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

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96307

JUL 18 1967

AVHGC-DH [redacted] 19090.6-A-2 16AUG1966

SUBJECT: Questions by USAC&GSC on Military Operations in Vietnam (U)

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TO: Commandant
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

ACCESSION NO_____
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1. (U) Reference is made to the questionnaires on operations in Vietnam prepared by your faculty and delivered to various headquarters in the Republic of Vietnam by Major General Davison during his recent visit. Replies to the 25 questions are attached as inclosures 1 through 25.

2. (U) Supporting documents, such as SOPs, staff manuals and directives are being forwarded separately because of their bulk. These documents have been segregated into packets corresponding to each of the 25 questions. They are being sent in this manner to facilitate distribution to the departments of the college.

3. (U) It is hoped that this material will provide the faculty with timely information on Vietnam operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Richard J. Seitz

RICHARD J. SEITZ
Brigadier General, US Army
Chief of Staff

25 Incl
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Incl 3: 1 (S) pg
Incl 13: 4 (S) pgs
Incl 18: 2 (S) pgs

DISPOSITION FORM

(AR 340-15)

OFFICE SYMBOL OR FILE REFERENCE	SUBJECT
ALLRI	Questions by USACGSC on Military Operations in Vietnam

TO Dir, DC
Dir, DDO
Dir, DJCASO
Dir, DLUO

FROM C/RI

DATE 12 October 1966 CMT 1

LTC Mortrude/hb/2940

1. Reference letter, AVHGC-DH, U. S. Army Vietnam, 16 August 1966, subject: Command and General Staff College Questionnaires.

2. Reference 1 above ([redacted]), which transmitted consolidated answers in regard to College questions on Vietnam to General Davison, was reproduced and is now on file in each of the instructional departments.

3. Considerable additional follow-up material related to the various basic questions has now been received and is available in the classified section of the College library under the following control numbers:

Control No	Description of Material	Basic Question
N-19090.6-B	Folder 2 and MACV document	2
N-19090.6-C	Folder 4	4
N-19090.6-D	Folder 6	6
N-19090.6-E	Folder 9	9
N-19090.6-F	Folder 11	11
N-19090.6-C	Folder 12 and documents I FFV, II FFV	12
C-19090.6-H	Folder 14	14
C-19090.6-I	Folder 14 and 15	15
N-19090.6-J	Folder 17	17
N-19090.6-K	Folder 18 and documents: I FFV, II FFV, 25th Inf, 1st Inf	18
N-19090.6-L	Folder 19	19
C-19090.6-M	Folder 23	23
N-19090.6-N	Folder 24	24

Eugene W. Wise, Col

WILLIAM D. WISE JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Chief of Resident Instruction

LIBRARY
USA CGSC FT LEAVENWORTH KAN.

AUG 26 1966

ACCESSION NO
PO REGISTR 16919

AVHCC-DH

SUBJECT: Command and General Staff College Questionnaires

TO: Commandant
USA Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1. Reference is made to USARV Ltr, subject as above, dated 16 August 1966, which transmitted a consolidated reply to questions prepared by the faculty and delivered by Major General Davison during his visit to RVN.

2. This package constitutes the follow-up material mentioned in the referenced letter. It includes folders of information corresponding to the various questions asked and the complete replies on specified questions as received from MACV, I FFV, II FFV, 1st Inf Div, 1st Cav Div (AM), and the 25th Inf Div.

3. At Inclosure 1 is an index of the information contained herein. The index is keyed to a listing of the 25 questions asked.

1 Incl
as

JOHN P. BROWN
Colonel, GS
ACofS, G3

QUESTIONS:

1. Refer to documents: MACV, I FFV, II FFV

N-19090.6-B — 2. Folder 2 and MACV document

3. Folder 2 and MACV document

N-19090.6-C — 4. Folder 4

5. No additional information provided

N-19090.6-D — 6. Folder 6

7. No additional information provided

8. No additional information provided

N-19090.6-E — 9. Folder 9

10. No additional information provided

N-19090.6-F — 11. Folder 11

N-19090.6-G — 12. Folder 12 and documents I FFV, II FFV

13. Refer to MACV document (Staff Organization & Functions Manual)

C-19090.6-H — 14. Folder 14

C-19090.6-I — 15. Folder 14 and 15

16. Folder 14

N-19090.6-J — 17. Folder 17

N-19090.6-K — 18. Folder 18 and documents: I FFV, II FFV, 25th Inf, 1st Inf

N-19090.6-L — 19. Folder 19

20. Folder 19

21. No additional information provided

22. No additional information provided

C-19090.6-M — 23. Folder 23

N-19090.6-N — 24. Folder 24

25. No additional information provided

[redacted]

QUESTION 1

1. (U) BACKGROUND: Reports from Vietnam indicate that the Army field force headquarters are playing an increasingly active role in the planning and conduct of tactical operations. To correlate College instruction on the corps headquarters versus the Army field force headquarters, it is necessary to determine the operational and combat service support responsibilities of Army field force headquarters.

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2. (U) QUESTIONS:

1a. Is the role of Army field Force headquarters equivalent to the role of a corps headquarters?

1b. What combat service support responsibilities are assigned to Army field force headquarters?

3. [redacted] ANSWER TO QUESTION 1a:

a. (U) The overall role of the Field Force Headquarters is equivalent to that of a conventional corps headquarters, in that broad general missions are received from COMUSMACV. These broad missions are analyzed and are the basis for more definitive missions issued to subordinate headquarters. Further, as with the conventional US corps, Field Force exercises allocation control of combat support assets.

b. [redacted] Field Force Command Relationships and Responsibilities. Field Forces Vietnam (FFORCEV) with assigned and attached units is assigned to USARV. USARV exercises command less operational control of the Field Force. Operational control is exercised by COMUSMACV. There are two US Field Force Headquarters in South Vietnam. The responsibilities of each CG FFORCEV are as follows:

(1) Exercise operational control of US and Free World Military Assistance Force units designated by COMUSMACV.

(2) Conduct in coordination with CG, Corps (Army of Vietnam, or ARVN), US unilateral and combined US--Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) combat operations.

(3) Provide security for designated critical US and Government of Vietnam (GVN) installations in the ARVN Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ).

(4) Exercise operational control of the US Army Advisory Group in the CTZ and serve as the Senior US Advisor to CG, Corps (ARVN).

(5) Prepare to execute US contingency plans as directed by COMUSMACV.

(6) Provide intelligence and counterintelligence as directed by COMUSMACV.

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[redacted]

c. [redacted] Listed below are some differences in the operations of the field force as compared to the operations a conventional US corps. These differences derive primarily from the close coordination which must be made with the RVN and FWMA armed forces, the civilian agencies of RVN, and other US agencies located in the various CTZ's.

(1) CG FFORCEV serves as Senior Advisor to the CG of the Corps (ARVN). He exercises operational control over the Army Advisory Group serving the ARVN Corps.

(2) FFORCEV operates within the same geographical area as Corps (ARVN). I FFORCEV is located at Nha Trang and II FORCEV is near Bien Hoa. Each operates a TOC to assist in the command and control of tactical operations. Since Headquarters, II FORCEV came to Vietnam with a full TOE, including a complete Corps Artillery Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (I FFORCEV Headquarters came at reduced strength) the TOC of II FFORCEV is somewhat more elaborate than that of I FFORCEV. However, each headquarters performs the same function. Operations within the Corps area require close coordination within US/FWMAF, RVNAF and Government Vietnam (GVN) authorities.

(3) Military operations are planned and controlled on the basis of cooperation and coordination between Commanders of US/FWMAF and Vietnam Commanders at all echelons.

(4) For military operations involving both RVNAF and US/FWMAF forces planning is accomplished as far in advance as possible in which the responsible RVNAF and US/FWMAF Commanders achieve agreement on the purpose, overall objectives, concept of operations, forces to be committed, and general timing. Selected staff personnel designated by these commanders join together to plan the operation in detail. Before the initiation of hostilities the responsible RVNAF and US/FWMAF commanders establish co-located command posts to facilitate coordination, cooperation, mutual assistance and decision making.

(5) For operations involving only US/FWMAF, coordination and cooperation procedures, to include combat liaison, is effected with GVN authorities at appropriate levels through US Advisory teams. Maximum use is made of Vietnamese liaison personnel.

(6) For operations involving only RVNAF, US advisory teams with RVN tactical commanders will effect coordination with the US/RWMAF and the US advisory teams in the area where the RVNAF intends to operate.

(7) As a matter of US policy, US Forces will not be placed under the command or operational control of allied commanders. However, this restriction does not preclude temporary tactical direction of US Forces by ARVN or FWMAF commanders or the temporary tactical direction of ARVN Forces by US commanders under certain circumstances.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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(8) In conjunction with military operations, civic action projects are emphasized. Maximum coordination is effected with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO).

d. (U) Information on FFORCEV staff functions which are peculiar to the field force is provided in inclosure 1-1.

e. (S) The term "Field Force" was selected in preference to Corps for the following reasons:

(1) To preserve the preeminence of the Vietnamese Corps.

(2) To prevent practical problems in communication and coordination that would develop through existence of a Senior US tactical headquarters, designated as a US Corps, functioning in the same area as a Vietnamese Corps.

(3) To avoid the connotation of a unilateral US effort.

(Continued on next page)

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4. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 1b:

a. Like the conventional US Corps, Field Force Headquarters is primarily a tactical organization of execution, with responsibilities limited to the coordination and supervision of logistical support activities.

b. The combat service support responsibilities assigned to the two field force headquarters in Vietnam vary slightly. The primary differences between I and II FFV operations regarding the logistical support of combat operations are:

(1) Tactical environment of the operational area.

(2) Type units involved in operations.

(3) Varied support requirements.

(4) Concepts of operations as envisioned by the individual force commanders.

c. The area of operations for both field forces is characterized by extremely varied terrain and climatic conditions. In the I FFV zone of operations, logistical support is normally provided over great distances due to the location of enemy troop concentrations and target areas. Two major support commands provide combat service support while in II FFV zone of operations, US Army Support Command, Saigon, provides combat service support.

d. I FFV is organized under MTOE 52-1D. It was activated during the initial phases of the US buildup in RVN. Because of the critical shortage of support units during this buildup and the extensive operations that were being conducted, it was necessary that the logistical support be monitored and strongly controlled by a central commander. The G4 section is aligned along the COSTAR concept, and consists of 20 officers and 20 EM. This section is heavily staffed to provide planning and coordination in supply, transportation, and maintenance.

e. I FFV missions its units to conduct operations, and concurrently the ACofS, G4, proposes a logistical support concept for that operation. Prior to the operation, the logistical plan as envisioned by G4 is compared with the unit's concept and discussed with all supporting representatives. I FFV mediates any unresolved problems at this time. During the operation, representatives from G4 visit supporting elements and monitor forward supply areas to insure adequate support. Requests for equipment and ammunition above authorization are submitted to I FFV by units for forwarding to USARV for approval. All other requirements go directly to USARV or 1st Log Command, with info to I FFV.

f. II FFV was activated after two of its three major units had been operating for many months without benefit of higher tactical head-

QUESTION 1 (Cont'd)

quarters. It is organized under TOE 52-1T and is completely along COSTAR guidelines. The staff is organized to monitor and mediate only. Units under II FFV handle all logistical support directly with 1st Log Command agencies.

g. II FFV units develop their own support during planning phase and submit requirements above organic capability to G4 II FFV. The unit coordinates with 1st Log Command and Saigon Support Command and obtains confirmation of support. II FFV monitors and mediates only when the unit and supporting agencies cannot resolve a problem. Requests for equipment and ammunition above authorization are handled in the same manner as I FFV. Only when a conflict arises between the unit and supporting elements that cannot be resolved between them does II FFV influence the support agreement.

Incl 1

Field Force Staff Functions

(U) The following is a brief analysis, by area of responsibility, of field force staff functions as they differ in kind or in emphasis from the functions of a conventional corps staff.

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G1:

a. (C) There are activities and special relationships with which G1 becomes concerned as a result of: Field Force operational control over Free World Military Assistance Forces; zone of coordination functions; and advisory organization functions.

(1) (C) Free World Military Assistance Forces. Relationships between US and FWMAF (i.e., ROK Forces) are described in classified agreements to which major commanders are signatories. Generally, US commanders have no legal authority in matters pertaining to law, order, and discipline of ROK Army troops and units. Special channels of cooperation are therefore established.

(2) (U) Zone Coordination Functions: These functions involve the preservation of law and order, evacuation of non-combatants, morale and welfare, liaison with civil authorities, and other functions associated with the responsibilities of major unit or support command commanders by virtue of their being senior officers located in designated zones. These functions extend the activities of commanders into varying special relationships with Vietnamese civilian businessmen, Vietnamese governmental authorities, Vietnamese Army units, FWMAF units, and US lodger units. It is essential to understand that US Commanders have no legal authority over Vietnamese civilians or ARVN troops and units.

(3) (C) Advisory Organization Functions: The Deputy Senior Advisor of the Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) has his own personnel staff which assists him in advising Vietnamese units and in preparing Senior Advisor Monthly Evaluation Reports pertaining to the personnel status of Regional Force/Popular Force and ARVN units. The G1 of the FFORCEV reviews and comments on the personnel aspects of these reports prior to their submission to HQ MACV, even though the Corps Advisory Group is under the command of MACV.

b. (U) There are no significant differences between field force and corps headquarters in the Adjutant General, Chaplain, Finance and Headquarters Commandant functions. Provost Marshal functions differ more in emphasis than in kind. Responsibilities in liaison and coordination are greater, complicated by differences in law enforcement methods, attitude and number of nations involved. The limited use of land lines of communication considerably reduces traffic control responsibilities. Conversely the lack of land lines of communication complicates evacuation of prisoners of war. PW responsibilities are further complicated by fighting primarily a guerrilla "no front war" and the inherent difficulties of identification, control, and segregation.

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G2:

a. (U) The functions and scope of intelligence activities performed by a field force headquarters are considerably broader and more intricate than that visualized for a corps headquarters. Although each of the field force type headquarters (i.e., III MAF, I and II FFORCEV) has problems peculiar to its respective area of operations, some of the peculiarities of intelligence requirements facing field force G2 elements are as follows:

(1) Area of Interest: The geographic size of the area of intelligence interest is considerably larger than that normally considered by a Corps G2 Section. Since there is no readily definable "front line" in Vietnam, I FFORCEV's intelligence production effort covers the entire II Corps Zone, an area approximately 30,000 square miles in size. This is approximately 46 percent of the land area of the Republic of Vietnam, and is comparable to the total land area of the Republic of Korea. II FFORCEV's area of interest is not as large as I FFORCEV's but is nevertheless more extensive than that normally considered by a Corps G2 Section.

(2) Intelligence Requirements: In addition to the large size of the geographic area of interest, the production of intelligence in support of field force counterinsurgency operations involves detailed consideration of factors or categories of information not given as much weight in "conventional" military operations. In addition to the standard "enemy, weather and geographic features," the following additional considerations have a major impact on the final intelligence product:

(a) Political intelligence concerning both the enemy and the host government. Political intelligence concerning the enemy includes determining and understanding the political chain of command extending from the Lao Dong (Communist) Party in NVN into SVN and the manner in which this complex chain of command and control is employed to direct and control the war of subversion within the Republic of Vietnam. Political intelligence pertaining to the host government is concerned with the political structure (formal and informal) and the periodic changes thereto, and their effect on current and planned US/FWMAF counterinsurgency programs and operations. It also concerns the activities, objectives and influence of noncommunist dissident or opposition political organizations. Fundamental to the foregoing is an understanding of the ideological base used by the enemy in their selection and use of military strategy, tactics and objectives.

(b) Sociological or socio-psychological intelligence is needed to provide an understanding of the various ethnic and social groups within the country as a whole and the composition and interaction between diverse groups in the specific areas of operations. Knowledge of cultural and behavioral patterns and characteristics is not only useful in the production of intelligence in support of tactical operations, but is also essential to the development and support of Revolutionary Development Programs, civic action projects, and psychological operations.

(c) Economic intelligence. Economic intelligence in this context is an extension of what in a conventional situation would

be considered as knowledge of enemy logistics. It includes consideration of the economic productivity of specific areas and the material support derived or anticipated by the insurgents from this production. It also involves an understanding of the various practices and techniques employed by the enemy to produce, coerce or extort revenues and goods needed to support their war effort within both enemy and government controlled areas.

G5:

(U) Primary G5 interest at a type corps headquarters is directed toward minimizing the effect of the civilian population upon the tactical operation only and not toward civic actions programs. In a corps, operational and administrative functions are therefore proportionately less than in a field force. A field force headquarters should normally be supported by a civil affairs company under the staff supervision of the FForce G5 to provide added capability for civil affairs/civic action during tactical operations.

COMPT:

(U) Only limited comptroller functions are performed at field force headquarters and they are restricted to support of that headquarters only. For that reason, no comptroller staff element has been provided for in the headquarters. Comptroller channels are direct from USARV to division and separate brigades.

Sig:

(U) Application of communications capabilities differs in many ways, depending on the situation, from that in a type corps. Doctrine and responsibility, however, are not fundamentally changed.

Engr:

(U) The roles are essentially the same. A major function is the consolidation of support requirements and coordination with the supporting and logistical commands. Support is based on mutual confidence and need rather than command. With rare exceptions this has worked extremely well. An example is the direct contact at Group level which the I FFORCEV Engineer utilizes with engineer groups of the 18th Engineer Brigade. Since the combat support mission has been assigned the highest priority by the Brigade Commander, many actions can be accomplished with information copies only being furnished the Brigade. USARV and MACV are available to resolve any differences which may arise.

Avn:

(U) The role of the aviation element in the field force headquarters is very similar to that of a corps headquarters. The Army aviation special staff section operates in the TOC or in close proximity and performs the primary functions of coordinating Army aviation operations with other tactical support operations.

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QUESTION 2

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1. (U) BACKGROUND: The College presents instruction on joint and combined commands and their operations. Within existing references, no mention is made of organizational methods involved when US unified commands are established in an allied country with no combined command as the final authority. In order to present a comparison of existing doctrine versus the current structure in Vietnam, it is essential to identify the methods used to cope with those problem areas normally resolved by a combined headquarters.

2. (U) QUESTION: What innovations to operations of larger unit headquarters have been introduced to cope with coordination and conduct of tactical and logistic operations involving multi-national forces where no combined command exists?

3. (U) ANSWER:

a. (U) The basic concept underlying command relations is one of cooperation and coordination in the mutual interest of US/FWMAF and RVNAF.

b. (U) Some of the innovations and procedures that have been introduced to cope with the coordination and conduct of operations are as follows:

(1) COMUSMACV exercises operational control over Free World Military Armed Forces.

(2) Campaign plans are developed through combined effort of USMACV and RVNAF and agreed to by both. For example Campaign Plan AB 141, which is a RVNAF/MACV Campaign Plan for Military Operations in the Republic of Vietnam for 1966, was developed through the combined efforts of RVNAF Joint General Staff and MACV, and was further agreed to and signed by the Chief, Joint General Staff, and COMUSMACV. In addition, RVNAF/JCS Directive 140 provides guidance and instructions for both the RVNAF and FWMAF to support the 1966 National Rural Construction Plan, now known as the Revolutionary Development Plan (description in Inclosure 3-1).

(3) Annexes to the campaign plan outline procedures to be followed for coordination of the RVNAF and US/FWMAF operations as follows:

(a) As far in advance of projected operations as possible, the responsible RVNAF and US/FWMAF commanders confer personally to achieve agreement on the purpose, overall objectives, concept of operations, forces to be committed and general timing. This agreement is published in writing to guide staffs and subordinate commanders. Subsequent to reaching agreement, the responsible commanders meet periodically to issue additional guidance.

(b) Following agreement by the responsible commanders, selected staff members designated by these responsible

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commanders join together to plan the operation in detail. They develop specific objectives, tasks, forces, phasing and timing. Tactical areas of responsiblity are defined, and detailed arrangements are made for air, artillery, naval gunfire and other required support.

