Modeling Career Enlisted Aviator Retention in the U.S. Air Force
Abstract
The research discussed in this report was conducted for a project entitled Cost-Benefit Analysis of Special and Incentive Pays for Aviators. The purpose of the project was to develop an analytic capability for determining the efficient amount of special and incentive (S and I) pay for career enlisted aviators (CEA) in the Air Force given the cost of producing an additional trained CEA, the cost of S and I pay to retain them, and their retention behavior in response to changes in S and I pay. The project builds on an earlier project that developed a similar capability for Air Force rated officers, documented in Mattock et al. (2019). The research summarized in this report lays the foundation for the analysis of CEA retention by providing contextual background information about CEAs, documenting the retention profiles of CEAs and the S and I pays available to them, and extending RAND Corporations Dynamic Retention Model to model the retention profiles of CEAs. This project should be of interest to those concerned with modeling the effects on retention of military compensation and S and I pays. Future work will build on this analysis to develop the capability to determine the efficient amount of S and I pay for Air Force CEAs. The research reported here was commissioned by AF/A1P and conducted within the Manpower, Personnel, and Training Program of Project AIR FORCE.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 2020
- Accession Number
- AD1106516
Entities
People
- Beth J. Asch
- Felix Knutson
- James R. Hosek
- Michael G. Mattock
- Patricia K. Tong
Organizations
- RAND Corporation