PROFESSIONAL SPACE WARRIOR:
INTERPRETING THE GRAMMAR AND LOGIC OF MODERN WAR

BY

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About the Author

Major Matthew Lintker is a native of Illinois, and a 2005 graduate of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. His first assignment was at Malmstrom AFB where he served in a variety of nuclear missile combat crew positions. In 2009, Major Lintker transitioned to space operations and was selected to work for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) with duty at the Aerospace Data Facility-Southwest (ADF-SW) in Las Cruces, NM. After being stationed at the NRO, Major Lintker moved to Air Force space operations with an assignment to the 3d Space Experimentation Squadron and subsequently the 1st Space Operations Squadron at Schriever AFB, Colorado. Following these operations jobs, Major Lintker transitioned to staff positions at both the wing and MAJCOM level, culminating as Junior Executive Officer to the Commander, Air Force Space Command.

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to reduce ambiguity concerning the grammar and logic of *war*, *violence*, and *military professionals*. As the character of war continually changes due to technological advances and the American public progressively becomes more disconnected from the military at large, it has become increasingly difficult to ascertain the link between violence and political aims. Consequently, the line between war and peace, especially in the eyes of the American public, has become blurred. As a result, the United States continues to have a military presence in Afghanistan, and there is seemingly no end in sight. This thesis puts forth a root cause for this—the American public's lack of fluency in the language of war.

To address this issue, a translator tool for the language of war is presented, which can be used to reduce ambiguity with the critical terms war, violence, and military professional. To address the subjectivity that is normally associated with these terms, a definition of *war* and *violence* are provided as a theoretical foundation for the entire research. In turn, the nature of violence (i.e., direct or indirect) and two differing interpretations of military professionals (i.e., identity either centered on a warrior ethos or political ethos) form the structure of the translator tool. In the end, the tool is merely meant to provide context, which ultimately shows how war and peace are not dialectic, but, instead, dialogic.

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Introduction

The universal soldier endures through time—the unchanging agent of pillage, destruction, and death. He carries a torch, but not as a beacon to mankind, for he deals in fire and blood. He thrives in popular imagination, perpetuated by the fear of war itself. Song and art give him breath as the eternal, faceless killer. Even historians consecrate the universal soldier when they assert that only weapons and tactics have changed, not the men who have wielded them. But does he really exist?

John A. Lynn

War is complicated. "In theory," Martin van Creveld explained, "war is simply a means to an end, a rational, if very brutal, activity intended to serve the interests of one group of people by killing, wounding, or otherwise incapacitating those who oppose the group…[But] in reality, nothing could be further from the truth."[1] So then, what is the truth when it comes to war? In other words, is it more apt to say people *know* war or people *know of* war? Alexander Moseley felt that war is a philosophical problem because "philosophy deals with life and death, and so with peace and war."[2] There is merit to this approach, but this research aims to show that there is much more to the very complex phenomenon known as war. Multiple fields of study, such as philosophy, anthropology, sociology, and even psychology, have attempted to add to the overall comprehension of war, but no one academic field can describe the phenomenon in its entirety. Really, the only thing that can be stated with any certainty is that war is not an exact science. In fact, war is probably best understood as a series of questions instead of merely answers. This is the essence of any theory pertaining to war.

Theories are beneficial because they act as a filter through which our minds can perceive the world around us, which in turn allows us to guide and organize our thoughts.[3] But, there are limits to what a theory can do. It is common to misapply theories and force evidence into some preconceived theoretical structure. "The important thing," as put forth by Marc Trachtenberg,

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[1] Martin van Creveld, *The Culture of War* (New York, NY: Presidio Press, 2008), 1.
[2] Alexander Moseley, *A Philosophy of War* (New York, NY: Algora Publishing, 2002), 5.
[3] Everett Carl Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age* (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2005), 12.

"is to realize that theory, in itself, does not provide answers and its main function is to bring questions into focus."[4] Therefore, what question is this specific research trying to bring into focus? To arrive at an answer, it is essential to first articulate a problem the "question" is trying to address. Unfortunately, based on the context of today, it is not hard to isolate a problem with the concept of war.

In September 2018, a *USA Today* article appeared, entitled "17 years after 9/11, Afghanistan remains the war we can't win but can't afford to lose."[5] From the title of the article alone, at least three exigent problems/questions can be formulated. First, why have senior US political leaders chosen to prolong what is already the lengthiest war in American history? Second, what is preventing the US military, which is commonly perceived as the most lethal fighting force ever seen in human existence, from winning the war? Third, why has the American public tolerated US involvement, to include American casualties, for the past 17 years in a country halfway around the globe? If these questions do anything, they at least illustrate why war is best described as a series of questions and not merely answers. Regardless, what can be made of these questions, or more precisely, what other question should be asked that will hopefully provide clarity to the three already put forth?

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The Question

Aristotle stated, "asking the right question is half the answer."[6] So then, what is the right question? The position of this paper is that the question to be asked must address something fundamental to the issue at hand—specifically, interpreting the overall language of war. US Army War College instructor Antulio Echevarria II articulated why this approach is warranted. In a *Strategic Studies Institute* monograph titled, "Preparing for One War and Getting Another?," Echevarria critiqued what many pundits now refer to as the American way of war. He stated, "While the US military remains eloquent in the vernacular of battle, it

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[4] Marc Trachtenberg, *The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 33.
[5] The Editorial Board, "17 years after 9/11, Afghanistan remains the war we can't win but can't afford to lose," *USA Today*, 10 September, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2018/09/10/afghanistan-remains-war-we-cant-win-but-cant-afford-lose-editorialsdebates/1191431002/.
[6] Neil M. Browne, *Asking the Right Questions: A Guide to Critical Thinking* (New York, NY: Pearson Publishing, 2018), 2.

is still developing fluency in the language of war."[7] This distinction is of utmost importance, because the language of war is what gives meaning to the use of force.[8] According to Echevarria, the key takeaway is that "until Americans clarify the roles of grammar and logic and develop a habit of thinking about war that goes beyond battles, they will have a way of war in name only."[9] Therefore, the overarching problem this paper seeks to address is an apparent lack of fluency in the language of war. In turn, the aim of this research is to provide clarity to the logic associated with at least some of war's grammar.

The overall lexicon associated with war is vast and continually growing, so it is necessary to appropriately scope this research to something that has a semblance of attainability. Hence, this research is narrowly scoped to one specific component necessary to war—*violence*. To address nuanced interpretations of this term, however, there must first be a theoretical baseline from which to proceed. Other terms, precisely *war* and *military professionals*, must also be addressed to garnered a more comprehensive understanding of violence as it pertains to war. Also, there is an illuminating assumption that will drive this entire research, and it is the idea that the nature of violence in war is continually trending towards a more indirect nature. Consequently, this trend is causing confusion regarding the logic normally associated with the term *violence*.

To show this apparent confusion, it is necessary to analyze a specific—albeit extremely subjective—analytical vehicle that both relies on violence and can illustrate the potentially faulty logic currently associated with the term. Thus, the vehicle for this research is the individual charged by society with carrying out violence on its behalf—the *military professional*. Specifically, the identity and culture of military professionals has always revolved around violence, but as a myriad of factors continually drive the nature of violence to become more indirect, the identity of military professionals has become ambiguous. For instance, when viewing the gradient scale—and it is important to note that it is indeed a gradient scale and not a binary choice—in Figure 1, consider the following questions:

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[7] Antulio J. Echevarria, *Preparing for One War and Getting Another?* (Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, September 2010), 26.
[8] Emile Simpson, *War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), 15.
[9] Antulio J. Echevarria, *Toward an American Way of War* (Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, March 20014), vii.

(1) Where will the **next** war fall on the scale below?

(2) Where would you put **today's** military professional this scale?



Figure 1: Interpreting the Language of War
Source: Marine Corps Times Editorial, "Tell us what you think: Should Marines wait four years before going infantry?", *Marine Times*, 2 August 2018, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2018/08/02/tell-us-what-you-think-should-marines-wait-four-years-before-going-infantry/; and Stilgherrian, "Cyber Dam Busters could give Australia's military an asymmetric edge," *ZDNet*, 9 April 2018, https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyber-dam-busters-could-give-australias-military-an-asymmetric-edge/.

Next, ask the same questions, but this time speculate how the American public would answer. Additionally, does the answer to the second question change if the phrase "military *professional*" is replaced by "military *warrior?*" What is the likelihood the answers to all the questions will match? Or more importantly, does it even matter if the answers match at all? Hopefully, this exercise illustrates that the concepts of war, violence, and military professionals are often open to interpretation, especially when injecting the uncertainty inherent to the future.

In the end, almost everything pertaining to war is open to interpretation. Thus, the goal of this paper is to build a translator tool, which will ultimately aid in both deciphering and connecting the grammar and logic associated with the language of war. As it was already mentioned, there are three terms in question—war, violence, and military professionals—and all three tend to have subjective definitions that suffer from an element of mutability and shallowness in the eyes of the American public. However, one element—the military professional—is something that society has an easier chance relating to. Therefore, the people dedicated to carry out violence on behalf of society will form the basis of the all-

important question for this thesis, which is: *why should military professionals not clearly involved in direct violence have a warrior ethos*?

The Answer

Easy answers to this question are "it depends" and "just because." While accurate, this does not help address the overall problem at hand (i.e., the American public's lack of fluency in the language of war). It must be noted, however, that this research is focused more on how to address the question and not necessarily on what the answer actually is. In short, the subsequent argument is that there is not one sole answer to the question as stated, there are innumerous answers. The reason this question is chosen, though, is that it allows an audience to relate to the grammar and associate with differing logics associated with the key terms.

The proposed focus for this thesis centers on the idea that the term military professional is indelibly linked to humans and violence, but this is becoming problematic as future battlefields may have little to no human presence. The American public relies on military professionals for their security, but the American public does not have an accurate perspective of who these military professionals are. Bluntly stated, *society's perception of a military "warrior" does not match the reality of today's military "professional."* With this thesis statement in mind, and considering the earlier problem statement, it is necessary to readdress the notion that this research will not arrive at a specific answer. Instead, the overall premise or goal of the research is to provide a translator tool that will ultimately aid in deciphering and interpreting the language of war. From a philosophical standpoint, what is learned in the process is always more important than the dream (i.e., a definitive answer).[10]

The Plan of Attack

A key grounding point is the delineation between a description and an explanation. To describe something is to depict it in written or spoken words,

[10] This statement cannot be directly attributed to an originator as it is somewhat common. In this context, the reason it is used is to frame readers towards thinking about multiple solutions to the problem at hand instead of arriving at a singular one. In other words, this research is more about providing conceptual boundaries and logics associated with common terms, which will hopefully enable different readers to reach similar conclusions that might have been impossible previously (i.e., always talking past each other).

while explaining something involves providing a reason for it.[11] In other words, describing the phenomenon of war is crucial to understanding its manifestation in the physical domain (i.e., *knowing of war*), but explaining the existence or lack of existence of war requires a rationale that is completely in the cognitive domain (i.e., *knowing war*). This research will attempt to do both, at least to some level, because both approaches are warranted and quite necessary to understand the language of war.

Chapter Two will tackle the daunting task of positing definitions of *war* and *violence*, which will provide the necessary theoretical foundation for the subsequent research. While this endeavor might seem simple enough, the terms in question are conceptual minefields because of the human involvement with them. Specifically, war and violence encompass both physical and cognitive elements, which are next to impossible to independently isolate from one another. Thus, the definitions provided for war and violence will leverage objectifiable criteria to overcome the subjectivity inherent to both terms. Also, a theme will be put forth here that will provide the underpinning for the entire research—societal ambivalence towards organized human violence. As societies rely on military professionals to execute sanctioned violence on behalf of the state, it is important, especially in the context of today, for societies to understand both the nature and character of war. As this chapter will articulate, though, the difference between war and peace is becoming increasingly hard for the American public to grasp. In turn, this forms the modern dilemma regarding war. In the end, this chapter will prove to be critical for the research because it will provide the necessary framework from which to proceed.

Chapter Three will pivot and focus entirely on two of the terms in question—*violence* and *military professionals*. The main argument of the paper is centers on the complex relationship between today's US military and violence, and this chapter will provide the context to show how there are different interpretations of both terms in question. For violence, the directness—or its nature—matters greatly, but it is often open to interpretation. In turn, the identity

[11] Koshal, "Difference Between Explain and Describe," 8 June 2011, https://www.differencebetween.com/difference-between-explain-and-vs-describe/.

or culture of military professionals has reason to be questioned now as the lethality of warfare continues to increase with technological advancements.

To put it simply, violence in war has continued to become more indirect in its nature and the significance of this is not fully understood by either the US military establishment or American society. This chapter will illustrate this by examining how two preeminent civil-military relations theories—Samuel Huntington's institution theory and Morris Janowitz's convergence theory—define a military "professional." In turn, this analysis coupled with the description of the changing nature of violence will be combined to form a translator tool that can be applied towards comprehending the overall grammar and logic of war.

Finally, the last chapter will apply this translator tool to the research question presented earlier. Specifically, there are two general answers possible to the question as stated. The first centers on the idea that all military professionals *should* have a warrior ethos regardless of being "clearly" involved in direct violence. A quick analysis of the US Marine Corps culture and identity will provide the setting for this answer, as the overall argument is that the military establishment is still in the business of violence. Juxtaposed to this, however, is the general belief that all military professionals should not have a warrior ethos, because this is ultimately hurting society's fluency in the language of war. The US Air Force will provide the backdrop for this argument. In the end, these two countering arguments will become grounding elements for the translator tool, which is essential for it to address the uncertainty of the future.

Accordingly, this thesis will end with a look towards the future. The military establishment has recently garnered increased attention concerning the on-going debates pertaining to the creation of a sixth military branch of the US armed forces (i.e., a US Space Force). If early Congressional hearings are any indication, there is a vast amount of uncertainty from all interested parties, especially members of Congress and the American public, regarding this topic. "My impression is [you are] all doing a good job," Senator Angus King stated to senior Department of Defense officials at an April 2019 Senate hearing on the creation of a Space Force. "I understand the threat," he continued, "but I [do not]

understand how adding a box to an organizational chart is going to give us some kind of qualitative military edge."[12]

Therefore, the end of this thesis will at look Senator King's comments and put forth recommendations and conclusions based on the results of this thesis. In short, the translator tool will hopefully show that part of the problem in making a case for a separate space-focused military service is that Americans general do not see military space operators in the same light as a traditional military "warrior." Again, the overall goal of this paper is to articulate how there are multiple interpretations of key aspects of war, and it is beneficial to ensure the logic typically associated with the terms is understood in a similar many by all intended audiences. The conclusion will therefore present specific areas that require further attention and hopefully show that the logic typically associated with war—and by default the logic also associated with peace—does not apply to the current international environment. In response, a new term might be warranted to adequately capture a period of almost calculated competition, where America is not in a state of war but also not quite in a state of peace either.

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[12] Patrick Kelley, "Senators Remain Skeptical of Space Force," *Roll Call*, 11 April 2019, https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/senators-remain-skeptical-space-force.

Chapter 2

The Changing Character of War(*riors*)

The point of grammar, after all, is to ensure that the logic behind the message is conveyed intact…how it is perceived is another matter.

