

The Philippine Insurrection

"U.S. Retaliates"

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17 March 2005

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the MASSACRE P 7.
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Outline

Thesis: The massacre of U.S. troops at Balangiga caused the retaliation at Samar.

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MEMORANDUM FOR Faculty Advisor, Group Room M10, USASMA, Ft Bliss, TX 79918-8002

SUBJECT: The Philippine Insurrection "U.S. Retaliates"

1. Thesis Statement. The massacre of U.S. troops at Balangiga caused the retaliation at Samar.
2. Discussion. After the American military forces freed the Philippine Islands from the rule of Spain, the American government implemented a benevolent policy of assimilation for the absorption of the Philippine government. This caused an insurrection within the Philippines. The lack of Presidential guidance, poor military leadership, and the dehumanization of the Filipinos caused many atrocities and immoral acts to be committed by American military forces. One such act took place on the Island of Samar. American forces retaliated against the people of Samar for the perceived massacre of U.S. troops at Balangiga, Samar.
3. Conclusion. There were reports that about one third of the entire population of Samar was annihilated during the campaign. The action and prosecution of General Smith and others completely justifies the claim that the massacre of U.S. troops at Balangiga caused the retaliation of Samar.
4. Counterpoint. Others believe that the American forces did not retaliate for the attack on American troops at Balangiga, Samar. They believe that the pacification of Samar and the atrocities committed there were part of President McKinley's "Benevolent Assimilation" and the extension of American sovereignty over the Philippine Islands.
5. Haines Award. We (do/do not) request that the Haines Award Selection Board consider this paper for the General Haines Award for Excellence in research. *Writing Research Papers*, 10th Edition by James D. Lester, is the guide used in the preparation of this research paper.

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The Philippine Insurrection “U.S. Retaliates”

The brutal repression of the rebellion in Cuba by the Spanish in 1896 captured America's attention as the nationalized press denounced the Spanish commander, General Valeriano “Butcher” Weyler. In addition, in 1896 thousands of Cubans died in Spanish detention camps during Cuba's fight for independence. Faced with the increasing pressure for American intervention, newly elected President William McKinley attempted to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. However, the warship, USS Maine exploded and sank in the Havana Harbor on the night of February 15, 1898. This sole action effectively ended President McKinley's efforts to avoid a war between the United States and Spain.

Ten days later, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt secretly informed the Asiatic Squadron Commander, Commodore George Dewey, that in the event of war, he was to conduct offensive operations against the Spanish fleet based in Manila Bay, Philippine Islands. On April 22, 1898, three days after Congress declared war, Commodore Dewey received his orders to proceed at once to the Philippines and capture or destroy the Spanish fleet (Karnow 101-2). As Dewey steamed from Hong Kong towards Manila Bay, he was unaware of the consequences that his action would bring about as he engaged and defeated the Spanish fleet on May 1, 1898.

After the defeat of the Spanish forces in Manila, President William McKinley implemented a benevolent policy of assimilation for the absorption of the Philippine government. This caused an insurrection led by Emilio Aguinaldo to challenge the United States Army for nearly four years. Despite lacking a formal, written counterinsurgency doctrine, the frontier experiences passed from one generation of Soldiers to the next provided invaluable lessons learned that was shared with incoming volunteers who had limited military experiences. The army's senior leaders, who were veterans of the Civil War and Indian Campaigns, were able to apply their

experience and developed questionable strategies to counter the insurrection. General Otis S. Elwell immediately realized that a military solution alone would not end the insurgency. By denying personnel and weapon replacements, Otis attempted to drive a wedge between the Philippine citizens and the guerrillas. Otis' subordinates realized the policy of attraction had failed to isolate the guerrillas from their home base and village support, forcing increased military actions against the guerilla fighters.

