

WHAT SECURITY CONDITIONS NEED TO BE MET IN ORDER TO
ACHIEVE PEACE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC?

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

WHAT SECURITY CONDITIONS NEED TO BE MET IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC?, by Captain Herwan Boex Mbega Ossa, 111 pages.

Central African Republic has experienced an enduring war since 1996. This conflict has been mutating from political to ethnic and then from ethnic to religious. Since its inception, various peacekeeping missions have been established. A United Nations (UN) mission (MINUSCA) is ongoing and struggles to establish an enduring peace in this country torn by more than two decades of war and largely controlled by armed groups. Presented first in this research are analysis of criteria defined by the UN and scholars on the nature of successful peacekeeping operations. Presented next are two peacekeeping case studies: the United Nations Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and United Nations Mission in Ivory Coast (ONUCI). These case studies, involving armed groups fighting against a government as MINUSCA are presented through the lens of criteria that led to their success and brought peace. This research identifies gaps in the peacekeeping mission in Central African Republic, particularly with an emphasis on security related criteria. By identifying these gaps, this research helps shed light on conditions that are critical for the efficacy of a peacekeeping mission on this fragile state.

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ACRONYMS

3R	Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CEMAC	Economic and Monetary Community of Central African Countries
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DDR	Disarmament, Remobilization, Reintegration
DDRR	Disarmament, Remobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation
DoD	Department of Defense
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTIC	Defense Technical Information Center
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FACA	Armed Forces of Central African Republic
FCCPD	Congolese Common Front for Change and Democracy
FDPC	Democratic Front for Peace in Central African Republic
FOMAC	Multinational Force of Central Africa
FOMUC	Multinational Force in Central African Republic
FPI	Ivorian Popular Front
FPRC	Popular Front for the renaissance of Central African Republic

FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MICOPAX	Peace Consolidation Mission in Central African Republic
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MISAB	Inter-African Mission for Monitoring Bangui Agreements
MISCA	African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic
MJP	Movement for Justice and Peace
MLCJ	Movement of Central African Liberators for Justice
MPC	Patriotic Movement for Central Africa Republic
MPIGO	Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West
MRDP	Movement of Resistance for the Defense of the Homeland
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ONUC	United Nations Operations in the Congo
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PK	Peacekeeping
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PO	Peace Operations
RCP	Rally of Central African Republic for Peace
RDR	Rally of Republicans
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance

RJ	Revolution and Justice
RPRC	Rally for the Renaissance of Central African Republic
SCC	Special Criminal Court
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UFR	Union of Republican Forces
UFR-F	Union of Fundamental Republican Forces
UN	United Nations
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration in Croatia
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIT	United Nations Mission in Timor Leste
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCA	United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa
UNOCI	United Nations in Cote d'Ivoire
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
UNOMOZ	United Nations in Mozambique
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSMIH	United Nations Mission Support in Haiti
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group

UPC Union for Peace in Central African Republic
USAID United States Agency for International Development

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Peace is not a document that is signed and then put up some place. Peace is made each day. Peace is a craft, a handiwork.

—Pope Francis, *The Guardian*



Figure 1. Central African Republic Map

Source: United States Agency for International Development, “Food Assistance Fact Sheet-Central African Republic.” 30 September 2018, 1, accessed 05 January 2019, <https://www.usaid.gov/central-african-republic/food-assistance>.

Central African Republic’s name comes from the fact that this country is located in the very central part of the African Continent. It is the natural link between Western, Eastern Africa and Central Africa. It is surrounded by several countries: Chad,

Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Sudan. It is a landlocked country with a land area covering 622 984 square kilometers and a population of approximatively five million inhabitants. Central African Republic (CAR) has a large amount of natural resources: Gold, Diamond, Cobalt, uranium, crude oil and timber. Unfortunately, these resources are improperly or not exploited for the benefit of the population (Chauvin and Seignobos 2014, 119). As many African nations, this country has around 80 ethnic groups. The most important being the Bayas, the Bandas, the Mandjias, the Saras, the Mboums, the Ngbakas, the Yakomas and the Fulanis. The overall security situation of today is the product of succession of conflicts which have their roots in the political history of this country.

Background

Before gaining independence in 1960, Central African Republic was a French Colony named Ubangi – Shari. Barthelemy Boganda, the first Central African prominent political leader, was elected president of the Grand Council of French Equatorial Africa in 1957. His dream was to federate the Central African countries (Chad, Congo, Gabon, Cameroun and Ubangi-Shari) into a single republic after independence. However, the other countries did not adhere to Boganda's idea and in 1958 he established the Central African Republic in Ubangi- Shari and became Prime Minister. Unfortunately, he died in a plane crash before his country formally received Independence from France on August 13th 1960 (Bradshaw and Fandos 2016, 33).

From independence until 1993, the CAR was ruled by a series of autocratic rulers. The first president, David Dacko, suppressed opposition and created a single party rule in 1962. In 1965, Dacko was overthrown by Colonel Jean Bedel Bokassa, Chief of the

Army, who suspended both the National Assembly and the Constitution. Bokassa ended declaring himself President for life in 1972 and established the Central African Empire in 1976. As a new, hereditary monarch he organized a very Lavish Napoleonic-like coronation ceremony which was largely broadcasted in Europe and Africa. Bokassa spelled doom for his reign by slaughtering hundreds of teenagers who protested against one of his decrees in 1979. He was overthrown with the help of France and Dacko was reestablished. In 1981, Dacko was overthrown once again by the newly appointed Chief of Staff (Army CoS) of the Army, General Andre Kolingba. Kolingba established a military government which turned into a single party rule in 1985. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, he was forced to pluralism by the international community and organized the first democratic elections in 1993 (Giroux, Lanz, and Sguaitamatti 2009, 5).

The first crisis which necessitated external military help in the CAR occurred in 1996. Ange Felix Patasse, longtime opponent to Kolingba's rule was elected as president after the first democratic elections. One of his initial challenges was to cope with the Central African Army whose officers and soldiers were predominantly subservient to Andre Kolingba. Patasse faced three mutinies which were very destructive and exacerbated tensions among the Central African populations. He was mainly accused of targeting Kolingba's supporters. The Bangui agreements were signed in January 1997 between the government and the mutineers; as a result of this agreement a multinational force composed of units from Gabon, Chad and Burkina Faso was deployed to ensure peace in the CAR (Giroux et al. 2009, 5).

Since the first multinational mission in 1997, Central African Republic Governments have hosted several peace keeping missions which can earn their country a

place in the Guinness Book of Records. In 1998, the first Inter African mission was replaced by the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic (MINURCA). That same year, President Patasse was reelected for a second term. MINURCA ended in January 2000, following an apparent stabilization of the situation between the government, army and rebels. In 2001, mutineers attempted to overthrow Patasse, the Army CoS was killed during the initial fighting and violence erupted in the capital city. Patasse regained control of the situation and started punishing all political and military figures involved in this failed coup. This new period of unrest brought back international military intervention through the Multinational African Force in Central African Republic (FOMUC) in 2002 (Bradshaw and Fandos 2016, 267).

The different peacekeeping missions which followed failed to stop the occurrence of violence in Central African Republic. It was during the FOMUC mandate that Ange Felix Patasse was overthrown by rebels led by Francois Bozize, former Armed Forces CoS in March 2003. The rebels entered Bangui almost unopposed and Bozize changed the constitution. In 2004, the Central African Bush War erupted, pitting new government forces against forces opposed to Bozize's rule in the Northeastern part of the country. In 2005, the government organized elections which excluded Patasse's supporters and Bozize won. Many ceasefire agreements were signed in 2007 at Syrte, Lybia and 2008 at Libreville, but none of them were fully respected. The Peace Consolidation Mission in Central African Republic (MICOPAX) was established in 2008 as a new international effort to consolidate peace in this country. In the aftermath of Bozize's controversial reelection in 2011, the conflict restarted in 2012. The rebels created a new coalition, known as Seleka. The Seleka entered Bangui and overthrew Bozize in 2013. Michel

Djotodia, their leader, declared himself President of Central African Republic. The same year MICOPAX mission handed over peacekeeping in the CAR to the Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) (Bradshaw and Fandos 2016, 447).

From 2013 up to now, what was a war between the government and rebels turned into a general civil war involving many actors from Seleka, disbanded after Michel Djotodia took power, and Anti Balakas, militias created among the population to resist the Seleka. Michel Djotodia resigned in 2014, in part to international pressure. His Prime Minister, Nicolas Tiangaye, asked for UN intervention to deal with this new situation. By the end of 2014, United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) replaced MISCA. A transition government led by Catherine Samba Panza was appointed and democratic elections held in 2016 led to the victory of Faustin Archange Touadera. Currently a significant part of the country is controlled by rebel groups either Ex Selekas, Anti Balaka or independents. An Ex Seleka Movement even created a proto-state, the Republic of Logone, in the Northeastern Part of Central African Republic. MINUSCA continues to deal with the violence which erupts frequently in different parts of the country (Lombard 2016, 25).

As far as the current situation in the CAR is concerned, even though 80% of the country is occupied by armed groups, a peace process is ongoing. On February 6th 2019, a peace accord was signed in Khartoum between the Government of Central African Republic and 14 recognized armed groups. This meeting was held under the aegis of African Union (AU). After 10 days of talks, building on two years of negotiation, the different parties built a document covering the principles of a sustainable resolution to this conflict. The role of every party, international community, government and armed

groups was outlined (Diatta 2019, 1). The recent signature of this agreement by different armed groups can be a hope for resolving the conflict by creating an open dialogue between all political forces in the country. However, it is the eighth time since the beginning of the Central African Civil war in 2013, that an agreement was signed between the government and the rebels. Those previous agreements contained almost the same provisions as this recent one.

On a regular basis, criminal militias and armed groups continue to commit attacks against the population and fuel intercommunal tensions. Most of the time, women and children are the victims of these actions. Armed groups occupy a majority of the country and administrate their ‘‘territories’’ in spite of their commitment to the peace process. The dry season allows expansion of transhumance movements, illegal trafficking of natural resources and commercial trucking. Armed groups compete violently to gain access to strategic sites such as mines, markets and lines of communication. It is also during the dry season that there is an increase of violence among armed groups and against civilians (UN Secretary General 2019, 4).

The most recent serious attacks happened in the Central and Eastern parts of the country. Particularly in the area of Bambari where forces of the Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC) retaliated against anti Balakas associated militias after the killing of two Muslim civilians on 15 November. UPC attacked a camp of internally displaced persons (IDP), supposedly anti Balaka friendly. They burnt the neighboring church to the ground and took the lives of 70 persons. Another IDP camp was attacked in Batangafo (Center of Central African Republic) by forces of The Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) and the Front Populaire our la Renaissance de la Centrafrique

(FPRC) in revenge of the wounding of three Muslims the day before. 11 persons were killed, most of the camp was burned to the ground, and the local church was also targeted (UN Secretary General 2019, 5). These camps, in Alindao, Ippy, as well as in Batangafo are actually frequently used as hiding places for the Anti Balaka fighters. MPC, FPRC and UPC have regularly threatened to attack them to expel the residing anti-Balakas.

In the area of Bambari, UPC keep establishing barricades to impede the movement of MINUSCA patrols. They threaten to attack the police and gendarmerie forces established there. They regularly use violence to deter the Muslim community from interacting or cooperating with national security forces. Several Muslim leaders were kidnapped in November to deter them from participating in a dialogue with governmental authorities aimed at recruiting young Muslim people into Central African Forces. The day of the announcement of the peace talks of Khartoum, on January 10, UPC attacked a Central African armed forces position and a MINUSCA patrol in Bambari in an effort to prevent President Touadera from participating in an event there that day; two policemen were killed. MINUSCA retaliated by launching an attack on UPC in Bambari and Bokolobo. This operation is still ongoing and has allowed MINUSCA to seize and dismantle UPC bases. Several civilians were wounded and more than 40 UPC fighters were killed (UN Secretary General 2019, 5).

In the most eastern part, on December 31st the FPRC attacked the mining city of Bakouma causing the exodus of 18,000 residents. They plundered almost all the houses and vehicles in the city and threatened to carry on their attack towards Bangassou where MINUSCA is located; 32 people were killed during this attack. They withdrew from Bakouma on January 16th 2019. 10 persons were killed and 17 others wounded when

UPC and FPRC fighters opened fire on a funeral procession in IPPY on January 25 (UN Secretary General 2019, 5).

Contrarily to the rest of the country, security incidents in Bangui and the Western part of the CAR remain stable. Retour, reclamations et rehabilitations (3R), based in the region of Ouham Pende is looking to expand its area of influence. In October 2018, this armed group sought to create an alliance with other armed groups such as Revolution et Justice (RJ) and Front Democratique pour la Paix Centrafrique (FDPC) which are operating in neighboring areas. The Rassemblement Centrafricain pour la Paix (RCP) was born from this coalition. Currently they attempt to control and collect taxes from transhumance and mines in the area. In November, 3R successfully disarmed fighters from the Siriri armed group, a Fula militia, operating along the Cameroonian borders. They integrated these fighters in their ranks. However, MINUSCA and governmental forces deterred 3R from establishing a foothold in the city of Ngaoundaye, ahead of the transhumance season. In Bangui's hottest spot, the PK5 conducted isolated security incidents after the death of its leader Mohammed Appo. Appo's supporters wanted to enforce a "Ville morte," but the increased presence of MINUSCA and security forces helped to mitigate the destabilizing impact of his death (UN Secretary General 2019, 6).

Statement of Problem/Purpose of Study/Research Questions

This study is designed to determine what solutions might bring peace to the Central African Republic. There are many possible domains to take in account considering this matter. Political, economic, social or military domains could be taken to try and find a lasting solution to this conflict. However, this study will focus mainly on those security issues which need to be tackled and might lead to enduring peace in this

war-torn country. The primary research question is: What security conditions are needed to be met in order to achieve peace in Central African Republic?

Some secondary questions need to be addressed to answer this question. What can be the contribution of the international community to help reach enduring peace in Central African Republic, as far as security is concerned? What actions need to be taken by Central African Government and other actors involved in security such as armed groups to reestablish the rule of law in the entire country?

A study on security and peace in Central African Republic necessarily involves international solutions since the government seems to have failed to tackle the issue itself. However, as peace cannot be imposed into a country by international community without the implication of national actors, they have to be taken into consideration as part of the solution.

Definitions of Terms

The definitions of a certain amount of key words have to be provided to give the reader an understanding of their use throughout this study. The researcher developed all the following definitions not accompanied by a citation:

Peacekeeping Operations: Peacekeeping operations are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute. They are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement (DOD 2017, 170).