Antulio J. Echevarria II

Today, American society has immense confidence in US military professionals, which is somewhat perplexing considering the military has never been so disconnected from society at large.[1] As of 2016, less than one half of one percent of the American public was currently serving in the military, and as Figure 1 shows, the total number of Americans with any military experience compared to those without is steadily declining.[2] Coupled with this growing rift, the composition of the military itself is also in flux. The percentage of military professionals in traditional combat roles—such as Army infantry or Air Force fighter pilots—is continuing to trend downward.[3] For comparison, 93.2 percent of military personnel in the Civil War were in combat roles, but that number dwindled to just 28.8 percent by 1960, and today it sits around 20 percent.[4]

Technology, according to military historian John Keegan, is the source for these trends, as it has continuously been leveraged to change the ways wars are fought and significantly altered the way modern militaries are constructed. It is unclear, though, if this change is fully understood by societies, like the American public. As Keegan proposed, while there has been "a considerable congruence between the technology of civilian and military life," there has also been a "divergence between the facts of everyday life and of battlefield existence."[5] In other words, the day-to-day life of common citizens has been vastly improved due

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[1] Lydia Saad, "Military, Small Business, Police Still Stir Most Confidence," *Gallup*, 28 June 2018, https://news.gallup.com/poll/236243/military-small-business-police-stir-confidence.aspx.
[2] Kori Schake and Jim Mattis, ed., *Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our Military* (Stanford, CA: Hoover University Press, 2016), 1.
[3] Traditional combat roles refers to military positions that lack a direct civilian counterpart. For instance, there is no civilian equivalent to an infantry soldier but there is for a lawyer. [Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (1960; repr., New York, NY: Free Press, 2017), 9.]
[4] Numbers from: Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 9.; and "5 Military Myths-Busted!," March 2019, https://www.military.com /join-armed-forces/military-myths.html.
[5] John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1976), 318, 320.

to technological advances, but most people are ignorant of how technology has altered the modern battlefield. This chapter will begin to delve into this interesting situation and provide a theoretical foundation from which to proceed. Thus, a conceptual description of what war is must first be established.



Figure 2: United States Civil-Military Population Pyramid
Source: Schake, Kori and Jim Mattis, *Citizens and Soldiers,* 2.

"Most studies of future war put the main emphasis, of course, on technological change," as Christopher Coker asserted, "but they usually tend to skim over the fact that the essence of technology…is not actually technological. Its essence is how it encourages us to re-perceive the world and our own place in it."[6] Understanding the human element of war is not as simple as it might seem, though. Many fields of study, such as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology, have attempted to explain some of war's many facets, but in the end, no one discipline can fully encompass the entire paradigm of war. Thomas Kuhn described this piecemeal approach as the puzzle-solving associated with normal science.[7] This is not meant to be a critique of the many scholars in these fields,

[6] Christopher Coker, *Future War* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015), 9.
[7] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962; repr. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 36.

it is just the reality of the situation. While normal science research problems do not typically produce major novelties or grandiose breakthroughs, they still provide a more precise paradigm by eliminating ambiguities.[8] The goal of this paper is to do just that—reduce societal ambiguity concerning war and its associated grammar and logic.

It is hard to fully grasp the precise identity and role of military professionals because the grammar and logic of war tends to change depending on context. For example, military philosopher Alexander Moseley justifiably saw war as a philosophical problem and pursued a working definition that could be altered as new information came to light.[9] Consequently, his definition of war—"*a state of organized open-ended collective conflict*"—was left empirically vague on purpose so it could be applied towards both physical battles (e.g., World War II) and metaphysical endeavors (e.g., war on drugs).[10] This is not helpful in articulating the role of military professionals.

In contrast, military historian J.F.C Fuller sought to bring rigidity to the subject and used an epistemological approach to describe war. He stressed the importance of history and experience, and believed war was merely the replication or imitation of past actions. As war was entirely comprised of human acts, it was the knowledge of these acts that formed an "organized common sense" of war.[11] Thus, no single definition would suffice, because Fuller saw war as a form of language where "one does…simply what one *can* in order to apply what one *knows*."[12] Again, there is little utility in leveraging this definition to articulate the job of military professionals at large. In the end, these two diverse views indicate that terms associated with war are particularly malleable.

The purpose of the first section in this chapter is to provide a theoretical foundation by defining *war* and *violence*. "The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled," as Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz emphasized. "Not until terms and concepts have been defined can one hope to make any progress in

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[8] Kuhn, *Scientific Revolutions*, 34-35.
[9] Alexander Moseley, *A Philosophy of War* (New York, NY: Algora Publishing, 2002), 5; 16.
[10] Moseley, *Philosophy of War*, 14.
[11] J. F. C. Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War* (London: Books Express Publishing, 2012), 37-39.
[12] Fuller, *Foundations of the Science of War*, 22. [italics original to author]

examining the question clearly and simply and expect the reader to share one's views."[13] The differing views of two well-regarded military minds, Clausewitz and British historian John Keegan, will provide the necessary vehicle to navigate the treacherous terrain associated with this endeavor.

The second section will take the definitions of war and violence and apply them to the context of today. We have waged war for millennia, yet few would argue against the idea that technology has enabled recent wars to be more lethal but less bloody than those of the past.[14] Arguably, the US military is the most powerful in the world today because it has such a technological edge over any potential adversary. In turn, the American way of war is typified by an unprecedented ability to project power and lethality across the globe, while not being equally susceptible to similar retaliatory violent acts. As a USAF officer put it, "the real advantage of unmanned aerial systems is that they allow you to project power without projecting vulnerability."[15] However, twenty-first century conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, have demonstrated that competency and efficiency in lethality have not translated to overall effectiveness in war. Antulio Echevarria II attributes this recent lack of success to America's misunderstanding of the grammar and logic of war. "While the US military remains eloquent in the vernacular of battle," he posited, "it is still developing fluency in the language of war."[16] Therefore, the second section of this chapter will analyze war and violence as they pertain to American society's interpretation of the changing character of war.

In the end, the definitions and descriptions that are about to be presented will provide the foundation for the rest of the research. Specifically, the ever-changing character of war will be examined in relation to modern conflict especially as it pertains to the two trends identified earlier. "The future is not the end of a trend line," as Christopher Coker correctly stated.[17] The world is too complex and there are too many variables constantly in play to accurately predict

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[13] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 132.
[14] Coker, *Future War*, 207.
[15] Coker, *Future War*, 80.
[16] Antulio J. Echevarria, *Preparing for One War and Getting Another?* (Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, September 2010), 26.
[17] Coker, *Future War*, 16.

the future. It is important, though, to clarify and articulate which variable is in question when considering how it will manifest itself in the future. For this research, the variable in question is not war or violence. The dependent variable, the one that can be altered, regards the people who actually commit violent acts and fight in the wars. Specifically, American society's interpretation of military professionals will prove to be key as it pertains to future wars. So, as Aristotle once said, "asking the right question is half the answer."[18] Thus, this chapter aims to find the right question that will help reduce societal ambiguity regarding military professionals in the future.

Defining War and Violence

The terms *war* and *violence* are conceptual minefields. For instance, Congress has not issued a declaration of war since June 1942, but most Americans would concur that the United States has fought multiple wars since then (e.g., Vietnam War, Global War on Terrorism).[19] Equally perplexing, a 2015 United Nations report on the global dangers for women and girls stated that "cyber violence is just as damaging as physical violence."[20] So, if the concept of war was not challenging enough on its own, there now appears to be the potential for a virtual violence of sorts to complicate matters further. As these examples illustrate, it is hard to articulate exactly what war and violence mean. Therefore, to address this and avoid the hollowness and mutability inherent to subjective definitions typically associated with terms like these, the focus of this section will be on establishing objective criteria, which will in turn provide a theoretical foundation for the subsequent research.[21]

In his preeminent work, *On War*, Clausewitz opened by theorizing that "war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale…[where] each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will."[22] Thus, the true aim of warfare is to take

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[18] Neil M. Browne, *Asking the Right Questions: A Guide to Critical Thinking* (New York, NY: Pearson Publishing, 2018), 2.
[19] The Constitution grants the US Congress the sole power to declare war and it has done so 11 times. [United States Senate, "Official Declarations of War by Congress," 8 April 2019, https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm.
[20] Charlotte Alter, "U.N. Says Cyber Violence Is Equivalent to Physical Violence Against Women," *Time*, 25 September 2015, http://time.com/4049106/un-cyber-violence-physical-violence/.
[21] Moseley, *Philosophy of War*, 15.
[22] Clausewitz, *On War*, 75.

actions that render an enemy powerless.[23] In true fashion, though, Clausewitz immediately discarded this simplistic definition and instead formulated a more comprehensive description of war by employing both abstract and tangible concepts. Conversely, military historian John Keegan felt Clausewitz never actually abandoned his original thinking regarding the duel and continued to focus too much on reason, or the rational calculations of a select few policy makers, as the foremost aspect in describing war.[24] This view, Keegan argued, came at the expense of human emotions and society at large.[25] Consequently, the dynamic between reason and emotions will prove to be a central theme throughout this research, and it is why these two specific interpretations of war are the focus of this section. In the end, both points of view will be reviewed in order to provide what Clausewitz derided, "a pedantic, literary definition" of war and violence.[26]

In a metaphoric sense, Clausewitz saw war as a bridge composed of "living and moral forces" that spanned the physical and cognitive dimensions.[27] On the conceptual front, he declared that the cause and primary consideration throughout the duration of a war was merely an idea, or more precisely some "political object."[28] He did caveat, though, that this idea can be altered as it influenced and permeated the physical means of war—viewed as the weapons, militaries, and societies involved. In this sense, violence was the manifestation of opposing ideas that could not be resolved by other instruments of the state (e.g., diplomacy, economic pressure, etc.). Clausewitz was steadfast, though, that the idea, or political aim, remained the foremost aspect in describing war's nature, and violence was purely a way to represent war's appearance in the physical

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[23] Clausewitz, *On War*, 75.
[24] Eliot Cohen, "Capsule Review," review of *A History of Warfare*, by John Keegan, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1994, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1994-03-01/history-warfare.
[25] Christopher Bassford, "John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz," *War in History*, November 1994, 319-336.
[26] Clausewitz, *On War*, 75.
[27] The use of a bridge as a metaphor in this instance is informed by Colin Gray's use of the term to describe strategy. Whereas Gray argued that the metaphor worked to show that strategy is a two-way process (i.e., translating political purpose into feasible military plans and vice versa), the focus within this thesis is on the bridge metaphor being "a simple image that is universally accessible and comprehended…[and] has to connect two distinctive entities or phenomena that otherwise would be divided." [Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010), 7; and Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.]
[28] Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.

dimension. This notion ultimately led to Clausewitz's often quoted definition of war—"*war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.*"[29]

Clausewitz utilized an analogy to further illustrate his point. "If the state is thought of as a person, and policy as the product of his brain," he stated, "then among the contingencies for which the state must be prepared is a war in which every element calls for policy to be eclipsed by violence."[30] The state, or "*person*" in this example, represents the physical realm. The policy, or "*product of his brain*", represents the cognitive realm and "*the contingencies for which the state must be prepared*" are opposing ideas that could endanger a state (e.g., real or perceived threats).[31] War occurs only when "*every element calls for policy to be eclipsed by violence.*" A state first relies on non-violent political measures to address threats, but if that does not suffice, then violence enters the equation. Thus, violence must be present for it to truly be considered a war. Military philosopher Alexander Moseley concurred with this logic and stated, "war inherently involves the pursuit of values…[and] an objective distinction can be made concerning war's method of acquiring values—it is violent."[32] This leads to the first proposition, or objective criteria, to be used in defining war.

PROPOSITION #1: *Violence is a necessary component of war.*

John Keegan agreed that war is reliant on some element of violence and further highlighted the critical role of violence in shaping history. "The written history of the world is largely a history of violence," he stated. "The great statesmen…have generally been men of violence for…they understood the use of violence and did not shrink to use it for their ends."[33] Before delving further into Keegan's counter-argument to Clausewitz, though, it is important to first

[29] Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.
[30] Clausewitz, *On War*, 88.
[31] The notion that states prepare for opposing ideas from other states is fundamental to international relations. In general, expectations of hostility are common in international politics where the phrase "I will believe it when I see it" is replaced by "I will see it when I believe it." [Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (1976; repr., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), xxxi.]
[32] Moseley, *Philosophy of War*, 20.
[33] John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1993), 386.

elucidate what is meant by the term violence. Particularly, violence in the context of war needs to be distinguishable from both other forms of human violence (e.g., crime) and other common war occurrences (e.g., accidents, destruction). In the end, these distinctions will prove to be a crucial element in understanding the changing role and identity of military professionals.

As indicated earlier, war and violence are not tantamount but they are indelibly linked. "War is a pulsation of violence," Clausewitz alleged, "variable in strength and therefore variable in the speed with which it explodes and discharges its energy."[34] It is important to note that "energy" in this sense is not exclusive to the physical force one soldier releases when striking another. This energy is more conceptual. While it is impossible to determine his actual intent, it is probably more apt to state that Clausewitz's use of energy here is associated with how masses of people (e.g., civilians, political leaders) would digest the fact that in war their soldiers were either the ones doing the killing or the ones being killed. Thus, the energy is inherent to people and their potential for future action. Hence, just as war spans two dimensions—physical and cognitive—violence has both practical and abstract qualities.

It is undeniably easier to ascertain the practical aspects of violence, primarily because physical things can be quantified. In his seminal work, *Men Against Fire*, S.L.A Marshall stated that "the battlefield is the epitome of war. All else in war…exists but to serve the forces of the battlefield and to assure final success on the field."[35] This focus on the battleground accentuates the physical side of violence, because it contains the things that can be seen, heard, felt, smelled, or tasted (e.g., weapons, soldiers). While it can take on many forms, such as beatings or torture, at its most basic level, violence is the "the deliberate infliction of harm on people" with death being the absolute form.[36] For the purpose of this research, then, violence is hereby defined as:

VIOLENCE: *The deliberate infliction of physical harm on someone for an effect*

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[34] Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.
[35] S.L.A. Marshall, *Men against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command* (1947; repr., Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 27.
[36] Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (2006; repr., New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 19-20.

This is a variation on how Stathis Kalyvas described violence, and it works in this context because there are both objective benchmarks—intent and components—and, more importantly, suitable ways to address the conceptual borders pertaining to violence that are inherently blurred. The first objective criterion—intent—is better stated as deliberately performing a physical act of harm for an effect. It should not be presumed, however, that intent will always be explicit. There are implicit traits, though, that make intent objectifiable. In the end, the significance of intent is profound, because it is what differentiates violence from two other common war occurrences—crime and accidents.

Crime is commonplace in war and the line between it and violence is inherently blurred.[37] Warfighters have beaten and killed innocent civilians throughout history and in some contexts, it may be associated with violence, while in others it may not. Analytically speaking, the distinction between violence and crime rests with the governing body, not with the individual perpetrator. Even if the governing body does not explicitly condone actions like beatings or murder—and most nations vehemently oppose them—silence by not punishing transgressions implies consent. Therefore, while intent is present in both crime and violence, the level the intent originates from is what matters.