This strategy, belatedly endorsed by General Arthur MacArthur, eventually caused the collapse of the insurrection through many atrocities and immoral acts. Only when the Americans employed the policies of conciliation and repression in the correct proportion were they able to end the insurrection. Over 126,000 American soldiers served in the Philippines. The total cost would amount to \$400 million with 4,234 Americans killed in action, and tens of thousands of Filipino casualties (Dolan 6). McKinley failed to provide clear guidance to his generals in the field. In Fact, after McKinley dispatched troops to the Philippines, he stated, "he could not have told where those darned island were within two thousand miles" (Karnow 105). The contempt felt by the American politicians, generals and soldiers for the Filipino enemy made it inevitable that acts of brutality would occur. One such act that was preceded by many others culminated on the island of Samar. After a perceived massacre of American troops at Balangiga, the Americans were "hell bent on getting even" (Nebrida). The massacre of U.S. troops at Balangiga caused the retaliation at Samar. An opposing view point by some believe that the Americans were on the island of Samar by request and that the atrocities committed there were not do to the loss of American troops at Balangiga.

U.S. Forces consisting of the Army and the Marines were on a time schedule to land at the town of Balangiga, Samar in response to a petition by Balangiga town's President, Pedro Abayan. President Abayan requested U.S. troops to protect the town from insurgents and Moro

pirates (Schott 25). When U.S. troops became available, Balangiga and the southern Samar region were next for occupation. The U.S. Army did not “just arrive” in Balangiga, there were hundreds of Army outposts strung throughout the archipelago chain.

Major General Adna R. Chaffee, U.S. Army Commander in the Philippines, divided the Philippine Islands into departments, in which Army generals commanded. Among these, Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes was the officer in charge of the Department of the Visayas located in the town of Calbayog, Samar. General Hughes awaited reinforcements to the Island of Samar so he could move his headquarters to the Island of Cebu where insurgent activities were numerous. Once Company C, 9th U.S. Infantry arrived for duty at Balangiga, the general was relieved as he could now pursue his plans to relocate (10). However, General Hughes could not relocate without additional support to his area of responsibility, meaning the whole Island of Samar.

The Island of Samar is approximately 120 miles wide by 160 miles in length measuring along the island's mass from tip to tip. Samar's total area coverage is 5,031 square miles. General Hughes' ^{poss.} headquarters was located at the northwest side of the island. He awaited U.S. Forces to arrive at the towns of: Catbalogan; south of his current position, Basey; Southwest of the island, Balangiga; south end of the island, and Lanang; located on the southeast side (Blount 228). The northern coastal areas awaited U.S. Troops upon availability.

Many battles ensued after the beginning of the Philippines Insurrection, which began on the night of February 4, 1899 at the San Juan Bridge in Manila, Philippines. During these early confrontations between American and Filipino soldiers, General Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the Philippine Insurrection, tried to stop the fighting by sending an emissary to appeal to Major General Elwell S. Otis, U.S. Army Commander in the Philippines, to end the hostilities. General Otis replied, “Fighting, having begun, must go on to the grim end” (Bautista).

From this point forward, Major General Arthur MacArthur carried on the advancement of American troops throughout Luzon, which is the main island of the Philippines, and replaced General Otis as U.S. Army Commander in the Philippines. General MacArthur furthered the advance on Filipino strong points by landing troops to adjacent islands and creating Army outposts strung out over the Philippine archipelago.

Surmising from a given strategic military standpoint, one could see that U.S. Forces have already placed a foothold on the Island of Samar and were awaiting further orders, equipment, and labor to occupy the neighboring islands. This type of island hopping resulted in a strategic takeover of the archipelago chain with the help of the U.S. Navy, of course.

International trade was sought after by the current U.S. administration under President William McKinley and his Philippine Civil Governor, William H. Taft. They believed that if they could create a stable democratic government it could lead to possible marketing for American goods as well as a stepping-stone for trade in the Orient.

Some other reasons for the United States' interest in the Philippines were the establishment of schools, the reorganization of their local municipal governments, and sanitary improvements for the Filipino living conditions (Nebrida). The most important fact was that the Philippines could not survive alone because they were unfit for self-government. The fear that another powerful nation would move in and take over the Philippines was also paramount to the U.S. Therefore, the Philippines needed U.S. protection whether they agreed to or not (Blount 292).

Although these good intentions were apparent, American foreign policy toward the Philippines failed. First, the Filipinos were fighting Americans, which shows that they wanted their independence. Second, The Filipinos had no say in the Treaty of Paris in deciding their country's fate and future progression. Third, President McKinley's "Benevolent Assimilation

Proclamation,” announcing that the U.S. would stay permanently in the Philippines and that U.S. Forces were ordered to “extend by force American sovereignty over this country” (Bautista).

