

THE KOREAN WAY OF WAR (THREE KINGDOMS TO THE JAPANESE
COLONIAL PERIOD: B.C. 57 – A.C. 1945): BASED ON
CONTRAST TO WESTERN EUROPE AND CHINA

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General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

THE KOREAN WAY OF WAR (THREE KINGDOMS TO THE JAPANESE COLONIAL PERIOD: B.C. 57 – A.C. 1945): BASED ON CONTRAST TO WESTERN EUROPE AND CHINA, by MAJ Kwon Moon, 115 pages.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Korea has a long history. As a nation, Korea is quite old. The first state in Korean history, Gojoseon, was founded in 2333 B.C. A chronological history of the Korean Peninsula can be briefly summarized as follows: Gojoseon (B.C.2333-B.C.108), Three Kingdoms (Goguryeo, Baekje, Silla; B.C.57-676), Unified Silla and Balhae (676-918), Goryeo (918-1392), Joseon (1392-1897), the Korean Empire (1897-1910), the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) and the Republic of Korea (1945-6th Republic).¹ By all measurable standards, Korea has survived for a long period of time as a nation-state with a unique cultural and national identity.

However, in spite of its long history, it is not readily accepted that Korea has a unique way of war because there is a lack of research on the subject. The overall history of Korea is well chronicled, but research on the subject of warfare in Korea is rather lacking. Moreover, even if the historical data on war were somewhat well organized, there is very limited research on the specific subject of a unique Korean way of war. The study of the subject of war has been done generally by explaining the principles of war or by drawing lessons through various war cases. However, it can be expected that Korea, which has a long history and a history of many wars, possesses a unique way of war influenced by geopolitical factors, religion, national power, ethnic factors, culture, and political system.

This study seeks to determine whether there is a unique way of war in Korea and, if so, explore it by contrasting it to the ways of war of Western Europe and China. In

order to confirm whether a country has its own way of war, it should be contrasted with other countries' ways of war. Therefore, it is productive to contrast the Korean way of war against the Chinese way of war, which might have historically influenced Korea. In addition, the Western European way of war has indirectly influenced the modern Korean military, and it is logical to contrast Korea's own way of war to it. Because of the aforementioned reasons, the Korean way of war appears to be ill-defined. This paper strives to remedy that.

Organization

This thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction, consisting of the background, organization, research question, significance, assumptions, definitions of key terms, and limitations. In the background section, the purpose and motivation of the study will be explained. In the organization section, the composition of this paper will be addressed. The research question section will explain the questions to be answered by this thesis and will be helpful in framing the research. The significance of this work is its contribution to the overall study of war. In the assumptions section, the focus is on establishing a common definition of the meaning of *way of war*. Additionally, definitions of key terms will help to provide a consistent understanding by the reader. Finally, the limitations of this study will be addressed.

Chapter 2 is a literature review consisting of the factors that create and define a specific way of war, a review of previous related studies, a review of Korean senior leaders' comments, and the working evaluation criteria. The factors will be helpful to establish evaluation criteria for determining the identity of the Korean way of war. In addition, the review of studies and senior leaders' comments establishes evaluation

criteria to answer the question, “Is there a distinct Korean way of war?” Lastly, the overall evaluation criteria, which include analysis of the above factors (contributing to a specific way of war, review of studies, and review of senior leaders’ comments), will be defined.

Chapter 3 proposes research methodology, relevant questions, threats to validity, and biases. The factors contributing to a specific way of war and the established evaluation criteria will produce relevant questions for this comparative study. Comparative studies, historical investigations, and analysis of senior leaders’ opinions will be utilized to answer the research questions. In the section of the threats to validity and biases, the risk factors that could lead to a loss of validity are summarized.

Chapter 4 analyzes application of the relevant questions drawn from evaluation criteria and a synopsis of the Korean way of war. In applying the relevant questions, the comparison analysis of the Korean way of war with Western European and Chinese ways of war will help to determine whether Korea has a unique way of war as contrasted to the Western European and Chinese ways of war. Finally, the Korean way of war, based on the analysis of the given assumptions and comparison with each country, will be defined.

Chapter 5 will address the conclusion and recommendations. In this section, implications derived from this study, as well as its limitations, will be discussed.

Research Question

The main research question of this thesis is “Is there a distinct Korean way of war?” Korea has a long history and has had many wars. So, it can be assumed that there may be a common view of warfare that Korea pursued in these various wars. On the other hand, it may be argued that Korea has been influenced by other countries such as China

(or in the Twentieth Century, the US), so there is no unique Korean way of war, but rather a hybrid.

The following are subsidiary research questions: “What is a way of war?”, “What factors contribute to a specific way of war?”, “What are the ways of war of Western Europe and China?”, “What are the key differences that characterize the different ways of war?”, “If there is a distinct Korean way of war, what is it?”, “What are the implications from this research?” In chapter 1, “What is a way of war?” will be addressed in the section of definitions of key terms. “What factors determine the specific way of war?” will be explained in chapter 2. “What are the ways of war of Western Europe and China?”, “What are the key differences that characterize the different ways of war?”, “If there is a distinct Korean way of war, what is it?” will be stated in chapter 4. “What are the implications from this research?” will be covered in chapter 5. Figure 1 below lays out the research questions of this thesis.




Figure 1. Research Questions

Source: Created by author.

Significance

This research is significant for three main reasons. Most importantly, this research will give readers a chance to explore an unknown area, Korea, on a way of war. It will be helpful to understand the diversity of source materials. Overall the main body of study on ways of war has addressed Western countries. There are also ample studies on the Asian way of war (and much emphasizing China). In contrast, studies on the Korean way of war are rare. Therefore, this study will help fill a research gap.

Second, this research will have meaningfulness with application to understanding the past development and execution of the Korean way of war, if there is a unique Korean way of war. At least, regardless of existence of a unique Korean way of war, this study will provide readers with a good opportunity to see several Korean military thoughts and wars Korea had experienced. To ascertain the unique nuances of a Korean way of war, several Korean wars are dissected and commonalities are identified. It is hoped that this exploration creates a deep understanding of Korea's past wars known only superficially in the West.

Third, this research has usefulness as a predictive tool of a Korean way of war in the future. This study will play a pioneering role in the understanding of how Korea has fought and will likely fight its wars and the contributing factors like the methodology, bibliography, and the contents. Regardless of the results of this study, someone might inspire some clues for a Korean way of war for the future in questions and discussions of this thesis. Of course, it would be better if this study could define the Korean way of war, which Korea has conducted.

Assumptions

Often, it is assumed that the various historic nations that existed in Korea's history have a common identity in terms of culture and a way of war. It can be argued that the countries in history which existed on the Korean Peninsula have developed their unique culture with their own identities and have adhered to their own unique ways of war. Given that they have lived in the geographical environment of the Korean peninsula and that the ethnic make-up has stayed relatively constant, it can be assumed that all historical Korean nations have cultural and war-fighting commonalities. This is the key assumption of this study.

In addition, even if ideas and technology spread from other countries and were introduced into Korea, the resulting way of war is as unique as its predecessors. For example, invented in Asia, gunpowder spread to the West where its use was incorporated in the Western Way of War. Another example concerns the works and ideas of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine Henri Jomini, which are vastly different but both highly influenced by Napoleon and his battles. In other words, a way of war does not require originality, but may be the combination of existing concepts into a new and specific one. As a Korean example, even though Sun Tzu's military insights might have influenced ancient Korean military thought, Korea likely developed its own way of war based on many factors like geography, politics, and national powers.

Definitions of Key Terms

The key terms that can be confused in the course of this study should be addressed. The key terms are way of war, total war, Korea, and Western Europe. These

terms are defined differently by various scholars; therefore, they must be accompanied by operational definitions.

Geoffrey Parker believes that the Western way of war is based on five principal foundations: 1) the primacy of technology and discipline; 2) the rapid offensive; 3) the challenge and response dynamic; 4) state finance; and 5) a dominant military tradition.² Basil Liddell Hart's *The British Way in Warfare*, published in 1932 criticized the notion of waging an absolute war and championed the "Indirect Approach".³ As can be seen from the above examples, the way of war can be understood as a concept that covers the total amount of national power to carry out the war as well as the approach to the objective. To summarize, a nation's way of war includes: first, technology like weapon systems; second, the way of conducting operations; third, the theory and doctrine of the war; fourth, the ideology of war; fifth, the military culture and tradition. Therefore, a proposed definition for a way of war is a combination of philosophy, principles and traditions that are used and displayed in a majority of conflicts in which a nation participates including the decision to go to war, the execution of war, and the consolidation of gains.

Second, the concept of total war will be discussed. The concept of *total war* to use in this study is very similar to what Erich Ludendorff discussed in his book *Der totale Krieg (The total war)*.⁴ Namely, total war means a warfare in which all elements of a nation's national power are mobilized to carry out war rather than to use only military force.⁵

Third, the concept of *Korea* should be defined to address the Korean way of war in this thesis. The nation of Korea may also be considered an ambiguous concept.

However, Korea can be described as a collection of three concepts. Most of all, geopolitically, Korea is a group of the countries that exists on the Korean Peninsula. In addition, as an ethnical concept, Korea is a nation that is composed of a single ethnical nation-state. Lastly, as a historical concept, Korea is a collection of countries which have a shared historic. The Korean nation may be defined as the concept of the countries which have existed since the history of Gojoseon to present-day Korea.

Finally, Western Europe in this thesis means countries that have traditionally been used as sources for research on the Western way of war: Germany, France, and Britain. Additionally, there are a number of Western European military theorists who have left many works on the Western way of war: Clausewitz, Napoleon, Jomini, and Liddell Hart to name a few.

Limitations

Since it is politically sensitive and not necessary to address North Korea in this study, it will be excluded. This is why the title has a certain period. The on-going conflict between South Korea and North Korea is politically sensitive, and it seems inappropriate to include North Korea's identity and their way of war in this political environment. Additionally, North Korean doctrines were heavily influenced by the Soviet Union before and during the Korean War.⁶

In order to accomplish the purpose of this study, a method of outlining the histories of the relevant countries with some evaluation criteria is needed. This study is limited by the examples chosen although an effort was made to use examples from different times and regimes.

The historic range of this study will be from Three Kingdoms (Goguryeo, Baekje, Silla; B.C.57-676) to the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945). There is Korean history prior to Three Kingdoms, but it is hard to analyze the period's historic examples due to scarcity of those studies as well as its accessibility. Also, given that the United States has been an influence on the military of the Republic of Korea from 1945 to present day, this study intentionally omits that time period.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a common awareness through background and discussion, and to provide a framework for the logical analysis of this study. It is meaningful to look at what factors contribute to a way of war in order to analyze whether Korea possesses a unique way of war. The factors that contribute to a way of war help to establish the evaluation criteria and serve as a framework for analyzing other studies and the comments of senior leaders.

Factors Contributing to a Specific Way of War

Factors contributing to a specific way of war are geography, international relations, national power, ethnic, religion, history, and culture. It is not an exaggeration to say that the factors that contribute to the way of war of a nation are all the areas that affect the survival and prosperity of the nation. However, it is necessary to formalize the framework for the purpose of this study. The factors that contribute to a way of war will explain how a nation forms its own unique way of war.