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(c) Before initiation of hostilities the responsible RVNAF and US/FWMAF commanders establish co-located command posts to facilitate the highest order of coordination, cooperation, mutual assistance and decision making. The command posts contain the necessary personnel and equipment to permit coordination and control of air, artillery and naval gunfire support.

(d) Liaison officers are exchanged between key RVNAF and US/FWMAF headquarters to assist in planning and conduct of operations.

(e) To permit combat operations in support of rural construction operations, coordination with appropriate GVN authorities is accomplished through the appropriate US advisory teams.

(f) For operations involving only US/FWMAF, coordination and cooperation is effected with GVN authorities at all levels, as appropriate, through U. S. Advisory teams. Maximum use is made of Vietnamese liaison personnel during such operations.

(g) In operations involving only the RVNAF, US advisory teams with tactical commanders effect coordinations and liaison with the US/FWMAF and US advisory teams in the area in which the RVNAF intends to conduct operations.

(h) MACV Directives establish policy and procedures for the organization and functioning of Combat Support Coordination Centers (CSCC) to insure that all combat support elements are coordinated. (A copy of this directive is at Inclosure 18-2).

(4) Integration and affiliation of units. Small integrated unit operations have been conducted in which de facto combined arrangements have been achieved on a temporary basis for tactical purposes. Also through mutual agreement between the commanders concerned, temporary tactical direction has been acceded to the U.S. commander in tight situations requiring centralized control. In addition ARVN units have been affiliated with US Units, i.e., ARVN squad with a US platoon, ARVN platoon with US company, etc., to provide for developing leadership, esprit de corps and an aggressive attitude through association, observation and example. This assists in the development of mutual trust, respect and understanding between the US and ARVN forces.

(5) Special Assistant COMUSMACV. COMUSMACV has a special Assistant, an office of General rank, with location with the Joint General Staff. In addition to such specific duties as may be assigned by COMUSMACV, he is responsible for:

(a) Maintaining command liaison between COMUSMACV and:

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1. The Minister of Defense, Government of Vietnam.

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2. The Chief, Joint General Staff, RVNAF

(b) Represents COMUSMACV on combined inspections at general officer level designed to

1. Assess RVNAF training status, RVNAF unit readiness, and revolutionary development progress.

2. Address such other subjects as may be mutually agreed between COMUSMACV and the Minister of Defense, Government of Vietnam, or the Chief, Joint General Staff RVNAF.

c. (U) In order to assist with the coordination and conduct of tactical and logistical operations involving multi-national forces in RVN, a Free World Military Assistance Office was established. The FWMAO is in effect a special staff organization within the MACV structure. The functions of this office are:

(1) Coordinates and supervises all preliminary planning for Free World Military Assistance Force deployments to the Republic of Vietnam.

(2) Negotiates for COMUSMACV, a general agreement with representatives of each nation contemplating dispatch of military assistance contingents to the RVN.

(3) Effects coordination of FWMAO matters with the American Embassy, USOM, JUSPAO, RVNAF, and MACV staff agencies to include: FWMAF personnel policies and procedures; collection and exchange of military information and/or intelligence; operational employment of FWMAF contingents; logistical support for FWMAF contingents and planning of FWMAF structure and deployment to RVN.

d. (C) Another innovation that is related to the combined command concept and relieves in to some degree the need for a combined command is the TAOR, TZ, AO concept.

(1) The Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) is an area void of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces in which the base area of US forces is situated. It is the responsibility of the commander to keep this area secure from enemy forces. The size of this area depends on the size of the force located therein. Operations may be conducted within this area by the occupying forces at any time without coordinating with ARVN.

(2) The Tactical Zone (TZ) and Area of Operations (AO) are coordinated areas set aside for a specified length of time for the sole purpose of conducting operations to destroy enemy forces located therein. These operations are usually combined in nature with participating ARVN forces operating in conjunction with or, in some instances, under

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the operational control of the US commander. Once operations are ended in these areas, the US/FWMA forces normally withdraw from the area.

e. With respect to civic actions, in the absence of a combined command, unilateral directives have been issued by the GVN (Inclosure 2-1), COMUSMACV (Inclosure 2-2), and the US service component commanders directing military participation in civic action projects. Coordinating councils are established at the government level, MACV and down through the various echelons to the province level. At the province level, MACV Advisory Groups, USAID, and JUSPAO representatives, constituting the "Provincial Team", coordinate and assist US and FWMAF participation in the Revolutionary Development Program. MACV Advisory Groups with the Vietnamese Armed Forces assist, in a similar manner, Vietnamese military participation.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96243

MACPD

Ser No 1538
24 February 1966

SUBJECT: RVNAF Civic Action Directive

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Attached is Directive 963 issued by Lieutenant General Co, in his capacity as the Minister of War and Reconstruction, concurrently Secretary of Defense, RVNAF, on 2 February 1966, prescribing the basic principles for RVNAF Military Civic Action.

2. The publication of this document should be recognized as a major event, in that it formalizes a civic action concept for RVNAF and should effectively contribute to a more intensified civic action program. It is essential that all advisors and unit civic action staff officers be aware of the potential this represents and to be prepared to plan and jointly execute civic action projects with RVNAF when feasible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HOWARD D. SCHULZE
Major, AGC
Asst AG

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as

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REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
963/QP/QS/RC

DIRECTIVE
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Prescribing RVNAF Military Civic Action Activities

CHAPTER I

PURPOSE

Article 1: The purpose of this directive is to prescribe the basic principles for RVNAF Military Civic Action as well as the authority and responsibilities of the officials responsible for the performance of RVNAF Military Civic Action activities.

CHAPTER II

GENERAL

Article 2: With a view to obtain the support of the rural people for defeating the Communists and restoring security in rural areas, Civic Action activities will be included in RVNAF activities, immediately upon publication of this directive.

Article 3: RVNAF Military Civic Action activities comprise relief activities and the participation in economic, social welfare, medical, and educational development programs.

Article 4: The participation of RVNAF units in the above programs comprises the assistance in command and technical fields, and the assignment of laborers, mechanical equipment, material, and funds as are available.

CHAPTER III

BASIC PRINCIPLES

Article 5: The competent authorities and military commanders of all ranks will strictly comply with the following basic principles in the performance of Military Civic Action activities.

51. Military Civic Action activities will only be conducted within the capabilities of the units without hindering the execution of their combat operations mission.

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52. Military Civic Action activities are not intended to replace the development programs of the government, but will be carried on to support these programs.

53. The Military Civic Action activities assigned to Regular Forces units will be conducted in insecure areas and the areas being pacified.

54. The Regional and Popular Forces are the main forces to carry on Military Civic Action activities and are responsible for conducting such activities whenever the situation and capabilities permit.

55. The purpose of Military Civic Action activities is to assist and guide the people in carrying out economic and social welfare development programs and not to implement these programs in place of the people.

56. Forced labor for the implementation of economic and social welfare development programs is strictly forbidden.

CHAPTER IV

AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PROVINCE CHIEF

Article 6: As a representative of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, the Province Chief is responsible for preparing plans, and coordinating, directing, and approving the participation of Regular Forces, Regional Forces, and Popular Forces units in economic and social welfare development projects.

Article 7: In order that Military Civic Action activities can achieve maximum success, the Province Chief will select, from the economic and social welfare development programs prepared by the province, those projects to be assigned to military units for implementation, which require the most appropriate use of these military units.

Article 8: The Province Chief is authorized to assign Military Civic Action activities to the Regular Forces units stationed in his province but not placed under his control, if such assignment is approved by the CTZ and DTA commanders.

Article 9: The Province Chief is authorized to employ the military units and their resources, with the exception of their funds, to help the people implement those projects which have been planned by the government ministries and for which funds have been provided.

Article 10: The Province Chief is authorized to employ the military units as well as their resources and funds to help the people implement those projects which are deemed necessary but have not been planned by the government ministries, and for which no funds have been provided.

CHAPTER V

EXECUTION

Article 11: All details relating to the execution of this directive will be prescribed by the Central PolWar Agency/JGS.

Saigon, 2 Feb 66

The Minister of War and Reconstruction,
Concurrently Secretary of Defense
Signed:

Lieutenant General NGUYEN HUU CO

OFFICIAL:

Acting Director of Cabinet,
Ministry of Defense
Lt Col NGUYEN DINH VINH
Deputy Director

/Signed and Sealed/

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 515-2

30 April 1966
(MACPD)

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

1. PURPOSE. To establish military civic action policies for all subordinate commands and advisory detachments, outline responsibilities for the development, coordination, and implementation of a military civic action program, and recommend basic guidance for other Free World Military Assistance Force commanders.

2. GENERAL.

a. Military Civic Action is defined as participation in or support of economic and sociological programs useful to the local population at all levels. Military Civic Action in Vietnam has two interrelated objectives, one of which is to improve the living conditions of the people so as to remove one of the underlying causes of the insurgency while the other is psychological and seeks to gain and maintain the support of the people for the GVN. Programs include short-term but high impact projects in the fields of education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and other areas which contribute to the general welfare and serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. Military or paramilitary forces utilize their skills and resources on behalf of, or in cooperation with, civil authorities, agencies, or groups.

b. Winning and maintaining the friendship and active cooperation of Vietnamese civilians living within an operational area is an essential step in reducing the effectiveness of the local Viet Cong guerrillas whose success is ultimately dependent upon civilian support. The two main aspects of US military presence which contribute toward good civil-military relations are the individual soldier's attitude in his dealings with local civilians, and planned military civic action programs. In Vietnam, military civic action, which incorporates the individual skills of US personnel and the inherent capabilities of US units, has become a major US contribution to the Revolutionary Development program.

c. The principal GVN focal point for integration of military civic action is the individual province chief who is the senior governmental official and concurrently serves as the province's military commander. He has an administrative staff for determining requirements, establishing priorities, and allocating resources for military civic action projects.

3. POLICY.

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TAB B

a. Operations plans will provide for utilization of all available assets for military civic action commensurate with the tactical situation.

(1) In operations designed to return an area which has been under VC domination to full time governmental control, or in operations wherein units occupy or operate within an area for an extended period of weeks or months, military civic action will be an essential element of the operation and will be accomplished as soon as the tactical situation permits.

(2) In connection with short term operations in inhabited areas, military civic action will, as a minimum, consist of emergency assistance such as medical treatment of non-combatant casualties.

b. Units not involved in necessary military operations should exploit their capability to engage in local military civic action projects designed to improve the life of rural people.

(1) Unit commanders must contact the local MACV sector or subsector advisor and the local Vietnamese official - district, village or hamlet chief - before beginning any specific projects in order to determine how the unit can best assist local plans and projects. In addition, efforts should be made to participate in combined civic action projects in which US/FWMAF personnel work side-by-side with RVNAF personnel. When additional guidance or supplies are required for particular projects, the normal point of contact is the MACV sector or subsector advisor, who will then contact the appropriate GVN official or the representative from USAID.

(2) Units will concentrate their civic action efforts on projects which complement or support the Revolutionary Development Program such as construction or repair of public facilities, roads, and bridges; supplementing the educational system by presenting English instruction to interested students and adults; establishing a planned medical civic action program for civilians in cooperation with Vietnamese personnel; assisting in the distribution of commodities furnished by USAID or the International Voluntary Agencies; and providing gifts to the Vietnamese from the people of the Free World. Units not able to complete projects should ensure a continuity of effort by a relieving unit or by sector resources.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Subordinate commanders and MACV advisors at all levels will devote personal attention to the subject of military civic action. Emphasis will be placed upon integrated plans which coordinate the efforts of military units with the advisory chain and GVN officials. Combined military civic action projects with US/FWMAF and Vietnamese military or paramilitary units and the local civilians working together are desirable and encouraged.

(1) HQ MACV is responsible for the development of policy and procedures involving the command as a whole and for directing the civic action efforts of component commands and advisory elements. Within HQ MACV, specific staff responsibility for policy, procedures, coordination, monitoring and evaluating military civic action projects is assigned to the Political Warfare Advisory Directorate (MACPD).

(2) Component commanders are responsible for the development, execution, and support of military civic action programs by subordinate units in Vietnam within the context of policies and procedures developed by COMUSMACV.

(3) US Advisors assigned as members of sector, division, and corps advisory teams are responsible for training and assisting the RVNAF in the conduct of military civic action. Sector and subsector advisors are responsible for providing advice to and liaison with US forces in military civic action programs when such units operate in their areas of responsibility.

(4) Senior US tactical commanders in each corps tactical zone are responsible for guiding and evaluating specific military civic action projects undertaken by subordinate units to insure that such projects are coordinated with GVN province plans and are consistent with MACV military civic action guidance.

b. In the US Mission, USAID has primary advisory responsibility for the socio-economic development of Vietnam. USAID advises the GVN in the administration of its development programs and provides the necessary resources for specific projects. Through the Provincial Committee, the USAID Representative helps to ensure that military civic action projects are directed toward the goals of the Revolutionary Development Program.

c. JUSPAO assists the military civic action program by encouraging the publicizing of civic action projects by the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) to ensure that the Vietnamese people recognize that the projects are the result of efforts of the GVN on their behalf, in coordination with other Free World countries. JUSPAO releases stories of newsworthy military civic actions that demonstrate the humanitarian, non-combatant contribution of US and other FWMAF forces in Vietnam.

d. The Provincial Committee, which consists of the Province Chief, the Senior MACV Advisor, and the USAID Provincial Representative, is the key to achieving an integrated military civic action program within a province and is a practical level for planning and executing projects. This committee should develop a file of potential military civic action projects which would have the greatest impact on the population and best support other programs.

5. CIVIC ACTION RESOURCES.

a. USAID has the capability, in resources and organization, to support US/FWMAF military forces and advisors in their military civic action efforts, mainly with food and construction materials. Through the USAID system of representation to major troop units and at corps (region) and province, plans can be made to support combat operations with immediate and appropriate military civic action. USAID commodities are normally stocked at provincial and regional warehouses. Arrangements can be made for units to pre-stock needed resources to insure immediate availability for planned operations.

b. Supplies to support the military civic action program are also available from the International Voluntary Agencies (IVA) such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services, etc. The USAID Provincial Representative will be contacted for any commodity required, and, if unable to meet requests from USAID stocks, he will assist in forwarding requests to the individual agencies. When IVA commodities are made available, commanders of divisions and separate brigades are authorized to contact IVA agencies directly to arrange for transportation and distribution of allocated military civic action supplies.

c. Funds are available for civic action expenditures from sources listed below.

(1) Subsector Fund.

(2) MACV Civic Action Fund.

(3) USAID Regional Director's and Provincial Representative's Imprest Fund.

6. PUBLICIZING CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES. Civic Action activities must be fully publicized in the public information media to insure complete recognition of the military support being offered the GVN Revolutionary Development Program. The focus of publicity will be placed upon the Vietnamese effort and government officials involved with US/FWMAF personnel and contributions shown in a support role. Care must be taken to ensure that only a minimum number of US/FWMAF personnel are in attendance at dedication ceremonies and other like functions.

7. REPORTS (RCS: MACPD-01).

a. SUBJECT	AS OF DATE	FROM	TO
Civic Action (US/FWMAF)	Last day of each month	Component Commander	HQ MACV, ATTN: MACPD

This report will include statistics on the following efforts undertaken during the report period:

(1) Brigade/Regiment involved (or comparable USN/USAF unit).

(2) Construction/engineering projects (type/location).

(3) Medical treatments (type/number/location).

(4) Voluntary contributions in support of charitable institutions (amount/location).

(5) Distribution of commodities (commodity class - medical, construction, clothes, foodstuff, etc./tonnage/location) supplied by IVA and private donors and means of distribution (land, sea, air; military or civilian).

(6) Educational efforts (type/location).

(7) Recovered foodstuffs redistributed to the people (amount/location).

(8) Health and sanitation (type/location).

(9) Efforts not otherwise mentioned above.

(10) Evaluation of program.

b. MACV Directive 335-10, dated 23 March 1966, requires Sector Advisors and Advisors to the Mayors of autonomous cities to submit a monthly report on civic action as part of the overall MACV monthly report on Revolutionary Development (RCS: MACJ3-15).

8. REFERENCES.

a. MACV Directive 37-11, subject: Subsector Fund.

b. MACV Directive 40-9, subject: Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP).

c. MACV Directive 525-3, subject: Minimizing Non-Combatant Battle Casualties.

d. MACV Directive 525-9, subject: Control Disposition and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property and Food Supplies.

e. Letter, MACPD, serial 4768, HQ MACV, 31 Oct 65, subject: Supplies for US/Free World Military Assistance Forces Military Civic Action.

f. Letter, MACJ332, serial 1987, HQ MACV, 8 Mar 66, subject: Regional Directors and Provincial Representatives Imprest Fund.

g. Joint Directive 2-65, 1 Sep 65, subject: US Agency Field Relationships.

h. RVMD Directive 963, 2 Feb 66, subject: RVNAF Military Civic Action.

i. MACV Directive, subject: Civil Affairs (to be published).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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QUESTION 2

1. (U) BACKGROUND: Recent reports indicate that many critical areas in Vietnam have not been cleared and/or secured. US forces appear to be engaged in search and destroy or reaction operations outside the critical areas. Current doctrine envisions a gradual extension of control by the "spreading oil drop" technique.

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2. (U) QUESTIONS:

3a. Why are US units employed outside the critical areas before these areas have been cleared?

3b. Is the "spreading oil drop" technique applicable in Vietnam?

3c. What role in the "spreading oil drop" technique is properly assigned to US combat forces?

3. [redacted] ANSWER TO QUESTIONS 3a and 3c.

a. US units are employed outside critical areas before these areas are completely cleared since the combat effectiveness of US units can be more effectively utilized against VC/NVA main forces while RVNAF can be best utilized in detailed clearing and securing operations. Both types of operations are necessary and are complementary.

b. The 1966 combined campaign plan assigns the following missions to the Vietnamese Armed Forces (RVNAF) and US/Free World Forces:

(1) RVNAF will defend governmental centers, control and protect rice and salt producing areas, and will conduct clearing and securing operations in selected high priority areas.

(2) US and other Free World Forces are responsible for security of their major bases, clearing in the vicinity of those bases, and, as directed, assisting in the control and protection of rice and salt producing areas.

(3) RVNAF and US/FWMAF will both conduct operations outside of the secure areas against VC forces and bases.

c. The primary role of US Forces in the three phase concept described in inclosure 3-1 is to disrupt and destroy the VC and NVA main force units and their base areas in order to provide a level of security so that revolutionary development and nation building activities may take place. US Forces are providing security for the clearing and securing forces by keeping the VC/NVA off balance and on the run by seeking out VC/NVA operational and logistical bases so they cannot disrupt government activities.

GROUP-4
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Declassified after 12 years.

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4. [redacted] ANSWER TO QUESTION 3b.

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a. The "spreading oil drop" technique has been the key element in the GVN strategy for several years. The military campaign plans for 1964 and 1965 both called for expansion of government control in this manner. For instance, the Hop Tac Secretariat was established in 1964 to coordinate the "spreading oil drop" technique.

b. The 1964 and 1965 programs were not particularly successful, not because of any fallacy in the concept, but because there was a lack of sufficient security forces to counter the VC/NVA build-up and also because there was a lack of adequate forces, both military and civil, to follow-on when areas were cleared.

c. The plans for 1966 established national and corps priority areas that are to be used as a base for outward expansion of control. RVNAF military commanders have been tasked to clear, secure, and assist in development of national priority areas by the end of 1966. Revolutionary Development activities are to follow when areas are cleared in order to provide continuing security in these areas.

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A BRIEFING ON
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

THE PURPOSE OF THIS PORTION OF THE PRESENTATION IS TO FAMILIARIZE YOU WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT AND THE 1966 PROGRAM.

THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS ENGAGED BOTH IN A STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE AGAINST THE FORCES OF COMMUNISM REPRESENTED BY THE VIET CONG AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, AND IN A PROGRAM TO BUILD A NATION. EITHER OF THESE TASKS IS DIFFICULT SEPARATELY, BUT THEY MUST BOTH BE ACCOMPLISHED SIMULTANEOUSLY.

THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM CONSISTS OF TWO DISTINCT BUT INTERRELATED ARMS:

(1) THE VIET CONG MILITARY APPARATUS CONSISTING OF A WELL EQUIPPED, EXPERIENCED ARMY AUGMENTED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE REGULAR FORCES.

(2) THE SECOND PART OF THE INSURGENCY APPARATUS CONSISTS OF VIET CONG ACTIVISTS, TERRORISTS, SYMPATHIZERS, AND COLLABORATORS WHO CONSTITUTE THE WEB OF SUBVERSION CALLED THE INFRASTRUCTURE.

TO COUNTER THE THREAT, VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES MUST BE DEFEATED MILITARILY; THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL APPARATUS AND TERRORIST BACKING MUST BE ISOLATED AND DESTROYED; PUBLIC SECURITY, LAW, AND ORDER MUST BE RESTORED; AND THE PEOPLE MUST BE WON OVER TO ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT.

THE RURAL POPULATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM, ABOUT 80 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL, HAS BEEN EXPOSED TO THE STRESSES AND PAINS OF WAR FOR MANY YEARS. THE PEASANT HAS BEEN ABUSED AND EXPLOITED BY GROUPS BOTH IN AND OUT OF POWER. AS A CONSEQUENCE, FATALISM AND WAR WEARINESS HAVE SAPPED HIS MOTIVATION; GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION, INEFFICIENCY, ABUSIVENESS, AND INDIFFERENCE HAVE REINFORCED HIS DISILLUSIONMENT. TO SOME, CONFLICT HAS BECOME A WAY OF LIFE WITH AN ATTITUDE OF EITHER APATHETIC INDIFFERENCE OR HOPELESS RESIGNATION. THEY HAVE ACCUSTOMED THEMSELVES TO THE STRUGGLE WITHOUT COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO EITHER SIDE.

Encl 3-1

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IN ORDER TO DEFEAT THE COMMUNISTS, THE PEOPLE MUST ENGAGE WILLINGLY IN THEIR OWN SELF-DEFENSE, SELF-HELP, AND SELF-GOVERNMENT IN WAYS THAT ISOLATE THE COMMUNISTS AND MAKE THE PEOPLE STEADILY LESS VULNERABLE TO COMMUNIST THREATS OR APPEALS.

TO DEFEAT THE VIET CONG AND SIMULTANEOUSLY BUILD A NATION, THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM HAS ESTABLISHED A CONCEPT WITH THREE MAIN PHASES: A MILITARY OFFENSIVE TO DESTROY THE VC AND NORTH VIETNAMESE MAIN FORCES; REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TO CONTINUE THE RESTORATION OF SECURITY AND ESTABLISH GOVERNMENT CONTROL; AND NATION BUILDING TO DEVELOP A NATION THAT CAN SURVIVE IN A MODERN SOCIETY OF NATIONS.

WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM THESE THREE PHASES ARE TAKING PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY. IN AREAS WHERE THERE IS ADEQUATE SECURITY, NATION BUILDING IS IN PROGRESS. IN OTHER AREAS REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IS UNDERWAY, AND IN OTHER LESS SECURE AREAS, MILITARY SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED.

DURING THE MILITARY OFFENSIVE, THE EMPHASIS IS ON MILITARY SECURITY AND MILITARY MATTERS PREDOMINATE. AS REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRESSES, CIVIL AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT AND SECURITY TENDS TO BECOME LESS A MILITARY AND MORE A POLICE FUNCTION, UNTIL IN THE NATION BUILDING PHASE, CIVIL AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMS ARE OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE. THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MILITARY OFFENSIVE, THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND MINISTRY OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND ALL MINISTRIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR NATION BUILDING.

IN ORDER TO CLEARLY ILLUSTRATE THIS THREE PHASE PROCESS I WILL TRACE THE EVOLUTION OF CONTROL FROM AN AREA NORMALLY UNDER VC CONTROL TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

FIRST COMES THE MILITARY OFFENSIVE. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF THIS PHASE ARE TO:

(1) DISRUPT AND DESTROY VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE MAIN FORCES.

(2) PROGRESSIVELY CURTAIL AND ELIMINATE SIGNIFICANT ENEMY INFILTRATION OF MEN AND MATERIAL INTO SOUTH VIETNAM.

(3) PREPARE THE WAY FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT.

VIETNAMESE REGULAR FORCES AND FREE WORLD FORCES FIRST CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS TO DEFEAT AND DISRUPT VC AND NVA FORCES AND DENY THEM BASE AREAS, SO THAT COMMUNIST MAIN FORCE UNITS CANNOT INTERFERE WITH REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND NATION BUILDING PROGRAMS.

IN ADDITION, OPERATIONS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ARE CONDUCTED BY REGULAR AND REGIONAL MILITARY FORCES TO CLEAR VC FORCES OF COMPANY SIZE OR LARGER FROM PREPLANNED SELECTED AREAS WHERE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IS TO TAKE PLACE AND ALSO TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THESE AREAS.

AS MILITARY FORCES ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE LEVEL OF SECURITY IN AN AREA, REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IS INITIATED TO SEPARATE THE PEOPLE FROM VIET CONG CONTROL AND WIN THEIR ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ENCOMPASSES THOSE MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO LIBERATE THE PEOPLE FROM VIET CONG CONTROL, RESTORE LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MAINTAIN PUBLIC SECURITY, AND WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE TO THE GOVERNMENT. IT REQUIRES COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION OF BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL PROGRAMS TO RESTORE AND EXPAND GOVERNMENT CONTROL, MAINTAIN SECURITY, AND IMPROVE THE LIFE OF THE PEOPLE.

THERE ARE FOUR MAIN TASKS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PHASE:

(1) DESTROY THE LOCAL VC AND GUERRILLA FORCES, AND PROVIDE LOCAL SECURITY.

Incl 3-1

(2) DISCOVER AND DESTROY THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL AND MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE.

(3) REPLACE COMMUNIST AUTHORITY WITH EFFECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVE BOTH TO THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE AND NATIONAL AUTHORITY.

(4) MOTIVATE AND ORGANIZE THE PEOPLE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AND RESIST THE RETURN OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE.

PROVINCIAL FORCES, INITIALLY REGIONAL FORCES AND LATER POPULAR FORCES, CONDUCT SECURING OPERATIONS TO DESTROY THE REMAINING VC GUERRILLAS AND PROVIDE LOCAL SECURITY FOR THE POPULATION. AS THE SECURITY SITUATION PERMITS, REGULAR MILITARY FORCES MOVE ON AND CONDUCT MILITARY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

CIVILIAN AUTHORITY IS INTRODUCED IN THE FORM OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE AND NATIONAL POLICE. THESE CADRE MOVE INTO RELATIVELY SECURE VILLAGES AND HAMLETS TO ESTABLISH THE INITIAL LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION, ORGANIZE THE POPULATION FOR SELF-DEFENSE AND OTHER REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TASKS, ASSIST IN DESTROYING THE VC COVERT POLITICAL AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION, AND INITIATE SIMPLE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS TO HELP WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE.

A REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE GROUP CONSISTS OF 59 PERSONNEL ORGANIZED IN FOUR TEAMS AND A GROUP HEADQUARTERS. THIS GROUP IS RECRUITED FROM THE AREA WHICH IT IS TO WORK, TRAINED FOR 13 WEEKS AT THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER, AND RETURNED TO THE AREA. PEOPLES ACTION TEAMS EXPLAIN GOVERNMENT POLICIES, MOTIVATE THE PEOPLE, AND ORGANIZE AND TRAIN LOCAL SELF-DEFENSE FORCES. THE CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM ESTABLISHES THE INITIAL VILLAGE AND HAMLET GOVERNMENT. THE CENSUS GRIEVANCE TEAM SURVEYS AND CLASSIFIES THE POPULATION, GATHERS INFORMATION, DISCOVERS THE ASPIRATIONS AND DESIRES OF THE POPULATION, AND CHOOSES CANDIDATES FOR HAMLET ELECTIONS. THE NEW LIFE DEVELOPMENT TEAM ASSISTS THE PEOPLE IN SELF-HELP PROJECTS, INITIATES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS, AND ASSISTS IN OTHER PROJECTS DESIRED BY THE PEOPLE.

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BY THEIR ACTIVITIES, THE CADRE ESTABLISH CONTINUING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE HAMLET PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES; AND THEY GUIDE THE PEOPLE TOWARD PARTICIPATING WILLINGLY IN THEIR OWN DEFENSE. THIS CADRE GROUP WILL STAY IN A HAMLET, DAY AND NIGHT, UNTIL THEIR FUNDAMENTAL TASKS ARE COMPLETED - WHEN A NORMAL GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE IS ESTABLISHED, HAMLET CHIEFS ARE ELECTED OR APPOINTED, AND THE PEOPLE ACTIVELY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT.

AS REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TASKS ARE COMPLETED, NATION BUILDING BEGINS. DURING THIS PHASE, ACTIVITIES OF A SOCIAL-ECONOMIC-POLITICAL NATURE TAKE PLACE TO STRENGTHEN GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND IMPROVE THE CONDITIONS OF THE PEOPLE. NATIONAL POLICE ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY, LAW, AND ORDER AND MILITARY FORCES ARE PHASED OUT. MORE LASTING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS ARE UNDERTAKEN SUCH AS CONSTRUCTION OF HOSPITALS AND SCHOOLS, AND NORMALCY RETURNS.

1966 IS THE FIRST YEAR UNDER THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM'S NEW REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WITH ITS REVISED CONCEPTS STRESSING TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES TO DELIBERATELY WIN THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE AND INVOLVE THEM IN PROGRAMS FOR THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BETTERMENT.

INSTEAD OF ATTEMPTING TO EQUALLY PACIFY THE ENTIRE COUNTRY AS WAS ATTEMPTED IN PROGRAMS OF PREVIOUS YEARS, IN 1966 PRIORITY AREAS WERE SELECTED WHERE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS AND ACTIVITIES COULD BE FOCUSED.

FOR 1966, THERE ARE THREE GENERAL TYPES OF PRIORITY AREAS: NATIONAL, CORPS, AND PROVINCIAL.

THERE ARE FOUR NATIONAL PRIORITY AREAS WHERE OVERALL EMPHASIS IS BEING PLACED:

IN I CORPS, QUANG NAM PROVINCE - DANANG CITY AREA

IN II CORPS, BINH DINH PROVINCE - QUI NHON CITY AREA

IN III CORPS, THE SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH EXPANSE

AND IN IV CORPS - AN GIANG PROVINCE

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CORPS PRIORITY AREAS HAVE BEEN SELECTED IN I, II, AND IV CORPS. HERE THE CORPS ARE PLACING SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT.

EACH PROVINCE HAS A DETAILED REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR 1966. IN THESE PLANS THERE ARE PROVINCIAL PRIORITY AREAS SIMILAR TO THE CORPS AND NATIONAL PRIORITY AREAS. IN FACT, THE CONTROL MECHANISM FOR THE CORPS AND NATIONAL PRIORITY AREAS ARE THE PROVINCIAL PLANS. THESE PLANS LIST THOSE HAMLETS IN THE PROVINCE THAT WILL BE BROUGHT UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL DURING THE YEAR, ESTABLISH MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, AND LIST THE DETAILS OF THE FOLLOWING VARIOUS REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS:

RESETTLEMENT	CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS)
SELF-HELP	IRRIGATION
TRANSPORTATION	ANIMAL HUSBANDRY
LAND CLEARING	AGRICULTURE
WAREHOUSES	FISHERIES
ROADS AND BRIDGES	RURAL ELECTRIFICATION

FOR 1966, APPROXIMATELY 1.6 BILLION PIASTERS OR 20 MILLION US DOLLARS HAVE BEEN ALLOCATED FOR THESE PROGRAMS.

THE 1966 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM BEGAN SLOWLY BUT HAS GAINED MOMENTUM. EMPHASIS IS ON QUALITY RATHER THAN QUANTITY. EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL IS NECESSARILY SLOW AND DELIBERATE IN ORDER TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN LASTING EFFECTS. THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE IS BEING STAFFED TO MANAGE AND CONTROL REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. THE INCREASED PRESENCE OF US AND OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES IS PROVIDING ADDITIONAL SECURITY. TRAINED REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE ARE BECOMING AVAILABLE.

THE PROGNISIS TO ACHIEVE PROGRAMMED GOALS VARIES FROM POOR TO EXCELLENT. THE AREAS WHERE THE PROGNOSIS IS POOR ARE THOSE AREAS, PARTICULARLY I CORPS IN THE NORTH, WHERE POLITICAL UPHEAVAL HAS DISRUPTED REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES.

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PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS CONTINUES TO BE CONTROLLED BY FOUR FACTORS:

THE FIRST TWO DEAL WITH LOCAL SECURITY - FIRST, THE ABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM TO FURNISH ADEQUATE VILLAGE/HAMLET SECURITY, AND SECOND, THE ABILITY OF THE VC TO DISRUPT GOVERNMENT EFFORTS.

THE THIRD IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE FIRST - ONE OF THE MAJOR RESTRICTIONS ON LARGE SCALE EXPANSION OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IS THE LIMITED AVAILABILITY OF QUALIFIED MANPOWER. MILITARY, PARAMILITARY, AND CIVILIAN AGENCIES ARE COMPETING FOR QUALIFIED MANPOWER IN A DIMINISHING MANPOWER POOL.

THE FOURTH FACTOR IS THE ABILITY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE AND SUPPORTING ELEMENTS TO CONTROL THE POPULATION AND GAIN ITS SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM.

THE CONTINUING EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STRUCTURE AND INCREASE AVAILABLE RESOURCES IN 1966 WILL DEVELOP A BASE FOR FURTHER PROGRESS IN 1967.

THIS COMPLETES MY PORTION OF THE PRESENTATION.

Encl 3-1

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QUESTION 4

1. (U) BACKGROUND: The college curriculum includes a subject covering actual combat service support operations in US overseas commands. A representative of the college visited PACOM in March, but he was not permitted to visit Vietnam. For this reason, the following questions pertain to the 1st Logistical Command and other Vietnam combat service support organizations in PACOM.

2. (U) QUESTIONS:

4a. What is the organization for combat service support of US Forces in Vietnam?

4b. What is the assignment and organization (to battalion level) of the 1st Logistical Command?

4c. What combat service support elements other than the 1st Log Command are in Vietnam? What are their assignments and missions?

4d. To what extent have COSTAR TOE's been introduced in Vietnam? Have any problems ensued from their use?

3. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 4a: See attached inclosure 4-1.

4. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 4b:

a. 1st Log Comd is assigned to US Army Vietnam with the mission of providing logistical support to US Army Forces in RVN, providing common user supply and support to other designated US Forces in RVN as directed and providing common user supply and support to Free World Assistance Forces in RVN as directed. Engineer construction, signal/operations and aviation maintenance and supply, which includes aircraft, avionics and related armament are excluded.

b. Attached as inclosures 4-2, 4-3, 4-4 and 4-5 are charts showing the organizational structure of 1st Log Comd and each support command, down to battalion level.

5. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 4c:

a. The other combat service support elements assigned to US Army Vietnam are shown in the attached inclosure 4-1.

b. The missions of these elements are as follows:

(1) 34th General Support Group has the mission to provide aircraft maintenance and supply for non-divisional units as required.

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(2) 18th Engineer Brigade has the mission to provide combat support to US Army units as a first priority. In addition, the Brigade provides combat support to elements of FWMAF and engineer construction to US Army and FWMAF agencies.

(3) The 1st Signal Brigade performs communications-electronics functions in support of US military and governmental agencies in Southeast Asia as directed by competent authority.

6. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 4d:

a. Selected units of the 1st Log Comd were reorganized under COSTAR in July 1966. At this point in time we are unable to comment on problems that may ensue from the introduction of COSTAR into RVN.

b. Attached as inclosures 6 through 15 to inclosure 4 are charts showing COSTAR organization of 1st Log Comd.

Encl 4

COMBAT SUPPORT

AND

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ORGANIZATION

USARV



Legend:

XX COMUSMACV is also CG, USARV

_____ COMMAND

_ _ _ OPNL CONTROL

★ COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

X COMBAT SUPPORT

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Encl 4-2.



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CHART 2

Incl 4-2

Encl 4-3



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*Asg to 44th Med Bde
Atch to USASC, Saigon

CHART 2

Encl 4-3

Encl 4-4



*Asg to 44th Med Bde
Atch to USASC, Cam Ranh Bay

CHART 2

Encl 4-4

Incl 4-5



* Asg to 44th Med Bde
Atch to USASC, QN

CHART 2

Incl 4-5

Incl 4-b



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CHART 3

Incl 4-6

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Encl 4-7

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LONG BINH SUB-AREA COMMAND



CHART 3

Encl 4-7

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Encl 4-5



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CHART 3

Encl 4-8

Encl 4-9

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VUNG TAU SUB-AREA COMMAND



CHART 3

Encl 4-9

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Incl 4-10



CHART 3

Incl 4-10

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

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CHART 3

Incl 4-11

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CAM RANH BAY

CHART 3



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Encl 4-13



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CHART 3

Encl 4-13

Incl 4-14

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

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CHART 3

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

CHART 3

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QUESTION 5

1. (U) BACKGROUND: Most recent information received by the college indicated that Marine Corps elements, concentrated in I Corps Area were being supported logistically by their own service channels from Okinawa.

2. (U) QUESTION: What responsibilities (if any) does the Army in Vietnam have for combat service support of Navy and Marine Corps elements, especially in the I Corps area?

3. (U) ANSWER: Normally the Army in Vietnam has no responsibilities for combat service support of Navy and Marine Corps elements in the I Corps area. However, on certain occasions when Marine Corps elements are conducting operations in the II, III or IV Corps areas the Army does provide limited logistical support for common type supplies as required, on a reimburseable basis.

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QUESTION 6

1. (U) BACKGROUND: Informal information indicates that planning factors in FM 101-10-1 have been used extensively by 1st Logistical Command in Vietnam. FM 101-10-1 is used throughout combat service support instruction at the College. Information concerning current validity can be useful in increasing student interest in planning exercises.

2. (U) QUESTION: How do replacement and consumption factors experienced in Vietnam compare with those in FM 101-10-1?

3. (U) ANSWER: In general, US Army replacement and consumption factors compare favorably with those in FM 101-10-1. Noticeable differences are evident in Class III and IIIA. Class III Bulk and Class III Package consumption factors are considerably below FM 101-10-1, primarily because of the poor and insecure road net which restricts the use of wheeled vehicles. Class IIIA however is more than double the factor in FM 101-10-1 because of the extensive use of helicopters. Current planning factors are shown on the attached sheet as inclosure 6-1. In addition, consumption data for combat operations are published in the form of logistical critiques prepared by this headquarters. Copies of these critiques are distributed to the Command and General Staff College. Information contained therein provides accurate consumption data for current operations in Vietnam.

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Incl 6

The planning factors listed below are used for planning of logistical support in the Republic of Vietnam. They were developed at the CINCPAC Requirements Conference held from 2-10 June 1966, based on usage data and the experienced judgment of representatives from CINCUSARPAC, COMUSMACV, USARV and 1st Logistical Command.

UNIT	FM 101-10-1	USA	USN/USCG	USAF	USMC	FWMAF
Class I (Dry)	6.8	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.9
Class I (Ref)	6.8	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.9
Class II(A)&IV(A) Class II & IV	18.58	16.0	8.0	17.2	4.0	16.0
*Class III Bulk	13.70	9.9				
Class III Pkg	9.20	2.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	2.0
Class IIIA	17.12	37.66				
Class V	8.23	10.1	10.1	NEG	18.8	10.1
Exchanges	-----	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.0
Lbs/Man/Day	42.81	42.9	34.0	34.0	41.4	42.9
ST/Man/Day		.0214	.0175	.0170	.0207	.0214
ST/Man/Mo		.65	.52	.51	.62	.65

*Actual consumption factors for the period Jan-Mar 66.