Political issues happening within the Philippine realm and outside had some devastating effects to the outcome of this war. The American people back home read the newspaper reports that claimed that the Filipinos started the war. This resulted in the ratification of the Treaty of Paris by the U.S. Senate days after the fighting began.

Inside the Philippine’s Army, General Aguinaldo was having some command and control problems with one of his top generals, General Antonio Luna. General Luna was by far the best general in the Philippine Army and received the appointment as Commander-in-Chief of Central Luzon by General Aguinaldo. General Luna was a very patriotic individual and always spoke his mind against entering into any deals with the American military or civilian officials. When he found out that General Aguinaldo’s Cabinet was plotting to make such deals with the Americans, he had them arrested and brought to Aguinaldo for punishment in which they received none and were set free. Furthermore, the traitorous cabinet officials convinced Aguinaldo that Luna wanted the presidency for him prompting Aguinaldo to plan and assassinate Luna. Once Luna was out of the picture, Aguinaldo arrested Luna’s brigade officers and disarmed several units that were pro-Luna. These acts plagued and eventually took its toll on the army as a whole, since General Luna was a revered leader and had many followers (Bautista).

These political and military issues from both the United States and the Philippine Governments eventually lead up to the occupation of all of the islands in the Philippine archipelago, especially in Samar. During the Samar campaign and throughout the rest of the war, U.S military presence and stabilization became unstoppable overwhelming the Guerrilla tactics of the insurgents.

When the United States entered into conflict with the Philippines, they were not prepared for the actions they would face when they arrived. The United States had trained its Soldiers to fight a conventional war. Guerilla tactics were around, however they were not formally taught. Guerilla tactics were passed down from past generations. This lack of training combined with long delays at sea proved to be disastrous for US Soldiers. The soldiers were eager “to get a whack” at their enemies, and were “smiling every day to think how nice it will be to blow them old guns from the Rebels in the air with ours” (Linn 41).

The battle of Manila was the first ground battle. Soldiers took control of the city of Manila as the Navy bombarded their coastline. Once the Americans had control of Manila, they were off to capture Marikina. There were very negative attitudes by the Americans by now. These negative attitudes caused Soldiers to do things that they would not normally do. One American James A. Reid, a Colorado volunteer wrote home to say the following:

“Maybe you think this isn’t a fine country...to keep away from. In fact, all of the country around here is just “lousy” with “niggers.” To the right of us is the lake. About seven miles away, to the north and east, is the little town of Marquina, which will soon have to be taken. As it is the birthplace of Pio del Pilar, one of “Aggie’s” great generals, we expect quite a fight. Malabon and Malolos have not as yet been taken. Don’t know about Malolos, but Malabon can be taken any time, as it is next to the bay....We are not nearly as anxious to fight these people as some of people may think we are, and we do not enter any of the fights with the same spirit we did when fighting the Spaniards. If a vote was taken to take us home now or wait six months and discharge us here with our travel pay

and finals, which would amount to nearly five hundred dollars, I do not believe that ten percent would be willing to stay, so you see how the men look at this addition to the United States. There have been about one hundred and twenty-five killed and three hundred wounded all together, and, when you consider that these beastly islands are not worth one American life, you can see what they are costing” (Bautista).

Now it was off to Caloocan. The Americans were unhappy about the war they were fighting and soon started resorting to cruel tactics. Prisoners were taken by the junior enlisted Soldiers, and then ordered to be executed by their leadership. The Kansas Twentieth conquered Caloocan. Prior to the battle, the town had a population of seventeen thousand people. Once the fighting was over, there was zero. The Americans had totally annihilated the village. Even with this total destruction, General Luna did not give up. Determined to win back some ground General Luna marched toward Manila and tried to recapture it. After suffering heavy losses General Luna and his troops retreated to Polo, Bulacan (Bautista).

After the battle in Caloocan, the American Soldiers marched on to Malabon. As they approached the village, artillery began to bombard it. As the Soldiers arrived in Malabon they killed every native in sight; men, women and children. The natives were successful at capturing some of the Americans, and literally hacked them to pieces. This action by the Filipinos caused the American commanders to issue orders to “spare no one.” Fred D. Stewart of the Utah Light Battery wrote; “the scene reminded me of jack-rabbits in Utah, only the rabbits sometimes got away, but the insurgents did not” (Bautista).

