EMPOWERING REPORTING OF MISBEHAVIOR

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by

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This research investigates the intentions of Army service members to report peer hazing misconduct – in other words, their propensity to blow the whistle, encourage or do nothing in response to hazing situations. Because the military is a hierarchal system and social norms significantly impact actions, this research further investigates the propensity of Army service members to blow the whistle or encourage hazing.

A unique feature of the current study is its development of a new survey, the Hazing Compliance Instrument. Development of this instrument provides a valuable contribution to hazing research because it addresses some of the limitations of methods used in other hazing research.

The current study also provided the rare opportunity to research whistleblowing with the targeted population because the participants were measured against an actual policy that directly affects the group.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

EMPOWERING REPORTING OF MISBEHAVIOR by Jabari M. Jackson, 125 pages.

This research investigates the intentions of Army service members to report peer hazing misconduct – in other words, their propensity to blow the whistle, encourage or do nothing in response to hazing situations. Because the military is a hierarchal system and social norms significantly impact actions, this research further investigates the propensity of Army service members to blow the whistle or encourage hazing.
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The current study also provided the rare opportunity to research whistleblowing with the targeted population because the participants were measured against an actual policy that directly affects the group.

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I dedicate this work to the Troopers past, present, and future of Blackfoot Troop, 5th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment and the Troopers of Lightning Troop, 3d Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. I commanded the former and deployed into harms way with the latter. I will never forget the lesson I learned in these organizations during my formative years as a company grade officer.

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ACRONYMS

CGSC	Command and General Staff College
DEOCS	DEOMI Organizational Climate Survey
DEOMI	Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute
DoD	Department of Defense
M	Mean
SD	Standard Deviations
Alpha	Cronbach Alpha Values
HCI	Hazing Compliance Instrument

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The struggle to eliminate hazing in the U.S. Army continues to remain at the center of intense public and private debates. Not all forms of hazing, but particular sensational cases of hazing that led to significant injuries and death proliferate headlines. This has caused many political and military leaders to make spirited calls for accountability and change. There is a large body of hazing literature, few empirical studies exist directly addressing this issue. What should the Army do in relation to this problem?

All military services to include the Coast Guard must conduct a quarterly review on their efforts to prevent hazing. This provides a unique opportunity to develop a competent strategy to orient the right resources, efforts, and attitudes toward the problem. Military leaders view strategy as an essential component of success. No strategy creates directionless environments while bad strategy creates chaotic environments. Neither situation helps the military address these issues. However, the development of a good strategy may provide unique opportunities for the prevention of hazing in the Army.

Richard Rumelt's book *Good Strategy Bad Strategy* illustrates adroit ways for the development and implementation of a strategy to solve problems. Strategy means "a cohesive response to an important challenge" and a "strategy that fails to define a variety of plausible and feasible immediate actions missing a critical component."[1]

[1] Richard P. Rumelt*, Good Strategy, Bad Strategy :The Difference and Why It Matters* (New York: Crown Business, 2012), 6.

Framing the problem through the lens of Rumfeldt's kernel for good strategy facilitates the efforts to prevent hazing in the military. According to this lens, the first antecedent for good strategy requires a diagnosis of the problem which requires defining and categorizing the problem.[2] So far, the DoD has made steady efforts to define and categorize the problem. This research project will provide some of the heavy work laid by the DoD to develop a working definition for hazing. According to the DoD, hazing describes forms of abuse ranging from assault to harassment that have a nexus with military indoctrination or the acceptance of newcomers.[3] Furthermore, a combination of scholarly and military research experiments produced new paradigms for describing types of hazing events. This knowledge allows new opportunities to research hazing as well as other behaviors in the military.

The second kernel of good strategy requires the development of an overall approach to solving the problem that places emphasis on the why the how.[4] DoD plans to incorporate the lessons learned from quarterly reports to Congress as well as create a comprehensive database that provides records of hazing-related events within the military. This project requires tremendous resources and efforts but in the long run, it will provide better techniques for locally addressing hazing and strategically organizing resources to address the problem.

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[2] Rumelt, *Good Strategy, Bad Strategy*, 81.

[3] Ibid., 59.

[4] Ibid., 85.

The third kernel of good strategy suggests that actions should be consistently and coherently oriented on target objectives.[5] Rumelt admonishes that "Strategy is not theoretical. A good strategy always involves doing something to move forward."[6] The strategy to move forward needs proximate objectives to obtain larger targeted objectives. In the process of reaching objectives, opportunities and more problems will present themselves. For example, a proximate objective would be the establishment of universal naming conventions to describe allegations by a stated date. A second reason that necessitates the building of this database revolves around data duplication. Guidelines must be established to provide an accurate interpretation of data because accounting for any type of misbehavior may cause counting one offense as more events. For example, one event may have more than one victim or more than one assailant. This proximate objective serves as one of the several proximate objectives that allow the activation of a database that describes hazing. These actions work in concert with the larger action of creating a universal database that captures the other major forms of misbehavior outlined by DoD.

The other initiative associated with responding to hazing revolves around capturing the prevalence of misbehavior. So far much of the DoD research surrounding prevalence has been based on self-reported survey information. Critics of self-reported surveys question the validity of the information. Self-reported studies alone capture a portion of the issue, but the questions asked in the self-reported information ask whether

[5] Rumelt, *Good Strategy, Bad Strategy*, 87.

[6] Ibid., 6.

or not the survey participant feels that they have been harassed, hazed, mistreated, etc. These types of questions have been used for RAND Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault Studies and DEOCs command climate surveys. This information provides some useful information because it describes general information surrounding events but it fails to capture the powerful influences of the actual situation.

Phillip Zimbardo, the creator of the Stanford Prison Experiment, wrote the forward to Ira Challef's book *Intelligent Disobedience*. His words describing the power of actual situations capture the essence of this research project. Zimbardo wrote the goal for the experiment was to "create a mindset in these college participants that they were real prisoners and real guards in prison."[7] Zimbardo's team accomplished the task but in doing so his team also realized that "in a contest between good people and an evil situation, humanity lost and the situation won."[8] He summarized that "the individual dispositions predicted nothing about how they behaved in either condition when overwhelmed by a powerful, novel social setting."[9] What if a way was developed to capture the novel social setting of hazing and measure the behavioral responses with approximate accuracy? This would be an opportunity to gain new insight into a challenging issue.

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[7] Philip G. Zimbardo, "Forward," in *Intelligent Disobedience*, ed. Ira Challef. (Oakland, CA: Barrett-Koehler Publishers, 2015), xii.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

When opportunities or problems such as this present themselves Rumelt suggests that better strategies may emerge from learning to think differently about strategy.[10] Rumelt wrote that "good strategy work is necessarily empirical and pragmatic."[11] The requirement to build a database will provide historical evidence that helps describe and categorize hazing events. Furthermore, he wrote strategy should be treated like a hypothesis and demand proof that it is working.[12] Hypothetically speaking, what if hazing reports accusations increase in the 300% in the Army? Is that an indicator that the strategy to prevent hazing is working? Rumelt added a second measure to thinking differently, he suggests that organizations must willingly subject the hypothesis to deep criticism.[13] Questions such as is increased hazing reports an indicator of that there is an increase in hazing incidents? Is a reduction in hazing reports an indicator of a decrease in hazing activity? These types of questions are measures of performance, but they fail to accurately measure the effectiveness of the policy. Which leads to Rumelt's third thinking suggestion that organizations must be prepared to form independent judgments.[14] This third suggestion captures the reason for this research project. This research project seeks to form independent judgments based on proprietary conditions unique to the military context.

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[10] Rumelt, *Good Strategy Bad Strategy*, 239.

[11] Ibid., 247.

[12] Ibid., 243.

[13] Ibid., 271.

[14] Ibid.

For this study, the Army will serve as the environment for research. The Army milieu provides the essential elements for replicating the Zimbardo describes as the novel social context with the evil element as well as the complexity of humanity. The Fishbein and Asjen's Theory of Reasoned Behavior provides a valid scientific method for measuring behavioral intentions, although this method is not 100% accurate, it provides enough accuracy to develop legitimate programs for identifying and correcting problems. Scientific inquiry requires replicable constructs to validate the research. Because the Army shares DoD's hazing definition, it provides a means for replicating the research.

Problems and Deficiencies

Much work has been done to increase the veracity of reporting, yet, reporting remains scarce. Information may be limited because hazing reports require administrative actions that also may require redactions to protect sensitive information about the people involved in the events. This study responds to this challenge by simulating situational hazing circumstances and measuring responses to the events.

This study is an attempt to clarify the relationship between reportable instances of the hazing policy and reported instances of the hazing policies. This research seeks to help better understand the behaviors of Army personnel in relation to the hazing policy.[15] The RAND studies, conducted from 2015 to 2017, revealed a significant gap in DoD's

[15] U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), *Hazing Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces: Department of Defense Summary Report of Hazing in the Armed Forces: Reporting Period: April 26, 2016-September 30, 2017* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017).

framework" for hazing.[16] In 2018, the Department of Defense issued DoD INSTRUCTION 1020.03. This new policy provides a way to describe the hazing but the means to address why and how and how hazing occurs needs more research and substance.

Most hazing research derives from the college milieu within the context of fraternities and sporting teams. Fraternities and sporting teams possess similar organizational relationships to military organizations. For example, like the military, fraternities and sporting teams operate through hierarchal systems with established authority structures. Also like the military, fraternities and sporting teams require new members to demonstrate the ability to contribute to the group. Abilities may be assessed through evaluation of the previous history through assessments of character, physical fitness, mental, fitness, and an initiation process. These similar characteristics contributed significant information in the development of this research project on Army soldiers.

However, the jurisdiction for the administration of corrective measures differs between the military and college institutions. Most fraternities and sports teams are responsible to two independent agencies who may choose different corrective actions in response to hazing. For example, college fraternities may be suspended from college campuses or a higher-level body within the fraternity system may suspend individuals or individual chapters. On the other hand, a college sports team may be penalized by the

[16] Jefferson P. Marquis, Coreen Farris, Kimberly Curry Hall, Kristy N. Kamarck, Nelson Lim, Douglas Shontz, Paul S. Steinberg, Robert Stewart, Thomas E. Trail, Jennie W. Wenger, Anny Wong, and Eunice C. Wong, *Improving Oversight and Coordination of Department of Defense Programs That Address Problematic Behaviors Among Military Personnel: Final Report* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), xii.

college or the same sports team may be penalized by one of the national college sports bodies dependent upon the affiliation. College institutions and national sports bodies may impose a range of options from less severe penalties that entail the removal of scholarships or more severe penalties that may eliminate a sports program from competition for several years.[17] In the military, the jurisdiction for enforcement of penalties resides with the service branch. For the purpose of this research, the service branch the Army serves as the representative branch for the U.S. Military.

Another major difference between fraternities and college sporting teams and the military derives from the military's authority over their personnel. Fraternity and colleges exercise control of group members on a limited basis. The terms of control may include during training, competition season, and campus-related activities. Outside of training, competition, and campus-related activities, fraternity and college leaders have little or no control over the conduct of personnel. On the other hand, military authorities are responsible for health, morale, and welfare of their subordinates at all times. This propriety power may prove valuable to the examination of hazing in the military context. This research focuses on Army soldiers with legitimate authority to act in response to hazing events.

Significance of the Study

This research investigates the intentions of Army service members to report peer hazing misconduct – in other words, their propensity to blow the whistle, encourage or do

[17] Nadine C. Hoover, "National Survey: Initiation Rites and Athletics for NCAA Sports Teams" (Alfred University, Alfred, NY, August 30, 1999), 20.

nothing in response to hazing situations. Because the military is a hierarchal system and social norms significantly impact actions, this research further investigates the propensity of Army service members to blow the whistle or encourage hazing.

Of the 415 DOD hazing complaints in 2017 46% were substantiated, 42% were unsubstantiated, and approximately 11% were pending, and 1% were inconclusive.[18] In the Army, 40% of hazing complaints were substantiated, 40% were unsubstantiated, and 20% were pending.[19] To date, no research efforts have been made to address unsubstantiated hazing complaints.

The DoD and the Army seek to develop a hazing assessment tool to define essential elements for tracking.[20] Recommendations to assess hazing through surveys outside of reported incidents allows the DoD and the Army to find a more accurate assessment of the prevalence of hazing.[21] This research allows the ability to determine current hazing detection abilities within the services. The targeted participants are Army service members.

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[18] DOD, *Hazing Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces: 2016-2017,* 53.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Kirsten M. Keller, Miriam Matthews, Kimberly Curry Hall, William Marcellino, Jacqueline A. Mauro, and Nelson Lim, *Hazing in the U.S. Armed Forces: Recommendations for Hazing Prevention Policy and Practice* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 73.

[21] Ibid., 86.

This projects directly aligns with the DoD stated "Goal# 6: Effective Hazing Prevention and Education Programs."[22] This goal seeks to train and educate personnel Regular "on how to identify, respond to, and report hazing, including clear definitions of hazing."[23] Additionally, these goals create opportunities to accomplish other DoD goals. DoD and the Army seek to develop better: hazing prevention messages through Goal 1; better data collection through Goal 2; better reporting protocols through Goal 3; better victim assistance and advocacy option through Goal 4; timely investigations through Goal 5.[24] Recommendations to assess hazing through surveys outside of reported incidents allow the DOD and the Army to find a more accurate assessment of the prevalence of hazing.[25] This research allows the ability to determine current detection ability within the services. The targeted participants are Army service members.

This study is significant because it adds to the body of research by examining behavioral intentions in compliance with the hazing policy. Some command climate surveys (e.g., DEOCS) include items pertaining to hazing. Those items typically address the prevalence of hazing events.[26] In contrast, information obtained via this study will

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[22] *2017 DoD Annual Hazing Prevention and Response Report*, 13.

[23] DOD, *Hazing Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces: 2016-2017,* 13.

[24] Ibid., 10-13.

[25] Keller et al., *Hazing in the U.S. Armed Forces*, 86.

[26] Marne Pomerance, Technical Report 11-18, *Hazing DEOCS 4.1: Construct Validity Summary* (Patrick AFB, FL: Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, Directorate of Research and Strategic Initiatives, 2018), 1-4.

examine factors that contribute to compliance with DoD policy of bystanders at the events.

