern defence capabilities that the Alliance needs in a more cost-efficient manner. Allies are encouraged to work together to develop, acquire, operate and maintain military capabilities to undertake the Alliance's core tasks. Prioritization: aligning national capability priorities with those of NATO. Specialization by design: members concentrate on their national strengths and coordinate budget cuts with Allies. Cooperation: nations develop capabilities which they could not afford individually.
CONNECTED FORCES INITIATIVE	Enhance high level of interconnectedness and interoperability through: a. NATO education, training, exercise, and evaluation (IEEE): linking national and NATO exercises; b. NATO training concept 2015-2020; c. High-visibility Exercise: Trident Juncture; d. Technology enabling interoperability; e. Special Operations Component Command HQ under SACEUR.

Source: Created by author. Information gathered: NATO, *Smart Defense*, 22 June 2016, accessed 11 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm?selectedLocale=en. NATO, *Connected Forces Initiative*, 22 June 2016, accessed 11 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_98527.htm?selectedLocale=en

Table 15. Assurance and Adaptation Measures of the RAP	
ASSURANCE MEASURES	Since May 2014, NATO has increased the number of fighter jets on air-policing patrols over the Baltic States, and deployed fighter jets to Romania and Poland. The Alliance conducts regular airborne early warning surveillance flights over the territory of its eastern Allies, and maritime patrol aircraft flights along the eastern borders of Allied territory. To provide assurance at sea, NATO deploys several multinational maritime forces (Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Group patrolling the Baltic Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, enlarged Standing NATO Maritime Group conducting maritime assurance measures in addition to counter-terrorism patrols). NATO has increased the number of exercises. These exercises take place on land, at sea and in the air with scenarios based on collective defence and crisis management.
ADAPTATION MEASURES	Enhanced NATO Response Force: enlarged to about forty thousand personnel (before thirteen thousand). Establishment of Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF or “spearhead force”): around twenty thousand, of which about five thousand are ground troops able to begin deployment within two to three days wherever it is needed. The VJTF is supported by air, maritime and SOF components. The VJTF participated in its first deployment exercise in Poland in June 2015 and is regularly tested during exercises. NATO Force Integration Units: small, multinational headquarters that will facilitate the rapid deployment of the VJTF and Allied follow-on forces. They are staffed by about forty national and NATO specialists. Their task is to improve cooperation and coordination between NATO and national forces, as well as to prepare and support exercises and any deployments needed. High-readiness multinational headquarters: a. The Multinational Corps Northeast Headquarters located in in Szczecin, Poland, provides a high-readiness capability to command forces deployed to the Baltic States and Poland. b. A new deployable multinational divisional headquarters for the southeast (HQ MND-SE) was inaugurated in Bucharest, Romania on 1 December 2015. The new high-readiness headquarters will be able to command forces deployed within NATO’s southeast region, supporting the defence of the Alliance. Logistics enhancements: Prepositioning of equipment and supplies to enhance NATO’s readiness. A new standing joint logistics support group headquarters will be established within the NATO Command Structure.

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Readiness Action Plan*, 21 September 2018, accessed 10 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm

Table 16. Key Decisions of NATO Summit in Warsaw	
ENHANCED FORWARD PRESENCE	Until June 2017 enhanced military presence will be established in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland with four multinational battalions on a rotational basis. Tailored forward presence for southeastern flank will be established around Romanian framework brigade (under Multinational Division Southeast), supplemented with steps to strengthen the readiness and interoperability of air and maritime forces in the Black Sea region.
TRAINING AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN IRAQ	Allies decided to start training and capacity building in Iraq, which is key to the fight against ISIL. Preparations are underway to provide strategic advice and support security sector reform.
SUPPORT FOR THE COUNTER-ISIL COALITION	Allies agreed to provide direct support to the Coalition in combating terror of the ISIL. From October 2016 NATO airborne early warning surveillance aircraft will be providing air surveillance to Coalition forces.
OPERATION SEA GUARDIAN	New maritime security operation in the Mediterranean will be launched in November 2016. It will have a broad scope, including situational awareness, counter-terrorism and capacity-building.
CYBERSPACE AS AN OPERATIONAL DOMAIN	Allies recognized cyberspace as an operational domain, joining land, air, and sea. This will enable better protection of networks, missions, and operations, with more focus on cyber training and planning. Allies also pledged to strengthen their own cyber defense.
COMMITMENT TO ENHANCE NATO'S RESILIENCE	Allies made a commitment to continue to enhance NATO's resilience and to develop capacity to resist any form of armed attack. Civil preparedness is a central pillar of Allies' resilience and a critical enabler for Alliance collective defence. Allies will improve civil preparedness by achieving the NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience, which focus on continuity of government, continuity of essential services, security of critical civilian infrastructure, and support to military forces with civilian means.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE	Allies declared Initial Operational Capability of the NATO ballistic missile defence system (U.S. ships based in Spain, the radar in Turkey, and the interceptor site in Romania can work together under NATO command and NATO control).
SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN	NATO will sustain Resolute Support Mission with training, advising and assisting the Afghan security forces beyond 2016 and contribute to their funding through 2020.
SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE	Allies endorsed a Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine, to make Ukraine's defense and security institutions more effective, efficient, and accountable. This Package includes strategic advice and assistance. New project on countering hybrid warfare will be developed.
COOPERATION WITH THE EU	A Joint Declaration identified key areas for expanding cooperation with EU, including countering hybrid and cyber threats, supporting partners in defense capacity building, and increasing maritime security.