Interpositional Mission: An interpositional mission is a type of peacekeeping operation which involves large forces of lightly armed troops which serve as bulwark

against belligerent parties during or in the aftermath of an armed conflict. This type of mission requires the consent of belligerent parties in order to operate. The use of force is strictly restricted to self-defense (Fortna 2008, 77).

Peace Enforcement Missions: A peace enforcement mission is a type of peacekeeping operation which involves large forces of heavily armed troops. These missions are mandated to use force beyond just self-defense and do not necessarily require the consent of belligerent partners to operate (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999, 61).

Mandate: In the domain of international law, a mandate is an irrevocable agreement or obligation issued from an international organization to a country which is obliged to follow the instructions included by the organization. Mandates are issued by the United Nations before sending any mission in a given area (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999, 186).

Non State Actors: Non State Actors are groups or individuals which hold an influence on a country and which are partly or wholly independent of governments. Armed groups in the case of Central African Republic are key non state actors to take into account (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999, 155).

Ex Seleka: The Ex Seleka are the remaining rebel groups of an alliance of militias that took the power in Central African Republic in 2013. These groups are almost entirely Muslims and play a key role on the ongoing conflict (Bradshaw and Fandos 2016, 78).

Anti Balaka: Anti Balaka are a group of militias formed in the aftermath of the rise of power of Seleka in 2013. These groups are predominantly Christians or animist and play a key role on the ongoing conflict (Bradshaw and Fandos 2016, 76).

Transhumance: Transhumance is a process used by pastors or nomads, it a seasonal movement of livestock to find better pastures. These movements often lead to conflicts between pastors and crop farmers for resources like land and water. These movements also occur across the borders of two countries, leading to security issues (Blench 2001, 12).

Proto-state: a Proto-state is not a state but a political entity which want to be recognized as a state but is not fully institutionalized or autonomous to constitute a state. It mostly refers to secessionist groups that claim or exert a territorial control over a specific region (Griffiths 2016, 53).

Fragile State: a fragile state is a country characterized by weak state legitimacy and weak state capacity. It makes citizens vulnerable to a range of shocks (Menkhaus 2001, 88).

Failed State: A failed state is a political body that has disintegrated to a point where basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government no longer function properly (see also fragile state and state collapse). It has an inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community (Patrick 2007, 644).

Limitation of Scope

Considering the fact that the Central African Republic's civil war is ongoing, this study may not be accurate as the situation may evolve and new elements will enter into account. Nevertheless, the researcher will try to provide an overall analysis based on the most recent information he will have access to. Most of the recent material on the situation in the CAR are MINUSCA Classified information, so, this can also limit this

researcher. However, despite these limitations, all the possible will be made to deliver a valid and reliable analysis.

To deliver an accurate thesis, delimitations has to be set. International community has to be delimited in the framework of the UN, which is the main actor involved in global peace and which is committed to bring peace to Central African Republic. Central African Government and Ex Seleka and anti Balaka militias will constitute most of the internal actors addressed on this thesis. Considering the long lasting conflict in the CAR, only the civil war begun in 2013 will be addressed.

Significance of Study

This study is important, first of all, because few or no studies have been made on Central African Republic in the Master of Military Arts and Science Program of the Command and General Staff College. It will provide a basis for further studies on the subject matter. Secondly, this study can put the cat among the pigeons for those interested in solving the issue of security and peace in the CAR.

This chapter presented the background of the ongoing situation in Central African Republic and stated what was the problem to be addressed on this thesis as well as some assumptions, definitions, limitations and delimitations related to the topic of peace in the CAR. The next chapter will contain the review of related literature and research related to peace and security in Central African Republic.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

It is very surprising fact that there is no existing Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) thesis on Central African Republic (CAR). Fortunately, the Central African Civil war is an ongoing conflict so there is a significant amount of recent literature on this topic. The primary research question being: What security conditions are needed to achieve peace in Central African Republic? The quest for literature for this thesis was focused on key words, namely “security,” “peace” (or “peacekeeping”) and “Central African Republic.” These key words allowed the selection of a set documents that will be used to deal with the primary research question.

Selected documents for this thesis have to be classified by categories. First of all, doctrinal documents related to international interventions and peacekeeping operations (PKO) issued by organizations such as NATO or UN. Secondly, professional journals, MMAS thesis, or School of Advanced Military Study (SAMS) monographs which contain a large amount of information concerning fragile states, the conduct of PKOs, interposition missions and peace enforcement missions. Finally, historical documents, articles and books are included to describe the security situation in Central African Republic and provide examples for case study. The purpose of this chapter is to review, assess existing literature and identify possible gaps in the literature about the crisis in the CAR, failed states, international resolution of conflicts by UN, and criteria for success of a peacekeeping mission.

Literature on Central African Republic Crisis

The literature about the Central African Crisis mainly consist of articles and reports. Many reports and articles are describing what are the implications of the Central African Republic enduring conflict regionally as well as globally. *The Crisis in Central African Republic*, a report by the U.S. congressional research service, states the crisis in CAR also has implications for several broader issues in which some Members of Congress have become interested in recent years. These issues include: stability in the wider Central Africa region; prevention of mass atrocities; status of U.S. efforts to counter the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a small, but brutal militia present in CAR and neighboring states; and the impact of instability in CAR on wildlife poaching and other cross-border criminal activity in the region (Arieff 2014, 1). *The tormented triangle: the regionalization of conflict in Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic*, an article by London based researchers, links the situation in CAR to that of Chad and Sudan. The main thesis is that conflicts in these regions are so interwoven that they should be considered as a one single conflict. This article explains genesis of the conflicts in these three countries and make the link among them through their evolution (Giroux et al. 2009, 1).

In *Central Africa: Back to war again?* by Roland Marchal, the author describes the situation in Central African Republic in 2013. He emphasizes the fact that contrarily to the belief of the international community, things are getting worse in this country. What was simply war has turned into banditry and total insecurity. His work is a call for action aimed at the international community inviting them to make an assessment on the ground to ascertain true situation in Central African Republic. There are three main

concerns presented in this article; the first of the main concerns is the polarization of the conflict into Christian vs Muslim. The second is the impact that the spread of the Central African conflict can have on the stability of the region, particularly on Chad and Sudan. The third concern is the incapacity of the Central African Government to tackle its security issues. CAR official are not considered as “strong interlocutors” for the international Community. In what seems to be a chaos, the author urges the international community to act (Marchal 2013, 1).

In the *Central African Imbroglia: the state, the rebels, bandits* by Emmanuel Chauvin and Christian Seignobos, the authors put their emphasis on the difficulties to develop a clear picture on the security situation in Central African Republic because of the overlap and entanglement of armed groups and loyalist forces. It analyses the part of each group in the Central African problem. The first targeted group are the Mbororos, these uncontrolled nomad people who move all across the country to feed their livestock and create security issues with their weapons. The second group are the rebels in the Northern regions that have very few in common but question the legitimacy of the government of Bangui. The third group that the authors call “the new competitors” consist of actors originating from Chad and Sudan that are involved in the conflict. Finally, the fourth group is the anti-Balaka, civilian militias without central Command. As the conflict and the actors are constantly changing, the authors infer that solving the security issues in the CAR is not an easy challenge (Chauvin and Seignobos 2006, 119).

Didier Niewiadowski, former French diplomat in the CAR in his article “La republique Centrafricaine: le naufrage d’un etat, L’agonie d’une nation” (translated Central African Republic: the wrecking of a state, the agony of a nation) begins his

analysis by stating that the international community was not interested in Central African Republic Crisis before 2012 because it considered it as a French Matter. As things became more dramatic the world discovered that this crisis could have effects on the stability of the Central African region which is a region of international interest. He considers that the leaders of the ex-Seleka have no real interest in the future of the Central African Republic and just want their slice of the pie on the resources of CAR. He considers the CAR not as a fragile state, but as a ghost state. The government is absent in the majority of the territory and national unity seems to be a failure. The article is very detailed on the issues faced at every level in CAR. As far as the security issues are concerned the author come to the conclusion that since nothing significant is done to deal with this issue, the country is likely to implode into proto-states or micro-states directed by armed groups. He questions the efficiency of the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic (Niewiadowski 2014, 1).

In “*Rebellion et limites de la consolidation de la paix en republique Centrafricaine*” (Rebellion and limits of the consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic) by Louisa Lombard and Raphael Botiveau, it is considered that the Central African Crisis failed to be resolved because of politics. The United Nations concentrated all their attention on politics and failed to put an appropriate focus on the security aspect in their strategy of consolidating peace in Central African Republic. Situation in Central African Republic suffered from an “oversimplification” by international community, particularly the UN Peacebuilding commission who considered it as a “simple case.” In fact it was more complicated than that. The article states that the security issues originate from the multiplicity of armed groups based the hinterland of CAR. The hinterland is

unfortunately not as developed as the Capital of Bangui, with lack of basic infrastructures such as roads. This fact isolates rural areas and allow local militias to grow and exploit the natural resources. The underrepresentation of the state in these places favored this situation too. According to the author, what the CAR need is security above all. He calls the United Nations to focus on the security of the overall territory before even thinking about tackling political issues because CAR population long for security, particularly in the rural areas (Lombard and Botiveau 2012, 189).

French military involvement in the conflict in CAR is related in an article titled *“45 ans d’operations militaires en republique Centrafricaine”* by Florent de Saint Victor. This article tells the genesis of the interaction of the French army and the different governments of CAR regarding security issues. From the signature of defense agreements in 1960, Operation Barracuda which overthrew emperor Bokassa to reestablish David Dacko in 1979, to the logistic and operational support of the French army to the Central African Armed Forces and all the Forces involved in Peacekeeping operations in CAR since 1997. This article identifies the new challenges that France has to face as the threat in Central African Republic evolved. First, the evolvement of the conflict from an ethnic to a religious one. Second, the implication of the Sudanese and Chadian militiamen in the armed groups. Third, the closeness of the Ex Seleka and Anti Balaka militias. Finally, the UN growing interest on the situation of CAR which deter France to intervene unilaterally as before. The presence of a weak state in an area can be detrimental to the others state in the area (de Saint Victor 2013, 1).

These selected readings, along with others were helpful to have a more comprehensive understanding of the crisis in CAR. These Different perspectives were determinant in shaping the researcher perspective on this conflict.

Literature on Weak or Fragile States

As Central African Republic is considered as a weak state, writings on conflict solving in these kind of countries has to be taken into account. The case of Somalia seems to be the most popular crisis. Many SAMS monographs and MMAS thesis have been written on Somalia. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) William J. Schayce's *An approach to stability in Somalia* offers a focused examination of two case studies to show how a traditional model of state building failed in Somalia, whereas a refined model, including deradicalization, succeeded in Somaliland. The case studies demonstrate that an approach to state building similar to that in Somaliland may lead to success in stabilizing Somalia (Schayce 2012, 1). The security part of this approach can help any other fragile state like Central African Republic to solve its problems. Major (MAJ) John Gibson's *Theoretical approach to dealing with Somalia* compares two theories for solving the crisis in Somalia. His thesis compares Seth Kaplan and Bronwyn Bruton, both experts on Somalia, who agree that United States policy in Somalia must change but differ upon the application of new policy. Kaplan offers an intrusive and comprehensive nation building approach while Bruton recommends a policy of constructive disengagement (Gibson 2012, 1).

In *La reforme du secteur de securite dans les etats et les societes fragiles: prealables indispensables au developpement ou dernieres des illusions neocoloniales* (The reform of the security sector in the fragile states and societies: conditions essential

to development or neocolonialist illusion) by Jean Marc Chataigner (2013, 101), the author analyses the impact of international aid programs on security in the fragile or weak states. This article advocates the need for the international community to allocate resources to security issues. However, this allocation of resources must be detrimental to the funding of social and economic issues. The article acknowledges the fact that providing funds for improving security in fragile states is the first step toward their development. It will help neutralizing all the causes of instability. Most of the international donors are more concerned by visible results than durable ones. In the case of CAR for example, the article pointed out one of the projects of France to finance creation a Navy headquarters there and to allocate funds to the Gendarmerie which are located in the Capital and plays the same role as a national police force. The author thinks that these funds should have been instead allocated to ground forces and allow them to conduct disarmament operations and tackle the real threats. The international donors must assess the particularity of the situation of each country they are interested in and adapt their aid accordingly to be more efficient in solving security issues (Chataigner 2013, 117).

The selected MMAS thesis and SAMS monograph explored the issue of fragile or weak states and how to deal with it. They used case study methodology to conduct their analysis which can be a very interesting construct to help the researcher to find an answer to its interrogations on peace in Central African Republic.

Literature on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

A UN mission is ongoing on Central African Republic, so writing on conducting successful UN PKO or improving them were relevant. The United Nations

Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA) mandate states that the first task of this mission is to protect the civilians by deterring and responding to serious threat and keeping a proactive, flexible and robust posture hand in hand with CAR authorities. Other tasks include the creation of a secure environment to allow humanitarian assistance, the deployment of security forces to support the extension of state authority and the preservation of territorial integrity, The Security Sector Reform (SSR) to empower law enforcement forces (Police, Gendarmerie) and conduct Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) and Repatriation (DDRR) (PKO 2018, 1). Most of the tasks in the UN's CAR mandate are mostly security oriented and designed to face the security challenges of this country.

In *21st century peacekeeping* LTC Pinto points out that in order to face the challenges of the 21st century operational environment, the United Nations needs to conduct reforms of the Security Council and its decision-making process. These reforms should reflect the current geopolitical realities and help to achieve effectively the objectives of the current complex PKOs (Pinto 2004, 98). For MAJ Kyle Henson, in *Peacekeeping in Congo 1999-2001: success or failure?* it is only when the UN force has been authorized to use force to disarm the rebels that the prospects for ending the fighting were better than ever before (Henson 2014, 34). *The United Nations and Military Interventions: Factors for Success and Ability to Lead in Comparison with an International Coalition* is an assessment of the United Nations Missions. It aims at determining which factors really impact the success or failure of post-Cold War military interventions, and by comparing the ability of the UN to lead such interventions with that of an international alliance or coalition (Lambert 2011, 1). Assessment of PKOs, most of

them led by United Nations, is a topic which was addressed relatively late by scholars. Today, there is a large amount of literature on defining criteria to determine what is a successful peacekeeping operation.

Literature on Criteria for Successful Peacekeeping Operations

Defining the success of a PKO is not an easy process. Long term success must be taken into account instead of short term success. The final goal being long lasting peace and social and economic development. However, long term success is built from short term successes as strategic success is built from operational and tactical successes. The fulfillment of operational and tactical goals is urgent and is nested to the fulfillment of strategic goals.

An agenda for Peace (1992), the “Capstone doctrine” (*United Nations peacekeeping operations and guidelines*, 2008) and the *report of the panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (2000) or “Brahimi report” are key documents regarding the question of successfulness of a peacekeeping operation.