A unique feature of the current study is its development of a new survey, the Hazing Compliance Instrument (described in chapter 2, Annex B and Annex C). Development of this instrument provides a valuable contribution to hazing research because it addresses some of the limitations of methods used in other hazing research. Most hazing research and information specific to hazing in the military has typically been conducted after hazing events occurred through case studies or self-self-reported hazing events.

Limited recall bias, reticence due to legal consequences, and concerns of reprisal describe some of the many problems associated with post-event and self-report research methods. The instrument developed in the current study reduces these biases by examining hazing behaviors based on the theory of reasoned behavior which seeks to predict how people will behave when addressed with a particular situation.[27] Additionally, the survey is designed so that it can be tested for validity and reliability, such that it can be developed as a validated questionnaire for use in future research. Development and refinement of the instrument could be critical in aiding future research efforts regarding bystanders' compliance with Army/DoD hazing policy.

As the Army addresses hazing, they have a unique opportunity to bolster the enigma of reporting misconduct. The principal question for the research is what affects

[27] Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, *Predicting and Changing Behavior : The Reasoned Action Approach* (London: Taylor and Francis Group, 2009).

how Army soldiers respond to hazing in regard to the new hazing policy? The secondary questions measure bystander compliance intentions in relation to hazing events. Secondary question one, will service members correctly comply with hazing policy? Secondary question two, does the type of hazing event affect compliance with the hazing policy?

The researcher will focus the inquiry on behavioral intent in hypothetical hazing situations. Participants will not be asked about their previous experience with hazing because the research project will not explore the extent or the prevalence of hazing.

Purpose

The purpose of this two-phase simultaneous and concurrent mixed method study will be to obtain statistical, quantitative results from active duty Army Soldiers and then follow up with a qualitative research question designed to discover possible exploratory reasons for non-compliance.

In the first phase, quantitative research questions will address the relationship between the hazing responses (independent variable) and hazing compliance (dependent variable) with Active Duty Soldiers through an online survey.

In the second phase, a qualitative question will be provided to the participants to probe for significant “reasons” that Soldiers do not comply with hazing policies by codifying answers to establish a framework for further research projects.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

A large and growing body of literature has researched hazing, bystanders, and whistleblowers. Most studies have sought to define the prevalence of hazing in college groups and athletic teams. What is known about those subjects depends largely on anecdotal qualitative studies and equivocal quantitative studies? Many of the studies investigated hazing events that led to serious injury or death. Because many of the events required administrative or criminal responses, information to contextualize the incidents lacks significant details due to sensitivity.

This chapter seeks to inform the reader of the complexities that drive hazing research. The first section examines the problem of hazing prevalence. It discusses the contribution of civil courts in the development of local and state definitions of hazing. These efforts ultimately led to a military definition of hazing. The next section will examine why people participate, allow, or subject themselves to hazing through the exploration of prominent theories associated with hazing. The third section describes whistleblowing and reporting research. The fourth section describes the major theories that were incorporated into the development of the research instrument.

The Prevalence Problem

Prevalence allows policymakers to solve problems. At this time, no comprehensive hazing policy exists. This section describes the prominent methods for examining hazing and describes potential reasons for conflicting interpretations of hazing prevalence.

Survey Vulnerabilities

Determining the prevalence of hazing is not unique to the military, academia and the public sector struggle in this area also. Traditionally, the survey method has assessed prevalence. Critics argue that results are tainted by the participants. One critique is prevalence surveys require self-reporting. Self-reporting does not require the rigid standards applied to categorize criminal or harassment hazing events. Another critique is prevalence surveys may cause some respondents to unintentionally or falsely report events due to memory lapse or false recollection of events. For example, some of the participants identified themselves as victims, perpetrators, and bystanders.[28] Some critiques also argue that respondents intentionally may falsely report through embellishment to protect their reputation or to persuade the interviewer about their life experiences. In addition to surveys, researchers have attempted to collect public information to determine the extent.

Data Collection Vulnerabilities

Data collection has also been unsatisfactory for determining prevalence. The fact that no federal database exists for criminal college hazing and the military's nascent

[28] Hoover, "National Survey: Initiation Rites and Athletics for NCAA Sports Teams," 7; Shelly Campo, Gretchen Poulos, and John W. Simple, "Prevalence and Profiling: Hazing among College Students and Points of Intervention," *American Journal of Health Behavior* 29 (2005): 146; Stephen S. Owen, Tod W. Burke, and David Vichesky, "Hazing in Student Organizations: Prevalence, Attitudes, and Solutions," *Oracle: The Research Journal of the Association of Fraternity/Sorority Advisors* 3 (2008): 42-44, 46-48; Allan & Madden, supra note 12, at 86.

hazing programs severely impedes this method.[29] This is exemplified by the 2012 congressional bill proposal that recommended adding hazing reporting requirements for colleges to the Clery Act.[30] The bill did not pass and to date, colleges are still not required to report criminal hazing events. On the other hand, in 2016, the 114th Congress established data collection requirements for hazing events in the armed services and outlined annual reporting requirements in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017.[31]

Ad Hoc Attempts to Find Solutions

The lack of government-sponsored reporting has led to attempts to create databases. Several claims have been made about the number of hazing-related deaths. History may inform the military community of past actions, but it is limited to reported instances of hazing. Even Benjamin Franklin was present at a death associated with hazing, in addition, the Pershing Rifles a military fraternity also had deaths associated with hazing, and most recently the suicidal death of Lance Corporal Harry New was related to hazing.[32] Hank Nuwer, a leading hazing expert, reports that at least one hazing-

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[29] Hank Nuwer, *Wrongs of Passage: Fraternities, Sororities, Hazing, and Binge Drinking* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2001): 200.

[30] Deborah L. Cohen and Richard Brust, "Clearing Up Hazing," *American Bar Association Journal* 98, no. 10 (2012): 14-15.

[31] U.S. Congress, House, Harry Lew Military Hazing Accountability and Prevention Act, H. Res. 5060, 114th Congress, 2016, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5060/all-info.

[32] Hank Nuwer, "Hazing Deaths Database: Unofficial Hazing Clearinghouse & Watchdog Site," http://www.hanknuwer.com/hazing-deaths/.

related death has occurred in the United States every year since 1903 and at least one death every decade since the 1830s, with 1850s and 1860s as the only exceptions.[33] The aim of the current study is to attain a better understanding of reporting and prevention of hazing within the Army.

However, many other writers argue that the estimate is too high. Brandon Chamberlain conducted an analysis of U.S. Department of Education murder statistics related to college organizations and reported an average of approximately 20 deaths occurred annually between 2005-2012 from hazing related activities or context.[34] Although prevalence attempts have been unsuccessful, they have provided information that supports that physical hazing is the least prominent form of hazing.[35] Prevalence is not only challenged by survey instruments and data collection, finding a definition for the hazing is another challenge. The Army reported 130 incidents between 2006 and March 2013. The Navy reported 111 over a one-year period between the second quarter FY 2012 and the second quarter FY2013. The USMC reported 98 between 2012 and 2013. The Air Force reported a total of 16 since 2000.[36] The number of reported incidents may

[33] Nuwer, "Hazing Deaths Database."

[34] Brandon W. Chamberlin, "'Am I My Brother's Keeper': Reforming Criminal Hazing Laws Based on Assumption of Care," *Emory Law Journal* 63, no. 4 (March 2014): 930; Nuwer, *Wrongs of Passage,* 200.

[35] Chamberlin, "Am I My Brother's Keeper," 932.

[36] Keller et al., *Hazing in the U.S. Armed Forces,* 65.

be misleading because at the time of this paper no reliable database exists to track the phenomenon within the military.[37]

Defining Hazing

This section describes the path to a working hazing definition for the military. It begins with an overview of hazing-related court cases that provided material for inclusion into the military definition. Next, this section will review the U.S. military's definition of hazing and describe methods, intent, and location of hazing.

Hazing and the Law

Researchers and lawmakers do not have a common definition of hazing. This may be a reason for the difficulty in recording hazing events. Goldstein noted that "hazing is a mixture of practices that appear harmless and playful, but with injurious acts that clearly qualify as low-level aggression."[38] Hoover defined hazing as humiliating, degrading, abusive, or potentially dangerous activities expected of new members to join a group.[39] These are two examples of numerous hazing definitions used for scholarly studies, this is one of the reasons many hazing studies should be interpreted with caution. The law has helped establish what hazing is not.

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[37] Keller et al., *Hazing in the U.S. Armed Forces*, 65.

[38] Arnold P. Goldstein, *The Psychology of Group Aggression* (New York: Wiley & Sons, 2004), 48.

[39] Hoover, "National Survey: Initiation Rites and Athletics for NCAA Sports Teams," 9.

Early North American Civil law established that consent does not justify hazing or any kind of abuse. Consequently, most common law cases today still reject consent as a defense in criminal law cases.[40] As of 2013, all but six states have enacted criminal or civil anti-hazing statues.[41] Sixteen U.S. states added anti-consent hazing laws to thwart subjective interpretations of hazing, the military policy followed suit and explicitly states that no one can consent to haze.[42]

The Military Defines Hazing

The hazing definition has also plagued the military, but the significant effort has been made to define hazing. The military has updated its 1997 definition of hazing. Military officials surveyed the force for the prevalence of hazing and hired scholars to help the military refine their hazing definition.[43] The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed the Army's training materials and recommended that the Army produce refined case studies that help distinguish between permitted and non-permitted activities."[44] GAO recommendations included that the hazing definition should include:

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[40] Gregory S. Parks and Tiffany F. Southerland, "The Psychology and Law of Hazing Consent," *Marquette Law Review* 97, no. 1 (2013): 8.

[41] Ibid., 15; Roosevelt, 6.

[42] Parks and Southerland "The Psychology and Law of Hazing Consent," 16.

[43] Keller et al., *Hazing in the U.S. Armed Forces*, x.

[44] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), GAO-16-226, *Actions Needed to Increase Oversight and Management Information on Hazing Incidents Involving Servicemembers* (Washington, DC: GAO, 2018), 23, accessed December 1, 2018, https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675040.pdf.

non-sanctioned activities that support initiations; defining the roles of authorities and individuals associated during hazing events and describe harm in less broad terms.[45]

As a result, the military created a strong definition of hazing. Hazing according to DODI 1020.03 occurs when a person is subjected "physically or purpose of initiation or continued membership into a military or DOD-affiliated organization without military or government purpose."[46] Hazing does not include properly command directed activities such as administrative corrective measures, extra military instruction or command authorized physical training.[47] A clear definition of hazing in the military creates an opportunity for replicated research. This is one of the reasons for the creation of a new survey specific to the military. So far, this chapter has discussed problems associated with defining hazing. The next section will discuss theories explaining hazing and the impact of hazing in the Army.

The Hazing Policy

DOD Instruction (DODI)1020.03 describes hazing as a form of unauthorized harassment "with a nexus to military Service."[48] Hazing is characterized as unauthorized actions linked to service with no government purpose. The definition explains harassment

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[45] Keller et al., *Hazing in the U.S. Armed Forces*, xi.

[46] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1020.03, *Harassment Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 8, 2018), 11.

[47] Ibid., 13.

[48] Ibid., 11.

as a function of hazing, however, hazing can also characterize more serious misconduct, such as assault, which turns the act from an administrative issue to a legal issue.

Physical

DODI 1020.03 states that hazing may physically injure or create a risk to injury. Furthermore, the following actions describe hazing as "striking another person in any manner or threatening to do the same."[49] This means hazing covers the small actions that may not cause hospitalization, but they can create a climate complicate for more dangerous activities. Research on problematic behaviors in the military suggests that service members with a propensity to haze require environments that seem to tolerate hazing behavior.[50] Physical injury is the most visible form of hazing, yet psychological injury carries severe consequences also.

Other forms of physical hazing include "Branding, handcuffing, duct taping, tattooing, shaving, greasing, or painting another person; Subjecting another person to excessive or abusive use of water: Forcing another person to consume food, alcohol, drugs, or any other substance."[51]

Psychological

Hazing may also psychologically injure or create a risk to psychological injury. This form of hazing is characterized by "encouraging another person to engage in illegal,

[49] Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, DODI 1020.03, 11.

[50] Marquis et al., *Improving Oversight,* 17.

[51] Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, DODI 1020.03, 11.

harmful, demeaning or dangerous acts;" "playing abusive or malicious tricks" "Encouraging another person to engage in illegal, harmful, demeaning or dangerous acts."[52] Hazing also includes participating or supporting the hazing activity. DODI explains this action as "soliciting, coercing, or knowingly permitting another person to solicit or coerce." Hazing can occur in a deployed environment, on a base or off base and even on the internet. DODI 1020.03 states "hazing can be conducted through the use of electronic devices or communications, and by other means including social media, as well as in person."

Intent

All the aforementioned acts are reportable offenses, but they do not become hazing unless one of them is conducted for the purpose of inclusion into a group or continuance in a group. Activities such as new affiliation with, change in status or position within, or a condition for continued membership in any military organization are norms because the military requires constant personnel changes. Therefore, hazing threatens military organizations continuously and existentially because may occur as an obtuse event in one location, a sporadic series of events in another location, or as a tradition in another location.

Location

Hazing may be confused with other military activities. The Army promotes healthy physical training and marks physical prowess as a requirement for excellence and

[52] Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, DODI 1020.03, 11.

professionalism. Other Army tasks require physical and mental endurance in combat and in training environments. Tasks may include the emplacement of obstacles, changing oversized truck tires, lifting heavy equipment, or carrying an injured soldier to safety. These group relevant tasks may cause some false reports. Comino explained that group relevant activities such as military-related tasks may require hard work.[53] For this reason hazing, the military-hazing definition was required to distinguish sanctioned from non-sanctioned hazing activities. The new instrument was developed to address this particularly.

Participation

Research indicates that hazing beliefs are developed from experiences prior to joining the military.[54] Hamilton et al, who measured the hazing attitudes of varsity high school athletes reported a positive correlation between hazing attitudes and previous hazing experience.[55] This is significant because the Army receives new recruits daily, therefore, hazing will be a persistent threat to military organizations. Why people do or do not participate in hazing will be discussed through related theories.

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[53] Aldo Cimino, "The Evolution of Hazing: Motivational Mechanisms and the Abuse of Newcomers," *Journal of Cognition and Culture* 11, no. 3-4 (2011): 241-266.

[54] Ryan Hamilton, David Scott, Diane LaChapelle, and Lucia O'Sullivan. "Applying Social Cognitive Theory to Predict Hazing Perpetration in University Athletics," *Journal of Sport Behavior* 39 (2016): 269.