First, geography is one of the factors contributing to a way of war. Korea is a peninsular nation, with three sides surrounded by the sea and a shared northern border with China. Until maritime navigation was well developed, influences from the Asian continent affected Korea more than influences from the ocean-faring peoples. The perception of geography on ancient Korea is very important. Even before the first half of the Joseon dynasty, the security threat that could come from the ocean was recognized

only as pirates from Japan. On the other hand, the area facing the border with China was a very important pathway to the continent as well as an axis to attack the Korean Peninsula. In addition, Korea has mountainous terrain covering 70% of the country, and the northern part has very rugged mountainous terrain, so there are limited avenues of approach for large-scale troop formations. This geographical factor is likely to have led to the belief that Korea could achieve national defense if it defended the northern region well.

Second, international relations are a critical factor that impacted the Korean way of war. Korea has a limited number of neighboring countries they have directly interacted with it due to its geopolitical characteristic. Since Korea is on a peninsula, only China and Japan had a direct linkage in terms of national security in the past. The situation of Korea was different than Germany and France who had many neighboring countries on their periphery. Therefore, if diplomatic relations between China and Japan were well established, it would not be necessary to exercise political influence by using armed forces. In fact, during the Joseon dynasty, Korea established close diplomatic relations with China, and there were no major armed conflicts between them. When Japan invaded Joseon, for example, China's expeditionary forces supported the Joseon dynasty to fight against Japan.

Third, national power has influence on forming a way of war. National power consists of elements of politics, diplomacy, military power, and economy.⁷ In history, Korea's political system was relatively stable except when the ancient nations such as Goguryeo, Baekje, and Silla who lost their political centripetal force before falling down by other countries. Diplomacy throughout Korean history was not weak. In the past three

kingdoms period, Silla executed diplomatic power and allied with China.⁸ After that, Silla unified the three kingdoms.⁹ There is also a historical case in which the invasion of a nomadic people located in the north of the Korean Peninsula was obstructed by diplomatic power alone during the Goryeo dynasty.¹⁰ Korea's military power is a key variable. When the military power of Korea was weak, there were cases where Korea depended on diplomatic power or was invaded by the foreign powers. In particular, the population of Korea was a factor. Korea's ability to mobilize military power was lower than those of neighboring countries such as China and Japan. Korea's economy was good but it could not surpass China, and it was not comparable to the Japanese economy after the Meiji Restoration.¹¹

Fourth, the ethnic factor also affects the way of war. The history of Korea developed with a single ethnicity, and its national identity is very strong. Therefore, when Korea was threatened and the population was in danger, all Koreans united and constantly fought to escape from the crisis. For example, when Korea was invaded by Japan in the Joseon dynasty, even monks and ladies carried out a small-scale war.¹² In the era of Japanese colonial rule, they also carried out subversive activities, insurgency, and guerrilla activities to regain the country, both on and off the Korean peninsula.¹³ Such national identity based on a single ethnicity is one of the reasons the history of Korea has persisted for such a long period of time.

Fifth, religion is one of the unique characteristics that contribute to the way of war. Korea has recognized Buddhism as a national religion for about 1,000 years since the Three Kingdoms period when Buddhism was preached. Buddhism is a religion that seeks quiet, comfortable, and unwavering awakening as the highest ideal level. Also,

during the Joseon dynasty, Confucianism was formulated as the national official religion. Confucianism was a philosophy as well as a religion in the dynasty. The ultimate goal of Confucianism is to make people good with morality for themselves by self-education. It can be noteworthy that both Confucianism and Buddhism are religions with attributes that are directed toward mankind's *inner* world.¹⁴ These religious attributes have contributed to the formation of a unique culture in Korea. Examples include pursuit of moral things when facing problems, and a tendency to look inside oneself to identify a solution rather than outside.¹⁵

Sixth, since mankind learns through past experience, history is also a factor that forms the way of war. Through the history of the ancient states that existed on the Korean peninsula, the countries that existed noted successful actions, and tried to improve on situations they deemed disadvantageous. For example, it can be seen throughout history that a country that holds the Han River in the middle of the Korean Peninsula has significant advantage. Therefore, the countries in the history of the Korean peninsula made a great effort to hold the Han River.¹⁶ Also, because the way of conducting the “Cheongyaippo (Scorched earth¹⁷ and Defend in fortifications, 청야입보)” was effective, the tactic lasted for a long time.¹⁸ Cheongyaippo means that when an enemy invaded Korea, all the crops outside the fortifications were pulled back or burned and all the citizens went into the castle to defend for the winter to force the enemy to return to their country.

Seventh, the culture of a nation is a factor that influences the formation of the country's unique way of war. From ancient times to the Joseon dynasty, Korea had differentiated class systems by status including slavery (Nobi, 노비).¹⁹ The higher classes

did not want to do physical labor and dangerous work, such as things related to armed forces.²⁰ There was a phenomenon of concentrating on classy and noble literary and arts, rather than martial arts accompanied by physical labor.²¹ Naturally, when a period of peace persisted, martial arts and national defense would become neglected. This occurred, for example during the second half of the Goryeo dynasty and the Joseon dynasty, which lasted for a relatively long time.

Review of Studies

In this section, three kinds of studies are reviewed: Korean way of war, Western European way of war, and Chinese way of war. Reviews of studies addressing the above ways of war will assist readers to identify the flow of the study area and understand deeply the concepts discussed in chapter 4.

Review of Studies on Korean Way of War

Kwonyoung Park (2013) conducted a study on the nexus of history-theory-doctrine in military thought to identify implications for the Republic of Korea Army.²² In his thesis, he argues that the military thoughts of Korea had Sang-Mu Spirit (Martialism, 상무정신)²³ and Cheongyaippo. However, he focuses on the lack of military thought in Korea instead of ascertaining a Korean way of war.

Gabje Cho (2016) insists that a Korean way of war is Gyeolsahangjeon (Desperate Resistance, 결사항전). According to his opinion, Korea has experienced five huge wars: (1) against the Su Dynasty and the Tang Dynasty in 612-645; (2) against the Tang Dynasty in 670-676; (3) against the Yuan Dynasty in 1231-1270; (4) against Japan

under Toyotomi Hideyoshi in 1592-1598; (5) and against North Korea in 1950-1953..²⁴ He claims that when Korea was attacked by an invasion, it used defensive warfare in accordance with its ability, set the battleground on the Korean peninsula to force prolonged supply lines for the enemy, and conduct total war with the military, the government, and the people to save their country..²⁵ Although his argument is persuasive, it is not validated academically.

Young-Jun Kim (2009) studied Korean military thought. He addressed the military thoughts of General Eulji Mundeok (Unknown, but in 7C), General Sunsin Lee (1545-1598), and Seongryoung Ryu (1542-1607), who are very famous military historic figures in Korea..²⁶ However, he only addresses the military thought of several famous Korean figures, and he does not mention the overall characteristics of a Korean way of war.

Military Research Institute of the Korean Army (2012) released a book, titled “Military History of Korea.” The book says that Korea has mostly conducted defensive, long-term resistance, and civilian-involved warfare with fortifications and strong points..²⁷ In addition, an official in the Joseon dynasty, Yakyong Cheong, insisted that people should construct fortifications for shelters and strong points at important areas and execute long-term resistance operations against an enemy who had limited logistic capability. This is “Minbo defense theory (민보론)” laid out in “*Minboui (민보의)*”, a book of Yakyong Cheong as a national defense strategy..²⁸ From these resources, the Korean way of war seems to have characteristics with defensive, responsiveness, total wars, and long-term resistance.

Seongryoung Ryu, another politician in the Joseon dynasty, wrote down the background, progress, and lessons of *The Imjin War* (임진왜란), the Japanese invasion (1592-1598) in his book, “*Jingbirok* (정비록).”²⁹ After the Imjin War, the Joseon dynasty was devastated entirely. So, through writing the book, he wanted future generations not to repeat the same mistake. Also, he proposed to apply “the Jinguang system (진관체제)” in defending the homeland.³⁰ The “Jinguang system” was a system in which military forces were to be mobilized and established in important areas of each city or county. In the Jinguang system, the city or county was expected to be defended by its citizens and permanent soldiers.³¹ As seen in this example, the characteristics like defensive, responsiveness, integration with people and government existed throughout Korean history.

Review of Studies on Western European Way of War

Reviewing studies on the Western European way of war will provide the theoretical basis for the following comparison. Most of all, the Western military thinkers who studied deeply on war are a very important part of the review of studies on the Western European way of war. Carl von Clausewitz addressed a way of war regarding attack and defense in strategy as well as the relation between politics and military.³² Jomini, another military thinker, influenced modern military affairs by presenting the principles of war in his book, *The Art of War* (1838). He developed the concept of exterior and interior lines of operation. Additionally, he categorized the types of warfare including offensive and defensive warfare, and he insisted that war against a nation with a united people who have strong will to fight would be the most formidable.³³ In this

context, *Makers of Modern Strategy* (1986) edited by Peter Paret provides a good tool to analyze the Western way of war because it contains many military thoughts and theories about Western history.³⁴ These military thinkers offer several ideas to compare to a proposed Korean way of war.

Some scholars arranged their thoughts directly on the Western way of war, and gave the readers materials which can help them think of the Western way of war by describing the history of wars through the ages. As mentioned before, Geoffrey Parker (1995) outlined a Western way of war in the book, titled *Warfare: The Triumph of the West*. It contains a comprehensive picture of how western wars were performed.³⁵ Knox and Murray (2003) also narrate the Western history in the perspective of the military revolution in their book, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050*. The book contains much information about the historic events and the characteristics of the Western way of war.³⁶

Review of Studies on Chinese Way of War

There are two critical figures on Chinese way of war: Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong. Most of all, *The Art of War* written by Sun Tzu has been very influential both in eastern and western countries as well as China itself. For almost 1,500 years, *The Art of War* was the lead book that would be formalized as the Seven Military Classics by Emperor Shenzong of the Song dynasty in A.D.1080.³⁷ The book was translated into many countries' languages like French, English, Japanese, and Korea.³⁸ It has influenced military thinking, business tactics, legal strategy, etc..³⁹ In the book, he emphasized the importance of deception, rapid victory, information, weather, and terrain, and left an important lesson in which supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance

without fighting..⁴⁰ Sun Tzu's military thought must be included in a study of the Chinese way of war because it has been dominated Chinese military thought so long.

Additionally, since the success of Mao's revolution, a number of revolutionary thinkers have modeled his methods, and now Western countries including the United States have also studied his military thought. Mao's *Selected Works* dealing with revolutionary war was translated into many languages and circulated throughout the world..⁴¹ For example, the Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, had not only read about Mao but had visited Yen-an in 1938, and later instructed Chinese Nationalist troops in Mao's guerrilla tactics..⁴² Mao's military successes show that his ideas and methods to conduct a war worked and are still worked in China. His military thought focuses on the close relationship between politics and military action, protracted struggle when your force is weaker, developing military forces, and execution of conventional war when forces are stronger..⁴³

To sum the military thought of the aforementioned remarkable figures up, Sun Tzu's ideas focus on overall area of war whereas Mao's ideas address intensively on revolutionary military strategy when one is under unfavorable condition such as when friendly forces are weaker than an enemy. Arguably, Sun Tzu and Mao are the best known military thinkers in Chinese history. Therefore, by going over their military thought, it will be possible to identify the Chinese way of war and contrast the Korean way of war with the Chinese one.

Review of Senior Officers' Comments

In this section, the thesis will address several Korean senior officers who mentioned on a Korean defense policy which might be related to a Korean way of war or

might have some clues about it in the period between the three kingdoms and the Japanese colonial era. At the time of the establishment of the Korean government in 1948, one of the people who had a clear view of Korea's defense policy was the new defense minister, Beomseok Lee. He proclaimed the "Alliance-based National Defense" as a basic premise of defense policy. To cope with the expansion of communist forces, the "Alliance-based National Defense" was to strengthen its military ties with the United States under the Cold War structure, and to build an elite armed forces that was dominated by anti-communism.⁴⁴ He intended to increase deterrence against war that might happen on the Korean Peninsula through diplomatic means within the alliance including the military.