The UN, which is the first organization to conduct peace keeping (PK) mission, has defined what they consider as success criteria for their missions. The “Capstone Doctrine” (DPKO 2008, 1) lists factors essential to turn a PKO into success

1. Consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate;
2. Perception of legitimacy and credibility of operations particularly in the eyes of local population; and
3. Promotion of national and local ownership, in order to contribute to the achievement of a sustainable peace (DPKO 2008, 38)

UN includes other important factors to the success of PK missions such as:

1. Genuine commitment to a political process by the parties in working towards peace (there must be a peace to keep);
2. Clear, credible and achievable mandates, with matching personnel, logistic and financial resources;
3. Unity of purpose within the Security Council, with active support for the UN operations in the field;
4. Host country commitment to unhindered UN operations and freedom of movement;
5. Supportive engagement by neighboring countries and regional actors;
6. An integrated UN approach, effective coordination with other actors on the ground and good communication with host country authorities and population; and
7. The utmost sensitivity towards the local population and upholding the highest standards of professionalism and good conduct (peacekeepers must avoid becoming part of the problem) (DPKO 2008, 40).

Other organizations are also interested in and have defined criteria for success as far as peace operations (PO) are concerned. NATO definition of the success for PKOs is enclosed the Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1 on “Peace support Operations” issued in July 2001. In this document, it is stated that a certain number of pre-determined strategic objectives have to be achieved to lead to the overall political end state. These objectives are tied to the establishment of a secure, stable and self-sustaining environment for the local population. It also emphasizes on the criticality of the achievement of security-

related military objectives as a very important part of the success of such missions. The success categorization developed by NATO make the difference between strategic success and operational and tactical success. It links the fulfilment of the strategic objectives by the implementation of operational and tactical ones. In the light of this, three main factors are determined in NATO doctrine:

1. Peace support forces must be adequately led, trained, organized, equipped and armed – that will give them credibility;
2. Peace support forces must be strictly impartial; and
3. The professional conduct of the peace support forces must reinforce all aspects of the conduct of the mission (NATO 2001, 1).

Other factors such as lack of international and local support, tensions among belligerents and peace support operation, cultural issues or limited rules of engagements are cited as elements that can hinder the success of peace support operations (NATO 2001, 2-3).

Among scholars, there is not a common definition of success as far as peace operations are concerned. This difficulty resides in the ambiguity of success and failure and also the ambiguity of the time frame used to measure the durability of results. Despite these challenges many scholars have attempted to find criteria for the success of peace operations. These criteria range from minimalist standards, focus on mandate and maximalist standards.

One of the first book to address success of PKOs was written by Paul Diehl, an American Scholar. In his book, *International Peacekeeping* (1993), he studied six PKO cases from 1956 to 1984 and came to the conclusion that two criteria prevailed, first of

all, the peacekeeping force must limit the armed conflict and second, the force must promote conflict resolution. The second criterion has been criticized mostly because the nature of a conflict can change progressively because the factors that trigger wars are often not similar to the factors which perpetuate the conflict. The conditions to be successful in meeting these two criteria are:

1. The consent of every party to peacekeeping operation;
2. Peacekeepers must not be heavily armed and only fire in self-defense;
3. The strict respect of the force neutrality/ The involvement in interstate rather than intrastate conflicts; and
4. The geographic context of the theater of operations (Diehl 1993, 220).

Diehl developed his analysis and criteria on UN PKOs which took place during the Cold War. Such criteria may not be applicable to assess multidimensional operations that are taking place since then. However, even if this analysis it seems to be based on an ideal view of conflict resolution, it allowed to throw bases for further reflection on the issue of conflict resolution.

In 1996, Duane Bratt, did an effort to adapt Diehl's evaluation criteria to the realities of Post-Cold War PKOs. He came up with four indicators to assess operational success in peacekeeping in the form of four questions: Did the operation complete its mandate? Did the operation facilitate a resolution to the conflict? Did the operation contain the conflict? Did the operations limit the casualties of combatants, civilians and peacekeepers? (Bratt 1996, 46). He assessed the success of 39 UN peacekeeping missions from 1945 to 1996 and came to the conclusion that there are three levels of operational success. First, in a successful operation, the four criteria or indicators are met. Second, in

a moderately successful operation, the facilitation of conflict resolution objective is met and one of the remaining objectives has been substantially fulfilled. Third, in a failed operation, all four objectives are not met or one had limited success (Bratt 1996, 46).

Jair Van der Lijn came up with nine factors of success and failure. He did not address the issue of criteria, but defined the objective as “contribution to durable peace.” So, the factor he identified explain and influence the differences in results of UN PK mission in reaching durable peace; for Van der Lijn, the first three factors are the most important:

1. The parties are sincere and willing to cooperate with the implementation of the operation;
2. The operation is able to provide a sufficient sense of security to the parties;
3. The operation pays sufficient attention to the causes of the conflict both in depth and in breadth;
4. The operation receives co-operation from important outside actors and parties;
5. The operation is deployed at the right time;
6. The operation is implemented by competent personnel under competent leadership and with clear command structures,
7. The operation is part of a long-term approach;
8. The ‘policy tools’ implemented in the operation are coordinated within the operation, as well as externally; and
9. The operation provides ‘ownership’ (Van der Lijn 2009, 1)

By analyzing in detail Van der Lijn’s view, factors for success and failure of PKOs are linked. It can be summed up in three words: Consent, willingness and sincerity.

The first prerequisite is the genuine desire of the combatant to resolve their differences. It must be laid down on a formal peace agreement. A loss of consent can bring to the implementation of the agreement by military force and peacekeeping turns into war fighting. Each party should be able to cooperate with the peacekeeping force and consider it as a desirable alternative for war. If they see the mission as a threat to their security and interest, it can lead to the belligerents to be insincere and break their promises later on. This disappointment leading to insincerity suggests that the PK mission also has a role to play by offering a reliable design and configuration of their operation (Van der Lijn 2009, 4).

The second prerequisite should be met by the peacekeeping force. Impartiality and Non-use of Force. These two principles are closely linked and the less a peacekeeping force uses force, the more it is regarded as impartial by the belligerent. However, If this situation lasts, there are more chance that the peacekeeping force end being seen as partial and caught in the middle between peace keeping and war fighting. In this case, they can abandon the use of force because it is “operationally justified” and “morally compelled” (Van der Lijn 2009, 5) to defend themselves, the mandate, and the civilians.

One other requisite for a successful PKO is the cooperation from other important outside actors according to the United Nations Secretariat. On one hand, International or regional organizations providing troops to fully support the operations, providing funds and other resources are key to achieve enduring peace. On the other hand, the outside backers and suppliers of the belligerents have to stop their support for violent means and stimulate the non-violent resolution of the conflict (Van der Lijn 2009, 6).

To guarantee the success of a PKO, all the parties must feel in security. This means that the peacekeeping force has to have sufficient combat power to guarantee the security of all parties involved in the conflict. It will deter them to rearm themselves for their own defense and allowing the conflict to escalate. The parties must see the intervention force as sustained, committed and credible. The military component must be able to defend themselves, the other components of the mission and the mandate of the mission. The intervention force has to be prepared for the worst case scenario to be relevant to all parties (Van der Lijn 2009, 7).

For Van der Lijn, the mandate has to be clear, appropriate and achievable. The objectives stated in the mission's mandate are of enormous importance for the success of a peacekeeping operation. Mandate are made achievable or appropriate to the situation if the diagnosis of the conflict from which are based the objectives is done properly. So it is an effort to put on good planning. If the situation is not properly assessed and the objectives a vague, further problems will arise. The Security Council has to come up with the right assessment to avoid the issue of ambiguous mandate. The mandate has to be organized in clearly identified phases and allow the appropriate action to concur with the right phase and level of conflict. The more the mandate is expansive and detailed, the more the operation has a chance of success (Van der Lijn 2009, 8).

Elaborating about timely deployment and at the right time. The author assumes that Intervening at a late stage of a conflict decrease the possibility of influencing its course as an external actor. The intervening force can be stuck to reaction rather than proactivity and have little time to plan and analyze the causes of the conflict. The pre-conflict phase is the most suitable part for an intervention by a peacekeeping force. The

roots of the country can be properly assessed and tackled and many costs in lives and resources can be avoided. When all parties agree to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, its rapid deployment is essential. The first weeks following a peace agreement or peace fire are important because each opposing parties assess the credibility of an operation to implement the mandate at the beginning of the mission. If the deployment is slow or ineffective, the consent of the belligerents to cooperated can be affected and the peacekeeping force can lose momentum (Van der Lijn 2009, 9).

As far as Competent Leadership and Personnel and Clear Command Structures are concerned. These three are the basis for the effective implementation of a mandate. The outcome of a peacekeeping operation can be influenced by the qualities and the competencies of those who lead it. The professionalism of every other actor, civilian or military, contribute to operational success. The provision of adequate equipment as well. To enable this participating personnel to give their best (Van der Lijn 2009, 9).

Sufficiently long duration is another factor. Missions with no longer durations have less chance of success than Longer operations. Even though a lengthy presence doesn't guarantee success of a mission, an early departure is certainly an ingredient for failure. To find the adequate duration and guarantee credibility and effectiveness, termination point or termination criteria have to be established. During the process, Milestones measuring progress has to be included too. A single event cannot be taken as a signal for departure but a series of event (Van der Lijn 2009, 11).

Internal and external coordination. Externally, peacekeeping operations must be nested to a broader strategy to build durable peace by resolving the conflict. They have to coordinate with international organization to solve the fundamental causes of the conflict.

To coordinate with other actors of the region because by this conflict, the stabilization of a whole region is at stake. Internally, chance of success is enhanced by coordination between the military and political component of the mission (Van der Lijn 2009, 11).

Ownership. The consent of the local populations and the accountability of the mission to them are key elements to succeed in a peacekeeping operation. The operation must not reach the point where the population consider them as an invading force. This ownership is a means to conduct effective peacekeeping but may also be an end (Van der Lijn 2009, 12).

Cause of the conflict. The cause of the conflict has to be tackled in an effort to ensure and enduring peace. Reconstruction may be doomed to fail if the causes of conflict subsist. The social, security or cultural conditions that causes violent conflicts can definitely be changer by peacekeeping operations (Van der Lijn 2009, 1).

Darya Pushkina went further than the two precedent researchers. she focused her study on internal conflicts solved by UN and the quest of success determinants. She came up with a broader criteria set: Limiting the conflict in the host state/ reducing human suffering/ preventing the spread of conflicts beyond state borders/ promoting conflict resolution. On the 17 missions analyzed by her, seven were considered successful (Namibia, Mozambique, UNTAES - Croatia, UNSMIH and UNMIH in Haiti, UNPROFOR and UNPREDEP in Macedonia), three were partially successful (Cyprus, Cambodia, ONUC - Congo) and seven were considered as failed (UNAVEM III - Angola, Lebanon, Somalia, UNPROFOR – Croatia, UNCRO -Croatia, UNPROFOR-Bosnia, Rwanda.)

The author highlighted the fact that the successful mission implement the majority of elements contained in their mandate: sustained ceasefires, the prevention of outbreak of major violence, reduction of the number of casualties, resettlement of refugees and displaced, and creation of a safe environment. It confirmed that UN PK is more successful in conflict management when:

1. UN members demonstrate consistent commitment to resolving the conflict;
2. UN peacekeeping is accompanied by effective diplomacy;
3. The warring parties give their consent to and cooperate with the UN peacekeeping mission;
4. There is a perception on the part of the warring parties that conflict should be resolved by non-violent means; and
5. UN peacekeeping is less successful in civil conflict management when one or both of the warring parties is supported militarily and/or politically by outside states or groups during the period of UN mission deployment. “(Pushkina 2006, 134)

So determinants of success could now be tied to the level of UN commitment, the level of outside support and diplomatic efforts, the consent of belligerent parties to nonviolence.

Darya Pushkina in *A recipe for success? Ingredient for a successful Peacekeeping mission* points out five important criteria to take into consideration for the success of peacekeeping operation after conducting the analysis of 17 UN missions from 1945 to 1998. As measure of success she selected four criteria:

Criterion 1: Limitation of violent conflict in the host state. Succeed in curbing large-scale violent, sustaining ceasefire agreement, reducing the number of casualties, supervising demobilization and assessing progress of disarmament.

Criterion 2: Reduction of human suffering, i.e., reduction in human rights abuses and success in resettling refugees.

Criterion 3: The prevention of the spread of the conflict beyond the borders of the object states to ensure regional security. Keeping intact the integrity of neighboring countries.

Criterion 4: The promotion of conflict resolution. The mission has to foster an environment which inhibit further violence (Pushkina 2006, 146).

Through the lens of these measures of success, five factors emerged as ingredients of successful PKOs; these factors are:

1. Level of UN commitment: It is not about passing resolutions and handling mandates. It is about providing consistent political will and economic support to the mission. In simple words UN must provide timely supply of troops and financial resources to carry on the mission. Providing one without the other can be detrimental to the mission.
2. Outside support: The material, ideological or political support of external actors to belligerents in internal conflicts is one of the primary factor of the instigation and the continuation of this conflict. The more there outside support, the more unsuccessful the mission will be. If the mission is able to mitigate that it is a factor of success.
3. Successful diplomatic efforts. The negotiation of meaningful settlement

agreements that address most or all the issues underlying the conflict is key for the success of a PKOs. The more comprehensive the agreements are, the more chance of reaching peace.

4. Consent and cooperation of warring parties. High levels of cooperation and consent are guarantee of a success of this operation. If the cooperation is low or decreases, the operation is likely to be unsuccessful.
5. Commitment of warring parties to non-violent means. Peacekeeping can only be successful when conflicting parties have the perception that the military way is not effective in achieving their goals. The belligerents demonstrate desire to negotiate. They don't conduct attacks during negotiations or don't refer to the other parties in insulting or dehumanizing terms (Pushkina 2006, 146).

She dismissed the following factors addressed by Van der Lijn:

1. The involvement of a regional organization. On the majority of the cases studied there was involvement of regional organizations but the degree of this involvement was unrelated to the final outcome. On the mission with strong regional support, six succeeded and six failed. On the other five missions, regional support was not important.
2. The duration of the mission deployment. According to the study, time has no or few effect on the outcome of a mission. Most of the successful UN peacekeeping operations lasted from 01 to 5 years. The mission that lasted more than 5 years proved unsuccessful.

3. The relative military strength and the mission's enforcement capabilities.

There is no strong correlation between the enforcement clause mandate and the effectiveness of a peacekeeping mission. Most of the succeeding mission did not have an enforcement clause. In most cases where the mission had a strong military strength, the mission was a failure (Pushkina 2006, 147).

The author points out that this does not mean that these factors have to be ignored because each of them has some influence on the situation on the ground, but they do not impact the outcome of the operations as the five selected factors do.

