

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

MISSION COMMAND AND THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMANDER - IN CHAOS LIES OPPORTUNITY:
A MODEL FOR CREATING BELIEF, CAPABILITY, AND
DRIVING INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

by

Darius D. Ervin, LTC, USA

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Mr. Daniel J. Collier, LeMay Center Intelligence Directorate, USAF

27 March 2020

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Biography

Lieutenant Colonel Darius Ervin is assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He is a career US Army Intelligence Officer that has served as the senior intelligence officer at the battalion and brigade level. Prior to attending Air War College, LTC Ervin commanded the 202nd MI Battalion, 513th MI Brigade (Theater), INSCOM, Fort Gordon, Georgia, responsible for setting the theater and directing sustained CI and HUMINT support to USARCENT. His overseas assignments include Hawaii and Korea, and he has deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait. He spent two years training brigade staffs as the Senior Intelligence Observer Coach/Trainer for Operations Group Bravo, Mission Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received his commission from Florida A&M University, graduating as an ROTC Distinguished Military Graduate with a Bachelor of Architecture Professional Degree.

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* This term was coined not during my Deuce Battalion years, but during my subsequent research for this paper. The original term while in command was “leader-led.”

Abstract

The Army's approach to mission command is more than good leadership; it requires sound systems and processes to address the science of control. The intelligence commander is responsible for command and control. Commanders arrange people, processes, and networks into command posts to best facilitate their exercise of authority and direction to accomplish the mission. The commander owns the mission and underwrites risk. With the recent updates to ADP 6-0, the publication of the Army Intelligence Enterprise framework and Army Intelligence Plan 2019, and continued dialogue on mission command, now is the time to evolve intelligence doctrine, adapt leader development to grow future commanders (not just "2s"), and refine our training for the multi-domain environment. Current US Army Intelligence Center of Excellence's leader development model focuses on building intelligence professionals that supplement the maneuver commander's operation process, the framework for exercising command and control. Today's Joint and US Army doctrine outlines the means to support mission command against all threats in MDO but limit discussion on how the intelligence commander conducts mission command for their organization. This research draws upon two qualitative sources to identify foundational principles of effective intelligence mission command: interviews and my experience as the 202nd Military Intelligence Battalion Commander, and a qualitative assessment of leadership and mission command literature, doctrine, and policy documents. Ultimately, this research proposes a useful, flexible model that can be institutionalized across multiple intelligence organizations to replace a personality-driven model. Lastly, this paper offers six recommendations across the institutional, operational, and individual domains to help guide commanders in balancing the art of command and the science of control and ultimately drive intelligence operations.

Introduction

“As intelligence professionals, the norm is working for two to three different bosses simultaneously. However, the standard should not be ‘to get over it.’ We have to change the narrative to embracing the challenges of mission command and leveraging the opportunity in multiple headquarters assisting the intelligence commander to accomplish the mission.”

--Author

While training intelligence professionals and brigade level staff as an observer, coach, and trainer for the US Army Combined Arms Center’s Mission Command Training program, I contemplated the question of how the military intelligence (MI) commander facilitates or conducts mission command. There are many competing requirements as the intel commander works for multiple commanders based on the command, administrative and support relationships, US law and policy, authorities, funding, and information collection requirements. The Army expects commanders to lead in a non-linear and unpredictable environment with chance and friction, increasing the potential for chaos and uncertainty of the best-laid plan.² A commander must position himself to exploit the opportunities presented and not permit them to frustrate him in accomplishing the mission.

Understanding the intelligence commander’s role for both today and tomorrow begins with a basic understanding of our past. The intelligence commander dates to the creation of the Continental Army with General George Washington and his network of scouts and spies. When General Washington assumed command of the Continental Army in July 1775, he understood the need to conduct mission command. He established an intelligence force and served as the Continental Army’s senior intelligence officer, as well as primary intelligence consumer. As the senior intelligence officer, he directed intelligence operations at the strategic level while

² Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,” *International Security*, vol.17, no.3 (Winter 1992).

obtaining tactical intelligence from subordinate commanders. In mid-1778, General Washington began planning for the Culper Spy Ring under Major Benjamin Tallmadge.

Then, in early July 1779, Washington drafted a message of instruction to his principal agents. The letter provided clear guidance on their roles and the ring's prioritization of its collection targets. It ended with a strong admonition regarding the requirement for disciplined operational security. This letter of instruction gave the ring its general organizational plan for operating but was not so specific as to take away the initiative that field operators must have to handle daily realities of collection network activities.³

The Culper Spy Ring's success can be attributable to several factors found in today's mission command philosophy. The courage of the network's agents and couriers reflects their tactical and technical competence, which played a significant role in its accomplishments.⁴ However, the network was more than a collection of individuals; it was a system based on shared understanding facilitated by careful planning and direction. From the top, Washington maintained constant communications with Tallmadge, issuing mission orders to focus the effort. At the bottom, individuals had specifically assigned missions and practiced solid tradecraft. In the middle, Tallmadge ensured his agents had the resources they required (i.e., secret ink and a system of codes) and arranged an effective system for communicating with his agents to maintain situational understanding.⁵ Moreover, he provided the overall purpose and direction for his intelligence organization.⁶

Mission command is described by the Army in its revised ADP 6-0, "Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces as:

³ Kenneth A. Daigler. *Spies, Patriots, and Traitors: American Intelligence in the Revolutionary War*. Georgetown University Press. Kindle Edition.

⁴ Michael E. Biglow, "A Short History of Army Intelligence," MIPB, July – September 2012.

⁵ Biglow, A Short History of Army Intelligence.

⁶ Biglow, A Short History of Army Intelligence.

the Army's approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.⁷

This approach requires using the principles of mission orders and providing clear commander's intent based on an environment of trust and shared understanding among commanders, staffs, and subordinates (i.e., George Washington's clear order and risk acceptance in crossing the Delaware River in 1776, Ulysses S. Grant's simple guidance to William T. Sherman in 1864).⁸ Much has been debated after then. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey released his 3 April 2012 Mission Command White Paper, asserting that "the commander must blend the art of command and the science of control."⁹ According to General Perkins, mission command did not replace command and control,

What **Command and Control** is, in essence, it is issuing orders and ensuring compliance. Issue orders: command. Ensure compliance: control. And so the control is for the sake of compliance. What we're saying in **Mission Command** is: What we are trying to do is empower our subordinates to exploit the initiative, to act within the commanders' intent using disciplined initiative.¹⁰ And so we are controlling for the sake of empowerment, not controlling for the sake of compliance ... **Mission Command** explains *why* you command and control.¹¹

However, leaders throughout the force frequently voice concerns that their personal experiences in garrison, during field training assessments, and while operationally deployed directly conflicted with the Army's mission command philosophy. The confusion stems from the four central challenges identified below:¹²

⁷ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) No. 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, 31 July 2019).

⁸ Gen. Stephen Townsend, MG Douglass Crissman, MAJ Kelly McCoy, "Reinvigorating the Army's Approach to Mission Command: It's Okay to Run with Scissors (Part 1)," *Military Review*, (April, 2019).

⁹ Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, "Mission Command White Paper." *CJCS*, 3 Apr 2012, pages 3-8.

¹⁰ Disciplined initiative refers to the duty individual subordinates have to exercise initiative within the constraints of the commander's intent to achieve the desired end state. Simply put, disciplined initiative is when subordinates have the discipline to follow their orders and adhere to the plan until they realize their orders and the plan are no longer suitable for the situation in which they find themselves

¹¹ LTG Perkins, Understanding Mission Command. MCTP Mission Command Workshop. Fort Leavenworth, KS. 29 October 2013.

¹² Gen. Stephen Townsend, "Reinvigorating the Army's Approach to Mission Command," <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Army-Press-Online-Journal/documents/2019/Townsend-online.pdf>, 6.

- directed mandatory training that stifled leaders the opportunity to lead and promote trust and confidence
- tighter budgets resulting in increased control for efficient use of limited resources
- the shift in readiness models and a new warfighting concept increased demands on units, leaders, and soldiers to increase centralized training
- “unforeseen ambiguity”¹³ based on the removal of the term command and control from the 2012 version ADP 6-0.

After seven years, leaders at every level, from recruiters to doctrine writers and squad leaders up to general officers, are talking about mission command.¹⁴ The updated ADP 6-0 highlights the evolution of mission command based upon lessons learned since 2012.¹⁵

This paper first explores the nature of Army leadership from the lens of the author detailing significant chapters of his career that shaped his leadership philosophy and approach to mission command. Next, the essential elements of intelligence mission command are defined by understanding the complexities of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and its subordinate Theater Intelligence Brigades with specific emphasis on authorities, functions, and responsibilities. The complexities of INSCOM are amplified with four elements that an effective intelligence commander will need to create decision advantage. The paper then describes how the intelligence commander must resolve to do everything in their power to divest control and distribute it to the lowest levels possible. However, the role of the commander in the Military Intelligence Corps is not always clear, and some argue MI culture has shifted to being staff centric. After understanding this paradigm shift, a deep dive into understanding the “why” of the military intelligence organization’s existence is explored with a case study of the 202nd Military Intelligence Battalion. The author walks you through the key transformational period of the organization resulting in a nonstandard, task organization to conduct deliberate mission and

¹³ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) No. 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, 31 July 2019), vii.