[55] Ibid., 270.

Hazing Theories

Groupthink

People may haze because they may become overwhelmed by events. Groupthink theory provides an explanation. Groupthink threatens every military formation because cohesiveness distinguishes one unit from the other. Street and Anthony described groupthink as a condition that leads groups to produce poor decisions that ultimately lead to grave consequences.[56] Street and Anthony wrote that three conditions are required for a groupthink situation: "group cohesiveness," "a provocative situational context," and structural faults."[57] Group cohesiveness is the most important antecedent for groupthink behavior.[58]In the provocative situational context, according to Street and Anthony, the group has made poor decisions previously and the group questions its morality standards and its ability to make competent decisions.[59] This condition makes the group vulnerable to a crisis situation, subsequently, the group seeks concurrence in decision making.[60] For example, a unit may have performed poorly in a field training exercise. Later, the same unit may lose a sensitive piece of equipment. Next, the unit must decide to report the information or attempt to find the equipment later. Team members will offer different

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[56] Marc D. Street and William P. Anthony, "A Conceptual Framework Establishing the Relationship Between Groupthink and Escalating Commitment Behavior," 28 *Small Group Research* 28, no. 2 (1997): 267-269.

[57] Ibid., 269.

[58] Ibid., 270.

[59] Parks and Southerland, "The Psychology and Law of Hazing Consent," 29.

[60] Ibid.

suggestions for solving the problem. The probability of poor decision increases because group solidarity is more important than doing the right thing.

Structural faults, the third condition of groupthink, directly relates to Army organizations. It is possible in Army organizations for some influential group members to practice lack impartiality when making decisions. Although the Army tries to diversify groups, some Army groups lack diversity in ideas. A lack of impartial leadership and diversity of backgrounds and ideologies describe faulty structures.[61] Groups that have all three conditions are more likely affected by groupthink, however, groups that can control the other two areas or more resistant to poor judgment.[62]

Justification

People allow themselves to be hazed because they want to earn their place in the group. Scholars suggest that people's private justification motivate their commitment to a failing course of action.[63] Dr. Whyte noted that people with high self-efficacy have a higher propensity to commit to a losing course of action.[64] Self-presentation theorists

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[61] Parks and Southerland, "The Psychology and Law of Hazing Consent," 29.

[62] Street and Anthony, "A Conceptual Framework," 286

[63] D. Ramona Bobocel and John P. Meyer, "Escalating Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Separating the Roles of Choice and Justification," *Journal of Applied Psychology* (June 1994): 360; K. Gordon, H. Hall, and B. Blankenship, "Hazing Revisited!? An Institutional Self Study," *Southern College Personnel Association Journal* 2 (1979): 33-34.

[64] Glen Whyte, Alan M. Saks, and Sterling Hook, "When Success Breeds Failure: The Role of Self-Efficacy in Escalating Commitment to a Losing Course of Action," *Journal of Organizational Behavior* 18, no. 5 (1997): 427, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3100213.

support the concept that employees operate consistent with organizational values.[65] This is important because the self-presentation is important to military cultures. Peer groups reflect self-presentation. The negative effect of self-presentation cultures is that many people are unwilling to admit failure and the resistance to change.[66] Hazing occurs even though members know that the actions that take place are hazing. Baier and Williams reported that "primary hindrance" to reducing hazing is the "it's somebody else's problem syndrome" among fraternity members.[67]

Affect

Affect theories purport that groups develop effective reactions to situations. Groups foster environments that mimic body language, facial expressions, and movements to homogenize the group.[68] This relates to the Army because soldiers learn military custom and courtesies and are expected to perform tasks in a military manner.

[65] Michael G. Bowen, "The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsidered: Decision Dilemmas or Decision Errors?" *Academy of Management* 12 (January 1987): 54; Parks and Southerland, "The Psychology and Law of Hazing Consent," 27.

[66] Parks and Southerland, "The Psychology and Law of Hazing Consent," 27.

[67] John L. Baier and Patrick S. Williams, "Fraternity Hazing Revisited: Attitudes Towards Hazing," *Journal of College Student Personnel* 24 (1983): 304.

[68] Jennifer R. Spoor and Janice R. Kelly, "The Evolutionary Significance of Affect in Groups: Communication and Group Bonding," *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* (October 2004): 403.

Aronson and Mills demonstrated that a trial for entrance makes members feel more closely associated with a group.[69]

Obedience

Milgram's Obedience to Authority theory may provide insight to hazing in the military. The theory suggests that followers see themselves as following orders rather than contriving evil.[70] Zimbardo complimented Milgram's study by asserting that authority figures must garner legitimacy; that people falsely assume they have personal control when in fact social forces play a large role in determining actions; that evil deeds are a product of good bureaucracy.[71] According to Milgram, obedience is a highly desired unquestioned operative norm in institutions of high cultural status, the military was one of his examples.[72] In high cultural status organizations like the military, legitimacy goes unquestioned and consequently "illegitimate authority" may be able to

[69] Elliot Aronson and Judson Mills. "The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group," *Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology* 59 (1959): 177–81.

[70] Thomas Blass, "The Milgram Paradigm After 35 Years: Some Things We Now Know About Obedience to Authority," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 29, no. 5 (May 1999): 955-978; Stanley Milgram, "Behavioral Study of Obedience," *Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology* 67, no. 4 (October 1963): 371, 373-374, 376.

[71] Philip G. Zimbardo, "On Obedience to Authority," *American Psychologist* 29 (1974): 566.

[72] Arthur G. Miller and Barry E. Collins, "Perspectives on Obedience to Authority: The Legacy of the Milgram Experiments," *Journal of Social Issues* 51, no. 3 (1995): 8.

operate with unquestioned impunity.[73] This is important because the Army is subject to mindless obedience because of the nature of military authorities.

Automatic Accrual

Automatic Accrual theorist Aldo Comino, stated that hazing has four observable characteristics—*temporary* because it is restricted to newcomers early in their tenure; *unidirectional* because veteran group members may subject other veterans and newcomers to treatment but newcomers never subject veterans to mistreatment; *coercive* because hazing is presented to newcomers as a social obligation, and *coalition* because hazing is seen as an aggregation of communal experiences.[74]

The automatic accrual theory Comino suggests that enduring coalitions developed throughout many ancestral environments and over time generated a significant amount of group benefits (status, protection, common property).[75] These strongly cooperative groups generate high levels of automatic benefits so hazing serves as a function to prevent newcomers from attempting to exploit the benefits.[76] As a consequence hazing strategies were developed to dissuade newcomers from exploiting benefits.[77]

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[73] Miller and Collins "Perspectives on Obedience to Authority," 9.

[74] Aldo Cimino, "Predictors of Hazing Motivation in a Representative Sample of the United States," *Evolution and Human Behavior* 34, no. 6 (2013): 447.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid., 448.

[77] Ibid., 447.

Reporting and Whistleblowers

Bystanders also have an option to report or blow the whistle when they observe hazing events. Near et al noted that empirical research ranging a variety of studies for nurses, internal auditors, federal employees, and manager describe whistleblowing as "the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action."[78]

Challenges for Whistleblowers

Once bystanders become whistleblowers, they may experience paradoxical consequences. On one hand, whistleblowers are seen as highly ethical and moral by their peers. While on the other hand, group research suggests that whistleblowers are evaluated by their peers as relentless and at times they are seen as too ethical.[79] Jennifer K. Bosson et al. noted that whistleblowers serve as a bonding agent for wrongdoers because when a person who whistle-blows or stops the group from having fun can quickly cause

[78] Janet P. Near, Michael T. Rehg, James R. Van Scotter, and Marcia P. Miceli, "Does Type of Wrongdoing Affect the Whistle-Blowing Process?" *Business Ethics Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (2004): 221.

[79] Barbara Culiberg and Katja Katarina Mihelic, "The Evolution of Whistleblowing Studies: A Critical Review and Research Agenda," *Journal of Business Ethics* 146, no. 4 (December 2017): 798.

individuals to become close because of a common enemy.[80] Furthermore, the group may attempt to punish the whistleblower as not supporting the team.

Whistleblower apathy may be linked to the belief that nothing will be done if they report violators or violations. Near et al conducted research on military services members and reported that although some respondents recognized wrongdoing, many would not report the wrongdoing because they believed nothing would be done.[81] A problem with this insightful Near et al reported this insightful information based on self-reported evidence from the survey participants' recollection of past events.[82] Near et al also reported that subjective memory caused problems in their research because some of the whistleblowers may have had remorse about whistleblowing due to negative evaluation reports post reporting the incident, time lags, and lack of input from those accused of wrongdoing by the whistleblowers caused issues with understanding the problem.[83] Culiberg and Mihelic noted the stigma of being called a troublemaker may cause some potential whistleblowers to resist reporting infractions to internal reporting agents.[84]

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[80] Jennifer K. Bosson, Amber B. Johnson, Kate Niederhoffer, and William B. Swann Jr., "Interpersonal Chemistry Through Negativity: Bonding by Sharing Negative Attitudes About Others," *Personal Relationships* 13 (2006): 135.

[81] Near et al., "Does Type of Wrongdoing Affect the Whistle-Blowing Process?," 238.

[82] Ibid., 239.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Culiberg and Mihelic, "The Evolution of Whistleblowing Studies," 798.

Like Near et al and Cho and Song, who conducted research in the civilian workforce, noted that whistleblowing decreases when employees perceive nothing will be done to correct the wrongdoing.[85] Cho and Song also reported that older, mature, tenured, higher educated, strong performers and higher level employees are more likely to blow the whistle because their commitment obligates them to protect the organization.[86] This idea is not the case in army situations, whistleblowers have been more junior soldiers as opposed to higher-ranking soldiers.[87] No substantiated hazing complaints were made by Army leaders in the rank of E-5 and above in the entire 2017,[88] For this reason, the participant populations will include high concentrations of Army service members in this population.

Culiberg and Katarina describe whistleblowing as a "complex phenomenon" that requires wrongdoers to commit the act; whistleblowers, who report the act; and recipient to record the report.[89] All the agents play a role in hazing, but, this research will focus on the whistleblower's ability to report the act. Furthermore, Culiberg and Mihelic suggested that whistleblowers must have "privileged access" that an act of wrongdoing occurred

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[85] Yoon Jik Cho and Hyun Jin Song, "Determinants of Whistleblowing within Government Agencies," *Public Personnel Management* 44, no. 4 (December 2015): 455.

[86] Ibid., 454.

[87] Cho and Song, "Determinants of Whistleblowing,"454.

[88] DOD, *Hazing Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces: 2016-2017,* 56.

[89] Culiberg, and Mihelic, "The Evolution of Whistleblowing Studies," 788.

and the organization has the capacity to respond to the action.[90] Culiberg and Mihelic acknowledged a gap in whistleblowing research is that most of the research participants had students serve as proxies for organizational employees.[91] This research project inherently helps the body of research because only active duty Army soldiers will take the survey.

Culiberg and Mihelic also suggested that most whistleblowing research instruments projected general actions to describe wrongdoing, such as using words like theft and illegal. This may have biased responses from survey participants. For this reason, they recommended specific scenarios that describe events.[92] This further convinced the student researcher that a more nuanced survey instrument is needed.

My research for this thesis directly operationalizes Near et al and Mohelic and Katrina's suggestion that the control variable should be measured by the type of wrongdoing and the instrument should scenario based.[93]

Potential whistleblower situations are similar to bystander situations for two reasons. One, like bystanders, whistleblowers experience ethical dilemmas the wrongdoing presents a conflict of interest for the decision maker. Two, like bystanders, whistleblowers act as responsible agents who make decisions that carry ethical relevance

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid., 790.

[92] Culiberg, and Mihelic, "The Evolution of Whistleblowing Studies," 791.

[93] Ibid., 792.

to others.[94] Third, like bystanders, whistleblowers are less likely to report wrongdoing when others are present during the incident.[95]

Organizational Challenges

The persistent transparency required to gain real-world observations requires a major commitment. Analoui and Kakabadse described this situation as "untouchable subjects" and noted that many practitioners practice "what you don't know doesn't hurt" approaches toward forbidden actions.[96] The lack of research on hazing may be a result of a reluctance to report negative organizational information.[97] It is also difficult to find strong data of observations in real work life settings because longitudinal studies require a large commitment.[98] One, researchers must dedicate time studying an environment for an extended period of time. Two, organizations must commit time and access to

[94] Ibid., 793.

[95] Ibid., 796.

[96] Farhad Analoui and Andrew Kakabadse, "Unconventional Practices at Work: Insight and Analysis Through Participant Observation." *Journal of Managerial Psychology* 7 (1992): 3; Mary Rowe, "Fostering Constructive Action by Peers and Bystanders in Organizations and Communities." *Negotiation Journal* 34, no. 2 (April 2018): 142.

[97] Yoav Vardi and Ely Weitz, "Using the Theory of Reasoned Action to Predict Organizational Misbehavior." *Psychological Reports* 91, no. 3 (December 2002): 1027; Analoui and Kakabadse, "Unconventional Practices at Work," 3.

[98] Vardi and Weitz. "Using the Theory of Reasoned Action to Predict Organizational Misbehavior," 1027.

researchers. To research misbehavior in organizations, Analoui and Kakabadse conducted "over 10,000 hours" and over "6 years" of undercover research.[99]

Israeli Defense Force Whistleblower Study

Ellis and Arieli examined combat officers in the Israeli Defense Force. Like the U.S. Army, IDF members may report to several channels within the chain of command and external to the chain of command. The IDF can report to an Ombudsman, Public Relations officer, the IDF Attorney General, or the Investigation Division.[100] Meanwhile, military service members may blow the whistle to the chain of command, their congressman, the Inspector General, or the Equal opportunity officer. Additionally, like the U.S. Army, the IDF attempts to inculcate organizational values.

The study measured whistleblowing in the IDF and focused on officer responses to illegal activities. The report revealed that subjective norms best predicted responses and that they also serve as a mediator for intentions.[101] The subjective norm represents a combination of personal beliefs and group beliefs surrounding the particular activity that one should perform or not perform.[102] Another informative piece of information from

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[99] Analoui and Kakabadse, "Unconventional Practices at Work," 4.

[100] Shmuel Ellis and Shaul Arieli, "Predicting Intentions to Report Administrative and Disciplinary Infractions: Applying the Reasoned Action Model," *Human Relations* 52, no. 7 (July 1999): 950.