For Donna Winslow, perception of success of a peacekeeping operation depends on the actors. NGOs, medias and other actors don't have the same perception of success than the military peacekeeping force. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) cannot consider a peacekeeping mission successful if all human suffering has been significantly reduced. Media and public opinion consider the end of fighting as benchmark of success. The military peacekeeping define success by the strict accomplishment of the mission that was given to them. She emphasizes on the fact that commanders care more about sustaining no or less casualties in their troops and bringing their men home safely than completely fulfilling the mandate (Winslow 2002, 1).

To solve this discrepancy of objectives pointed by Winslow, Herman Jung emphasizes on the importance of the convergence of goals of the various actors involved in the peacekeeping operations. He infers that Military contingents, other international actors, as well as the host nation must communicate and establish a goal congruence. He was the first to introduce the local population as major factor for evaluating the success of peacekeeping operation (Jung 2009, 353).

In a study reported by Maja Garb, a South African scholar, Students of the University of Slovenia came up with a very interesting study on PK assessment of success. Their analysis evaluated/assessed the success of this type of mission through three elements:

1. Fulfilment of mandate or goals;
2. Political and security situation; and
3. Assistance to local population (Garb 2014, 44).

In addition, they talked about the prolongation of the mandate of a mission as a sign of success. Their view is that an organization cannot prolong a mission which was not successful at some point. This can be discussed because the prolongation of a mission can also mean that the mission did not achieve success and need to have more time to do so.

Other factors such as international and political will were evoked as decisive factors. Overall, they described the EU and OSCE as the most successful ones. Among the UN mission studied, they ranked UNMIT (Timor – Leste), UNOGIL (Lebanon), UNMOGIP (India-Pakistan), UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone), UNAVEM I (Angola), UNSMIH (Haiti), UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone), ONUCA (Central America) and UNTAG (Namibia) as successful according to their criteria. NATO missions seem to have fewer positive outcomes.

This student evaluation showed that implementation operations and operations that were taken in the late phase were more successful. The fact that international organization or states are reluctant to establish a new operation in a contested area can be explained by this finding (Garb 2014, 63).

Overall, on the light of this review of literature, the assessment of the success of peacekeeping operations is linked with the criteria selection. These criteria are defined differently by institutions and various authors although there is some kind of common understanding of the different criteria. Mandate fulfilment seem to be the most widely shared criterion.

Amira Ghoniem in “UN peacekeeping Operations: Improvement for mission success” is interested in making the UN peacekeeping more successful by highlighting the successes and failures of two United Nations Peacekeeping Mission (in Bosnia and East Timor). The author recalls the history of UN peacekeeping, originating from the League of Nations, the first UN peacekeeping mission in 1956 in response to the Suez crisis, the focus on interstate conflict resolution during Cold War and the switch to new type of emergencies as collapsed state structures, large scale intrastate fighting and slaughter and horrific human right atrocities. As the type of threat evolved, the UN peacekeeping mission had to adapt their format. A certain degree of Force became necessary for the success of the mission despite UN overall opposition to the notion of use of force to keep peace (Ghoniem 2003, 1).

The author states that event though UNPROFOR Bosnia is considered as a success, it had flaws that needed to be addressed:

1. Indecisiveness of UN to intervene on time allowed the belligerent to create ethnically cleansed areas;
2. The peacekeeping mission had no clear mandate and no real design;
3. The rules of engagement given were considered inadequate; and
4. The very limited capacity to protect the civilians, even in so called “safe

areas.” (Ghoniem 2003, 23)

As far as UNAMET and UNTAET (East Timor) are concerned, the United Nations lacked a branch plan to anticipate the consequences of a rejection of autonomy by the East Timorese, which led to a humanitarian catastrophe (Ghoniem 2003, 24).

As a summary, the author praises the mandate of the UNTAET and say that it should apply to any peacekeeping mission conducted in fragile states. He puts an emphasis on the fact that UN must use multinational regional forces in its peacekeeping operations. The belligerent will not feel that the force is too “foreign.” A regional force will understand better the need of the people and react faster accordingly. He ends up with the fact that United Nations must look for support of great Nations having some interests in the region to accelerate the resolution of conflicts (Ghoniem 2003, 25).

From all the literature on success of peacekeeping operations, some criteria or factors are common and sometimes interwoven. Five main criteria seem to be interesting to take into account to assess conditions necessary to reach enduring peace in a conflict. These criteria are focused on security and are:

1. Clear, credible and achievable mandate with matching personnel, logistics and resources (Consent of all parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate, the peacekeeping force is deployed at the right time, the peacekeeping operation provides ownership to the population.);
2. Supportive engagement by neighboring countries and regional actors (UN);
3. The professional conduct of the soldiers of the mission must strengthen the mission (NATO);

4. The peacekeeping force is able to provide a sense of security to all the parties;
and
5. The peacekeeping operation is part of a long term approach.

Those criteria that are generally accepted will be applied to two case studies that are considered as successful. First of all, the case of United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) as described by Daria Pushkina and which involved armed groups fighting on an African soil (Pushkina 2006, 147). The second interesting case study is the case of United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI), which is a more recent peacekeeping mission and involved armed groups fighting over political power in a fragile state. This case is largely described in various reports made by the Secretary General of the United Nations on the situation and other sources. This set of criteria and these two peacekeeping operations will be the basis for applying the case study methodology to address the research questions.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Despite all the literature about the war in the Central African Republic, most authors are basically describing the CARs situation in many domains, including security to raise international's community awareness. They do not focus on actually finding relevant solutions to the ongoing conflict. So, in order to find an answer or answers to the interrogation made in chapter one, we will have basically to describe what is really ongoing in Central African Republic and conduct case studies from historical international interventions and national actions taken to effectively end a difficult civil war.

The present chapter will discuss first how and why the research methodology was selected. Second, the strength and weaknesses of the methodology will be addressed. Third, it will discuss the method of information collection and fourth, it will discuss the selection of the evaluation criteria.

Selection of the Research Methodology

To solve the issue of peace in Central African Republic, it is obvious that a study of other countries having experienced the same type of crisis and the subsequent resolution of it was the path to follow. So case study methodology seemed to be the most relevant to develop a useful response to the Central African Crisis. However, this methodology is wide and had to be narrowed to find a format fitting to this study.

The case study is designed to capture the complexity of a single case. The case, or the object of study should be:

1. A complex functioning unit;
2. Investigated in its natural context with a multitude of methods; and
3. Contemporary.

The researchers of case studies have different approaches on the emphasis of the case study. Robert Stake (1995) assumed that the most important is that the object of study is a case, while Robert Yin (1984) points out that the methods and technique of investigation are the most crucial for case study researchers.

A case study focus on one case, but simultaneously take account of the context and so, include many variables and qualities. What is a case? It is not a well-defined concept and its definition remains debatable. It may be a bounded object or a process, it can be empirical, theoretical or both. Bottom-line, it is a phenomenon specific to time and space.

How does the researcher select his case study? He selects purposefully a case in virtue of a quality, the case can be unique, information rich, revelatory, critical or extreme. Then, there is an interest in generalizing the findings (Stake 1995, 85), From a single case analytical generalizations are made, based on reasoning (Patton 1990, 253). The three common principles of reasoning are deductive, inductive and abductive. Generalizations can be a product of one or a combination of these three forms of reasoning.

As far as the deductive reasoning is concerned, a hypothesis is formulated and the testable consequences are derived by deduction. By comparing the expected findings to empirical findings, it becomes possible to verify or falsify the theory (Johansson 2007, 48). More precisely, it is possible to define the domain within which the theory is valid.

Cases that are essential to the theory are selected. From the theory and facts of a case, generalizations are made concerning the domain of the theory (Yin 1984, 36).

Induction is another mode of generalizations. Inductive theory-generation or conceptualization are based on data from within a case. It results in a theory consisting of a set of related concepts. Glaser and Strauss (1967) consider it as the best way to make generalizations as far as Grounded Theory is concerned.

If deduction and induction are more familiar to people, abduction is not. The principle of deduction assume that a conclusion is necessarily true from a case and a rule. If the premises are true, so is the conclusion. Deduction aims at proving that something must be true. From facts in a case, by Induction, the researcher can conclude that a rule that actually is operative, is probably operative in similar cases. Abduction is encountering an unexpected fact, applying a set of rules, already known or made up, and as a result, positing a case that may be. The concept of abduction was created by the Philosopher Charles Sanders Pierce (1992, 1).

There are two kinds of abduction, which results in two kind of generalizations. First, when the case is created or reconstructed by abductive reasoning from few facts, historical data or clue. This is known as “evidential paradigm” (Ginzburg 1989, 1). The other kind of abductive Generalization, called naturalistic generalization (Stake 1995, 1), is operative when generalizations are made from known cases and applied to an actual problem by making appropriate comparisons.

For this study, the researcher replicated mostly Robert Yin’s (1984) approach. The methods and techniques of collection and analysis of data are more important than the cases themselves. Moreover, he deductive approach is preferred to inductive or

abductive approaches. Each stage of the methodology will consist of a discussion of procedures recommended in the literature, followed by a discussion of the application of those procedures in the proposed case studies:

1. Design the case study protocol:
 - a. determine the required skills; and
 - b. develop and review the protocol.
2. Conduct the case study: data collection;
3. Analyze case study evidence: analytic strategy; and
4. Develop conclusions, recommendations, and implications based on the evidence.

Methodology Strengths and Weaknesses

Case study is a strategic qualitative research methodology. Although it has been criticized by many scholars as being deprived from scientific rigor, it seems to be appropriate to deal with processes or complex real life activities as it's the case on this study.

For this research problem the case study will allow to investigate on contemporary events (PKOs) within their context using multiple sources of evidence. It will allow to discover how and why things happened and allow the investigation of contextual realities and understanding of the differences between the outcomes. Case study is not general it is mainly focused on a particular issue and enable the researcher to examine and understand this difficult issue amidst the complexity of the various sources of evidence used. It becomes useful to understand particular situation in great-depth when cases are rich in information.

One of the strength of case study is that it enables the researcher to have a holistic view of a phenomenon and can provide a round picture since many sources are used. Another advantage is that case study methodology can help capturing all the inherent properties as well as all the ebb and flow of an event or organization in a changing environment. Case study also allow generalizations as the result of findings using multiple cases can lead to some form of replication of model to other cases.

A multiple case study is employed in the research study. The choice for multiple case studies (two for this research) is appropriate given that multiple case studies should follow a replication, not a sampling logic as single case study does. It allows the investigator to predict that the results found on the case studies will be replicated. If such replication is found for several cases, the researcher and its readers can have more confidence in the overall results. The development of robust findings over many cases can then be considered as consistent finding. The fact of examining many events (PKOs for this research) will enhance the reliability, accuracy and validity of the results by apprehending the entire essence of the issue studied.

Case studies has been criticized by many scholars who point out its lack of scientific rigor and the fact that it does not address the issue of generalizability (Noor 2008, 1). Some like Johnson (1994) argue that each case study is unique and cannot be replicated and therefore not corroborated. The data and results are only valid for each case and even by adding other studies the researcher can never be 100% certain. Another element of weakness of the case study methodology seems to be the bias of the researcher. Jacques Hamel (1993) observes that the lack of rigor of case study methodology is linked to the bias of the of the researcher. This bias can influence the

choice of the subject, the form of data collection and the interpretation of data. It can lead to an overall subjective assessment, which is very common since it is normal for humans to have biases. There is a risk that the researcher identify himself with the issue and loses its perspective as an outsider.

Overall, as mitigation of its weaknesses, the qualitative case study includes differences and human factor. As Shields (2007) states, case study cannot eliminate what cannot be discounted, it cannot simplify what cannot be simplified. It includes paradoxes and take in account the fact that there are no simple answers. These weaknesses identified by authors can therefore be considered as misunderstandings.

In order to have a credible and defendable analysis on the issue of security in Central African Republic, at least two case studies had to be taken into consideration. Two case studies preferably contemporary, involving internal conflicts and taking place in Africa. The first case study identified by the researcher is the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) which took place from 1992 to 1994. UNOMOZ'S mission was to monitor the peace agreements between the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). The second case study is a more recent one, the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI). It was longer, from 2004 to 2017, and involved the Government of Ivory Coast and the New Forces, a rebel force which controlled the North of the country. The researcher collected data on these two cases, as well as the CAR case.

Method of Information Collection

Information collection for this thesis was limited to open source or unclassified information. As the Central African Republic crisis is an ongoing conflict and UNOMOZ

and UNOCI are contemporary conflicts, an important use of internet resources such as newspaper articles was made. United Nations electronic publications allowed to gather information about mandates and other regulations which will be interesting to analyze the action of the international Community. Other web based research included online resources from Combined Arms Research Library in Fort Leavenworth and articles and books from databases such as Ebscohost, Proquest, Ciao, Country Watch, DTIC online, CSIS, the RAND corporation or UN data. Librarians of the Combined Arms research were helpful in enabling access to a wide range of other relevant literature.

Research Criteria

Much contention remains as far as defining a set of indicators for success of peace operation is concerned. Several analytical decisions must be made. In this quest of a criteria which can fit with the Central African scenario, the different actors have to be taken into account. If there is success. Success for whom? In a mission all the actors have different priorities and these goals can determine the choice of indicators for success. So the more specific the criteria and indicators are, the more clearly the study is constructed. As far as time is concerned, a longer term perspective must be preferred to a short term perspective.

There is not absolute measure of success, so assessing relative success seems to be the best approach when dealing with peace operations.

To establish research criteria, the fact that the success of peacekeeping operations is a burning and complex issue was very helpful. Significant literature exists on describing what can be assessed as reliable measure of success. This literature has been largely addressed in Chapter 2. From this literature, the researcher selected five important

security related criteria which come to play in the success of a peacekeeping operation.

These criteria are:

1. Clear, credible and achievable mandate with matching personnel, logistics and resources (Consent of all parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate, the peacekeeping force is deployed at the right time, the peacekeeping operation provides ownership to the population.). The mandate is the decision that gives a body authority to carry out its functions. In the framework of Peace Operations, it is the document establishing a mission and enumerating the types of activities to be carried out by the mission. First, the mandate must be clear, it means that the mission must not be ambiguous and the objectives and end state of the mission must be clearly stated. Second, the credibility of the mandate depends on many factors, the consent of all parties is an important part of it, if all the parties participating in a conflict are not involved in the peacekeeping mission, it discredits the mission from the start. The local population must be willing to take ownership of the mission too. Moreover, the mandate must put the emphasis on impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defense or in defense of the mandate. Third, the mandate must be achievable. This means that the mission and objectives must be realistic and must be tied to the extent of the problem and the resources available for the mission. The adequate force must be deployed at the right time. This implies that the troop-contributing countries must make an important effort to mobilize their personnel and equipment in a timely manner to make the mission more efficient. The UN

must also provide the right amount of resources to make things work. This criterion will be assessed as present or not present.