NOTES: a. The Class II (A) & IV (A) factor does not include Engineer construction. The factor for engineer construction is under study.

b. Class V (A) - For CY66 actual tonnage allocations were used. For CY67 2,000 ST per USAF squadron/month and a 1.1 sortie rate with 2.4 ST load factor/sortie per USMC squadron day were used.

c. Unit equipment tonnages will be actual tonnages if available. Otherwise, a factor of 1.8 ST per individual is used.

Encl 6-1

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QUESTION 7

1. (U) BACKGROUND: Part of the instruction in Communications Zone operations presented by USACGSC is devoted to the procedures used in determining supply daily tonnage requirements to support a theater of operations. Related to this problem is that of determining the adequacy of the existing ports and air terminals in the theater to provide the throughput capacity needed to move the required supplies into the theater. Student interest will be increased in instruction dealing with supply requirements determination and terminal throughput capacity evaluation if current examples from experiences in Vietnam can be related.

2. (U) QUESTIONS:

7a. What is the current throughput capacity of each of the existing ports and air terminals in Vietnam?

7b. What problems have been encountered in meeting the daily tonnage requirements to support the theater?

7c. What plans exist for developing additional ports and air terminals or increasing the capacity of the existing ones?

3. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 7a:

a. The throughput capacity of existing ports operated by the US Army Transportation Corps in the Republic of Vietnam is:

Daily Average Throughput - June 1966

	Discharge		Handled	
	S/T	M/T	S/T	M/T
Saigon	4530	8706	4929	9893
Nha Be	1431	1558	1431	1558
Vung Tau	1330	2415	1373	2643
Cam Ranh Bay	2766	6009	3337	7526
Phan Rang	193	253	147	296
Nha Trang	678	1257	813	1468
Qui Nhon	1617	2546	1795	2787

NOTE: The ports of Da Nang and Chu Lai are operated entirely by the Navy.

b. The throughput capacity of existing air terminals in the Republic of Vietnam is:

(1) Tan Son Nhut - Receives approximately 40,000 short tons of air cargo from CONUS per month.

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Incl 7

QUESTION 7 (Cont'd)

(2) Cam Ranh Bay Air Force Base - Receives approximately 10,000 short tons of cargo per month from CONUS or outside of RVN.

4. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 7b:

a. The major problems encountered in meeting daily tonnage requirements at port and beach clearance operations have been:

(1) Antiquated facilities i.e. absense of piers, cranes, and deep draft piers to discharge cargo from the ship direct to the pier or shore.

(2) Shortages of Terminal Service and Boat Companies.

(3) An inadequate railroad with which to move cargo inland from the port.

(4) A shortage of Truck Companies.

(5) Limited use of Land LOC's due to lack of security and low bridge capacities.

(6) Lack of storage facilities once cargo is cleared inland from the port.

b. The major problems which have been encountered in meeting daily tonnage requirements at air terminals have been:

(1) Lack of modern air terminals. Until recently only Tan Son Nhut could handle large jets or heavy cargo planes.

(2) Rapid troop build-up utilizes cargo planes as troop carriers.

5. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 7c:

a. Port expansion projects are currently under way at Saigon (Newport), Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, Vung Tau and Nha Trang. The port expansion program envisions installation of De Long Piers, permanent LST ramps, POL off-loading facilities (pipelines), channel dredging and special ammunition piers. Most of the port expansion projects are programmed to be finished in late 1966 and early 1967. However because of shortages in materials, labor and funds some construction projects are behind schedule.

b. Air Terminal Expansion includes new permanent runways at Tan Son Nhut and Cam Ranh Bay Air Force Base. It is envisioned that a replacement battalion will be organized at Cam Ranh Bay to handle direct flights from

Encl 7

QUESTION 7 (Cont'd)

CONUS carrying replacements. The addition of a second runway at Cam Ranh Bay will also facilitate additional air cargo flights into this base.

c. Present planning envisions expanded ports and air terminals to handle programmed tonnage increases. The increased handling capabilities of RVN ports makes it mandatory that land LOC's and the present rail capability be expanded. Depots must increase their receiving and storage capability in order to handle the increased throughput of the expanded ports.

QUESTION 8

1. (U) BACKGROUND: College instruction in combat service support includes exercises in the determination of transportation requirements for moving forward tonnages required to support daily operations and to maintain adequate reserves. Student interest in exercises will be increased if current experiences from Vietnam can be used for illustration.

2. (U) QUESTION: What modes of transportation (and in what approximate percentages and/or tonnages) are used for movement of supplies forward from ports (especially Cam Ranh Bay) and air terminals to field depots and using units?

3. (U) ANSWER:

a. All four modes of transportation are utilized to transport cargo inland to the unit from the ports, air terminals and depots in the Republic of Vietnam. An average percentage and tonnage figure was obtained by evaluating performance figures for the past four months (Mar-Jun 66).

Mode	Percent	Short/Tons
Truck	63.8	203,817
Air	18.8	59,879
Intra-Coastal Sealift	15.9	50,214
Rail	1.5	4,086
	100%	317,996

b. Air accounted for 18.8% (59,879 short tons) of the cargo moved forward monthly from the ports, depots and air terminals. Air lift is used primarily to move high priority cargo i.e. Red Ball Shipments, ammo, repair parts and POL. Presently, two C130's are equipped to handle POL products.

c. Intra-Coastal Sealift accounted for 15.9% (50,214 short tons) of cargo moved forward (laterally) to the units from the port or depot. Cam Ranh Bay Depot shipped 65% of all cargo going to Phan Rang (Base Camp 101st Abn) and Nha Trang (Hq Field Force I, Hq 5th Special Group) by ship, mainly because the roads to these subareas were not consistently secure. Inclosure 8-1 shows typical intra-coastal sealift routes.

d. Trucks moved 63.8% (203,817 short tons) of all cargo forward from ports and depots. Because most depots are close to the ports, trucks move almost all cargo from beaches or piers to the depot. Even though a high percentage of cargo moves by truck to the unit, only about 200 miles of available highways are secure. Inclosure 8-2 shows the roads which are open for military trucks. Special military clearance operations open other portions of the highways as needed. The most prevalent problems with respect

Incl 8

QUESTION 8 (Cont'd)

to highway operations, aside from security, are low bridge capacities and poor road surfaces.

e. Railroads accounted for only 1.5% (4,086 short tons) moved forward from the ports and depots. Inclosure 8-3 shows those sections of the Republic of Vietnam national railway which are secure and are carrying military cargo. Future plans call for opening new sections of the railroad.

Incl 8

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SOME OF THE EXISTING INTRA-COASTAL ROUTES



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HIGHWAYS



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RAILWAYS



--- RED DOTTED LINE SHOWS TRACKS WHICH ARE OPEN FOR MILITARY TRAFFIC.

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Encl 8-3

QUESTION 9

1. (U) BACKGROUND: Rapid force buildup and base development by US forces will have caused significant labor requirements at a time when Republic of Vietnam forces are being increased. Procedures used in providing labor support in Vietnam may provide realistic input to subjects that include this aspect of logistic operations.

2. (U) QUESTION: Is indigenous labor plentiful in Vietnam? Is it unionized? Is security screening effective? What measures have been taken to minimize competition between service elements and the local economy?

3. (U) ANSWER: Indigenous labor, insofar as actual manpower is concerned, is plentiful in Vietnam. There is, however, a critical shortage of skills and this problem has further compounded the personnel security clearance system. The language barrier also creates significant problems not easily overcome. Urban areas produce the greatest labor force, however, many Vietnamese lack the desire to either move to or work in many of the areas where our military is operating. This is primarily because these areas are generally not advantageous for habitation, schools or business. The Cam Ranh Bay area is a typical example. That locale has a large requirement for civilian workers. There has been and continues to be an effort to resettle refugees to create a pool of labor.

There are unions among the labor force in Vietnam. The exact percentage, however, cannot be defined. Significant unionization in the same degree and sense as US union organizations is unrecognizable at this time, but it is known that steps are being taken to increase employee unions and organizations among employees of the US Forces.

Security screening is difficult and still of questionable reliability. Civil unrest and mass refugee movement over the past decade, coupled with combat conditions and lack of appropriate records precludes the establishment of a truly effective security screening precedure. The system requires from 30 to as high as 120 days to obtain security clearances.

The local economy is adversely affected by the presence of troops since costs rise with requirements from service elements for services and real estate. US Forces will not hire local nationals presently in the employ of the Vietnamese Government unless they have a written release. Likewise, they will not be hired from another US Government agency without proper release. This measure in itself appears to be sufficient at present to minimize competition. Shortages of Assistance-in-Kind (AIK) funds have necessitated use of O&MA funds for direct hire personnel.

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QUESTION 10

1. (U) BACKGROUND: TM 38-750, Army Equipment Records Procedures, presents a system of maintenance record keeping and reporting procedures. In accordance with TM 38-750, the college teaches that referenced procedures are applicable to a peacetime environment only. Recent information from Vietnam indicates that units in Vietnam continue to use the system. If this is true, and if the system is feasible under combat conditions, a revision of the maintenance records and reporting concept may be required.

2. (U) QUESTIONS:

10a. Are maintenance management procedures outlined in TM 38-750, Army Equipment Records Procedures being used in Vietnam?

10b. Are units experiencing any specific problems in applying the system?

10c. Are units required to submit materiel readiness reports as required by AR 750-10?

10d. Are units required to submit unit readiness reports as required by AR 220-1?

3. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 10a: Although adjusted to meet local conditions, the provisions of TM 38-750 are implemented within Vietnam. Attached as Incl 10-1 is a copy of USARV Regulation 750-20 which is the Army level implementation of TM 38-750.

4. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 10b: There are no specific problems which can be identified with application of TM 38-750 procedures in Vietnam that are not inherent in any data recording and collection system installed in this environment.

5. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 10c: AR 750-10 does not require reports to be submitted by units. It does provide the basic formula for computing the logistics portion of the Unit Readiness Report which is submitted under the provisions of AR 220-1.

6. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 10d: Department of the Army excused US Army units in Vietnam from Unit Readiness reporting requirements under AR 220-1, effective with the 31 Dec 65 report.

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Incl 10

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO US Forces 96307

*REGULATION
NUMBER 750-20

31 May 1966

MAINTENANCE OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

The Army Equipment Record System (TAERS)

1. PURPOSE: To implement TM 38-750 w/C-2 and prescribe USARV reporting procedures for TAERS Reports amd Materiel Readiness Report, DA Form 2406 (RCS CSGLD-1042 (R1)).

2. APPLICABILITY: The provisions of this regulation are applicable to all Army units and activities assigned or attached to USARV.

3. DEFINITION: The Army Equipment Record System (TAERS) is the standard system used to determine, correct, record or report to responsible authorities pertinent factors contributing to qualitative or quantitative deficiencies of equipment.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, this headquarters is assigned staff responsibility for the implementation of the TAERS program and material readiness functions of this command.

b. Commanders at all levels are responsible for the full implementation of TM 38-750 and provisions of this regulation.

5. GENERAL: a. Information required by TAERS can be provided only by individuals and units in possession of the equipment. Therefore, it is essential that records and reports be maintained with the highest degree of accuracy. Data submitted under this system are used in every aspect of materiel readiness from design and procurement to disposal. One of the benefits of the system provided to the user is the replacement of old or inadequate materiel with new and improved equipment.

b. Commanders and materiel readiness officers at every echelon must insure that reports reflect accurate information and that reports are submitted to the proper address within time frames specified.

c. Incomplete, inaccurate and illegible forms and reports result in loss of valuable time at every echelon of command. Reports of this nature will be returned to the preparing unit through command channels.

*This regulation supersedes USARV Reg 750-20, dtd 23 Nov 65 w/C-1, Letter, this HQ, Subject: Materiel Readiness Report (DA Form 2406), dtd 30 Nov 65, Letter, this HQ, Subject: TAERS, DA Form 2408-7, dtd 18 Nov 65, Letter, this HQ, Subject: TAERS, DA Form 2408-7, dtd 28 Dec 65, Letter, this HQ, Subject: Materiel Readiness Report, DA Form 2406, dtd 15 Mar 66.

INCL 10-1

6. POLICY: a. DA Form 2400 may be used in lieu of the equipment log for dispatch authorization and utilization control when authorized by the major subordinate command.

b. Protection and storage of equipment log books. During classified troop movements and while in areas of combat operations, unit commanders will take actions deemed appropriate to safeguard equipment log books and information contained therein depending on the situation at the time. Log books may be stored in a central location and made available during inspections and servicing and repair of equipment, or intelligence information may be removed from log books for storage in a secure location and log books remain with the equipment. Blank forms will not be placed in log books.

c. Preprinted control numbers. Preprinted control numbers on DA Forms 2407, 2410, 2408-3, 2408-7, and 2408-8 will not be altered in any manner except as authorized by paragraph 1-7e, TM 38-750, for corrected copies. No other entry will be made in the block with the control number.

d. Modification work orders. The US Army Equipment Index of Modification Work Order (RCS CSGLD-1250) published by the Logistics Data Center, Lexington, Kentucky, will be used as the official publication for reference to current authorized and required DA MWOs.

e. Unit Location. DA Forms of the 2400 series forwarded as prescribed by TM 38-750 and this regulation will contain the APO designation in all instances where unit location is required. Example: Block 2, DA Form 2408-3, "APO US Forces 96307".

f. Recommendations for changes. Recommendations for changes to TM 38-750 will be submitted on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to DA Technical Manual, Parts Lost or Supply Manual 7, 8, 9) through command channels to this headquarters, ATTN: Materiel Readiness Officer.

7. REPORTS AND INCLOSURES: The following reports will be prepared and submitted as prescribed by TM 38-750 as modified in the appropriate inclosures to this regulation:

a. Unit Identification Codes. Inclosure 1.

b. Materiel Readiness Report (RCS CSGLD-1042(R1)) (DA Form 2406). Inclosure 2.

c. Maintenance Request (RCS CSGLD-1047(R1)) (DA Form 2407) and Maintenance Request Continuation Sheet (DA Form 2407-1). Inclosure 3.

d. Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR). Inclosure 4.

e. Equipment Maintenance Record (Organizational) (RCS CSGLD-1048 (R1)) (DA Form 2408-3). Inclosure 5.

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f. Weapon Record Data (RCS CSGLD-1051) (DA Form 2408-4). Prepared and submitted in accordance with TM 38-750.

g. Equipment Transfer Report (RCS CSGLD-1049 (R1)) (DA Form 2408-7). Inclosure 6.

h. Equipment Acceptance and Registration Record (RCS CSGLD-1050 (R1)) (DA Form 2408-8). Prepare in accordance with TM 38-750 and submit the NMP copy (Copy 1) to TAERS, PO Box 9036, Honolulu, Hawaii 96820. No other distribution of this form will be made except the log book copy will always remain in the log book.

i. Component Removal and Repair/Overhaul Record (RCS CSGLD-1052 (R1)) (DA Form 2410) and Transaction Report (DA Form 2410-1). Inclosure 7.

8. CLASSIFICATION: Classification of reports will be in accordance with TM 38-750 and AR 380-5. For missiles, see USARPAC Reg 750-10.

9. REFERENCES: a. TM 38-750.

b. TM 38-750-1.

c. AR 18-50.

d. DA Cir 750-14.

(AVD-MR)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY VIETNAM OFFICIAL ★★★★

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7 Incl
as

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UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODES

1. Unit Identification Codes (UIC) for morning reports will be used as the UIC for logistics reporting purposes with the following exception:

For logistics reporting purposes only, the seventh digit is added as a USARV Major Command Code. Reading from left to right, the structure of the UIC for logistics reporting is as follows:



The UIC for the 15th AG Admin Co of the 1st Cav Div, to be used for all logistical reporting, will be WAGXAAA.

2. Definitions: a. Service Designator. "W" indicates a Department of the Army unit.

b. Parent Unit Code. Three alphanumeric characters assigned by DA to identify the parent unit.

c. Sub Unit Code. Two alphanumeric characters used to identify sub units of a parent unit.

d. Major Command Code. A one position alpha code assigned to identify the major USARV Command to which a unit is assigned.

3. The following major command codes will be the seventh digit of the UIC for all logistics reporting. All units assigned to the following commands will add a seventh digit to the assigned UIC as indicated:

Major Command	7th Digit for UIC
1st Cav Div (Airmobile)	A
1st Inf Div	B
1st Bde, 101st Abn Div	C
18th Engr Bde	D
23d Arty Gp	E
34th Gen Spt Gp (AM&S)	F
89th MP Gp	G
97th Arty Gp	H

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Major Command (Cont'd)	7th Digit for UIC (Cont'd)
525th MI Gp	J
1st Avn Bde	K
Special Troops, HQ USARV	L
1st Sig Bde (STRATCOM)	M
I Field Force Vietnam	N
173d Abn Bde	P
1st Log Comd	R
II Field Force Vietnam	S
25th Inf Div	X
MACV	U
5th Special Forces Gp	T
507th Trans Gp	W
HQ Area Comd, Saigon	Y

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MATERIEL READINESS REPORT (RCS CSGLD-1042 (R1)) (DA FORM 2406)

1. Purpose of Report. DA Form 2406 provides commanders at all levels, information as to the readiness status of equipment in the hands of using organizations. Information contained in this report is designed to meet the following specific requirements:

a. Provide commanders at lower levels with equipment status information for planning day-to-day operations.

b. Provide installation and organization commanders with information as to maintenance backlogs, serviceability of equipment, density of selected items of equipment and availability of equipment for operations.

c. Provide Department of the Army the materiel readiness status of designated items of equipment.

2. Reporting Units. All Army organizations or installations maintaining a property book under the provisions of AR 735-35, or a property account under the provisions of AR 711-16, will complete this report. Reports from organic companies and batteries of a TOE battalion may be consolidated at battalion level even though property books or accounts are maintained at company or battery level. When consolidation is effected, the units included within the report will be listed in the remarks section along with the applicable Unit Identification Code (UIC).

3. Frequency of Report. DA Form 2406 will be prepared as an accumulative quarterly report. The report cut-off date will be as of the last day of the quarter. Units arriving in-country before the 20th day of the last month of a quarter will submit the quarterly report. In this instance, accumulative information will be from date of arrival.

4. Preparation of Report. The report will be prepared as prescribed by paragraph 3-6d, TM 38-750 w/C-2, with the following clarifications/additions or exceptions:

a. Unit Identification Code (UIC) will be placed in block 6 of DA Form 2406.

b. Block 4 will contain the following address: CG, USARV, APO US Forces 96307, ATTN: AVD-MR.

c. Reportable items are those items authorized or on hand in the unit, which are designated by an "X" under the 2406 column, appendix III, TM 38-750. In addition to these items, equipment listed in Incl 1 to this incl, will also be reported.

d. In order to effect the non-availability for supply and non-availability for maintenance entries as illustrated on page 3-20, figure

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3-6-4, TM 38-750, the vertical lines must be drawn on this form thru columns 11i and J. Later editions of DA Form 2406 may have these lines added.

e. The following procedures will be used for recording and reporting non-available supply and maintenance time:

(1) Organizational non-available time. The 2408-1, 2408-3 and 2408-14, in conjunction with the Document Register (DA Form 2064) will be used to tabulate organizational non-availbility supply and maintenance time. This data will be computed monthly and entered in column G on the monthly 2408-1, for ready reference in completing DA Form 2406.

(2) Support level non-available time. The support shop completing repairs on the equipment will enter in block 16 of DA Form 2407 (organizational copy No 4) the number of days that the equipment was waiting parts. The unit will consider all other time the equipment was in support maintenance as non-available time-maintenance. All delays experienced in transporting the equipment to and from repair shops are chargeable to non-available time-maintenance. The support unit (shop) will, for equipment not returned to the supported unit by the end of the reporting period, and upon request from the supported unit, provide the information required.