¹⁴ Townsend, “Reinvigorating the Army’s Approach to Mission Command,” 6.

¹⁵ ADP 6-0, Mission Command, vii.

requirements management. Throughout the paper, the leader-leader model,¹⁶ defined by Robert Greiner and David Marquet as a resilient construct centered on leaders at every level of an organization and pushing decision-making authority down to the lowest level, becomes the backdrop to the efforts to execute mission command and drive intelligence operations.

Committing an organization to the elements of this model results in more engaged team members with a sense of meaning and purpose in their work. The paper concludes with the concept of being a “master negotiator” to guide the intelligence commander through the nuances of commanding and controlling an organization that relies on collaboration and close coordination across echelon. Simply stated, when you lose TACON, or you are not a self-sufficient organization, you might have to resort to ‘negotiate missions’¹⁷ that usually end in dialogue similar to the following: “We are willing to do this, but we cannot do that.”¹⁸

Consequently, the author recommends all Army Center of Excellence (CoEs) include more curriculum of how to apply the existing mission command framework during every step of a Soldier’s professional development life cycle. The focus should be warfighting function or branch-specific. The institutional domain directly supports the second recommendation within the operational domain. The CoEs should focus on developing the required skills and attributes to enable their branch-specific commanders and organizations to conduct the orders process, produce mission-type orders, and leader certification in the most critical task of risk mitigation. As it pertains to the individual domain, all leaders should continue to embrace mission command as the Army’s approach to command and control, while engaging in stimulating and thoughtful discussions on the challenges and opportunities in enabling multi-domain operations (MDO).

¹⁶ Robert Greiner, Leader-Leader, 17 December 2013, <https://robertgreiner.com/leader-leader/>.

¹⁷ Major General B. Chance Saltzman, “C2 Challenges – practitioner View,” (lecture, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 11 February 2020).

¹⁸ Saltzman, “C2 Challenges – practitioner View.”

Despite having very little command and control, the intelligence commander executes efficient mission command by being a master negotiator and mission/requirements manager, with functional oversight of operations, subject matter expertise, and leader and team certification.



Thesis

Despite having very little command and control, the intelligence commander executes efficient mission command by being a master negotiator and mission/requirements manager, with functional oversight of operations, subject matter expertise, and leader and team certification.

The intelligence commander rejects the traditional personality-driven, leader-follower model that limits decision-making authority and flexibility. Instead, the leader-leader model is preferred to guide the intelligence commander's strategies and actions in directing, leading, and assessing intelligence operations, as more decision-making authority is pushed down with organizational clarity of purpose.



Establishing the Foundation for the Future

Battalion command is indescribable. Incredible, humbling, challenging, rewarding, and unforgettable are all adjectives that fall short of capturing the honor and privilege of commanding the nation's best and brightest intelligence Soldiers and Civilians. Previously as a career Army intelligence officer, I served in key direct leadership positions at the platoon and company levels, and later, as a senior intelligence practitioner at the battalion and brigade levels. These positions were formative, but battalion command was unique for the reasons described in this paper.

When I served in the Army Mission Command Training Program as a brigade senior intelligence observer, coach, and trainer, I had firsthand experience with the best how-to manual on mission command. It was a simple 10-minute animation by Inno-Versity Digital Learning of a retired Navy Captain David Marquet's talk on Greatness and is based on his book, *Turn the Ship Around! A true Story of Turning Followers into Leaders*. The book provides the complete story of a push for leadership at all levels changed the USS SANTA FE from worst to first in the fleet by challenging the US Navy traditional leader-follower approach. Struggling against his instincts to take control, he instead achieved the vastly more powerful model of giving control.

Leadership should mean giving control rather than taking control and creating leaders rather than forging followers.¹⁹

I agree with Marquet's assessment that most of what we study, learn, and practice in terms of leadership adheres to a leader-follower structure. Without a close examination of the Army's doctrinal publication on leadership, one will have the same takeaway as this model is pervasive throughout military formations. Nevertheless, the leader-follower model is like an

¹⁹ L. David Marquet, *Turn the Ship Around! A True Story of Turning Followers into Leaders* (New York: Penguin Group, 2012).

iceberg with hidden limitations (i.e., personality-driven leadership, limited decision-making authority, and inflexibility).²⁰ Here is what my Army Doctrinal publication told me about being a leader:

Leadership involves at least two people or groups, one which leads and another which follows... Effective organizations depend on the competence of respectful leaders and loyal followers. Given the hierarchical structure of the Army, every Army leader is also a follower. Learning to be a good leader also needs to be associated with learning to be a good follower—learning loyalty, subordination, respect for superiors, and even when and how to lodge candid disagreement.²¹

The problem with a cursory look at Army leadership doctrine, and reliance on a limited leader-follower model, one could overlook the essence of being an Army leader – developing others to be leaders, not followers. A good or “professional follower” does not blindly follow, but provides reasoned dissent.

An Army leader is anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command toward action or to change thinking when appropriate.²²

When I was assigned the task of developing a personal vision at the pre-command course, I understood my sole purpose as a commander was to create and inspire energy that positively influences others to achieve beyond their potential. This was not a mystical quality that I suddenly possessed, and others did not. This vision was rooted in the belief that we all can be leaders, and in fact, the battalion would be at its best when we all are leaders. From the most junior Soldier in the organization to the most experienced, we all are humans with the cognitive capacity to act, think, and decide for the greater good of the organization.

²⁰ Marquet, *Turn the Ship Around!*, xxv-xxvi.

²¹ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) No. 6-22, Army Leadership (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, August 2012).

²² ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, 1-13.

In my years of serving with some highly successful superiors, peers, and subordinates, I picked up some meaningful leadership lessons that shaped my approach to mission command.

Leaders make good decisions. “Make a decision right or wrong...” What nonsense! Leaders are in charge because we are expected to make the right decision given the facts at hand. We may never achieve 100% correctness, but we will not make “wrong” decisions just to get it over with.

Leaders solve problems, or at the very least set the conditions for others to solve their own. Nothing ever got more responsive when it moved to the next higher HQ – this means we should do everything we can to fix our internal problems at our level.

The foundation was being set. The leader-leader model not only achieved significant improvements in the effectiveness and morale of the battalion but also made us stronger. It has been six months since I relinquished command, and only time will tell if the improvements are enduring, decoupled from my personality and presence. The leader-leader model was significantly more resilient, and it did not rely on the designated leader always being right. Furthermore, the leader-leader model spawned additional leaders throughout the organization naturally. It was contagious.

Essential Elements of Intelligence Mission Command

The intelligence unit’s collection operations (intelligence operations) follow the Army’s framework for exercising mission command the same way maneuver units do to conduct operations. The mission command activities performed during operations are planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. Intelligence commanders, supported by their staff, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to direct, lead, and assess intelligence operations. However, to understand the command and control of intelligence operations, intelligence professionals must understand the

oversight, management, and resourcing of intelligence operations and the authority for or prohibitions on certain intelligence activities, and how information collection nests within intelligence operations.

As the first step in information collection planning is describing/understanding the operational environment, understanding the complexities of INSCOM and its Military Intelligence Brigade's (Theater) (MIB-T) authorities, functions and relationships is the first step in understanding the challenges of intelligence mission command. As a direct reporting unit (DRU) to the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) G2, INSCOM serves as the operational-level headquarters for the Army's intelligence enterprise to provide unity of command to synchronize multidiscipline intelligence and bridge the gap between the national intelligence community (IC) and tactical forces.²³

The INSCOM Commander exercises command relationships following joint doctrine and exercises administrative control (ADCON) authority²⁴ and responsibility (i.e., resources, equipment, personnel management, logistics, discipline, training) on behalf of the SECARMY.²⁵ INSCOM consists of 17 major subordinate commands (MSCs) that are "organic" for the purpose of Army force structure management. However, through the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), INSCOM's six MIB-Ts are assigned to each geographic²⁶ combatant command (CCMD); or have been placed under the operational control (OPCON) of the Theater Army Service Component Command (ASCC). Inherent in combatant command

²³ Major General Gary W. Johnston and Richard A. Harfst, "U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command Strategy," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, July – September 2019, 7

²⁴ ADCON is a specific type of command authority; it is not a command relationship.

²⁵ Army Regulation 10-87, *Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units*. 11 December 2017, 22

²⁶ MIB-T regional focus enhances its capabilities to develop and exploit language skills and cultural insights, continuity and cultural context, and gain a deep understanding of the threat characteristics and doctrine of partner nations, enemies, and adversaries over many years.

(command authority) (COCOM) is OPCON.²⁷ Although INSCOM does not possess COCOM or OPCON authorities, it is a force provider of Army intelligence forces that operate under COCOM and, as delegated, the OPCON of the ASCCs, with whom it shares ADCON responsibility.²⁸




Figure 1.

²⁷ OPCON is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.

²⁸ LTC Ryan H. Beery, "Seeing the Elephant: INSCOM's Exercise of Mission Command, MIPB July-September 2018, 13.

For example, 513 MIB-T is an Echelons Above Corps (EAC) unit, assigned to CENTCOM and OPCON to US Army Central Command (USARCENT)/Third Army. It serves as the Army's access point into intelligence enterprise assets and services²⁹ in the USCENTCOM AOR. INSCOM shares ADCON responsibilities over the 513th MIB-T with USARCENT and United States Army Cyber Center of Excellence and Fort Gordon. Both mission and geography influence the specific division of shared ADCON responsibilities³⁰ as the 513th MIB-T has personnel distributed throughout the continental United States and CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) (see Figure 1 on page 12).