The ministers of defense, who took office following Beomseok Lee, also refer to "Alliance-based National Defense" with the United States in their inaugural addresses. In former ministers of defenses' speeches from the 38th minister of defense, Youngkil Cho, to the 46th minister of defense, Kyungdoo Cheong, they referred to the defense policy based on the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States alliance. For example, the 43rd minister of defense, Guanjin Kim, said in his inaugural address that the Korean military should promote a stable and continuous development of the ROK-US alliance.⁴⁵ Whatever the reason, senior officers generally stress on the capability of deterrence based on the alliance and a strategy to lead a war to victory when a contingency situation rather than mentioning a historical Korean way of war. That means Korea has been pursuing diplomatic power to deter and prepare for a war.

Unfortunately, there is no direct mention of a Korean way of war by senior Korean military officers. Because publicly mentioning such ways of war would have a

big influence, both inside and outside of the nation, their comments on ways of war would most likely not be recorded. It is regrettable to have to combine the ideas of their minds in the various inaugurations shown in the newspaper's records to identify a Korean way of war they thought.

Proposed Characteristics of a Korean way of war

Based on the literature review, it is possible to establish proposed characteristics of a Korean way of war. The following are proposed characteristics of a Korean way of war, which are drawn from looking into identity of way of war, literature review, and senior officers' comments. Following that, the proposed characteristics will bear evaluation criteria for this comparative thesis.

Proposed Characteristic #1: To Pursue Reactive-Defensive Posture

Proposed Characteristic #2: To Pursue a Total War

Proposed Characteristic #3: Endurance

Proposed Characteristic #4: To Favor Diplomatic Methods over employment of Military Methods

To Pursue Reactive-Defensive Posture

Historically, Koreans pursue a reactive-defensive posture. Generally, in response to the large-scale invading war from neighboring countries, Korea did not proclaim and carry out a large-scale war first. This is a different approach than the preemptive or proactive posture. In addition, when Korea conducted those wars, it did not take operations offensively, but performed defensive by using space and time.

To Pursue a Total War

Historically, Koreans pursue a total war. Korea has not been engaged in a war consisting only of professional military from the past. Generally, the people, the government, and the military all became combatants. In addition, all the resources of the nation were put into the war, and the war was perceived as total by the Korean people.

Endurance

Endurance characterizes the Korean way of war. Korea had designed and planned a long-term war of resistance while preparing for war in terms of strategy. When an enemy invaded the Korean peninsula, Korea conducted a long-term resistance warfare, which meant burning farmland, entering established fortifications, waiting for the enemy's logistics functions to culminate, and attacking the weakened enemy. Furthermore, Koreans have protested against enemies with the national spirit and patriotism to save the country for a long time. This type of warfare is not limited to just a few examples. It is characterized by the fact that the way of war was politically or strategically planned and had been continued by many centuries.

To Favor Diplomatic Methods over Employment of Military Methods

Koreans prefer to use a diplomatic method instead of armed forces. Historically, Korea used diplomatic power more than military power when there was a dispute with other countries or a situation deteriorating national interests. Other countries in the world, of course, would pursue using their armed forces as the last option. However, Korea is distinguished in that diplomacy has been being a big part in a national strategic

dimension. It is a result of the big gaps of the relative military power and the national power that could not be overcome with neighboring strong powers.

Evaluation Criteria

To verify if there is a distinct Korean way of war, evaluation criteria are required to contrast a proposed Korean way of war to Western European and Chinese way of war. Evaluation criteria should be necessarily relevant to the four proposed characteristics of a Korean way of war. First, from the characteristic of *to pursue Reactive-Defensive posture*, it is certain that posture toward war will be useful as evaluation criteria. Second, from the characteristic of *to pursue a Total War*, comparing mobilized resources of a nation would be meaningful to identify which type of warfare does a nation pursue, such as a total war or a limited war. Third, from the characteristic of *Endurance*, endurance of the people would be reliable evaluation criteria to contrast the ways of war each other. Fourth, from the characteristic of *to favor Diplomatic Methods over employment of Military Methods*, this study will look into relationship between diplomacy and military in each nation's history and military thoughts as evaluation criteria. The followings are the four evaluation criteria.

Evaluation Criteria #1: Posture toward War

Evaluation Criteria #2: Mobilized Resources of a Nation

Evaluation Criteria #3: Endurance of the People

Evaluation Criteria #4: Relationship between Diplomacy and Military

¹ National Institute of Korean History, *Korean History* (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of Education and Science Technology, 2009).

² Geoffrey Parker, *Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 2-9.

³ P. K. Gautam, *Ways of Warfare and Strategic Culture* (New Delhi, India: The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 2009), 413-423.

⁴ Wikipedia, "Erich Ludendorff," 13 November 2018, accessed 13 November 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Ludendorff.

⁵ Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 537-554; Wikipedia, "Total War," 13 November 2018, accessed 13 November 2018, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_war.

⁶ Aurora, "The relationship between North Korean military and the Soviet Union during the Korean War," *Aurora's Gongsang Season II*, 5 May 2018, accessed 10 February 2019, <https://blog.naver.com/kkumi17cs1013/221268713511>; Guangje Yoon, "June 1950, the military force of the Soviet Union, direct inspection for the invasion to the South Korea," *The Ilyoseoul News*, 5 September 2016, accessed 10 February 2019, <http://www.ilyoseoul.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=143177>.

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), I-1.

⁸ National Institute of Korean History, *Korean History*, 54-55.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 54-55.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 72.

¹¹ Economic History Association, "The Economic History of Korea," 07 March 2019, accessed 07 March 2019, <https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economic-history-of-korea/>.

¹² National Institute of Korean History, *Korean History*, 90-92.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 114-115.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 274-301.

¹⁵ There were, of course, other influential religion aside from Buddhism and Confucianism such as Taoism, Won Buddhism, and Christianity introduced in the early 19 Century in Korea. However, the most significant two religions likely influencing a Korean way of war will be addressed in this study.

¹⁶ National Institute of Korean History, *Korean History*, 50-55.

¹⁷ Wikipedia, “Scorched Earth,” 10 February 2019, accessed 10 February 2019,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scorched_earth.

¹⁸ Hwee Rhak Park, *The Development of Operational Art of the Korean Military* (Seoul, Korea: Joint Staff School, National Military University, 2005), 34-35.

¹⁹ Korean Central Research Institute, "Slavery," Korean National Cultural Heritage Encyclopedia, 28 February 2019, accessed 28 February 2019, <https://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=657655&cid=46622&categoryId=46622>.

²⁰ National Institute of Korean History, *Korean History*, 203-220.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Kwonyoung Park, "Restoring the Nexus of History-Theory-Doctrine in Military Thought: Implications for the Republic of Korea Army," (master's thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2013).

²³ Kunbum Lee, *Textbook for Moral Education* (Seoul: Minister of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, 2008), 332-333.

²⁴ Gabje Cho, "The power of Korea who has fought against the strongest world power: the wise grand strategy of Korea," *Chosun Pub*, 9 August 2016, accessed 13 November 2018, <http://pub.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?cate=C03&mcate=M1003&nNewsNumb=20160821132&nidx=21133>.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Young-Jun Kim, "Evolution of Korean Military Thought and Its Future Development," (master's thesis, Graduate School of Peace and Security, Sangji University, Wonjoo, The Republic of Korea, 2009).

²⁷ Military Research Institute of the Korean Army, *Military History of Korea* (Paju, The Republic of Korea: Kyeongin Munwhasa, 2012).

²⁸ Korean Central Research Institute, "Minbou (1812)," Korean National Cultural Heritage Encyclopedia, 14 November 2018, accessed 14 November 2018, <https://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=555184&cid=46622&categoryId=46622>.

²⁹ Seongryoung Ryu, *Jingbirok*, ed. and trans. Heungsik Kim (Seoul, Korea: Seohaemunjip, 2003).

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Korean Central Research Institute, "Jinguan," Korean National Cultural Heritage Encyclopedia, 14 November 2018, accessed 14 November 2018, <https://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=940555&cid=47322&categoryId=47322>.

³² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75-126, 357-392.

³³ Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War*, ed. and trans. Capt. G. H. Mendell and Lieut. W. P. Craighill (Radford, VA: Wilder Publications, 2008), 7-248.

³⁴ Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 11-872.

³⁵ Parker, *Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare*, 2-388.

³⁶ MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1-194.

³⁷ Wikipedia, "The Art of War," 08 January 2019, accessed 08 January 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Art_of_War.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, ed. and trans. by Lionel Giles (New York, NY: Open Road Integrated Media, Inc., 2014).

⁴¹ John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 841.

⁴² Ibid., 846-847.

⁴³ Ibid., 839-841.

⁴⁴ Namsoo Park, "We depend on each other to survive... Alliance defense policy statement," *Kookbangilbo*, 23 October 2018, accessed 15 November 2018, https://kookbang.dema.mil.kr/newsWeb/20181024/1/BBSMSTR_000000010374/view.do.

⁴⁵ Guanjin Kim, The Inauguration Address, Resource from the Korean Ministry of Defense, in *Park Sungjin's Military Story* (blog), 5 December 2010, accessed 15 November 2018, <http://mustory.khan.kr/160>.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapter Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce what and how research methodology is applied in this research paper. After addressing the research methodology, relevant questions for analysis in chapter 4 will follow. Put another way, evaluation criteria which are drawn from the literature review help provide the relevant question. Lastly, this chapter discusses threats to validity and biases.

Research Methodology

This thesis is a comparative case study. In the following chapter, comparative study will be applied to compare and contrast the ways of war. Based on the relevant questions already established, the ways of war of Western Europe and China will be contrasted to a proposed Korean way of war. In other words, following eight relevant questions drawn from four evaluation criteria will lead the analysis as a structure. In this process, the way of war in each country will be reviewed with prominent military theorists or thinkers as well as history of war. At the end, a Korean way of war will be defined through differentiating with other' way of war. Furthermore, this research utilizes studies of historians and analysts for ascertaining differences between a Korean way of war and other countries' ways of war.




Figure 2. Structure of This Thesis

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Figure 2, above, depicts the methodology and the structure of this thesis. For this comparative case study, establishing evaluation criteria for contrasting the different ways of war was required. In order to develop evaluation criteria and a proposed Korean way of war, three sources of information are considered: the factors that contribute to identify a way of war, a literature review, and senior leader's comments. Specifically, eight factors are considered in evaluating Korean history: geography, national power, international relations, history, ethnic, culture, religion, and politics. In chapter 2, the four proposed characteristics are: to pursue reactive-defensive posture, to pursue a total war, endurance, and to favor diplomatic methods over employment of military methods. Furthermore, four evaluation criteria are developed based on the four proposed

characteristics of a Korean way of war. With that, in chapter 3, the four evaluation criteria deliver eight relevant questions to work for this comparative study. And then, the chapter 4 will discuss the analysis which contrasts a proposed Korean way of war to the Western way of war and the Chinese way of war through the relevant questions mentioned above. By comparing the aforementioned ways of war, we will ascertain if there is a distinct Korean way of war. This thesis consists of three parts for proving the research question: identifying evaluation criteria and its relevant questions (chapter 2), applying those to Western Europe and China as well as Korea (chapter 4), and determining if the Korean way of war is unique (chapter 5).