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Warsaw Summit Key Decisions," Factsheet, February 2017, accessed 10 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_02/20170206_1702-factsheet-warsaw-summit-key-en.pdf

Table 17. Key Decisions of NATO Summit in Brussels	
FAIR BURDEN SHARING	Decade long negative trend on defence spending was reverted, however all Allies agreed to redouble their efforts to share the burden more fairly, with more financial resources, capabilities, and contributions to missions and operations.
NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE REFORM	NATO leaders agreed on a major update of the NATO Command Structure, with more than 1,200 additional personnel and two new commands. Joint Force Command for the Atlantic will be based in Norfolk, Virginia (United States), ensuring that sea lines of communication between Europe and North America remain free and secure. Enabling Command will be based in Ulm (Germany), helping to improve the movement of troops and equipment within Europe. Additionally, Cyberspace Operations Centre, in Mons (Belgium) will be part of the adapted Command Structure, which will make NATO more effective in cyberspace domain.
READINESS INITIATIVE, “FOUR THIRTIES”	NATO Readiness Initiative lays emphasis on short notice response and quick reinforcement. Allies committed to have 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 combat vessels, ready to use within 30 days or less by 2020. Initiative doesn’t mean new forces but increasing the readiness of current forces. The initiative will enhance both the Alliance’s collective defense and improve its ability to address other crises quickly.
COUNTER-HYBRID SUPPORT TEAMS	Counter-Hybrid Support Teams will be established. These teams can deploy to support national efforts in variety of areas, including cyber defense, countering disinformation or energy security.
NEW NATO MISSION IN IRAQ	New training mission was launched in Iraq, at the request of the Iraqi Government and in coordination with the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. In the fight against terrorism the best weapon is training local forces. This will be a non-combat mission, building on current efforts to train Iraqi instructors. It will help them to better fight terrorism, stabilize their country and prevent the re-emergence of ISIS.
PACKAGE ON THE SOUTH	Range of political and practical cooperation initiatives will be launched to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defense against threats from the South. Leaders also declared the Hub for the South in Naples fully operational. It will regional threats and coordinate NATO efforts. Enhanced planning and exercises will also help improve NATO’s ability to anticipate and respond to crises in the region.
FURTHER SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN	Allies reconfirmed NATO’s military, financial and political commitment to Afghanistan. It was agreed to sustain presence in Afghanistan until conditions allows changes. Allies also agreed to extend funding for the Afghan Security Forces through 2024.
ACCESSION INVITATION TO NORTH MACEDONIA	Allies made clear that NATO’s door remains open by inviting the North Macedonia to begin accession talks leading to NATO membership.
COOPERATION WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION	NATO Secretary General, presidents of the European Council, and the European Commission signed a new declaration on NATO-EU cooperation, demonstrating the desire to deepen cooperation. It will be focused military mobility, response to hybrid threats and counter terrorism.

Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Brussels Summit Key Decisions (11-12 July 2018),” Factsheet, November 2018, accessed 10 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_11/20181105_1811-factsheet-key-decisions-summit-en.pdf.

APPENDIX C

SLOVENIAN DEFENSE POLICY AND DEFENSE PLAN

Table 18. General Long-Term Program for Development and Equipping of the SAF to 2015	
SAF Development	Starting Points: Building of capabilities for Self-Defense and NATO's Collective Defense. Level of ambitions for participation in International Operations: two simultaneous medium operations (1 company on each) for 1 year or more; one large operation (1 battalion for half year), one medium operation in long period; one very large operation (all available capabilities of the SAF). Size of the War-time organization lowers immediately to 18.000 with progressive lowering to 14.000 in 2010. Integration of MoD and General-Staff. Rise of the Defense Expenditure to 2% in 2008. Structure of the SAF: Role of Forces: Combat Arms, Combat Support, Combat Service Support, Support to C2. Deployment: Deployable Forces, Undeployable Forces. Combat Readiness: High Combat Readiness Forces (Combat Ready in 90 days), Low Readiness Forces (Combat Ready in 91-180 days), Forces with longer time needed to achieve Combat Ready status (War-time organization). The SAF will have the following deployable forces in High Combat Readiness Status: three (3) maneuver battalions, SOF unit, CBRN battalion, elements of Artillery Bn, Rotary Wing Bn, MP Bn and CSS Bn. Maneuver Battalions will achieve Combat Ready status in 2006, 2007 in 2008; CBRN battalion in 2009.
Equipping Program and Infrastructure	Priorities for procurement: Systems: 135 x Medium Armored Wheeled Vehicles with integrated gun systems, 85 x Light Armored Wheeled Vehicles for Maneuver Bn, MP Bn, CBRN Bn, 3 x ADA batteries, Systems for Air Control, CBRN Systems, Engineer Systems, 400 x terrain vehicles, 400 x trucks, 140 x vehicles for enabling mobility, C2 Systems, Infantry Weapons. Infrastructure: Airport Cerklje in accordance with NATO standards. Training Systems: Infantry Simulators, Indoor and Outdoor Ranges, revitalization of Maribor barracks for TRADOC. Barracks: 13 barracks of the SAF were determined as perspective for future development.
Personnel	Wartime organization will be progressively lowered to 14,000 members until 2010, with a Contractual Reserve (like the U.S. National Guard) counting 5,500 members, and Active Duty 8,500 (including civilians). In 2003, active duty counted 6.376 personnel; plan was to recruit 600 personnel in 2004, 400 in 2005, and 1,100 in years from 2006-2010


Table 18. General Long-Term Program for Development and Equipping of the SAF to 2015	
Priorities	- Bn and Bn group with combat support and logistics; - CBRN battalion, - Communications, - Education and training system, - Intelligence, - Human Resources for NATO structures. In addition: - C2, - Vertical maneuver, tactical transport, - Air defense, - NCO corps.

Source: Official Gazette of RS, *General Long-Term Program for Development and Equipping of the SAF*, Vol. XIV, No. 89, 12 August 2001, p. 9365-9370, accessed 31 March 2019, https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2004/Ur/u2004089.pdf.

Table 19. Investments of the SAF in Infrastructure and Equipment (2005-2010)		
Year	Infrastructure and Equipment	Description
2005	Reconstruction of Airport Cerklje	Military Airport and HN Infrastructure
	6x6 Light Armored Vehicle Valuk	Combat Vehicles
	Mobile Hospital ROLE 2	Medical Equipment
	Terrain Vehicles, Trucks	Transport Vehicles
2006	Reconstruction of Airport Cerklje	Military Airport and HN Infrastructure
	6x6 Light Armored Vehicle Valuk	Combat Vehicles
	AR, LMG, GPMG, sniper rifle	Individual and Crew-Served Weapons
	ATGM Spike, RGW	Anti-Tank Weapons
2007	Reconstruction of Airport Cerklje	Military Airport and HN Infrastructure
	Range Vipava	Range for Personal and Individual Weapons
	Assault Rifle	Personal Weapons
	ATGM Spike, RGW 90	Anti-Tank Weapons
	Mobile Chemical, Biological Laboratory	CBRN Equipment
2007	Reconstruction of Airport Cerklje	Military Airport and HN Infrastructure
	8x8 Medium Armored Vehicle Svarun	Combat Vehicles
	4x4 Light Armored Vehicle Cobra	CBRN Reconnaissance Vehicle
	RGW 90	Anti-Tank Weapons
2009	Reconstruction of Airport Cerklje	Military Airport and HN Infrastructure
	8x8 Medium Armored Vehicle Svarun	Combat Vehicles
	Radar	Air Control, Air Defense
2010	Reconstruction of Airport Cerklje	Military Airport and HN Infrastructure
	Range Škrilj	SOF Range
	Range Kranj	Indoor Range
	8x8 Medium Armored Vehicle Svarun	Combat Vehicles
	Radar	Air Control, Air Defense
	Short Range Air Defense SA-24 Grinch	Short Range Air Defense