Although each MIB-T is unique in its organization, capabilities, and capacities, tailored to its theater's enduring requirements and prioritization within Defense Planning Guidance, the challenges of mission command throughout INSCOM can only be overcome through coordination, anticipation, verification, and follow-up. Therefore, INSCOM has a general support relationship with the entire Army; and routinely establishes coordination relationships with other Army commands, DoD headquarters and agencies, intelligence community partners, and other government agencies in support of Army HUMINT, CI, cover, collection management, and related operational activities. These coordination relationships exist through a combination of direct liaisons and memoranda of agreement (MOAs)/memoranda of understanding (MOUs).³¹

INSCOM also has service-derived "operational" intelligence authorities that do not fit into traditional doctrinal lines between service authorities and CCMD authorities. Under these service intelligence authorities, executed on behalf of SECARMY and DCS G2, INSCOM

²⁹ Johnston and Harfst, "U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command Strategy," 7.

³⁰ Beery, "Seeing the Elephant: INSCOM's Exercise of Mission Command," 13.

³¹ Beery, "Seeing the Elephant: INSCOM's Exercise of Mission Command," 13.

provides worldwide operational oversight, synchronization, coordination, and technical authority of all Army CI investigations, and CI and HUMINT activities.³² The Army and the CCMDs (i.e., USCENTCOM) both exercise CI authorities; however, the Army exercises some CI authorities exclusively in support of both the Army and the designated DoD components. Under DoD Instruction 5240.10, *Counterintelligence (CI) in the Combatant Commands and Other DoD Components*, the military services alone have the authority to conduct CI investigations. At the same time, DoDI 5240.10 prohibits the CCMDs and defense agencies from conducting such investigations.³³ These service intelligence responsibilities are executed by what is colloquially described as “service OPCON.” Service OPCON is technically a type of ADCON because it is the exercise of SECARMY authorities, provided by the President in EO 12333.³⁴ In addition to CI investigations, the 202nd MI BN executes other service-derived “operational” intelligence authorities through HUMINT overt and clandestine source operations and CI support to DoD Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, cleared defense contractors, and research and development.

INSCOM also manages multiple intelligence projects that the 202nd MI BN executes for USARCENT, including the Army Cover Program, the Force Protection Detachment Program, the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Program, and the Army CI Cyber Program. These projects require continuous coordination with INSCOM to maintain “relationships, pursue acquisition solutions, and manage each project within the Army, DoD, and intelligence community.”³⁵ In addition to the role of the project manager, INSCOM serves as the Army

³² AR 10-87, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units, 20.

³³ Beery, “Seeing the Elephant: INSCOM’s Exercise of Mission Command,” 13.

³⁴ Executive Order 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, authorizes the SECARMY to collect (including through clandestine means), produce, analyze, and disseminate defense and defense-related intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) to support departmental requirements, and, as appropriate, national requirements; and to conduct CI activities.

³⁵ Beery, “Seeing the Elephant: INSCOM’s Exercise of Mission Command,” 13.

program manager for contract linguist support services to all DoD components. This program is essential to Army intelligence and CENTCOM operations and supports users down to the tactical level. The INSCOM Contract Linguist and Intelligence Program Support Office (CLIPSO) serves as the single point of entry for all contract linguist requirements validated and resourced under executive agent authorities.³⁶ For that reason, CLIPSO and INSCOM are routinely involved in discussions with DoD, CCMDs, ASCCs, and joint task force on linguist support requirements. For example, the 202nd MI BN CI personnel are tasked by the DCS G2 to conduct periodic screenings of those linguists with security clearances.

For every challenge, a new opportunity awaits to operate as a robust enterprise within a system of enterprises in order to create decision advantage for commanders. Although INSCOM and its subordinate MSC command authorities and relationships can be complicated to the novice, much can be gained by the synergy of mission command and the intrinsic capability to deliver resources, authorities, and agility across the Army. This coupled with battalion-level commanders capable of empowering leaders, collaborating horizontally and vertically, seizing opportunities, and filtering outcomes (i.e., negotiate) are the essential elements of intelligence mission command.

Empowered Leaders – Leader-Leader Organization

Most intelligence battalion's unit of action is the team. Therefore, a commander's span of control should not exceed that commander's capability to command the CI and HUMINT team effectively. Also, intelligence organizations' geographical dispersion requires narrowing the span of control (i.e., lessening the number of immediate subordinates). Consequently, the

³⁶ Beery, "Seeing the Elephant: INSCOM's Exercise of Mission Command," 13.

task organization should allow the battalion commander to effectively communicate three levels down (i.e., company, OMT, HUMINT team leader/CI Resident Office). The core principle that enables effective communication is the leader-leader model and empowered team leaders. Army leadership doctrine captures this the best: “empowering others is a forceful statement of trust and one of the best ways of developing subordinates as leaders.”³⁷ Empowerment leads to success.

The leader-leader organization understands that at the center of its success or failure is the ability for everyone to lead others, build trust, extend influence, lead by example, and communicate. First, leaders developing subordinates to be leaders is the most critical training focus! When we train leaders, we empower and prepare them to perform our role in the future and give them the means to train others. Rather than delegate responsibilities, the leader commits to coaching, counseling, and mentoring in a way that builds relationships that foster trust. Then, provide purpose, direction, and motivation to the led to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. This demonstrated leadership includes, among other things, setting the example in discipline, performance, competence, appearance, confidence, fitness, bearing, flexibility, enthusiasm, and accepting responsibility. Finally, understanding what it would take to get those team leaders to make decisions requires communication. This typically includes sharing experiences and knowledge, an open, two-way exchange of information that reinforces sharing team values, and encourages constructive input.³⁸

Another element of the leader-leader organization is using active, empowering phrases. Throughout his book, Marquet suggests using terms as “I intend to ...,” rather than a passive language such as “Do you think we should...” or “Could we...” The benefit of the empowered phrase is initiative and acceptance of responsibility at the lowest level. The led begins to outline

³⁷ ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, 5-5

³⁸ ADP 6-22, Army Leadership, 9-3.

their complete thought process and rationale for their course of action.³⁹ The organization slowly shifts from the passive activity of briefing to certifications. Briefing the same action can compensate for poor planning, and certification places more work on mid-level leaders to understand near-term requirements, anticipate future requirements, and understand the role of each team member. Unlike a brief where the responsibility lies with the only the briefer, a certification requires those being asked the questions to demonstrate the necessary knowledge or risk the operation or task not being executed. Certification shifts the onus onto the participants.

Filtering Outcomes

Today's environment requires an intelligence commander that can engage with people across the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment in order to achieve military objectives. As described previously in the role of INSCOM and its subordinate MIB-Ts, the span of the military leader's responsibility has increased, but not their authority. The intelligence commander must engage with people they have no direct authority over.⁴⁰ ADP 6-22 describes "identifying who is who, what role they have, over whom they have authority or influence, and how they are likely to respond to the intelligence commander's influence as important considerations"⁴¹ when leading outside the organization. Although mission orders create assigned or forced partnerships, our partners have their own equities and priorities that will differ with those of the intelligence commander. This environment calls for an adaptive negotiating skill set.

³⁹ Marquet, *Turn the Ship Around!*, 83.

⁴⁰ Stefan Eisen, Jr. "A Negotiating Model for the Military Context," *Intercultural Management Quarterly*, spring 2014. http://issuu.com/interculturalmanagement/docs/imq_spring_14_final-wmarks-arabicfn

⁴¹ ADP 6-22, 5-10.

In his presentation to Air War College 2020, Major General B. Chance Saltzman, deputy commander US Air Forces Central Command/Combined Force Air Component Commander (CFACC), USCENTCOM, coined the phrase “negotiate missions.”⁴² He was describing the CFACC’s role as collection operations manager of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), not tactical control of airborne ISR. This unique distinction, negotiate missions, meant that the CFACC deputy commander was required to spend time discussing what the supporting commands were willing to accomplish according to the air tasking order. There is a clear distinction that mission type orders are not a replacement for the collection plan.⁴³ The supporting or subordinate commanders retained operational and tactical control as a mechanism to keep them in the operational loop.

The intelligence commander is usually a supporting or subordinate commander. Therefore, intelligence commanders will not be able to rely on traditional leader-follower style that leverages positional power. Based on Stefan Eisen’s comparison of market-based negotiating models and the complexities in today’s military context, five elements should be considered in applying an adaptive negotiating skill set.⁴⁴ First, the intelligence commander must manage the relationship as the negotiating “opposite” is either not interested or is not aware of the need to negotiate. Next, emphasize trust and rapport building actions⁴⁵ as the negotiating “opposite” can perceive the intelligence commander as having a position of advantage.⁴⁶ A shared purpose among prospective negotiators can eliminate this as credibility might be established solely on unit reputation. Most discussions on negotiations include developing your

⁴² Saltzman, “C2 Challenges – practitioner View.”

⁴³ Saltzman, “C2 Challenges – practitioner View.”

⁴⁴ Eisen, Jr. “A Negotiating Model for the Military Context.”

⁴⁵ ADP 6-22 Table 5-2, summarizes the key competency Builds Trust.

⁴⁶ Eisen, Jr. “A Negotiating Model for the Military Context.”

Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), an opportunity you would explore should negotiations fail. BATNA determination, or not involving the opposite's participating, is often not viable based on the nature of intelligence operations.⁴⁷ Consequently, those involved might have to RECLAMA the taskings to the higher headquarters if a negotiated agreement is not feasible. Also, it is necessary to explore how a breakdown might have occurred and how to remedy for future operations. The fourth element includes identifying and prioritizing interests to help guide the selected solution. The last element addresses time constraints. Time might dictate a more direct, task-oriented "insist" approach⁴⁸ in where every issue might not get resolved, but those involved have shared understanding. A key element of mission command, shared understanding amongst the decision-makers described above are essential in eliminating blind spots between supported and supporting commanders.

Divesting Control and Distributing It

Our intelligence professionals deserve more than a personality-driven approach to command. Success in mission command can no longer be defined by a commander's willingness to employ it. To put this in context, as the former US Army Training and Doctrine Command Commanding General, General Stephen Townsend, explained, "it must be clear and convincing that the Army's approach to command and control is mission command – as it is the only approach to leading a winning Army."⁴⁹ As General Dempsey stated in his white paper, "mission command is commander-centric."⁵⁰ Mission command is a continual cognitive effort

⁴⁷ Eisen, Jr. "A Negotiating Model for the Military Context."

⁴⁸ Eisen, Jr. "A Negotiating Model for the Military Context."

⁴⁹ Townsend, "Reinvigorating the Army's Approach to Mission Command," 4.

⁵⁰ Dempsey, "Mission Command White Paper." pages 3-8.

to understand, to adapt, and to direct effectively the achievement of intent.⁵¹ As evidence, the Army has implemented the Battalion Commander Assessment Program (BCAP), which aims to identify future commanders with the requisite cognitive ability⁵² and will to place uncomfortable levels of trust in subordinates. While decisions with potential strategic consequences may not solely be the commander's decision, the intelligence commander must resolve to divest control and distribute it⁵³ to the lowest levels possible:

Before long-distance communications, a commander's span of control was limited to the subordinates who could directly hear his voice. Modern communications allow control over much greater distances. Nonetheless . . . a single commander can only exercise close control over a finite number of other soldiers during a fast-moving battle. And while radios, digitized messages, electronic maps, and symbology have improved upon the human voice in many ways, none of these enhancements has done much to expand the cognitive capacity of the individual tactical commander.⁵⁴

The intelligence commander, supported by staff, must blend the art of command and science of control while synchronizing, integrating, and executing intelligence operations. After a significant MTOE reduction in FY18 and out of pure frustration, I informed the unit that the way forward was to emphasize mission command execution. Despite inadequate guidance, poor communication systems, and poor oversight, the teams were executing tasks with great proficiency. The battalion was efficient - but that was the problem. We had spent a significant amount of organizational energy on mission command as a philosophy (see Figure 2 on page 21),


⁵¹ Dempsey, "Mission Command White Paper." 4.


⁵² James W. Browning, *Leading at the Strategic Level in an Uncertain World*, (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2013), 48 and 51. Cognitive Capacity is the collective ability to maximize remembering, perceiving, thinking, and reasoning skills and abilities. Cognitive capacity often includes complex mental models and frames of reference as well as development of solutions to conceptualize, analyze, and evaluate the complex and often wicked problems faced by strategic leaders. The leader must have matching frames of reference or complex mental models that align with the complexity of the job at a specific leadership level.

⁵³ In order to give control, competence (is it safe?) and clarity (is it the right thing to do?) must be established and an environment for thinking as if the commander was right there to make the decision. By giving control, the commander creates leaders.


⁵⁴ John Patrick White and Zalmay Khalilzad, *Strategic Appraisal the Changing Role of Information in Warfare* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 161.

not so much on the execution of command and control. We were stuck in a quagmire of attempting to do things right, efficiency or management, at the cost of not assessing if we were doing the right things, effectiveness or leadership. As retired General Stanley McChrystal illustrates in *Team of Teams*, our systems were very good at doing things right but too inflexible to do the right thing.⁵⁵ The battalion would have to transition and fight the command and control warfighting function, which is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities, enabling the commander to balance the art of command and the science of control. We had to establish the science of control. We had to establish a task organization, process, and battle rhythm to improve commander's understanding and support accomplishing missions.





Mission Command Philosophy



The Army's approach to **command and control** that **empowers** subordinate **decision making** and **decentralized execution** appropriate to the situation.

ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*

Principles of Mission Command:

- Competence to perform tasks to standard
- Build cohesive teams through mutual trust
- Create shared understanding
- Provide a clear commander's intent
- Use mission orders
- Exercise disciplined initiative
- Risk acceptance

Our challenge is to achieve mission preparedness by fostering an environment that promotes the use of disciplined initiative within the commander's intent.

FY16 FORSCOM *Command Training Guidance*

*Updated to reflect 31 JUL 2019, ADP 6-0, *Mission Command*




Figure 2. Mission Command Philosophy

The unit's methods for communicating intelligence operations did not effectively drive analysis for the staff. They did not set conditions for commanders to effectively drive operations

⁵⁵ Stanley McChrystal, *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World*, (New York: Penguin Publishing Group), 2015, 81.

and manage capacity through the activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing.⁵⁶ The mission command structure was sub-optimal in terms of providing commanders and staff shared understanding and ultimately did not accommodate risk mitigation decisions in command channels. The OPCON and technical control channels were mostly independent of one another and unsynchronized from a mission management and unity of effort perspective. The lack of shared understanding amongst decision-makers in each channel created blind spots in the areas of operations, training, and administration that resulted in organizational capacity overload and conflicting priorities at the individual and team levels.⁵⁷




Figure 3. Commander's Visualization.

In early FY19, amid my vision to operationalize the battalion staff and ensure shared understanding, new training guidance from higher, and lessons learned from the INSCOM Table Top Exercise (TTX), it became apparent there needed to be a significant organizational change. This would come in the form of a solution that achieved sustained readiness and enabled effective mission command. Through the battalion's mission analysis of operations, training, and requirements, the 202nd MI Battalion restructured command and technical control,⁵⁸

⁵⁶ COL Kimo C. Gallahue, Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) Mission Command Training in Unified Land Operations: FY 16 Key Observations, No. 17-05, February 2017, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Center for Army Lessons Learned), 6.

⁵⁷ Alpha Detachment, 202nd Military Intelligence Battalion White Paper "The Human Intelligence Sustained Readiness Model: Lessons Learned, Analysis, and Recommendations for the Future, 30 April 2019.

⁵⁸ Technical control ensures adherence to existing laws, authorities, policies, and regulations. It includes but not limited to guidance, oversight, quality assurance/quality control mechanism.

synchronized mission, requirements, and asset management to create unity of effort, and set clear priorities to serve as the framework from which the organization could build on.

Rewriting the Genetic Code

Establishing clean command and support relationships is fundamental in organizing for intelligence operations. These relationships can achieve clear responsibilities and authorities among subordinate and supporting units. While not an actual command and control function, technical control affected how we conducted intelligence operations. The commanders did not direct intelligence operations, and they did not direct the intelligence teams. The authority of the unit commanders had long been eroded. Although I cannot precisely pinpoint when this change occurred, a 2008 article published in the *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* details a significant change in MI culture:

Times are changing. In the future, there will be more emphasis on building a professional intelligence officer, not a commander. USAIC (now USAICoE) recognizes the shift in capabilities and operational decision-making during combat operations away from the MI Commanders and towards G2/S2s. It will be difficult for MI to break away from the command track, but the 2 drives operations to develop targets for effects-based operations.⁵⁹

This paradigm shift from command-centric operations to staff-centric operations has hindered intelligence mission command. As an intelligence corps, we have gone down the slippery slope of placing the burden of the operations process on our technical channels resulting in some commanders becoming disengaged from the mission. This change causes significant issues as the operations process encompasses the full integration of numerous tasks that must be

⁵⁹ US Army Intelligence Center Fort Huachuca Chief of Staff quoted in Captain Raven Bukowski, "Bridging the Doctrine Gap: A CI and HUMINT Focused Look at the Transformation of MI Doctrine," *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin Special Issue 2008*, April – June 2008, 11.

planned and executed across an entire headquarters and placing the mission requirement on our technical experts becomes a distractor to their ability to execute the mission.

The institutional problem was that the desire to have proficient intelligence officers to lead G2/S2 sections ran counter to developing officers to command and drive intelligence operations. The USAICoE implemented a highly successful program to produce relevant officers who can critically think, adapt, and be effective tactical intelligence combat leaders using proven Army processes. From an organizational perspective, the accountability of the technical element was heavily stressed. Their selection and employment were determined by the senior CI and HUMINT advisor to the brigade commander, the Director of CI/HUMINT operations (DCHO). The DCHO basically approved operations, and the DCHO staff, to include the HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) and Army Theater Counterintelligence Coordinating Authority (ATCICA), authorized collections. To add to the confusion, a long list of activities could be performed only with the specific permission of the ASCC G2X, HOC, ATCICA, and so on. The reality was the “control mechanism outweighed the command element.”⁶⁰

These practices and others reinforced leader-follower in the intelligence community. Consequently, the performance of the unit was directly coupled with the technical ability of the DCHO staff and appointees. There was a sense among the unit that commanders were not being allowed to command.