Relevant Questions

Figure 3, below, shows eight relevant questions that chapter 4 will use: First, what kind of posture toward war did countries pose? Second, what are the purposes of having military according to how a nation views security? Third, what extent of the country's resources are mobilized toward war? Fourth, how does a nation recruit and maintain its military forces? Fifth, in terms of endurance, how long of a time horizon has a nation spent for a war? Sixth, how is the willingness of people to keep going a war? Seventh, how does a nation define war? Eighth, what is a nation's procedure for going to a war? In this thesis, each evaluation criteria have two relevant questions.

Evaluation Criteria	Relevant Questions	Measure	Western Europe	China	Korea
Posture toward War	1. What kind of posture toward war did countries pose?	Proactive – Offensive, Proactive – Defensive, Reactive – Offensive, Reactive – Defensive			
	2. What are the purposes of having military according to how a nation views security?	Protect regime, Protect homeland, Protect neighbor States, Protect region, Protect world			
Mobilized Resources of a nation	3. What extent of the country's resources are mobilized toward war?	Partially, Very limitedly, Limitedly, Most, Totally			
	4. How does a nation recruit and maintain military forces?	Voluntary, Mandatory reserve, Mandatory Service, Draft			
Endurance of the People	5. How long of a time horizon has a nation spent for a war?	0-1 year to More 21 years			
	6. How is the willingness of people to keep going a war?	Low, Medium, High			
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military	7. How does a nation define war?	Big event for a nation's rise and fall, Medium, Mean of policy			
	8. What is a nation's procedure for going to a war?	Deliberate change To policy to allow war, Systematic, Automatic (extortion of policy)			

Figure 3. Relevant Questions

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First, a relevant question of evaluation criteria is what countries have been posturing toward war. As mentioned in the evaluation criteria, Korea has had a reactive and defensive posture towards war, but other countries could have taken different posture. Some countries may have been proactive and defensive and some may have been proactive and offensive. Also, some countries are likely to have been reactive and offensive.




Figure 4. Relevant Question #1

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Second, what the national purposes of having a military are or how a nation views security is a relevant question of evaluation criteria of contrast for the postures toward war. For example, the purposes of having military according to how a nation views security would be to protect regime, homeland, neighbor states, region, and world. Through these relevant questions, how Western Europe and China as well as Korea have conducted war will be discussed.




Figure 5. Relevant Question #2

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Third, what extent the country's resources are mobilized toward war is a relevant question of evaluation criteria for how Korea pursues total wars. In history, nations sometimes carry out a total war by putting all the resources of the country into war, and in some cases they have carried out a limited war that uses only professional military force and limited resources. In Korea's case, it has pursued a form of total war and devoted all the resources of the nation to the war from ancient times to the present. This relevant question will be helpful to understand whether a nation pursues the form of total war or limited war in terms of mobilizing the resources of the nation in executing the war.




Figure 6. Relevant Question #3

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Fourth, how a nation recruits and maintains military forces is another relevant question of evaluation criteria for the mobilized resources of the country. The methods of recruiting and maintaining military forces classify of voluntary, mandatory reserve, mandatory service, and draft. For example, in recent times, the United States and Taiwan have a voluntary service system while the Republic of Korea utilizes the mandatory service system. Comparing the systems will show how a nation mobilize its resources in history, specifically manpower, for waging a war.



Figure 7. Relevant Question #4

Source: Created by author.

The fifth relevant question will be how long of a time horizon a nation has been willing to invest in a conflict. Put another way, this means the endurance of the people concerned about war. Most of all, when it comes to the endurance in wars, the criteria will link to the time-based aspect of performing the war. A time horizon a nation has spent for a war according to its strategic vision will give this thesis a good point of view to contrast between the endurance of the countries.




Figure 8. Relevant Question #5

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Sixth, the will of the people to fight is one of relevant questions of endurance criteria. Korea has been having a relatively weak national power and has been living on the Korean Peninsula for a long period of time as it is located among the strong powers. There have been many invasions by external countries in history, but the Korean people have endured and, over time, outlasted their invaders. In so doing, they have preserved their unique identity, culture and native lands. In this thesis, the relevant questions to the cases of other countries to see what differences there are will be applied.




Figure 9. Relevant Question #6

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Seventh, how a nation defines war is will be relevant questions to analyze if favoring diplomatic methods over employment of military methods can be a unique characteristic of the Korean way of war. The relation between diplomatic and the military might exist in the definitions of war which each country defines. In the Korean case, Korea has consistently prioritized diplomacy rather than using force, and has used force as the last resort of policy. Whether this characteristic of Korean way of war can be applied as a unique way of war by contrasting to other countries will be examined.




Figure 10. Relevant Question #7

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Eighth, the procedure of going to a war is the second relevant question of evaluation criteria which is that Korea utilized diplomatic methods over employment of military methods. Some nations are deliberate to change policy to allow war, so the nation is hard to go to a war. However, some nations adapt a systematic method to go to a war. For example, there are coalition agreements and alliance treaty for the method. Furthermore, a few nations go to a war automatically by extension of policy. Several Western European countries like Britain and France during the colonial period are related examples. The process of going to war will show an aspect of the relationship between diplomacy and military.




Figure 11. Relevant Question #8

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Threats to Validity and Biases

One threat of bias is that this thesis only compares Korea to Western Europe and China, and no other countries. However, because this subject has huge area to research, this thesis will address just the ways of war in two regions which are acknowledged as influential study areas. There are many countries in the world. Those countries also might have their own ways of war. Furthermore, the ways of war may be similar with an estimated Korean way of war. But, it is difficult to contrast to the regions because there is minimal capability to study in other areas such as Middle East and Japan due to language limitations. Even though, the regions have not much resources on the topic in English. Other reasons are limitations of time and quantity of this paper. Since this study are essential to research many resources, in fact, it is hard to study the two regions. So, the

threat to validity should be taken in this thesis, and the limitation will give chances to study those regions to others.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Chapter Introduction

In this chapter, based on the relevant questions discussed in the previous chapter, a full-scale analysis will be conducted to find answers to the research questions. For reminder, the evaluation criteria are posture toward wars, mobilized resources of the country, endurance of the people to wars, and relationship between diplomacy and military. Along with those, the relevant questions were developed in chapter 3. The major research questions which are going to deal with in this chapter are “*What are the ways of war of Western Europe and China?*”, “*What are the key differences that characterize the different ways of war?*”, “*If there is a distinct Korean way of war, what is it?*” “*Is there a distinct Korean way of war?*” is the main research question. In order to verify whether there is a unique way of war of Korea, it will be individually contrasted the Chinese way of war and the Western European way of war based on the relevant questions established before.

Application of the Evaluation Criteria

Western European Way of War

Relevant Question #1: Posture toward War

Historically, practitioners of the Western European way of war pursued a proactive-offensive posture to wars, which is one of the most significant differences with the Korean way of war. Most of all, they used to adapt proactive strategy toward wars in history. For example, Britain deployed their military forces into the Western European

continent and fought against Napoleon's troops during Napoleonic Wars even though they had not been invaded directly.¹ Additionally, Britain proactively involved itself in the wars of the continent once World War I and the World War II began.² As another example, Germany preemptively initiated the Austro-Prussian War in 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 in order to achieve and extend their unification.³ Also, starting the World War I, they adopted a invaded France as a way of response to the increased crisis in the region.⁴ In the Napoleonic period, France had driven the expansive strategy proactively through their patriotic troops and had conquered vast territory to defend the revolutionary ideals.⁵ A veteran of these campaigns, Clausewitz observed, "War is a mere continuation of policy by other means," in *On War*.⁶ Western European countries routinely utilized wars proactively to achieve national goals on a continuation of policy as a mean like diplomacy and economic power.

In addition, Western European countries take an offensive posture in terms of how to conduct war. Clausewitz put a statement related to this offensive posture in his book, *On War*: "The direct annihilation of the enemy's forces must always be the dominant consideration because destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war."⁷ Furthermore, in *On War*, Clausewitz mentioned that "Pure defense would be completely contrary to the idea of war, since it would mean that only one side was waging it", and "The defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made up of well-directed blows."⁸ This shows his thought about a concept of defensive and offensive. He emphasizes the importance of offensive considerations even in defensive operations. Obviously, we should note that he does not discard the defense and he contends that the defense is quite valuable and shouldn't be ignored in favor of always

being on the offense. As another argument to support this claim, a prominent scholar, Geoffrey Parker insisted that the general goal of western strategy almost always remained the total defeat and destruction of the enemy.⁹ With the assertion, the Command and General Staff College in the United States summarizes that one of Western military tradition is rapid and offensive victory resulting in total defeat of the enemy.¹⁰ Synthesizing above arguments, figure 12 indicates the Western European way of war has the characteristic with proactive-offensive posture toward wars.




Figure 12. Analysis with Relevant Question #1 on the Western European Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #2: Purposes of Having Military According to How a Nation Views

Security

Application of military power in Western Europe has changed from protecting neighbor states to protecting region. Before the 20th century, Western European countries were intertwined because of blood relations, territory, and religion. Due to these reasons, Western European countries viewed neighbor states interests as their security issues at the time. An example is the War of the Spanish Succession from 1701 to 1714 which was associated with blood relationship of royal family. Britain, Dutch, and Portugal participated in the alliance of the Holy Roman Empire to deter territorial expansion of France.¹¹ Another example is the Seven Years' war (1756-1763).¹² The war divided Europe into two coalitions: one side consisted of the Kingdom of Prussia, the Kingdom of Portugal, and Britain; on the other was the Kingdom of France, the Austrian-led Holy Roman Empire, the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Spain, and the Swedish Empire.¹³ The European countries proactively used their military forces to protect neighbor states under an alliance in order to pursue their own countries' national interests. As a relatively recent example, in World War I and World War II, Britain participated abroad in the continental conflict to protect its near abroad and interests.¹⁴

Recently, the main purpose that Western Europe has militaries could be considered to protect the region. This is because the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) have emerged in 20th century. For example, NATO consists of twenty-nine countries including Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy.¹⁵ Western European countries have been protecting the region by forming alliances and coalitions currently. Therefore, as shown in figure 13,

purpose of having military is considered as *protect neighbor states* in the past and as *protect region* in present.




Figure 13. Analysis with Relevant Question #2 on the Western European Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #3: Extent of the Country's Resources Are Mobilized toward War

Historically, Western European countries used to minimally mobilize their national resources to conduct a war. Specifically, this means that the countries did not marshal whole populations, financial resources, materials, and total military forces. Before the 19th century and during the Napoleonic period, king's armies in Western Europe were based on mercenaries and captains' loyalty toward the kings.¹⁶ Additionally, wars were limited from becoming total war because of several elements such as logistics constraints, cost, and size of armies.¹⁷ For example, in 1757 at the battle

of Leuthen of the Seven years' war, Frederick's army had about 36,000 troops toward the Austrian army of about 80,000.¹⁸ In addition, at Waterloo campaign in 1813, the combined armies of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden, totaling 340,000 allied soldiers, defeated Napoleon's army of nearly 200,000.¹⁹ The above number of soldiers were not most of population of both countries as well as not the total. However, since the French revolution, the scale of warfare and the extent of the countries' resources mobilized into a war had become expanded than before, the quantity of mobilized resources of Western European countries were limited. Of course, there are exceptions.

World War I and the World War II trended towards total war. At that time, each country in Western Europe proclaimed mobilization order and put many resources of the country into the wars. This paper, however, focuses on the tendency of what extent the countries have mobilized resources in the various wars that each country has made.