Source: Created by Author using Ministry of Defense, *Annual Report 2005*, 16 May 2006, 40-44; *Annual Report 2006*, 30 July 2007, 43-48; *Annual Report 2007*, 21 July 2008, 39-44; *Import and Export of Military Equipment 2008, 2009*, 1-6; *Annual Report 2009*, 18 August 2010, 61-69; *Annual Report 2010*, 16 May 2011, 72-76.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SAF



Source: Ministry of Defense, Annual Report 2017, 10 May 2018, 9

APPENDIX E

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Memorandum for record: Thesis appendix document

Subject: Research supervisor commentary for MAJ Kesic, 29 May 19

Purpose: To document the professional discourse between researcher and committee during the conduct culminating in the successful thesis defense, for the record.

Author: Dr. Kenneth E. Long, D.M. (on behalf of the committee)

Date: 29 May 2019

Organization: U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth KS
66027

STANDARD INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE'S MEMO FOR RECORD

A feature of the Applied Professional Case Study (APCS) is the iterative nature of the research. The researcher and the committee go through a series of iterative check-ins that allow for a review and an update of the research questions the preliminary findings, initial insights, and the possibility for other excursions for the research to follow. This is typical of the experience of action researchers in a similar way, for example. Based on cross-talk between multiple researchers and committees we have collaboratively decided that it would be a good idea to add an appendix at the end of an APCS thesis to document the socialized experience of the professional dialogue without intruding into the researcher's privileged spaces within chapters one through five.

In this way, we believe we can capture some of the dynamics and synergies that arise from the professional discourse on these focused inquiries. This is similar to the idea of military scouts departing on a reconnaissance patrol with certain specific things to look for and then reporting back on what they found, which might cause a change in both strategies and tactics after a dialogue between scouts, planners and leaders. We will start documenting the insights from these dialogues which are often summarized during the actual thesis defense in an appendix to the theses with this standard introduction.

This is important because what has emerged from this APCS method is what we describe as two objectives: Objective Near and Objective Far. This resonates with our professional doctrinal language on the importance of objectives as seen in the idea that military campaigns are a series of linked objectives that have logical, geographical and operational connections in a series of continuous efforts. We describe Objective Near as the researcher's effort to get good answers to the specific research questions. This is the explicit purpose of the thesis after all. We describe Objective Far as the development of a broader professional skill set that will support the researcher/officer's future independent research and professional staff work. We think this could be combined with the ability to act as a project manager supervising the professional staff work of a team of action officers collaborating on a more complex problem. Integrating the two skill sets of direct research and project management creates a broad professional skill set we seek to

develop in our professional officers and which is a feature of the application of this method.

In the action research tradition, this process could manifest as a series of memorandums for record which document essential checkpoints along the iterative research journey. Similarly, we offer this memo as an important component of this evolving method which surfaced in part during this thesis. Our collective professional thanks to the researchers and committee members who contributed to these emergent insights and provided important critical thinking and creative insights to our deeper professional understanding of the potential of this method.

Important insights from the committee that surfaced during our professional dialogue:

MAJ Kesic's research insights and impact summary:

1. The potential solution space for policy development at the strategic level is never a blank canvas but rather a rich contextual opportunity space.
2. The importance of developing mature assumptions that are important, necessary, relevant and reasonable are amply displayed in the stage setting chapters of this thesis.
3. An important tension of competing values between regional stability and security and the internal satisfaction of multiple demographics with the direction of national policy had a fractal quality to it. This is an area for future development as well as in item of professional interest. It will feature in our curriculum in the year 2020 in our military college because of the power of the insight. We consider this to be an important finding and artifact.
4. The use of multiple mental models in this thesis approach reflects the sense of much of the community of practice associated with complexity theory which treat the triangulation and mutually supporting effects of multiple mental models to be an appropriate strategy to respond to complexity. This thesis demonstrates an advantageous and practical implementation of that approach.
5. The campaign plan and timeline for implementation of the recommendations reflect strongly the notion that problems don't stand still and that the ground moves under our feet. This illuminates the sense of urgency which informs all professional military officers about their bias for action.
6. The literature review reflected the broad and deep dimensions of such a complex environment and the stage setting chapters met the standards of a case study's purpose to inform policymakers of the broad context they will encounter in the search for solutions.

7. The researcher did not shrink from the challenges of this complex problem, and we observe that if it were easy, then even the committee members could do it. We applaud his intellectual courage and curiosity in pursuing this difficult line of inquiry.

8. The blending of methods tools and concepts from diverse disciplines seemed comprehensive and properly integrated into a useful narrative.

9. The analysis models chosen were properly selected and applied in a way that a Chief Decision Maker would find persuasive and compelling.

10. The APCS method offers two formal opportunities for the committee to evaluate the critical thinking skills and preferences of the researcher. In R1 we asked the officer to establish the pre-research position and then we compare that position to the R2 position which is produced after a thorough review of literature in the first round of analysis. If the officer researcher applies critical thinking, we would not be surprised if there was a change in position due to the cognitive effort. In fact, no change in the R1 and R2 positions is suggestive that the research was simply an effort to confirm pre-existing biases. A normal result is to see an evolution and sometimes a revolution of the officer's position. It's even more difficult for the officers to change their mind when going from R2 to R3, when they must supply the different professional perspectives to their newly found position. This is even harder than shifting from R1 to R2 because normal human practice is to be more convinced of your new position after deep reflection. Kahneman and Tversky talk about this in their work on human biases. When the officer properly applies these new perspectives we can then see that they can step outside of their personal opinion and adopt a truly broad-based professional perspective which is crucial to the development of senior staff officers and commanders in the broad military profession. This thesis is an example of a successful demonstration of critical thinking in both dimensions, and we applaud the researcher for his efforts in this area.