[101] Ellis and Arieli, "Predicting Intentions to Report," 959, 962.

[102] Ibid., 961.

this study was that attitudes did not serve as the best predictors for intentions.[103] This is significant because it corresponds with Azjen's observations that context and subjective norms serve as better indicators of behavioral intentions predictions.[104] Therefore, this served as another compelling reason not to measure attitudes in the new instrument.

Theoretical Framework

This research project integrates three major theories to create establishment measurements.

Theory of Reasoned Action

The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) originated in social psychology. The theory generally explains the relationship between beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors and argues that behavior and intentions can be predicted based on behavioral, normative, and control beliefs.[105]

Theory of Planned Behaviors

The theoretical framework that I will use for this study is the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) by Icek Ajzen which asserts that behavioral intentions serve as the best

[103] Ibid., 962.

[104] Icek Ajzen, "The Theory of Planned Behaviour: Reactions and Reflections," *Psychology & Health* 26, no. 9 (2011): 1119.

[105] Sergey Yuzhanin, David Fisher, "The Efficacy of the Theory of Planned Behavior for Predicting Intentions to Choose a Travel Destination: A Review," *Tourism Review* 71, no. 2 (2016): 135.

predictor of the behavior in question.[106] This method of inquiry was developed based on TRA, and the health care community significantly applies this method for exploratory research for high risk or ethically risky situations.[107] TPB consists of three factors concerning the participants 1) attitudes about the likely outcome of the behavior; 2) beliefs about the normative expectations of others; 3) and beliefs about the authority or power to control of their actions in the situation.[108]

Greaves et al summarized the factors summarized the TPB factors more concisely. Attitudes encompass the overall evaluation of the behavior, meaning, how participants evaluate the outcomes of the actions.[109] Subjective norms encompass the participants' beliefs and perceived social pressure to perform an activity.[110] Perceived Behavioral Control is the individual's perception of how hard it would be to perform the behavior.[111]

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[106] Icek Ajzen and Sana Sheikh, "Action versus Inaction: Anticipated Affect in the Theory of Planned Behavior," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 43, no. 1 (2013): 155.

[107] Martin Greaves, Lara D. Zibarras, and Chris Stride, "Using the Theory of Planned Behavior to Explore Environmental Behavioral Intentions in the Workplace," *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 34 (2013): 110.

[108] Ajzen and Sheikh, "Action versus Inaction," 155; Yuzhanin and Fisher, "The Efficacy of the Theory of Planned Behavior for Predicting Intentions to Choose a Travel Destination," 135; Greaves, Zibarras, and Stride, "Using the Theory of Planned Behavior," 110.

[109] Greaves, Zibarras, and Stride, "Using the Theory of Planned Behavior," 110.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Ibid.

Critiques of the TPB assert that behavioral intentions are best expressed if the behavior in question is under volitional control; meaning if the person can decide at will to perform or not perform the behavior.[112] A critique of TPB scenarios based on behavioral intentions models indicated that clear right answer scenarios rarely characterize real situations.[113] There, scenarios were developed to present multiple dilemmas to reflect the complex environments associated with hazing events. At the same time, the scenarios will clearly define hazing. Another weakness in TRB is a time-lag between the behavior and the measurement.[114] To fill this gap, the scenarios were designed for the participants to provide immediate feedback.

To address volitional control, since hazing occurs as a means of indoctrination, bystanders are always present when hazing occurs. Hazing may also occur as a form of harassment, assault, or occur in conjunction with sexual assault or harassment. Academic research may provide anecdotal and empirical links to the exploration of hazing in the military environment.

Bystander Theory

Bystanders will serve as the agents for responses in this thesis project. "Bystanders are individuals or groups of individuals who are present when someone needs help or when some sort of negative behavior (like bullying or harassing comments)

[112] Ajzen and Sheikh, "Action versus Inaction," 155.

[113] Ajzen, "The Theory of Planned Behavior," 1123.

[114] Ibid.

is taking place."[115] Early studies focused on bystander apathy. Researchers attempted to discover why "bystanders in groups" did not act to prevent poor misconduct.[116] Bystanders were present in one-third of sexual assaults in victim reports.[117] "Bystanders are also present across a variety of interpersonal violence situations (including peer bullying, child maltreatment, intimate partner violence, and sexual assault)."[118]

Dr. Victoria Banyard directly linked sexual harassment to sexual assault. Her work suggests that bystanders can improve prevention in reporting of sexual harassment. She theorized that a bystander must consider four things before deciding to act: 1) notice the event; 2) interpret the event as a problem; 3) assume personal responsibility for doing something, and 4) decide how to intervene.[119] Hazing is linked to sexual assault and harassment. A RAND study confirmed that "34% of male victims and 7% of female victims experienced sexual assault in conjunction with a hazing incident."[120]The males reported multiple sexual assaults as acts of humiliation. "More than one-half of all men and women in the active component who experienced such violations said it was ongoing

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[115] Victoria L. Banyard*, Toward the Next Generation of Bystander Prevention of Sexual and Relationship Violence* (New York: Springer Verlag, 2015), 3.

[116] Ibid., 8.

[117] Ibid., 9.

[118] Ibid.

[119] Kathryn J. Holland, Verónica Caridad Rabelo, and Lilia Cortina, "See Something, do Something," " *American Journal of Community Psychology* 58, no. 1 (September 2016): 4.

[120] Marquis et al., *Improving Oversight,* xix.

for a few months to a year or more."[121] This research project assumes that Dr. Banyard's theory applies to Army/ DoD service members that encounter a hazing event.

Other bystander research teams explored the significance of the relationship between bystanders and perpetrators and found that bystanders were less likely to intervene when they knew the perpetrators, this is significant because most Army/DoD hazing bystanders know the perpetrators.[122] To date, this question has not been explored in the military context. Another interesting observation from Holland et al was this statement, "although officers have more power, they are less likely to directly intervene during sexual assault situations."[123] This may explain why reporting of hazing events is almost non-existent from military officers. A survey recommended that more research should be conducted on how when and why people intervene or not intervene to forestall sexual misconduct.[124] Milgram's experiments directly contribute to bystander research because during one of his experiments the peers who did not directly conduct the harmful behavior also do not act to stop the harmful behavior.[125]

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[121] Ibid.

[122] Sidney Bennett, Victoria L. Banyard, and Katie M. Edwards, "The Impact of the Bystander's Relationship with the Victim and the Perpetrator on Intent to Help in Situations Involving Sexual Violence," *Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 32, no. 5 (March 2017): 682-702.

[123] Holland, Rabelo, and Lilia Cortina, "See Something, do Something," 11.

[124] Holland, Rabelo, and Cortina, "See Something, do Something," 14

[125] Miller and Collins, "Perspectives on Obedience," 7.

Compliance Factors

Because no empirical research exists to show why service members do not comply, the current study focuses on examining factors that may in part explain compliance with the hazing policy. That is, what factors affect whether bystanders participate, whether they stop the hazing event, or whether they report the hazing event to the proper authorities? This study proposes two factors: the type of hazing event, and the relative rank of people present during the hazing event.

Hazing Event

Types

As a result of research into military hazing, the RAND study produced a taxonomy to describe the most common types of hazing found in the military, the terms are as follows: celebration rituals, newcomer testing, and maintenance of group structure.[126] The taxonomy helps illustrate that hazing is "not defined by the activities or goals but by characteristics: coercive, abusive, illegitimate versions of sanctioned practices."[127]

Sanctioned *celebration rituals* occur during several periods within the military. Some examples are tough culmination events prior to graduation for new recruits and promotion and duty appointment ceremonies recognizing assumptions of command,

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[126] Keller et al., *Hazing in the U.S. Armed Forces*, 31. Note: for the purpose of this study, celebration replaces the term initiation ritual to reduce ambiguity between initiation practices and newcomer practices.

[127] Keller et al., *Hazing in the U.S. Armed Forces*, 33.

duties, or responsibilities. However, unsanctioned hazing activities such as "blood wings" and "cherry blasts" have ad hoc practices that lead to more dangerous results.[128]

Sanctioned *newcomer testing* activities also occur in the military. Leaders must demonstrate competence in areas unique to the local environment prior to assuming roles. For example, many installations require administration and successful completion or safety, security, and equipment training. Special Operations units may include additional screening and testing for admittance into the units.[129] However, unsanctioned *newcomer testing* practices may result in hazing. Examples of newcomer hazing may include may system for indoctrinating cadets at the service academies where senior cadets and midshipmen add additional screening measures for younger class-men.[130] Younger cadets and midshipmen experience situations such as having their uniforms trashed, being pelted with water balloons, public humiliation, forced exercise and excessive servitude to upper class-men.[131]

Sanctioned maintenance of the group normally comes in the form of peer accountability. In initial military training, new Army recruits are assigned peers as battle buddies. The battle buddies are expected to account for one another and serve as accountability partners. Peers are expected to police deficiencies within the teams. Even senior level military leaders expect peer leadership as a sign of expertise. This practice is

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[128] Ibid., 34-36.

[129] Ibid., 37.

[130] Ibid., 38.

[131] Keller et al., *Hazing in the U.S. Armed Forces*, 38-39.

also common in the USMC. Many leaders expect peers to correct minor infractions. However, this activity may become hazing when oriented in the wrong direction.

Four hazing theories are tied to this form of hazing. Group commitment and liking theories hold that the hazed are willing to endure hazing because it expresses their commitment to the group.[132] Group dependency theory states that hazing can provide a "Stockholm Syndrome-like affiliation" to the group.[133] Commitment display theorists argue that existing members feel that newcomers must demonstrate their loyalty to the group before acceptance.[134] Free riding theories argue that existing members feel that new members must pay a cost before receiving the benefits of the organization.[135]

Hazing to maintain the group is a form of social control form where older members seek to maintain dominance within a group.[136] This form of hazing differs from newcomer hazing because the intent of newcomer hazing is to accept members into the group with full benefits while this form of hazing seeks to normalize the authority structure in the group.[137] It is also distinctive because it is abusive.[138] An example of this form of hazing was newcomer hazing practice of a Bahrain Military Dog detachment that

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[132] Ibid., 37.

[133] Ibid.

[134] Ibid., 38.

[135] Ibid.

[136] Keller et al., *Hazing in the U.S. Armed Forces*, 39.

[137] Ibid., 39.

[138] Ibid.

forced new members to "bark like a b—h;" eat dog food; sleep in "feces-filled dog kennels.[139]" Corporal Harry Lew committed suicide while deployed to Afghanistan in 2011 after what has been characterized as hazing by members of his squad.[140] Lew's peers interpreted their squad leader's message to fix Corporal Lew's poor performance as authorization to haze. Subsequently, his peers physically abused him with punches, insulted him, and forced him to carry excessive gear.[141]

Bystanders

Peers

In large hierarchal systems, such as the military, leaders are not always available to enforce every infraction. Levine and Modica suggest that in the military milieu peer enforcement promotes the hierarchal organization.[142] Furthermore, the right to punish is not always recognized based on rank, hence, social norms may allow junior members the right to punish.[143] These norms can also counter prescribed law as members may feel "rating" on others may cause policing and ridicule by members in the group.[144] Previous

[139] Ibid, 40.

[140] Ibid., 41.

[141] Ibid.

[142] David K. Levine and Salvatore Modica, "Peer Discipline and Incentives within Groups," *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,* no. 123 (2016): 29.

[143] Ibid.

[144] Ibid., 30.

research on bystanders and hazing indicate that females display a higher propensity to intervene and recognize misbehavior.[145]

Responses

If an event is deemed to be hazing, there are three types of responses categorized as apathetic, encouragement, and interdiction. An *apathetic* response is a do-nothing response to hazing. An *encouragement* response is a response to include one's self into the hazing activity; in this study, this response is hereafter referred to as "participation". Campo et al reported that college students felt their friends' attitudes toward hazing greatly impact their decision to participate.[146] The apathetic and encouragement responses are violations of the hazing policy. An *interdiction* response is an attempt to stop the hazing on the spot or report the hazing to a higher authority. These responses are hereafter referred to as "stop" and "report" responses. An interdiction response is in compliance with the hazing policy.

Summary

Army service members are required to comply with the Army/DoD policy regarding hazing events. Compliance with the policy prohibits soldiers from articipating in hazing events. Compliance also requires soldiers who observe hazing events to stop the hazing event and to report the hazing event via the chain of command.

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[145] Holland, Rabelo, and Cortina, "See Something, do Something," 8; Adam Reid and Lauren Dundes. "Bystander Programs: Accommodating or Derailing Sexism?," *Behavioral Sciences* 7, no. 4 (2017): 5.

[146] Campo, Poulos, and Simple, "Prevalence and Profiling," 147.

However, there is evidence that Army soldiers may not be fully complying with the hazing policy. Additionally, some military members incorrectly report non-hazing activities as hazing. False reports of hazing result in loss of time and effort for investigation, as well as other harms for those falsely accused of hazing. The current study examines the factors underlying these two problems.

Most of the existent literature implies that there are many factors that influence a bystander's decision to participate or intervene in a hazing event. However, research does not address factors specific to military members' compliance with Army/DoD hazing policy when they are bystanders at hazing events in the Army.

Thesis Goals

1. Creation of a new measure, the Hazing Compliance Instrument. This process will be described fully in Chapter 3.

2. First steps to assess measurement validity/reliability. As the Hazing Compliance Instrument is a newly created measure, tests of validity and reliability are needed. For the purposes of this research project, with the time restrictions inherent in the program, the project will be of an exploratory nature. Thus, this thesis will only address these first steps towards measurement development: development of items, face validity, a test of and inter-item reliability. For exploratory purposes, descriptive statistics will be used.

3. An initial examination of reasons for non-reports of military hazing events.

The results of this qualitative analysis are intended to be used as a substrate for the future development of a validated questionnaire to inform unit leadership efforts to address barriers, specific to their units, to reporting. That is, the categories of reasons

from this study would be used as response options for a future quantitative measure that would assess reasons for failure to report.

Purpose and Hypotheses

Taken altogether, the purpose of this study is to determine whether Army service members intend to correctly comply with hazing policy and whether these two factors (i.e., type of hazing event, the rank of bystanders) influence compliance intentions. These are the hypotheses:

Question 1: Will Army service members correctly comply with hazing policy?

Hypothesis 1: Some service members will not express intentions to correctly comply with the hazing policy.