2. Supportive engagement by neighboring countries and regional actors.

Supportive engagement by neighboring countries and regional actors.

Enduring peace in a country most of the time depends on its neighbors. Van der Lijn (2009) states that regional involvement in PKOs by the provision of troops and resources are key to achieve enduring peace. The neighboring countries must be part of the mission by sending troops and resources. Ghoneim (2003) puts an emphasis on the fact that if neighboring or regional actors are involved in the security of a country in crisis, they will have a better understanding of the situation, the people of the country, the traditions and other features which will allow them to react accordingly and take the right action. These regional actors have interests and most of the time these interests are matching with the interests of the country in crisis. So, they can be more involved than any other actors of the PK mission. Moreover, the belligerents and the local population will not consider the intervening force as intruders or invaders if they see soldiers from neighboring countries of from the region. This criterion will be assessed as present or not present.

3. The professional conduct of the soldiers of the mission must strengthen the mission. NATO Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1, Peace Support Operations (2001) define the professional conduct of the peace support forces as a determining factor for the success of the mission. The soldiers of are in contact with the population and the belligerents on a daily basis. They are

considered as the “face” of the mission. So, their actions and behavior are put into scrutiny by the people they are protecting. This implies that the forces have to act on respect of the mandate they are defending. They have to respect basic human rights and execute rules of engagement in conformity with the mandate and international law. The force must show total impartiality between the belligerents, be transparent in its action to maintain this perception. Accusation of bias would undermine all the efforts of the mission to reestablish enduring peace in the country in crisis, so the soldiers must find a way to manage the perceptions of the population and other actors by remaining professional. This criterion will be assessed as present or not present.

4. The peacekeeping force is able to provide a sense of security to all the parties. This criterion was developed by Van der Lijn (2009) as an objective to reach to attain durable peace. Most of the time, the belligerent parties do not trust each other, that is why they keep bearing weapons. Disarmament and demobilization are part of the key steps towards enduring peace in a conflict. The proliferation of weapons greatly undermines the process of peace. So, the PK force needs to have a sufficient strength and equipment to be trusted by all belligerent parties so that they don't have to provide for their security against each other. The parties are most of the time armed for the purpose of self-defense so the force has to offer an alternative to the spiral of armament. To sum up, the PK force must have sufficient strength to be able to defend itself, the other members of the mission, the belligerent parties and the civilian

population. The force, as a third party, must always be prepared to the worst case scenario as far as security is concerned. This criterion will be assessed as present or not present.

5. The peacekeeping operation is part of a long term approach. According to Van der Lijn (2009), a peacekeeping operation must not necessarily last long because its effectiveness lies on the long term approach of the organizations on the ground. The force must continually take into account the end state and the objectives that are supporting this end state. Operating in a multiagency environment, the focus of the force should be building long term capacity to support an enduring and sustainable peace. The success of PKOs are assessed by the results of long term success at the operational level. Short term goals achieved must be the precondition for longer term success. The force must set the conditions for the establishment enduring peace. The effect of the operations of the force must be long lasting and align themselves with the overall strategic approach of the mission. Military action must be successful to ensure long term stability in the host country. This criterion will be assessed as present or not present.

This set of criteria will be applied to the CAR PK mission and the two cases studies selected. Their presence or absence will allow the researcher to rate the selected missions and assess what is missing in the Central African Republic PKO. Moreover, to be more objective and avoid bias, dilemmas and issues faced in the case studies has to be addressed too in case of absence.

To sum up, the research methodology and the case studies selected by the researcher allowed the building of the following chart which will be the guideline of the next chapter focused on the analysis of data:

Table 1. Template for Case Studies Analysis with Selected Criteria			
Criteria\Cases	UNIMOB	ONUCI	MINUSCA
1. A clear and credible and achievable mandate with matching personnel, logistics and resources			
2. Supportive engagement by neighboring countries and regional actors			
3. The professional conduct of the soldiers of the mission must strengthen the mission			
4. The peacekeeping force is able to provide a sense of security to all the parties			
5. The peacekeeping operation is part of a long term approach			
Totals			

Source: Created by author.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

In the precedent chapters, the researcher identified a set of criteria to assess the success of Peacekeeping Operations and selected case studies based on their similarities to the CAR scenario. This chapter will analyze the case studies selected in the light of the list of criteria identified and will provide an assessment of each of them. However, before deep diving in the analysis, a more detailed presentation and description of each case study has to be made. This will be made chronologically starting from UNOMOZ, UNOCI and then MINUSCA.

UNOMOZ

The United Nations Mission in Mozambique or UNOMOZ was established in December 1992 in an effort to implement the Rome General Peace agreement in Mozambique. This agreement was made between the government of the Republic of Mozambique and a rebel movement called RENAMO which threatened stability of the country. The country had been at war since 1977, starting as a local dynamic, it rapidly evolved into a cold war satellite conflict. FRELIMO rose to power after independence of in 1975 and wanted to establish a socialist one party state. RENAMO was created to oppose this attempt and armed conflict erupted in 1977. The Soviet Union supported FRELIMO Government and Western aligned Rhodesia and South Africa heavily backed RENAMO. More than one million Mozambicans were killed during this conflict, either by violence or by starvation, the food supply was impaired and over five million people were displaced. Most of the rural infrastructure was destroyed including roads, railroads,

hospitals and schools. Human right abuses were committed by each party like the use of child soldiers and landmines. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the two parties found themselves without external support. The Mozambican church and the Italian Government accepted to serve as the third party to this conflict and lead a process that led to the signature of peace agreement on October 4, 1992. After signature of the agreement in Rome, a resolution was voted on by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to send a peacekeeping mission to Mozambique. Resolution 797 (1992) was signed on December 16 1992 with the mandate to implement this ceasefire by demobilizing armed groups and monitoring the withdrawal of external forces among other tasks. (DPI 1996, 1).

In early 1993, military observers and over 6500 troops were deployed, led by the Secretary General's Special Representative, Aldo Ajello. A multilateral commission was established to guarantee implementation of these agreements and settle potential disputes; it was named the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission. This commission was composed of representative from FRELIMO, RENAMO, Italy (mediator), Portugal (former colonizer), France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States (observer states) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and was chaired by the United Nations (DPI 1996, 1).

UNOMOZ played its main role of verifying implementation of the security aspect of the peace agreement and overseeing a new electoral process, as well as providing humanitarian assistance to the large numbers of displaced persons and refugees (over five million people). Thanks to the rapid improvement of security, and the effort of UNHCR,

by mid-1994, three quarters of the displaced were resettled and refugees were brought back to Mozambique (DPI 1996, 1).

The process of demobilization reached its apex in 1994. It involved over 76 000 soldiers from FRELIMO and RENAMO sides. The new national army integrated around a third of these demobilized soldiers. The mission recovered an overall amount of 155,000 weapons (DPI 1996, 1).

With the stabilization of the situation in Mozambique, the first democratic elections, monitored by United Nations observers, were held in October 1994. FRELIMO won the general elections (presidential and parliamentary) and secured its position as leader of the country. RENAMO accepted the outcome of the elections which were considered as generally transparent. After inauguration of the new president and new parliament on December 8th 1994, the mandate of UNOMOZ came to an end on December 9th. This mission, a success, fully left Mozambique by the end of January 1995 (DPI 1996, 1).

UNOMOZ was one of the first major success of UN peacekeeping operations in an African theatre. The success of another PKO, UNOCI, in Ivory Coast, echoed this success of UNOMOZ.

UNOCI

The United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire was a mission established in 2004 with the objective to monitor implementation of the peace agreement signed by Ivorians belligerents in January 2003. The Ivorian civil war involved government forces, which controlled the south of the country, and the New Forces (a rebel group), which controlled the Northern of part of the country. This conflict started in September 2002 with the

mutiny of troops of the army, mainly originating from the northern part of the country who attacked Abidjan, the biggest city and other main cities. They protested against the lack of northern representation in the government and for improvement with voting rights (Yabi 2012, 2). The government was successful in maintaining control of Abidjan and the southern part of the country, while the north was taken by the rebels, establishing their main base in Bouake. The rebels were very well armed, mostly because they were part of the national army and the government claimed that they had received support from neighboring Burkina Faso. France sent 2500 soldiers to establish a peace line and was successful at stopping the rebels from mounting new attacks on the south. On October 17, a ceasefire was signed and a process of negotiation started. Unfortunately, on November, two new rebel movement emerged, the Movement of the Ivory Coast of the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) that took control of the west of the country. They attacked French positions and were repelled by French forces. The ceasefire had collapsed (DPKO 2017, 1).

In January 2003 all the parties finally signed a peace agreement at Lina Marcoussis in France. This agreement granted seats to the rebels inside the government. In the aftermath, soldiers from the Economic community of Western African States (ECOWAS) were sent to strengthen the peace line established by the French Army. The United Nations Security Council voted a resolution (resolution 1528) and authorized the formation of the UNOCI on February 27th 2004. By 2006, the strength of the mission consisted of 8000 uniformed soldiers from 41 different countries (DPKO 2017, 1). The UN mandate was set to expire in 2008 but it was extended due to the organization of presidential elections which would allow the stabilization of the country. The elections

were postponed twice and the UN mandate was extended. The presidential election finally took place in March 2011. After the proclamation of contested results heavy fighting broke out between Laurent Gbagbo's forces and Alassane Ouattara's forces. UN forces were attacked by Gbagbo loyalists and retaliated in self-defense. On April 2011, UN forces participated in the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo at his palace and he was subsequently placed under United Nations Guard before being sent to The Hague (Yabi 2012, 2).

The Mandate of ONUCI was extended to assist the new government in demobilizing the rebels and implementing reforms in the security system by the creation of a new national army. By the beginning of 2012 the force comprised 10,954 uniformed personnel. In June 2012, UN soldiers were killed in an attack in Tai, a city of the southwestern part of Ivory Coast. This ambush was perpetrated by a border crossing Liberian militia and resulted in the strengthening of the borders security by UN forces in Ivory Coats and Liberian Forces in the Liberian side (DPKO 2017, 1).

In 2013, the security council decided to reduce the strength of the military forces in Ivory Coast, (Resolution 2112/2013) thanks to the rapid improvement of the security situation in this country. However, in 2015, the mandate of the UNOCI was extended once again to monitor the presidential elections of 2015. ONUCI finally ended its mission on June 30th 2017 with only 17 uniformed personnel deployed (DPKO 2017, 1). This was another success for United Nations in an African theater which end allowed the United Nations to focus on another ongoing crisis on the continent, the Central African Civil war.

MINUSCA

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was established in April 10th 2014 in order to protect the civilians of Central African Republic under the chapter VII. It has the particularity to have inherited from the start from 6000 troops from the African Union led peacekeeping force, the MISCA which was established in CAR from 2013 to 2014 (DPKO 2019, 1). The reasons of the political, social and security instability of the CAR were explained in the previous chapter. However, an emphasis has to be put on the event which led to the involvement of the United Nations in this theater of operations.

The first UN peacekeeping mission conducted in Central African Republic was from 1998 to 2000 after the failure of the first peacekeeping mission, the MISAB to reestablish peace in CAR it was a peacekeeping force of over 1500 soldiers in charge of monitoring legislative elections of 1998 and the presidential elections of 1999 as well as storing and disposing weapons of the former mutineers. In light of the little progress witnessed after the elections, the mission ended in 2000 (Mitchell 2014, 1).

Unfortunately, violence resumed in CAR and other peacekeeping operations were established. The MISCA, the mission preceding the MINUSCA could not reach the guarantees of all the belligerent to ceasefire and abide by the peace agreement signed in Libreville in 2013. The violence, traffic of weapons, destruction of public and private assets never stopped and massive migration of refugees occurred (Mitchell 2014, 1).

The United Nations decided to vote a resolution to establish a UN – led multinational force. The mission of the MINUSCA, as far as security is concerned, is focused on supporting the transition process and monitoring disarmament, demobilization

and reintegration. From April to September 2014, UN deployed a transition team to establish MINUSCA and prepare for the transfer of authority between MISCA and MINUSCA. In 2016, more than 10, 000 troops were deployed in CAR in the framework of MINUSCA. Nowadays around 12000 troops are deployed (DPKO 2019, 1). After the civil war of 2013, the government of the CAR have been heavily devastated. MINUSCA managed to successfully monitor the organization of the presidential elections of 2016 but the most of the country remain under the control of rebel forces. Without strong government institutions present in the entire territory, CAR has the potential to become a terrorist safe haven and a ground for other opportunist groups and illicit activities. There are still around one millions of internal displaced people (IDPs) and 250 000 refugees in the neighboring countries and nearly half of the population is in need of humanitarian assistance (DPKO 2019, 1).

UN forces were attacked several times by the armed groups the last major attack being an ambush on the Moroccan contingent in Bangassou in 2017. The rebels, anti balaka, targeted a humanitarian convoy secured by the Moroccan Blue helmets, two of them were killed and many civilians were wounded (North African Post 2017, 1). After the Khartoum summit held in February 2019, no major outbreak of violence has occurred in Central African Republic, however, armed group still carry on their illegal traffic and mining throughout the country.

The three case studies which will serve as the basis of the analysis were presented in the first part of this chapter and some similarities can be pointed out. However, applying criteria selected will allow the researcher to make a more accurate comparison and identify the gaps on Central African PKO.

A Clear, Credible, and Achievable Mandate with Matching Resources

The mandate of the UNOMOZ was labeled as follow:

1. To monitor and verify the ceasefire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilization and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons;
2. To monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces and to provide security in the transport corridors;
3. To monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups;
4. To authorize security arrangements for vital infrastructures and to provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the peace process;
5. To provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process; and
6. To coordinate and monitor humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilized military personnel and the affected local population.” (UNOMOZ mandate 1992, 1)

The mandate of UNOMOZ includes three important elements: political, humanitarian and military. The operational concept of this mission was based on the strong interrelationship between these three components. Without an adequate security, the humanitarian aid cannot reach the population and the electoral process cannot take place. Without humanitarian aid, particularly food supply, the security situation could deteriorate and the efforts on demobilization could stall. Without political progress and elections, disarmament and rehabilitation process cannot occur as well as the formation of new armed forces. In this integrated concept, all tasks are security oriented and the last

three are interwoven with humanitarian and political tasks. The mandate gives clear directions on how to monitor the ceasefire and implement efficiently the Rome peace agreements. The force knew almost exactly what they have to do regarding the concentration of forces, the treatment of weapons, the objectives of the mission regarding the armed groups and the security of civilians and infrastructure. The objectives are clearly stated, the characteristics of a clear mandate.