11. An important insight was the researcher's conclusion that actions taken in the interest of the defense of the nation which do not lead to improved stability in the region in a calm and balanced relationship among stakeholders are actually destabilizing and therefore not in the nations self-defense interest. This emergent constraint is an important nuanced position for a military officer to take since the military experts are often asked only to comment on direct action solutions which can often exacerbate a delicate political, economic environment. That the researcher discovered this insight speaks well of his future potential as a senior level strategist.

12. A list of future research questions suggested by this effort could include:

a. How to improve the clarity and completeness of the national security documents to provide actionable, nested guidance to the armed forces.

b. Consider extending the case study approach to Kazakhstan and Moldova to extend the insights.

c. Reflect on how the secondary research questions and some of the detailed investigations followed after a set of preliminary analyses and conclusions which shaped subsequent rounds of research and analysis. The iterative approach was useful and professionally developed.

d. Seek clarification on itemize national priorities if the competing mission sets should present limitations.

e. Consider the use of your thesis as an educational artifact for your peers as a way to become aware of NATO style doctrine, missions and processes.

f. Explore how binding NATO guidance and doctrine may be on your national forces

g. Explore methods of conducting combined arms training for your active military forces with your reserve artillery and armored formations and other NATO partners in order to reduce the cost of generating ready task forces.

h. Compare and contrast your multiple simultaneous mission support to the Serbian model of focused concentration on a support mission aligned with their national interest.

i. Explore the application of an Ends-Ways-Means model or a policy analysis model as a supplement or alternative to the use of Army Design Methodology (ADM) in addressing complex issues at the national strategic level.

13. The thesis defense suggested the idea of the Cameron and Quinn competing values model as a possible method to explore for broader application at the strategic level since it is a useful way to discover win-win situations among commercial organizations. If it is an effective way of finding common ground for mutual support among organizations perhaps it can be applied at the regional and national level.

14. The officer's demonstrated deep understanding of diplomacy, information, military and economic domains, also known as the DIME model, suggests an opportunity for him as a strategist in the future.

15. In conclusion, we think these discussions deserve to be documented as part of the thesis, as spin-offs and professional insights suggested by the thesis and serve as an illustration of the emerging insights available from the application of this APCS method. We offer this as evidence to further demonstrate the relevance and utility of the method to members of our military profession and to other professions concerned with integrating the practical needs of a profession with a bias for action and the academic interests of research rigor, quality, validity, and transparency. The effect of the iterative approach as a way to evolve the elements of ADM is especially instructive in this thesis and will become an important insight for future researchers when we document this in the method's description and guidance.

16. The insights from this discourse are solely the responsibility of the research supervisor who made an effort to fairly represent the views of the committee members. Responsibility for any error in transmission or misconstrual of insights is strictly the research supervisor's (Dr. Long), whereas all useful insights derive from the due diligence and professional excellence of the researcher, whom we congratulate on a job well done.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Čelik, Pavle. *Stražarji državne meje v Sloveniji: 1918-2013* [State Border Guards in Slovenia: 1918-2013]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Modrijan, 2013.
- Davis, Ian, ed. *SIPRI Yearbook 2018*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Department of Logistics and Resource Operations. *F100: Managing Army Change*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2018.
- Ferfila, Bogomil. *The End of Utopia: Reforms of the Former Communist Countries*. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Delavska enotnost, 1992.
- Filiberti, Ed. *How the Army Runs (2017-2018): A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2018. Accessed 14 April 2019. [https://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil/files/HTAR2018/HTAR%202017-18%20\(Online%20Version\).pdf](https://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil/files/HTAR2018/HTAR%202017-18%20(Online%20Version).pdf).
- Hackett, James, ed. *The Military Balance 2015*. London, England: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015.
- . *The Military Balance 2016*. London, England: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016.
- . *The Military Balance 2017*. London, England: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017.
- . *The Military Balance 2018*. London, England: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018.
- . *The Military Balance 2019*. London, England: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019.
- Kotter, John P. *Leading Change*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2012. Kindle.
- Larson, Eric V., and John E. Peters. "Appendix D: Overview of the Posse Comitatus Act." In *Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options*, 1-3. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001. Accessed 23 April 2019. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251.html#download.
- Long, Kenneth. *Emerging Best Practices from Professional Case Study Research*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2016.

- Palmer, Diego A. Ruiz. *The Framework Nations' Concept: Game-Changer for a New Strategic Era or Missed Opportunity?* Research Paper 132. Rome, Italy: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Defense College, July 2016. Accessed 12 April 2019. <http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=965>.
- Pirjevec, Dušan. *Jugoslovanske vojne: 1991-2001* [Yugoslav Wars: 1991-2001]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Cankarjeva Založba, 2003.
- Redman, Nicholas, ed. *Strategic Survey 2018: The Annual Assessment of Geopolitics*. London, England: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018.
- Švanjcer, Janez J. *Obranili Slovenijo* [Slovenia Defended]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Viharnik, 1993.
- Young, Thomas-Durell. *Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions: The Mirage of Military Modernity*. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017.