An important caveat to this distinction is the aspect of time. For practical purposes, the blurred line between violence and crime is skewed towards violence during war primarily because punishments for crimes are slow. In other words, something that is deemed criminal later can still fall under the heading of violence during war solely because society cannot perceive a difference at that moment. Thus, time just confirms the malleability of war's energy as described by Clausewitz.

The second objective criterion within the definition of violence—components—is what separates it from accidents and destruction. Accidents, which are sometimes labeled as non-hostile or non-combat deaths, are an ever-present danger in a war zone. In the Vietnam War, for instance, 10,786 of the

[37] Ole Jørgen Maaø argued "war has been, and still is, a harbinger of violence and atrocities—especially against civilians. Looting, mass killings and rape are not, unfortunately, new to war." [Ole Jørgen Maaø, "Mary Kaldor's New Wars: A Critique," in *Conceptualizing Modern War*, ed. Karl Erik Haug and Ole Jørgen Maaø (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), 77.]

58,220 US deaths (or roughly 18.5 percent) were deemed non-hostile.[38] But, just like a duel is made up of two sides fighting each other, violence in the context of war has two components—a perpetrator and a recipient. Since accidents are one-sided affairs (i.e., no enemy involvement), then they should not be considered violence in an analytic sense.

An area that requires clarification, though, is the notion of collateral damage. Unintended consequences are inevitable when deliberate actions are taken to cause harm. Consequently, the definition of violence has purposely been left vague enough to account for this. Once again, intent is the key as it must account for the inherent risk and uncertainty intrinsic to war. Many nations address the risk for collateral damage in different manners, but the important takeaway is that the risk itself can never be nulled out completely.[39] So even though there might not be explicit intent to harm innocent bystanders, intent is still implicit because the potential for unintended recipients of harm is always a part of a governing authority's decision calculus. Therefore, collateral damage should be compartmentalized as violence in war because it meets both objective criteria—intent and components. The makeup of the components is the next important factor that needs to be addressed.

Wars can be devastatingly destructive events, and just like crime and accidents, it is important to separate destruction from violence. This is done by analyzing the composition of the components themselves. Specifically, both the perpetrator and recipient of violence must be human. "The human body," as Thomas Rid put it, "is the foundation of violence. It enables both the act of attacking and of being attacked."[40] As an example, if a US Air Force remotely-piloted aircraft (RPA) pilot targeted an inanimate object, such as a bridge or communication node, the act should be characterized as destruction. But, if that strike inadvertently caused physical harm to a bystander, this action has now

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[38] National Archives, "Military Records: Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics," accessed 16 April 2019, https://www.archives.gov/research/military/ vietnam-war/casualty-statistics#hostile.

[39] For US military personnel, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) memo—CJCSI 3160.01A—outlines a collateral damage estimation methodology that aims to reduce the likelihood of collateral damage, but also to inform all arms of the US government on the potential of it still occurring. [CJCSI 3160.01A, *No-Strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology*, 12 October 2012, https://info.publicintelligence.net/CJCS-CollateralDamage.pdf.]

[40] Thomas Rid, *Cyber War Will Not Take Place* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 15.

crossed a threshold and should be considered violence. Even though the RPA pilot could be thousands of miles away, a human was still the final decision authority on executing the act, and, while not necessarily the intended target, a human was the recipient of physical harm.

Academically speaking then, since violence is defined as the deliberate infliction of physical harm on someone for an effect, it is possible to distinguish violence from other common war occurrences, such as crime, accidents, and destruction. Additionally, it is now possible to transcribe the second objective proposition concerning war by using deductive reasoning and this definition of violence. Since war requires some element of violence, and violence necessitates human components, then war must be a uniquely human endeavor.

PROPOSITION #2: *War is a human endeavor.*

So, as it has been argued, war and violence necessitate human involvement, but it is precisely the human element that makes the terms so vague. While war bridges the physical and cognitive dimensions, thus far the focus has only been on war's physical features that can be felt, seen, heard, tasted, or smelled. While these have been useful objective benchmarks for crafting a definition, it is wrong to think war and violence can be succinctly summarized in only a few pithy propositions fixated on tangible facets. As Ulysses reminded Nestor in Shakespeare's *Triolus and Cressida*, the "still and mental parts" of war are much more important than brute strength.[41] So, it is time to transition to the more complicated, abstract qualities of these terms.

As the definition of violence states, there must be a desired or sought-after effect that drives the execution of the deliberate act. This is the foundation of violence's intent and it is also the focus of Ulysses' comment to Nestor. Thus, the psychological effects of violence and war tend to be more important than their physical counterparts. In other words, even though death is the absolute form of violence, death is not always the sought-after effect in and of itself. Instead, the choices and beliefs of survivors (i.e., those not killed) are typically the intended targets. This leads to one of the primary differences between Clausewitz and

[41] Coker, *Future War*, 61.

Keegan. Simply stated, they differ on their interpretation of violence's "effect" and how it characterized war.

In *A History of Warfare*, Keegan was not shy in critiquing Clausewitz and even went so far as to state his "intellectual ambitions verged on the megalomaniac."[42] Keegan deduced that because Clausewitz lived in an age where "men stood silent and inert in rows to be slaughtered," his views were therefore tainted. Specifically, Keegan felt Clausewitz focused too much on the butchery or physical aspects of violence, where the desired effect was to force your enemy into submission by hurting or killing as many of them as you could.[43] This interpretation harkens back to Clausewitz's use of a duel to describe war and views the relationship between violence and war as a cruel calculation of sorts.[44] War was not the continuation of policy with other means, according to Keegan, because this definition relied too much on reason, or the rational cost-benefit calculation of a select few individuals. In short, Keegan felt Clausewitz was a child of his era, and thus had a dichotomous outlook on war and peace. There was no in-between.

Keegan argued instead that a society's culture was the dominant factor in describing war.[45] He conceded that while individuals were indeed thinking beings capable of leveraging reason, it was a society's culture that made the individuals who they were.[46] Put another way, individuals may believe they are making rational decisions regarding war and violence, but when viewed from a different perspective, these same decisions could be viewed as irrational. "We are hardened to what we know," Keegan claimed, "and we rationalize and even justify cruelties practiced by us…while retaining the capacity to be outraged, even disgusted by practices equally cruel which, under the hands of strangers, take a different form."[47] Thus, war involves much more than political reason as it is also an expression of the culture and emotions innate to a society.[48]

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[42] Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 354.
[43] Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 9.
[44] Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 3.
[45] Keegan felt that it was at the cultural level that Clausewitz's answer to his own question, what is war, is defective [Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 11.].
[46] Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 12.
[47] Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 9.
[48] Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 12.

The 2012 Taliban attack against Camp Bastion in Afghanistan illustrates this very point. For some time, Camp Bastion in Helmand Province was considered one of the largest and best-defended posts in Afghanistan, but this perspective was drastically altered on 14 September 2012. On this fateful date, 15 insurgents blew a hole in the camp's perimeter defenses and proceeded to launch a full assault against the NATO stronghold. When the dust settled, the insurgents were able to kill two US Marines and cause more than $200 million in damage. In a purely physical sense, it is plausible to think the insurgents lost the battle since all attackers were either killed or captured. However, the psychological effects associated with this attack were in fact quite profound and completely change the perspective.[49]

"Audacious Raid on NATO Base Shows Taliban's Reach" was the title of the New York Times article covering the attack. While the physical details of the assault were not insignificant nor were they overstated, the article focused on the extremely influential cognitive facets of violence and war. Specifically, it drew attention to the ongoing American withdrawal plan from Afghanistan and noted how the Taliban had succeeded in putting new pressure on negotiations. Put simply, while other attacks caused greater loss of American life, this one proved to the American public that the Taliban was still a formidable opponent even after years of conflict. "We may well have 'won' the battle in our own definition of the event," as former British infantry officer Emile Simpson said, "but members of the audience will have their own political interpretation."[50]

In this case, the American public and political leaders viewed the attack as a resounding win for the insurgents. Only a few months later, the US Senate overwhelmingly voted for an end to combat operations and an expedited US withdrawal from Afghanistan.[51] Referencing back to Clausewitz's use of the term, the "energy" discharged by the insurgents' violence, as illustrated here, was not contained to the physical location of Camp Bastion. Instead, it was intrinsic to

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[49] Alissa J. Rubin, "Audacious Raid on NATO Base Shows Taliban's Reach," *New York Times*, 16 September 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/world/asia/green -on-blue-attacks-in-afghanistancontinue.html?pagewanted=all&_moc.semityn.www.

[50] Emile Simpson, *War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018), 23.

[51] Traci G. Lee, "Senate Votes to Accelerate Troop Withdrawal from Afghanistan," *MSNBC.com*, 29 November 2012, http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/senate-votes-accelerate-troop-withdrawal-f.

the American public and US policy makers. The insurgents played to US culture and the emotions of Americans, and ultimately succeeded in obtaining what was most likely their main objective—reduced American presence in Afghanistan. So then, what is the takeaway? How can emotions and culture—two entirely subjective facets—be adequately captured in defining war? The reality is they cannot be precisely articulated.

William McNeill described this challenge and claimed "a profound ambivalence inheres in warfare and organized human violence." On one hand, violence is a strong bond that binds and holds a society together. "Human propensities find fullest expression in having an enemy to hate, fear, and destroy," McNeill argued. On the other hand, "organized and deliberate destruction of life and property is profoundly repugnant to contemporary consciousness." Put simply, humans are morally repulsed by violence. This overall concept is critical here, because the difficulty in comprehending the cognitive aspects of war can best be captured as a perpetual struggle inherent to societies.[52] To address this ambivalence towards violence and war, societies leverage reason, or rational decision-making. However, this reason is constantly influenced by the emotions of the people within the society.[53]

Keegan concurred and further contended that compromise was the only solution. "Culture looks for compromises," he posited, "and the compromise at which it has arrived over the issue of public violence is to deprecate its manifestation but to legitimize its use."[54] So, while societies acknowledge violence's existence and to some extent need it to exist themselves, they will only hesitantly turn to violence if needed. Thus, the cognitive aspects of both war and violence cannot be rationally predicted, since it is impossible to accurately calculate the compromise a given society will reach.

This gets back to Keegan's main criticism of Clausewitz. In particular, Keegan believed Clausewitz poisoned the minds of political leaders because his

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[52] The most important element to this perpetual struggle is that every society ultimately comes to a different conclusion. For instance, the German society in 1940 viewed violence differently than say the American public in 1940, but in a similar vein, Germans in 1940 saw it differently than Germans in 1945.

[53] William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), viii.

[54] Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 5.

logic argued for the "harnessing of the popular will to strategic purposes."[55] "The First World War was…a monstrous cultural aberration," Keegan contended, "[because Clausewitz's] logic ran, those who make war an end in itself are likely to be more successful than those who seek to moderate its character for political purposes."[56] In other words, if you are the first to compromise and bend to a society's outcries against violence, then you will lose. Keegan felt that Clausewitz's so called "truth" of war was an influential fallacy because it played to the inherent fear in people. "Any government which blinded itself to that truth," Keegan contended, "doomed itself to harsh treatment at the hands of an unblinkered opponent."[57] This led to World War I being "worse by far than anything the citizens had bargained [for]."[58]

However, this is a faulty interpretation of Clausewitz's work. While Keegan's logic regarding the influence of societal emotions towards war and violence was accurate, so was Clausewitz's logic. "Were it a complete, untrammeled, absolute manifestation of violence," Clausewitz affirmed, "war would of its own independent will usurp the place of policy the moment policy had brought it into being."[59] Thus, violence is just a means to an end in war. Policy, or more precisely reason, will always act to temper emotions, not annihilate them, and Clausewitz understood this.[60] Keegan wrongly assumed Clausewitz had a myopic view towards war because of the brutal wars that occurred in his era. In Keegan's defense, though, Clausewitz wrote in a manner that invited confusion. The main culprit was Clausewitz's use of the Napoleonic Wars in an analogous fashion to provide a theoretical baseline of war taken to the extreme—he referred to this as total war.[61] Yet Clausewitz clarified that total war was merely a cognitive ideal to help understand the overall phenomenon of war. Military historian B.H. Liddle Hart succinctly captured this typical confusion. "Clausewitz's greatest contribution to the theory of war was in emphasizing the psychological factors," Liddle Hart explained, "[but] not one

[55] Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 353-354.
[56] Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 21-22.
[57] Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 353-354.
[58] Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 21.
[59] Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.
[60] Moseley, *Philosophy of War*, 23.
[61] Clausewitz, *On War*, 77.

reader in a hundred was likely to follow the subtlety of his logic."[62] Consequently, Keegan fixated on the abstract ideal of total war and overlooked how Clausewitz did in fact articulate the consequences associated with it.[63]

In the end, the focus should not be on whether Clausewitz or Keegan was right or wrong. When analyzing the phenomenon of war, the focus should always be on what war is and what war is not. While Keegan's argument against Clausewitz was erroneous, the key takeaway should be that both military minds agreed that war involves an ever-changing compromise between reason and emotions, which continually influences the physical and cognitive facets of war. Consequently, the definition of war is stated as follows:

WAR: *A human endeavor that links violence with political aims*

The key takeaway from this definition is the fact that the physical and cognitive facets of war are in fact inseparable and indivisible.[64] To put it bluntly, physical acts of violence mean little in isolation when viewed in the context of war. As Emile Simpson warned, "[because] war's most conspicuous feature is combat, it is easy to become preoccupied with the notion that battles define the meaning of wars."[65] Therefore, the nature of war is best understood as a uniquely human endeavor where policy—war's animating idea—is linked to violence in the physical sense.[66] In other words, policy provides a meaning to the violence. Consequently, the manifestation of this linkage constitutes the character of war. It is important to note that since there is always a human element required in war and violence, there must also be some aspect of choice associated with the terms. Decisions to pursue and ultimately use weapons, such as strategic bombers or atomic bombs, demonstrate this notion. It is beneficial, then, to think of a war's character as the choices made pertaining to the nature of violence and the complexion of the political aims within the war.

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[62] B. H. Liddle Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd ed. (1954; repr., New York, NY: First Meridian Printing, 1991), 340, 342.
[63] Liddle Hart, *Strategy*, 342.
[64] Liddle Hart, *Strategy*, 327.
[65] Simpson, *War from the Ground Up*, 37.
[66] Simpson, *War from the Ground Up*, 24.

At the heart of the matter, the character of war is a malleable and interpretive concept because the interplay of force and policy are continuously being adjusted by three variables—reason, emotion, and uncertainty.[67] As it was outlined earlier, societies balance emotions and reason to reach a compromise regarding how best to address their ambivalence towards organized human violence. Thus, reason and emotions comprise two of the three elements that make up the character of war. The third ubiquitous element is an ever-present factor of uncertainty. "War is the realm of uncertainty," Clausewitz stated. "Three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty."[68] In the end, these three components incessantly react with each other and permeate the physical and cognitive dimensions of war, which in due course shape the choices made by the people involved.[69]

This reaffirms Christopher Coker's quote at the beginning of this chapter regarding the impact of technology on future warfare. "Most studies of future war put the main emphasis, of course, on technological change," he stated, "but they usually tend to skim over the fact that the essence of technology…is not actually technological. Its essence is how it encourages us to re-perceive the world and our own place in it."[70] So then, even though war and violence have been defined here, and there are objectifiable criteria within the respective definitions, there will always be an element of subjectivity inherent to both terms because war is a uniquely human endeavor.