(3) Responsibility for obtaining support level non-availability time is that of the reporting unit. Responsibility for providing this information is that of the support maintenance unit.

f. Special reference is made to page 3-18, figure 3-6-2, TM 38-750 and the remarks thereon which state "Model M-135 issued and is limited standard. Not reported but listed as short". Units will report limited standard as specified, however, when a shortage is indicated and some or all of that shortage is actually being filled by limited standard items on hand, the number will be shown in parenthesis. Example, a unit reports a shortage of six trucks: Three of these six are filled with M-135's. The entry in column 11o would be 6(3).

g. The quantity of equipment in the Amber Category due solely to age, mileage, hours, rounds or starts (as determined by applicable ECS) will be entered in parenthesis in block 11L on the line entry of the specific type, make and model of equipment reported. This will be an additional entry, e.g., unit has ten M-211, 2½ ton trucks classed as amber, five of these trucks are amber due to overage or mileage. Entry in block 11L would be 10(5).

h. An item of equipment issued in lieu of an authorized item will be reported in the manner specified on page 3-24, para 3-6b (1) (i), TM 38-750.

i. Entry in column e (authorized will be the quantity of the specific line item that is authorized the unit in a Department of the

Army TOE, TA, MTOE and other special authorization documents. Equipment on hand receipt (on loan) or TDY to the unit will not be reported as authorized.

j. Entry in column f (on hand) will be the quantity of the specific line item that is on hand in the unit. On hand is interpreted to mean that equipment which is under the operational control of the reporting unit at the time report is prepared. Items which are at support or depot maintenance for repair and return to the reporting agency (including contractor repair) are considered to be on hand.

k. Entry in column c (shortage) will be the quantity of the specific line item that is authorized the unit but is not on hand. Exception to this is equipment which is on loan (hand receipted) to or TDY to another unit, or equipment in transit.

l. Entry in column p (TDY) will be the quantity of the authorized equipment (column e) which is not on hand because it is on loan to or TDY to another organization. Included in the TDY category is equipment that has been issued the unit, but is still in transit from another station due to PCS of the reporting unit. The number of items that are in transit from another station due to PCS of reporting unit will be shown in parenthesis in column p, e.g., a unit has five $\frac{3}{4}$ ton trucks on loan to another organization and three $\frac{3}{4}$ ton trucks that have not arrived from the previous station; entry in column p would be 8(3). If none of the items are on loan, entry in column p will show in parenthesis only the number that are in transit, e.g., (3).

m. Block 12 will be completed as shown in figure 3-6-3, TM 38-750. In addition, the fourteen digit milstrip requisition number will be placed in column 12h, if this number is available to the unit.

n. Items issued in lieu of authorized items which contain similiar operational characteristics and mission capabilities will be considered for profiling purposes if an ESC has been established for the issued items. Where an ESC has not been published for an item type classified A, B, or C the ESC of a like type item will be used, i.e., for M48 Tank use ESC for M48A1. Items not profiles by ESC, will be scored "Green" if operational or "Red" if non-operational. Reason for "Red" will be indicated for these items. Equipment is considered operational when it will perform the mission for which it was designed.

o. Commanders may add an item of equipment to the report if a readiness problem is being experienced which effects mission capability.

p. Missile systems will be reported as prescribed by USARPAC Regulation 750-10 (NOTAL).

q. Maintenance float items will be reported on a separate DA Form 2406. Utilization Code "4" will be placed in block 9, DA Form 2406, for all maintenance float reports.

5. Disposition. a. The original copy of report will be mailed to this headquarters, ATTN: AVD-MR. This copy will be forwarded not later than the 3d calendar day following cut-off date of report. It is essential that reports are forwarded no later than the date specified.

b. One copy will be provided the maintenance support unit which normally supports the reporting unit.

c. One copy will be retained on file by the originator for one year and then destroyed.

ADDITIONAL ITEMS TO BE REPORTED ON DA FORM 2406

The following items of equipment will be added to the report. Do not place these items in regular line number sequence of items required by TM 38-750. Add them at the end of the report in the sequence shown below:

*779998 TYPE I CONEX
**779999 TYPE II CONEX

Reporting will be as follows:

Column 11b	CONEX
Column 11c	TYPE I or TYPE II
Column 11d	As Stated Above
Column 11e	Leave Blank
Column 11f	Total on Hand
Column 11r	Number Unserviceable

*TYPE I CONEX
FSN 8115-654-2908
Length 4'3", width 6'3", height 6'10½"
Capacity 135 cubic feet

**TYPE II CONEX
FSN 8115-271-7001
Length 8'6", width 6'3", height 6'10½"

Incl 1 to Incl 2 to USARV Reg No 750-20, dtd 31 May 66

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Maintenance Request (RCS CSGLD-1047 (R1)) (DA Form 2407) and Maintenance Request Continuation Sheet (DA Form 2407-1)

1. DA Form 2407 is used to:

a. Request maintenance service.

b. Report accomplishment of modification work orders (MWO).

c. Record maintenance performed.

d. Submit equipment improvement recommendations (EIR).

e. Serve as a service document for maintenance data collection.

2. DA Form 2407 used as a request for maintenance service.

a. For preparation see TM 38-750.

b. Disposition.

(1) The requesting organization prepares DA Form 2407 and sends it with the equipment log book to the support activity.

(2) The support activity completes block 24 and returns the receipt copy to the requesting organization's representative as a receipt for the equipment and the log book.

(3) When returning copy number 4 to the using unit upon completion of work requested, the support maintenance facility, for reportable items of equipment under the DA Form 2406 column, appendix III, TM 38-750, will enter in the lower margin of DA Form 2407 the number of days the item of equipment was awaiting parts while in support maintenance.

(4) Upon completion of Section II of this form, the equipment will be returned to the representative of the requesting organization and copies of DA Form 2407 will be disposed of as prescribed below. National Maintenance Point (NMP) copy forwarded pertains only to selected items listed in appendix III, TM 38-750.

(a) Receipt Copy No 1, obtained from requestor, then destroyed.

(b) NMP Copy No 2, forward to TAERS, PO Box 9036, Honolulu, Hawaii 96820 (except for aircraft).

(c) Control Copy No 3, may be destroyed.

(d) Organization Copy No 4, will be returned to the requesting agency. Requesting agency will destroy this copy after 90 days.

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(e) The file copy No 5, will be retained by the organization indicated in block 17 for a period of 90 days and then destroyed.

3. DA Form 2407 used to report accomplishment of modification work orders at organizational level.

a. For preparation see TM 38-750.

b. Disposition.

(1) Receipt Copy. Not issued, will be destroyed.

(2) NMP Copy. Forwarded to TAERS, PO Box 9036, Honolulu, Hawaii 96820 (except for aircraft).

(3) Control Copy. May be destroyed.

(4) Organization Copy. Destroyed 90 days after report is submitted.

(5) File Copy. Destroy.

4. DA Form 2407 used to report accomplishment of modification work orders by support maintenance.

a. For preparation see TM 38-750.

b. Disposition. Upon completion of all phases of an MWO, the equipment will be returned to the representative of the requesting unit or agency and copies of DA Form 2407 will be disposed of as prescribed by paragraph 2b(4) above.

5. The NMP copy of the DA Form 2407 submitted on aircraft when used as a work request or to report MWO accomplishment will be mailed to: CO, 34th General Support Group (AM&S), APO US Forces 96307.

6. DA Form 2407 when used for submitting equipment improvement recommendation (EIR). See Incl 4 to this regulation.

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Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR) (RCS CSGLD-1047 (R1))

1. The proper preparation and submission of EIRs is a matter of great concern to this headquarters, Commodity Commands and National Maintenance Points (NMP). Therefore, it is imperative that emphasis be placed on the submission of EIRs on equipment failures, defective new materiel received and for proposed improvements in materiel.

2. Paragraph 3-7.4, of TM 38-750 prescribes the procedures, conditions and priorities for submission of EIRs. Copies of EIRs submitted will be as follows:

a. Emergency EIRs will initially be submitted by electrical message or telephone to the appropriate National Maintenance Point (NMP), listed in appendix II, TM 38-750. A follow-up DA Form 2407 marked Emergency will be submitted by airmail within five working days to the NMP. This EIR will specify the same activity, EIR control number and the date assigned to the electrical transmission being confirmed. The following statement will be entered in block 35: "This EIR confirms emergency EIR No ___ or phone conversation, transmittal date ___."

b. Urgent EIRs will be airmailed to the appropriate NMP listed in appendix II, TM 38-750.

c. Routine EIRs, prepared as a separate action will be sent by regular mail to the appropriate NMP listed in appendix II, TM 38-750.

d. The NMP Copy (Copy 2) will be forwarded as outlined in paragraph 2 a, b, or c above.

e. The file copy (Copy 5) will be forwarded to the supporting maintenance activity. When the failure or deficiency for which the separate EIR is submitted also results in a work request to the support echelon, the file copy will be attached to the DA Form 2407.

f. The organization copy (Copy 4) of the EIR will be retained by the submitting organization for 90 days.

g. The receipt copy (Copy 1) will be forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: AVD-MR.

h. The control copy (Copy 3), for equipment less aircraft, will be furnished to CG, 1st Log Comd, ATTN: AVLC-GM, APO US Forces 96307.

i. For aircraft, the control copy will be forwarded to CO, 34th General Support Group (AM&S), ATTN: AVGS-M, APO US Forces 96307.

j. This headquarters will be info addressee on all emergency EIRs submitted by electrical means.

Incl 4 to USARV Reg No 750-20, dtd 31 May 66

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Equipment Maintenance Record (Organizational)
(RCS CSGLD 1048 (R1)) (DA Form 2408-3)

1. DA Form 2408-3, Equipment Maintenance Record (Organizational) provides:

a. A record of maintenance service, inspections and repairs requiring parts usage at the organizational level.

b. A method of recording and reporting status of equipment availability and serviceability.

c. A source document for collection of maintenance engineering data.

d. A source document for determining overhaul and rebuild requirements.

2. DA Form 2408-3 is one of the major elements in the Equipment Records System. Its importance to the entire program makes it mandatory to document each action with a maximum degree of accuracy and to properly distribute the record on a timely basis.

3. DA Form 2408-3 will be completed in accordance with TM 38-750 and forwarded quarterly and at any other time the form becomes filled prior to the end of the reporting quarter.

4. DA Form 2408-3 for equipment on loan or TDY will be the responsibility of the unit in possession of equipment at the end of the reporting period.

5. Disposition.

a. Control copy (Copy 1) will be forwarded directly to TAERS, PO Box 9036, Honolulu, Hawaii 96820, within three calendar days after close of the quarter (except aircraft).

b. For aircraft the control copy will be forwarded to CO, 34th General Support Group, (AM&S), APO US Forces 96307, within three calendar days after close of the quarter.

c. Log book copy (Copy 2) will be retained in the equipment log for a period of one year at which time it will be removed and destroyed.

d. NMP copy (Copy 3) may be destroyed or it may be retained for use by the unit.

Incl 5 to USARV Reg No 750-20, dtd 31 May 66

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Equipment Transfer Report (RCS CSGLD 1049 (R1)) (DA Form 2408-7)

1. DA Form 2408-7 must be prepared each time the equipment is transferred between property books, stock records, or other property accounts. DA Form 2408-7 will be prepared by the shipping (losing) organization and receiving (gaining) organization.

2. This form will be prepared and distributed under any of the following conditions for which accountability for the equipment is changed.

a. When equipment is transferred between property books.

b. When equipment is shipped to another supply agency.

c. When the federal stock number of an item is changed as a result of being modified or rebuilt. (In this case the utilization code "Y" will be entered in block 10.)

d. Loss of equipment through excess, disposal, salvage, or combat.

3. For reporting purposes equipment transfers and losses will be coded as follows:

a. Equipment transfers.

(1) Figure one (1) will be entered in block 18 if equipment is shipped out of the USARPAC theater e.g., USARV to CONUS for overhaul. This normally will apply only to Support Areas.

(2) The letter alpha (A) will be entered if equipment is transferred within the USARPAC theater e.g., USARV to USARYIS, or from one property book level to another within USARV.

(3) A figure two (2) will be entered in block 19 if equipment is received from a unit or agency not in the theater.

(4) A letter bravo (B) will be entered in block 19 if the equipment is received from a unit within the theater.

b. Equipment losses.

(1) All losses will be entered in block 10 of DA Form 2408-7, using applicable code from table VII, appendix 1, TM 38-750.

(2) "Combat losses" will be included in "other type losses" under Code I. Equipment dropped from the inventory as a "combat loss" will have the words "combat loss" entered in block 18 of DA Form 2408-7.

(3) A DA Form 2408-7 will be initiated on all equipment dropped from the inventory as a "combat loss" for all items listed in

DA Cir No 711-2. Upon receipt of the new AR 711-140, DA Cir No 711-2 will be rescinded and only RICC 1 items listed in the new AR 711-140, March 1966, will be reported.

c. All transfers and/or losses recorded on DA Form 2408-7 must be submitted by the losing and gaining unit or organization as prescribed by paragraph 4-11b, TM 38-750.

4. Disposition: DA Forms 2408-7 will be completed and forwarded within three calendar days after loss or transfer of equipment as follows:

a. Support copy (Copy 1). Forwarded to the supporting maintenance activity.

b. Control copy (Copy 2). Forwarded by mail to this headquarters, ATTN: AVD-MR (except aircraft).

c. Control copy (Copy 2) for aircraft only will be forwarded to CO, 34th General Support Group (AM&S), APO US Forces 96307.

d. Log book copy (Copy). File in the equipment log book and destroy old copy. Only the DA Form 2408-7 indicating the current equipment assignment will be retained in the log book.

e. The combat losses reported on DA Form 2408-7 will be processed in accordance with USARV Reg No 735-2.

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Component Removal and Repair/Overhaul Record (RCS CSGLD 1052 (R1)) (DA Form 2410) and (Transaction Report) (DA Form 2410-1)

1. DA Form 2410 is a six part manifold form used to provide the basic repair and control record for specific components not installed on end items of equipment. DA Form 2410-1 is a single card form designed as a supplement to DA Form 2410, for updating control and maintenance data with a minimum of paper work. The use of these forms are applicable to the following controlled components:

a. All combat vehicle engines.

b. All "time change" aircraft components as specified in the appropriate organizational (-20) technical manual.

c. All "condition change" items listed in TB AVN 23-65.

d. Selected missile components, when designated (DA Form 2410 column, Appendix III, TM 38-750).

2. DA Form 2410 will be initiated each time a component is removed from an end item, a component is placed in the supply system, the federal stock number of a component is redesignated, or when an uninstalled servicable component becomes unserviceable. The organization removing a component, accepting an uninstalled component, or in possession of a servicable uninstalled component that is rendered unservicable, is responsible for initiating a DA Form 2410.

3. Initial DA Form 2410 activated on the above items will be completed by transcribing from the existing component historical records, covering condition tag and/or appropriate supply records.

4. Disposition. Copies to be forwarded are outlined in paragraph 3-8, TM 38-750. Copies forwarded will be mailed to TAERS, PO Bos 9036, Honolulu, Hawaii 96820.

5. In the interest of safety and economy, it is essential that the hours of operation of costly components installed on Army materiel be made a matter of record. When hours of operation are not recorded, costly components having useful remaining life are sometimes discarded because of safety considerations resulting in a monetary waste and a reduction in the availability of essential components.

6. The importance of DA Form 2410 properly executed, must be understood at all levels of responsibility. Experience has demonstrated that it is impossible to collect the previous operating time by inquiry or records research after an item has been received at an overhaul facility without or with an incomplete DA Form 2410.

7. Because of the importance of the properly completed DA Form 2410, both from a safety and economic aspect, commanders must insure that re-

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cords are maintained in accordance with TM 38-750. Each activity receiving components, from the original turn-in point to the overhaul activity, will verify that the completed DA Form 2410 is with the components. When the forms are not present or are incomplete, the activity receiving the components will take immediate action to get the completed forms from the last shipping activity. Components that are received crated or canned will not be deprocessed for this purpose alone.

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QUESTION 11

1. (U) BACKGROUND: According to current doctrine, theater army estimates losses and submits estimates to DA monthly indicating replacements required during the 2d, 4th, and 7th subsequent months. Thus, time is provided to allow for the procurement, training, and shipment of replacements from CONUS. Replacements from CONUS are received and processed (trained, etc.) by replacement units in the theater.

2. (U) QUESTIONS:

11a. What is the replacement organization in Vietnam?

11b. What is the general flow of replacement estimates and requisitions from the Army in Vietnam to DA?

11c. What is the average time lapse between requisition and arrival in country?

11d. What is the average time lapse between arrival in country and arrival at assigned unit?

11e. What unit(s) trains replacements?

3. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 11a: The 90th Replacement Battalion, organized with a Battalion Headquarters Company and 3 Replacement Companies is charged with operation of the USARV replacement system. Currently 2 companies and the Bn Hqs operate the Replacement Center at Tan Son Nhut and one company operates a small center at Pleiku for the purpose of handling the replacement hump for the 1st Cavalry Division. This is a satisfactory solution to the problem and the company will return to Tan Son Nhut shortly. All replacement and rotatees for USARV are handled by the 90th Replacement Battalion. Currently most of the replacements are assigned directly to their units by DA, and are separated upon arrival and transhipped to final destination by in-country airlift or over-land transportation in the Saigon area.

4. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 11b: Headquarters USARV, acting as the controlling agency for requisitions for subordinate commands and elements, has adapted existing DA guidance in this area to the local situation. Essentially, personnel requisitioning in RVN is the same as in all other oversea commands e.g., requisition cycles, acknowledgement of receipt and fill action by DA, substitution of related-qualified personnel on occasion when required numbers of shortage skill personnel are not available to draw from at time required.

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Encl 11

AVHGA-P
SUBJECT: Question 11 (Con't)

A particular note of interest is that no USARV requisition may be cancelled, although arrival of the requisitioned individual may be during the period from two months prior to two months following the month requested. Major commands are responsible to Headquarters USARV for the submission of personnel requirements to this headquarters (in requisition format) each month. Consolidation into one package is accomplished and all requirements forwarded to OPO DA for fill. Individuals are port-called to CONUS port of exit from where they are moved to RVN by airlift.

5. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 11c: The majority of requisitioning action is to replace programmed losses (approaching DEROS and ETS losses), hence, time lapse between submission of personnel requisitions and personnel arrival in-country is five and seven months, the requisition cycle for enlisted men in grades E6 and below, and senior grades respectively. This is, of course, modified by the "hard-to-fill" requirements noted in paragraph 4 above. There are, also, emergency requisitions which of necessity are submitted from time to time. Reasons for such are, activation of new units in-country, supplements to earlier requisitions which failed to include all requirements, requirements to support MTOE's for which Force Development Division, ACofS, G-3, determines early priorities, and requirements of newly arriving units to bring them into the requisitioning cycle and to obtain shortages upon arrival. Unprogrammed loss-fills are assigned to the 90th Replacement Battalion and are thus reassigned after arrival, and unit assignment has been determined. The requisition base for unprogrammed losses is 1.2% of the USARV strength projected 5 months hence.

6. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 11d: Depending on two factors, the availability of in-country transportation, and location of the gaining unit, the time span between an individual's arrival in-country and at unit is from 24 to 72 hours.

7. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 11e: No generalized training is afforded replacements immediately upon arrival. Replacements are moved as soon as possible to their new units where necessary training is provided. All Divisions and separate brigades have established replacement training programs. Individuals must complete this required training prior to participation in combat.

Incl 11

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QUESTION 12

1. (U) BACKGROUND: In leadership instruction at the College, emphasis is placed on the differences that exist between leadership at low and high levels of command. In dealing with high command, the College stresses the responsibility for making decisions involving moral and ethical factors. In considering the environmental and cultural background of Southeast Asia, certain contradictions exist between oriental and occidental philosophy. Consequently, commanders can be faced with problems requiring the utmost in moral courage and integrity.