Western European countries have had many limited wars. In the Franco-Prussian War, the Prussians deployed 380,000 men on the French frontier while the French had 224,000 soldiers on the frontier.²⁰ In the Boer war (1899-1902), 347,000 British regular soldiers engaged with Boer states, the Republic of Transvaal and the Orange Free State.²¹ A more recent example, in the Falklands War, Britain deployed two brigades, one air force squadron, and 127 naval ships including merchant ships.²² Despite the fact that those figures are not small, Western European countries did not pursue a total war in that they did not mobilize their entire national resources to conduct a war. Therefore, the extent of Western European countries' resources mobilized is between *limitedly* and *most* as shown figure 14.




Figure 14. Analysis with Relevant Question #3 on the Western European Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #4: Type of Recruiting and Maintaining Military Forces

Western European countries have traditionally adopted voluntary recruiting systems, but they did institute conscription for the periods between the French Revolution and the Cold War. For instance, the British army has counted on voluntary recruits.²³ The only exceptions are during the latter part of the First World War until 1919 and during the Second World War when conscription was brought in during the war and stayed until 1960.²⁴ Likewise, the French army has conventionally relied on voluntary recruits. However, with the beginning of the French Revolution, France opened the door to the beginning of conscription.²⁵ The system called “Levée en masse” conscripted able-bodied men aged 18 to 25 beginning in August 1793.²⁶ In spite of this revolutionary change, France switched the conscription system back to a voluntary recruitment system in 1996 after the Cold War.²⁷ Similarly with other Western European countries, Prussia

stopped using a mercenary system and implemented short-service peacetime conscription after Napoleonic period.²⁸ Additionally, recruitment for the armed forces of Nazi Germany (Wehrmacht) was attained through voluntary enlistment and conscription.²⁹ Also, German introduced conscription in 1956 and shifted the system into voluntary recruitment in 2011.³⁰ With summary with above, as depicted in figure 15, Western European countries recruit and maintain military forces through voluntary and mandatory service (conscription) systems alternately.




Figure 15. Analysis with Relevant Question #4 on the Western European Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #5: Time Horizon Spent for a War

Table 1, below, presents the time horizon spent for a war of the representative countries of the Western Europe. According to the analysis, Britain spent an average of 6.43 years at war, Germany spent an average of 3.75 years at war, and France spent an

average of 9.5 years at war. After averaging the three countries, the West took an average of 6.56 years to conduct a war (See figure 16, below).

Table 1. Time Horizon Spent for the Western European Wars					
Country	Name of War	Year	Time Span (year)	Average (year)	Total Average (year)
Britain	English-Spanish War	1585-1604	10	6.43	6.56
	Spanish Succession War	1701-1714	14		
	Seven Years' War	1756-1763	7		
	First Opium War	1839-1842	4		
	Second Opium War	1856-1860	5		
	Boer War	1899-1902	4		
	Falklands War	1982	1		
Germany	Austro-Prussian War	1866	1	3.75	
	Franco-Prussian War	1870-1871	2		
	World War I	1914-1918	5		
	World War II	1939-1945	7		
France	Crimean War	1853-1856	4	9.5	
	War of 1812	1812-1815	4		
	French-Indian War	1754-1763	10		
	Napoleonic War	1796-1815	20		

Source: Created by author using Wikipedia, “List of Wars: 1500-1799,” accessed 16 February 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars:_1500-1799; Wikipedia, “List of Wars: 1800-1899,” accessed 16 February 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars:_1800-1899; Wikipedia, “List of Wars: 1900-1944,” accessed 16 February 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars:_1900-1944; Wikipedia, “List of Wars: 1945-1989,” accessed 16 February 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars:_1945-1989.




Figure 16. Analysis with Relevant Question #5 on the Western European Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #6: Willingness of People to Keep Going a War

Traditionally, countries in Western Europe have a tendency to avoid long-term conflict and pursue short-term conflict by decisive engagements. Theories of Western European military thinkers provide a clue to the validity of this argument. For instance, Helmuth von Moltke and Alfred von Schlieffen who provided the basis for modern German military doctrines pursued a strategy to end the war quickly through decisive engagement, specifically a strategic envelopment, in the war.³¹ In addition, as already mentioned above, Clausewitz, who influenced military thought throughout Europe, explained that direct annihilation of the enemy's forces by decisive engagements should always be the most dominant consideration.³² This can be interpreted to mean a more rapid termination of the war by annihilating the opponent's combat power rather than prolonging the war. Furthermore, it can be inferred that the tendency of these military

thinkers to pursue the rapid termination of the war has reflected the security environment and the public sentiments in Western European countries.

However, the people of Western European countries showed a remarkable will to keep fighting a war if their countries was in a contingency. For example, in World War I and World War II, the people of Britain, France, and even Germany struggled to protect their national interests such as territory, population, and financial materials. They mobilized many resources of the country and put them into the wars. During the five and seven years, respectively, the people of each country showed their strong willingness to carry out the war. Consequently, the willingness of Western Europeans to keep going a war can be *medium* as figure 17.




Figure 17. Analysis with Relevant Question #6 on the Western European Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #7: How a Nation Defines War

Western European countries have long regarded war as a policy tool. According to Clausewitz's definition of war, "the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose."³³ Furthermore, he defines war as "a duel on a larger scale to compel the other to do his will."³⁴ His definition of war is the most dominant representation of the concept of wars in Western Europe.

Another prominent military thinker, Jomini, defines war in this context. Jomini argues that war is carried out in accordance with certain scientific principles and presents fundamental principles of war in his book.³⁵ He provided the principles of war as detailed instructions in the commercial product today. And these principles serve as a guideline that should not be overlooked in wars that would take place at any time as a means of policy. Indeed, he summarized the purposes that a country goes to war, and the purposes are so diverse that it implies that a war is carried out by the countries' policies.³⁶ Here are the purposes of war he organized: 1) to reclaim certain rights or to defend them; 2) to protect and maintain the great interests of the state such as commerce, manufacturing, or agriculture; 3) to uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary; 4) fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances; 5) to propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to defend them; 6) to increase the influence and power of the state by acquisition of territory; 7) to defend the threatened independence of the state; 8) to avenge insulted honor; 9) from a mania for conquest.³⁷ The fact that the purpose of war can be so diverse proves that a country can start a war for executing their policies. So, as shown in figure 18, how Western Europe defines war belongs to *mean of policy*.




Figure 18. Analysis with Relevant Question #7 on the Western European Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #8: Procedure for Going to a War

The procedure for committing to war in the Western European way of war was *systematic*. They traditionally try to resolve conflicts between countries through diplomatic means before a war, but they go to a war systematically if diplomatic means fail. Also, they are more likely to go to a war because they are tied up in alliances or coalitions with other countries, depending on their own national interests. As an example, the Prussian army in the Austro-Prussian War rapidly deployed three armies on the Austrian frontier as soon as Bismarck's diplomatic effort had been denied by Austrians.³⁸ In another example, Germany in the first World War chose a preventative war during a 1912 conference between the Kaiser and his military leaders, considering their gloomy international environment.³⁹ Moreover, one of the reasons that many Western European

nations were involved World War I and the World War II is based on the alliances or coalitions they had established. Apart from the two big scale wars, Western European countries had systematically participated in the Nine Years War, War of Spanish Succession, War of the Austrian Succession, and the Seven Years War due to the relationship with other countries. Thus, the 8th relevant question of evaluation criteria on the Western European way of war is presenting *systematic*, as figure 19.




Figure 19. Analysis with Relevant Question #8 on the Western European Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Chinese Way of War

Relevant Question #1: Posture toward War

China has generally been disposed to be proactive and defensive in its views toward war. Most of all, China responded very proactively to the security crisis of neighboring countries in order to defend their mainland. In particular, they were reluctant

to go to war in mainland China, so they wanted to use neighboring countries as buffer zones. The Korean peninsula is clearly such an example. When Japan invaded the Korean peninsula in the Imjin War (1592-1598), the Ming Dynasty supported the Joseon dynasty by deployment of expeditionary forces and encouraged them to fight in the Korean peninsula instead of on their mainland.⁴⁰ In addition, in the early days of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895),⁴¹ and in the Korean War, China proactively engaged in war to secure buffer zones in the Korean peninsula.⁴²

Additionally, the Chinese way of war has defensive features. The buffer zone already mentioned above implies that China's posture toward war is *defensive* in perspective of the whole world. In addition, the Chinese Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) strategy which has been getting attention recently is more a defensive than an offensive strategy.⁴³ In addition, scholarly wisdom argues that conventionally Chinese strategists favored defensive military posture basically attributed to Confucianism.⁴⁴ However, the Yuan dynasty which had pursued expansionism also existed in the history of China, and it can be said that China has an offensive strategy from the viewpoint of neighboring countries forming *the buffer zones*. So, it is reasonable to assume that Chinese way of war is basically defensive, but it also has some offensive parts. Therefore, the posture toward War of the Chinese way of war is proactive-defensive as shown the below figure 20.




Figure 20. Analysis with Relevant Question #1 on the Chinese Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #2: Purposes of Having Military according to How a Nation Views Security

Historically, China employed their military forces to protect their homeland and the territories that they had considered buffer zones as mentioned. Other than above wars, China has also waged war against India and Vietnam. In the Sino-Indian War (1962), China attacked India due to securing borders in its western sector.⁴⁵ Additionally, in the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), China launched an offensive in response to Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia in 1978 in order to cope with the Soviet Union's efforts to contain China.⁴⁶ In the years before the wars listed above, though China had their military, the armed forces were not effective to protect homeland in Opium Wars attacked by Britain (1839-1842, 1856-1860) and Sino-French War attacked by France

(1884-1885).⁴⁷ To summarize the history of China's war until the Korean War, 1) China's military was used to suppress insurgencies or conduct their own civil wars in the mainland, 2) has been forming neighbor borders and taking initiative in the region through wars against neighboring countries, 3) and on the process, China had lost its initiative in the region by overwhelmingly dominant forces of the Western powers.⁴⁸ Taken together above, China basically has had military forces to protect its mainland rather than to protect its regional neighbor states. Therefore, the Chinese purpose of having military is located between *protect homeland* and *protect neighbor states* in figure 21.




Figure 21. Analysis with Relevant Question #2 on the Chinese Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #3: Extent of the Country's Resources Are Mobilized toward War

Historically, China mobilized limited resources to wage wars. It has not entirely poured its wealth of human and material resources into a single war. In the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598), the Ming dynasty had deployed about up to 200,000 soldiers into the Korean peninsula against the Japanese invasions.⁴⁹ Also, in Sino-Burmese War (1765–1769), the Qing dynasty deployed 5,000 (1st invasion), 25,000 (2nd invasion), 50,000 (3rd invasion), and 60,000 (4th invasion) soldiers into the Myanmar campaign, rather than their entire national power.⁵⁰ After that, in the Sino-Nepalese War, the Qing dynasty again organized about 70,000 soldiers to invade Nepalese territory.⁵¹ To give another example, in the First Opium War (1839-1842), even though the Qing army consisted of over 200,000 soldiers with around 800,000 men being able to be called for war at the start of the war, they did not mobilize the 800,000 men and did not utilize the huge territory unlike the example of Mao Zedong that followed.⁵² Similarly, in the Korean War (1950-1953), they deployed about 1,350,000 soldiers into the Korean peninsula.⁵³ That figure means that a great number of soldiers were mobilized in the Korean War, but it is hard to say that all the national capabilities of China have been put into the war. Thus, the extent of the Chinese resources mobilized toward war is on *limitedly* in the figure 22.