In summary then, the main takeaway from this section pertains to war at the conceptual level. Specifically, the most important "truth" when it comes to war is that violence alone has little meaning. The decisions and choices made by the people involved regarding political aims and nature of violence are what

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[67] Emile Simpson concluded that war is malleable because decisions are made to "invest force with the meaning desired by policy." [Simpson, *War from the Ground Up*, 32.] In the context of this research, these decisions are influenced by the interplay of societal reason, emotions, and uncertainty. This view is informed by Clausewitz's trinity regarding the character of war (passion, chance, uncertainty). [Clausewitz, *On War*, 89].

[68] Clausewitz, *On War*, 101.

[69] Fuller also wrote on the interplay between the "mental sphere" and "physical sphere" of war, and his conclusion was that the continual interaction of the two, in addition to a third, "moral sphere," formed the basis of general reasoning and rationality associated with war. In other words, these three spheres formed Fuller's principles of war, and analyzing the interaction constitutes the "science of war." [J. F. C. Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War* (London: Books Express Publishing, 2012), 326].

[70] Coker, *Future War*, 9.

matter most. As Clausewitz stated, it is important to understand that "war is a clash between major interests, which is resolved in bloodshed—that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts."[71] The next section will illustrate why it is becoming increasingly hard to distinguish war from "other conflicts."

Modern Dilemma

As it has already been articulated, wars act as a bridge between the physical and cognitive dimensions, and, thus, it is impossible to totally separate the abstract and tangible aspects. Hence, there is always an element to war open to interpretation. This is pertinent as some pundits, like Christopher Coker, have asserted that wars today tend to be much more cerebral than wars of the past.[72] The butchery of the Napoleonic Wars is long gone, as post-modern war is characterized by dramatically less face-to-face combat and, instead, soldiers fighting from safe shelters hundreds and even thousands of miles away from the actual battlefield.[73] This potentially poses a problem for an American society that is becoming increasingly distant from military matters.

As illustrated in the first section, the most critical aspect regarding the nature of war is the link between violence and political aims. In theory then, it should be easy to delineate a state of war from that of peace, since this link must be present for war to exist. The reality, however, is that the starting and stopping points of war are not readily apparent. Coincidentally, it is not hard to pinpoint the cause of this ambiguity. Changes in the character of war, particularly to the nature of violence and different concepts pertaining to military action, have made it increasingly difficult to ascertain the link between violence and political aims. This is the modern dilemma regarding war.[74]

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[71] Clausewitz, *On War*, 149.
[72] Coker, *Future War*, 61.
[73] Moseley, *Philosophy of War*, 34.
[74] The delineation of war and peace dates back eons, and multiple societies have addressed the problem in different manners. For instance, it is commonly understood that the doors on the Temple of Janus were used as an indicator for when Rome was at war. When the temple doors were open, Rome was at war, when closed, Rome was at peace. The point of this thesis is to address how difficult this distinction is for the American public today. [S. J. Green, "Multiple Interpretation of the Opening and Closing of the Temple of Janus: A Misunderstanding of Ovid "Fasti,"" Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, vol. 53, June 2000, 302-309.]

"For most of recorded history, humans have sought to draw sharp lines between war and peace," Rosa Brooks stated.[75] This has been easy when narrowly viewing war as state-on-state conflicts, such as the World Wars that ravaged Europe in the early twentieth century. "We modern Americans," Brooks continued, "prefer to believe that war and the military can be kept in tidy little boxes: war…is an easily recognizable exception to the normal state of affairs, and the military an institution that can be easily, if tautologically, defined by its specialized, war-related functions. [We are] wrong on both accounts."[76] Today, the United States finds itself engaged in global conflicts while at the same time the American public's perception of war is vague. Real or potential ramifications of this ambiguity can be difficult to precisely attribute, but they do exist.

As of October 2017, there were over 240,000 active-duty and reserve troops in at least 172 countries and territories performing a myriad of missions. While some missions are strictly focused on training and assisting local militaries (i.e., outside the definition of war), other missions undoubtedly have an element of violence (i.e., meet the two objective criteria for war). This is the manifestation of the modern dilemma, and it exemplifies the blurred line between war and peace. A recent event illustrates this further. On 4 October 2017, four Green Berets on a mission to capture or kill an Islamic State leader in Niger were themselves ambushed and killed.[77] So, since this engagement met the objective criteria for war laid out earlier—violence and human involvement—it could be argued that the United States is officially fighting a war in this African nation. Whether this is true depends on whom is asked.

A New York Times article titled, "America's Forever Wars" claimed that US leaders have defined the fight against terrorism as a "permanent struggle against a permanent threat."[78] In essence, this implies the United States has been in a state of perpetual war since 9/11. The problem with this notion is that there appears to be no end in sight. According to the article, this is because "the public

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[75] Rosa Brooks, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2016), 9.
[76] Brooks, *Everything Became War*, 9.
[77] Kyle Rempfer, "Two-Star General, Green Berets punished for deadly Niger ambush that killed 4 US soldiers," ArmyTimes.com, 5 November 2018, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/11/05/two-star-general-green-berets-punished-for-deadly-niger-ambush-that-killed-4-us-soldiers/.
[78] Rempher, "Green Berets Punished," ArmyTimes.com.

is quiet…[as] most people simply do not have a family member in harm's way."[79] In a way, this line of thinking implies the US public has grown to be indifferent towards what some scholars have deemed the "American way of war."[80] If this is true, then it also means the US public's balance between reason and emotions pertaining to warfare and organized human violence is skewing more and more towards pure reason. The downside to this is that emotions work as a counterbalance to reason. Without an emotional outcry from society, the potential exists for more minor conflicts, like the Niger engagement, in the future. The larger danger stems from the uncertainty intrinsic to war, as the potential exists for a small engagement to spiral into a larger, more costly war. In short, primarily relying on only two elements that comprise the character of war—reason and uncertainty—is a dangerous endeavor.

Before proceeding, it is important to first clarify why American society, and not political leaders or military professionals, is the focus here. In war, like many other areas of social science, there are inherent difficulties in determining how the past is tied to the present and how the parts of a system intimately depend on each other.[81] To address this conundrum, Kenneth Waltz suggested one "form a picture in the mind" to view the world in a specific way.[82] While his three levels of analysis, or "images"—individual, state, and international system—focused primarily on determining the cause of war, there are helpful elements that can be applied towards the modern dilemma.

Specifically, Waltz's image two (i.e., the state or societal level) is beneficial for this research because "the second image…is the key to understanding war and peace."[83] It is important to note that while his overall argument centered on human nature being the driving cause of war, Waltz stated that "the events to be explained [in war] are so many and so varied that human nature cannot possibly be the single determinant."[84] "Man's behavior," Waltz continued, "is…in great part

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[79] Editorial Board, "America's Forever Wars," The New York Times, 22 October 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/opinion/americas-forever-wars.html.
[80] The phrase "American way of war" is commonly attributed to Russell Weigley and his seminal work of the same title. [Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973)].
[81] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (1954; repr., New York, NY: Columbia University Press,2001), 1.
[82] Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, ix.
[83] Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, 81.
[84] Waltz, *Man, the State and War,* 80.

a product of the society in which he lives."[85] This view comes from Jean-Jacques Rousseau who stated that bad polity makes men bad and good polity makes them good.[86] This is also in concert with Keegan's earlier argument that societies make individuals who they are, and it is ultimately why a societal interpretation of war is the focus of this research. In a metonymic sense, then, societies act to define the boundaries of war by either supporting or opposing choices made pertaining to the violence and political aims inherent to the nature of war. In a democracy like the United States, this process manifests itself in the form of voting for or against political leaders.[87]

Getting back to the problem at hand, the key issue that needs to be addressed is American society's interpretation of post-modern war. However, as Moseley argued, post-modern warfare may be a slight misnomer. "It attempts to describe a low-intensity warfare that may exist under the nuclear umbrella of the superpowers," he stated, "[but] such warfare does not alter the overriding conceptual definition of war."[88] In other words, Moseley concurred, at least conceptually, that post-modern warfare is no different than major conflicts like World War II. It is just the latest iteration of war's changing character, which has been subject to frequent changes in style throughout history. Thus, the main problem associated with the modern dilemma of war is American society's apparent lack of an emotional connection to ongoing conflicts. Put simply, Americans have a hard time delineating war from peace because they have little to no emotional connection to the violence that is occurring.

In his book, *Future War*, Christopher Coker succinctly captured the significance of this statement. While America's conduct of war owes much to industrialization and the systemic application of science and technology to warfare, he posited, "the advantage may not persist much longer."[89] Put simply, the United States has benefitted tremendously from having an asymmetrical

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[85] Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, 5.
[86] Quoted in Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, 172.
[87] Milner and Tingley argued that domestic politics, especially in the United States, heavily influence international relations. Specifically, they argued that American political institutions create a bias in favor of military means at the expense of other instruments of power. [Helen V. Miler & Dustin Tingley, *Sailing the Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 25.].
[88] Moseley, *Philosophy of War*, 35.
[89] Christopher Coker, *Rebooting Clausewitz: 'On War' in the 21st Century* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), 85.

military advantage over potential adversaries, but lethality alone does not equate to victory. Hence, the danger lies in the notion that the American public has come to rely too much on violence in war without having a meaning or purpose behind it. This is exactly what Antulio Echevarria II described as the trouble with the American way of war.

"While the US military remains eloquent in the vernacular of battle," Echevarria posited, "it is still developing fluency in the language of war."[90] This is an important distinction, because the language of war is what gives meaning to the use of force.[91] The Camp Bastion example described earlier in this chapter along with the ongoing conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria attest to this notion. As a society, it is in America's best interest to become fluent in the language of war while the US military still has a technological advantage over potential adversaries. To accomplish this, there are two crucial elements tied to war's nature that need to be addressed—the different concepts of military actions associated with political aims and the nature of violence itself.

First, society's understanding of political aims and their relationship to military action in its contemporary context is paramount to the language of war. Emile Simpson articulated two distinctions in this regard. The practice traditionally associated with military action in the context of war is the "use of armed force within a military domain that seeks to establish military conditions for a political solution."[92] In the end, Simpson argued there is a general tendency to move away from situations like these as modern wars are becoming less polarized affairs.[93] This harkens back to the definition of violence—specifically its components—described earlier. There is always a perpetrator and a recipient in violence, and in this first practice of war, the divergence between the two is distinct and readily apparent. "This polarity is necessary for war as traditionally understood to perform its basic function as a political instrument," Simpson contended, "to provide a military outcome that sets conditions for a political

[90] Quoted in Simpson, *War from the Ground Up*, 15.
[91] Simpson, *War from the Ground Up*, 15.
[92] Simpson, *War from the Ground Up*, 1.
[93] Simpson, *War from the Ground Up*, 3.

solution."[94] Put simply, the overall success or failure of this type of military action is judged relative to the engaged enemy (i.e., recipient of the violence).[95]

The other practice that relates military action to political aims is "the use of armed force that directly seeks political, as opposed to military, outcomes."[96] Simpson maintained that this practice lies beyond the scope of war in its traditional paradigm and it is best characterized by an inability to clearly distinguish military activity from political activity.[97] Here, a lack of polarity as compared to the previous practice makes it hard to evaluate success and failure. The lack of polarity is attributed to the fact that there are multiple audiences involved. For example, while the drone strikes in Pakistan are effective against the insurgents in a tactical sense (i.e., there is polarity between US forces and insurgents), it is hard to argue against the widespread global protests against them (i.e., the potential exists for a wide array of recipients outside the targeted insurgents). Put another way, the targeted insurgents were recipients of physical violence, but nearby Pakistani citizens were victims of psychological violence.[98] The main takeaway, here, is that society's interpretation of the intended audience, or more precisely the recipient of violence, as it pertains to political aims matters greatly.

In a conceptual sense, there are always only two constituents of violence—a perpetrator and a recipient. The distinction is that a single act of violence executed by a lone perpetrator could result—and typically does—in multiple pairings with different recipients. It is up to society to determine which match should be emphasized above the others. In the earlier drone strike example, it appears American society has placed greater emphasis on the insurgents over Pakistani citizens as the primary recipient of violence. This is illustrated by the continued practice of drone strikes in Pakistan.[99] Thus, the more polarized the contest (i.e., easier for a society to attribute political aims with two clear-cut audiences), the easier it is for a society to ascertain the link between violence and

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[94] Simpson, *War from the Ground Up,* 3.
[95] Simpson, *War from the Ground Up,* 3.
[96] Simpson, *War from the Ground Up,* 1.
[97] Simpson, *War from the Ground Up,* 2.
[98] Simpson, *War from the Ground Up,* 3.
[99] Nicholas Grossman, "Trump Cancels Drone Strike Civilian Causality Report: Does it Matter?," War on the Rocks, 2 April 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/trump-cancels-drone-strike-civilian-casualty-report-does-it-matter/.

political aims. Stated another way, societies have an easier time discerning war from peace when military action seeks to establish military conditions for a political solution, instead of directly seeking political outcomes. One of the reasons for this comes from the relationship between the next element critical to the language of war and the yet to be discussed third component of war's character—violence and emotions.

Violence—defined as deliberate infliction of physical harm for an effect—is the second critical element necessary in the language of war. Thus far, most aspects of its definition, such as intent and components, have been academically segregated and addressed. However, there is still an element of violence open to interpretation. Specifically, the relationship between the person receiving the physical act of harm and the desired effect can be hard to determine. The direct versus indirect nature of this relationship is at the heart of the matter, but, unfortunately, it is hard to illustrate all aspects of this. Luckily, there is a lens that society can use to assist in this endeavor—the military professional.

As Keegan described earlier, societies look for compromises, and the compromise reached regarding warfare and organized human violence is to "deprecate its manifestation but to legitimize its use."[100] In this vein, the American public turns to military professionals to carry out its sanctioned violence when necessary. The military is a unique organization in this regard, as it is the sole organization authorized to commit violent acts in the name of political aims. Therefore, by analyzing military professionals, it will be possible to illustrate both the direct and indirect nature of violence in war. The next two chapters will address this directly.

[100] Keegan, *History of Warfare*, 5.

Chapter 3

Managing Violence

The civilian image of the professional soldier remains firmly rooted in the past.

Morris Janowitz

Societies rely on military professionals to do what no one else can—execute sanctioned violence on behalf of the state.[1] As the first chapter described, violence is what separates war from all other types of state conflicts, but the mere existence of violence does not equate to that of war. War is a uniquely human endeavor that links violence to political aims, and this is always open to interpretation. In recent years, this linkage has proven to be increasingly hard to ascertain as the line between war and peace is continually blurred in the eyes of an emotionally disconnected American public. Consequently, the danger in this dilemma resides in the American public's potential appetite for future violence as society struggles to understand the grammar and logic of war today.