Periodicals

- Grizold, Anton. "Izzivi v razvoju nacionalne obrambe Slovenije" [Challenges in the Development of the Defense System of the Republic of Slovenia]. *Teorija in praksa* 41, no. 1-2 (2004): 448-458. Accessed 25 October 2018. <http://dk.fdv.uni-lj.si/db/pdfs/tip20041-2grizold.PDF>.
- Kotnik, Igor. "Professionalization of the Slovenian Armed Forces – A Goal or a Path." *Sodobni vojaški izzivi* 14, no. 1 (May 2012): 11-26. Accessed 30 March 2018. http://www.slovenskavojska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojska/pdf/vojaski_izzivi/svi_14_1.pdf.
- Markovič, Zvezdan. "The Yugoslav People's Army – A Paper Tiger or a True Military Power." *Vojaška zgodovina* 13, no. 1-2 (2017): 26-40. Accessed 25 October 2018. <http://www.dlib.si/stream/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-SH6KQSQW/7da1ef3b-0bf6-428c-b569-9450421da5ba/PDF>.
- Raduha, Nina. "NATO'S Strategic Communications Concept in the Republic of Slovenia with Emphasis on the Slovenian Armed Forces." *Sodobni vojaški izzivi* 18, no. 4 (December 2016): 67-90. Accessed 30 March 2019. http://www.slovenskavojska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojska/pdf/vojaski_izzivi/2016/svi_18_4.pdf.
- Young, Thomas-Durell. "The Challenge to Defense Reform in Central/Eastern Europe, with Reference to Slovenia." *Sodobni vojaški izzivi* 18, no. 4 (December 2016): 15-34. Accessed 18 February 2019. http://www.slovenskavojska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojska/pdf/vojaski_izzivi/2016/svi_18_4.pdf.

Slovenian Ministry of Defense Reports

- Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia. *Letno poročilo za leto 2003* [Annual Report 2003]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2004. Accessed 1 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/letno_porocilo_2003.pdf.
- . *Letno poročilo za leto 2004* [Annual Report 2004]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2005. Accessed 1 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/letno_porocilo_2004.pdf.
- . *Letno poročilo za leto 2005* [Annual Report 2005]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2006. Accessed 1 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/letno_porocilo_2005.pdf.
- . *Letno poročilo za leto 2006* [Annual Report 2006]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2007. Accessed 1 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/LP_MO_2006.pdf.
- . *Letno poročilo za leto 2007* [Annual Report 2007]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2008. Accessed 2 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/LP_MO_2007.pdf.
- . *Letno poročilo za leto 2009* [Annual Report 2009]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2010. Accessed 2 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/LP_MO_2009.pdf.
- . *Letno poročilo za leto 2010* [Annual Report 2010]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2011. Accessed 2 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/LP_MO_2010.pdf.
- . *Letno poročilo za leto 2011* [Annual Report 2011]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2012. Accessed 14 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/LP_MO_2011.pdf.
- . *Letno poročilo za leto 2012* [Annual Report 2012]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2013. Accessed 14 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/LP_MO_2012.pdf.
- . *Letno poročilo za leto 2013* [Annual Report 2013]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2014. Accessed 14 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/LP_MO_2013.pdf.
- . *Letno poročilo za leto 2014* [Annual Report 2014]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2015. Accessed 14 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/javne_objave/2015/LP_MO_2014.pdf.

- . *Letno poročilo za leto 2015* [Annual Report 2015]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2016. Accessed 14 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/LP_MO_2015.pdf.
- . *Letno poročilo za leto 2016* [Annual Report 2016]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2016. Accessed 14 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/LP_MO_2016.pdf.
- . *Letno poročilo za leto 2017* [Annual Report 2017]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2018. Accessed 14 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/javne_objave/2018/LETNO_POROCILO_MO_2017.pdf.
- . *Uvoz in izvoz vojaškega orožja in opreme v letu 2008 za javnost* [Report for Public on Import and Export of Military Equipment 2008]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2009. Accessed 2 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/uvoz_izvoz_08.pdf.

Acts and Documents of the Republic of Slovenia

- Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Slovenia. *Military Doctrine*. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 1 June 2006. Accessed 22 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/vojd2006_eng.pdf.
- . *Obrambna strategija Republike Slovenije* [Defense Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 7 December 2012. Accessed 22 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/predpisi/drugo/obr_strategija.pdf.
- . *Srednjeročni obrambni program Republike Slovenije 2016-2020* [Mid-Term Defense Program of the Republic of Slovenia 2016-2020]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 17 February 2016. Accessed 16 October 2018. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/predpisi/obramba/SOPR2016_2020.pdf.
- . *Srednjeročni obrambni program Republike Slovenije 2018-2023* [Mid-Term Defense Program of the Republic of Slovenia 2018-2023]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 13 April 2018. Accessed 16 October 2018. <http://vrs-3.vlada.si/MANDAT14/VLADNAGRADIVA.NSF/71d4985ffda5de89c12572c3003716c4/709feb255697c4b7c125826e00469436?OpenDocument>.
- . *Strateški pregled obrambnega resorja 2009* [Strategic Defense Review 2009]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, October 2009. Accessed 2 April 2019. <http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/SPOR2009.pdf>.

- . *Strateški pregled obrambe 2016* [Strategic Defense Review 2016]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Ministry of Defense, 2016. Accessed 2 April 2019. <http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/SPOR2009.pdf>.
- Republic of Slovenia. Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Resolucija o izhodiščih zasnove nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije* [Resolution on the Establishment of Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia]. Vol. III, no. 71, 30 December 1993. Accessed 27 March 2019. https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/1993/Ur/u1993071.pdf.
- . Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Resolucija o splošnem dolgoročnem programu razvoja in opremljanja Slovenske vojske* [Resolution on General Long-Term Program for Development and Equipping of the SAF]. Vol. XIV, no. 89, 12 August 2004. Accessed 31 March 2019. https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2004/Ur/u2004089.pdf.
- . Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia. *Resolution on General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the SAF*. Vol. XIX, no. 99, 7 December 2010. Accessed 23 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/ReDPROSV25_slo_en.pdf.
- . Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Resolucija o strategiji nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije* [Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia]. Vol. XI, No. 56, 06 July 2001. Accessed 28 March 2019. https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2001/Ur/u2001056.pdf.
- . Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Resolution on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia*. Vol. XIX, No. 27, 2 April 2010. Accessed 22 April 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/RSNV2010_slo_en.pdf.
- . Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Rebalans proračuna Republike Slovenije za leto 2019* [Rebalance of the Budget of the Republic of Slovenia for 2019]. Vol. 19, no. 19, 29 March 2019. Accessed 06 April 2018. https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2019/Ur/u2019019.pdf.
- . Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Splošni dolgoročni program razvoja in opremljanja Slovenske vojske* [General Long-Term Program for Development and Equipping of the SAF]. Vol. X, no. 32, 13 April 2000. Accessed 28 March 2019. https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2000/Ur/u2000032.pdf.
- . Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Splošni dolgoročni program razvoja in opremljanja Slovenske vojske* [General Long-Term Program for Development and Equipping of the SAF]. Vol. XI, no. 97, 4 December 2001. Accessed 28 March 2019. https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2001/Ur/u2001097.pdf.

- . Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Strategija sodelovanja Republike Slovenije v mednarodnih operacijah in misijah* [Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia in International Operations and Missions]. Vol. XIX, no. 19, 12 March 2010. Accessed 6 April 2018. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/ministrstvo/strategija_sodelovanja_RS_MOM.pdf.
- . Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Ustava Republike Slovenije* [Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia]. Vol. I, no. 33, 28 December 1991. Accessed 28 March 2019. https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/1991/Ur/u1991033.pdf.
- . Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Zakon o obrambi* [Defense Act]. Vol. XXV, no. 95, 10 December 2015. Accessed 28 March 2019. <http://pisrs.si/Pis.w eb/npbDocPdf?idPredpisa=ZAKO5800&idPredpisaChng=ZAKO532&type=pdf>.
- . Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, *Zakon o vojaški dolžnosti* [Conscription Act]. Vol. XII, no. 108, 14 December 2002. Accessed 30 March 2019. https://www.uradni-list.si/_pdf/2002/Ur/u2002108.pdf.

Slovenian Public Opinion Surveys

- Hafner-Fink, Mitja, and Marjan Malešič. “Slovensko javno mnenje 2015: Mednarodna raziskava Stališča o delu (ISSP 2015), Mednarodna raziskava Stališča o vlogi države (ISSP 2016), Ogledalo javnega mnenja 2015 in raziskava Stališča o varnosti” [Slovenian Public Opinion 2015: International Survey on Positions on Work (ISSP 2015), International Survey on the Role of the State (ISSP 2016), The Mirror of Public Opinion 2015 and Security Positions Survey]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov, 2016. Accessed 23 February 2019. <https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/sjm15/>.
- Hafner-Fink, Mitja, Janez Štebe, Brina Malnar, Samo Uhan, Slavko Kurdija, and Marjan Malešič. “Slovensko javno mnenje 2012/1: Raziskava o nacionalni in mednarodni varnosti, Mednarodna raziskava o družini in spreminjanju spolnih vlog IV., Primerjalna raziskava volilnih sistemov CSES V. in Longitudinalni program SJM 2012” [Slovenian Public Opinion 2012/1: National and International Security Survey, International Survey on Family and Changing Gender Roles IV, Comparative Survey of Electoral Systems CSES V, and Longitudinal Program SJM 2012]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov, 2013. Accessed 23 February 2019. <https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/sjm121/>.
- Jelušič, Ljubica, and Brina Malnar. “Slovensko javno mnenje 2005/2: Nacionalna in mednarodna varnost (CRP Znanje za varnost in mir) in Mednarodna povolilna raziskava” [Slovenian Public Opinion 2005/2: National and International Security Survey (CPR Knowledge for Security and Peace) and Comparative Survey of Electoral Systems]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv

- družboslovnih podatkov, 2009. Accessed 23 February 2019. <https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/sjm052/>.
- Malešič, Marjan. "Slovensko javno mnenje 2007: Raziskava o nacionalni in mednarodni varnosti; vojaški poklici" [Slovenian Public Opinion 2007: National and International Security Survey; Military Profession]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov, 2010. Accessed 23 February 2019. <https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/sjm07/>.
- Malešič, Marjan, Brina Malnar, Ljubica Jelušič, Anton Grizold, Vinko Vegič, Mitja Hafner Fink, Samo Uhan, and Slavko Kurdija. "Slovensko javno mnenje 2009/2: Raziskava o nacionalni in mednarodni varnosti" [Slovenian Public Opinion 2009/2: National and International Security Survey]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov, 2010. Accessed 23 February 2019. <https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/sjm092/>.
- Toš, Niko. "Slovensko javno mnenje 2001/3: Raziskava o zdravju in zdravstvu IV. in Raziskava o obrambi in varnosti" [Slovenian Public Opinion 2001/3: Survey on Health and Health Service IV and Survey on Defense and Security]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov, 2002. Accessed 23 February 2019. <https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/sjm013/>.
- Toš, Niko, and Marjan Malešič. "Slovensko javno mnenje 2003/3: Nacionalna in mednarodna varnost; vojaški poklic" [Slovenian Public Opinion 2003/3: National and International Security Survey; Military Profession]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov, 2004. Accessed 23 February 2019. <https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/opisi/sjm033/>.
- Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. "Population." 16 October 2018. Accessed 16 October 2018. <https://www.stat.si/StatWeb/en/Field/Index/17>.
- . "Road Infrastructure 2014: There were almost 38,900 kilometres of public roads in Slovenia in 2014." 27 October 2015. Accessed 1 May 2019. <https://www.stat.si/StatWeb/en/News/Index/5559>.
- . "SI-STAT Database." Accessed 16 October 2018. <https://pxweb.stat.si/pxweb/Dialog/statfile2.asp>.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Publications

- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Brussels Summit Key Decisions (11-12 July 2018)." November 2018. Accessed 10 April 2019. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_11/20181105_1811-factsheet-key-decisions-summit-en.pdf.
- . "Connected Forces Initiative." 22 June 2016. Accessed 11 April 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_98527.htm?selectedLocale=en.

- . “Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018).” 14 March 2019. Accessed 5 April 2019. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_03/190314-pr2018-34-eng.pdf.
- . “Founding Treaty.” 30 January 2017. Accessed 15 April 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/topics_67656.htm.
- . “NATO Air Policing.” Accessed 18 April 2019. <https://ac.nato.int/page5931922/-nato-air-policing>.
- . “NATO Defence Planning Process.” 28 June 2018. Accessed 19 April 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49202.htm.
- . “NATO Wales Summit Guide.” 3 September 2014. Accessed 10 April 2019. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20141008_140108-SummitGuideWales2014-eng.pdf.
- . “Readiness Action Plan.” 21 September 2017. Accessed 10 April 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm.
- . “Smart Defense.” 22 February 2017. Accessed 11 April 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm?selectedLocale=en.
- . “Summit Meetings.” 19 July 2018. Accessed 9 April 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50115.htm.
- . “The North Atlantic Treaty.” 10 April 2019. Accessed 15 April 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/ua/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.
- . “Wales Summit Declaration.” 05 September 2014. Accessed 26 February 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm#def-exp.
- . “Warsaw Summit Key Decisions.” Factsheet, February 2017. Accessed 10 April 2019. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_02/20170206_1702-factsheet-warsaw-summit-key-en.pdf.
- . “What is NATO?” 15 April 2019. Accessed 15 April 2019. <https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html>.