2. (U) QUESTIONS:

12a. What are the most perplexing leadership problems involving moral and ethical issues which commanders in Vietnam face?

12b. What techniques are used to solve these problems? (Illustrative examples are desired).

3. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 12:

a. (U) Probably the most perplexing problem involving moral and ethical issues confronting the commander in Vietnam is the requirement to defeat the enemy, yet eliminate or minimize the loss of life and property to innocent noncombatants. This is not a new problem in military operations, but it is greatly accentuated in Vietnam by the very nature of the conflict. This problem is a matter of grave concern from the highest level to the lowest commanders conducting small tactical operations. The principal decisions made, and the techniques used in solving this problem are set forth in Inclosures 12-1, 12-2, and 12-3, USMACV directives governing this matter, and in Inclosure 12-4, an implementing directive published by the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

b. (U) Psychological ploys, through the use of leaflets and heliborne loudspeakers, and CS gas have proven to be effective means of assisting commanders in avoiding noncombatant casualties. The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Combat After Action Report for Operation Masher and Operation White Wing (mailed separately) contains several illustrations of the effective use of these tools. At any echelon, this particular problem can be solved only by the judgement of the commander. When in doubt and when American lives are at stake, commanders ordinarily employ whatever firepower is necessary. However, as reported by the 1st Infantry Division, the record is astonishingly good in avoiding noncombatant casualties.

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GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
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dwd 12
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[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

MACV DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 525-3

UNCLASSIFIED

7 September 1965
(MACPD)

Effective until 6 September 1966 unless sooner rescinded or superseded

COMBAT OPERATIONS
MINIMIZING NON-COMBATANT BATTLE CASUALTIES

1. PURPOSE. This directive prescribes policy designed to minimize non-combatant battle casualties and the impact of those which may occur.

2. GENERAL.

a. The Government of Vietnam (GVN) is engaged in a fight for its survival against the communist Viet Cong (VC) supported and reinforced by the forces of the DRV. It is the objective of the VC to seize control of the hamlets, villages and towns by a combination of military action, terrorism, political action and subversion. It is the objective of the GVN to resist this process and where it has occurred, to reverse it. This means that the battle for Vietnam flows backward and forward across the homes and fields of the hapless rice farmer and the small town inhabitant. Whether, at any one time, he lives in a VC or a GVN controlled hamlet depends to a large extent upon factors and forces beyond his control. Eventually, of course, the GVN plans to regain control over all of the hamlets and all of the people.

b. The use of unnecessary force leading to non-combatant battle casualties in areas temporarily controlled by the VC will embitter the population, drive them into the arms of the VC, and make the long range goal of pacification more difficult and more costly.

c. The circumstances described above call for the exercise of restraint not normally required of soldiers on the battlefield. Commanders at all echelons must strike a balance between the force necessary to accomplish their missions with due regard to the safety of their commands and the high importance of reducing to a minimum the casualties inflicted on the non-combatant populace.

d. The VC exploit fully incidents of non-combatant casualties and destruction of property by RVNAF and US combat forces. Their objectives are to foster resentment against GVN and the United States, and to effect the permanent alienation of the people from the Government.

[redacted]

Encl 12-1
Incl 1 to Incl 7

[redacted]

Command, Vietnam

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[redacted]

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3. APPLICATION.

a. US Forces - Commanders at every echelon are directed to plan and conduct operations in accordance with the following guidelines:

(1) Commanders will consider both the military and psychological objective of each operation. Prestrikes in populated areas, reconnaissance by fire into hamlets and poorly selected harassing and interdiction fires are examples of military measures which will be counterproductive in the long run.

(2) Troop indoctrination briefings will be held before each operation to emphasize both the short and long range importance of minimizing non-combatant battle casualties.

(3) The proper selection of landing zones, the careful planning and execution of air strikes and the proper employment of artillery and armed helicopters will avoid unnecessary damage to lives and property of non-combatants.

(4) Forward air controllers and armed helicopter commanders will be briefed on areas to be avoided because of the presence of friendly or potentially friendly population. Such information must be sought from local officials at province and district level.

(5) With due regard to security and success of the mission, whenever possible the people will be warned of impending air strikes or operations by leaflets and broadcasts. Blame for military action in the area would be shifted to the VC.

(6) A civic action plan should be developed to support each operation even if the area has been controlled by the VC.

(7) Free strike zones should be configured to eliminate populated areas except those in accepted VC bases.

(8) Operations should be planned in coordination with province and district chiefs with due regard to security of plans. A liaison officer from US combat forces conducting operations in a particular province should be positioned at the sector headquarters for coordination. The sector advisors must perform this function in the absence of liaison.

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(9) Assignment to US combat forces of qualified RVNAF liaison officers from appropriate RVNAF commanders is essential and should be arranged between US commanders and advisors for each significant operation. These liaison officers through their knowledge of the area of operation and the population can assist in identification of friend from foe and can help to insure close coordination with all Vietnamese forces. In this connection, the participation of Vietnamese forces in operations should be encouraged so that the war does not appear to be a US action against the Vietnamese people. Regional and Popular Force participation should be sought at US battalion or even company level so that they may assist in the search of private dwellings, obtain information, and contribute to the desired effect of the cooperative war effort.

(10) Established rules of good military conduct and discipline must be enforced.

(11) It is absolutely essential that US forces establish the reputation of being able to move at will throughout SVN and to defeat any VC force encountered. This reputation for invincibility will produce innumerable psychological benefits and hasten the end of the war. On the other hand, these same forces must constantly demonstrate their concern for the safety of non-combatants -- their compassion for the injured -- their willingness to aid and assist the sick, the hungry and the dispossessed.

b. US Advisors - US advisors will make every effort to convince Vietnamese counterparts of the necessity for preservation of the lives and property of non-combatants. Counterparts must be encouraged to promulgate and implement parallel instruction.

4. IMPLEMENTATION. Implementing instructions and SOP's will be issued by major subordinate commanders and senior corps advisors. Annex A provides additional guidance for incorporation in the instructions.

5. REFERENCES.

a. MACV Directive 95-2, dated 2 July 1965.

b. Letter, COMUSMACV, Subject: Minimizing Non-Combatant Casualties, to SA and US Commanders, dated 7 July 1965.

W. C. Westmoreland

1 Incl
Annex A - Psywar/CA

W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

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Directive Number 525-3, HQ MACV (Cont) 7 September 1965

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ANNEX A to Directive Number 525-3, HQ MACV

UTILIZATION OF PSYWAR/CIVIL AFFAIRS RESOURCES

1. Commanders will utilize G5/S5 and Psywar staff officers to:

a. Assure that, where feasible, each operational plan contains a Psywar/CA annex and that all concerned are familiar with its provisions. Fragmentary orders should include reference to SOP's on minimization of non-combatant battle casualties.

b. Whenever possible, utilize appropriate leaflets, airborne loudspeakers, ground loudspeakers and/or face-to-face teams to separate non-combatants from the Viet Cong (VC).

c. Utilizing appropriate psywar techniques, explain to the people that the GVN and the US understand that in many cases villages and hamlets are, unfortunately, under temporary VC domination; that this condition will not for long prevail; and that in due course the GVN will restore law and order. In the meantime, the populace should shun the VC and protect themselves against battle damage.

d. Where feasible, follow each operation with a Psywar/CA team to explain to the population what happened and how to avoid future non-combatant casualties.

e. Following each operation wherein non-combatant casualties and/or property damage have occurred, coordinate with the province chief concerned on prompt indemnification of those affected. Consideration should also be given at this time to appropriate civic action measures.

2. Civic Action:

As the situation dictates, operation plans will provide for utilization of all available assets, to include a program for dispensing of medical supplies; transportation and distribution of emergency rations; medical evacuation of injured or sick regardless of suspected or known political affiliation; and light engineering work within the capabilities of tactical units.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

CHANGE 3
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 95-2

9 May 1966
(MACCOC2)

UNCLASSIFIED

AVIATION
EMPLOYMENT OF AND OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON US MILITARY AIR DELIVERED FIREPOWER IN RVN (U)

Directive Number 95-2, this headquarters, dated 20 December 1965, is changed as follows:

* * * * * *

a. Add the following subparagraph:

7. (C) SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Strike aircraft.

(1) FAC/TAC(A)/ALO/ASRT.

(a) Close Air Support.

* * * * * *

2.

* * * * * *

d. (Added) US pilot of an airplane or helicopter required to operate within the vicinity of a hostile village or hamlet for the purpose of conducting a medical evacuation or supply mission, and where enemy fire presents an immediate threat to the lives of the helicopter or transport crew.

* * * * * *

b. Make the following pen and ink changes:

(1) Paragraph 4a: Delete the words "2d Air Division" and insert "Seventh Air Force."

(2) Paragraph 7a(1)(a)5, line 2: Delete the word "Such" and insert "Except in emergencies, such."

(3) Paragraph 7a(1)(a)5, line 6, 7, and 8: Delete the word "ground."

Encl 12-2
~~Encl 2 to Incl 7~~

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(4) Paragraph 7e(3), line 2: After the words "or village," insert the words "whenever possible."

(5) Paragraph 8d(2), line 4: Delete the words "2d Air Division" and insert "Seventh Air Force."

(6) Paragraph 7a(1)(a)1d: Delete the words "MSQ-35, Ground Directed Bombing System" and insert "AN/MSQ-77, Bomb Directing Central Radar."

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

E. D. BRYSON
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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30 - CG, USARV
30 - CG, III MAF
30 - CG, 1st Inf Div
30 - CG, FFORCEV
30 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div
150 - Cdr, 2AD
20 - Cdr, I Corps Adv Gp
20 - Cdr, II Corps Adv Gp
20 - Cdr, III Corps Adv Gp
50 - Cdr, IV Corps Adv Gp
2 - SA, CMR
2 - SA, Abn Bde
2 - SA, RF/PF
150 - COMSEVENTHFLT
10 - CTF 115
20 - FWMAO
1 - SA, RW Scty Adv Det
300 - MACAG-ARP
2 - MACAG-AO

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CHANGE 2
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 95-2

7 March 1966
(MACCOC2)

AVIATION
EMPLOYMENT OF AND OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON US MILITARY AIR DELIVERED FIREPOWER IN RVN (U)

Directive Number 95-2, this headquarters, dated 20 December 1965, is changed as follows:

* * * * * *

7. (C) SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Strike Aircraft.

(1) FAC/TAC(A)/ALO/ASRT.

(a) Close Air Support.

1.

* * * * * *

d. (Added) MSQ-35 Ground Directed Bombing System.

* * * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM
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W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

E. D. BRYSON
Colonel, AGC
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Change 2, MACV Directive 95-2 (Cont) 7 March 1966

DISTRIBUTION:
A - HQ MACV
30 - CG, USARV
30 - CG, III MAF
30 - CG, 1st Inf Div
30 - CG, FFORCEV
30 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div
150 - Cdr, 2AD
20 - Cdr, I Corps Adv Gp
20 - Cdr, II Corps Adv Gp
20 - Cdr, III Corps Adv Gp
50 - Cdr, IV Corps Adv Gp
2 - SA, CMR
2 - SA, Abn Bde
2 - SA, RF/PF
150 - COMSEVENTHFLT
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20 - FWMAO
1 - SA, RW Scty Adv Det

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
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CHANGE 1
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 95-2

17 January 1966
(MACCOC2)

AVIATION
EMPLOYMENT OF AND OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON US MILITARY AIR DELIVERED FIREPOWER IN RVN (U)

Directive Number 95-2, this headquarters, dated 20 December 1965, is changed as follows:

* * * * * *

2. (C) DEFINITIONS.

* * * * * *

b. (Superseded) FAC, as used in this directive, refers to an airborne Forward Air Controller (known as a Tactical Air Coordinator, Airborne, in the United States Marine Corps) or a Forward Air Controller operating from a ground position.

* * * * * *

Make the following pen and ink changes:

a. Paragraph 5b, line 21: After the abbreviation "FAC", insert the words "when appropriate."

b. Paragraph 7a(1)(a)5, line 2: Delete the word "airborne."

c. Paragraph 8b(5), line 1: Delete the words "All pilots" and insert the words "The controlling FAC."

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM
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W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

L. M. HARRIS
Colonel, AGC
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Change 1, Directive Number 95-2, HQ MACV (Cont) 17 January 1966

DISTRIBUTION:
A - HQ MACV
30 - CG, USARV
30 - CG, III MAF
30 - CG, 1st Inf Div
30 - CG, FFORCE V
30 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div
150 - Cdr, 2AD
20 - Cdr, I Corps Adv Gp
20 - Cdr, II Corps Adv Gp
20 - Cdr, III Corps Adv Gp
50 - Cdr, IV Corps Adv Gp
2 - SA, Capital Military Region
2 - SA, Abn Bde
2 - SA, RF/PF
150 - COMSEVENTHFLT
10 - CTF 115
20 - FWMAO
1 - SA, Rail Security Det

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 95-2

UNCLASSIFIED

20 December 1965
(MACCOC2)

AVIATION

EMPLOYMENT OF AND OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON US MILITARY AIR DELIVERED FIREPOWER IN RVN (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. To establish guidance, procedures and restrictions on the employment of United States (US) military air delivered firepower in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

2. (U) DEFINITIONS.

a. Areas of operation previously referred to as "Free Bomb Zones" or "Free Strike Areas" are hereby redesignated as "SPECIFIED STRIKE ZONES." These zones are further defined as those areas where strikes may be made without further approval by the province chief.

b. FAC as used in this directive refers to an Airborne Forward Air Controller.

3. (U) GENERAL.

a. The mission of all US military aviation in RVN is to provide support for the counterinsurgency effort of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) by both supplementing the Vietnam Air Forces (VNAF) in support of the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and by supporting US ground forces. In order to effectively accomplish the task of augmenting RVNAF or US ground force endeavors against hostile targets and to minimize casualties among friendly forces and non-combatants, necessary guidelines and procedures for air strikes are established in this directive. It is extremely important that priority emphasis be placed on the reduction of incidents involving friendly forces, non-combatant casualties, and civilian property damage.

b. While restraints and procedures designed to minimize losses among friendly forces and non-combatants are necessary, the objective to obtain the full productivity of US air capabilities without inhibiting

*This directive supersedes directive number 95-2, 2 July 1965

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responsiveness or flexibility remains. US personnel operating under the terms of this directive retain, at all times, the inherent right to defend themselves against hostile attack. When possible, coordination with the unit ground commander and the appropriate Direct Air Support Center (DASC) should be obtained prior to initiating an air strike. In the case of fire suppression in an approved target area where all friendly locations are known, the strike may be accomplished immediately at the FAC's discretion.

4. (U) RESPONSIBILITIES.

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a. Commander 2d Air Division will:

(1) In his capacity as the US MACV Air Force Component Commander, act as coordinating authority for all US tactical air operations and VNAF activities (insofar as practicable) in the MACV area.

(2) Establish and operate, in conjunction with the RVNAF, a Tactical Air Control System (TACS) for command and control of USAF/VNAF and for the coordination of USMC/USN strike aircraft.

(3) Conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations in accordance with the established rules of engagement.

b. The Commanding General, US Army, Vietnam (USARV) will:

(1) Provide US Army aviation resources to support offensive and defensive ground operations, as appropriate, in accordance with the established rules of engagement.

(2) Establish and operate an Army Air Traffic Regulation and Identification System coordinated with and responsive to the Air Traffic Control System operated in conjunction with RVN agencies, by the 2d Air Division.

c. Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), through his Tactical Air Commander the Commanding General, First Marine Aircraft Wing, will conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations in accordance with the established rules of engagement.

5. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

a. A TACS has been established in RVN for use as both an operational and a training vehicle. Allocation and control of USAF/VNAF air resources and coordination of USMC/USN aircraft are exercised through the elements of this system. Aircraft and units operating under the TACS are controlled and scheduled by the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) to

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support specific missions within the Corps Tactical Zones. USMC strike sorties not used for USMC operations are provided for mission planning and use by the TACC.

b. In-country mission requests for USAF/VNAF air support are processed according to category - immediate or preplanned. Immediate requests are handled on a priority basis and normally constitute requests from friendly elements in contact with the enemy or from an airborne observer who achieves positive enemy identification. Any request requiring ordnance delivery within three hours after initiation is handled as an immediate request. Preplanned missions are developed at any echelon of command from the analysis of intelligence that has been acquired. Except for preplanned close support missions, preplanned targets are normally permanent or semi-permanent. They are reviewed and analyzed at each level in the chain of command through the Corps and require approval by the Province Chief or higher ARVN authority. Necessary GVN/Div Commander approval is required prior to nomination of targets to the appropriate DASC. Submission of requests to the TACC is considered tantamount to approval. Because selection and validation of targets by the GVN/RVNAF agencies are presently largely a matter of individual judgement, mission requirements may be developed sometimes against targets which do not meet US targeting criteria. The decision to strike is based, therefore, on many factors: number of non-combatants, number of VC, tactical situation, local intelligence of the area, and the actual estimate of the target subsequent to reconnaissance by the FAC. US/Free World Force Divisions and separate Brigades insure that ALO/FAC personnel are included in the planning of all operations in which aircraft may participate. Ground Liaison Officers (GLO) assist in planning air missions for strike aircraft and are located at the TACC and each supporting air base when personnel and equipment requirements are met. G2/G3 Air Officers are to perform this function when GLO's are not present.

c. US ground force aviation resources are allocated to Corps and/or separate Division Senior US Advisors for employment of ARVN/US/Free World Forces operations. Aviation resources so allocated are assigned, insofar as practicable, missions of direct support of divisions and zones. Allocations may be made on the basis of operational control, direct support, or general support in accordance with concepts of US ground forces. An Army aviation element is collocated with each corps DASC and each division Tactical Operations Center (TOC) to insure coordination of US/VNAF air activities supporting ARVN, US or Free World Military Assistance Forces operations.

6. (C) TARGET PLANNING.

a. Priorities.

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(1) For planning purposes, available air support in RVN will normally be committed in the following order of priority:

(a) Troops engaged with the enemy in combat.

(b) Units on major ground operations (pre-strike and air cover, relief convoys, and spray aircraft escort on crop destruction missions).

(c) Air cover for trains, convoys, ships and aircraft.

(d) Other targets.

1. Targets directly affecting current operations.

2. Lucrative perishable targets.

3. Lucrative targets expected to exist for a period of time.

4. Others.

7. (C) SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Strike Aircraft.

(1) FAC/TAC(A)/ALO/ASRT.

(a) Close Air Support.

1. USAF, USMC, and USN strike aircraft will normally be controlled by the following in the order of preference as listed:

a. US FAC/TAC(A)/ALO.

b. VNAF FAC/FAO.

c. USMC ASRT (TPQ-10).

2. Under emergency conditions when none of the above means of controlling strike aircraft are available, the following personnel may designate the target for an aircraft except where restricted by paragraphs 7a(1)(a)5 and 7a(1)(b):

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a. The commander of a ground unit engaged with the Viet Cong.

b. US Advisor to a ground unit engaged with the Viet Cong.

c. US pilot of an airplane or helicopter supporting a or b above, who has radio contact with the ground unit involved and/or can identify all friendly positions in relation to enemy positions.

3. ALO/FAC or other controller on close air support missions will ensure that the positions of friendly troops are known and the information passed to the strike aircraft. When friendly troop positions are uncertain, the ground commander will be required to mark or otherwise identify his position prior to the strike. If time permits, the controller will be briefed on the ground scheme of maneuver, and friendly troops will be made aware of the time and place of the impending air strike.

4. Close air support missions in support of US or Free World Forces will be coordinated, when possible, with the unit's Vietnamese Liaison Officer, when one is assigned, to make certain that other friendly troops or civilians are not attacked.