As General Robert E. Lee stated after the Civil War, "It is well that war is so terrible, or we would grow too fond of it."[2] Thus, if American society's fluency in military matters such as war continues to wane, then reason and uncertainty would theoretically reign supreme when it comes to the choices made regarding violence and political aims. If this is true, then the character of future wars involves an increased likelihood for more—albeit small—violent engagements with a high risk of escalation. Hence, it is important for the American public to understand the grammar and logic associated with violence, especially as it pertains to its nature, which is the focus of this chapter. To aid in this endeavor, it is helpful to view violence through the lens of the individuals charged with committing the act—military professionals.

The main argument of this chapter, and in fact the entire paper, is that the relationship between today's US military and violence is different from what

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[1] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (1960; repr., New York, NY: Free Press, 2017), 15.
[2] Quoted in Lawrence LeShan, *The Psychology of War: Comprehending Its Mystique and Its Madness* (Chicago, IL: The Noble Press, 1992), 31.

it has been in the past. Subsequently, the functions of modern military professionals are not as unique compared to their civilian counterparts, which in turn has confounded the American public's grammar and logic of violence and, ultimately, that of war. Put bluntly, society's perception of a military "warrior" does not match the reality of today's military "professional." To test this assumption, this chapter will analyze the changing nature of violence and its relationship with military professionals today.

The Nature of Violence

Modern battlefields are vastly different than those of the past. The reason for this is a perpetual desire innate to humans to utilize technology to go farther, faster, and higher, which in turn results in the same technology being applied to warfare.[3] As Christopher Coker stated, "[there is] a continuing belief that the man-machine interface holds the most potential for the millennial-old goal of augmenting human performance on the field of battle."[4] Consequently, this has also had a significant effect on the nature of violence in war as societies try to make war almost "risk-free."[5] As Chapter Two described, there is an ambivalence that inheres society regarding the organized use of violence. On one hand, societies rely on violence as a coalescing agent and legitimize its use, but on the other hand, societies tend to be morally repulsed by violent acts against other humans. Therefore, societies rely on technology to sanitize violence to some extent by reducing reciprocal risk and eliminating some of the emotional repulsion to its existence. The key question, then, revolves around the impact of this type of technology on the grammar and logic of violence. As Bernard Brodie stated, "the chief dilemma which confronts modern man…[is the] ever-widening disparity in accomplishment between man's military inventions and his social adaptation to them."[6]

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[3] History is littered with examples of technological inventions that were pursued for seemingly benign intentions, but ultimately had drastic effects on the battlefield. For instance, the railroad and airplane were byproducts of the industrial revolutions of Europe and America, respectably, but both have had huge effects on the modern character of war. The railroad was leveraged to enable the maneuver warfare of Prussian General Helmuth von Moltke the Elder and the airplane enabled Germans to unleash their blitzkrieg aerial assaults in World War II.

[4] Christopher Coker, *Future War* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015), 70.

[5] Coker, *Future War*, 64.

[6] Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (1959; repr., Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2007), 4.

While there is undoubtedly still an element of direct violence in modern warfare, most battlefields today are characterized by their over-the-horizon nature and complete lack of a traditional front line. Indeed, the boundaries separating opposing sides in today's low-end conflicts are extremely blurred and fluid.[7] Consequently, this has had a significant effect on the relationship between the perpetrator, recipient, and desired effect of violence, which are inherent to the definition of violence itself. Additionally, the nature of the reciprocal risk of violence to the perpetrator is fundamentally different today than years past, and this can be attributed to America's preference for an indirect nature of violence.

Since differentiating direct versus indirect violence can be a challenging undertaking, it is helpful to establish a theoretical extreme as a baseline in order to understand the overall concept. In the case of violence—defined earlier as the deliberate infliction of physical harm on someone for an effect—the directness of its nature comes from the relationship between the perpetrator, recipient, and the desired effect inherent to the act. Clausewitz's use of a wrestling match as metaphor for war is also useful here to illustrate this relationship, especially when visualizing the conceptual extreme of direct violence.

The entirety of war, Clausewitz posited, can be visualized as two wrestlers competing where "each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his will."[8] Accordingly, the analogy of two wrestlers engaged in hand-to-hand grappling also captures direct violence in its purest sense. Independently, each wrestler is committing an act of physical harm on the other to impose his or her will or obtain an effect. Thus, direct violence is characterized by two factors: the proximity between the two wrestlers (i.e., perpetrator and recipient of physical harm are directly engaged) and the inherent risk of a reciprocal act of force (i.e., recipient could respond accordingly). Conversely, indirect violence is the opposite end of the spectrum.

Violence with an indirect nature is characterized by some level of distance between the participants and involves little to no risk of an immediate reciprocal act. The trouble with this conceptualization, however, is that there is no logical

[7] Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 88.
[8] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. And trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.

limit to how indirect this type of violence could be. In the case of the wrestlers, this could be viewed as one wrestler (i.e., wrestler A) engaged in a match with another (i.e., wrestler B), while at the same time being focused on someone completely different (e.g., a bystander in the stands or another wrestler). In other words, wrestler A could seek to achieve a psychological effect on someone entirely different from wrestler B. To achieve this effect, wrestler A communicates the potential for a future act of force via the act of physical harm against wrestler B. Put simply, the recipient of physical harm and the desired effect could have little to no actual relationship. Again, this means there is no logical limit to the level of indirectness.

To summarize then, the relationship between the perpetrator, recipient, and the desired effect of violence, which ultimately boils down to proximity and the risk of reciprocity, delineates direct from indirect violence. But like many things in war, this is open to interpretation. Additionally, it must also be noted that there is another important factor in this calculation—the element of time. Just as time had an impact on the malleability of violence's energy associated with distinguishing violence from crime, time also plays a role in interpreting the directness of violence.

In the wrestling example utilized earlier, wrestler A does not need to know about the third indeterminate person to achieve a psychological effect. Hence, psychological effects can be either intended or unintended, and, at least conceptually, there is no predetermined shelf life associated with a physical act of harm. In a military sense, this is typically viewed as the notion of deterrence, with the best example being the continued psychological effects associated with nuclear weapons.[9] The key takeaway is that the directness of violence is best understood as a gradient scale that is open to interpretation. Next, the following

[9] The psychological effects associated with nuclear weapons have had a significant impact on modern societies regarding their understanding of violence and war. While some people, such as Thomas Hobbes and even Clausewitz, have argued that the "threat of violence" should still be considered war, the definition of war as it pertains to this research has been deliberately left vague and open to interpretation. "The effect could be to make war a half-thing, not fully complete in itself, and 'often…nothing more than armed neutrality, a threatening attitude meant to support negotiations.'" Hence, the determination of a state of war vice a state preparing for war is left to the individuals and societies involved. [Hew Strachan, "Introductory Essay: The Changing Character of War," in *Conceptualizing Modern War*, ed. Karl Erik Haug and Ole Jørgen Maaø (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011), 8.]

section will transition to the topic of military culture as a pretext for interpreting the changing nature of violence as outlined above.

Military Culture

The purpose of a military is one of the few things in war that appears straightforward—fight and win its nation's wars. In an even simpler sense, it has even been described as "killing people and blowing things up."[10] In the context of the modern dilemma of war, however, this purpose is becoming progressively ambiguous. "As the lines we have drawn between 'war' and 'nonwar' grow indistinct," Rosa Brooks argued, "the role and mission of the US military have grown similarly hazy."[11] The core of this argument is that the culture of the US military today is tied to the nature of violence associated with past wars (i.e., more direct in nature), however, modern military professionals have taken on increased roles due to technological advances in warfare, which has resulted in an emphasis on violence with an indirect nature. Brooks described this very assertion and stated, "in some places, [military personnel] 'shoot, move, and communicate' just as generations of soldiers have been taught to do in basic training…but the vast majority of modern military personnel today spend most of their time engaged in activities that bear little resemblance to those depicted in Hollywood films."[12]

The overall premise of Brooks' argument is that the military has become an all-purpose tool of sorts that is applied to a wide array of problems. "If your only tool is a hammer," she reasoned, "then everything looks like a nail."[13] Consequently, this claim is becoming increasing true as the military has shifted its focus, and ultimately its general preference, towards indirect violence. It should be noted, however, that part of the blame in this regard resides with the two different concepts of military action associated with political aims that was addressed at the end of Chapter Two.[14] To a large extent, the recent ways political

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[10] Everett Carl Dolman, *The Warrior State: How Military Organization Structures Politics* (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 174.
[11] Rosa Brooks, *How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales From the Pentagon* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2016), 13.
[12] Brooks, *Everything Became War and Military Became Everything*, 13.
[13] Brooks, *Everything Became War and Military Became Everything*, 21.
[14] This is a reference back to Emile Simpson's argument that military action is lumped into two distinct categories—the use of armed force to set the conditions of a political solution or

leaders have chosen to leverage military action to seek a direct political solution has caused the "all-purpose tool" metaphor to have merit. The key question, though, is why has the American public continued to allow political leaders to do this? The answer rests with society's lack of fluency in the language of violence. While somewhat complicated, this notion can be viewed through the lens of the study of civil-military relations, especially when analyzing the cultural perceptions of military professionals.

"There is nothing more dangerous than an army amid an unwarlike nation," Alexis de Tocqueville argued. "The citizens' excessive love of quiet puts the constitution every day at the mercy of the soldiers."[15] This statement captures the essence and impetus of civil-military relations theory. Put simply, the field of expertise seeks to explain the subordination of a powerful military force to civilian control.[16] While this field of study is rich in academic vigor, for the most part civil-military relations in this context is not applicable to the problem at hand. In general, the American public is not concerned with an imminent military coup bent on changing the governmental structure of America.[17] The real value of civil-military relations here comes from how two preeminent theories in the field—Samuel Huntington's institutional theory and Morris Janowitz's convergence theory—characterize the "powerful military force" and its cultural affiliation with either direct or indirect violence.

Violence is at the heart of military culture, because, as Shannon French argued, "warriors are given a mandate by their society to take lives."[18] This belief has been a foundational element of military culture since antiquity, but it is generally geared towards violence with a direct nature. Indeed, violence with an indirect nature complicates matters significantly. "The use of military force is—and should be—for the application or threat of violence," Everett Dolman contented. "Whenever military force is used for nonviolent operations, the specific

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leveraging military action as a direct extension of political aims. [Emile Simpson, *War From the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics*, rev. ed. (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2018), 1.]

[15] J. P. Mayer, *Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America*, trans. George Lawrence (New York, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1969),

[16] Jeffrey W. Donnithorne, *Four Guardians: A Principled Agent View of American Civil-Military Relations* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018), 4.

[17] Donnithorne, *Four Guardians*, 3.

[18] Shannon E. French, *The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and Present* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 3.

value of using military assets over civilian ones is to have the latent threat of violence available to expedite the process."[19] Thus, when the military is utilized in endeavors where the "latent threat of violence" is hard to ascertain (i.e., increasingly indirect in nature), or in some cases not warranted, the difference between military assets and civilian ones becomes blurred. Ultimately, this hinders the American public's ability to become fluent in the language of war, specifically pertaining to one of war's essential elements—violence.

In Chapter Two it was argued that societies are ambivalent to organized human violence. On one hand, history has proven that societies tend to be built around the notion of violence, but on the other hand, humans generally abhor violent acts against other humans. According to seventeenth-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes, "people want to live under some sort of system that at least attempts to make good on the guarantee that when they go to sleep at night, they will not be murdered in their beds."[20] Therefore, to ensure this safety, it may be necessary for other people to be murdered instead. Hence, society's utilize military professionals to do this on their behalf. However, when military professionals dabble in violence that is increasingly indirect in nature, there is a level of ambiguity that is injected into the societal ambivalence towards violence. An analysis of military culture as it pertains to violence will illustrate this very point, and it is the focus of the upcoming sections. Before proceeding, though, it is essential to clarify what is meant by "culture" in this context.

The most important element of culture, as said by Edgar Schein, is that it is "a *shared* product of *shared* learning."[21] Ultimately, he defined culture as "the accumulated shared learning of [a] group as it solves its problems of external adaptation and internal integration…[and] this accumulated learning is a pattern or system of beliefs, values, and behavioral norms that come to be taken for granted as basic assumptions and eventually drop out of awareness."[22] Therefore, in the context of this research, there are two elements within Schein's definition of culture that warrant attention: (1) culture is focused on the group's own

[19] Dolman, *The Warrior State*, 174-175.
[20] French, *The Code of the Warrior*, 3.
[21] Edgar H. Schein and Peter Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 5th ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2017), 6. [italics original to author]
[22] Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 6.

interpretation of its shared learning and (2) the beliefs, values, and behavioral norms become basic assumptions.

This leads to the two driving questions that will form the general structure for the remaining analysis. First, are the beliefs, values, and norms—or more precisely the assumptions—associated with a military culture associated with the notion of a "warrior ethos" still valid? Put another way, why should military professionals not clearly involved in direct violence have a warrior ethos? Second, how do military professionals and the American public interpret the current military culture? Specifically, are the interpretations the same, and if not, does it matter? In the end, the answers to these questions will hopefully shed light on how the American public can increase its fluency in the language of war. Accordingly, the following sections will provide analytical baselines for interpreting military culture in the context of violence.

Institutional Theory

Samuel Huntington's 1957 book *The Soldier and the State* is a seminal work in the field of civil-military relations, and his overall argument was that civilian leaders should establish a pattern of "objective control" over the military. Accordingly, this type of control is characterized by a certain extent of military autonomy in exchange for voluntary subordination.[23] From Huntington's perspective, the primary issue concerning civil-military relations regarded what military professionals should do in relation to their civilian leaders.[24] While vastly important to the civil-military relations field in its traditional context, the impetus for leveraging his theory here is to benefit from the way Huntington described and characterized the military professional within his causal logic. In the end, his definition of professionalism animated his entire theory and provides one end of the military culture spectrum necessary for this analysis.[25]

"Professionalism distinguishes the military officer of today from the warriors of previous ages," Huntington stated.[26] "When the term 'professional' has been used in the connection with the military," he argued, "it normally has

[23] Donnithorne, *Four Guardians*, 4.
[24] Donnithorne, *Four Guardians*, 4.
[25] Donnithorne, *Four Guardians*, 4.
[26] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 12.

been in the sense of 'professional' as contrasted with 'amateur' rather than in the sense of 'professional' as contrasted with 'trade' or 'craft.'"[27] His overall line of reasoning centered on military professionals—which he scoped to only military officers—being the latter.[28] To him, the phrases "professional army" and "professional soldier" obscured the difference between one who works for monetary gain (i.e., the former) and one who pursues a "higher calling in the service of society" (i.e., the latter).[29] Therefore, Huntington's institutional theory characterizes military professionals as specialists in the management of violence, not necessarily specialists in the execution of violence.[30] This is a key distinction for this research and, thus, it warrants further explanation.