At the same time, the Army intelligence program has succeeded in developing an alternative to the personality-centered leadership approach, a procedurally centered leadership structure in which the procedure reigns supreme. This structure is useful when it comes to operating an automotive assembly plant. The system is well defined and predictable: the people

⁶⁰ Saltzman, “C2 Challenges – practitioner View.”

are highly trained, and the operators follow the procedure! Not saying the Soldiers and Civilians under my command were untrained and disregarded regulations and standard operating procedures. However, the operating environment was far from predictable. As a consumer of the automotive industry, you want this procedurally centered leadership when it comes to driver safety. Accidents typically happen when operators do not follow procedures during unpredictable situations.⁶¹

Yet this emphasis on following procedure can have a stultifying effect. This is exacerbated when coupled with the Army's deeply ingrained culture of risk aversion and uncertainty intolerance.⁶² As evident, many intelligence collectors receive extensive training but are limited in their performance often due to their fear of violating policies such as Procedure 15, questionable intelligence activities.⁶³ This risk aversion mentality must change if successful divesting of control is to be achieved. Leaders must find opportunities for "positive risks"⁶⁴ to maintain the initiative and a position of relative advantage.

When it comes to conducting intelligence operations against an adversary, the application of this procedurally centered approach is limiting, both in how intelligence capabilities are employed and in how the intellect of the collectors is employed. Fundamentally, intelligence operations are different from automotive plant operations. Intelligence operations are against an intelligent adversary in a hyperactive environment.⁶⁵ The complexity is much higher and

⁶¹ David Marquet discusses procedurally centered leadership in terms of operating a nuclear reactor.

⁶² GEN James C. McConville and Hon Thomas E. Kelly III, *Army Innovation Strategy 2017 – 2021*, 6.

⁶³ QIA is any alleged intelligence activity constituting a violation of US law, EO, or applicable DoD regulation or policy. It must be reported through the chain of command, Inspector General, or appropriate Intelligence Oversight Officer as QIA of Federal Crime upon discovery. Failure to report a QIA is in itself a QIA.

⁶⁴ Risk is the probability that an event will occur with either negative or beneficial outcomes for a particular person or group of people. Positive risk management is primarily concerned with identifying, assessing and managing these potentially beneficial outcomes.

⁶⁵ LTG Eric J. Wesley describes a complex world as an environment that is not only unknown, but unknowable and constantly changing. This complexity is brought on by the availability of mass communications

requires a resilient, adaptable organization, and flexibility of mind and agility of action.⁶⁶

Strictly following procedures will not get us there. Do not accept “that is the way we have always done it” as a standard. At this point, we, unfortunately, fall back on the personality-centered leadership structure.

In reversing years of the leader-follower system’s erosion of the intelligence commander’s authority, the subordinate commanders of the *Mighty Deuce Battalion*, now under my command, went against the status quo. I encouraged the commanders to take charge and be a consumer, not a doer. Are the commanders grinding away at something the staff, another officer, or NCO can do? We discussed the reality that running a *DEUCE Company* would mean they would be accountable for the performance of their teams. David Marquet calls this “eyeball accountability” or being intimately involved, physically present in most cases, in the operations of the unit and each activity.⁶⁷ The commanders had to desire this for themselves, as directing change from the top would have been counter-productive. I could not invoke leader-follower rules to direct a shift from leader-follower to leader-leader.

Turning Passive Followers to Active Leaders.

Like all military organizations, readiness remains a top priority. During the time I was in command, former Army Chief of Staff General Mark A. Milley became known as the “readiness chief” as he pushed to increase unit readiness. He also focused on developing the following attributes: self-motivation, critical thinking skills, empathy, active listening, teamwork, and

and social networks, proliferation of advanced weapons, unmanned aerial and ground systems, ubiquitous sensors, dynamic populations, combat forces and varying political systems and ideologies.

⁶⁶ LTG Eric J. Wesley and COL (Retired) Desmond Bailey, “Beyond Planning: Ensuring Mission Success Even when Situations Change,” (AUSA Magazine, October 2018).

⁶⁷ Marquet, *Turn the Ship Around!*, 56.

tolerance for ambiguity. Now, under General James C. McConville, people are the number one priority as they are the ones who will deliver on our readiness, modernization, and reform efforts. I caution commanders in “mirror imaging” the CSA priorities without having an organizational level discussion on what readiness means to the unit, what you are getting ready for, and the type of people required to build cohesive teams. How proactive are the senior leaders in your organization?

“Sir, the staff and commanders should be providing you with the information you need for the readiness brief!” The unit was experiencing a “significant emotional event.” The monthly Brigade Unit Status Report (USR)⁶⁸ was approaching and the data being presented was either irrelevant or incomplete. More importantly, the intent of the USR brief was becoming irrelevant. The information being delivered lacked meaning and value, thus constrained decision-making. The brief was becoming a battle-drill in self-satisfaction. It was clear that my rater, senior rater, and USARCENT G2, who were incredible leaders, did not have the time or energy to analyze my battalion or its needs. They needed me to do my job of concisely articulating the unit’s vision, risks, and requirements written at a general officer consumption level.⁶⁹ Only the commander can determine “where to assume risk when shifting priorities and force disposition.” As a CENTCOM assigned forward collection battalion, I indirectly had a voice or vote in the assignment and allocation processes to distribute forces to CENTCOM in a resource-informed manner while assessing the risks to CJTF-OIR, Joint Task Force, and SPARTAN SHIELD; potential future contingencies; and the health, readiness, and availability of

⁶⁸ Primary purpose of the report prepared by commanders using NetUSR is to provide the POTUS, SECDEF, JCS, HQDA, and all levels of the Army’s chain of command with the current status of US Army units and necessary information for making operational decisions. The reports provide a timely single source document for assessing key elements of a unit’s status according to the unit commander. It does not provide all the information to manage resources at the strategic level.

⁶⁹ COL Glenn C. Schmick, “Build New Muscles for Brigade Command,” *Army Magazine*, December 2019, 10.

the current and future force.⁷⁰ My mid-grade leaders had to take ownership of this process. We had to relook our processes and, above all, change our mentality.

Resisting Urge to Provide Solutions

We lacked systems and processes that allowed the Battalion Commander situational understanding of operations in which to provide intent/guidance to enable CI and HUMINT to exercise initiative within the constraints of the commander's intent. The deficiency created a constant sense of urgency. Nothing was routine. Everything was an emergency. Furthermore, snap decisions from what appeared always to be a crisis strangely resemble a tendency to "make a decision right or wrong, just to get it over with." This was not conducive to the leader-leader model and ran the risk of triggering inaction and indecisiveness at the lowest levels.

The organization's daily interactions, rather it was a commander update brief, unit physical training, mission confirmation brief, or training brief, was creating space for open decisions by the entire team. This was difficult as it required everyone to anticipate decisions and alert the organization for an upcoming one. However, the mentality of the leader-follower model, where subordinates do not need to anticipate requirements because the boss will make a decision when needed, was changing. Personnel throughout the unit felt less stress and pressure as time was taking to let others react to the situation as well.

⁷⁰ Global Force Management, Appendix E, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning, 16 June 2017, E-1.

Thinking out Loud

As a commander, the concept of thinking out loud can make one feel vulnerable. Especially in an environment where leaders feel as if they are expected to achieve certainty and conformity in following specific and concise orders. Marquet refers to this as “losing perspective about what is important.”⁷¹ This manifests in overly cautious operations due to the lack of organizational clarity and the tendency to avoid mistakes rather than achieve excellence. We had to create an environment where everyone was comfortable in sharing their ideas and thoughts while expressing their uncertainties and concerns.

The leader’s role as an “over communicator” that thinks out loud had to start with the battalion commander. My actions needed to reflect General Milley’s tolerance for ambiguity; thus, modeling that lack of certainty is strength and certainty is arrogance.”⁷² Throughout the organization, the expectation for leaders was to do more than talk to their Soldiers. They motivated their Soldiers by sharing experiences and knowledge – by telling their stories. Artificial barriers between staff and operators, officers and non-commissioned officers, and Soldiers and Civilians disappeared as a sense of team was developing by asking questions, being curious, and taking the initiative. Personnel tended to be able to see and appreciate multiple perspectives and thus not so quick to rush to judgment. As a result, thinking out loud created organizational clarity as the unit gained confidence in its ability to operate effectively in an uncertain environment.

⁷¹ Marquet, *Turn the Ship Around!*, 102.

⁷² Marquet, *Turn the Ship Around!*, 106.

Clarity of Purpose

We (TEAM DEUCE) are an unparalleled team of highly skilled, professional experts exercising disciplined initiative, with shared understanding, that develop and deliver timely and accurate CI/HUMINT capabilities to the Army - - Anytime, Anywhere! We embody GREATNESS and expertly set the conditions for decision-makers -- in garrison or in the field, in peace or at war.