Figure 22. Analysis with Relevant Question #3 on the Chinese Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #4: Type of Recruiting and Maintaining Military Forces

The military recruiting and maintaining system of China has historically changed in many ways, but it is generally based on conscription. For example, the Tang Dynasty of China (618-907) had a mandatory reserve system, “Fubing”, which is a local militia system that could be mobilized quickly in times of war.⁵⁴ Individuals, between the ages of 21 and 60, who lived 250km from the capital served one month in five, and those over 1,000km away served for two months out of every eighteen.⁵⁵ After the Tang Dynasty of China, the Song dynasty (960-1279) did not have military conscription but rather recruited through volunteers.⁵⁶ The Song dynasty’s army comprised of approximately a million men, half of which served in the imperial armies, and the other half as laborers in prefectural reserves.⁵⁷ In the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), according to the traditional Mongolian military system, each household was obliged to give its young men to the

army, which served as a kind of conscription.⁵⁸ The Ming dynasty (1279-1368) had initially adopted a “Guard Battalion system”.⁵⁹ It meant that the dynasty assigned soldiers to settlements and cultivatable lands, regularly trained them, and rotated the soldiers into military posts.⁶⁰ However, the system is considered to be a sort of conscription in that substantial soldiers are constituted by conscripts.⁶¹ During the dynasty period, after the decline of the Guard Battalion system, the Ming army came to rely more upon mercenaries to improve efficiency and lighten local military burdens as of the 1570s.⁶² In the Qing dynasty (1636-1912),⁶³ the Eight Banners, which is the root of the Qing dynasty military, counted on military registration and conscription systems that incorporated entire families and ethnic groups.⁶⁴ Today, China has been adopting conscription system for their military. An interesting thing is that while conscription system still technically exists under Chinese Military Service Law, the authorities have rarely enforced it because China’s gigantic population yields more than enough volunteers for the military needs.⁶⁵ Taking above statements together, China, except for the Tang and Song dynasties, has been adopting the mandatory military service recruitment system as figure 23.




Figure 23. Analysis with Relevant Question #4 on the Chinese Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #5: Time Horizon Spent for a War

As a result of studying the time horizon of major wars that China carried out externally, it was an average of 3.56 years as shown in the table 2. This figure is even lower than the average of 6.56 years of wars that Western European countries had conducted. Surprisingly, this result is in contrast to the long-term war considered a characteristic of Mao Zedong's strategic thought, which is known as the typical Chinese way of war. Mao's concept of "People's War" traditionally relies on protracted conflict.⁶⁶ Consequently, as shown in table 2, the time horizon spent for the China's wars is the average of 3.56 years and the mark of the relevant question is on *2-4 years* in figure 24. The result of this analysis highlights two passages of *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu that contradicts Mao's strategy of *long-term war*: "If the campaign is protracted, the resources

of the state will not be equal to the strain”, “There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.”⁶⁷

Table 2. Time Horizon Spent for the China's Wars			
Name of War	Year	Time Span (year)	Average (year)
Imjin War	1592-1598	8	3.56
Sino-Burmese War	1765-1769	5	
First Opium War	1839-1842	4	
Second Opium War	1856-1860	5	
Sino-French War	1884-1885	2	
Sino-Japanese War	1894-1895	2	
Korean War	1950-1953	4	
Sino-Indian War	1962	1	
Sino-Vietnamese War	1979	1	

Source: Created by author using Wikipedia, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/>, accessed 19 February 2019.




Figure 24. Analysis with Relevant Question #5 on the Chinese Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #6: Willingness of People to Keep Going a War

The willingness of Chinese people to keep a war going is traditionally considered not high and not low, so it is *medium*. As mentioned, the average of Chinese wars is 3.56 years in above relevant question #5, the figure implies that their willingness to keep going a war is not relatively high. As another reason for this context, traditional Chinese military thinkers are cautious of prolonged warfare as it brings the nation's economic woes. Sun Tzu warned of the prolonged warfare a long time ago in his masterpiece, *The Art of War*. His military thought still deeply affect current Chinese military affairs. This shows that China's traditional military ideology is not based on long-term warfare.

Although Mao's revolutionary strategy makes it seem that a characteristic of the Chinese way of war is long-term warfare, Chinese history does not support this assertion. In fact, Mao was effective in overthrowing the regime of China, not a victory in a war against other countries.⁶⁸ In order to overthrow the regime of a nation, the shift of the heart and mind of people is the critical factor as Mao argues.⁶⁹ And it takes a very long time to lead the shift. Therefore, the case of the revolutionary war can be a long-term warfare. However, it is difficult to say that the Chinese way of war pursues such protracted warfare.

Though, the willingness of Chinese people to keep going in a war is not low. Chinese soldiers carried out war even under very difficult situations. For example, during the Korean War, at night, the Chinese army attacked deeply into the rear of troops of the United States mainly through mass infiltration.⁷⁰ In addition, they continued to conduct attacks under inclement weather like cold temperature and rainy weather, eating powdery

foods in poor conditions..⁷¹ Therefore, the willingness of Chinese people to keep going a war can be on *medium* mark in figure 25.




Figure 25. Analysis with Relevant Question #6 on the Chinese Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #7: How a Nation Defines War

The relevant question shows that how China defines war is on *medium*, between *big event for a nation's rise and fall* and *mean of policy* in figure 26. China, in theory, sees war as a very serious event in a country with life and death. Sun Tzu said that “War is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.”⁷² That means China considers that conducting a war is a very significant thing to determine the rise and fall of the nation.

However, in the real world, China has waged a number of wars, which were different from the above theory. From the Tang dynasty to present, China has conducted

approximately 259 instances of wars and battles..⁷³ Of course, much of it involves counter-insurgency battles and skirmishes against their ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, we can draw a significant implication, which is that China did not hesitate to use their military forces, rather than Sun Tzu's theory. But, the relevant question does not mean China has used military means to conduct wars as means of policy. It is because there have been just a few external wars in comparison to the total amount of wars and battles they have conducted..⁷⁴




Figure 26. Analysis with Relevant Question #7 on the Chinese Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #8: Procedure for Going to a War

China's procedure for going to war is between *deliberate change to policy to allow war* and *systematic* as shown in figure 27. This is because it is prone to the former in the theoretical aspect, but it is also inclined to the latter in the practical aspect. There are the seven deliberations which can forecast victory or defeat as the criteria of going to

a war in Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*: 1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the moral law? 2) Which of the two generals has most ability? 3) With whom lie the advantages derived from heaven and earth? 4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? 5) Which army is stronger? 6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? 7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?⁷⁵ Sun Tzu emphasizes that a country should judge the possibility of victory before a war and then try to start a war only after convinced the war is possible to win. Furthermore, Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* continues to guide past and current Chinese strategists in utilizing deception, leveraging all aspects of national power, disturbing the enemy's alliances, undermining the enemy's strategy, and the preference for achieving the national goals without using force.⁷⁶ An attempt to achieve national goals without the use of force means using all national power before a war begins. It shows that Chinese procedure of going to a war is deliberate to allow a war.




Figure 27. Analysis with Relevant Question #8 on the Chinese Way of War

Source: Created by author.

However, China's procedure of going to a war is inclined to *systematic* in the practical aspect based on several historical examples. As mentioned in relevant question #5, China has waged several invasive wars against neighboring countries such as Burma, India, and Vietnam. It does not seem that they considered the seven deliberates of Sun Tzu before starting the war. For example, in the Sino-Burmese War (1765-1769), although the Qing sent 50,000 and 60,000 soldiers in the last two invasions, the command lacked new information about invasion routes, and had to refer to centuries-old maps to develop their war plan.⁷⁷ The Qing dynasty did not even prepare for the war properly, but began going to the war; nevertheless, they had other options other than using forces. China does not demonstrate much reluctance to use force, indeed they are prone to noteworthy risk-taking, albeit calculated.⁷⁸

Korean Way of War

Relevant Question #1: Posture toward War

Korea has traditionally posed a reactive-defensive posture toward war as shown in figure 28. Above all, Korea historically does not take proactive actions in wars, but rather takes reactive postures that have been brought to the Korean peninsula by other countries. In other words, when the security environment went up to a crisis point, past Korean dynasties were prone not to proactively exert full national power in order to avoid a war on the Korean peninsula. Instead, when an enemy invaded the Korean peninsula, they customarily used to allow the enemy to take a space and conduct a long-term war depleting the enemy's sustainment ability for operational reach. It is noteworthy that most wars that Korea had in the past were invasions by other countries, and most of the wars took place on the Korean peninsula.⁷⁹ For example, there were the Su and early

Tang dynasties' invasions, another Tang dynasty's invasion, the Khitanese invasion, the Yuan dynasty's invasion, the Japanese invasion, and the Qing dynasty's invasion..⁸⁰




Figure 28. Analysis with Relevant Question #1 on the Korean Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Several observations, including those about the Korean concepts of conducting war, its official military system for engagements, and military thought of Korean policy makers support the argument that Korea prefers a defensive posture. First, Cheongyaippo and Gyeolsahangeon argue that the Korean way of war has been inclined to a defensive posture. For Cheongyaippo, it is demonstrated by the army's burning of and use of fortifications. Gyeolsahangeon adds, the way in which the army, together with the people with being ready to die against an invading enemy points to defensive action.

Second, the Jinguan military system as the official military system of the Joseon dynasty, which occupies a large part of history in the Korean peninsula, is of a defense nature to maintain the security of the Korean Peninsula. Third, the overall ideas in Jingbirok of Seongyoung Rye and Minbo defense theory of Yakyong Cheong, which are addressed in chapter 2, are support the point that the Korean way of war is defensive. The reasons Korea had pursued the defensive way of war may be related to the factors contribute to a way of war: especially geography, national power, international relation, religion, and culture. For examples, Korea has incremental weather in summer and winter by geography when a war used to be hard to keep prolonged. Additionally, Korea had only China and Japan who had probability to fight against Korea in the past, and ancient Korean might think that they could manage the probability by diplomatic method mainly. Or, their defensive posture seemed likely to be influenced by Buddhism and Confucianism cherishing the value of peace. Although why Korea had pursued the defensive way of war is not a research question in this thesis, it is an interesting point.

Relevant Question #2: Purposes of Having Military according to How a Nation Views Security

It is obvious that Korea's main purpose of having a military is to defend the homeland. First of all, Korea has no history, in the period covered in this thesis, of invading other countries, except for the certain periods (two to three rulers who expanded their territories to the North) in the ancient Goguryeo dynasty.⁸¹ Rather, Korea has been invaded many times by China and Japan.

In addition, military system of the Joseon dynasty such as the Jinguan system and Jeseungbanglyag (Victory Strategy, 제승방략) are based on the concept of defending

homeland.⁸² While the Jinguang system was a defense system empowered to local authority, the Jeseungbanglyag was a centralized defense system led by commanders dispatched from the capital with mobilized troops from neighboring regions.⁸³ The systems are slightly different, but both systems support the premise that the purpose of having a military is, fundamentally, to defend the homeland as figure 29.