Multiple times in his work, Huntington used civilian specialists—explicitly doctors—as an analogy to drive home his point regarding military professionals as managers of violence. "Within the [military] profession itself," he stated, "there are specialists in the management of violence on sea, on land, and in the air, just as there are heart, stomach, and eye specialists within medicine."[31] His overall concern, though, was that the public "hardly conceives of the [military professional] in the same way that it does the lawyer or doctor."[32] To Huntington, military professionals are unique because they have a special social responsibility. "Society has a direct, continuing, and general interest in the employment of [the military professional's] skill for the enhancement of its own military security," he contended.[33] In essence, the military professional only exists because societies desire a sense of security, but there is no guarantee this same society will approve of the military establishment performing its only true function—sanctioned violence on behalf of the state. "[The military professional's]

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[27] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* 7.
[28] This was not meant to be a critique of enlisted military members, merely outside the scope of Huntington's argument. Since Huntington was concerned with the nexus of strategic military leaders and their civilian counterparts, he narrowly scoped his theory to just military officers. Specifically, Huntington argued that the enlisted vocation is a trade and not a profession because the enlisted hierarchy reflects "varying aptitudes, abilities, and offices within the trade of soldier." Thus, he saw the enlisted force as specialists in the execution of violence. [Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* 18]
[29] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* 8.
[30] Huntington admitted that the phrase "management of violence" in the context of a military professional's unique skill was first used by Harold Lasswell. [Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 11].
[31] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* 12.
[32] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* 7.
[33] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* 14.

behavior in relation to society," Huntington contented, "is guided by an awareness that his skill can only be utilized for purposes approved by society."[34]

The reason for this discrepancy rests with society's ambivalence towards organized human violence. As described earlier, societies rely on violence to some extent, but humans are generally repulsed by violence against other humans. Therefore, to put it simply, doctors do not face the same societal scrutiny regarding their specialized skill craft compared to the societal reservations towards violence military professionals must deal with. Consequently, this societal ambivalence is crucial to fully understanding the culture of military professionals. As Huntington stated, "even the military themselves are influenced by their image in the public mind and at times have refused to accept implications of their own professional status."[35]

Therefore, military professionals, within the auspices of institutional theory, are best described as experts in the management of violence and not specialists in merely the execution of violence. In other words, military professionals are thinking beings that have a say in decisions associated with violence. They are in turn considered professionals because they must be cognizant of how to leverage violence in the face of a societal ambivalence towards it. Consequently, this also requires the knowledge and ability to commit the violent act. While there has been concerted effort thus far to keep the level of analysis for this research at the societal level, it is necessary now to diverge to a concept that originates at the individual level—the notion of a warrior ethos.[36]

Martin van Creveld argued that "[war] is one of the very few activities in which humans…deliberately court death, and the only one in which they do so while taking on an opponent who is as strong and as intelligent as themselves."[37] The great paradox, according to van Creveld, regarded the question on how to get military professionals to look death in the face and potentially give their lives for

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[34] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* 16.
[35] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* 7.
[36] The individual level is highlighted here to emphasize a different level of analysis that is being utilized as compared to most of this research. As Kenneth Waltz described, these "levels of analysis" or "images" are useful to suggest a specific way in which to view the problem at hand. In this specific instance, the notion of a warrior ethos is best understood by starting with an individual in mind instead of the military as an entire organization. [Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (1959; repr., New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001), ix.]
[37] Martin van Creveld, *The Culture of War* (New York, NY: Presidio Press, 2008), 411.

something bigger then themselves.[38] Additionally, Lawrence LeShan added a caveat to this notion when he described a human attraction of sorts to war. "There is one 'basic,' or at least almost universal, tension that seems restricted to human beings," he stated. "This is the problem of how to be both an individual and a part of something larger than oneself."[39] The answer to both questions comes in the concept of a warrior ethos.

In its most basic sense, an ethos is explained as a compilation of the central ideas, core competencies, and goals that define a group or organization.[40] For instance, in *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*, Carl Builder described the Army's ethos as "the nation's obedient and loyal military servant.[41] A 2019 RAND report on the culture of US military services reified this notion and stated that there are multiple guiding ideals that ultimately form a general ethos unique to each military service. In the case of the US Army, Huntington described its ethos as "the government's obedient handyman performing without question or hesitation the jobs assigned to it."[42]

Referring to the Army as a "handyman" in this context is quite telling of how Huntington viewed individual military members, particularly Army soldiers. Put bluntly, since Huntington believed the Army was solely in the business of violence, then it is incumbent on soldiers to carry out violent acts if asked to do so. Thus, much like a handyman is socially obligated to perform the work if called upon, societies will not tolerate dissention or objection to violence from military professionals. Therefore, the military establishment relies on instilling a "warrior ethos" within its ranks to thwart any potential objections to violence—be it direct or indirect in nature, and Figure Two illustrates a recent example of the Army's efforts to do just that.

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[38] Creveld, *The Culture of War*, 412.
[39] LeShan, *The Psychology of War*, 23.
[40] S. Rebecca Zimmerman et al., *Movement and Maneuver: Culture and the Competition for Influence Among the U.S. Military Services*, RAND Report (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), 17.
[41] Carl Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 33.
[42] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 261.



Figure 3: United States Army Warrior Ethos Poster
Source: Fort Carson Public Affairs Office, "Warrior Ethos," Fort Carson Mountaineer, 15 April 2019, https://www.fortcarsonmountaineer.com/2018/08/warrior-ethos/.

The key takeaway from everything thus far is evident in this poster. Specifically, the Army's "warrior ethos" and Huntington's institutional theory are both focused on violence with a direct nature. As humans are generally repulsed by violence, as has been continuously argued here, then this repulsion must be overcome by military professionals engaged in it. Consequently, this is especially true if the nature of the violence is direct. As the poster illustrates, both elements that determine the directness of violence's nature are evident. The short-range weapons carried by the soldiers indicate a degree of proximity to potential recipients, and the risk of reciprocity is conceivable because of the protective gear worn by them. The only element missing, then, is an illustration of the desired effect associated with an act of physical harm. Alas, this relationship is almost impossible to show unless the desired effect is purely in the physical sense (e.g., wounded or killed recipients of harm). Regardless, the relationship to an effect is not as relevant nor entirely needed here to show that the violence in question is

skewed towards having a direct nature. In the end, the four pithy statements captured in Figure Two:

I will always place the mission first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I will never leave a fallen comrade.[43]

help military professionals—soldiers in this case—prepare for and ultimately overcome any potential repulsions and uncertainty associated with future violence. "When we go to war," Lawrence LeShan contended, "our perception of reality is quite different from that which we commonly use in peacetime."[44]

Military professionals engaged in combat marked by direct violence are faced with a myriad of emotions, such as anger, fear, and excitement, but these emotions can be disastrous if they prevent the completion of a mission or task. Thus, a warrior ethos is a way the military establishment can harness these emotions and channel them towards the task at hand. As Christopher Coker stated, though, "it is important to remember that soldiers in the heat of battle often behave bravely because they have no other choice…warriors inhabit an intensely social world in which everyone counts on everyone else."[45] In the end, the idea of a warrior ethos is directly linked to the elements within violence that determine its degree of directness—risk of reciprocity and the proximity between the recipient, perpetrator, and effect. In summary, a warrior ethos is geared towards direct violence and its relevance wanes the more indirect the violence is. In other words, if military professionals do not need to "count on everyone else" in the heat of battle, then what utility does a warrior ethos have?

It is time to tie all this back to Huntington's institutional theory and its characterization of military professionals. The best way to do this is to answer a question posed by Huntington himself. He asked, "is there any skill common to all military officers and yet not shared with any civilian groups?"[46] To put this

[43] Fort Carson Public Affairs Office, "Warrior Ethos," Fort Carson Mountaineer, 15 April 2019, https://www.fortcarsonmountaineer.com/2018/08/warrior-ethos/.
[44] LeShan, *The Psychology of War*, 3.
[45] Christopher Coker, *Rebooting Clausewitz: 'On War' in the 21st Century* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), 7.
[46] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 11.

another way, what makes military professionals unique when compared to civilian counterparts? The answer resides with the two distinct groups that Huntington argued comprised the entire military establishment—(1) managers of violence and (2) an auxiliary force.

The first group—managers of violence—was the focus of Huntington's institutional theory, and it is comprised of a distinct sphere of military competence that is uniquely different from civilians.[47] For the most part, when Huntington referred to "military professionals" throughout *The Soldier and the State*, he was only referring to this group. To him, the key distinction of this group was the fact that these individuals oversee the "direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence."[48] Since the function of the military force is successful armed combat, per Huntington, then the managers of violence are responsible for: "(1) the organization, equipping, and training of this force; (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat."[49] While he never precisely defined violence or armed combat, Huntington saw this first group as the individuals within the military who are intimately familiar with the execution of both direct and indirect violence.

This conclusion can be illustrated by Huntington's analogy between military professionals and physicians. Just as physicians require a period of residency before becoming licensed in their field, military professionals are best suited to manage violence if they have a background in its actual execution. Thus, true managers of violence, according to Huntington, only come from fields within the military that are linked to the execution of violence, and, thus, the more direct its nature the better suited they would be. "None of the auxiliary specialists contained within or serving the military professional," he argued, "are capable of the management of violence."[50]

Accordingly, the second group of military professionals were referred to as auxiliary specialists. In *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington acknowledged there were several varieties of technical specialists found within military ranks, such

[47] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 11.
[48] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 11.
[49] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 11.
[50] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 12.

as engineers, doctors, pilots, personnel experts, intelligence experts, and communications experts.[51] He was very clear, though, that these experts were merely auxiliary vocations that have the same relations to the expertise of violence as "the skills of the nurse, chemist, laboratory technician, dietician, pharmacist, and X-ray technician have to the expertise of the doctor."[52] This group was still necessary to the achievement of military objectives, to include the execution of violence, but in general, auxiliary specialists are not specialists in the management of violence.

In summary, Huntington viewed this group as technical specialists in their specific tradecraft, and, while necessary for the overall success of the military, this group does not have the same social responsibility as the first group. In short, the American public, per Huntington, does not view military engineers or intelligence experts in the same way it views an Army infantry soldier or a Marine. While auxiliary specialists may be needed—and today they often are—to enable the execution of direct and indirect violence, Huntington's logic indicates that a warrior ethos is not necessary within these specialties and trying to apply one to this group would only confound the logic typically associated with the term.

While the military members within the auxiliary force still fall under Huntington's definition of "professional"—as contrasted against "trade" or "craft" and not against "amateur"—their overriding skill is merely in the technical job they are performing. In contrast, the predominant skill for managers of violence is violence. Again, this is the fundamental element that sets military professionals within institutional theory apart from civilians. Hence, if there is a civilian counterpart to a military skill (i.e., military lawyer versus civilian lawyer), Huntington's logic indicates that a warrior ethos is not warranted. It must be noted here, however, that there are undeniably elements to this logic that are open to interpretation. Specifically, emerging fields like space, cyber, and remote piloted aircraft operations have forced a new look at this paradigm, and, thus, this exact topic will be the focus of the last chapter.

For now, the key distinction is that Huntington's institutional theory compartmentalized military members into two distinct groups—managers of

[51] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 11.
[52] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 12.

violence and an auxiliary force. To Huntington, the first group is the central tenet of the military and it alone is what separates the military establishment from civilian society. Managers of violence—or military professionals as referred to by Huntington—have a unique relationship with society and abide by a social responsibility to commit violence if called upon. Their focus, however, is skewed towards violence with a direct nature. To overcome any potential hesitation or misgivings against committing violence, though, this group relies on a warrior ethos to channel individual emotions towards achieving the task at hand. In the end, Huntington emphasized the important difference between civilian and military roles because he sought to challenge a popular view at the time, which he labeled as "fusionist."[53] As Peter Feaver claimed, "Huntington argued that fusionist approaches fundamentally misunderstood the nature of civil-military relations and, if followed, would lead the United States to disaster."[54] One such view is Morris Janowitz's convergence theory.

CONVERGENCE THEORY

"The military face a crisis as a profession," according to Morris Janowitz. "How can it organize itself to meet its multiple functions of strategic deterrence, limited warfare, and enlarged politico-military responsibility."[55] Janowitz published his book *The Professional Soldier* three years after Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, and it directly challenged Huntington's assertions that the military professional could be characterized merely as managers of violence. Regarding the complexity and multiple functions of a modern military, Janowitz stated that there are two ways to approach his question. "First, there is the complex task of adapting the military establishment to continuous technological change. Second, there is the necessity of re-defining strategy, doctrine, and professional self-conceptions."[56] In an effort to address both, Janowitz's argument and underlying logic is founded on a nuanced disagreement with Huntington's definition of a "professional."

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[53] Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 8.
[54] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 8.
[55] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (1960; repr., New York, NY: The Free Press, 2017), lvi.
[56] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, lvi.

It must be noted, however, that Janowitz's deviation from Huntington was on whether the divisions of labor between military and civilian professions were still desirable, not on whether there were actually any difference between the two.[57] In his book *Armed Servants*, Peter Feaver succinctly captured the crux of the issue as "the trend at least since World War I has been for a civilianization of the military sphere and a militarization of the civilian sphere."[58] The reason for this, as noted by Feaver, is that "the functional logic undergirding the distinction [between military and civilian spheres] has changed with the changing technology of war and the changing patterns of elite expertise and political interaction."[59] Put simply, Janowitz argued that the line between Huntington's two military groups—managers of violence and auxiliary specialists—has become blurred as technology has progressed. Basically, Janowitz's logic is that the functions of the military are no longer unique compared to its civilian counterparts precisely because there has been an increased focus on violence with an indirect nature. In turn, this has caused the notion of military professionals to be suspect in the eyes of the American public.

The term "professional" plays a key role in both Huntington's institutional theory and Janowitz's convergence theory. For Huntington, military professionals were experts in the craft of violence and "pursued a higher calling in the service of society."[60] Additionally, society has a conflicted relationship with military professionals which is reflective of society's ambivalence towards organized human violence. Conversely, Janowitz argued that society merely sees the military profession as another career opportunity.[61] "The narrowing difference in skill between military and civilian society," he contented, "is an out-growth of the increasing concentration of technical specialists in the military."[62] In other words, Janowitz's convergence theory is based on the premise that technology has caused the military to become a bureaucratic organization with violence as its manufactured product. This is evident when applying the concept of a warrior

[57] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 8.
[58] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 8.
[59] Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 8.
[60] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 8.
[61] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 4.
[62] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 9.

ethos, in the same vein as Huntington's institutional theory, to the three subgroups Janowitz believed comprised the military establishment.

Whereas Huntington categorized military members into two distinct groups—managers of violence or auxiliary force—Janowitz saw it differently. To him, the military establishment consisted of three roles—heroic leaders, military managers, and technical experts.[63] Additionally, he contended that these roles are continually being balanced. Thus, the modern military establishment is best described as a "struggle between heroic leaders, who embody traditionalism and glory, and military 'managers,' who are concerned with the scientific and rational conduct of war."[64] Janowitz argued that a balance needs to be struck at each level in the hierarchy of authority and, ultimately, all three roles are vital to the overall success of the military.[65] Trouble will potentially arise, however, if a proper balance does not exist.

The first group Janowitz described was that of the heroic leader, whom he stated "is a perpetuation of the warrior type, the mounted officer who embodies the martial spirit and the theme of personal valor."[66] To draw parallels with Huntington's institutional theory, this group is very similar to the "managers of violence." Janowitz concurred with Huntington that military professionals, specifically these heroic leaders, are unique in the eyes of society because they are experts in "war-making and in the organized use of violence."[67] Thus, the logic and justification for a warrior ethos within this group is no different.