It did not take long for the Filipinos to realize they were outnumbered and outgunned. As the Filipinos learned they could not fight the American Soldiers with conventional tactics they were

forced to resolve to guerilla tactics. This shift in tactics caused heavy and brutal casualties on the United States.

American Soldiers realizing they could not compete conventionally with guerilla tactics started employing some of their own guerilla tactics. American Soldiers were never formally taught guerilla tactics; they had to rely on training passed down from generations of past wars. These guerilla tactics combined with the attitude of the American Soldier would later prove to have very detrimental results. The Americans were holding a grudge, and did not see the Filipino's actions as necessary for their survival.

As the war ensued, the Filipino Army gradually broke up with one defeat after another on the battlefield. By the closing days of 1899, the Army of the Philippine Republic was no longer a regular fighting force, and on November 12, 1899 was dissolved by General Aguinaldo. The Army was formed into smaller guerilla units that would carry on the war (Bautista).

Later in the war a battle was fought in Lonoy. This battle is often referred to as the "Lonoy massacre." In March 1901, American forces learned of two insurgent encampments in Lonoy, Jagna on the island of Bohol. The Filipino forces had prepared an ambush along a narrow path, but the American soldiers learned of the ambush and attacked the Filipino forces from the rear. Filipinos were shot and stabbed to death in their trenches by the American Soldiers. The Americans were ordered to take no prisoners and shot any Filipino who tried to surrender. Of the 413 Filipino Soldiers only seven escaped the massacre. Americans suffered three casualties in the battle. It is likely that this battle may have led in part to the attack at Balangiga six months later (Dowell).

One by one, battles were fought and more and more towns and villages came under US control. Many of the civilians and military officials surrendered as soon as the Americans arrived in their village. The capture of General Aguinaldo became a top priority for the

Americans. This would prove to be a tough task as many of the villagers were loyal to Aguinaldo and would aid him in his escape. On March 23, 1901, General Aguinaldo was finally captured as a result of a trick planned by Brigadier General Frederick Funston. A party of pro-American Macabebe scouts marched into Palanan pretending to be the reinforcements Aguinaldo was waiting for. They had with them two former Filipino army officers named Tal Placido and Lazaro Segovia who had surrendered to the Americans. They led five Americans including Brigadier General Funston who were pretending to be prisoners. This act overwhelmed Aguinaldo's guards, and he was easily taken captive after a few shots were fired. He was then brought to Manila to be kept as a prisoner at Malacanang. On April 1, 1901, realizing the futility of the war, General Aguinaldo swore allegiance to the United States. On April 19, 1901, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation to the Filipino people to lay down their weapons and accept American rule. His capture signaled the death of the first Philippine Republic. However, the war continued.

Americans eager to gain information about their enemies resorted to cruel tactics on the Filipinos. The water cure, given to those merely suspected of being rebels. Some were hung by their thumbs, others were *dragged* drug behind galloping horses, and others had fires lit beneath them while they hung. Other Filipinos were tied to trees and shot in the leg. If they did not confess they were left tied to the tree and shot again the next day. This would continue until either the prisoner died or confessed.

The Americans were not the only ones who were committing such horrific acts of violence. The Filipino guerillas chopped off the noses and ears of captured Americans in violation of Aguinaldo's orders. There were also reports of Americans being buried alive by angry Filipino guerillas. As word of this activity reached the Americans they became more enraged at the

Filipino Soldiers and their actions became more violent. These actions finally reached a boiling point at Balangiga, Samar.

Company C, 9th U.S. Infantry sailed into Balangiga, Samar on August 11, 1901. The so-called Balangiga Massacre happened just a few weeks after this company of American soldiers arrived. The natives plotted to resist forced starvation on a famine season due to the destruction or confiscation of their food stocks. They wanted to free about 80 male residents who had been rounded up for forced labor and detained for days in crowded conditions with little food and water. They also wanted to fight for honor after having been publicly shamed.

On the night of September 27, the sentries on the guard posts around the plaza were suspicious of the unusual number of women hurrying to church. They were all heavily clothed, which was unusual, and many carried small coffins. Sergeant Scharer, Sergeant of the Guard, stopped one woman. He pried open her coffin with his bayonet and inside found the body of a dead child. "El calenturon! El colera!" the woman hysterically cried (Schott 33).