As far as the credibility of the mandate is concerned all the parties took part to the establishment of UNOMOZ by signing the peace agreement of Rome which led to the issuing of the resolution and mandate. FRELIMO and RENAMO were the two opposing parties. FRELIMO originated as a guerilla independentist movement created in 1962 to fight the Portuguese colonizers. After many years of war with Portugal, negotiations occurred and a transitional government was established until the independence from Portugal in 1975. FRELIMO established a one party state and took socialist principles as the basis of their government. FRELIMO's domination was challenged by RENAMO and this resulted in a civil war which undermined all FRELIMO's effort to establish an economic growth in Mozambique. By 1988, FRELIMO left its hardline and started to look for negotiation with RENAMO to end the conflict. In 1989, FRELIMO transitioned from a Leninist – Marxist party to a democratic socialist party and managed to broker a peace agreement with RENAMO that led to the UN intervention (DPI 1996, 1).

RENAMO, the other party was formed by dissidents from the armed wing of FRELIMO after the establishment of the one party rule. They were supported by the neighboring South Africa and Rhodesia and their effectiveness in undermining FRELIMO's effort were reflective of the fractured opinion about FRELIMO in the

overall population. Their claim was to have more representativeness in the political landscape of Mozambique. After the suppression of their support by neighboring countries and the softening of the position of FRELIMO, they were ready to negotiate and agreed on a ceasefire monitored by a UN force (DPI 1996, 1). Both parties agreed on UN mandate and with its clarity it provided credibility.

The mandate of UNOMOZ was achievable. Since, both group agreed on giving in to UN, and both groups were cut from external support except from UN. The perspective of demobilizing armed groups, support the conduct humanitarian assistance, and support the political and electoral process seemed attainable. By May 1993, six months after the issuing of the resolution and the mandate, UNOMOZ was fully deployed and its military forces operating all over the country, around 4000 soldiers, with adequate infrastructure and logistics (DPI 1996, 1). So the first criterion is considered as present in UNOMOZ.

As far as UNOCI is concerned, its mandate was longer, due to the evolution of UN mandates and the inclusion of many aspects concerning human rights. It was first issued in February 27th 2004 and subsequently further developed to better reflect the situation on the ground. It had ten pillars:

1. Protection of civilians;
2. Political support;
3. Address security related threats and border related challenges;
4. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program and collection of weapons;
5. Reconstitution and reform of security institutions;
6. Monitor the arms embargo;

7. Support for compliance with international humanitarian laws;
8. Support of humanitarian assistance;
9. Public information; and
10. Protection of the United Nations personnel (PKO 2015, 1).

UNOCI mandate is way more detailed than UNOMOZ mandate. Among this ten pillars or lines of operations, seven out of ten are particularly security related. In other words, the mission relied heavily on security to achieve the other objectives which were political and humanitarian. Each pillar is explained in details and forces are given clear instructions. For example, for the protection of civilians, the force is asked to “move to a more preventive and pre-emptive posture in pursuit of its priorities and in active defense of its mandate” (PKO 2015, 1) which is a detailed indication of how to act to protect civilians in an efficient way in the framework of UNOCI. UNOCI mandate was clear.

UNOCI mandate did not suffer for a lack of credibility. First of all because of the way it was elaborated and its constant evolution and adaptation to the situation. Second, all the parties in the Ivory Coast crisis agreed on the mandate. Despite the change of government and ruling party, both government of Laurent Gbagbo (Front Populaire Ivoirien or FPI) and his successor Alassane Ouattara (Rassemblement des Republicains or RDR) agreed on the mandate of the UN mission after having fought against each other during the First Ivorian Civil war which began in the early 2000s (Di Campo 2011, 1). The other party was the New Forces of Ivory coast, created as a mutiny inside the national army, it became a rebel force which took over the northern part of the country and started the civil war. By 2007, the New forces occupied half of the country and were structured in 10 zones. Their main claim was more representativeness in the government

for northerners. They also agreed on the UN mandate to ensure their reintegration and the integration of the militiamen they recruited on the regular forces. All the parties were involved and accepted the mandate making it a credible one (Di Campo 2011, 1).

Achievability of the mandate depended on the situation of the ground, the mandate of the UNOCI changed several time to adapt to the situation of the ground, when violence erupted again in the aftermath of 2011 elections, UNOCI reinforced the protection of civilian pillar because the use of heavy weaponry at that time took an increasing toll on the civilians. Three months after the issuing of the mandate, there were 6,901 blue helmets deployed in Ivory Coast, in 2006, it augmented to 8000 soldiers and then to 11,000 uniformed personnel in 2011. After the end electoral crisis, the number of soldiers started to decrease in 2013 until the end of the mission in 2017 with 17 uniformed personnel (DPKO 2017, 1). In fine, UNOCI has a mandate which was clear, credible and achievable, mainly because of the adaptation which were made to the mandate. This criterion is assessed as present.

MINUSCA mandate is a typical UN modern mandate, it is very detailed. Its priority tasks include by order of priority:

1. Protection of civilians;
2. Good office and support of the peace process, including national reconciliation, social cohesion and transitional justice;
3. Facilitate the creation of a secure environment for the immediate, full, safe, and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance;
4. Protection of the United Nations;
5. Support for the extension of state authority, the deployment of security forces

and the preservation of territorial integrity;

6. Security Sector Reform
7. Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation;
8. Promotion and protection of human rights; and
9. Support of national and international justice, the fight against impunity and the rule of law (PKO 2018, 1).

Most of the tasks included in the mandate are based on security. It is clearly obvious that security is the first condition to allow the political and humanitarian action. However, in details, concerning the action of the force they are tasked as far as the protection of civilian is concerned to: “maintain a proactive deployment and a mobile, flexible and robust posture, as well as by conducting active patrolling, in particular in high risks areas” (PKO 2018, 1) basically to conduct a show of force in order to mark the force presence, no further action is prescribed. Concerning the support for the extension of state authority most of the prescriptions are focused on training and technical assistance, omitting the direct actions to be taken by the mission in order to provide a sense of security. In a nutshell, the mandate has clear objectives but the actions to reach these objectives are not clear.

As far as the credibility of the mandate is concerned when MINUSCA replaced MISCA, the mandate was agreed by the transitional government of Catherine Samba – Panza, after the resignation of Michel Djotodia, the chief of the Ex- Seleka. The main armed groups, Ex Seleka and Anti Balaka exploded into a myriad of local militia groups or regional mercenaries. Their origin and outward motivations may differ but they have one thing in common, they struggle for the control of the country’s resources. These

groups control the vast majority of the country and have undermined the principle of territorial sovereignty and established a system which benefits them at the populations' expense (Dukhan 2017, 4). The proliferation of these groups hinders the credibility of the MINUSCA mandate. However, UN succeeded in bringing 14 major armed groups together in Khartoum in the beginning of 2019 and sign a peace agreement, these groups agreed on stopping attacks as a first step toward peace and respect the UN mandate among other measures in exchange of political representativeness. These groups were:

1. Anti Balaka (Mokoum wing);
2. Anti Balaka (Ngaissona wing);
3. Front Democratique du peuple Centrafricain (FDPC);
4. Ex Seleka Front Populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC);
5. Ex Seleka MLCJ;
6. Ex Seleka MPC;
7. Ex Seleka RPRC;
8. Ex Seleka UPC;
9. Seleka Renovee;
10. 3R;
11. RJ Belanga Wing;
12. RJ Sayo wing;
13. Union des Forces Republicaines (UFR); and
14. Union des Forces Republicaines Fondamentales (UFR – F).

Though the majority of groups were represented during this meeting some groups undermining the security of CAR did not participate in the peace talks. It is the case for:

1. Mouvement de Resistance pour la Defense de la Patrie or MRDP of Seraphin Komeya, based in Bambari is an anti Balaka movement. Created in 2016, they want to “free the country” from ex- Seleka combatants. Their strategy consists in attacking Minusca troops until the international community take action against Ex Seleka combatants. They operate with other local anti Balaka groups.
2. Local Anti Balaka group who do not recognize Ngaissona or Mokoum as their leaders. These group emerged with the other anti Balaka movements in the 1990s. Their local leaders act autonomously and its goal is to hunt down Ex Seleka fighters and Muslims that they consider as close to Seleka. They basically act like bandits with no specific political agenda and no specific military training.
3. Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony, a Ugandan militia which is active in the Eastern part of CAR since 2008. They operate in small groups to attack, abduct and kill people. They recruit child soldiers, loot goods and are involved in the trafficking of weapons and natural resources. In the past, they have collaborated with Ex Seleka factions and do not have a political agenda in the CAR.
4. Front du Peuple Congolais pour le Changement et la Democratie or FCCPD of John Shibangu. It is a militia from the neighboring DRC, whose agenda was to overthrow President Kabila of DRC. They are present in the CAR, Bangui and Bambari, and have alliances with FPRC and RPRC. Some of their leaders were arrested by the government in 2017, but none of them are under

sanctions.

5. MPC – Siriri of Mahamat Abdel Karim. This group emerged in 2017 after deadly attacks were conducted against Muslims in Bangassou. It broke with the MPC and is mainly composed of Arab Muslims. They regularly attacked the FPRC and MPC, and it does not have a political agenda; its focus is to protect Arab Muslims.
6. Muslim self-defense groups. Based in Bangui – PK5, these groups were created in December 2013 and are composed of young Muslims mobilized to protect their communities from anti Balakas attacks and reprisal. They were organized and given a command and control structure by Ex Seleka leaders. Despite the killings of three of their Important leaders, Abdul Danda, Issa Kapi and Big Man in 2017, these groups are constantly reactivated when the local population perceive a need (Dukhan 2017, 14).

So many armed groups having an impact on the daily life of the population are not taking part in the peace process. This fact discredits the mandate of MINUSCA. It means that some parties were not included in the peace process and did not have ownership of the mission. Most of these left out groups threaten enduring peace and can reignite tensions at any time. This lack of credibility put in question the achievability.

Central African Republic is a weak state, with a fragile government structure which controls roughly 20% of the territory, the military and security forces are embryonic and not operational despite all the efforts of the international community to rebuild them. MINUSCA needs a strong mandate, a strong position to ensure enduring peace since they are the primary provider of security in Central African Republic.

MINUSCA mandate was conceived and look like UNOCI mandate. However, UNOCI had a different environment. The government of Ivory Coast was well established and in control of half of the country while they had officials working in the rebel areas. In the CAR, most of the country is ruled by armed groups moreover, some of them created a proto state in 2015 in its Northern part: The republic of Logone in 2015 (Pike 2017, 1). Nonetheless, MINUSCA added temporary tasks to the mandate in 2018 to deal with the evolution of the situation in CAR. This addition states that the mission must take urgent temporary measures where the state is absent to arrest and detain in order to maintain basic order; and Implement these measures to those engaging in acts undermining peace, stability and security in CAR. These temporary tasks are:

1. A special criminal court (SCC) in accordance with CAR laws to prosecuted the wrongdoers; and
2. Rebuild the Rule of Law and other measures concerning the control of the illegal trafficking of resources (PKO 2018, 1).

These additions are considered as a step forward for MINUSCA because they tried to adapt the mandate to the reality of this weak state. However, it is still not enough to make the mandate achievable. Overall, since MINUSCA's mandate has been assessed as not totally clear, not credible and not achievable, this criterion is considered as absent.

Overall, a clear, credible and achievable mandate is assessed as present in UNOMOZ and UNOCI however it is assessed as absent in MINUSCA due to its lack of credibility and achievability.

Supportive Engagement by Neighboring and Regional Actors

Neighboring countries and regional actors had an important role to play in the success of UNOMOZ mission. At first, countries like South Africa and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) were deeply involved in the conflict opposing FRELIMO and RENAMO. These two anti-communist countries used RENAMO as proxy to annihilate the support of Frelimo to militant organization of their own countries. Years after, when the fight intensified, the armies of Malawi and Zimbabwe were deployed in transport corridors to assist the Government forces in keeping them operational. These landlocked countries needed these corridors which are of critical importance for their economy (Synge 1997, 32).

The regional actors were more involved in the peace process. When peace talks began, the organization of African Union (OAU) joined efforts with the UN and Italy (the Mediator State) to conduct them and lead to the Rome Peace agreement. Foreign forces present in Mozambique were forced to withdraw and handover the security country to UNOMOZ. Zimbabwe, Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa were de facto excluded from the mission as they have been instrumental at fueling the conflict at some point. However, South Africa shifted from an interfering role to a more cooperative role, focusing on the political aspect of the resolution of conflict. The African countries who contributed to the UNOMOZ were Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, Togo and Zambia among them, only Zambia was a neighbor of Mozambique and it was selected because it did not take a very active part in the Mozambican Civil War (Synge 1997, 42).

Mozambique had a very important level of African support that few African states with comparable problems expected to enjoy at that time.

In July 1993, while working on the formation of the New Mozambican Defense Forces, the United Nations and the Joint Commission for the formation of the Mozambican Forces initiated the training of 540 officers' instructors from FRELIMO and RENAMO in Nyanga, Zimbabwe during 06 months (Synge 1997, 104). Overall, there was an effort by neighboring countries to solve the security issues in Mozambique, either by withdrawing troops and military support to parties (South Africa, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe) or by participating in the PKO like Zambia. Regional actors like OAU played an important role in the peace process by supporting the peace talks. This criterion is assessed as present.

UNOCI neighboring countries and the regional actors were instrumental in the solving of the crisis in Ivory Coast. During the civil war, the New Forces rebels were said by the Government to be backed by Burkina Faso, a neighboring country. However, neighboring countries did not particularly take part in this conflict, That is why after the breakout of violence in Ivory Coast, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed 1258 troops in 2003. These troops were from Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal and Togo and increased to 3000 by the end of the year 2003. Along with the French Forces they were an interposition force. ECOWAS was involved in the peace talks of Lina Marcoussis and when the UNOCI mandate was signed, ECOWAS troops were directly integrated in the mission (DPKO 2017, 1).

Following the lack of compliance of the rebels in the disarmament process, South Africa participated in bringing the belligerent parties together in 2005. Thabo Mbeki,

South African President, acted as mediator and all the parties agreed on a new date to start the disarmament and to organize elections in Pretoria. After the postponement of elections in 2006 and the turmoil experienced by the country in the aftermath, Burkina Faso led a mediation which ended with the Ouagadougou agreements, these agreements organized the demobilization of the rebels and their integration in the new Ivoirian defense Forces to be created as a blend of all parties. During the electoral crisis of 2010 – 2011, ECOWAS threatened to take military action against Laurent Gbagbo, if he did not leave power, but AU stepped in and resumed talks with the government. Gbagbo did not want to comply and the African Union officially recognized Alassane Ouattara as president. Violence erupted again and led to the capture of Laurent Gbagbo by the Forces Republicaines de Cote d'Ivoire, loyal to Ouattara. AU and ECOWAS then joined their efforts alongside UNOCI to tackle the security issues raised in the aftermath of this electoral crisis. UNOCI added four other African countries as troop contributors to the mission: Nigeria, Malawi, Morocco and Egypt (DPKO 2017, 1). Overall, ECOWAS, and AU played a very important role in the success of UNOCI. This criterion of supportive engagement of regional actors and neighboring countries is assessed as present as far as UNOCI is concerned.