U.S. Army Publications

Headquarters, Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2017. Accessed 25 October 2018. <https://archive.org/details/FM3-0OperationsOctober2017/page/n1>.

- . Army Doctrine Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012. Accessed 18 April 2019. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/adp5_0.pdf.
- . Army Techniques Publication No. 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012. Accessed 18 April 2019. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/atp5_0x1.pdf.

Other Sources

- 24UR. “Časovnica večjih napadov v Evropi od leta 2004” [Chronology of Major Attacks in Europe Since 2004]. 23 May 2017. Accessed 27 March 2019. <https://www.24ur.com/novice/svet/kronologija-vecjih-napadov-v-evropi-od-leta-2004.html>.
- Army Force Management School. “Army Force Management Model.” Accessed 14 April 2019. <https://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil/files/publications/Placemat%20Army%20Force%20Management%20Model%20%2012%20Jan%202018.pdf>.
- Arms Control Association. “The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance.” Accessed 24 March 2019. <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty>.
- Brožič, Liliana. “Morali boste znati pripraviti obrambni načrt, ki je financiran: Intervju dr. Thomas-Durell Young” [You Will Have to Prepare Resourced Defense Plan: Interview with Dr. Thomas-Durell Young]. April 2018. Accessed 18 February 2019. http://www.mo.gov.si/fileadmin/mo.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/dogodki/2018/intervju_young_slo.pdf.
- Christian Broadcasting Network. “Churches Desecrated in Ongoing Attacks Across Europe.” 16 April 2019. Accessed 1 May 2019. <http://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2019/april/churches-desecrated-in-ongoing-attacks-across-europe>.
- European Commission. “Defending Europe: Improving Military Mobility Within and Beyond the European Union.” Accessed 18 April 2019. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/2018_military_mobility_factsheet_0.pdf.
- European Parliament. “Russian Military Presence in the Eastern Partnership Countries.” Brussels, Belgium: Directorate-General for External Policies, 2016. Accessed 24 March 2018. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/578021/EXPO_IDAN\(2016\)578021_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/578021/EXPO_IDAN(2016)578021_EN.pdf).
- Faculty of Social Sciences. “Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre.” University of Ljubljana. Accessed 23 February 2019. <https://www.fdv.uni-lj.si/en/research/research-centres/departement-of-sociology/public-opinion-and-mass-communication-research-centre>.

- Gosar, Anton. *Narodnosti Slovenije* [Peoples of Slovenia]. Ljubljana, Slovenia: Anton Melik Geographical Institute. 8 May 2019. Accessed 8 May 2019, https://giam.zrc-sazu.si/sites/default/files/gs_clanki/GS_2401_033-050.pdf.
- Government of the Republic of Slovenia. "Basic Geographical Data." 16 October 2018. Accessed 16 October 2018. www.vlada.si/o_sloveniji/osnovni_geografski_podatki/.
- . "History." Accessed 16 October 2018. http://www.vlada.si/o_sloveniji/zgodovina/.
- . "Past Governments of Slovenia." 15 April 2019. Accessed 15 April 2019. http://www.vlada.si/en/about_the_government/governments%20of_the_republic_of_slovenia/.
- . "Slovenian Government." 15 April 2019. Accessed 15 April 2019. http://www.vlada.si/en/about_the_government/members_of_government/.
- Institute for Economic and Peace. *Global Peace Index 2018: Measuring Peace in a Complex World*. Sidney, Australia, June 2018. Accessed 06 April 2019. <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/06/Global-Peace-Index-2018-2.pdf>.
- Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development. *Spring Forecast of Economic Trends 2018*. Republic of Slovenia. 27 March 2019. Accessed 06 April 2019. <http://www.umar.gov.si/en/forecasts/spring-forecast/>.
- Long, Kenneth E. "Emerging Best Practices from Applied Professional Case Study Research." PowerPoint presentation at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 September 2018.
- Ministry of Defense, MORStudio. "Novinarska konferenca načelnika Generalštaba SV" [Press Conference of the Chief of General Staff of the SAF]. 7 March 2018. Accessed 28 April 2019. Video, 39:51. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wCWAiWcRbmG&feature=youtu.be>.
- . "Novinarska konferenca: Predstavitev medijem letošnjih vojaških vaj" [Press conference: Presentation of This Year's Military Exercises to the Media]. 22 March 2019. Accessed 28 April 2019. Video, 29:29. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9XKk1X6mQg>.
- Ministry of Defense, Slovenian Armed Forces. "About the Slovenian Armed Forces." Accessed 22 April 2019. <http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/about-the-slovenian-armed-forces/>.
- . "Enhanced Forward Presence – eFP." Accessed 20 April 2019. <http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/international-cooperation/international-operations-and-missions/latvia/#c3328>.