The sight of the dead child upset Sergeant Scharer. He nailed down the coffin lid again and let the woman pass. He knew that cholera and fever were an epidemic and killing off children in great numbers. He thought it strange that no news of any such epidemic had reached the garrison. If Sergeant Scharer had been less upset and had searched beneath the child's body, he would have found the cane-cutting knives. All the coffins were loaded with them.

The night passed and morning came. At about 6:20 a.m., Saturday, September 28, 1901, a sergeant was in the door of his squad hut. At that time, the unarmed Americans were going to breakfast. Some of them had finished their breakfast. The sergeant saw Pedro Sanchez, chief of police of the town, line up prisoners for work. Then Sanchez sent all the workers to work in the plaza and in the streets. After that, Sanchez went to a hut and talked with a corporal who knew "pidgin Spanish and Visayan" (36).

After speaking with the corporal, Sanchez walked behind Private Adolph Gamlin, the sentry on the area. Suddenly Sanchez grabbed Private Gamlin's rifle. He smashed the rifle's butt on the American soldier's head. The Filipino "fired a shot and shouted a signal" (37). After that, chaos broke loose. "The church bell ding-donged crazily and conch shell whistles blew shrilly from the edge of the jungle" (37). The doors of the church flew open and out rushed a mob of bolo men who had been waiting inside. The native laborers working around the plaza suddenly turned on the soldiers and began chopping at them with "bolos, picks, and shovels" (37). As the church bells rung, Sanchez fired upon the Americans at the breakfast table. He then led the Filipinos in attacking the American soldiers.

The prime target for the attack was the mess tents. They were full of unarmed soldiers. These soldiers stood up and began fighting with chairs and anything they could get their hands on. The tents collapsed on the struggling soldiers. The natives ran in from all directions to slash with bolos and axes at the men struggling under the canvas.

As Sanchez grabbed Gamlin's rifle, two men were to kill the stationery guards outside the convent and municipal hall. They carried out their task and killed their targets. Immediately, the Filipinos sealed the tents at the front of the municipal hall. Having had weapons smuggled to them in water carriers, they broke free, entered the municipal hall, and made their way to the second floor.

Simultaneously, the attackers in the church broke through into the convent through a connecting corridor, attacked, and killed the officers. The mob successfully occupied the convent and municipal hall. The mess tent and barracks attack suffered a fatal flaw. About one hundred men split into three groups. There were not enough attackers to ensure a successful mission for each one of these targets. A number of Company C personnel escaped from the mess tent and the barracks and were able to retake the municipal hall.

Additionally, Private Gamlin recovered consciousness, found a rifle, and caused considerable casualties among the Filipinos. Faced with extremely superior firepower and a rapidly degrading attack, Sanchez ordered a retreat. Having insufficient numbers to hold the town, the Company C survivors escaped by sea. Hundreds of villagers and guerrillas attacked the seventy-four officers and men of Company C, 9th U.S. Infantry, killing forty-eight soldiers in what was the “worst single American disaster of the war” (Linn 219). The townspeople returned to bury their dead and then abandoned the town.

The Balangiga attack was a Filipino success because Company C had to abandon the garrison. The splitting of forces at the mess tent and the barracks with insufficient manpower was a weakness. When Sanchez failed to kill Gamlin it caused significant Filipino losses and later enabled Gamlin to secure a field of fire across the plaza. Gamlin, together with those in the municipal hall, made continuation of the attack insupportable.

A shameful episode that the U.S. government has not yet regretted nor apologized for followed the Filipino victory in Balangiga. General Adna Chaffee, the last commander of the U.S. military forces in the Philippines, sent Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith, commander the 6th Separate Brigade, to Samar. This would prove to be “one of the gravest blunders of the entire war” (312). Smith led an emotionally charged group of soldiers and marines in what was to be a retaliatory campaign against the inhabitants of Samar.

The Balangiga Massacre is popularly associated with three church bells of varying sizes, all taken as war trophies, and brought to the U.S. The smallest bell is on permanent display at the traveling museum of the 9th U.S. Infantry. The two bigger bells are on display at Trophy Park in Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The return of these bells to the Philippines remains the last issue of contention between the U.S. and Philippine governments related to the Philippine-American War.