Hypothesis 1a: When an event is hazing per policy, some service members will express intentions to participate in the hazing event, some won't intend to stop the hazing event, and some won't intend to report the hazing event.

Hypothesis 1b: When an event is not hazing per policy, some service members will express intentions to stop the non-hazing event, and some will express intentions to report the non-hazing event.

Question 2: Do intentions to comply with hazing policy differ according to the type of hazing event (i.e., celebration, newcomer, and structure)?

Hypothesis 2: Intentions to comply with hazing policy differ according to the type of hazing event.

Hypothesis 2a: Compliance intentions will differ for types of hazing events.

Hypothesis 2b: Intentions to participate in a hazing event will differ based on the type of hazing event.

Hypothesis 2c: Intentions to stop a hazing event will differ based on the type of hazing event.

Hypothesis 2d: Intentions to report a hazing event will differ based on the type of hazing event.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter will describe the methodology employed in this study, including the development of a new instrument, the Hazing Compliance Instrument (HCI). This research seeks to determine whether Army service members intend to correctly comply with the hazing policy and whether the type of hazing event influences compliance intentions. The second aim of this study seeks to determine emergent themes that may affect compliance with the hazing policy.

Measures

The HCI was constructed in order to assess Soldiers' intentions to comply with DOD hazing policy. The instrument can be viewed in Appendix C. The instrument consisted of four portions: demographic items, scenarios incorporating the hazing event, behavioral intentions items assessing response to an event (i.e., stop, participate, report), one exploratory question to elicit reasons for failure to report hazing events in the U.S. Army.

Demographics

Four demographic items assessed gender, rank (i.e., enlisted, officer, warrant officer), status as a CGSC student (currently a student, not currently a student), and the number of years served as Active Duty soldier. As members had to be active duty Soldiers to be eligible to participate in the study, a fifth item asked participants to mark the DOD branch they worked for. The online survey was set up so that those who did not mark the US Army were not able to continue with the survey.

Scenarios

Six scenarios were constructed as summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. Summary of Scenarios in the Hazing Compliance Instrument

Scenario	Hazing	Event Type	Description
1	Hazing	Celebration	Newbie Tasks
2	Hazing	Newcomer	Awards Ceremony
3	Hazing	Structure	Carrying Personal Gear
4	Not Hazing	Celebration	Orientation
5	Not Hazing	Newcomer	Push-ups
6	Not Hazing	Structure	Walking to Left of Rank

Source: Created by author.

Three of the scenarios described hazing events according to the Army/DOD hazing policy. Three of the scenarios described events that were not hazing events according to hazing policy. For the three hazing scenarios, one of the scenarios represented the newcomer type of event; one represented the celebration type; one represented the structure type. For the three non-hazing scenarios, each one likewise reflected the three event types. Note that other modifications of the Hazing Compliance Instrument can be used to study other factors believed to influence bystander compliance.

To assess face validity for the scenarios, the scenarios were distributed to two experts, a DEOMI certified professional and a Student Affairs Ph.D. from Western Kentucky University. They were asked to review the scenarios to determine whether the scenario correctly represented hazing and non-hazing events, per DOD policy. They were also asked to determine what type of hazing intent was represented by the event in the scenario. See Appendix B (Scenario Validity Form). The experts provided additional

feedback to ensure the realism of scenarios matched actual occurrences. They also checked for grammatical errors as well as readability. The surveys were developed iteratively over the course of two months until all committee members and experts agreed that the scenarios matched the descriptions in Table 1.

Behavioral Intentions

Each of the scenarios described above is followed by three behavioral intentions items, totaling 18 behavioral intention items. These items were designed to measure intentions to comply with the hazing policy. Specifically, the items assess intentions to participate, stop, or report events should participants observe events described in the scenarios above. For example, the Awards Ceremony scenario was followed by three items: "When the co-worker walks by me, I would punch him in the chest, too.", representing intention to participate; "I would tell my peers to stop punching the co-worker in the chest", representing intention to stop the hazing event, and "I would tell the person above me in the chain of command about my peers punching my co-worker." representing intention to report a hazing event.

For each item, participants were directed to rate how likely they were to take the action from 1, Very Unlikely, to 7, Very Likely, if they had observed the event described in the scenario. For hazing scenarios, higher scores on Stop and Report items indicate compliance (e.g., 7, very likely to stop a hazing event). Lower original scores on participation items (i.e., 1, very unlikely) indicate compliance with DOD policy because the participants indicate they do not intend to participate in the hazing event. Participation items of hazing scenarios were reverse scored (e.g., "1" changed to "7", "2" changed to "6"). For non-hazing scenarios, the decision to participate in a non-hazing event is not

relevant to compliance. Higher original scores on intentions to stop or report would indicate lower compliance because participants intend to stop or report an event that isn't hazing. These items were also reverse scored. Therefore, across all behavioral intention items, with the exception of non-hazing participation items, higher scores are indicative of higher compliance.

Because the instrument is new, inter-item reliability will be used to assess possible sub-scales that can be derived from the 18 items. All nine behavioral intention items following the three hazing scenarios are referred to as Hazing Compliance Sub-Scale. The six-stop and report items following the three non-hazing scenarios are referred to as Non-Hazing Compliance Sub-Scale. The three participation items following the hazing scenarios are referred to as the Participate Sub-Scale. The three stop items following the hazing scenarios are referred to as the Stop Hazing Sub-scale. The three stop items following the hazing scenarios are referred to as the Stop Non-Hazing Sub-scale. The three report items following the hazing scenarios are referred to as the Report Hazing Sub-Scale. Higher scores on all sub-scales are indicative of higher compliance with the hazing policy.

Of note, these behavioral intention items were constructed in alignment with the theory of planned behavior and other behavioral intention measures. Measures of behavioral intentions have been shown to predict, to some degree, what individuals would actually do in a specific situation. This type of measure has been used in other research (e.g., crime-reporting behaviors, behavior towards other religious groups, intent to commit a crime) for which post-event research is obstructed by legal concerns and fear of consequences.

Open-Ended Question

This item was constructed to identify beliefs Soldiers have regarding reasons for non-compliance with the reporting requirement of the hazing policy: "DOD policy requires Army Soldiers who see hazing occur to report the hazing event to the chain of command. However, some hazing events are not being reported to the chain of command. Please describe what you think is the main reason(s) that hazing does not get reported to the chain of command."

Procedures

After the instrument was constructed, the instrument was piloted by 5 individuals: 4 active duty service members and one Army veteran. The group included 3 males and 2 females. After each pilot group member provided feedback, and the survey was adjusted iteratively. Of note, a member of the survey pilot group was an Army lawyer who indicated the survey did not present legal concerns. Both versions of the Hazing Compliance Instrument (i.e., original, experimental) were entered into Verint online survey software.

After receiving approval from CGSC's human protections administrator and the Army Research Institute, the student researcher compiled approximately (n=369) email addresses of active duty Army Soldiers via convenience sampling. The email addresses belonged to Soldiers who were currently enrolled in CGSC, provided by CGSC administration, as well as Soldiers who were professional acquaintances of the student researcher. Using a random sequence generator at Random.org, the email addresses were assigned to three groups to enhance the likelihood that the three groups contained an equitable distribution of current CGSC students.

The first group of the email addresses (n = 369) was designated for Part One of the study. An online link to the original version of the Hazing Compliance Instrument was sent to this group. Results from that group were quantitatively analyzed to assess inter-item reliability of scores, to assess the measure's stability in relation to the demographic variables, and examine Hypotheses 1 and 2. For this part of the study, a minimum sample size of 100 was desired so that exploratory correlations could be conducted.

Finally, Part two consisted of a qualitative analysis of the open-ended item from all participants. All prospective participants who accessed the link viewed an informed consent form (See Appendix A). After the initial recruitment email, follow-up emails were sent thereafter approximately one week apart (see Appendix _, Recruiting Materials).

Participants

Participants consisted of 111 active duty Soldiers who completed the online Hazing Compliance Instrument.

Data Analytic Strategy

With the limitations inherent in the program, only the data collected within the first two weeks of the start of recruitment were analyzed for the purpose of this master's manuscript. Because the HCI is a newly created measure, tests of validity and reliability are needed. As stated previously, the quantitative portion of this master's thesis addresses a test of internal consistency and one experimental test. The student researcher acknowledges that more extensive analyses are needed (e.g., exploratory factor analysis,

tests of assumptions) than the exploratory ones conducted herein. The following analyses were performed using SPSS v.

Quantitative Study

This portion of the study was used to assess the inter-item reliability of scores, to assess the measure's stability in relation to the demographic variables and examine Hypotheses 1 and 2.

First, cases in which respondents marked "No" to informed consent or responded to less than 10 of the 18 items were removed from the analysis. Items were reverse scored as described in the measures section. Descriptive statistics (i.e., mean, standard deviation) were calculated for the continuous variables (i.e., 18 behavioral intention items, number of years on active duty). Outliers for each item was examined such that scores with standard deviations of 3.29 or higher away from the mean for the item were retained if they were plausible (e.g., only two participants marked "1" for an item, whereas all other participants marked "2" through "7"). For participants who responded to more than 10 and less than 17 of the behavioral intention items, the incomplete data were replaced with the mean value for that item. Descriptive statistics were calculated for all participants for the total behavioral intention scores, and for all behavioral intention sub-scales, and for all event types.

To examine one indicator of the reliability of the Hazing Compliance Instrument, internal consistency was appraised via calculations of Cronbach's alpha for total behavioral intention scores and for all behavioral intention sub-scales. Cronbach's alpha values $\geq .70$ were interpreted to be good indicators of inter-item reliability whereas values $< .70$ were deemed less than satisfactory.

To examine the instrument's scores in relation to demographic variables, descriptive statistics of the behavioral intentions sub-scales and event types were calculated for the demographic sub-groups (i.e., gender, rank, and CGSC student status).

To examine hypotheses 1a and 1b, frequencies were calculated to yield percentage of those who expressed intentions to not comply (i.e., score < 7 on participate, stop, or report items) in response to hazing events, or not comply in response to non-hazing events (i.e., scores of < 7 on stop or report items). To examine hypothesis 2a, mean scores of the Hazing Compliance Sub-scale were calculated per type of hazing event. To examine hypothesis 2b, 2c, and 2d, the mean scores of the Participate, Stop, and Report Sub-Scales were calculated per hazing event type.

Qualitative Study

Qualitative data elicited by the open-ended item was analyzed using categorical coding system (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). Via this method, the student researcher created distinct categories that fully encompassed the data while removing the appearance of overlap between categories. Categories which appear related were linked to higher, emergent themes.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

This chapter will present the results of this study. The aim of this research is to determine whether Army service members intend to correctly comply with the hazing policy and whether the type of hazing event influences compliance intentions. Prior to data collection, the project received approval research from both the Army Research Institute (ARI) and the Command and General Staff College Internal Review Board. The first of this chapter reviews the results of the quantitative study. The second section of this chapter reviews the results of the qualitative study.

Quantitative Study Results

Accepted Survey Population Characteristics

After removing 7 cases due to failure to provide informed consent, and 9 cases due to incomplete data (i.e., failed to provide answers to 9 or more of the 18 behavioral intention items), the sample consisted of 111 active duty Soldiers. Of the respondents, 4.5% were enlisted, 77.5% were officer, 17.1% were warrant officers; 1 participant did not provide rank. For gender, 6.3% were female Soldiers, while 91.9% were male, and 1.8% did not provide gender. Students currently enrolled at CGSOC made up 52.3% of the participants; 43.2% indicated they were not currently students at CGSOC, and 4.5% did not respond to this item. Participants served from 2 to 26 years ($M = 14.22$, $SD = 5.49$) on active duty.

Inter-item Reliability

This portion of the study was used to assess the inter-item reliability of scores, to assess the measure's stability in relation to the demographic variables and examine Hypotheses 1 and 2. Descriptive statistics of the behavioral intentions for all participants are presented in Table 2. The following indicates the Mean (M), Standard Deviations (SD), and Cronbach Alpha values (Alpha) for the Behavioral Intentions Sub-Scales for all Participants (n = 111). Note: A higher mean score is indicative of higher intentions to comply with the DOD hazing policy.

Table 2. Behavioral Intentions Sub-Scales

Behavioral Intentions Sub-Scales	# Items	Alpha	M	SD
Total Intentions to Comply	18	0.44	5.25	1.00
Hazing Compliance*	9	0.80*	4.82	1.15
Non-Hazing Compliance*	6	0.70*	5.61	0.56
Participate	3	0.49	5.84	1.15
Stop Hazing	3	0.57	5.16	1.30
Report Hazing*	3	0.80*	3.47	1.64
Stop Non-Hazing	3	0.46	5.90	1.09
Report Non-Hazing	3	0.66	5.32	1.36

Source: Created by author.
NOTE: *The internal consistency of these sub-scales was good, as indicated by Cronbach's alpha values > .70.

Measure Stability for Demographic Sub-Groups

This portion of the study assesses the measure's stability in relation to the demographic variables. This examines Hypotheses 1 and 2. Descriptive statistics of the

behavioral intentions sub-scales for participants by demographic sub-groups are presented in Table 3. Means are represented by (M) and Standard Deviations are represented by (SD) for the Behavioral Intentions Sub-Scales by Gender, Rank, and Student Status.

Table 3. Demographic Behavioral Intentions Sub-Scales

		Female		Male		Enlisted		Officer		Warrant Officer		NOT currently a student at CGSOC		Currently a student at CGSOC	
		n = 7		*n* = 102		*n* = 5		*n* = 86		*n* = 19		*n* = 48		*n* = 58	
Behavioral Intentions Sub-Scales	# Items	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Participate	3	6.71	0.52	5.79	1.16	5.00	1.75	5.91	1.04	5.77	1.43	5.77	1.31	5.89	1.05
Stop Hazing	3	5.13	1.53	5.18	1.30	4.93	2.25	5.20	1.18	5.09	1.61	5.10	1.44	5.25	1.19
Report Hazing*	3	3.81	2.01	3.48	1.61	3.33	2.20	3.48	1.61	3.59	1.68	3.68	1.73	3.40	1.57
Stop Non-Hazing	3	5.03	1.56	5.94	1.04	6.38	1.04	5.84	1.13	6.01	0.89	5.87	1.16	5.90	1.06
Report Non-Hazing	3	5.29	1.79	5.32	1.34	5.93	0.98	5.32	1.36	5.14	1.45	5.19	1.54	5.41	1.25

Source: Created by author.
NOTE: *The internal consistency of these sub-scales was good, as indicated by Cronbach's alpha values > .70. A higher mean score is indicative of higher intentions to comply with the DOD hazing policy. Due to the small number of female, enlisted, and warrant officer participants, there is caution in interpreting comparisons with these groups.

