Doctrine and its Use 1939-1943, Specialization of Capabilities in the U.S Infantry Division
Abstract
This study analyzes the doctrinal development and implementation of emerging technologies and how they were integrated into infantry divisions of the United States Army from 1939 through combat operations in North Africa. The concept and discussion revolve around specialized units pooled at echelons above division. The thesis discusses infantry divisions and these specialized units responsibilities' and doctrine from the 1939 and 1941 versions of FM 100-5. The thesis concludes that despite apparent risks identified by tactical commanders in the prewar maneuvers, such as lack of organic capabilities and struggles relating to rapidly integrating specialized units, the U.S. Army believed the specialization concept was the best way to build a combined arms team. The results of Kasserine pass proved, operationally, that the U.S. doctrine which had been validated in the prewar maneuvers functioned, at the cost of placing tactical units at higher risk. The study looks to explain how doctrine changed in exercises, and how it was ultimately tested in combat.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 14, 2019
- Accession Number
- AD1107104
Entities
People
- Jacob W. Knell
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College