Both Huntington and Janowitz viewed their respective "warrior" groups as a social class of sorts that derived its significance and legitimacy from a societal need for violence. As Huntington stated earlier, this group has a special social relationship that governs its existence and utilization. What separates Janowitz's convergence theory from Huntington's institutional theory, however, is the fact that Janowitz argued this group has undergone changes throughout the twentieth century as war fighting technology has continued to advance.[68]

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[63] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 21.
[64] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 21.
[65] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 21.
[66] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 21.
[67] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 15.
[68] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 7.

Specifically, the overall size of the group and its prominence in representing the military establishment's overall identity are rapidly decreasing.

"The social and political behavior of the military in the middle of the twentieth century cannot be understood as deriving only from the stratification of American society," Janowitz contented. "Modern technology has produced such a high level of specialization that men are likely to think of themselves as members of a specific skill group, rather than as members of a social class."[69] His justification for this position resides in the destructive potential of modern warfare. Specifically, his logic centers on the notion that as the growth of destructive power of warfare increases, the political involvements and responsibilities of the military also increases.[70] Therefore, the purpose and meaning behind violence has changed as "the solution to international relations becomes less and less attainable by use of force...but [instead] an index of political intentions and goals."[71] Consequently, this leads to the second of Janowitz's three groups—the military manager—having primacy within the military establishment at the expense of the heroic leaders.

"The growth of the military establishment into a vast managerial enterprise with increased political responsibilities," Janowitz stated, "has produced a strain on traditional military self-images and concepts of honor."[72] In turn, this has caused the military profession, especially at the most senior levels, to be increasingly defined by an explicit "political ethos" vice a warrior ethos.[73] To put it simply, Janowitz argued that because technology has increased the lethality of the US military, then military managers have had to increase the breadth of their expertise to now include more than just that of violence. Modern war has necessitated military managers to now account for more of the potential political ramifications associated with violence. Thus, military managers need to be more skilled and aware of the cognitive effects associated with violence, since they are primarily concerned with political intentions and goals when making strategic and even tactical decisions.[74]

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[69] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 7.
[70] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 14.
[71] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 14.
[72] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 12.
[73] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 12.
[74] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 14.

In a subtle critique of Huntington's institutional theory, Janowitz contented that the military profession, from an internal perspective at least, has historically put too much emphasis on the function of violence, especially when it comes to the formation of foreign policy.[75] In a way, then, this foreshadowed Echevarria's description of the American way of war in Chapter Two—America is good at the vernacular of battle while at the same time struggles with the language of war. In the end, just as the managers of violence were the center of Huntington's institutional theory, the military manager group forms the basis of Janowitz's convergence theory.

In *The Professional Soldier*, Janowitz offered a hypothesis that during the Cold War the military establishment continually shifted—and in fact is still shifting—towards a greater reliance on "explanation, expertise, and group consensus" as it pertains towards its overall identity.[76] Basically, because the military as an organization leveraged technology to become very good regarding the "how" to inflict physical harm question, military managers needed to pivot and focus more on justifying the "why" question associated with actually doing it. The reason for this was the fact that the nuclear era ushered in a new level of restraint as it pertains to violence.

This is very significant as it pertains to this research and everything described thus far, because it explains why there has been a trend towards executing violence with an increasingly indirect nature. Put simply, the possible consequences of a society legitimizing violence are now vastly different than in the past because of the destructive potential associated with modern warfare. Accordingly, the US military has responded by leveraging technology to reduce the risk of reciprocity to its own forces via increasing the distance between the perpetrator and recipient of physical harm (e.g., bomber aircraft, RPA pilots, space and cyber operations). In the end, the increased propensity for military managers within the overall military establishment, according to Janowitz, is because activities now subsumed under the term "military" are becoming increasingly immense.[77] Put simply, the complexity of the different skills

[75] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 14.
[76] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* xix.
[77] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* xiv.

associated with military professionals is proportional to the directness of violence's nature. This leads to the third of Janowitz's groups—technical experts.

For Janowitz, "military technologists" are important members of the military establishment, and this group is needed more and more as the man-machine interface is being increasingly leveraged in warfare. The military establishment has traditionally been resistant to technological change concerning military means so this group takes on increased significance when viewed through the lens of future warfare. In his book *Winning the Next War*, Stephen Rosen argued that the differences associated with technological push versus military pull regarding the adaptation and drive for new technology is a complicated matter. Innovation and change are foregone conclusions in warfare, Rosen argued, and "if war does occur, it is likely that some of our forces will be inappropriate to the realities of combat."[78] Therefore, technical experts are needed within the military establishment to translate military ideas into weapons systems.[79] Yet again, though, this group further blurs the line between what is considered uniquely a military profession and a profession within civilian society.

In the end, Janowitz's convergence theory is based on the notion that there is a narrowing difference in skill between military professionals and their counterparts in civilian society.[80] This convergence of skill has meant that more and more military professionals continue to have effective careers without ever fighting in a "direct" violent manner. The result of this change is a rise of a political ethos as the dominant factor in describing the culture of the military.

Summary

This chapter set out to address the relationship between violence and military professionals. Specifically, the assertion that society's perception of a military "warrior" does not match the reality of today's military "professional" was offered as an illuminating assumption to test the grammar and logic associated with modern war. Two components of war—violence and military professionals—were analyzed to show how seemingly straightforward terms can have different

[78] Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 261.
[79] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 23.
[80] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier,* 9.

meanings. All of this was done under the pretext that technology has had a significant effect on the nature of violence in war as societies try to make war almost "risk-free." This leads to the third proposition in this research.

PROPOSITION #3: *Technology coupled with a societal aversion to violence has forced a continued trend towards the character of modern war to be based on violence with an increasingly indirect nature.*

The directness of violence is best understood as a gradient scale that is open to interpretation. For instance, a B-52 dropping bombs is more indirect than a Marine engaging an insurgent in urban warfare, but the B-52 is more direct than an RPA pilot engaging the same insurgent. Thus, violence with an indirect nature is characterized by some level of distance between the participants and involves little to no risk of an immediate reciprocal act. It must be noted, though, that there is no logical limit to how indirect violence can be.

For example, technological advances in the space and cyber domains have significantly increased the size and scope of modern battlefields, and subsequently altered perceptions concerning the nature of violence in war. In *Cyber War Will Not Take Place*, Thomas Rid reasoned that while cyber enabled violence is inherently indirect, it is still theoretically possible. His reasoning was that cyber could target something, such as an airplane or even a battery pack, which could then release whatever force is "embedded in the targeted system or created by it."[81] While no human has ever been hurt or killed in this manner, it is still possible.[82] Hypothetically speaking then, this action would fall under the definitions of violence and potentially that of war. However, would a society interpret this act in the same manner as say a Marine unit launching an assault on an insurgent's compound in Afghanistan? This question and others like it will be scrutinized in the final chapter as the framework articulated thus far—represented in Figure 4—will be put to work.

[81] Thomas Rid, Cyber War will not take place, 13.
[82] Thomas Rid, Cyber War will not take place, 13.



Figure 4: Language of War Translator Tool
Source: Original to author

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Chapter 4

A True Chameleon

War has its own grammar but not its own logic.

Carl von Clausewitz

This paper started with a question concerning the truth of war. Hopefully, the material covered thus far has shown that the "truth" of war—to include its associated terms—is best understood as a variable concept that changes based on the eye of the beholder. Both the description and explanation of the overall phenomenon of war are important, but ultimately *knowing* war and *knowing of* war boils down to speaking and interpreting the language of war. Accordingly, this paper has focused on three specific terms—war, violence, and military professionals—and its goal has been to provide clarity and reduce ambiguity pertaining to the associated logic tied to these terms. Therefore, this final chapter aims to apply what has already been laid by revisiting the primary question this thesis sought to address: *why should military professionals not clearly involved in direct violence have a warrior ethos?*

The purpose of Chapter Two was to provide a theoretical foundation for the argument by positing definitions of war and violence. While both terms are typically associated with subjectivity inherent to their respective definitions, the definitions provided in this thesis were based on at least some objectifiable criteria: (1) violence is a necessary component of war, and (2) war is a uniquely human endeavor. Consequently, the definition of war—also deemed its immutable nature—was presented as *a human endeavor that links violence to political aims*. An important aspect of this definition is that both violence and political aims can exist outside a state of war. In other words, war is a socially constructed state and, thus, the societal interpretation of war is critical to understanding the overall phenomenon. Considering this, a critical theme was also put forth regarding societal views towards organized human violence.

As William McNeill stated, "a profound ambivalence inheres in warfare and organized human violence."[1] On the one hand, violence is a coalescing agent that binds and forms societies as "human propensities find fullest expression in having an enemy to hate, fear, and destroy."[2] History is littered with examples of the coalescing power of violence. For instance, the disdain, animosity, and even fear the American colonists felt towards the British was a key component that led to the American Revolutionary War. In other words, violence, or at least the threat of violence, created American society as we know it today.

On the other hand, according to McNeill, "organized and deliberate destruction of life and property is profoundly repugnant to contemporary consciousness."[3] This individual repulsion towards violence has been exasperated in light of the recent "quantum jump in human capacity to kill."[4] In short, there is always a societal ambivalence towards warfare and organized human violence. Each society reaches a different conclusion or compromise pertaining to it, however, and it is impossible to predict how it will manifest itself in the future. For instance, the American public will sometimes legitimize the use of violence in war (i.e., aftermath of 9/11), but other times demand for the cessation of violence (i.e., Vietnam circa 1975). The most important point is that societies have a conflicted view towards violence.

The modern dilemma regarding war, however, is that societies, like the American public, are having an increasingly hard time ascertaining the link between violence and political aims. Put simply, the reason, or purpose, behind the violence in the modern American way of war is lacking. Therefore, the American public has conflicting views on whether the American way of war is actually war at all. To a large extent, the reason for this rests with differentiating the physical and psychological effects associated with violence.

With violence defined as *the deliberate infliction of physical harm on someone for an effect*, it is essential to understand that the desired effect associated with violence could be either physical or cognitive in nature. Most people have an easier time associating violence with physical effects since it

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[1] William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), viii.
[2] McNeill, *Pursuit of Power*, viii.
[3] McNeill, *Pursuit of Power*, viii.
[4] McNeill, *Pursuit of Power*, viii.

involves things that can be seen, heard, felt, tasted, or smelled. As S.L.A. Marshall stated, "the battlefield is the epitome of war."[5] But, in many instances, the death of or physical harm to individuals is not the sought-after effect in and of itself. The "still and mental parts" of war are much more important than brute strength, as the choices and beliefs of survivors (i.e., those not killed or hurt) are typically the intended targets in war.[6] The key takeaway here is that in both war and violence, there are physical and cognitive elements that are always at play.

Chapter Three built on the conceptual definitions of war and violence and narrowly focused in on the nature of violence and its relationship with the people dedicated to carry it out on behalf of society—military professionals. The nature of violence—also referred to in this thesis as the directness of violence—comes from the relationship between the perpetrator, recipient, and effect inherent to violence itself. Two elements—proximity and risk of reciprocity between the components of violence—ultimately determine the directness of the violence, but like everything else thus far, this is also open to interpretation. In fact, there is no theoretical limit to how indirect violence could actually be. For instance, the atomic detonations in World War II are still having psychological effects today, so, their nature is becoming more indirect with the passage of time. This is an important distinction, because the more military professionals dabble in violence that is increasingly indirect in nature, there is a level of ambiguity that is injected into the societal ambivalence pertaining to violence

Subsequently, the last term to be addressed in this thesis was the military professional, or more precisely, the culture associated with military professionals. As Edward Schein described it, culture is "a *shared* product of *shared* learning."[7] Therefore, the focus of Chapter Three was on how military culture reflected the system of beliefs, values, and behavioral norms associated with violence. Two ends of a spectrum were presented based on two preeminent views of the military "profession" as defined in civil-military relations theory.

On one end, Samuel Huntington's institutional theory posited that military professionals are best characterized as "managers of violence," where their

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[5] S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command* (1947; repr., Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 27.
[6] Christopher Coker, *Future War* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015), 61.
[7] Edgar H. Schein and Peter Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 5th ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2017), 6. [italics original to author]

primary concern is understanding the execution of violence in the face of a societal ambivalence towards violence itself. To Huntington, military professionals pursue a "higher calling in the service of society," and they are "professionals" in the sense that their skill or craft is violence.[8] Through this lens, military professionals are unique (i.e., there is no civilian equivalent) because they have a special social responsibility to execute violence on behalf of society if called upon to do so, regardless of any personal risk to themselves. The key takeaway from this group is that it is geared more towards violence with a direct nature. Put simply, as humans are generally repulsed by violence, it is incumbent on the managers of violence to find a way to overcome this repulsion and carry out the task if called upon to do so. To do this, the military establishment relies on a warrior ethos-centric culture. However, the relevance of a warrior ethos wanes the more indirect the violence. The other end of the spectrum is marked by an increased emphasis on political aims.

Morris Janowitz's convergence theory suggests military professionals are no longer as unique compared to their civilian counterparts. Janowitz contented that, "perhaps the greatest strain facing the military "manager" is the episodic character of combat."[9] Specifically, he argued that technological innovation proceeds faster and more efficiently than does organizational change, and, thus, the destructive potential of military technology has far outpaced that of the traditional notion of a warrior ethos.[10] Put simply, military managers (i.e., Janowitz's counter to Huntington's "managers of violence") seek to invoke a combat philosophy to "demonstrate their combat potency," but this is merely due to personal psychology and a commitment to the past.[11] The reality of the modern military establishment, according to Janowitz, is that it is a complex, large-scale organization that increasingly relies on "manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus" to achieve its aims.[12] In other words, the military establishment increasingly turns to reason and a "more managerial approach to the problems

[8] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 12.
[9] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (1960; repr., New York, NY: The Free Press, 2017), 46.
[10] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 46.
[11] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 47-48.
[12] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 38.

of organizing men for combat."[13] In summary, Janowitz argued that "military managers" were the driving group within the military establishment, and this group is best characterized by a political ethos, not a warrior ethos. This difference is illustrated best when viewing the definition of war.

Since war is defined as a human endeavor that links violence to political aims, the biggest difference between Huntington and Janowitz's description of a military professional is on where the focus resides. For Huntington, military professionals, or "managers of violence," are primarily—and he might have even argued singularly—focused on the decisions pertaining to violence (i.e., the who, what, when, where, how). Conversely, Janowitz's theory postulates that while military professionals, or "military managers," are still experts in violence, they are in fact more focused on "the most rational and economic ways of winning wars or avoiding them. They are less concerned with war as a way of life."[14] Put simply, Janowitz's military managers are more concerned with the interplay of violence and political aims, rather than just being focused on violence. The industrialization and technology of modern war is the reason for this, as it necessitates military managers to now account for potential political ramifications associated with violence. Put simply, military professionals have become too good at violence, as the capacity to kill impersonally and at a distance has forced military professionals to rethink their effect on the societal ambivalence towards organized human violence. Basically, Huntington's managers of violence put primacy on the decisions associated with *violence*, while Janowitz's military managers dedicate more attention towards the *political aims*. The reality, however, is that both matters greatly. But it is correct to consider which element—violence or political aims—a military professional should be concerned with more. For a visual depiction, Figure 5 captures the key points covered thus far in this thesis.