- . —. “International Cooperation.” Accessed 22 April 2019.
<http://www.slovenskavojska.si/en/international-cooperation/>.
- . “Slovenska vojska: pregled 2016, načrti 2017” [Slovenian Armed Forces: Review 2016, Plans 2017]. 13 March 2017. Accessed 26 April 2019.
http://www.slovenskavojska.si/uploads/media/NOV_KON_13MAR17.pdf.
- Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. “Russian Defence Minister Summarises Vostok 2018 Maneuvers.” *News*, 10 October 2018. Accessed 24 March 2019.
http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12199205@egNews.
- Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia, Police. “Letno poročilo o delu policije za 2017” [Annual Report for 2017]. April 2018. Accessed 1 May 2019.
<https://www.policija.si/images/stories/Statistika/LetnaPorocila/PDF/LetnoPorocilo2017.pdf>.
- Ministry of Public Administration of the Republic of Slovenia. “Število zaposlenih po skupnem kadrovskem načrtu v letu 2019 v organih državne uprave” [Number of employees according to the establishment plan in 2019 in state administration bodies]. Accessed 15 March 2019. http://www.mju.gov.si/fileadmin/mju.gov.si/pageuploads/JAVNA_UPRAVA/SUKV/sukv/01_do_01_letu_2019_prvi_dan_v_mesecu_-_st.zap.po_SKN_v_ODU.pdf.
- National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia. “Razglasitev referendumu” [Referendum Decision]. Accessed 8 May 2019, <https://www.dz-rs.si/wps/portal/Home/ODrzavnemZboru/Umetnost/RazstavaRazglasitevPlebiscita/>.
- . “Volitve in volilni sistem” [Elections and the electoral system]. Accessed 5 May 2019, <https://www.dz-rs.si/wps/portal/Home/PoliticniSistem/VolitveInVolilniSistem>.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. “Joint Press Conference.” 9 October 18. Video, 19:26. Accessed 26 February 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dN9ZQcgMdP4>.
- Politico. “How Merkel Broke the EU.” 11 April 2019. Accessed 11 April 2019.
<https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-broke-the-eu-migration-crisis-refugees/>.
- Port of Koper. “Port Info Book.” March 2019, 6. Accessed 30 April 2019. <https://www.luka-kp.si/libs/download.php?file=/a98c70445bbe432bd01cee02f83658dc>.
- . “Summary of Luka Koper d.d. and the Luka Koper Group Business Strategy until 2030 and the Company’s and Group’s Strategic Business Plan 2016-2020.” August 2015. Accessed 30 April 2019. <https://www.luka-kp.si/libs/download.php?file=/c540d123aea55aa4394c27047f8a8879>.

- Putin, Vladimir. "Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly." 1 March 2018. Accessed 24 March 2019. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957>.
- Radio-Television Slovenia. "Ameriška vojska potrdila zanimanje ua logistično točko v Luki Koper" [The U.S. Army Confirmed the Interest in the Logistics Point in the Port of Koper]. 11 September 2018. Accessed 1 May 2019. <https://www.rtv slo.si/slovenija/ameriska-vojska-potrdila-zanimanje-za-logisticno-tocko-v-luki-koper/465659>.
- . "Francoske ulice varuje tudi vojska, v državi vedno več napadov na muslimane" [The French Streets are Guarded by the Army: There are More and More Attacks on Muslims in the Country]. 12 January 2015. Accessed 19 April 2019. <https://www.rtv slo.si/svet/francoske-ulice-varuje-tudi-vojska-v-drzavi-vedno-vec-napadov-na-muslimane/355615>.
- . "Modernizacija vojske odložena za nedoločen čas, obrambna sposobnost pa ostaja klavrna" [Modernization of the SAF Postponed Indefinitely, Combat Readiness Remains Low]. 21 February 2019. Accessed 15 March 2019. <https://www.rtv slo.si/slovenija/modernizacija-vojske-odlozena-za-nedolocen-cas-obrambna-sposobnost-pa-ostaja-klavrna/480762>.
- . "Pogodba s Patrio prekinjena, Rotis potegnil kratko" [Contract with Patria Dissolved]. 5 September 2012. Accessed 2 April 2019. <https://www.rtv slo.si/slovenija/pogodba-s-patrio-prekinjena-rotis-potegnil-kratko/290823>.
- . "Pripravljenost Slovenske vojske" [Readiness of the Slovenian Armed Forces]. Studio ob 17h. 5 April 2019. Accessed 16 April 2019. <https://4d.rtv slo.si/arhiv/studio-ob-17h/174606902>.
- . "Pripravljenost vojske je boljša" [The Readiness of the Army is Better]. 26 October 2005. Accessed 3 April 2019. <https://www.rtv slo.si/slovenija/pripravljenost-vojske-je-boljsa/44946>.
- . "V Šri Lanki izredne razmere" [Emergency Conditions in Sri Lanka], 23 April 2019, accessed 1 May 2019, <https://www.rtv slo.si/svet/azija-z-oceanijo/v-srilanki-izredne-razmere-in-skupinski-pokop-prvih-zrtev/486186>.
- . "Tudi Belgija na ulice pošilja vojsko" [Belgium Also Sends Troops to the Streets]. 17 January 2015. Accessed 19 April 2019. <https://www.rtv slo.si/svet/tudi-belgija-na-ulice-posilja-vojsko/356075>.
- Reuters. "Factbox: Deadly attacks in Western Europe." 7 April 2018. Accessed 27 March 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-crash-timeline-factbox/factbox-deadly-attacks-in-western-europe-idUSKBN1HE0ND>.

Sanderson, Seraton. "More Foreigners Living in Germany Than Ever Before." Deutsche Welle. 1 July 2017. Accessed 11 April 2019. <https://www.dw.com/cda/en/more-foreigners-living-in-germany-than-ever-before/a-39495808>.

Siol.net. "Slovenska policija potrjuje: dva osumljenca terorizma potovala čez Slovenijo" [The Slovenian Police Confirms: Two Suspects of Terrorism Activity Traveled Across Slovenia]. 6 September 2016. Accessed 1 May 2019. <https://siol.net/novice/svet/cnn-teroristi-v-pariz-potovali-preko-slovenije-425288>.

Sky News. "A Timeline of Terror." 13 May 2018. Accessed 27 March 2019. <https://news.sky.com/story/france-a-timeline-of-terror-10787264>.

Slovenska vojska, Uradni blog. "Po preoblikovanju bo SV bolj vključena v prostor" [After the Transformation, the SAF Will Be More Involved in the Area]. 7 May 2013. Accessed 3 April 2019. <http://slovenskavojska.blogspot.com/2013/05/pogovor-z-nacelnikom-gssv-brigadirjem.html>.
Time. "The 25 Most Influential Business Management Books." Time USA, LLC. Accessed 12 April 2019. <http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/completelist/0,29569,2086680,00.html>.

Ukleya, John F. "L104: Leading Organizations in Change." PowerPoint Presentation, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 September 2018.

U.S. Department of Defense. "NATO Defense Chiefs Build 360-Degree Defense on Maturing Framework, Dunford Says." 1 October 2018. Accessed 19 April 2019. <https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1650814/nato-defense-chiefs-build-360-degree-defense-on-maturing-framework-dunford-says/>.

Združena Levica. *Program stranke levica* [Program of the Leftist Party]. Accessed 15 April 2019. <http://www.levica.si/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Levica-volilni-program-2018.pdf>.