Clarity means people at all levels of an organization clearly and completely understand why the organization exists.⁷³ This is imperative as more decision-making authority is pushed down the chain of command and those decisions are made against a set of criteria that includes what the organization is trying to accomplish. If the decision-maker cannot clearly articulate “why” the organization exists in terms beyond its outputs, then how does he expect others to know “why” to be committed to mission accomplishment?⁷⁴

Like General McChrystal’s description of a Navy Seal team, each CI and HUMINT team member must understand the goals of the mission and the strategic context in which it fits in order to evaluate risks and know how to operate with their teammates. Each member had to be collectively responsible for the organization's success and understand everything that responsibility entails. “If clarity of purpose is misunderstood, then the criteria by which a decision is made will be skewed, and suboptimal decisions will be made.”⁷⁵ 513 MIB-T, USARCENT, and INSCOM leadership needed to know that collectors could make the right decision in dangerous, high-risk settings where adversarial intentions are continually changing. As a result, our readiness model needed to invest deeply in ensuring every collector was

⁷³ Marquet, *Turn the Ship Around!*,

⁷⁴ Simon Sinek, *Start with Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action*, (New York, New York: Penguin Group: 2009), 66.

⁷⁵ Marquet, *Turn the Ship Around!*, 161.

holistically aligned in purpose with the strategic function of the unit and with the objective of any given mission and their specific role.⁷⁶

We devised a few mechanisms to implement leader-leader practices by stressing clarity. The most important ones directly contributing to mission command are these: use your legacy for inspiration, use guiding principles for decision criteria, and encourage a questioning attitude over blind obedience.⁷⁷

What is the legacy of your organization? How does that legacy shed light on your organization's purpose? Something minimal got my attention as soon as I took command. As we went through the usual formalities of preparing for the change of command ceremony, rehearsals, reception site, capabilities briefs, initial office calls/meet and greets, and guest lists amongst other things, I noticed the glaring absence of an invite list for former battalion commanders and command sergeant majors. Those that came before us. Besides, it was only 13 months prior that I had worked directly under Colonel Dave Branch, who commanded the organization from 2011 to 2013. He had spearheaded the battalion transformation from an individual/team combat deployment model to preparing for battalion wide contingency operations. This small, but an impactful gesture of inviting former leaders was part of the Army's combat arms branches. But has the intelligence force lost their way? We have a prominent, unselfish, and rich legacy of service to this great nation, but is our culture of secrecy and classification levels keeping us from talking about it?

We needed to resurrect the true legacy of our predecessors. We tapped into the battalion's sense of purpose and urgency that developed during Operation Desert Shield/Storm and Operation Restore Hope. We took pride in the fact that the battalion has maintained a

⁷⁶ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 99.

⁷⁷ Marquet, *Turn the Ship Around!*, 162.

deployed presence throughout Southwest Asia for enduring intelligence operations, theater engagements, and exercise support since 1990. We talked about the fact that the battalion deployed a small specialized collection detachment to Somalia (1992) and played a critical role in the capture of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein (2003). The command sergeant major and executive assistant took on the effort to “make better” the headquarters with the unit’s lineage, a wall of honor to commemorate the outstanding service and sacrifice during deployments, and a historical timeline to graphically illustrate the unit’s history. We would honor the legacy of SGT Cari Anne Gasiewicz and SGT Taurean T. Harris with a memorial ceremony on the dates of their deaths during combat operations. Although I was worried that the organization would be apprehensive of the sobering ceremony, that was not the case. Through the memorial events, we realized that several current Soldiers and Civilians served with them, and others were still in the area. Family members and friends would visit the unit to share their stories. The organization’s identity and meaning were strengthened when we gathered and shared our stories. It helped provide organizational clarity into what we were about, the why for our service.

Another mechanism for clarity that became effective was the battalion’s guiding principles, DEUCE and GREATNESS (See Figure 4 on page 33). Although not initially deliberate, we found ourselves doing several things to reinforce these principles and make them real for the teams. DEUCE was the de facto unit motto and part of the everyday lexicon. But once leaders started linking it to the unit’s “why” and priorities, it indeed became a lifestyle. During my commander’s remarks at company level changes of command ceremonies, I would highlight the individual and unit accomplishments using the DEUCE mnemonic. The brigade senior leaders and those outside the battalion would comment on our guiding principles. The

few times I decided not to use the mnemonic during a ceremony, I received negative feedback as certain individuals were looking forward to hearing the guiding principles.



Figure 4. 202nd MI BN (DEUCE) Guiding Principles and Priorities.

I found myself expressing behaviors in the language of these principles when writing awards, evaluations, and letters of recommendation. When we provided command SITREPs, the assessment was framed against these principles. The guiding principles accurately represented the principles of the organization. For example, early in my command, I wanted to do something to show every Soldier and Civilian that they had my full support. So, I decided to create an alto ego, DEUCE man. The organization had a superhero to rally behind. DEUCE man would make random appearances during sporting events, award ceremonies, and other unforeseen situations. Everyone knew the “why” of DEUCE man. Everyone began to trust that the principles could guide them. More importantly, DEUCE and GREATNESS became the set of criteria used when they made decisions. As a result, decisions became aligned with the organization’s goals.

Military organizations live under a sense of obligation, aligned with a strong base of order, obedience, and discipline. These qualities within themselves do not seem to align with a

culture that embraces a questioning attitude. A counterproductive leader,⁷⁸ and in some cases an inexperienced leader, views engaging in questioning the commander as decision justification or approval seeking, which is far from the intent of mission command and a leader-leader model. This requires a shift to a learning environment allowing all to think critically and creatively and share ideas, opinions, and recommendations.⁷⁹ It comes down to the tone you use, and perhaps even your facial expression and body language, as they are all influenced by your attitude. Is the command climate one of inclusiveness and openness or “zero-defect” and fear of reproach? Effective commanders establish a culture of collaboration throughout the organization. Collaboration requires candor and a free yet mutually respectful exchange of ideas.⁸⁰ It is through this exchange of explaining “why” that everyone learns, from the commander to the most junior Soldier. As stated in the Army’s doctrine of mission command, effectively achieving the balance between obedience and initiative is central to mission command.⁸¹ Thus, the unit developed the ability to communicate through familiarity, trust, a shared philosophy, and experiences. We gained organizational clarity by encouraging a questioning attitude over blind obedience.

Organizing for Command and Control

I define success as establishing the science of control (systems and procedures used to improve the commander’s understanding and support accomplishing missions) by successfully integrating a CI/HUMINT Operations Cell into BN S3 (without MTOE authorization) that enables disciplined initiative of our HUMINT and CI Platforms. --- Commander’s Planning Guidance

⁷⁸ The term toxic has been used when describing leaders who have engaged in what the Army now refers to as counterproductive leadership behavior.

⁷⁹ ADP 6-0, 1-8.

⁸⁰ ADP 6-0, 1-8.

⁸¹ ADP 6-0, 3-3.

The role of the battalion commander in mission command is to direct and lead from the beginning of planning throughout execution and continually assess and adjust operations to achieve their intent.⁸² The battalion commander drives the operations process (i.e., plan, prepare, execute, and assess) through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and continuously assessing; builds teams within the organization and with unified action partners, and informs and influences audiences both inside and outside the organization. Conversely, the battalion staff must conduct the operations process, knowledge management and information management, and synchronize information-related capabilities. The First Armored Division's Combat Aviation Brigade might have captured this the best with command post boards reminding the staff that they exist to "coordinate, anticipate, verify, and follow-up."⁸³ This strong message was reemphasized with a posting of the six command post functions that enable situational understanding: receive information, distribute information, analyze information, make recommendations to the commander, integrate resources, and synchronize resources.⁸⁴

Although mission command is commander-centric, commanders alone cannot exercise command and control.⁸⁵ Commanders must rely on a command and control system⁸⁶ that provides support and situational understanding. The command and control system also helps the commander exercise authority and direction. The way we organize, locate, and design the command and control systems directly affected our ability to conduct operations. Based on distributed and decentralized operations, we had to change how we fundamentally operated.

Mission. Effective immediately (January 2019), 202nd MI BN reorganizes in order to conduct deliberate mission and requirements management and enable

⁸² ADP 6-0, 2-24.

⁸³ Notes from 14 February 2017 while observing 1AD CAB during their warfighter exercise (WFX) 17-3 at FT Bliss, Texas as the senior intelligence observe, coach-trainer.

⁸⁴ Notes from 14 February 2017.

⁸⁵ ADP, 4-15.

⁸⁶ The command and control system is the arrangement of people, processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders to conduct operations.

functional oversight of operations, subject matter expertise, and organizational training/certification/leader development (sustainable readiness model) while enabling the commander to balance the Art of Command and the Science of Control in order to facilitate discipline initiative of both HUMINT and CI Platforms.⁸⁷

Our processes and procedures had to reinforce a leader-leader model, as opposed to the personnel-based, leader-follower model. The unit of action for our forward collection battalion is the team, CI and HUMINT teams. Thus, the center of gravity is the management of those teams, the operational management team (OMT). It was imperative that our structure reinforced the role of the OMT to fuse teams through trust and purpose. Also, we had to establish a sustainable battle rhythm nested with the brigade, USARCEN, and ongoing operations in Southwest Asia and anchored by fast and flat communications.

In line with the battalion's guiding principles and above mission statement, we established eight essential tasks focused on achieving the desired endstate of establishing the science of control. First, our mission command structure needed to be agile and adaptive as the industrial age structure's pursuit of efficiency limited flexibility and resilience.⁸⁸ Besides, as much as we desired to provide predictability to the force, as intelligence collectors, we also live in a world of uncertainty, risk, and chance. Similarly to the problem presented by Al Qaeda in Iraq in 2004, "we needed a system that, without knowing in advance what would be required, could adapt to the challenges at hand."⁸⁹ Also, we had to organize the unit to consolidate gains, which are the activities to make enduring any temporary organizational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing transition to being an effective organization.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Battalion FRAGO, 202nd Military Intelligence Battalion, dated 16 January 2019.