[13] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 38.
[14] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 35.



Figure 5: Language of War Translator Tool: Societal Ambivalence
Source: Original to author

Within Figure 5 is a notional depiction of the ever-present ambivalence inherent to all societies regarding organized human violence. On one end, war—or at least the traditional interpretation of war—constitutes the ambivalence being skewed towards legitimizing violence. Coupled with this, is the emotional connection a society has towards both the violence and the military professionals carrying out the acts. Put simply, the further the line goes towards "direct violence" and "warrior ethos," then the more emotionally vested a society tends to be towards the violence. This is simply due to the proximity of the constituents of violence (i.e., recipient and perpetrator) and the inherent risk of reciprocity military professionals face. Bluntly stated, the more American military professionals risk their lives, the more the American public will be emotionally connected to any conflict.

For example, technological advances in the space and cyber domains have significantly increased the size and scope of modern battlefields. In *Cyber War Will Not Take Place*, Thomas Rid reasoned that while cyber enabled violence is inherently indirect, it is still theoretically possible. His reasoning was that cyber could target something, such as an airplane or even a battery pack,

which could then release whatever force is "embedded in the targeted system or created by it."[15] While no human has ever been hurt or killed in this manner, it is still possible.[16] Hypothetically speaking then, this action would fall under the definitions of violence and potentially that of war. However, would the American public interpret this act in the same manner as say a Marine unit launching an assault on an insurgent's compound in Afghanistan?

What Figure 5 shows is how the American public tends to equate direct violence to military professionals with a warrior ethos; and indirect violence with a political ethos. Thus, as the trend of violence in war continues to trend more and more towards an indirect nature, then the traditional notion of a warrior ethos becomes less and less relevant. Ultimately, this is due to the logic society has assigned to the terms *violence* and *military professionals*. It is important to note, however, that everything in this tool is relative. The line placement is completely notional, as it could be placed anywhere on the graph. Thus, to use the tool properly, a grounding element is warranted. That said, it is finally time to apply this tool to the question presented earlier: *why should military professionals not clearly involved in direct violence have a warrior ethos?*

The case for "should": US Marine Corps

"The whole of military activity must therefore relate directly or indirectly to the engagement," Clausewitz contented. "The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole objective of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time."[17] As this argument has shown, Clausewitz's statement has been the predominant belief regarding military professionals for some time, and, generally speaking, this argument still holds true today. The military is still in the business of violence. As General James Mattis told Marines in 2004, "be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everybody you meet."[18] As this statement indicates, the US Marine Corps provides an interesting case for why all military

[15] Thomas Rid, *Cyber War Will Not Take Place* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 13.
[16] Rid, *Cyber War Will Not Take Place*, 13.
[17] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 95.
[18] Thomas Ricks, "Fiasco," Armed Forces Journal, 1 August 2006, http://armedforcesjournal.com/fiasco/.

professionals *should* have a warrior ethos regardless what is considered "clearly involved" in direct violence.

In his book, *Warrior Culture of the US Marines*, Marion Sturkey argued that "Marines have evolved into American icons, the Warrior Elite."[19] Accordingly, the overall premise of this book is to reinforce stereotypical axioms regarding Marines as "*battle* heroes, not paper-pushing efficiency experts, library assistants, mail clerks, or staff pogues."[20] In other words, Sturkey's work is just one of many that illustrates how Marines are traditionally viewed in the top-left quadrant of the translator tool—involved in direct violence and driven by a warrior ethos. "Marines are built through the ethos of struggle and sacrifice," as former Marine Corps Commandant General James L. Jones, Jr., stated.[21] The organizational culture that epitomizes the Marine Corps is the idea that "the *Corps* is not just something you do but *who you are*."[22]

It is not hard to find examples of Marines being described in terms traditionally associated with direct violence and warrior ethos. For instance, the 2009 Marine Corps Association's Guidebook for Marines articulated how "Marines are warriors, and warriors are professionals…Marines fight and win—[that is] what we do, [that is] who we are."[23] The vast and storied history of the US Marine Corps is full of instances where direct violence and a warrior ethos played a significant role. From the Pacific island-hopping campaigns in World War II to the more recent battles in the Vietnamese jungles, the Marine Corps has relied extensively on its image as "America's premiere fighting force."[24] This view is epitomized in the first verse of the Marines' Hymn:

From the Halls of Montezuma
To the shores of Tripoli;
We fight our country's battles
In the air, on land, and sea;

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[19] Marion F. Sturkey, *Warrior Culture of the U.S. Marines: Axioms for Warriors, Marine Quotations, Battle History, Reflections on Combat, Corps Legacy, Humor—and much more—for the World's Warrior Elite*, 3rd ed. (Plum Branch, SC: Heritage Press International, 2010), 1.
[20] Sturkey, *Warrior Culture of the U.S. Marines*, 5. [italics original to author]
[21] Sturkey, *Warrior Culture of the U.S. Marines*, 46.
[22] Jeffrey W. Donnithorne, *Four Guardians: A Principled Agent View of American Civil-Military Relations*
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018), 70.
[23] Quoted in Sturkey, Warrior Culture of the U.S. Marines, 49.
[24] George Bransfield Clark, *Devil Dogs: Fighting Marines of World War I* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1999).

First to fight for right and freedom,
And to keep our honor clean;
We are proud to claim the title
Of United States Marine.[25]

In *A Sense of Values*, David Wood stated that, "Marines are warriors, a profession Americans have always looked upon with awe."[26] In essence, the American public views Marines as the epitome of a warrior ethos, because of the Marine Corps' vast history pertaining to war and battles. Thus, the societal interpretation of Marines and the Marine Corps identity tends to fit squarely in the top-left quadrant of the translator tool. While technology has been leveraged to reduce some of the risk of reciprocity associated with "sending in the Marines," the US Marine Corps will always have some element of direct violence and warrior ethos attached to it. Thus, regardless of whether each individual Marine is "clearly involved" in direct violence, the overall assumption is that there is at least some level of risk associated to each Marine. Put simply, every military member is linked to violence at some level, and thus, every military member should be viewed as a potential target in war (i.e., lawful combatant).

"Combat…is not like a feud against a known and familiar foe," as John Lynn contented. "A good deal of research suggests that most Americans in combat fought for and with their comrades rather than against their enemies."[27] The point of this is that no matter the overall disconnect from any of Huntington's or Janowitz's military establishment subgroups—managers of violence and auxiliary force; or heroic leaders, military managers, and technical experts—each and every military member has some linkage to violence. The social relationship between military professionals and society at large is still present, and therefore, a warrior ethos is still needed, at least at some level. The problem with this, however, comes from the overall professionalization of violence. To put it in Huntington's own words, violence as contrasted with "amateur" instead of against "skill" or "trade."[28] Scrutinizing a sister-service of the Marines—the US Air Force—will illustrate this point.

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[25] William P. McCahill, *First to Fight* (Philadelphia, PA: The David McKay Company, 1943), viii.
[26] David Bowne Wood and Bob Mahoney, *A Sense of Values: American Warriors in an Uncertain World* (Kansas City, MO: Andrews and McMeel, 1994).
[27] John A. Lynn, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2003), 241.
[28] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 8.

The case for "should not": US Air Force

If the whole of *military activity* must relate directly or indirectly to the engagement, as Clausewitz contended, what should be said regarding *civilian activity* that relates directly or indirectly to the engagement?[29] Put simply, technological changes associated with warfare coupled with the increased preference for indirect violence (i.e., reduced risk of reciprocity and increased distance between perpetrator and recipient) have made it increasingly difficult to separate military actions from non-military ones. As Janowitz argued, "increased destructiveness of military technology tends to weaken the distinction between military and civilian roles."[30] The consequence of this is an "equalization of risks" between civilians and military professionals, which ultimately hinders the American public's fluency in the language of war.[31] Accordingly, the Air Force's identity has been described as an infatuation with "disruptive new technology" and a political ethos, as juxtaposed to the Marine Corps' warrior ethos.[32]

This infatuation is not entirely within the Air Force, though. In fact, since its inception in Douhet, air power theory has sought to replace manpower with technology, which aims to reduce the cost in human lives for the perpetrator, but not for any adversary. In other words, the push for technological advances in warfare can be traced to a societal desire for "risk-free" or "bloodless" wars on behave of at least one-side. In other words, societies, like the American public, have some level of aversion to organized human violence and, in general, they do not want to risk the lives of their sons or daughters. Therefore, since the Air Force's identity is rooted in a commitment to technological superiority, societies and political leaders alike have come to rely on the seductive potential of the "air weapon."[33] In short, the Air Force theoretically could provide the *ends* the American public desires.[34]

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[29] Clausewitz, *On War*, 95.
[30] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 32.
[31] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 33.
[32] Donnithorne, *Four Guardians*, 120.
[33] Carl H. Builder, *The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force* (1994; repr., New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 6.
[34] The *ends* in this context equate to "risk-free" or "bloodless" wars. [Builder, *The Icarus Syndrome*, 31.]

The basic principle that governs all warfare, according to Guilio Douhet, is to "*inflict the greatest damage in the shortest possible time*."[35] While this view may appear to be focused on the physical elements of violence, Douhet's seemingly one-sided dictum was actually centered on the cognitive elements instead. In other words, the physical "damage" was merely the means to achieve the cognitive ends, with the ends being the capitulation of an adversary. As Bernard Brodie contented, "Douhet was bent on restoring *reason* to war."[36] To put this in the framework of the translator tool presented earlier (i.e., Figure 5), Douhet believed air power could quickly inflict massive amounts of damage on an adversary, which would ultimately force the adversarial society to bend to its inherent aversion to violence. Put simply, the Air Force could bomb an adversary to the point that *reason* would triumph over an adversary's *emotional* outcries to reciprocate violence. The problem with this, however, is that it is focused on *reason* from the viewpoint of the recipient of violence, not the perpetrator.

Referencing back to an earlier John Keegan quote, societies have the unique ability to "rationalize and even justify cruel practices by us…while retaining the capacity to be outraged, even disgusted by practices equally cruel which, under the hands of strangers, take a different form."[37] In other words, the Air Force's mantra of leveraging technology and "bombing to win" is blindly associated to reason applied to an adversary's response to aerial bombardment and not reason that is tied to the perpetrator's decision to leverage violence in the first place. Put simply, the Air Force fell into a trap regarding the professionalization of violence as contrasted with "amateur," instead of violence as contrasted with "skill" or "craft."

"In the aftermath of America's near bloodless victory in the Gulf War," Robert Pape argued in *Bombing to Win*, "proponents claim…that the Gulf War heralds a new age in which strategic bombing will be the strongest form of military power."[38] Pape further contends that while the premise of this argument

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[35] Guilio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington D.C: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 51.
[36] Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (1959; repr., Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2007), 70. [italics original to author]
[37] John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1993), 9.
[38] Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 318.

might be true, the logic is faulty.[39] To put it bluntly, it does not matter if more targets can be destroyed in an expedited and efficient manner, because it makes little difference if there is no meaning behind the violence. Thus, just because the Air Force is quite good at committing violent acts, these are acts related to the assumption that the recipient of violence will change course. However, as Pape concluded based on his empirical analysis concerning the effectiveness of aerial coercion, "if modern nation-states can withstand so much, they will not give in under the relatively bloodless harassment envisioned by today's strategic bombing advocates."[40] In other words, the Air Force's reliance on indirect violence as compared to their sister-service Marines (i.e., different risk of reciprocity and more distance between perpetrator and recipient of violence), equates to a reduced emotional connection to the American public.

To put it in the context of the translator tool, the American public views the identity of the Air Force to be more in line with calculated competition, or at least something less than the traditional notion of war. The overall result of this is an Air Force culture that appears to be confused as to its true identity, but the reality is that it fits within Janowitz's description of a military establishment with a political ethos. Specifically, Janowitz described a political ethos as a "measured application of violence," which aptly corresponds with Douhet's original belief that the air weapon will reintroduce the restraint of reason back into war.[41] In the end, all of this is open to interpretation, but the point of the translator tool is to reduce at least some of the ambiguity concerning some of war's grammar.

Conclusion: Professional Space Warrior?

So, what is the point of all of this? At the very start of this thesis there was a quote from John Lynn, where he questioned whether the "universal soldier" actually exists. Hopefully, this thesis has presented the argument that yes, there is such a thing as a universal soldier that endures through time, but, the societal perception of him or her is continually changing. In addition to the ever-changing character of war becoming more focused on indirect violence, there is also a trend of the overall military establishment becoming increasingly characterized by a

[39] Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 319.
[40] Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 320.
[41] Janowitz, Professional Soldier, 33; and Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 69.

political ethos instead of a warrior ethos. The argument here is that the American public relies on the military, to include all services, to carry out violence on its behalf. If a warrior ethos is needed to accomplish this, then military professionals should have it. However, there needs to be caution in applying it haphazardly. The American public still views the military as practitioners of violence. Thus, if the line between military professionals and civilians becomes too blurred, the overall purpose of the military could be lost on the general public. The recent focus on a potential sixth branch of the US military—US Space Force—illustrates this critical point.

On 18 June 2018, President Donald Trump directed the Pentagon to create a "space force" as a new, sixth military service dedicated to overseeing the military missions and operations in the space domain.[42] "We must have American dominance in space," he stated, "[so I am] hereby directing the Department of Defense to immediately begin the process to establish a space force as the sixth branch of the armed forces."[43] So, if this comes to fruition, then what would the culture of the service be? Would the Space Force have a similar ethos to that of say the US Marine Corps? How would society interpret the culture of a US Space Force?

As early as 2001, the Space Commission recognized the need for "a stronger military space culture."[44] The problem is that cultural changes in general tend to be a slow, iterative process. Recent events, like the 2009 Chinese anti-satellite test, have changed this, however. "We are at the war fighter table [now]," as Major General Joseph Guastella, Jr., director of integrated air, space, cyberspace and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations at Air Force Space Command, stated in 2018.[45] Thus, the all important question that needs to be addressed, then, is where will society put military space professionals on the translator tool?

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[42] Oriana Pawlyk, "It's Official: Trump Announces Space Force as 6th Military Branch," Military.com, 18 June 2018, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/06/18/its-official-trump-announces-space-force-6th-military-branch.html.
[43] Pawlyk, "Trump Announces Space Force."
[44] *Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization*, executive summary (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2001).
[45] Sandra Erwin, "Air Force tries to create a warrior culture in space," *Space News*, 3 March 2018.

It is safe to assume that the nature of the violence space professionals will be involved in is inherently indirect (i.e., space professionals are not clearly involved in direct violence), so the bigger question resides in which ethos is more apt in describing a potential US Space Force. To most, the US Space Force would clearly be in the bottom-left quadrant, but does that mean space professionals tend to not be involved in war? Maybe space professionals should concentrate on what is described as calculated competition? In the end, everything revolves on the interpretation of *war*, *violence*, and *military professionals*, and that is purposefully left up to the readers.

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