To understand the U.S. retaliation at Samar we must look at where the problem started. The problems of Samar started after a visit by Brigadier General R.P. Hughes, commander of the Visayan military district, he commented that the American forces “know nothing beyond gun shot range of their stations” (Linn 306). Assuming responsibility for Samar on May 13, 1901, Hughes extended the naval blockade of the island and began active military operations, combined with extensive food and property destruction, tactics he had used effectively on Panay in 1900. He ordered his subordinates to “clear the country of all insurgents, capture the necessary guides and compel them to do such service and generally speaking, make the region untenable by the insurgents” (309). What Hughes failed to take into account was that his policy of extensive population resettlement, causing some villages to triple in size, and the destruction of food and crops left the people of Samar unable to support themselves and probably stiffened their resistance. Facing the prospect of starvation and possible famine, the guerrillas became increasingly desperate and attacked the soldiers at Balangiga allegedly massacring the soldiers there. The massacre of U.S. troops at Balangiga caused the retaliation of Samar.

Linn wrote that the “myth making began at once” reports by the Americans showed, of the thirty-five Americans who managed to escape, fifteen later died of wounds sustained in the attack. Captain Edwin Bookmiller, leader of the initial force sent to Balangiga after the incident, stated that the natives had mutilated the victim’s bodies, beheaded the company commander, Captain Thomas Connell, and gouged the eyes out of a dog that had served as the company’s mascot. Linn also, stated, “this makes stirring reading, but as an accurate account of events it fails most of the test for historical evidence” (311). The Americans’ anger was fueled when they uncovered alleged evidence that the mayor, Pedro Abayan, had planned the entire affair prior to the arrival of Company C. In a letter to General Lukban, Abayan had described how he would ask for protection from the Americans and, at a “favorable opportunity, launch an uprising

them” (Karnow 189). In George Meyers’ book, *“Massacre at Balangiga”*, it is claimed that Co. C., 9th US Infantry was dispatched to Balangiga in response to a request by its then-Mayor Pedro Abayan. This claim is based solely on the testimony of R.O. Taylor, a Co. C survivor, in support of his efforts to secure the Congressional Medal of Honor (201). No such letter has been found in U.S. or Philippine archives and is not referred to by any military authority on either side, despite its potent value.

The attack at Balangiga shocked the Americans causing an “outcry for vengeance” (Linn 312). Due to the public demand in the U.S. for retaliation, President Theodore Roosevelt ordered the pacification of Samar. General Jacob H. Smith’s arrival to the island of Samar would be the means for swift retaliation and pacification the Americans demanded. Smith, who Captain Henry T. Allen concluded was insane ordered his subordinates to “carry out the campaign with more severity and more killing” (314). Smith’s instructions to Major Littleton Waller, commander of a battalion of Marines on Samar, were “I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn, the better you will please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms...persons ten years and older” (Karnow 191). Smith gave additional instructions to make Samar a “howling wilderness” (Miller 220). Later it was observed by a U.S. Army Judge Advocate, that, “only the good sense and restraint of the majority of Smith’s subordinates prevented a complete reign of terror on Samar” (Gates 225).

Three months of widespread destruction accomplished little to pacify Samar. Forced to reevaluate his strategy, Smith issued new guidance to his subordinates on February 13, 1901. His new policies were a copy of those successfully implemented by Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell in the Batangas province. An American patrol captured General Lukban the commander of the Philippine guerillas, five days later, but his successor and his followers continued fighting until the end of April, capitulating only after Smith had toned down his

approach. His surrender ended the “longest and most brutal pacification campaign of the entire war” (Linn 321).

When the campaign was over, the U. S. army court-martialed and retired General Smith from the service. Smith’s abuses prompted a horde of courts-martial, including senior and junior officers. There were reports that about one third of the entire population of Samar was annihilated during the campaign. On July 4, 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt declared that the Philippine-American War, which Americans called the Philippine Insurrection, was over. He made the declaration after the Philippine Commission reported to Roosevelt that the recent “insurrection” in the Philippines was over and a general and complete state of peace existed (Bautista). The action and prosecution of Smith and others completely justifies the claim that the massacre of U.S. troops at Balangiga caused the retaliation of Samar.

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