MINUSCA's situation has similarities with UNOCI. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and AU were involved in peacekeeping in this country since the mutiny of 1996. The first peacekeeping mission, MISAB was a mission of ECCAS, as well as two other missions: FOMAC and FOMUC; none of them were successful in bringing enduring peace to the country. AU's mission, MISCA, tried in 2013 to solve the CAR security's problem, but failed. AU was instrumental in bringing

back UN in this theater after the failure of MINURCA (1998-2000). This failure was due to a lack of clear response from the regional community.

As far as the neighboring countries are concerned, Chad took an active part in sponsoring Seleka Forces during their attack towards Bangui, DRC and Cameroon stood by the government. The lineup for MISCA was Gabon, Burundi, Cameroon, Republic of Congo and Chad. Following media attention on the involvement of Chad on this crisis, Chad removed its troops from CAR in April 2014 (Reuters 2014, 1). When MINUSCA came, the remaining forces were de facto included in the mission. Other African countries were added: DRC, Rwanda, Mauritania, Senegal, Zambia, Niger, Benin and Morocco (DPKO 2017, 1). AU and ECCAS created a facilitation structure called the African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in CAR. The Africa Initiative include representatives from AU, ECCAS, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the governments of Angola, Republic of Congo, Chad and Gabon (IPI 2018, 4). This facilitation structure initiated a peace agreement process in 2017 in Libreville, Gabon, this process culminated in the peace agreement of Khartoum in February 2019. This agreement was signed by all present parties and the AU and CEMAC representatives.

External observers may think that neighboring countries are less and less involved in the security of the CAR. After the departure of its forces, Chad is said to have increased cooperation more with armed groups than with the government and is often used as a retreat base for these groups. South Sudan and Sudan do not have troops deployed in CAR, as they have their own internal issues and ongoing peacekeeping missions. However, armed groups use their territories as logistic routes. DRC and

Republic of Congo military, the two southern neighbors of CAR had their military units expelled from MINUSCA respectively in 2016 and 2017 for poor performances (DPKO 2017, 1). This exclusion could have reduced their involvement in the security of CAR even if Republic of Congo retains a police force inside MINUSCA. Out of six neighboring countries, only one is fully committed to the security of the CAR in the framework of MINUSCA: Cameroon. Regional actors and neighboring countries are involved in the resolution of the conflict in CAR politically, but not enough in its security, particularly the neighboring countries. However, since their extraordinary political action with establishing the new concept of African Initiative is efficient this criterion is considered as present.

Overall, contribution of regional actors and neighboring countries is assessed as present in UNOCI, UNOMOZ and MINUSCA.

The Professional Conduct of the Soldiers of the Mission Must Strengthen the Mission

UNOMOZ, the reputation of the military contingents of this mission was altered by child abuse allegations. Save the Children, an NGO accused Italians blue helmets of abusing young girls for sexual purpose in December 1993. This NGO put an emphasis on the fact that child prostitution rate increased considerably when the Italian contingent arrived on the region of Beira in April 1993. The young girls involved aged between twelve and fourteen years old. The Special Representative of the Secretary General, head of mission, opened an investigation. On February 1994, the results were made public and the allegations were justified and sanctions were taken against those involved from the Italian Battalion. No one individual was accused, but the entire contingent flew back to

Italy in April 1994. Other unsubstantiated allegations were made against the Uruguayan Battalion operation in the Maputo-Beira highway (Synge 1997, 42). This criterion is considered as absent.

There were not many complaints about UNOCI professional behavior while conducting this mission. The population generally complained about the fact that they did not properly enforce the arms embargo however, it was not part of their mandate which was just to monitor this embargo. In July 2007, the Moroccan contingent posted to Bouake was accused of sexual exploitation and abuse against the civilian population by an NGO. UNOCI headquarters opened an internal investigation and the Moroccan force was relegated to its barracks during the whole process. This investigation was led conjointly with the Moroccan Government. These allegations could not be confirmed and the Moroccan contingent resumed its activities and was decorated in December 2007 (Kouadio 2011, 40). Overall, the soldiers of UNOCI had the reputation of being professionals despite their limited span of action. This criterion is assessed as present.

MINUSCA has had its share of issues concerning the professionalism of its soldiers. In 2015, a wave of more than 150 sexual abuse allegations were made against MINUSCA peacekeepers in many cities of CAR. This happened only one year after another sex abuse scandal involving French Peacekeepers in Bangui made headlines around the world. These allegations concerned an amazing number of contingents, nine total. Contingents from Egypt, Morocco, Burundi, Congo Brazzaville, Pakistan, Zambia, Cameroon, Gabon and Niger. MINUSCA investigations on this issue are still “pending,” even as the mission makes efforts to conduct these investigations with the national authorities of the countries involved. In 2016 and 2017, two contingents were sent back

home: DRC and Congo - Brazzaville respectively. The reason given was poor performance in their area of operations, denoting a lack of professionalism from these units. These units failed to properly protect civilians, the primary mission of MINUSCA. The professionalism of MINUSCA soldiers was also put into question when attacks occurred in Alindao on November 15th 2018. MINUSCA was present when an IDP camp was attacked by UPC fighters and more than 110 persons were killed in one of the bloodiest moments of CAR crisis. MINUSCA was supposed to provide protection to this IDP camp and had 50 soldiers deployed there (Agence Francaise de Presse 2019, 1). This event really damaged the reputation of MINUSCA as able to protect civilians from armed groups. The conduct of MINUSCA soldiers is constantly put into question, so they fail to convey a good image of the mission. This criterion is therefore considered as absent.

The Peacekeeping Force is Able to Provide a
Sense of Security to all the Parties

As far as UNOMOZ is concerned, RENAMO's General Secretary, Francisco Marcellino criticized the mission as unable to ensure the impartiality of the police. The small format of the new army was a concern for both parties. The government ensured that the size would not increase by lack of facilities. However, they would focus on training the New Forces properly. Out of the 15,000 desired strength, the New Mozambican defense forces were around 6,000 (Synge 1997, 106).

UNOMOZ military units were a symbol of the power of the international community throughout the process of demobilization and the ensuing electoral process. Despite being criticized by the parties to be too large, the strength of the Military component of UNOMOZ built confidence and provided the parties with a guarantee that

it was able to intervene if the conflict reignited. UNOMOZ forces executed extensive operational activities throughout Mozambique. They secured the corridors and main roads by regular and aerial patrols. They provided engineering and medical assistance in the remote areas of Mozambique, gaining the trust of the population of all parties. Allegations of cease fire violations were investigated by military observers in both FRELIMO and RENAMO fighters' assembly areas. The results of these allegations were approved by both parties (Van der Lijn 2006, 1). These violations were relatively few and did not represent a serious threat to the overall peace process. One of the greatest achievement of UNOMOZ was the resettlement of refugees and Internally displaced persons. Four million people returned home and among them one million came back voluntarily, because of the secure environment UNOMOZ forces provided in less than two years. Demobilized soldiers and militiamen returned to their home and started their life on a road to normality (Synge 1997, 108). The collection and disposal of weaponry were effectively conducted by UNOMOZ forces. Most of the credit of the successes in the security field should also go the country's people. They showed patience and cooperative spirit towards UNOMOZ forces. UNOMOZ was capable of providing to all parties a sense of security. The criterion is assessed as present.

For UNOCI, in the first days of the operations a "buffer zone" was established between the north of the country, controlled by the rebels, and the south of the country, controlled by the government. UNOCI forces occupied this zone and conducted patrols with French forces. At the beginning, UNOCI was composed of around 6,000 forces. It was soon confronted to capacity problems. When rebels refused to disarm, in late 2004, UNOCI proved unable to prevent president Gbagbo's forces to attack them and protect

the civilian from these attacks. Disarmament and demobilization failed to happen due to the persisting political problems and the fact the Rebels did not feel that they were protected enough by the peacekeeping Force (Druckman and Diehl 2013, 53). In 2008, after the Ouagadougou agreements, new benchmarks were established by the Secretary General. The number one priority was now the DDR and dismantling of militias. UNOCI force was reconfigured to provide the guarantee needed to make this priority happen. An emphasis was put on enhancing mobility and quick reaction capability; despite these efforts, DDR stalled. All parties kept breaking the arms embargo by importing weapons, and crime and banditry remained high throughout the country. After the 2010 elections, UNOCI could not prevent the breakout of violence between forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo and the rebels who were allied of his challenger Alassane Ouattara. After being attacked by Gbagbo forces on April 10, 2011, UNOCI participated in the military operations against Gbagbo's forces with limited forces. UNOCI proved that they were not the primary instrument for achieving the goal of preventing the spread of the conflict (Druckman and Diehl 2013, 26). After the inauguration of Alassane Ouattara, his victorious forces integrated the new armed forces and peace was slowly established. This criterion is considered as absent because UNOCI failed to deter the parties to fight and seem to have aligned themselves with Ouattara Forces. The criteria is assessed as absent.

As far as MINUSCA is concerned, over the past year, it helped the decrease the overall levels of violence in CAR. However, violence against humanitarian workers and civilians remains a very serious concern. MINUSCA theater is more complex than UNOMOT or UNOCI. Small, localized militias or criminal groups are responsible of most of the violence. These groups fight against each other and have a wide variety of

interests and objectives. The representatives of these armed groups do not exert effective command and control over their men in the field. This make violence a difficult issue to anticipate and contain when it breaks out. Despite some robust intervention to stop violence against civilians in areas such as Bambari or Bangassou, Minusca faces pressure from local or national actors to fill the gap left by the absence of viable armed and security forces (IPI 2018, 4). The population wants MINUSCA to expand the conditions under which it uses force and eradicate armed groups. MINUSCA wants to remain impartial, a key characteristic to achieve its ultimate goal of dialogue between the armed forces. This posture makes that armed groups are reluctant to participate in the DDR because they don't feel that their security will not be guaranteed by MINUSCA. Moreover, the possession of weapons and active militia remain the only way to make their voice heard. MINUSCA also conduct joint operations with CAR armed Forces (FACA). FACA are mistrusted by the majority of belligerents as they were not held accountable of the violence they perpetrated in 2012-2013. FACA also remain ethnically, religiously and geographically not representative of the overall CAR population. So, MINUSCA fails to provide a sense of security to all the parties. This criterion is considered as absent.

The Peacekeeping Operation is Part of a Long Term Approach

A UN mission must be approached with a comprehensive and long term view of what is needed to put a country in crisis back on its feet. Political, humanitarian and security aspects must be taken to account together. There need to be interaction between those in charge of these aspects. The work of coordination was made by a hastily

assembled bureaucracy with few or no experience of the country, so this coordination was not efficient.

The short presence of UNOMOZ facilitated the solution of the security problem but it was not the comprehensive solution it was supposed to be, humanitarian and political issues still remained. Opportunities were missed to contribute to the country's long term recovery. After the elections, the UNOMOZ forces scaled down rapidly. Practical measures such as removing the substantial amount of mines all around the country failed to happen. Moreover, the country was left with poor infrastructure and remained poorly equipped to deal with its own affairs and be able to compete in the African or international economy (Synge 1997, 191). National reconciliation, institution building, rehabilitation and human right education were not given more attention too by UNOMOZ. These ingredient being key for an enduring peace. However, even if durable peace was not intended by conducting UNOMOZ, this mission contributed to the peace that lasted more than 20 years after their departure. This criterion is assessed as absent.

The focus of UNOCI was clearly political. It was to assist Ivory Coast in electing a legitimate government who would be able to bring back enduring peace. The securing of elections by UNOCI forces suffered few or no complaint and was considered as one of their best achievement in this mission, if not the best. By aligning with the French, another important actor of this conflict, and securing Alassane Ouattara, the mission was helpful in bringing the conflict to a rapid end (Druckman and Diehl 2013, 37). The mission assisted the prevention of a new civil war. Even if it was by abandoning impartiality and openly backing one of the belligerents. This formula may not work for all the conflicts but it worked for that one. When UNOCI left, Ivory Coast had an

elected government, some level of national reconciliation, new armed forces operating throughout the country and a growing economy. All ingredients to lead to enduring peace. So, UNOCI was definitely part of a long term approach. The criterion is assessed as present.

MINUSCA is a multidimensional mission. The security element of the mission is nested with the political, economic and humanitarian elements. MINUSCA made progresses on training and equipping the CAR Armed Forces (FACA) and did efforts to deploy with them, but they have to face their capacity to withstand long term deployment. FACA remain limited by poor logistics and infrastructure. CAR Government is unable to supply FACA with food, water, medical services and even salaries when they are deployed outside of the capital (IPI 2018, 5). Since the government does not have control of the majority of the country, this mission remains difficult. Efforts to train security forces, to sustain stabilizing efforts gained by MINUSCA in some areas and allow them to focus on other areas, has lagged. Over half a million of Central African refugees remain in neighboring countries and do not feel that returning back to CAR is safe because of their ethnic or religious identity which will make them a target of one armed group or another (IPI 2018, 3). MINUSCA forces struggle to consolidate gains and thus are not able to support effectively an enduring and sustainable peace. The criterion is considered as absent

In this chapter, MINUSCA and the two other case studies selected have been analyzed through the lens of criteria defined in chapter 3. The following table summarizes this analysis.

Table 2. Results of the Case Study Analysis			
Criteria\Cases	UNIMoz	ONUCI	MINUSCA
1. A clear and credible and achievable mandate with matching personnel, logistics and resources	Present	Present	Absent
2. Supportive engagement by neighboring countries and regional actors	Present	Present	Present
3. The professional conduct of the soldiers of the mission must strengthen the mission	Present	Present	Absent
4. The peacekeeping force is able to provide a sense of security to all the parties	Present	Absent	Absent
5. The peacekeeping operation is part of a long term approach	Absent	Present	Absent
Totals	4 out of 5 Presents	4 out of 5 Presents	1 out of 5 Presents

Source: Created by author.

The findings will be presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study examined the efficacy of three peacekeeping operations through the lens of criteria of success defined by United Nations, NATO or scholars. All this in order to identify security conditions to meet to solve the Central African Crisis and bring enduring peace.