Hypothesis 1: Not All Participants Will Express Intentions to Comply

Hypothesis 1 was not disproven because it suggested that not all participants will express intentions to fully comply with the hazing policy. From Figure 1 it is certain that all Army service members would not comply with the hazing policy. It is probable that

Army service members are more likely to comply with the non-hazing compliance than with hazing compliance. This may be explained by the tendencies of most service members not to report things to the chain of command. These results are also consistent with self-presentation theories which state that employees will operate consistent with organizational norms.[147] These results are consistent with obedience theorists who state that in high culture organizations such as the military legitimacy of authority often goes unquestioned or is assumed as legitimate until proven otherwise.[148]



Figure 1. Hypothesis 1: Hazing Compliance Results

Source: Created by author.
NOTE: Scores range from 1 to 7. Higher scores are indicative of a higher likelihood of compliance.

[147] Bowen, "The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsidered," 52.

[148] Miller and Collins, "Perspectives on Obedience," 9.

Hypothesis 1a: Intentions will not Fully Comply with the Hazing Items

Hypothesis 1a was not disproven because it suggested that not all participants will express intentions to fully comply with the hazing policy when they encounter a hazing situation. From Figure 2 it is certain that all Army service members would not comply with the hazing policy. It is also certain that reporting a hazing incident is the least preferred response to a hazing incident. On the other hand, not participating in a hazing event is the most probable response (See Figure 2). This is significant because, based on the mean scores, soldiers are almost twice as likely not to participate in a hazing event than they are to report a hazing event. Subsequently, soldiers are also more likely to intervene in a hazing event than they are to report a hazing event (See Figure 2). This may be explained by the tendencies of most Army service members not to report things to the chain of command.



Figure 2. Hypothesis 1a: Hazing Compliance Results

Source: Created by author.
NOTE: Scores range from 1 to 7. Higher scores are indicative of a higher likelihood of compliance (i.e., less likely to participate in the hazing event, more likely to stop or report it).

Table 4. Hypothesis 1a: Highest Hazing Compliance Intentions

Hazing Event Type	Very Unlikely to Participate	Very Likely to Stop	Very Likely to Report
Celebration	52.30%	23.40%	11.70%
Newcomer	38.70%	22.50%	12.60%
Structure	66.70%	53.20%	10.80%

Source: Created by author.
NOTE: Percentage of Participants (n = 111) Who Indicated the Highest Intentions to comply with DOD Hazing Policy.

The results in Table 4 also support hypothesis 1a. As hypothesized, some participants would not express intentions to correctly comply with hazing policy because

they would not endorse intentions to participate in, not stop, or not report hazing event. The percentages reflect the number of participants out of 111 who indicated that they fully intended to take the correct action in response to the event by marking 1, very unlikely, for participant items, 7, very likely, for hazing stoppages and to report items, and 1 for non-hazing stop and report items. Less than 13% of the participants indicated that they fully intended to comply with the hazing policy by reporting the hazing events, whilst more participants indicated full intentions to comply with stopping it and non-participation requirements regarding hazing events. Of note, of the three actions, the fewest number of participants indicated they were likely to participate in a hazing event. Figure 3 provides an illustration of these results.



Figure 3. Hypothesis 1a: Highest Hazing Compliance Intentions

Source: Created by author.
NOTE: Percentage of Participants (n = 111) Who Indicated the Highest Intentions to comply with DOD Hazing Policy.

Hypothesis 1b: Intentions will not fully Comply with Non-hazing Items

Hypothesis 1b was not disproven because it suggested that not all participants will express intentions to fully comply with the hazing policy when they encounter a non-hazing situation. The correct response to a non-hazing situation is not to report or stop a non-hazing situation. Figure 4 shows that it is likely that some Army service members would not comply with the hazing policy because they will stop or report a non-hazing event. This is significant because a significant amount of hazing allegations has been determined unfounded. This is not an attempt to suppress dialog between soldiers and their superiors, but it provides evidence for a need to continuously communicate standards so that soldiers will respond with confidence when they encounter similar situations.



Figure 4. Hypothesis 1b: Non-Hazing Compliance Intentions

Source: Created by author.
NOTE: Scores range from 1 to 7. Higher scores are indicative of a higher likelihood of compliance.

Table 5. Hypothesis 1b Percentage of Total Non-Hazing Compliance

Non-Hazing Event Type	Very Unlikely to Stop	Very Unlikely to Report
Celebration	45.00%	26.10%
Newcomer	43.20%	40.50%
Structure	64.90%	54.10%

Source: Created by author.
NOTE: Scores represent only the participants who (n = 111) selected the highest compliance score possible for non-hazing compliance intentions;

Hypothesis 1b was also supported in that some participants indicated they would stop or report the non-hazing events. The percentages reflect the number of participants out of 111 who indicated that they fully intended to take the correct action in response to the event by marking 1 very unlikely for non-hazing stop and report items. For non-hazing celebration events, over 70% of participants expressed some degree of willingness to report the event, though it is not a hazing event. Figure 4 provides an illustration of these results. These results are consistent with the unsubstantiated hazing complaints reported in the 2017 Hazing and Response Review as well as the 2015/2016 Hazing and Response review.[149]

[149] 2017 DoD Annual Hazing Prevention and Response Report, 13; and U.S. Department of Defense Hazing Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces Reporting Period: April 26, 2016 – September 30, 2017: 19.



Figure 5. Hypothesis 1b: Highest Non-Hazing Compliance Report

Source: Created by author.

Hypothesis 2: Overall Intentions to Comply Differ by Event Type

Hypothesis 2a: Intentions to Comply will Differ by Event

Results regarding event type for an examination of hypothesis 2a are presented in Table 6. This table reflects the Mean Hazing Compliance Scores represented by (M) and the Standard Deviations represented (SD). It is organized by Hazing Event Type for all participants and demographic Sub-Groups.

Table 6. Hypothesis 2a Compliance

Hazing Event Type	All Participants			Female		Male		Enlisted		Officer		Warrant Officer		NOT currently a student at		Currently a student at CGSOC	
		n = 111		*n* = 7		*n* = 102		*n* = 5		*n* = 86		*n* = 19		*n* = 48		*n* = 58	
	# Items	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Celebration	3	4.6	1.5	5.05	1.39	4.53	1.50	4.87	2.24	4.55	1.43	4.53	1.62	4.71	1.59	4.52	1.42
Newcomer	3	5.9	1.1	6.57	0.37	5.89	1.15	5.67	1.93	5.94	1.04	5.96	1.31	5.81	1.37	6.02	0.91
Structure	3	5.2	1.1	5.57	0.81	5.23	1.12	5.13	1.80	5.27	1.01	5.16	1.33	5.17	1.31	5.33	0.93

Source: Created by author.
NOTE: Scores range from 1 to 7. Higher scores are indicative of a higher likelihood of compliance.

The results in Table 6 provide support for hypothesis 2a, in that mean scores for intentions to comply differ according to the event type. Across all participants, and all demographic sub-groups, the intentions to comply were lowest for the Celebration event type relative to the mean scores for the other two event types. For example, the mean intention to comply score for Celebration events was 4.53 for males, which was lower than the scores for structure (5.23) and newcomer (5.89). The consistency of this pattern suggests that Celebration events are the ones most susceptible to non-compliance with DOD hazing policy by Soldiers. Across all participants and all sub-groups, the scores for the structure event type were between those Celebration and Newcomer, indicating these types of events are the next-most susceptible to non-compliance (See Figure 5).



Figure 6. Hypothesis 2a Compliance

Source: Created by author.

Hypothesis 2b, 2c, 2d: Intentions to Stop, Report, or Participate will Differ by Event

The results in Table 7 reflect the items examined in hypotheses 2b, 2c, and 2d. Table 7 expresses the effects of event type on the participants' selection of specific intentions to participate, stop, and report. The mean scores are represented by (M) and the standard deviations are represented (SD) for the Participate, Stop, and Report Sub-Scales for All Participants (n = 111) According to Event Type.

Table 7. Hypotheses 2b, 2c, 2d Compliance

Hazing Event Type	Participate		Stop		Report	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Celebration	5.41	1.71	4.71	1.84	3.53	1.92
Newcomer	5.79	1.78	4.70	2.05	3.56	2.00
Structure	6.32	1.40	6.08	1.41	3.32	1.89

Source: Created by author.
NOTE: Scores range from 1 to 7. Higher scores are indicative of a higher likelihood of compliance (i.e., less likely to participate in the hazing event, more likely to stop or report it).



Figure 7. Hypotheses 2b, 2c, 2d Compliance

Source: Created by author.
NOTE: Scores range from 1 to 7. Higher scores are indicative of a higher likelihood of compliance.

Figure 7 illustrates that of the three event types, participants were most likely to participate in the celebration event. This result surprised the student researcher because of the high amount of attention that units and soldiers receive concerning celebration activities. This may indicate that some soldiers may feel that some forms of celebration should be allowed. These sentiments were also expressed in the qualitative study and affirm the observations of automatic accrual theorist, Aldo Comino, who wrote that in ancestral type environments group members desire to ensure that new members do not exploit group membership benefits.[150] Participants were less likely to stop a newcomer or celebration event than a structured event. This result may be explained by the Army's commitment to maintaining published standards. Structured activities in the military are established during initial training and reinforced throughout the terms of service. These results are also consistent with Campo et al observations that during hazing situations, that the perceived attitudes of peers greatly impacted the decisions to participate.[151] Participants were less likely to report structure events than the other types of events. This may also be explained because soldiers feel that they have the legitimate authority to reinforce normalized standards. Celebration and newcomer events are more localized activities, therefore, soldiers may or may not fully understand the implications when they first encounter these situations. The most striking result to emerge from the data is that across all event types, reporting was the hazing policy requirement least endorsed by participants relative to not participating and stopping. This may also explain the small

[150] Cimino, "Predictors of Hazing Motivation," 448.

[151] Campo, Poulos, and Simple, "Prevalence and Profiling," 147.

number of Army hazing complaints in relation to 2015 and 2017 Hazing and Response reports.[152]

Demographic Quantitative Results

Intentions by Gender



Figure 8. Gender Comparison

Source: Created by author.
NOTE: Scores range from 1 to 7. Higher scores are indicative of a higher likelihood of compliance by gender (Because of a limited number of female participants results should be considered with caution).

[152] DOD, *Hazing Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces: 2016-2017;* U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), *Hazing Prevention and Response in the Armed Forces: Department of Defense Summary Report of Hazing in the Armed Forces: Reporting Period: December 23, 2015-April 25, 2016* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016).

Figure 8 illustrates that female participants were less likely to participate in hazing-related events than males. Females were also more likely to report hazing than males. However, Females were more likely to intervene in non-hazing events than males. This was an expected result, Holland et al and Reid and Dundes recorded that females have a higher propensity to intervene and recognize misbehavior situations.[153] Females were more likely to however, because of the limited number of female participants these results should be viewed with caution.

Intentions by Enlisted, Officer, and Warrant Officer



Figure 9. Rank Comparison Chart

Source: Created by author.
NOTE: Scores range from 1 to 7. Higher scores are indicative of a higher likelihood of compliance by the military status subcategory (Because of a limited number of enlisted participants results should be considered with caution).

[153] Holland, Rabelo, and Cortina, "See Something, do Something," 8; Reid and Dundes, "Bystander Programs," 5.

Figure 9 illustrates that there was no significant difference between the enlisted, officer, and warrant officer participants' responses to hazing events. Officer and warrant officer participants responses were slightly more compliant than enlisted, however, because of the limited number of enlisted participants these results should be viewed with caution.

Qualitative Study Results

By the time of this manuscript, 39 participants responded to the open-ended item. Participants wrote responses that indicated 3 major themes that may explain why hazing may not be reported to the chain of command in accordance with policy. About 54% of the 39 participants who provided answers to this item indicated an ambiguous definition as a reason. About 28% of participants indicated a preference to handle the situation at the lowest level. About 36% of the participants indicated that the stigma from peers and the chain of command influence reporting.

Ambiguity Definition (21/39/54%)

The ambiguous definition group included people who felt that they would need further information and context to report misconduct. Other participants presented information that demonstrated a lack of knowledge or understanding of the hazing policy. For example, one participant wrote that hazing occurs on a spectrum that "ranges from practical to harmless." Hazing has no spectrum according to the hazing policy, instead, hazing characterizes harassment or abuse not the severity or intentions of the

misconduct.[154] Another participant wrote that actions are "Not hazing since I was not compelled to participate in this activity." A person cannot voluntarily participate in unsanctioned practices according to the hazing policy hazing is all unsanctioned activities and a person cannot voluntarily.[155]A tradition vice hazing dichotomy emerged within this theme, some participants felt that their traditions provide a means to encourage esprit and satisfies the desire for new members to become a larger part of the group. However, they failed to understand the difference between sanctioned and unsanctioned events which is directly tied to the hazing policy.[156] Some of the participant responses linked together other hazing themes, where one participant commented the following: "I don't believe that the overall failure to report events in to the chain of command is a result of 'covering things up', but outside of the most egregious acts of hazing, this can often be quelled at the lowest leader levels." This leads to the second theme, handle at the lowest level.

Handle at the Lowest Level (11/39/28%)

The Army promotes a culture of leadership that expects soldiers to value duty which is defined as doing the right thing when no one is looking. Duty is often operationalized through the on the practice of making *on the spot* corrections. This norm is an expected practice by all members of the United States Army. It is referred to as general military authority in the Army Command Authority Manual AR 600-20. Which

[154] Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, DODI 1020.03, 11.

[155] Ibid., 13.

[156] Ibid., 11.

emphasizes that the most junior level soldier has the authority to correct to the most senior level soldiers who violate Army policy.

The handle at the lowest level group consisted of people who felt that an incident must reach a certain threshold prior to informing the chain command. Some participants felt that what they perceived as correctable offenses would sully the reputation of the organization if reported. Handling incidents at the lowest level also connected to the third emerging theme of peer and command perception. One participant wrote: "Keeping things at the lowest level and making those corrections is my preferred way to handle it, and I wouldn't want my peers to think I couldn't be trusted, or that I was telling on them to improve my rating."