5. Close air support missions that involve strikes on hamlets or villages always must be controlled by an airborne FAC. Such an attack will be executed only after US - GVN - RVNAF approval, as appropriate. Obtaining this approval is the responsibility of the unit requesting the strike. Hamlets or villages may be attacked by air without prior warning to the inhabitants if the attack is in conjunction with ground operations involving the movement of ground forces through the area and if, in the judgement of the ground commander, the mission would be jeopardized by such warning.

(b) Interdiction. Missions not directly involved in support of ground forces and against targets not in a "SPECIFIED STRIKE ZONE" will be struck only after approval by the Corps Commander or his designated representative. These strikes will be controlled normally by an ALO/FAC aircraft with a Vietnamese observer aboard. An ALO/FAC may direct a strike against targets without a Vietnamese observer only after every effort has been made to secure one. If the target involves an area that is populated with non-combatants such as a hamlet or village, prior approval for the attack must be obtained through the appropriate US - GVN - RVNAF channels even though light fire is received from the village or hamlet, and the strike must be controlled by an airborne or ground FAC. Obtaining

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this approval is the responsibility of the unit requesting the strike. The inhabitants must have been warned by leaflets and/or loudspeaker systems sufficiently in time to evacuate the area in advance of the strike.

(c) The above restrictions pertaining to firing upon non-combatants in populated areas such as villages and hamlets also apply to artillery and naval gun fire, as outlined in MACV letter number 01448, 7 November 1965.

(2) JETTISON AREAS. Certain areas within a specified strike zone are designated as jettison areas for the purpose of jettisoning munitions. Ordnance will be jettisoned only in these areas. Ordnance drops made in these areas during day VFR conditions will be monitored by radar whenever possible. Night or IFR jettison drops in these areas will be made under positive radar control. All other ordnance released will be under the control of an agency listed in paragraph 7a(1)(a)1 above, as appropriate.

b. The preparation of "Backlash" (special incident) reports, in cases of air attacks on hamlets and villages, will include sufficient data to permit a detailed analysis of the incident.

c. Air Commando Aircraft. The mission of air commando squadrons includes combat operations in support of RVNAF/US Forces and, as necessary, in support of VNAF. Air Commando aircraft will be marked with USAF insignia. Combat operations are authorized with all-US crews aboard.

d. US Army and US Marine transport helicopter. The weapons on these aircraft are installed for defensive purposes. Fire may be initiated on enemy targets that are positively identified and present a clear threat to the safety of the helicopter or crew.

e. US Armed Helicopters.

(1) US Army and US Marine armed helicopters will be marked "US Army or US Marine", as appropriate, and may be manned with all-US crews at the unit commander's discretion.

(2) The primary mission of armed helicopters is the escorting of transport helicopters in heliborne operations and/or the providing of direct air to ground fire support of ground maneuver elements.

(3) If the target involves non-combatants, such as in a hamlet or village, an RVNAF observer will be aboard the helicopter and US - GVN - RVNAF approval to fire must be obtained unless the situation clearly presents an immediate threat to the lives of the crew. Obtaining this

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approval is the responsibility of the unit requesting the strike. If the attack on the village or hamlet is deemed necessary and is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, the attack may be made without warning; however, appropriate US - GVN - RVNAF approval is required. If the attack is not in conjunction with any immediate ground operations, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets and/or loudspeaker systems prior to the attack and must be given sufficient time to evacuate the area.

f. US Army OV-1 Aircraft. The OV-1 may be armed for defensive fire while on surveillance missions. Armament will not be utilized to initiate fire on any target. In situations where light fire is received from a populated area, early withdrawal from the area is the action to be considered. This aircraft will not be used as a strike aircraft. OV-1's will be marked with US insignia and may be manned with all-US crews at the unit commander's discretion.

g. Ranch Hand Aircraft. Ranch hand aircraft flying crop destruction missions in RVN will be marked with VNAF insignia and will be manned by mixed USAF and VNAF crews.

h. Excluding Arc Light forces, strike aircraft supporting operations in RVN will be launched from CVA's or bases from within RVN.

8. (C) BORDER RESTRICTIONS.

a. General.

(1) Aircraft-helicopters conducting assigned missions in RVN will not cross the demilitarized zone or Cambodian border unless specifically authorized by COMUSMACV.

(2) The best available maps, mosaics, and photographs will be available to pilots and units operating in the vicinity of the border.

(3) Joint USAF-VNAF operations and intelligence facilities will be established and complete prestrike briefings and post strike debriefings will be conducted for all aircrews conducting strikes within 5000 meters of the border, when practical.

b. Cambodian Border Restrictions:

(1) All strike aircraft conducting air strikes within 5000 meters of the Cambodian border will be under positive control of an FAC. Selection criteria will insure assignment of targets which can be tactically struck without overflying the border.

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(2) Any request for US strike aircraft within 5000 meters of the Cambodian border will be brought to the attention of the TACC Deputy Director when it is received at TACC.

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(3) Appropriate radar stations will flight follow aircraft on missions within 5 km of the border within equipment capability.

(4) All organizations responsible for planning or execution of missions within 5 km of the border will have posted in operations a 1:250,000 or larger scale map on which the Cambodian border is distinctly marked on the RVN side to a depth of 5 km.

(5) All pilots on strike missions within 5 km of the border will have in their possession a 1:50,000 map of the target area.

c. Border outposts. Aircraft supporting border outposts (fire support, reconnaissance, supply, and transportation) are allowed to operate as necessary within the outpost area provided they do not cross or fire across the border.

d. Air Reconnaissance and Aerial Surveillance Missions.

(1) Operational restrictions place upon reconnaissance aircraft near the RVN/Cambodian border, for the purpose of insuring that inadvertent overflights do not occur, preclude aerial reconnaissance over large areas within RVN where significant enemy activity is known to be taking place. In order to eliminate the immunity of such areas to observation and photography, these restrictions may be waived, on a case-by-case basis.

(2) Reconnaissance requests for coverage in areas which present a danger of an overflight or border violation will be forwarded to the ACofS, J-2, MACV. Upon determination that a waiver is justified, ACofS, J-2, will approve the waiver and forward the request to 2d Air Division for execution. In the event of particularly sensitive complications, COMUSMACV will be the final determining authority.

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

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W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

L. M. HARRIS
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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A - HQ MACV
30 - CG, USARV
30 - CG, III MAF
30 - CG, 1st Inf Div
30 - CG, FFORCE V
30 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div
150 - Cdr, 2AD
20 - Cdr, I Corps Adv Gp
20 - Cdr, II Corps Adv Gp
20 - Cdr, III Corps Adv Gp
50 - Cdr, IV Corps Adv Gp
2 - SA, Capital Military Region
2 - SA, Abn Bde
2 - SA, RF/PF
150 - COMSEVENTHFLT
10 - CTF 115
20 - FWMAO
1 - SA, Rail Security Det

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ASCV (7 Jul 65) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Minimizing Non-Combatant Casualties

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, VIETNAM, APO US Forces 96307, 14 July 1965

TO: The Officers and Men, United States Army Support Command, Vietnam

1. I am forwarding a letter from the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, to you in its entirety. I desire that each officer and non-commissioned officer in our chain of command read, study and ponder the full implications of General Westmoreland's message.

2. We will "Win in Vietnam". This is a certainty and the purpose of our presence here. However, to make victory lasting, we must also help the Vietnamese to understand the meaning of liberty and freedom. We are fighting for their rights of life and property; let each of us respect them.

3. To do this, we must follow these simple rules:

a. Know your enemy. Destroy only him.

b. Never fire your weapon until you are certain of your target.

c. Do not willfully damage private property unless it is necessary to disclose or rout the enemy.

4. I expect all soldiers of this command to follow these rules, to respect the lives of non-combatants and to refrain from wanton property damage and destruction. Only in this way will we be sure to win the people and win the peace as well as the war.

JOHN NORTON
Brigadier General, US Army
Commanding

Encl 12-3 UNCLASSIFIED
~~Encl 3 to Encl 9~~

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
Office of the Commander
APO San Francisco 96243

MACJ332

Serial No. 2815
7 JUL 1965

SUBJECT: Minimizing Non-Combatant Casualties

TO: Commanding General
U.S. Army Support Command
APO U.S. Forces, 96307

1. Reference MACV Directive 95-2, Operational Restrictions on Military Aircraft in RVN, dated 19 June 1964.

2. The number of non-combatant casualties resulting from combat air and ground operations is a matter of concern. These casualties have an adverse effect on the rural reconstruction effort and the attainment of the GVN national goals.

3. With the increase of US Forces and their participation in combat operations, this area becomes one of vital concern at all levels. I have every confidence in the discretion and judgement of our personnel, however, I feel this problem is worthy of increased command emphasis. It is imperative that all our officers and men understand the importance of minimizing non-combatant casualties whenever possible.

4. It is not my intent to infringe upon the inherent right of an individual to defend himself against hostile attack, however, in the exercise of this right, the utmost in discretion and judgement must be used in the application of firepower. Some points which deserve particular consideration are:

a. Discriminate use of artillery and weapons capable of causing mass casualties. Firing on targets in populated areas should be restricted whenever possible to close support missions and to clearly identifiable targets.

b. Reconnaissance by fire should be resorted to only when other means of reconnaissance are not possible and when it is essential to safe movement.

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7 JUL 1965

AVGJ332
SUBJECT: Minimizing Non-Combatant Casualties

5. You will give this problem your continual thought and frequently impress upon your troops the need for prudence and good judgement in the employment of fire power.

W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding

Ind 12-3

Annex T (Rules of Engagement) to TAC SOP, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

1. (U) References:

a. US MACV (MACCOC2) Directive 95-2, Subject: Employment of and Operational Restrictions on US Military Air Delivered Firepower in RVN (U) dated 20 December 1965.

b. Ltr, FFORCEV, AVF-GC-PL, Subject: Letter of Instructions (U) dated 31 December 1965.

c. Msg, FFORCEV, AVF-GC-PL 0696, Subject: Village Destructions (U) DTG 311430Z Jan 66.

2. (U) PURPOSE. The purpose of this annex is to consolidate and clarify the rules of engagement to be observed by units of this division and all units or agencies operating under its control.

3. (U) GENERAL.

a. Nothing shall infringe on the inherent right of an individual to defend himself against hostile attack. In the event of such an attack, the individual concerned may take immediate offensive action against the hostile force with any means available. Nevertheless, each man must do everything possible, short of endangering his life, to avoid wounding or killing non-combatants. Only when absolutely necessary will the division's firepower be brought to bear on VC in populated areas and then only to the extent absolutely necessary to accomplish the assigned mission.

b. Commander will consider both the military and psychological objective of each operation.

4. (U) ENGAGEMENT AUTHORITY. Commanders may initiate fires:

a. On targets that are observed and positively identified as enemy.

b. On locations from which enemy fire is being delivered against friendly troops.

c. On enemy locations with a confirmed A1 (completely reliable source confirmed by other sources) evaluation rating and reported in a timely manner.

APPENDIX II

ENCLOSURE-7

Add 12-4

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d. On armed personnel attempting by hasty or suspicious acts to obviously avoid contact with friendly troops.

e. On suspected enemy locations, when friendly personnel or non-combatants are not endangered.

f. In response to requests from friendly Vietnamese Commanders or RVNAF Officials, and in accordance with those Rules of Engagement.

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g. Populated areas.

(1) When conducting search operations, storage facilities found to contain VC supplies or determined to definitely be used by the VC will normally be destroyed. (Whenever practicable, supplies will be evacuated for use in civic action programs). Destruction should normally be initiated by ARVN or RF/PF personnel, if available.

(2) When fired upon from a dwelling or when VC are seen entering a building, that building may be fired upon by both small arms and artillery.

(3) Special instructions pertaining to destruction of VC in populated areas from which light fire on aircraft is being received are contained in para 7.

5. [redacted] Mortar, Artillery and Naval Gunfire.

a. In areas exclusive of hamlets and villages, artillery fire and naval gunfire may be directed against VC forces in accordance with para 3 above, "Engagement Authority" except that Naval gunfire must be observed.

b. Missions against known or suspected enemy targets in hamlets and villages occupied by non-combatants will be conducted as follows:

(1) All fire missions on the enemy in hamlets or villages will be controlled by an airborne or ground observer and will be executed only after approval of the responsible tactical commander, who in turn will have obtained clearance from the appropriate GVN or RVNAF official. Whenever the tactical situation permits a warning will be given prior to initiating any firing. In event ARVN or GVN officials request village destruction, US Forces may secure that area to allow Vietnamese Nationals to effect the destruction. In any case of request by Vietnamese for village destruction by US Forces, the commander will immediately report the details to this Headquarters, ATTN: G3. This headquarters will refer such requests to Headquarters MACV for a decision by COMUSMACV or DEPCOMUSMACV.

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(2) Viet Cong in hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with ground operations involving the movement of ground forces through the area, and if, in the judgement of the senior tactical commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning. In such case the tactical commander must have determined in advance that hostile forces occupy the hamlet or village.

(3) Unobserved artillery fire will be directed at VC targets in hamlets or villages only when cleared by the GVN official responsible for the area in question or by his authorized representative.

(4) Unobserved Naval gunfire will not be fired at any time into the land mass of RVN.

c. Mortar, Artillery and Naval gunfire in the vicinity of the Vietnamese border will be conducted as follows:

(1) Fire missions against a target area within 2,000 meters of the border will be observed, air or ground.

(2) Fire missions except Naval gunfire against targets not nearer than 2,000 meters from the border may be unobserved.

6. (C) Fire from Aircraft.

a. Pilots will be briefed frequently on the necessity of minimizing the chance of death and injury to the civilian population in combat areas.

b. Close Air Support:

(1) All close air support missions will normally be under the control of a FAC. Under emergency conditions, when a FAC is not availabel, the ground unit commander or his designated representative engaged with the enemy may designate the target for the strike aircraft.

(2) FAC or other controller on close area support missions will insure that the positions of friendly troops are known and the information passed to the strike aircraft. When friendly troop positions are uncertain, the ground commander will be required to mark or other wise identify his position prior to the strike.

7. (C) Suppressive Fire Against Populated Areas.

a. In situations where light fire on aircraft is received from a populated area, disengagement will be considered as a course of action unless the firing point is positively identified.

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b. Leaflets and loudspeaker messages warning of consequences of firing at aircraft should be disseminated to cover populated areas in which operations are to be conducted. If ground fire is received from a populated area, such as village, after a timely initial warning has been disseminated, and the commander concerned determines destruction of VC targets within the village is essential to prevent loss of US lives and aircraft, request will be made through channels to the DTOC that a final warning be given to the village. Coordinates and planned time of destruction will be furnished. DTOC will arrange leaflets and/or loudspeaker broadcasts warning inhabitants of the village that the VC in the village are to be attacked. Non-combatant inhabitants will be instructed to evacuate the village immediately.

c. After sufficient time has elapsed for non-combatant evacuation, (approximately 30 minutes) selected targets within the village may be destroyed. The destruction mission will be under the control of an airborne or ground observer. Immediately following the destruction mission, the force commander will direct leaflets and/or loudspeaker missions on the destroyed area blaming the Viet Cong for the destruction.

d. If, in spite of all efforts to the contrary, non-combatant casualties should occur, medical evacuation should be provided by the responsible commander, subject to tactical considerations and resources available.

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QUESTION 13

1. (U) BACKGROUND: Fundamental instruction in joint and combined operations includes discussion of organizational structure of MACV. Necessary information for general discussion of this structure is on hand. However, since MACV is unique in some respects and does not adhere in every case to joint doctrine established in JCS Pub 2, a more detailed analysis is desired. This requirement could be satisfied by provision of a "staff functions manual, "or a "command analysis" of this subordinate unified command, if such documents are available. If they are not, answers to the following questions are desired.

2. (U) QUESTIONS:

13a. What is the relationship between the Navy Component Commander and the Marine Amphibious Force Commander?

13b. Does the Army Component staff concern itself strictly with matters pertaining to administration and logistics or does it have responsibilities in the operational area with regard to Field Force I and II?

13c. What is the relationship of advisors operating in the MAF and Field Force areas to the MAF and Field Force commanders?

13d. What is the relationship of Allied Forces, other than VN forces, to the commanders of US forces in operational areas?

13e. How are the activities of the Military Advisory Group of the Republic of China, the Royal Thai Military Assistance Group and the Republic of the Philippines contingent coordinated with the US Advisory effort?

13f. What are the functions of the Studies and Observations Group, the Free World Military Assistance Group and the Political Warfare Advisory Directorate?

3. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 13a:

a. Naval Forces Vietnam (NAVFORVN) is assigned to PACFLT for command less operational control and to COMUSMACV for operational control.

b. III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) is a separate uni-service command directly subordinate to COMUSMACV, is under the command less operational control of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC), and under the operational control of COMUSMACV.

c. NAVFORVN provides administrative and logistical support to III MAF except for those items specifically excluded. This is the primary support mission of Naval Support Activity, DaNang.

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31 75

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4. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 13b: CG USARV exercises command of all US Army elements in RVN except the advisory groups and US Army Element MACV. He exercises command less operational control of the 5th Special Forces Group, the two field force headquarters, and Army units under operational control of the two field force headquarters. The Army component staff does concern itself with matters other than administration and logistics. A representative description of its operations are contained in the HQ USARV Operational Report of Lessons Learned RCS CSGPO-28(R1) covering the period 1 Jan - 30 Apr 1966, a copy of which was distributed to USA C&GS College.

5. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 13c:

a. The commanders of MAF and I and II Field Forces are the Senior US Advisors in Corps Tactical Zones I, II, and III.

b. COMUSMACV exercises command less operational control over each Army Advisory Group in I, II, and III Corps Tactical Zones.

c. The Commanding General of the MAF or the Field Force exercises operational control over the Advisory Group assigned to his Corps Tactical Zone.

d. As Senior Advisor, MAF and FF Commanders exercise operational control over the advisory detachment through the C.O. of the advisory detachment who has the title of Deputy Senior Advisor.

e. Note that there being no major US headquarters in IV CTZ, the C.O. of the Advisory Detachment operating in IV CTZ is also Senior Advisor to CG IV RVNAF Corps Tactical Zone.

6. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 13d: The nation contributing free world military armed forces will designate a military commander who will be responsible for the performance and discipline of the force. The FWMAF Commander will exercise command functions in accordance with doctrines and procedures prescribed by the donor country. Commanders of FWMAF's have agreed in writing, except for the Republic of Korea and they consented orally, to delegate operational control of their combat and combat support forces in Vietnam to Commander United States Assistance Command, Vietnam, who is authorized to further delegate operational control of these forces to appropriate United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, subordinate commanders.

7. (C) ANSWER TO QUESTION 13e:

a. Republic of China - Through the US Polwar Advisory Directorate.

b. Royal Thai Military Assistance Group - None at present, forces will come under U.S. OPCON in the near future.

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c. Republic of Philippines Contingent - Surgical Teams: Ministry of Health, Mobile World Health Teams, and Ministry of Defense.

8. (S) ANSWER TO QUESTION 13f:

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a. (U) FWMAF:

(1) Coordinate all USMACV activities relevent to the FWMAF's until operational/mission control passes to a USMACV Command or Staff Agency.

(2) Negotiate, where required, a military working arrangement between the commander, FWMAF, and COMUSMACV.

(3) Represent COMUSMACV on the American Embassy Free-world Assistance Council.

(4) Arrange for the Operational/Mission control of each FWMAF to be delegated either to a subordinate USMACV Command or Staff Agency, or to be dstablished by the Free World Military Assistance Policy Council.

(5) Continuously monitor the activities of each FWMAF while in-country and insure coordinated staff actions to provide support and resolve problems.

(6) Serve as a single point of contact for COMUSMACV on all FWMAF activities and maintain a complete file on each FWMAF.

b. Political Warfare Advisory Directorate:

(1) Operate under staff supervision of ACofS, J3.

(2) Advises COMUSMACV and MACV staff elements on psychological operations and psychological implications of military operations.

(3) Serves as senior advisor to the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD), RVNAF, and provide staff guidance to subordinate advisory teams in matters relating to political warfare.