It started as an attempt to answer to a primary research question which was: What security conditions are needed to be met in order to achieve peace in Central African Republic? The primary question was too wide and served mainly as a guideline throughout this analysis. Some secondary questions were designed to help the researcher find a more accurate and focused answer; they were formulated as follows:

1. What can be the contribution of the international community to help reach enduring peace in Central African Republic, as far as security is concerned?
2. What actions need to be taken by Central African Government and other actors involved in security such as armed groups to reestablish the rule of law in the entire country?

All of the criteria defined to analyze the efficiency of the peacekeeping operations helped to answer the first secondary question: a clear and credible mandate, supportive engagement of neighboring countries, professional conduct of the soldiers, a sense of security of all the parties, and a long term approach.

The second question were answered through the lens of three criteria: the credibility of the mandate depends heavily on the local actors and governments, the local actors can stop the spread of violence in they feel a sense of security from the

international force and they also have an important role to play to root the peacekeeping mission into a long term approach.

After comparison and analysis with two case studies similar to the CAR, conditions to be met to reach enduring peace are more or less defined, as well as the roles of the international community and the local actors in the realization of these conditions.

This chapter will mainly provide an interpretation of the findings, a conclusion to this study and make recommendations for further research on the topic of Peacekeeping in the Central African Republic.

Interpretation of the Findings

In chapter 3 the researcher used a chart as a guideline to conduct its analysis on the case studies. After the analysis of all the criteria applied to each case study the chart was filled in the previous chapter. From this chart we can draw the following conclusions.

Not all the criteria had to be met, but at least having the majority of them was the key for success. As far as UNOMOZ is concerned; four criteria out of the five selected are assessed as present. The mission had a clear, credible and achievable mandate, there was involvement of neighboring countries and regional actors, the behavior of the blue helmets strengthened the image of the mission and the military component offered a sense of security to both opposing parties.

The only criteria missing was that the mission was not part of a long term approach. Alas, the security part was not everything. UNOMOZ implemented most of the elements of its mandate by securing humanitarian help and the electoral process. It sustained ceasefire, prevented major outbreaks of violence, helped in reduction of the

number of casualties and provided assistance in the resettlement of refugees and IDPs. A safe environment was created, even if the country was left without adequate security forces, no national reconciliation and low economy after the departure of UNOMOZ. However, the case of UNOMOZ is proof that even short term wins can bring enduring peace.

UNOCI finds itself with four criteria present out of five. Like UNOMOZ most of the criteria defined for success are present. UNOCI had a very detailed mandate which was constantly adapted to the situation faced by the mission. These adaptations made it achievable. Regional actors like the AU and sub-regional actors like ECOWAS were involved from the start and helped the peacekeeping mission throughout the peace process. Overall, soldiers of the mission behaved professionally in the area they were deployed and UNOCI blue helmets helped the Ivorian Government to consolidate gains and pave the way for long term reconstruction.

The criteria that UNOCI failed to meet was to provide a sense of security to all parties; at some point they took the side of Alassane Ouattara forces. This gamble could have been fatal for them if the New Forces had lost the final battle against Gbagbo's forces. This is definitely not a mistake to make as peacekeepers are guarantors of neutrality. However, the efforts put into other areas made this mission successful and a model among peacekeeping operations in Africa.

MINUSCA, the focal point of this study, finds itself with one criteria present out of five. The only criteria present is support of the regional actors and neighboring countries. Indeed, AU and ECCAS are involved in the resolution of this enduring conflict which undermine the peace of the heartland of Africa. That is why they were the first

providers of units when MINUSCA started. Even if today, neighboring countries are less implicated in the military structure of the peacekeeping mission, their action led to signature of an historic agreement with most of the armed groups in the Central African Republic.

With four criteria absent, MINUSCA is clearly not yet as successful as UNOMOT and UNOCI. The mandate of MINUSCA, despite multiple adaptations, does not yet meet the standard to solve security issues. The mandate is not clear on the actions to take against the armed groups or violators of peace. Some of the most problematic groups are not involved in the agreements made and this discredits the mandate. The mission is besmirched by the conduct of its soldiers allegedly involved in sexual exploitation and abuse. Even if no acts were confirmed, the amount of allegations and the number of units supposedly involved is too high to be ignored. MINUSCA failed to provide a sense of security to all parties by operating alongside FACA and letting certain armed groups act as they want. DDR is stalling as well as the capacity building of the governmental forces. In its operations, the force has not yet set conditions for establishment of an enduring peace.

This analysis reveals that as we consider successful peacekeeping operations, three criteria are the most important for success: a clear, credible and achievable mandate; a supportive engagement by neighboring actors and regional actors and the professional conduct of the soldiers which must strengthen the mission. The other two criteria according to the study are assessed as still important, but secondary: provide a sense of security to all parties and being part of a long term approach. The conclusion on what MINUSCA should do will be built accordingly.

Conclusion

To achieve enduring peace in the Central African Republic, MINUSCA must take several steps and make some changes. First of all, MINUSCA mandate must be clearer, credible and achievable. It must be as tied to the actual situation on the ground than UNOMOT and UNOCI mandates were.

The protection of civilian must remain the primary task of MINUSCA or any peacekeeping operations in the CAR. All additional tasks must not take the mission away from protection of civilian needs and objectives. The mandate does not extend to reducing general level of violence and military activities all around Central African Republic. The force must be mandated to deter or dissuade these activities, instead of simply monitoring them. The force should prevent them or enforce compliance.

The mission must deter armed groups from establishing illegal parallel administrations and taxation structures in the areas under their control. These parallel administrations deeply weaken the consolidation of authority of the state in CAR.

MINUSCA must understand that they cannot replace the government of CAR, but since CAR is a fragile state they must be more involved as far as security is concerned. At least until the CAR Government can stand on its feet.

As far as the credibility of the mandate is concerned, there is a need for MINUSCA to retain a high level of awareness of the dynamics of the different armed groups involved. The fractious armed groups still have different goals and interests. Loyalties are fluid in CAR and groups like the Anti Balaka, who do not have a central command structure, remain an equation difficult to solve. Peace keepers can only achieve as much as the parties themselves want to achieve. The solution can be an all of society

approach, involving ethnic and religious leaders as well as civil society and women. All levels of society must be closely involved in the peace talks and agreements.

To make the mandate achievable, the mission must hold ground and expand its coverage, create conditions to protect effectively the civilians from armed groups and help create conditions that would make the political process easier. Now, peacekeeping forces are unable to be present in large parts of CAR. New forces have to be added or governmental forces need to be strengthened to fill this security gap. MINUSCA has around 13000 troops deployed and will increase its troop ceiling by 900 soldiers through the end of 2019 (IPI 2018, 3). It is still not enough to cover efficiently a country bigger than the state of Texas and ruled in majority by warlords. MINUSCA has to make more efforts to provide protection so the people of the CAR can feel safer.

Even if regional actors and neighboring countries are present in the peace process, MINUSCA must be aware of the fact that in the past, numerous CAR governments have been made and unmade by wider regional processes. So, regional actors and neighboring countries have important implications for the country's stability. MINUSCA must be supportive of any actions towards peace undertaken by regional and neighboring actors. African Initiative represents nowadays the best path to achieve durable peace and enable the conditions for extension of state authority to promote development. Every actor, including the UN, must commit to transparency and coordination in this process. Previous dialogues have produced agreements with no definitive results, but there is hope for this initiative given the unexpected number of armed groups included in the recent Khartoum agreements.

Africa Initiative for peace is a unique opportunity. In the past, sub regional and regional organizations had tensions over peacekeeping in Central African Republic. AU assessed that ECCAS was unable to manage the CAR conflict in the past by establishing MISCA in 2013. The AU wanted to establish themselves as the primary security actor in the continent and they conducted a rapid handover from MICOPAX. AU involvement was not received positively by ECCAS and these rivalries led to the poor performance of MISCA and prompted establishment of MINUSCA.

Moreover, the CAR is located in an active conflict neighborhood. The LRA makes incursions in its Eastern part, and three of its neighbors are hosting peacekeeping operations. MINUSCA must focus on more coordination with the neighboring PK missions in South Sudan, Sudan, and the DRC to be efficient.

MINUSCA must particularly manage the involvement of Chad which had a big role in shaping the course of events leading to the last CAR civil war. MINUSCA has to ensure to keep them on board in the peace process politically, while preventing them from becoming instigators of instability in CAR by providing for the armed groups.

MINUSCA needs to provide a sense of security to all parties in the CAR. The security of parties is linked with the posture of MINUSCA.

MINUSCA created safe havens: downtown Bangui, Bambari and Bangassou, which are now regularly visited by CAR Government officials. This was impossible two years ago due to the control exerted by armed groups at that time. In this areas the mission supported local peace initiatives, inclusive of armed groups and civil society who have been assisting in reducing violence, building trust between communities and facilitating the return of IDPs. Safe havens must be created in cities like BRIA and

Alindao which remain hot spots for the mission. Bria being the headquarters of FPRC and Alindao the headquarters of UPC.

MINUSCA should watch closely a neglected aspect of the conflict, that of pastoral and farming issues. These existing rivalries between pastoralists and farming groups had been exacerbated by this crisis. Each of these groups have aligned themselves with an armed group to protect their interests. These conflicts are mostly arbitrated by armed groups who traditionally settle them by taking a cut from themselves. MINUSCA must be involved in the resolution of such internal conflict, which are part of the daily lives of the CAR people and impact their security.

Currently four FACA battalions have been trained, but they are still not ethnically diverse. This same situation led to the failure of FACA in the past: tribalism, lack of equipment and political interference. These conditions led to the mutinies, military coup, extrajudicial killings, lootings, and human right violations that undermined the reputation of FACA in the past. MINUSCA should make SSR one of its priorities. There should be more cooperation between SSR and DDR because they are closely linked. An effective DDR will lead to an effective SSR, and will be the start of an enduring peace. The mission must provide operational and logistical support to government forces to become more efficient. This must be done for a certain amount of time and under certain conditions. These forces have to be vetted and approve the principles of accountability and the rule of law. MINUSCA should avoid working with those who have been linked to human right violations.

The misconduct of MINUSCA soldiers has seriously damaged the reputation of peacekeeping troops in CAR. Unusually strong response must be taken by the mission to

sanction the wrongdoers if any allegation is confirmed. Impunity must be eliminated for actions of those peacekeepers, regardless if those actions were conducted on duty or not in the course of official duties. Important efforts must be made by troop contributing countries in MINUSCA. It is important that their forces undergo proper training and sensitization to human right norms and strict discipline within police or military contingents.

MINUSCA must root itself in a long term approach. It is not about the duration, but about the impact of its actions in the building of enduring peace. Blue helmet operations must be embedded into the approach of the other dimensions of the mission on the ground. Humanitarian and political stability remain a concern, as long as the majority of the country is ruled by armed groups.

MINUSCA does not need to meet all the criteria to reach an enduring peace. It just needs to fulfill at least three of them as the example of UNOMOT and UNOCI. This study did not intend to criticize peacekeeping operations in the CAR; it was built as a contribution to the efforts of MINUSCA to perform better and achieve enduring peace in this country torn by war for so long.

MINUSCA has the highest number of troops than every other Peacekeeping mission and it has helped to reduce significantly violence in CAR since 2014. The face of CAR in 2014 is not the same as 2019. Armed groups feel less entitled to initiate certain violent actions because of the presence of blue helmets. Even if some types of violence occurs, the watchers have to recognize that there would be much more violence in the absence of those peacekeepers.

Recommendations

During the conduct of this research, several recommendations for further studies became apparent: first of all, the Central African Republic is a much unexplored topic as far as MMAS thesis and SAMS monograph are concerned. This study seems to be the first to tackle this topic. Does it mean that it is of no interest? Certainly not, the CAR is an important part of Africa. Achieving peace there will certainly have consequences to overall peace on the African continent which experiences many such conflicts. There is value added in showing interest in the Central African Republic and MINUSCA particularly. MINUSCA is one of the largest ongoing UN PKO; failure of MINUSCA would mean the failure of an entire system built after World War II to avoid mass killings. Each contributor is more than welcome to give a thought to the issue of peacekeeping in CAR.

Second, other criteria not explored in this study can be used to measure the success of MINUSCA and assess what needs to be done as far as security is concerned. One of the criteria identified by Van der Lijn (2009) was that the peacekeeping operation should be implemented by competent leadership and personnel with clear command structures. Leadership is important with regard to the continuity of the mediation role played at the political level on the ground, during an operation. Good leadership makes the mission respected and taken more seriously by all parties. A competent officer can become a good public relation asset. As far as clear command structures are concerned, they are important particularly in extreme situations. A lack of clarity and friction between Headquarters can lead to wrong decision making.

Another criterion identified by Van de Lijn (2009) is that the mission must have a sufficiently long duration to succeed. In order to contribute efficiently to enduring peace, and address particularly the root causes of conflict, a peacekeeping mission needs time. The trend is to keep the duration to a minimum mainly because of resources. Time allows the peacekeeping mission to implement all its tasks and solve once and for all those issues that led to conflict and associated consequences.

The cause of conflict is another criterion to assess success of a peacekeeping operation according to Van der Lijn (2009). The causes of a conflict are very important because they provide the conflict its shape and makes it harder or easier to deal with. Conflicts often have several causes and attention should be given to each of them. Each cause can contribute to the different outcomes of peacekeeping missions. These causes can be lack of good governance, lack of legitimacy, or social inequalities among others. These causes are important to understand the relationship between the different parties. Overall the three criteria cited above can lead to further research on assessing the success of MINUSCA. Other case studies considered as successful by UN could also be used to compare to MINUSCA.

Third, as far as external actors are concerned, this study's focus was on regional and neighboring actors. Further research on the role that France plays within the CAR may be worth conducting. France, the former colonizer of the Central African Republic, has always been put in question as far as the Central African issue is concerned. France has always been involved in the crisis in CAR, either by supporting Central African successive governments or by positioning troops during the various wars that occurred.

Another important actor recently entered into the CAR picture is Russia. Russian involvement was triggered by the CAR Government who seemed not totally satisfied by the training provided by its European partners. Russia has recently sent military advisers and mercenaries to help train the FACA. Do they want to regain the influence they lost in Africa after the Cold War? Do the Russian want to get access to CAR's rich mineral deposits? These are topics of particular interest to many.

To date the crisis in the Central African Republic remains one of the most enduring conflicts in African History. As long as MINUSCA, or any other peacekeeping operation taking place in CAR, will be asked to achieve ambitious objectives with poor guidance, limited means and support in a complex environment the results will be at best ambiguous. Ultimately, the purpose of this study was to start the reflection on an enduring solution to war in Central African Republic. It also allowed the researcher to have a clear vision of the gaps to be filled to keep MINUSCA on track. Development of the African Continent relies on the stability of its countries, especially in this time of global economic competitiveness.

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