The results of handling things at the lowest level were consistent Levine and Modica's assertion that peer enforcement prevails as a social norm in the military milieu.[157] Social norms impacted these results very similar to Eliss and Arieli's study of the Israeli Defense Forces because responses indicated a combination of strong personal beliefs and group beliefs surround the activity of corrective actions.[158]

Peer and Command Perceptions (14/39/36%)

This theme represents participants that indicated that perceived responses of peers or the chain of command would determine their willingness to report. Some wrote that reporting to the chain of command may present a "breach of trust" between them and their peers or chain of command. Some participants indicated that peers or commanders

[157] Levine and Modica, "Peer Discipline," 29.

[158] Ellis and Arieli, "Predicting Intentions," 959, 962.

may seek reprisal. One participant provided an example of this dilemma from a new team member's perspective by writing: "If you are the new guy and see something, you don't want to say anything else until you have established your reputation. But by that point, you have already let things slide for a while it might not be easy to switch your position." Some participants wrote that commanders and peers may see things differently and as a result fail to understand the severity of the incidents. One participant wrote that the chain of command to include supervisors and leaders may "condone (hazing) at worst or ignore it at best." Some of these participants also noted that in some cases command teams can be completely oblivious and removed from how their soldiers actually operate.

These results were consistent with whistleblower research that suggests that whistleblowers may become targets of reprisal.[159] These results were also consistent with Near et al research that claimed that despite the recognition of wrongdoing some people will not report because they feel that nothing will be done.[160] Culiberg and Mihelic, as well as Levine and Modica, stated that some people feared the becoming stigmatized as trouble makers were also confirmed by these results.[161] These findings were significant because the research instrument did not induce bias with the use of words such as "theft" or "illegal."[162] However, this report was inconsistent with Cho and Song's claims that

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[159] Bosson et al., "Interpersonal Chemistry," 135.

[160] Near et al., "Does Type of Wrongdoing Affect the Whistle-Blowing Process?," 238.

[161] Culiberg and Mihelic, "The Evolution of Whistleblowing Studies," 798; Levine and Modica, "Peer Discipline," 29.

[162] Ibid., 791.

higher level employees are more likely to blow the whistle.[163] Instead, the results indicate a closer alignment with a bystander and sexual assault researchers, Holland et al, who reported that rank did not significantly impact higher intervention or reporting.[164]

[163] Cho and Song, "Determinants of Whistleblowing," 455.

[164] Holland, Rabelo, and Cortina, "See Something, do Something," 11.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

The research project accomplished its goals. A new measure was created to assess hazing. This project addressed the first steps toward measurement development including the preliminary tests for face validity and inter-item reliability. Preliminary exploratory descriptive statistics show that the measure has the potential for further evaluation for validation. The measure is currently under review for additional tests for validation including all the forms of validity (e.g., factorial, both exploratory and confirmatory; convergent; divergent; predictive). Therefore, conclusions drawn from these results are contingent on further validation of the measure.

Strengths

One of the strengths of this study is that it provides an instrument suitable for measuring hazing incidents specific to the military milieu. Because the instrument tested Army culture-specific aspects of hazing, the results may be used to support future training for Army soldiers. This directly supports Goal #6 which seeks to assist in developing a greater capacity to identify, assess, and evaluate hazing.

This study also provides strong evidence that most Army Soldiers intend to comply with the hazing policy. The most significant finding of the research is that most Soldiers do not see reporting as the best solution for hazing prevention. This may indicate a misalignment of Army culture and policy. If the goal of the hazing policy is indeed a commitment to prevention a greater emphasis should be oriented toward stopping hazing. Overemphasis of reporting may cause an unintended shift from a culture of lower-level

soldiers exercising initiative in favor of recording incidents and later reporting hazing or other forms of misbehavior.

This project examined the three types of hazing. The results indicate a need for addressing celebration and newcomer hazing activities. Because the Army will continue to practice traditions and incorporate new soldiers into organizations, education and training efforts should focus on how to detect and respond to these types of events. This project also may be used to introducing preliminary scenario-based assessments for hazing. These scenario-based assessments can be conducted in conjunction with command climate surveys to identify specific unit training needs. The results from the tests would allow unit commanders to intentionally focus training in troublesome areas.

The feedback from the qualitative study demonstrated that soldiers feel a need to be connected with the unit history. Commands who devalue the opportunity to instill traditional unit and cultural values through sanctioned events may place their units at risk to clandestine and unsanctioned activities that may lead to serious injury or death.

This research project also examined non-reportable hazing events. Because some of the information presented to participants was reportable and some of the information was not reportable, the findings will allow an outside observer to understand the complexity of reacting appropriately to hazing circumstances. For example, less than a quarter of the participants expressed that they were very likely not to report a non-hazing Celebration event, less than half expressed that they were very unlikely to stop a non-hazing event. This is significant because commanders may receive a high volume of unfounded allegations. Unfounded allegations or false allegations also impact readiness and morale within the command.

The current study also provided the rare opportunity to research whistleblowing with the targeted population because the participants were measured against an actual policy that directly affects the group. The findings of this research project may provide additional information for whistleblower intentions within the Army as well as outside the Army. Additionally, this project can be replicated to produce additional research studies. This is also significant because unlike previous hazing studies, this study was conducted with and established the DOD/Army definition for hazing criteria.

Limitations

This study has a number of limitations. The sample size is limited. This study lacked the representative population of female and enlisted soldiers participating in the survey. The current pilot test was administered mainly at CGSC and the personal connections of the student researcher. CGSC consists of an officer only population. Using a pretest and posttest methodology may have provided the student researcher with the ability to measure the attitudes of contributing to responses.

The survey did not further investigate specific follow up activities that measure the number of effort soldiers would take to follow up with reportable incidents. Due to the time restrictions of this thesis project, this study was unable to complete the analysis of a third hypothesis which would have compared bystander responses with a senior bystander present.

Future Directions

Two future projects are currently in production: One project seeks to complete validation of the HCI. The second project, a qualitative study, seeks to compare bystander

intentions when senior members are present. The HCI will certify the instrument for future hazing research. The experimental hypothesis will measure the effects of senior ranking members of intentions to report.

Future studies should use the HCI to survey a population with a higher percentage of enlisted and female soldiers to provide a better representation of the population. Additionally, incorporate the HCI within command climate surveys or other Army research initiatives concerning hazing, sexual assault, or other forms of whistleblower reporting. The instrument may also provide an opportunity to establish a baseline for long longitudinal studies that may measure indications of the Army moving from hazing compliance to indications of a commitment to preventing hazing.

The HCI was originally developed to incorporate all services and DoD Civilians but was reduced to the army only after receiving Army Research Institute approval. However, with modifications, the HCI can also measure hazing compliance in the Navy, Marines, Air Force, Coast Guard, and DOD employees. Studies should focus on measuring the whistleblower's commitment to reporting. An intention to report or stop may be disrupted by resistance.

Based on the qualitative study, the Army should seek to restrict the use of the term "hazing" describe unsanctioned harassment and abuse associated with military initiation or acceptance of newcomers. Therefore, the use of terms that describe hazing such as "soft," "hard," "light" or "heavy" should be removed from the Army lexicon, because hazing is an unsanctioned activity and because it is unsanctioned the Army has no mechanism for assessing the risks. This should be expressed in training because based

on the findings of the research soldiers do not fully grasp the volatility of hazing. Future training should also systematically address non-hazing reporting.

Also based on the qualitative study, further research should be conducted to explore reporting. The research should specifically measure the impact of handling hazing at the lowest level and command and peer perceptions. This is significant because it may help indicate whether or not there are implications of organized intentions to suppress whistleblowing. In the meantime, commands should communicate the need to report issues at the appropriate level as opposed to the lowest level.

APPENDIX A

INFORMED CONSENT FORM

NOTE: The following Informed Consent will be on the first page of the online survey and on the first page of packets containing hard copies of the survey.

Please read the following information. After you have read it, you will be asked if you wish to participate in this study.

I am conducting research to see how active duty members handle certain kinds of situations.

You are invited to participate if:

*You are currently an active duty military member in the United States Army.

*You are 18 years old or older.

If you agree to be in this study:

*You will complete this survey.

*It takes about 10 minutes to do the survey.

In this survey, you will answer questions about:

*demographic information (such as gender, rank)*what you think you would do in some situations

Risks and Benefits:

*The study has few risks involved.

*Some may find the scenarios difficult to read, but the likelihood of this harming you in any way is very minimal.

*There are no direct benefits or compensation for participating in this project.

*However, study results may be beneficial to professionals in the Department of Defense.

Confidentiality:

*Your confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure.

*You will not be identified by name in any reports using information obtained from this study. *Research records will be stored securely, and only researchers will have access to the records. *Cookies, personal data stored by your web browser, are not used in this survey.

*Data from this study may be placed in a publicly available repository for study validation and further research.

*Subsequent uses of records and data will be subject to standard data use policies which protect your anonymity.

Voluntary Participation:

If you decide to participate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at any time.

Questions and Contacts:

If you have questions or concerns about this study, please contact the researchers and/or institution members listed below.

Principal Investigator:

Captain Jabari Jackson, jabari.m.jackson.mil@mail.mil or jabari.m.jackson@gmail.com, (254) 220-5089

Research Supervisors:

Major Kenneth Rich, Ph.D., kenneth.c.rich4.mil@mail.mil

Robert Salvatore, robert.l.salvatorelli.civ@mail.mil, (913) 684-4742

Vista Beasley, Ph.D., vista.l.beasley.civ@mail.mil, (913) 684-9557

APPENDIX B

EXPERT SURVEY VALIDATION

1. DOD INSTRUCTION 1020.03 HARASSMENT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE IN THE ARMED FORCES.

3.5. HAZING. A form of harassment that includes conduct through which Service members or DoD employees, without a proper military or other governmental purpose but with a nexus to military Service, physically or psychologically injures or creates a risk of physical or psychological injury to Service members for the purpose of: initiation into, admission into, affiliation with, change in status or position within, or a condition for continued membership in any military or DoD civilian organization. Hazing can be conducted through the use of electronic devices or communications, and by other means including social media, as well as in person.

a. Hazing is evaluated by a reasonable person standard and includes, but is not limited to, the following when performed without a proper military or another governmental purpose:

(1) Any form of initiation or congratulatory act that involves physically striking another person in any manner or threatening to do the same;

(2) Pressing any object into another person's skin, regardless of whether it pierces the skin, such as "pinning" or "tacking on" of rank insignia, aviator wings, jump wings, diver insignia, badges, medals, or any other object;

(3) Oral or written berating of another person with the purpose of belittling or humiliating;

(4) Encouraging another person to engage in illegal, harmful, demeaning or dangerous acts;

(5) Playing abusive or malicious tricks;

(6) Branding, handcuffing, duct taping, tattooing, shaving, greasing, or painting another person;

(7) Subjecting another person to excessive or abusive use of water:

(8) Forcing another person to consume food, alcohol, drugs, or any other substance; and

(9) Soliciting, coercing, or knowingly permitting another person to solicit or coerce acts of hazing.

b. Hazing does not include properly directed command or organizational activities that serve a proper military or other governmental purposes, or the requisite training activities

required to prepare for such activities (e.g., administrative corrective measures, extra military instruction, or command-authorized physical training).

c. Service members may be responsible for an act of hazing even if there was actual or implied consent from the victim and regardless of the grade or rank, status, or Service of the victim.

d. Hazing is prohibited in all circumstances and environments including off-duty or "unofficial" unit functions and settings.

2. Hazing Taxonomy (According to RAND's Hazing in the U.S. Armed Forces: This hazing taxonomy helps show that hazing is not defined by the activities or goals but by characteristics: coercive, abusive, illegitimate versions of sanctioned practices.

Celebration Rituals: Ceremonies and rituals that mark entry or transition. This is a command sponsored event. Used to recognize individual accomplishments.

Newcomer testing: Tests intended to prove new members' commitment or solidarity and to screen out those free riding to obtain the benefits of a group membership. This normally involves performing tasks for an unspecified amount a time. This action normally occurs during routine training.

Maintenance of group structure: Exercise of dominance by more powerful members over weaker members to maintain existing power arrangements and enforce group norms

3. Please read each scenario and answer questions after each scenario.

Scenario 1: Imagine you are standing at an award ceremony. Your coworker completed a new member leadership orientation course. One of the service members at the ceremony turns to the co-worker and says in an excited tone, "Good job!" He then punches the co-worker in the chest, hard enough so that the co-worker takes a couple of steps back to keep his balance. As the co-worker walks towards the front of the room to accept the award, other service members punch the co-worker on the chest too. People who outrank you are present when this occurs.

A. Is this a hazing event according to DOD policy?

No

Yes

B. What type of event do you think this is?

Initiation

Newcomer

Maintain Structure

C. Please provide feedback or updates to the scenario

Scenario 2

Imagine that you are in a unit that holds a command sponsored event twice a year to add members to a prestigious unit club. Before unit members agree to participate, they are told that if they want to participate, they'll have to recite unit history, recite poems, create skits commemorating unit history, and sing or create songs that express organizational values. If they mess up during these activities, they have to do a prescribed amount of push-ups exercises while another participant tries to do the activity correctly. Knowing this, some members sign up to participate. While at the event, you observe one of the participants fail to recite a unit history question. The participant is told to execute the prescribed amount of push-ups. He executes the push-ups and continues to the next station.

A. Is this a hazing event according to DOD policy?

No

Yes

B. What type of event do you think this is?

Initiation

Newcomer

Maintenance o group structure

C. Please provide feedback or updates to the scenario

Scenario 3

Imagine you observed your supervisor suggest that certain undesirable duties would only be performed by new members. According to your supervisor, these "newbie" tasks would ensure that the new members proved their commitment to the group. Your supervisor and your peers call the new team members "newbies." The new team members

do not appear to be bothered by the comments. One of the new members said “As long as I’m the new guy, I can make mistakes. Besides, when the new person shows up, I won’t have to be the new guy anymore.”