Figure 29. Analysis with Relevant Question #2 on the Korean Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #3: Extent of the Country's Resources Are Mobilized toward War

The Korean way of war pursues a total war by mobilizing all of resources as depicted in figure 30. The wars Korea has conducted were struggles to survive foreign invasions. In particular, based on Cheongyaippo strategy, civilians went into the fortresses with soldiers in wars, so the integrated defense operations which the people,

the military and the government conducted together were inevitable. For example, in the Yuan dynasty's invasion, the Goryeo dynasty moved the capital to Ganghwa island, where refugees lived in and on islands and resisted against the Yuan's expeditionary troops with both engagements and diplomacy.⁸⁴ In this period, civilian militia, monks, and women fought with governmental troops against Mongolian armies.⁸⁵ After 40 years of the war, though the Goryeo dynasty concluded a peace treaty with the Yuan, the Yuan dynasty respected Goryeo's sovereignty and indigenous customs.⁸⁶

As an another example, when the Japanese invasion (1592-1598) occurred, civilian militia troops, "Righteous Armies (의병)",⁸⁷ were organized voluntarily throughout the country.⁸⁸ They consisted of the surviving and leaderless Korean regular soldiers, the patriotic yangbans (aristocrats) and commoners, and Buddhist monks.⁸⁹ They conducted guerrilla warfare by exploiting the advantage of geography, and they gave a great blow to the Japanese invading army.⁹⁰ By 1592, there were approximately 22,200 Korean guerrillas serving in the Righteous Army.⁹¹ All the resources of the country were committed to the war. This differs from the fact that Western European countries and China have usually committed limited resources when waging a war.




Figure 30. Analysis with Relevant Question #3 on the Korean Way of War

Source: Created by author

Relevant Question #4: Type of Recruiting and Maintaining Military Forces

Korea has traditionally adopted a kind of draft military system to recruit and maintain the military forces. In the period of the Goryeo dynasty (918-1392), the military system consisted of a dualist organization of central and provincial armies.⁹² The central army's soldiers, who were registered in the roster of the central government, received the farmland from the government.⁹³ The duty of the defense was passed to offspring.⁹⁴ The provincial army consisted of farmers, aged 16 and older, who fought against the enemy in contingency.⁹⁵

In the Joseon dynasty (1392-1897), from its founding, the government ordered all men aged 16 to 60 to carry out military service compulsorily.⁹⁶ However, incumbent bureaucrats and students were exempted from military service, and the children of high-ranking officials were transferred to premier special military units.⁹⁷ After the Imjin War,

in 1593, the Joseon dynasty established the Hunlyeondogam (Capital Defense Troop, 훈련도감) which were professional soldiers receiving salaries from the government..⁹⁸

However, most soldiers belonged to the Sogogun (Provincial Army, 속오군).⁹⁹ Most of the inhabitants of each province were organized into the Sogogun..¹⁰⁰ In this military system, they farmed and trained in peace time, but in emergencies, the soldiers were mobilized to defend the country without salary from the government..¹⁰¹

In summary, Korea has adopted mandatory military service for men aged 16 to 60 years. They conducted mainly farming activities in peace, but they were drafted and fought against enemy in a war. Therefore, Korea's military recruiting and maintaining system, which drafts most of the country's men, differs from the Western European and Chinese systems as shown in figure 31.




Figure 31. Analysis with Relevant Question #4 on the Korean Way of War

Source: Created by author

Relevant Question #5: Time Horizon Spent for a War

The wars Korea has conducted have normally had long time spans as table 3 presents. For example, Korean waged a war against the Su and Tang dynasties' invasion for 65 years. Additionally, the Goryeo–Khitan War lasted for 27 years and Korean fought against the Yuan dynasty's invasion for 40 years. The average length of a war Korea has conducted is 24.67 years. This is amazing but it is even more surprising that Koreans did not surrender easily and continued to resist for such long periods. Thus, how long of a time horizon Korea has spent for a war is on *more 21 years* in figure 32.

Table 3. Time Horizon Spent for the Korea's Wars			
Name of War	Year	Time Span (year)	Average (year)
Su / Tang dynasties' invasion	612-676	65	24.67
Tang dynasty's invasion	670-676	7	
Goryeo–Khitan War	993-1019	27	
Yuan dynasty's invasion	1231-1270	40	
Imjin War (Japanese invasion)	1592-1598	7	
Qing dynasty's invasion	1636-1637	2	

Source: Created by author using Wikipedia, “List of Korean Battles,” accessed 21 February 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Korean_battles.




Figure 32. Analysis with Relevant Question #5 on the Korean Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #6: Willingness of People to Keep Going a War

The willingness of Korean people to keep supporting a war traditionally is high as presented in figure 33. There are three critical concepts in Korea that support this claim: Sang-Mu Spirit, Ho-Kuk Spirit (Patriotic Spirit, 호국정신), and Gyeolsahangjeon. Sang-Mu Sprit means to admire or value “Martiality (Mu, 무)”.¹⁰² The belief in this spirit has been existed since the Three Kingdoms era and has become a fundamental force behind the Korean people resilience and ability to survive long conflicts. This belief is pervasive in the Korean society. It is not present merely in military affairs, but also in the area of sports, academics, and philosophy where the temper of martialism with civility, virtue, and wisdom is required.¹⁰³ For examples, the Korean army, which values the Sang-Mu

Spirit, has a team named *Sang-Mu* who participates in professional leagues such as basketball, soccer, and volleyball.

The Ho-Kuk Spirit is a patriotic belief that Korea is protected in crises such as natural disasters and invasions by foreign armed forces.¹⁰⁴ This spirit is deeply carved in the bones of Koreans and has served as an engine to sustain war. Ho-Kuk Buddhism Faith is a representative example of the Ho-Kuk Spirit. From the introduction of Buddhism to the end of the Joseon dynasty, Ho-Kuk Buddhism Faith has led to important Buddhist practices in Korea.¹⁰⁵ In Korean society, it was common to conduct Buddhist ceremonies in the face of natural disasters, external invasions, and civil war in order to facilitate unity of population's mind and promote national consciousness.¹⁰⁶ An example of this is the production of the Tripitaka Koreana by the Buddhism of the Goryeo dynasty in 1236 during the Yuan dynasty's invasion in the form earnest praying for the peace of the country and the comfort of the people.¹⁰⁷

In addition, the high willingness of people to keep going a war is based on the concept of Gyeolsahangjeon. The concept made the Korean people fight the long-term wars as shown in figure 32. In fact, for whole population to go into the fortifications and carry out a war against the foreign expeditionary troops that have invaded the Korean mainland means fighting coupled with being ready to die. For example, at the battle of Dong-Rae Fortress in the Imjin War, women climbed on house roofs and threw tiles down against the Japanese troops; ultimately, they were stabbed to death.¹⁰⁸ There is an actual story: "Kim Sang, a Dong-Rae people, threw down the tiles which his wife and daughter broke it down against the Japanese soldiers, and died."¹⁰⁹ This example shows

the cruelty of the battle at the time, and demonstrates that all the people, including women, were willing participants in battle.




Figure 33. Analysis with Relevant Question #6 on the Korean Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Relevant Question #7: How a Nation Defines War

Korea has used to start going to a war considering a big event for its rise and fall as figure 34 shows. Korea has tended not to preemptively declare a war as a means of strategy. Rather, Korea has waged wars to resist invasion war..¹¹⁰ When they were in situation considering of going to a war, they used to worry that the country's territory would be devastated and the lives of the people would become destitute. For them, a war meant loss of populations desperately and own territory devastated unlikely to Western European countries and China.




Figure 34. Analysis with Relevant Question #7 on the Korean Way of War

Source: Created by author.

A good example of this is the discussion of the king and his staffs of the Joseon dynasty to resolve a war just before the Japanese invasion of the Imjin war. When the two dispatched officials presented different opinions about whether Japan would invade the Korean peninsula, the Joseon's king and staffs worried that the country would become devastated if they began a war, made the wrong decision and were then unprepared for the invasion.¹¹¹

Another example is the Goryeo–Khitan War (993-1019). When Khitan initially invaded the territory of the Goryeo dynasty with 800,000 troops, the Goryeo dynasty sent a man named Seo Hee to a diplomatically avoid war.¹¹² Diplomacy was successful and Seo Hee made the Khitan army go back to their territory.¹¹³ This example proves that Korea used to try to avoid a war by exercising diplomacy as much as possible before a war.

Relevant Question #8: Procedure for Going to a War

The procedure of going to a war marks on *deliberate change to policy to allow war* in figure 35. It is because Korea has considered a war as a big event for its rise and fall. Except for the case of ancient Goguryeo expanding its territory to the north, it is rare for Korea to proactively expand territory or preemptively declare war.¹¹⁴ So why is Korea so deliberate about this decision?




Figure 35. Analysis with Relevant Question #8 on the Korean Way of War

Source: Created by author.

Koreans have an ideological preference pursuing peace rather than pursuing war. And such ideological preference is based on Buddhism and Confucianism. There is a guideline in Buddhism's practice that it is a virtue to not to kill, even an ant. This is taught to children by parents and has become part of Korean culture.¹¹⁵ Additionally, Confucianism has a basic premise that everyone's character is good.¹¹⁶ Furthermore,

Buddhism and Confucianism both pursue to making the world peaceful by making their followers good humans through self-discipline and by spreading the spirits to others.¹¹⁷ Considering that Buddhism and Confucianism have continuously influenced Korean society from the ancient to the present, an ideological preference which pursues peace rather than war is understandable.

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the Korean way of war by contrasting it with the ways of other countries based on relevant questions. In connection with the research questions of this study, it can be concluded that Korea has a unique way of war. This conclusion summarizes the results of the analysis and defines the Korean way of war.

There are eight relevant questions derived from chapter 2 and chapter 3: 1) posture toward war; 2) purposes of having military; 3) extent of the country's resources are mobilized toward war; 4) system of recruiting and maintaining military forces; 5) time horizon spent for a war; 6) the willingness of people to keep going to war; 7) how a nation defines war; and 8) procedures of going to a war. The result of the analysis based on the above relevant questions below figure 36. As the figure presents, each relevant question shows that Korean way of war is different from the Western European way of war and the Chinese way of war.

Evaluation Criteria	Relevant Questions	Measure	Western Europe	China	Korea
Posture toward War	1. What kind of posture toward war did countries pose?	Proactive – Offensive, Proactive – Defensive, Reactive – Offensive, Reactive – Defensive	Proactive-Offensive	Proactive-Defensive	Reactive-Defensive
	2. What are the purposes of having military according to how a nation views security?	Protect regime, Protect homeland, Protect neighbor states, Protect region, Protect world	Neighbor States → Region	Homeland ~ Neighbor States	Homeland
Mobilized Resources of a nation	3. What extent of the country's resources are mobilized toward war?	Partially, Very limitedly, Limitedly, Most, Totally	Limitedly	Limitedly	Totally
	4. How does a nation recruit and maintain military forces?	Voluntary, Mandatory reserve, Mandatory Service, Draft	Mandatory Service ↔ Voluntary	Mandatory Service	Draft
Endurance of the People	5. How long of a time horizon has a nation spent for a war?	0-1 year to More 21 years	5-10 years	2-4 years	More 21 years
	6. How is the willingness of people to keep going a war?	Low, Medium, High	Medium	Medium	High
Relationship between Diplomacy and Military	7. How does a nation define war?	Big event for a nation's rise and fall, Medium, Mean of policy	Mean of policy	Medium	A nation's rise and fall
	8. What is a nation's procedure for going to a war?	Deliberate change To policy to allow war, Systematic, Automatic (extortion of policy)	Systematic	Systematic ~ Deliberate	Deliberate change

Figure 36. The Result of Analysis Based on the Relevant Questions

Source: Created by author.

According to the result of the analysis as figure 36, the Korean way of war can be defined as follows: Korea has regarded war as a critical event that determines rise and fall of the nation, strictly refraining from the use of military forces for the offense, and pursuing peace through diplomacy as much as possible. However, when a crisis was escalated, Korea has reactively and defensively conducted total war to defend the Korean peninsula. The whole population has pursued long-term defensive wars with strong endurance, called “*Gyeolsahangjeon*”, against the enemy by taking advantage of territorial and seasonal effects.