⁸⁸ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 84.

⁸⁹ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 82.

⁹⁰ ADP 3-0, Glossary-7.

Just as we had to establish an agile and adaptive structure, while sustaining our strengths, it was also necessary to focus on providing our people the best opportunity for success. It was imperative to establish a push environment, not a pull one. During the first year of my command, the company leadership and battalion staff had made significant improvements in their command updates and running estimates to higher echelons. But it was time to get everyone throughout the organization access to the kind of perspective once limited to senior leaders. We needed a system that enabled leaders in providing information so that subordinates, armed with context, understanding, and connectivity, could take the initiative and make decisions.

The push environment requires continuity. Thus, stabilizing our teams and maintaining our people, systems, and tools to enable winning became the linchpin to our center of gravity. In the old model, the battalion provided little purpose, motivation, and direction as the technical channel of communication was dominant over both command and staff channels. The only way to change this was focusing on the last two essential tasks: eliminating single points of failure and identifying planning gaps, friction points, and issues impacting the transition to executing mission command.

The Chain of Command.

Joint Publication 1 defines the chain of command as the succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised.⁹¹ Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates and is bestowed by law, Department of Defense Directives, Service Regulations, and other members of

⁹¹ ADP 6-0, 4-13.

the organization as a function of influence. Although a commander might delegate authority, the delegation does not absolve commanders of their legal and ethical responsibility for their decisions, as well as the actions, accomplishments, and failures of their subordinates. The Uniform Code of Military Justice underwrites the chain of command and assigns important procedural roles to senior commanders. This became painstakingly important when the organization went from the authorization of four company level commanders to three, degrading our capacity to command and control forward-deployed forces. As a result, for about four months, company level headquarters were expected to man, train, and resource teams at home station, while simultaneously owning the forward-deployed mission and underwriting operational risk across six countries. In addition, the assigned responsibility and authority of command, staff, and technical channels fluctuated, the span of control exceeded capabilities, and relationships were unstable, with an overabundance of unanticipated challenges as our mission command system was not sufficient.

We created a nonstandard, task force and operations cell to conduct deliberate mission and requirements management and enable functional oversight of both HUMINT and CI platforms. As an intelligence collection organization, it was critical to use the collection management subfunctions as our task organization model because intelligence operations require collaboration and close coordination with the supported unit intelligence staff (i.e., USARCENT 2X).⁹² According to the legacy FM 34-2, *Collection Management and Synchronization Planning*, the three subfunctions of collection management are mission management, requirements management, and asset management.⁹³ In addition, the subfunctions distinguish

⁹² FM 2-0, 3-9.

⁹³ Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 34-2, *Collection Management and Synchronization Planning*, (Washington, DC), 8 March 1994, Chapter 1.

between internal and external relationships among collection managers, requestors, and collectors during intelligence operations.⁹⁴ Due to the nature of day-to-day distributed operations, while sustaining readiness and flexibility to respond to major contingencies with our ready force, we deviated from the JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, lexicon of two subfunctions of collection management, collection requirements management and collection operations management.⁹⁵ Therefore, we reduced our span of control by allowing the company level commanders to focus more on asset management.

The term mission management is sparsely used outside of joint doctrine when not referring to intelligence below the CCMD level, subordinate JTF, and Service component intelligence staff directorates, as well as defense and national intelligence organizations. However, it is relevant to the MIB-T, which conducts collaboration and close coordination across echelon as the Army's access point into the greater IC. The DoD dictionary describes mission management as the process in which the intelligence staff proactively and continuously formulates and revises command intelligence requirements and tracks the resulting information through the processing, exploitation, and dissemination process to satisfy a requirement. At the battalion level, mission management is command and control. The commander owns the mission and underwrites risk. This risk encompasses how best to employ collection resources to satisfy requirements.⁹⁶ As an extension of the commander, mission management evaluates the suitability of systems, teams, and units based on capability and availability. This is the greatest challenge to the intelligence commander as DoD experience requirement/resource disconnect with the National Defense Strategy priorities and meeting day-to-day requirements that can only

⁹⁴ FM 34-2, Chapter 1.

⁹⁵ Joint Publication 2-0. *Joint Intelligence*. 22 October 2013, I-13.

⁹⁶ FM 34-2, Chapter 1.

be managed by commander's risk. Mission management maps out commander guidance (i.e., collection strategy), synchronizes operations and derives information collection tasks issued by USARCENT and/or the MIB-T, or assess from an ongoing operation.

As an extension of command authority and responsibility, the new task organization consisted of three distinct mission management elements: battalion command team, S3 CI and HUMINT Operations Cell, and battalion tactical command post (TACP) (See Figure 5 on page 41, red cloud annotating mission management). The battalion executive officer and operations officer, as the other field grade officers in the unit, played a critical role as the commander and staff use the science of control to understand the constraints under which the unit operates. In a forward collection battalion, the operations officer is concerned with planning, training, control, and supervision of operations. Working with the 513 MIB-T DCHO, we were able to gain technical oversight capability at the battalion level with the procurement of a Battalion Deputy S3 (DS3). The DS3 would be the collaborative link between the technical channels at 513 MIB-T, INSCOM, USARCENT, and national level agencies to the operational management teams (OMT). From a technical standpoint, the DS3 serves as the battalion commander's senior advisor, while providing advice and guidance to the OMTs, CI teams, and HCTs.




Figure 5. 202nd MI BN Task Organization

The CI and HUMINT Operations Cell executed most of the Deputy S3 functions. The CI and HUMINT OPS cell is a non-standard element as the battalion is only authorized eight personnel⁹⁷ within the S3 section to provide management of organization and mission requirements.⁹⁸ Both our HUMINT and CI company were tasked to provide the force structure for the new cell that ultimately provides focus and direction to each CI team and HCT through the appropriate OMT. The HUMINT company attached one Warrant Officer and one Non-commissioned officer to the S3 to become part of the HUMINT Operations cell's foreign

⁹⁷ The MTOE authorizes twelve, however, two are SIGINT specialist that have been attached to the MIB-T analysis battalion and the other two soldiers are intelligence analysts align to S2 section.

⁹⁸ Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD), Military Intelligence Battalion (FCB) TOE Narrative, approved 22 Nov 2016

military intelligence collection activities (FORMICA) branch. We also aligned the full spectrum clandestine operational platform OMT, also known as Operating Base-Gordon (OB-G), under the direction of the HUMINT Operations cell CLAN Branch OIC to gain synergy within the battalion staff. The CI company attached two Warrant Officers to the S3 to become part of the CI Operations cell. The realities of today's complex operating environment, in which planners and commanders must simultaneously train, equip, prepare, deploy, and direct collection efforts of CI and HUMINT assets as part of split-based operations, calls for a more robust element capable of synchronizing operations, optimizing collection, and supporting future operational planning in coordination with ASCC Commander's information requirements.

The new CI and HUMINT OPS cell has striking similarities to the legacy Tactical HUMINT Operations Section (THOPS), a METT-TC dependent organization used to manage CI and HUMINT operations at the corps/joint task force level.⁹⁹ When the 2X concept was in its infancy, the THOPS provided the highest level of technical control within the intelligence battalion.¹⁰⁰ However, the THOPS concept is nonexistent in today's doctrine as some designers of MI force structure viewed it as a "crisscrossing of MI battalion and 2X lines of operational control, resulting in disjointed operations, redundant requirements, and at times, wasted effort."¹⁰¹ Others claim it was just a means for intelligence commanders to control reporting.¹⁰² We acknowledge those concerns while embracing the opportunity to increase transparency and collaboration with USARCENT and conduct battalion quality assurance and control of reporting before releasing for enterprise consumption. These functions are inherent in command authority and the responsibility of owning the mission.

⁹⁹ Bukowski, "A CI and HUMINT Focused Look at the Transformation of MI Doctrine," 8.

¹⁰⁰ Bukowski, "A CI and HUMINT Focused Look at the Transformation of MI Doctrine," 9.

¹⁰¹ Bukowski, "A CI and HUMINT Focused Look at the Transformation of MI Doctrine," 9.

¹⁰² Bukowski, "A CI and HUMINT Focused Look at the Transformation of MI Doctrine," 9.

The final key element in improving the battalion's mission management function was addressing the absence of a forward command presence. The battalion was in the initial stages of shifting the focus of our Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD) from direct, manage, and support training of all battalion and support staff elements, to an expeditionary mindset, in which HHD would facilitate initial RSO&I operations in theater for follow-on MIB-T forces. This falls in line with more of a traditional administrative and logistical operations center (ALOC) consisting of the battalion executive officer, HHD commander, and the staff's sustainment warfighting function. However, due to the new requirements and necessity for unity of command established forward, the HHD Commander would assume command of all forward-deployed elements. Not only would admin and logistics be a priority, the command post required representation from all six warfighting functions to ensure situational understanding and enabling capabilities in support of sustained HUMINT and CI support, and RSO&I as required (see Figure 6 on page 44, the chart shows how the command and control warfighting function synchronizes and converge the other five). This became our forward tactical command post responsible for monitoring the OPTEMPO, reinforcing battalion commander's priorities, underwriting risk, resourcing the force, decision-making, and leader development. The HHD Commander received OPCON of one CI and HUMINT OMT, two HCTs, and ten CI Teams, along with some MIB-T enablers.