A. Is this a hazing event according to DOD policy?

No

Yes

B. What type of event do you think this is?

Initiation

Newcomer

Maintain Structure

C. Please provide feedback or updates to the scenario

Scenario 4

Imagine you are in a deployed environment. Your organization requires all new personnel to attend an orientation. The orientation is held once a month. Newcomers who haven’t attended the orientation are not allowed to go off post, have restricted access to the internet, and are not allowed to attend certain meetings. Imagine that today you are going to a meeting. Prior to attending the meeting, everyone was required to complete newcomer orientation and provide proof of identification. You observed a new team member trying to walk into the room where the meeting is. You hear one of the soldiers say to the new soldier, “Hey…You haven’t completed the orientation and you do not have your identification.” The new soldier refuses to leave the meeting and attempts to enter the meeting anyway. The security clerk states “This is a secure area and you must leave.” You then see security personnel restrain the soldier.

A. Is this a hazing event according to DOD policy?

No

Yes

B. What type of event do you think this is?

Initiation

Newcomer

Maintain Structure

C. Please provide feedback or updates to the scenario

Scenario 5

Imagine you are walking with a group of soldiers. In the group, all of you are the same rank, except one soldier who is of a lower rank. You hear one of your peers in the group telling the lower-ranking soldier that he must walk to the left of other members senior to him. The lower-ranking member says “I don’t have to and I will walk wherever I want to walk.” Three of your peers in the group tell the lower-ranking member that this is the standard, so he needs to do it. The lower-ranking member turns to you and asks for your opinion.

A. Is this a hazing event according to DOD policy?

No

Yes

B. What type of event do you think this is?

Initiation

Newcomer

Maintain Structure

C. Please provide feedback or updates to the scenario

Scenario 6

Imagine you are walking with a group of soldiers. In the group, all of you are the same rank, but one soldier who is new to your unit. You hear one of your peers in the group tell the new member to carry the rest of the group’s personal to the unit office. The new member says “I don’t have to carry your gear.” Three of your peers in the group tell the new member that new members carry older members gear. The lower-ranking member turns to you and asks for your opinion.

A. Is this a hazing event according to DOD policy?

No

Yes

B. What type of event do you think this is?

Initiation

Newcomer

Maintain Structure

C. Please provide feedback or updates to the scenario

APPENDIX C

COMPLIANCE INSTRUMENT

Copy of Survey: What would you do if this happened to you as of 12 MAR 19

SURVEY APPROVAL AUTHORITY:
U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
SURVEY CONTROL NUMBER: DAPE-ARI-AO-19-29
RCS: MILPC-3
EXPIRES: 04/11/2020

What would you do if this happened to you?

Please read the following information. After you have read it, you will be asked if you wish to participate in this study.

I am conducting research about how U.S. Army Soldiers handle certain kinds of situations.

You are invited to participate if:
- You are **currently an active duty Soldier** in the United States **Army**.
- You are **18 years old or older.**

If you agree to be in this study:
- You will complete this survey.
- It takes about **10 minutes to do the survey**.

In this survey, you will answer questions about:
- what you think you would do in some situations
- demographic information such as gender and rank

Risks and Benefits:
- The study has a few risks involved.
- Some may find the scenarios difficult to read, but the likelihood of this harming you in any way is very minimal.
- There are no direct benefits or compensation for participating in this project.
- However, study results may be beneficial to professionals in the Department of

Defense.

Confidentiality:
- Your confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure.
- You will not be identified by name in any reports using information obtained from this study.
- Research records will be stored securely, and only researchers will have access to the records.
- Cookies, personal data stored by your web browser, are not used in this survey.
- Data from this study may be placed in a publicly available repository for study validation and further research.
- Subsequent uses of records and data will be subject to standard data use policies which protect your anonymity.

Voluntary Participation:
If you decide to participate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at any time.

Questions and Contacts:
If you have questions or concerns about this study, please contact the researchers and/or institution members listed below.

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This project has been approved by
Army Combined Arms Center Human Protections Administration, tracking number _____.
Army Research Institute, survey control number DAPE-ARI-AO-19-29.

Informed Consent. Do you agree to participate in this study?

Note:

By marking yes, you are verifying that you have reviewed the above information and agree to participate in the study as described.

□ No

□ Yes

Branch to: **No Consent** (Informed Consent = No)

(End of Page 1)

Eligibility. Which Department of Defense branch do you currently work for?

□ US Air Force

□ US Army

□ US Marines

□ US Navy

□ Other

Branch to: **Not Eligible** (Eligibility ≠ US Army)

(End of Page 2)

Scenarios

The following six scenarios describe six different situations.

While reading each scenario, imagine that you are present in the situation.

Imagine what you would ACTUALLY do if you were present in that situation.

After you read each scenario, you will be asked questions about what you think you would ACTUALLY do if you were present in that situation.

Please do not consult any outside sources to answer these questions.
Please answer based on what you personally think, believe and know right now.

Do NOT answer the questions based on what you think you SHOULD do.

Please answer based on what you think you would ACTUALLY do.

Remember: Your answers are confidential and anonymous.

In the following scenarios, "**peers**" refers to people you work with who are of the **same rank/pay grade as you** in that job.

(End of Page 3)

Push-ups

Push-ups. Imagine that you are in a unit that holds a command-sponsored event twice a year. This event is one way that new members are added to a prestigious unit club.

Before unit members agree to participate in the event, they are told that if they want to participate, they'll have to recite unit history, recite poems, create skits commemorating unit history, and sing or create songs that express organizational values. If they mess up during these activities, they have to do a prescribed amount of push-ups and other exercises while another participant tries to do the activity correctly.

Knowing this, some members sign up to participate.

Imagine that you attend the event as a spectator. Some of your peers are running the event.

While at the event, you observe one of the participants give the wrong answer to a unit history question. Your peers tell the participant to do the prescribed amount of push-ups. The participant begins to do the push-ups. Some of your peers and some of the spectators cheer for the participant while he does the push-ups.

Please respond to the below items based on what you think you would ACTUALLY do if you had been at the event.

Please rate how likely you are to take the following actions from 1, Very Unlikely, to 7, Very Likely.

	1 Very Unlikely	2 Unlikely	3 Somewhat Unlikely	4 Neither Unlikely nor Likely	5 Somewhat Likely	6 Likely	7 Very Likely
I will cheer while he does the push-ups.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

I will tell my peers to not make the participant do the push-ups.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
I will tell the person above me in the chain of command about the participant being made to do push-ups.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

(End of Page 4)

Awards Ceremony

Awards Ceremony. Imagine you are standing at an awards ceremony. Your co-worker is getting an award for completing a leadership orientation course that is known to be difficult.

One of your peers at the ceremony turns to the co-worker and says in an excited tone, "Good job!" He then punches the co-worker in the chest, hard enough so that the co-worker takes a couple of steps back to keep his balance.

As the co-worker walks towards the front of the room to accept the award, other peers punch the co-worker on the chest, too.

Please respond to the below items based on what you think you would ACTUALLY do if you had been at the awards ceremony.

Please rate how likely you are to take the following actions from 1, Very Unlikely, to 7, Very Likely.

	1 Very Unlikely	2 Unlikely	3 Somewhat Unlikely	4 Neither Unlikely nor Likely	5 Somewhat Likely	6 Likely	7 Very Likely
When the co-worker walks by me, I will punch him in the chest, too.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
I will tell my peers to stop punching the co-	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

worker in the chest.							
I will tell the person above me in the chain of command about my peers punching my co-worker.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

(End of Page 5)

Newbie Tasks

Newbie Tasks. Imagine you are present when a group of peers at work are having a discussion. They agree that specific, undesirable duties are only to be performed by new members. These "newbie tasks" would ensure that the new members proved their commitment to the group.

The next day, you and some of your peers are present when a peer speaks to a new member.

The peer calls the new member "Newbie", and then tells the new member to do one of the "newbie tasks". You and your peers then watch the new member start to do the undesirable duty. As he does it, you overhear the new member say, "I don't mind. When another new person shows up, I won't have to be the newbie anymore."

Please respond to the below items based on what you think you would ACTUALLY do if you were in this unit.

Please rate how likely you are to take the following actions from 1, Very Unlikely, to 7, Very Likely.

	1 Very Unlikely	2 Unlikely	3 Somewhat Unlikely	4 Neither Unlikely nor Likely	5 Somewhat Likely	6 Likely	7 Very Likely
When I have a "newbie task" that needs doing, I will direct a new member to do it.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

I will tell my peers to stop making new members do the newbie tasks.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
I will tell my chain of command about the new member being told to do the newbie task.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

(End of Page 6)

Walking

Walking. Imagine you are walking with a group of Soldiers.

In the group, all of you are the same rank, except one Soldier who is of a lower rank.

You hear one of your peers tell the lower-ranking Soldier that he must walk to the left of the Soldiers senior to him. The lower-ranking Soldier says, “I don’t have to. I will walk wherever I want to walk.”

Three of your peers in the group tell the lower-ranking Soldier that this is the standard, so he needs to do it.

The lower-ranking Soldier turns to you and asks for your opinion.

Please respond to the below items based on what you think you would ACTUALLY do if you were present when this happens.

Please rate how likely you are to take the following actions from 1, Very Unlikely, to 7, Very Likely.

	1 Very Unlikely	2 Unlikely	3 Somewhat Unlikely	4 Neither Unlikely nor Likely	5 Somewhat Likely	6 Likely	7 Very Likely
I will tell the lower-ranking Soldier that he needs to walk to the left of the group.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

I will stop my peers from making the lower-ranking Soldier walk to the left of the group.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
I will tell my chain of command that my peers told the low-ranking Soldier to walk to the left of the group.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

(End of Page 7)

Newcomer Orientation

Newcomer Orientation. Imagine you are in a deployed environment. Your organization requires all newly-arrived personnel to complete a newcomer orientation. After completing the newcomer orientation, personnel is given documents showing they have attended it.

The newcomer orientation is held once a month.

Newcomers who haven't gone to the orientation are not allowed to go off post, have restricted access to the internet, and are not allowed to attend certain meetings.

Imagine that today you are going to a meeting. This is one of the meetings which require all attendees to have gone through the newcomer orientation. You and some peers are in the room where the meeting is going to be. It is now time for the meeting to start.

You observe a recently-arrived team member walk into the room and sit down. You hear one of your peers say to the new member, "Excuse me, but you haven't completed the orientation. You need to leave." The new member refuses to leave the meeting. The security clerk says to the new member, "This is a secure area. You must leave." The new member does not make any movement. You then see two peers go to the new member. One of them states, "It's going to be okay, but right now you need to leave".

The new member looks worried and asks for your opinion.

Please respond to the below items based on what you think you would ACTUALLY do if you were in this unit.

Please rate how likely you are to take the following actions from 1, Very Unlikely, to 7, Very Likely.

	1 Very Unlikely	2 Unlikely	3 Somewhat Unlikely	4 Neither Unlikely nor Likely	5 Somewhat Likely	6 Likely	7 Very Likely
I will tell the	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

new membe r to leave.							
I will tell my peers to leave the new member alone.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
I will tell my chain of command what my peers did to the new member at this meeting.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

(End of Page 8)

Carry

Carry. Imagine you are walking with a group of Soldiers.

In the group, all of you are the same rank, except one Soldier who is of a lower rank.

You hear one of your peers tell the lower-ranking Soldier to carry the rest of the group's personal gear to the unit office. The lower-ranking Soldier says, "I don't have to carry your gear." Three of your peers tell the lower-ranking Soldier that he does have to carry the other Soldiers' personal gear.

The lower-ranking Soldier turns to you and asks for your opinion.

Please respond to the below items based on what you think you would ACTUALLY do if you were present when this happens.

Please rate how likely you are to take the following actions from 1, Very Unlikely, to 7, Very Likely.

	1 Very Unlikely	2 Unlikely	3 Somewhat Unlikely	4 Neither Unlikely nor Likely	5 Somewhat Likely	6 Likely	7 Very Likely
I will tell the lower-ranking Soldier that he needs to carry the others' gear.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□
I will stop my peers from making the lower-ranking	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

Soldier carry their gear.							
I will tell my chain of command that my peers were making the lower-ranking Soldier carry their personal gear.	□	□	□	□	□	□	□

(End of Page 9)

Reasons

Reasons. DOD policy requires Army Soldiers who see hazing occur to report the hazing event to the chain of command.

However, some hazing events are not being reported to the chain of command.

Please describe what you think is **the main reason(s) that hazing does not get reported to the chain of command**.

Please use details and examples to help me understand your thoughts on this topic.

Your answer will be confidential and anonymous.

Demographics

D1. Which of the following best describes you?

*CGSOC = Command and General Staff Officer's Course

□ Active duty Army Soldier who is **currently a student at CGSOC**

□ Active duty Army Soldier who is **NOT currently a student at CGSOC**

D2. Approximately how many years have you been an active duty Soldier in the US Army?

Note:
For periods of 6 or more months, round up to the next higher number of years.
For periods of less than 6 months, round down to the next lower number of years.

□ 1 year

□ 2 years

□ 3 years

□ 4 years

□ 5 years

□ 6 years

□ 7 years

□ 8 years

□ 9 years

□ 10 years

□ 11 years

□ 12 years

□ 13 years

□ 14 years

□ 15 years

□ 16 years

□ 17 years

□ 18 years

□ 19 years

□ 20 years

□ 21 years

□ 22 years

□ 23 years

□ 24 years

□ 25 years

□ 26 years

□ 27 years

□ 28 years

□ 29 years

□ 30 years

□ Other _____

D3. Which one of the following categories reflect your current rank in the US Army?

□ Enlisted

□ Officer

□ Warrant Officer

D4. Are you

□ Female

□ Male

A request...

Please **do not discuss this study with other students and Soldiers** until the study is finished.

That way, we can prevent them from being biased before they take it.

(End of Page 10)

End Page: Survey submitted

Thank you for participating in this study!

I'll be sending out follow-up emails, asking people who haven't done the survey to please do it. You might get some of these even though you have already done the survey. My apologies if this happens.

If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please contact me or any of the others listed below.

Again: Thank you.

--Capt. Jabari Jackson

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End Page: No Consent

You indicated that you do not wish to participate in this study.

If this is an error, please re-enter the link and start again.

If you have any questions or concerns about this study, please contact

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End Page: Not Eligible

You indicated that you do **not** currently work for the US Army.

Thank you for being willing to help with this study.

However, this survey is **only for active duty US Army Soldiers**.

If you are not currently an active duty US Army Soldier, please do not take this survey.

If this is an error, please re-enter the link to take this survey.

If you are unsure of your eligibility to participate in this study, please contact Captain Jabari Jackson (jabari.m.jackson.mil@mail.mil or jabari.m.jackson@gmail.com, 254-220-5089).

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