Using Attestation to Lift Crash Resilience to Byzantine Resilience

Abstract

This paper explores the use of attestation protocols as Byzantine failure detectors. An attestation protocol enables one node in a distributed system to obtain enough information about other nodes to detect malicious compromises. By filtering network communication, channels to Byzantine nodes are made to appear crashed. Distributed algorithms that tolerate channel failures are thus transformed into ones that tolerate Byzantine failures. Erlang modules to support filtering and attestation have been written, including a partial Trusted Platform Module (TPM)interface. A demonstration prototype for a leader election algorithm is in progress.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Sep 01, 2009
Accession Number
AD1108338

Entities

People

  • Ariel Segall
  • Brian Ohanlon
  • John D. Ramsdell
  • Jonathan Herzog
  • Jonathan Millen

Organizations

  • MITRE Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Engineered Resilient Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Authentication
  • Automata
  • Compilers
  • Computer Program Documentation
  • Computer Programming
  • Computer Programs
  • Computer Science
  • Computers
  • Computing System Architectures
  • Cybersecurity
  • Damage Detection
  • Detection
  • Detectors
  • Distributed Computing
  • Intrusion Detectors
  • Language
  • Monitoring
  • Notation
  • Operating Systems
  • Resilience
  • Simulations

Fields of Study

  • Computer science

Readers

  • Applied Combinatorial Optimization and Logic Circuit Design.
  • Cybersecurity.
  • Statistical inference.