Figure 6. Convergence of Warfighting Functions.

If ensuring commander's understanding, visualization, and decision making are keys to a commander owning the collection mission; then requirement management is the critical input into the commander's guidance that drives synchronizing and integrating the planning and employment of sensors and assets. Requirement management defines what to collect, when, and where. The battalion primarily receives requirements through technical channels, the HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) and the Army Theater CI coordinating authority (ATCICA), based on its OPCON relationship to USARCENT. Additionally, requirements would come in based on INSCOM's "service OPCON" and project management role of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Program. The process was not always perfect and required continuous collaboration. This is the one area in which mission command and the leader-leader model is likely to have the most significant impact on intelligence units as more decision-making authority is pushed down with organizational clarity of purpose. For example, earlier in my command tour, the battalion S3 would routinely receive phone calls from the MIB-T responding to a time-sensitive requirement from USARCENT. Unfortunately, both brigade and battalion were not always tracking the requirement before the urgent call as the technical channels were operating independently of command and staff channels.

The requirement management function within the CI and HUMINT operations cell facilitates collaboration both horizontally (i.e., across intelligence disciplines) and vertically (i.e., between echelons of command), validates collection requirements, recommends collection assets and capabilities, and maintains synchronization as operations progress. The CI and HUMINT operations cell also enabled USARCENT and INSCOM technical channels to execute their primary function of technical control (i.e., technical support, guidance, oversight, QA/QC), enhancing our collectors' ability to provide timely and accurate intelligence. The more the CI and HUMINT operations cell worked with USARCENT; both elements gained a better appreciation of constraints and limitations. Ultimately, the quantity of short term ad-hoc requirements was reduced. More importantly, the technical experts saw the benefits when commanders direct operations, but also rely on the technical intelligence experts to plan portions of the intelligence operations effort.

The final management function, asset management, provided the battalion with flexibility and is likely to have the most significant impact on the future force. Initially, I was not an advocate of limiting the operational role of the company commanders. As a battalion commander, I had an inherent responsibility to expose them to directing operations and leading the operations process. How could they be successful future S3s and battalion commanders if I regulated them to being “force providers.” Instead, both the HUMINT and CI company commanders led our shaping operations, executing the USARCENT Commanding General’s approved sustainable readiness model (SRM) (See Figure 7 and 8 on page 46). Although this paper’s focus is not on unit readiness, SRM was a massive success as the unit leaders leveraged input from all levels (i.e., individual Soldiers to the USARCENT HOC and ATCICA). The result was shared understanding throughout OPCON, ADCON, and technical channels and the

responsibility to maintain a situational understanding of ongoing and future operations. We had created a push environment in which information was at the lowest level enabling our leaders to anticipate and address challenges, enhance readiness and warfighting, protect critical capabilities, and enable decision-making. For example, analysis of the MTOE, unit strength, and Army Design Methodology provided the data to determine how many HUMINT and CI personnel could be trained and deployed annually, with an emphasis on “to do what” from a requirement management perspective. The following questions created clarity of purpose for the subordinate commanders: are the people, places, and things under your control ready? For what?

In years past, we re-task organized to react to emerging requirements from the AOR, resulting in a task organization significantly different than the MTOE. This presented challenges in our ability to understand ourselves and communicate capacity. However, by aligning task organization as closely as possible to the MTOE, we were able to create a baseline understanding across echelons, communicate in a resource-informed manner while assessing the risks, and posture the battalion to support contingency operations. This, combined with the analysis of the operational requirements, enabled company-level leaders to design the SRM on a train/certify – deploy – reset foundation (See Figure 8 on page 46).

Recommendations

The intelligence commander must interact with leaders and other influential people who may influence intelligence operations. Prior to assuming battalion-level command of an intelligence organization, intelligence commanders should understand the complexities of INSCOM authorities, functions, and responsibilities. LTC Ryan Berry's "*Seeing the Elephant: INSCOM's Exercise of Mission Command*" should be required reading for all intelligence professionals as it goes into greater detail of all aspects of INSCOM, not just the CI and HUMINT authorities and relationships.

Second, when building your task organization to support the multi-domain environment, the intelligence commander should at the collection management subfunctions, mission management, requirements management, and asset management, as a model because intelligence operations require collaboration and close coordination with the supported unit intelligence staff. Even considering establishing the non-doctrinal Tactical HUMINT Operations Section (THOPS) concept is a consideration to increase transparency, collaboration, and oversight of reporting before releasing for enterprise consumption.

Third, the intelligence commander must be a "master negotiator," capable of applying the skills of influence and negotiation to guide them through the nuances of commanding and controlling an organization that relies on collaboration and close coordination across echelon. Negotiation is a perishable skill and needs to be incorporated throughout each level of professional military education. Additionally, those in command and staff positions require specific training focusing on the knowledge, skills, and attributes for military leader influence in a JIIM environment, as opposed to the tactical oriented, "extreme" negotiations seen in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Fourth, all Army Center of Excellence (CoEs) should include more curriculum on the application of the Army mission command framework from the COEs particular warfighting function or specific branch. This supports the Army Intelligence Plan 2019 first independent priority of “people,” building a Total Military Intelligence (MI) Force and a culture of professionalism and trust. The approach needs to incorporate both commander and staff perspectives as the tasks for each is different. This will require continued dialogue and input from the operational force in sharing best practices, innovative solutions, and opinion articles, as the way we currently fight some of our intelligence organizations are not captured in doctrine or other authoritative documents.

Fifth, the CoEs should focus on developing the required knowledge, skills, and attributes to enable branch-specific commanders and organizations to conduct the orders process, produce mission-type orders, and leader certification in the most critical task of risk mitigation.

Sixth, all leaders should continue to embrace mission command as the Army’s approach to command and control, while engaging in stimulating and thoughtful discussions on the challenges and opportunities in enabling seamless operations across all domains. As Army Intelligence looks at forming an Army Counterintelligence Command and consolidating its Counterintelligence forces under the command, the lessons learned from 202nd MI BN’s nonstandard, task force and operations cell is relevant for this new headquarters. Lastly, the importance of reading cannot be overstated. For those commanders and leaders trying to implement the concepts of mission command, the following are exceptional reads that will bring clarity of purpose to your organizations: *Turn the Ship Around! A True Story of Turning Followers into Leaders*, *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World*, and *The Speed of Trust: The One Thing that Changes Everything*.

Conclusion

Despite the complicated command authorities and relationships of US Army Intelligence and Security Command and its major subordinate commands, much can be gleaned by the synergy of mission command and the intrinsic capabilities the organizations deliver across the Army. The synergy, coupled with battalion-level commanders capable of empowering leaders, collaborating horizontally and vertically, seizing opportunities, and filtering outcomes (i.e., negotiate), are the essential elements of intelligence mission command.

The Army's approach to mission command is more than good leadership; it also requires sound systems and processes to address the science of control. The intelligence commander is responsible for command and control. Commanders arrange people, processes, and networks into command posts to best facilitate their exercise of authority and direction to accomplish the mission. Most importantly, the commander owns the mission and underwrites risk.

The leader-leader model and mission command concept of divesting control and distributing it to the lowest level is essential as our intelligence organizations operate at the team level. Unfortunately, the role of the intelligence commander is not always clear. It can be complicated if the leader's experience only consisted of manning, training, and resourcing intelligence assets, not directing intelligence operations, or vice versa. A shift from a personality-driven approach based on the "boss" experience, to the commander-centric, mission command approach, creates a baseline understanding and expectation for our intelligence professionals. The shift requires adjusting how we approach intelligence professional military education and how we select commanders. The Army's recent implementation of the Army's Battalion Command Assessment Program is a positive change, and there are discussions on implementing a similar program for our command senior enlisted advisors.

Developing the skills and attributes for the non-combat arms branches to conduct the orders process, produce mission-type orders, and risk mitigation requires innovative future solutions as our cultural bias is to support the maneuver commander. Thus, all Center of Excellence must apply the existing mission command framework as part of all company grade level certification. Future environments will demand multi-domain operations as collaboration and close coordination across echelon will be challenging. This makes it more imperative that our leaders within the functional branches, with niche capabilities like intelligence, communications, and cyber, are operationally sound at directing operations and risk mitigation as operations become more distributed and across services. It is highly likely that a US Army Intelligence Battalion or Company element could conduct operations in support of a Joint Force's warfighting headquarters across all domains, and with our Partners and Allies, all without a single Army command element providing guidance, expertise, or oversight.

Not all warfighting headquarters are designed the same. However, all commanders must own the vision, set/monitor the operations tempo, establish priorities, guard the reputation of the unit, underwrite risk, resources the unit, make decisions, and develop leaders. The research was aimed at providing intelligence commanders with a model to guide strategies and actions in directing, leading, and assessing intelligence operations. Building on an agile and adaptive mission command structure, consolidating gains, establishing a push environment, creating clarity of purpose, empowering subordinates, stabilizing teams and maintaining systems, eliminating single points of failure, and identifying gaps and friction points, commanders and leaders can maximize mission effectiveness and innovate by implementing the proposed leader-leader model and master negotiator concept. The time is now to evolve our intelligence doctrine,

adapt leader development with innovative solutions, and refine our training to facilitate disciplined initiative.



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