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- ² Knox and Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050*, 132-174.
- ³ Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 281-295.
- ⁴ Ibid., 324-325; Parker, *Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare*, 260-261.
- ⁵ Knox and Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050*, 57-73.
- ⁶ Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.
- ⁷ Parker, *Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare*, 5.
- ⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, 357.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), “H102 Limited War in the Eighteenth Century” (AY19 Student Class Power Point Presentation, CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2018), slide 14.
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- ¹² Wikipedia, “Seven Years’ War,” 15 February 2019, accessed 15 February 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_Years%27_War.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ Parker, *Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare*, 264-276.
- ¹⁵ Wikipedia, “NATO,” 15 February 2019, accessed 15 February 2019, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO>.
- ¹⁶ CGSC, “H102 Limited War in the Eighteenth Century,” 20-26.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., 26.
- ¹⁸ Parker, *Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare*, 182-183.
- ¹⁹ Ibid., 207.
- ²⁰ Ibid., 237.
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²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Knox and Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050*, 57-73.

²⁶ Wikipedia, “Levée en masse,” 16 February 2019, accessed 16 February 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Levée_en_masse.

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²⁸ Kevin Linch, “A History of Military Conscription in Europe,” *Brewminate* (blog), 8 February 2018, accessed 16 February 2019, <https://brewminate.com/a-history-of-military-conscription-in-europe/>.

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³¹ Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 296-325.

³² Clausewitz, *On War*, 228.

³³ Ibid., 87.

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³⁶ Ibid., H106RB-203.

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- ³⁸ Parker, *Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare*, 233-235.
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- ⁷² Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, 3.
- ⁷³ Wikipedia, "List of Chinese wars and battles."
- ⁷⁴ Ibid.
- ⁷⁵ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, 3-4.
- ⁷⁶ CRS, *The Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress*, 7.
- ⁷⁷ Wikipedia, "Sino-Burmese War (1765–69)."
- ⁷⁸ Scobell, "Is there a Chinese Way of War?", 112.
- ⁷⁹ Wikipedia, "List of Korean battles," 21 February 2019, accessed 21 February 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Korean_battles.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid.
- ⁸¹ Ibid. Because this thesis deals with tendency of a Korean way of war, this historical example will remain as an exception.
- ⁸² National Institute of Korean History, *Korean History*, 97.
- ⁸³ Ibid., 84-97.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid., 72-73.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid.
- ⁸⁷ Wikipedia, "Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598)."
- ⁸⁸ National Institute of Korean History, *Korean History*, 90-91.
- ⁸⁹ Wikipedia, "Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598)."

⁹⁰ National Institute of Korean History, *Korean History*, 90-91.

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- ⁹¹ Wikipedia, “Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598).”
- ⁹² National Institute of Korean History, *Korean History*, 68.
- ⁹³ Ibid.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid.
- ⁹⁵ Ibid.
- ⁹⁶ Ibid., 84.
- ⁹⁷ Ibid.
- ⁹⁸ Wikipedia, “훈련도감 [Capital Defense Troop],” 23 February 2019, accessed 23 February 2019, <https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/훈련도감>; Doopedia, “훈련도감 [Capital Defense Troop],” 23 February 2019, accessed 23 February 2019, <https://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=1156237&cid=40942&categoryId=31748>.
- ⁹⁹ Doopedia, “속오군 [Provincial Army],” 23 February 2019, accessed 23 February 2019, <https://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=1114360&cid=40942&categoryId=31748>.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰² Kwonyoung Park, “Restoring the Nexus of History-Theory-Doctrine in Military Thought,” 14.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁴ Naver Knowledge Encyclopedia, “민본사상 - 위민사상, 충, 호국정신 [People-oriented Ideology – Ideology for people, Loyalty, and Patriotic Spirit],” 23 February 2019, accessed 23 February 2019, https://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=2060537&cid=47331&categoryId=47331#TABLE_OF_CONTENT5.
- ¹⁰⁵ Korean Central Research Institute, “호국신앙 [Patriotic Religion],” Korean National Cultural Encyclopedia, 23 February 2019, accessed 23 February 2019, <https://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=528016&cid=46648&categoryId=46648>.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁷ Wikipedia, “Tripitaka Koreana,” 23 February 2019, accessed 23 February 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tripitaka_Koreana; Korean Central Research Institute, “호국신앙 [Patriotic Religion].”

¹⁰⁸ Namuwiki, “동래성 전투 [Battle of Dongrae fortress],” 23 February 2019, accessed 23 February 2019, <https://namu.wiki/w/동래성%20전투>.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Wikipedia, “List of Korean battles.”

¹¹¹ Korean Central Research Institute, “임진왜란 [The Imjin War],” Korean National Cultural Encyclopedia, 23 February 2019, accessed 23 February 2019, https://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=795412&cid=46622&categoryId=46622#TABLE_OF_CONTENT3; Wikipedia, “Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598).”

¹¹² National Institute of Korean History, *Korean History*, 72.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Wikipedia, “List of Korean battles.”

¹¹⁵ Naver Knowledge Encyclopedia, “살생금지,” Religion Encyclopedia, 24 February 2019, accessed 24 February 2019, <https://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=629668&cid=50766&categoryId=50794>.

¹¹⁶ Naver Knowledge Encyclopedia, “유교 [Confucianism],” Student Encyclopedia, 24 February 2019, accessed 24 February 2019, <https://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=942986&cid=47331&categoryId=47331>.

¹¹⁷ Naver Knowledge Encyclopedia, “불교의 진리 [Truth of Buddhism],” Student Encyclopedia, 24 February 2019, accessed 24 February 2019, <https://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=3339360&cid=47323&categoryId=47323>; Naver Knowledge Encyclopedia, “유교[Confucianism].”

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

This impetus behind this study was that, despite Korea's long history, it was hard to say that Korea has a unique way of war because there is a lack of research on the subject. Within that context, this study has tried to verify whether there is a unique way of war in Korea and explored the Korean way of war through contrast to the ways of war of Western Europe and China.

The main research question of this thesis was "Is there a distinct Korean way of war?" And, the subsidiary research questions were: "What is a way of war?", "What factors contribute to a specific way of war?", "What are the ways of Western Europe and China?", "What are the key differences that characterize the different ways of war?", "If there is a distinct Korean way of war, what is it?", "What are the implications from this research?"

The answers to these questions are summarized below. First, for the subsidiary question, "What is a way of war?", a way of war means a combination of philosophy, principles and traditions that are used and displayed in a majority of conflicts in which a nation participates including the decision to go to war, the execution of war, and the consolidation of gains.

Second, for the question, "What factors contribute to a specific way of war?", there are geography, international relations, national power, ethnic, religion, history, and culture as factors contributing to a specific way of war.

Third, to answer both research questions “What are the ways of Western Europe and China?” and “What are the key differences that characterize the different ways of war?”, figure 36 in chapter 4 answers those questions. According to the figure 36, the results of analysis based on the relevant questions of evaluation are the following: 1) while a Korean way of war has a tendency with reactive-defensive posture toward wars, the one of a Western European war is proactive-offensive and the Chinese way of war is proactive-defensive; 2) while Korea has military forces to protect the homeland, Western Europe’s purpose of having military has been to protect its neighbor states and region, and China’s purpose of having military lies between homeland and neighbor states; 3) while Western European countries and China have usually mobilized their resources limitedly, Korea has mobilized the nation’s total resources in wars; 4) while the Western Europe has adopted mandatory service and voluntary systems alternately and China used to utilize mandatory service system as a recruiting and maintaining military forces, Korea has traditionally used a draft system; 5) while the average of a time horizon Western European countries have spent for a war is 6.56 years and China is 3.56 years, Korea has spent an average of 24.67 years to wage a war; 6) while the willingness of Western European and Chinese to keep going a war is medium, the Korean willingness to keep going a war is high; 7) while Western Europe defines a war as a mean of policy and China defines a war as midway between a mean of policy and a nation’s rise and fall, Korea manifestly defines a war as a nation’s rise and fall; 8) in terms of the procedure of going to a war, while the Western Europe has inclination to a systematic way and China’s approach marks on midway between systematic and deliberate change to allow a war, Korea has obviously chosen a way of deliberate change to policy to allow a war.

Fourth, the following is for the subsidiary research question “If there is a distinct Korean way of war, what is it?” as mentioned in the chapter 4. The Korean way of war is: Korea has regarded war as a critical event that determines rise and fall of the nation, strictly refraining from the use of military forces for the offense, and pursuing peace through diplomacy as much as possible. However, when a crisis was escalated, Korea has reactively and defensively conducted total war to defend the Korean peninsula. The whole population has pursued long-term defensive wars with strong endurance, called “Gyeolsahangjeon”, against the enemy by taking advantage of territorial and seasonal effects.

Fifth, for the question, “What are the implications from this research?”, a big implication of this study is the fact that the outcomes of the Korean way of war which Korea has conducted with usually were not successful in terms of keeping sovereignty and peace on the Korean peninsula. Though the Goryeo dynasty desperately resisted against the Yuan dynasty’s invasion (1231-1270), the Goryeo dynasty’s government finally negotiated with the Yuan’s expeditionary troops and sent the future king Wonjong as hostage to the Yuan.¹ As another example, the territory of the Joseon dynasty on the Korean peninsula was devastated by the Japanese expeditionary troops during the Imjin War (1592-1598).² In addition, in the Qing dynasty’s invasion (1636-1637), the Joseon dynasty submitted to the Qing’s invasion troops and King Injo of the Joseon dynasty kowtowed to Hong Taiji who was an emperor of the Qing dynasty.³ Hong Taiji allegedly forced King Injo to repeat the humiliating ritual many times.⁴ Lastly, at the end of the Joseon dynasty in 1907, Japan abdicated King Gojong, and forcefully enthroned King Sunjong.⁵ Also, Japan dispositioned officials to each department of the Korean

government, disbanded the Joseon dynasty's army, and practically controlled the dynasty.⁶ Then, in 1910, Japan suppressed the resistance of the militia troops by force, took the jurisdiction and the police right, and made the Korean empire a colony.⁷ This implication means that the Korean way of war should be fundamentally changed.

Recommendations

The Korea's way of war is unique but is valuable only in limited application. It is because the factors contributing the way of war have fundamentally changed. First, modern warfare is carried out beyond the geographical constraints, and peace cannot be guaranteed through only diplomacy with neighboring countries. Second, since the national power of Korea has increased to such an extent that it cannot compare with the past in terms of population and economy, the Korea can exert influence externally over the Korean peninsula. Third, the Korean political system changed from a dynasty to a republic with democracy. Fourth, international relations are not confined to China and Japan as in the past, but are intertwined in complex relationships with countries around the world today. Fifth, in addition to Confucianism and Buddhism in the past, Christianity and Catholicism have also been influential in religion and culture. Sixth, although a minority, other races constitute part of Korean ethnic. Seventh, Korea has enough histories of having been suffered by foreign invasions and the reactive-defensive postures.

¹ Wikipedia, “Mongol invasions of Korea,” 27 February 2019, accessed 27 February 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mongol_invasions_of_Korea#Sixth_campaign_and_peace.

² Wikipedia, “Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598).”

³ Wikipedia, “Qing invasion of Joseon,” 27 February 2019, accessed 27 February 2019, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qing_invasion_of_Joseon#War.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ National Institute of Korean History, *Korean History*, 113.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

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