(4) Exercises staff responsibility for Psychological Warfare and Civic Action activities as they pertain to MACV.

(5) Supervises and directs the staff of the Political Warfare Advisory Directorate.

c. (S) The Studies and Observation Group (SOG) is assigned to and is under the operational control of COMUSMACV. USARV provides logistical support except for mission peculiar items which are provided through own resources. The Commander SOG:

(1) Exercises operational control over US forces and personnel assigned or attached to the SOG to execute such missions as may be directed by COMUSMACV or competent higher authority.

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[redacted]

[redacted]

(2) Advises, assists, and supports the GVN and RVNAF in planning and implementing such missions as may be mutually agreed upon between the US and GRN and directed by COMUSMACV.

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(3) Coordinates activities with other US forces and agencies in all matters of mutual concern and in accordance with policies prescribed by COMUSMACV.

(4) Prepares unilateral US and coordinated US/GVN plans for contingency or general emergency operations as directed by COMUSMACV; develops GVN capabilities to provide support of US forces as may be required under existing assumptions or agreements contingency or special operations.

(5) Acts as Commander (Designate), Joint Unconvential Warfare Task Force (JUWTF). In southeast Asia, develops for implementation upon order, plans for unconventional warfare in S.E. Asia.

Incl 13

[redacted]

[redacted]

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QUESTION 14

1. (U) BACKGROUND: Environmental improvement is regarded as a necessary corollary to successful internal defense operations. Military units participate through military civic action. In Phase II or III insurgencies short-term, high-intensity programs are employed to gain maximum civilian support for military operations in the shortest possible time.

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2. (U) QUESTIONS:

a. Are US military units participating in the GVN environmental improvement program? If so, how are these programs coordinated?

b. Are the military civic action projects implemented by US forces of the short-range, high-intensity type?

c. What tangible results of military civic action can be observed in Vietnam; e.g., increase in reports of VC activity by civilians?

3. (U) ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 14a: Reference MACV Directive 515-2 psychological Operations Military Civic Action, dated 25 Jun 66, (see inclosure 14-1). US units do participate in the GVN environmental improvement program-which is an integral part of the Revolutionary Development Program - through military civic action activities. The principal GVN focal point for integration and coordination of US Military Civic Action is the provincial committee which consists of the Province Chief, the MACV Senior Advisor, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) Province Representatives. Normally, civic action projects are not undertaken without approval of the committee. Unit commanders may deviate from this procedure only in those instances where loss of time would detract from the favorable effects of the projects, and where it is obvious that the project is of a type generally acceptable under the circumstances; e.g., immediate impact projects during tactical operations.

4. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 14b: The majority of the projects are of the short-range high-intensity type. Construction of school classrooms, dispensaries, wells, roads, and bridges are typical projects. Most significant projects undertaken by the US military units meet the following requirements:

(1) Are approved by the appropriate GVN official, e.g., province or district chief.

(2) Are consistent with the unit capability and operational requirements.

(3) Encourage participation by Vietnamese nationals, civilian and/or military.

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QUESTION 14 (cont'd)

5. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 14c: Tangible results of military civic action are as follows: .

a. Increase flow of information of the enemy.

b. Decrease in VC instigated incidents.

c. Improved relations among villagers, GVN, and participating units.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

CHANGE 1
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 515-2

25 June 1966
(MACPD)

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

Directive Number 515-2, this headquarters, dated 30 April 1966, is changed as follows:

1. Change as indicated:

* * * * * * *

7. REPORTS (RCS: MACPD-01).

a. (Superseded) Component commanders, FWMAF, and CG, III MAF, will prepare a civic action report as of the last day of each month and forward to HQ MACV, ATTN: MACPD, to arrive not later than the 15th of the succeeding month. Format to be followed is at Annex A.

* * * * * * *

2. (Added) Insert attached Annex A.

3. Make necessary pen and ink corrections on page 6, basic directive, to indicate the addition of Annex A.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM
OFFICIAL

W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

E. D. BRYSON
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 515-2

30 April 1966
(MACPD)

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

1. PURPOSE. To establish military civic action policies for all subordinate commands and advisory detachments, outline responsibilities for the development, coordination, and implementation of a military civic action program, and recommend basic guidance for other Free World Military Assistance Force commanders.

2. GENERAL.

a. Military Civic Action is defined as participation in or support of economic and sociological programs useful to the local population at all levels. Military Civic Action in Vietnam has two interrelated objectives, one of which is to improve the living conditions of the people so as to remove one of the underlying causes of the insurgency while the other is psychological and seeks to gain and maintain the support of the people for the GVN. Programs include short-term but high impact projects in the fields of education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and other areas which contribute to the general welfare and serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. Military or paramilitary forces utilize their skills and resources on behalf of, or in cooperation with, civil authorities, agencies, or groups.

b. Winning and maintaining the friendship and active cooperation of Vietnamese civilians living within an operational area is an essential step in reducing the effectiveness of the local Viet Cong guerrillas whose success is ultimately dependent upon civilian support. The two main aspects of US military presence which contribute toward good civil-military relations are the individual soldier's attitude in his dealings with local civilians, and planned military civic action programs. In Vietnam, military civic action, which incorporates the individual skills of US personnel and the inherent capabilities of US units, has become a major US contribution to the Revolutionary Development program.

c. The principal GVN focal point for integration of military civic action is the individual province chief who is the senior governmental official and concurrently serves as the province's military commander. He has an administrative staff for determining requirements, establishing priorities, and allocating resources for military civic action projects.

3. POLICY.

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a. Operations plans will provide for utilization of all available assets for military civic action commensurate with the tactical situation.

(1) In operations designed to return an area which has been under VC domination to full time governmental control, or in operations wherein units occupy or operate within an area for an extended period of weeks or months, military civic action will be an essential element of the operation and will be accomplished as soon as the tactical situation permits.

(2) In connection with short term operations in inhabited areas, military civic action will, as a minimum, consist of emergency assistance such as medical treatment of non-combatant casualties.

b. Units not involved in necessary military operations should exploit their capability to engage in local military civic action projects designed to improve the life of rural people.

(1) Unit commanders must contact the local MACV sector or subsector advisor and the local Vietnamese official - district, village or hamlet chief - before beginning any specific projects in order to determine how the unit can best assist local plans and projects. In addition, efforts should be made to participate in combined civic action projects in which US/FWMAF personnel work side-by-side with RVNAF personnel. When additional guidance or supplies are required for particular projects, the normal point of contact is the MACV sector or subsector advisor, who will then contact the appropriate GVN official or the representative from USAID.

(2) Units will concentrate their civic action efforts on projects which complement or support the Revolutionary Development Program such as construction or repair of public facilities, roads, and bridges; supplementing the educational system by presenting English instruction to interested students and adults; establishing a planned medical civic action program for civilians in cooperation with Vietnamese personnel; assisting in the distribution of commodities furnished by USAID or the International Voluntary Agencies; and providing gifts to the Vietnamese from the people of the Free World. Units not able to complete projects should ensure a continuity of effort by a relieving unit or by sector resources.

4. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Subordinate commanders and MACV advisors at all levels will devote personal attention to the subject of military civic action. Emphasis will be placed upon integrated plans which coordinate the efforts of military units with the advisory chain and GVN officials. Combined military civic action projects with US/FWMAF and Vietnamese military or paramilitary units and the local civilians working together are desirable and encouraged.

(1) HQ MACV is responsible for the development of policy and procedures involving the command as a whole and for directing the civic action efforts of component commands and advisory elements. Within HQ MACV, specific staff responsibility for policy, procedures, coordination, monitoring and evaluating military civic action projects is assigned to the Political Warfare Advisory Directorate (MACPD).

(2) Component commanders are responsible for the development, execution, and support of military civic action programs by subordinate units in Vietnam within the context of policies and procedures developed by COMUSMACV.

(3) US Advisors assigned as members of sector, division, and corps advisory teams are responsible for training and assisting the RVNAF in the conduct of military civic action. Sector and subsector advisors are responsible for providing advice to and liaison with US forces in military civic action programs when such units operate in their areas of responsibility.

(4) Senior US tactical commanders in each corps tactical zone are responsible for guiding and evaluating specific military civic action projects undertaken by subordinate units to insure that such projects are coordinated with GVN province plans and are consistent with MACV military civic action guidance.

b. In the US Mission, USAID has primary advisory responsibility for the socio-economic development of Vietnam. USAID advises the GVN in the administration of its development programs and provides the necessary resources for specific projects. Through the Provincial Committee, the USAID Representative helps to ensure that military civic action projects are directed toward the goals of the Revolutionary Development Program.

c. JUSPAO assists the military civic action program by encouraging the publicizing of civic action projects by the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) to ensure that the Vietnamese people recognize that the projects are the result of efforts of the GVN on their behalf, in coordination with other Free World countries. JUSPAO releases stories of newsworthy military civic actions that demonstrate the humanitarian, non-combatant contribution of US and other FWMAF forces in Vietnam.

d. The Provincial Committee, which consists of the Province Chief, the Senior MACV Advisor, and the USAID Provincial Representative, is the key to achieving an integrated military civic action program within a province and is a practical level for planning and executing projects. This committee should develop a file of potential military civic action projects which would have the greatest impact on the population and best support other programs.

5. CIVIC ACTION RESOURCES.

a. USAID has the capability, in resources and organization, to support US/FWMAF military forces and advisors in their military civic action efforts, mainly with food and construction materials. Through the USAID system of representation to major troop units and at corps (region) and province, plans can be made to support combat operations with immediate and appropriate military civic action. USAID commodities are normally stocked at provincial and regional warehouses. Arrangements can be made for units to pre-stock needed resources to insure immediate availability for planned operations.

b. Supplies to support the military civic action program are also available from the International Voluntary Agencies (IVA) such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services, etc. The USAID Provincial Representative will be contacted for any commodity required, and, if unable to meet requests from USAID stocks, he will assist in forwarding requests to the individual agencies. When IVA commodities are made available, commanders of divisions and separate brigades are authorized to contact IVA agencies directly to arrange for transportation and distribution of allocated military civic action supplies.

c. Funds are available for civic action expenditures from sources listed below.

(1) Subsector Fund.

(2) MACV Civic Action Fund.

(3) USAID Regional Director's and Provincial Representative's Imprest Fund.

6. PUBLICIZING CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES. Civic Action activities must be fully publicized in the public information media to insure complete recognition of the military support being offered the GVN Revolutionary Development Program. The focus of publicity will be placed upon the Vietnamese effort and government officials involved with US/FWMAF personnel and contributions shown in a support role. Care must be taken to ensure that only a minimum number of US/FWMAF personnel are in attendance at dedication ceremonies and other like functions.

7. REPORTS (RCS: MACPD-01).

a. SUBJECT	AS-OF-DATE	FROM	TO
C-1 Civic Action (US/FWMAF) SUPERCEDED	Last day of each month	Component Commander	HQ MACV, ATTN: MACPD

This report will include statistics on the following efforts undertaken during the report period:

(1) Brigade/Regiment involved (or comparable USN/USAF unit).

(2) Construction/engineering projects (type/location).

(3) Medical treatments (type/number/location).

(4) Voluntary contributions in support of charitable institutions (amount/location).

(5) Distribution of commodities (commodity class - medical, construction, clothes, foodstuff, etc./tonnage/location) supplied by IVA and private donors and means of distribution (land, sea, air; military or civilian).

(6) Educational efforts (type/location).

(7) Recovered foodstuffs redistributed to the people (amount/location).

(8) Health and sanitation (type/location).

(9) Efforts not otherwise mentioned above.

(10) Evaluation of program.

b. MACV Directive 335-10, dated 23 March 1966, requires Sector Advisors and Advisors to the Mayors of autonomous cities to submit a monthly report on civic action as part of the overall MACV monthly report on Revolutionary Development (RCS: MACJ3-15).

8. REFERENCES.

a. MACV Directive 37-11, subject: Subsector Fund.

b. MACV Directive 40-9, subject: Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP).

c. MACV Directive 525-3, subject: Minimizing Non-Combatant Battle Casualties.

d. MACV Directive 525-9, subject: Control Disposition and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property and Food Supplies.

e. Letter, MACPD, serial 4768, HQ MACV, 31 Oct 65, subject: Supplies for US/Free World Military Assistance Forces Military Civic Action.

f. Letter, MACJ332, serial 1987, HQ MACV, 8 Mar 66, subject: Regional Directors and Provincial Representatives Imprest Fund.

g. Joint Directive 2-65, 1 Sep 65, subject: US Agency Field Relationships.

h. RVMD Directive 963, 2 Feb 66, subject: RVNAF Military Civic Action.

i. MACV Directive, subject: Civil Affairs (to be published).

C-1 1 (ADDED) ANNEX A

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

E. D. BRYSON
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
E
Plus 50 - MACPD
200 - MACAG-ARP
2 - MACAG-AO

CIVIC ACTION REPORT (RCS: MACPD-01)

1. Reporting Command.

2. Construction projects completed during report period; those only repaired or renovated will be marked with an R. Those joint projects with RVNAF will be marked with a J.

a. Bridges _____

b. Churches/Temples/Pagodas _____

c. Culverts _____

d. Dispensaries _____

e. Dwellings _____; number of families _____

f. Fences (tenth of km) _____

g. Fish ponds _____

h. Hospitals _____

i. Information booths _____

j. Irrigation systems (tenth of km) _____

k. Leveling/grading projects _____

l. Libraries _____

m. Market places _____

n. Orphanages _____

o. Playgrounds _____

p. Rice drying courts _____

q. Roads (tenth of km) _____

r. Schools _____; classrooms _____

s. Showers, public _____

Annex A to MACV Directive 515-2, 30 April 1966

t. Toilets, public _____

u. Wells _____

v.

w.

x.

y.

z.

3. Medical treatments.

a. General medical _____

b. Dental _____

c. Surgery _____

d. Emergency evacuations _____

e.

f.

4. Health and sanitation.

a. Classes on personal hygiene _____; attendance _____.

b. Immunizations _____

c. Medical aides or nurses trained _____

d. Physical examinations _____

e. Spray insecticide operations _____

f. Swamp areas drained _____

g.

h.

5. Distribution of commodities (pounds unless otherwise specified).

a. Blacksmith kits (number) _____

b. Cement _____

c. Clothing _____

d. Fertilizer _____

e. Food _____

f. Lumber (board feet) _____

g. Medical, non-prescription _____

h. Midwifery kits (number) _____

i. Physical education kits (number) _____

j. School kits (number) _____

k. Soap _____

l. Tin sheets (number) _____

m. Woodworker kits (number) _____

n.

o.

p.

q.

r.

6. Recovered goods redistributed to the people, name of operation (if applicable) _____

a. Rice (pounds) _____

b.

c.

d.

7. Education efforts.

   a. English classes _____; attendance _____

   b. Korean classes _____; attendance _____

   c.

   d.

   e.

8. Voluntary contributions in support of: (piasters)

   a. Hospitals _____

   b. Orphanages _____

   c. Religious _____

   d. Schools _____

   e.

   f.

9. Efforts not otherwise mentioned above.

10. Selected civic actions having a particular human interest appeal which would make them suitable for publication or the subject of a special feature article.

11. Evaluation of program (A short, concise statement).

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QUESTION 15

1. (U) BACKGROUND: Current doctrine as reflected in paragraph 8, FM 31-73 states: "At all levels, conterinsurgency planning and direction should be accomplished through area security coordination centers (ASCC)".

2. (U) QUESTIONS:

15a. Are ASCC in operation in Vietnam? If not, why not?

15b. To what extent do U.S. and/or third country units participate in the ASCC operations.

3. (U) ANSWERS TO QUESTION 15a:

a. There are no ASCCs in operation in Vietnam. There are several other type centers in operation; there may be just a question of terminology involved in identification. The following type organizations are employed and their locations are identified in Inclosure 15-1. Annex A to Staff Study.

(1) Central Intelligence Coordination Committee (CICC).

(2) Province Intelligence Coordination Committee (PICC).

(3) Sector Operations Intelligence Center (SOIC).

(4) Province Coordinating Intelligence Center (PCIC).

(5) Tactical Operations Center (TOC)

b. Attached as Inclosure 15-2 is a MACV J21 letter, subject: MACV Position Province Intelligence Coordination Committee (PICC), dated 19 June 1965, which provides some additional background information on the use of several of the above referenced organizations.

c. US tactical troops only employ the TOC as their central organization for coordination, when they are engaged in tactical operations in non-pacified areas.

4. (U) ANSWERS TO QUESTION 15b:

a. The locations and amount of participation in these various centers by advisor personnel is described in Inclosure 15-1.

b. The tactical US troop elements have minimal participation in these organizations.

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.
DOD 5

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Annex A to Staff Study (Sector Operations Intelligence Center (SOIC)(U), dated 21 Jan 66

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
APO San Francisco 96243

EXPLOITATION BRANCH, INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DIVISION

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Statistical Summary of Intelligence
Organizations in being at the time (U)

INCL #15-1

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PROVINCE	SOIC	PICC	TOC	PCIC	OTHER	EVALUATION	VN & US REPRESENTATION	REMARKS
COMMAND MILITARY REGION*								
GIA DINH	NO	YES	YES	NO	NONE	BARELY EFFECTIVE	VN - S2/S3, Nat'l Pol US - S3, S3 NCO ADV PICC - VN - DPC For Security, S2, MSS, Nat'l Pol	SOIC Established in August 1965 PICC meets daily
I CORPS - 1ST ARVN DIVISION								
THUA THIEN	NO	NO	NO	NO	Joint Intel Center	Excellent	VN - S2, RF-S2, Nat'l Pol, MSS, 101st Intel Det, Hue City Police, Pol Act TM, CT & CG US - S2, Asst S2, S2 NCO ADV	In operation 18 months
QUANG TRI								
1 CORPS - 2ND ARVN DIVISION								
QUANG NAM	NO	NO	YES	YES	NONE	Barely Satisfactory	VN - S2/S3 US - S2/S3 ADV	Entity known as PCIC/TOC. Division rating due to lack of key personnel

* Capitol Intelligence Coordination Committee (CICC) at CMR has been discontinued.

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QUANG TIN	YES	NO	YES	NO	NONE	SOIC - Effective in Administration TOC - Marginal	SOIC - VN - S2, Nat'l Pol, MSS US - S2, Asst S2, S2 NCO Adv TOC - VN - CofS, DPC for Security US - None	SOIC - In operation for two years. TOC - Not known when established
QUANG NGAI	YES	NO	NO	NO	NONE	Satisfactory	VN - S2/S3, Nat'l Pol, MSS. US - S2, Naval Ln Off, S2 NCO Advisor	SOIC in operation for 19 months SMIAT maintains Ln/w/SOIC.
					II CORPS - 22ND ARVN DIVISION			
HAU BON	YES	NO	NO	NO	NONE	Very Effective	VN - S2/S3, MSS, Nat'l Pol, RF/PF, 42dth Spec Gp, Nat'l Geog Sys. US -S2 & S2 NCO Adv	NONE
PHU YEN	YES	NO	NO	NO	Fairly Effective	Fairly Effective	VN - S2/S3, S3 Air US - S2, S2 NCO Adv	In operation since 1962
BINH DINH	YES	YES	NO	NO	NONE	Effective-SOIC *Ineffective-PICC	VN-S2/S3,NCK Ln Off, RF/PF, MSS, Nat'l Pol, Junk Fleet Rep, 1ST Cav Div Rep (US), USSF, 22d Inf Div (ARVN), 704th INTC (US), 24th Psyops Det. US-S2/S3, S3 Air, RF/PF, S2/S3 NCO Adv.	*Not constituted as ARVN directives require.

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PROVINCE	SOIC	PICC	TOC	PCIC	OTHER	EVALUATION	VN & US REPRESENTATION	REMARKS
	II CORPS - 23D ARVN DIVISION							
NINH THUAN	YES	YES	NO	NO	NONE	Ineffective PICC & SOIC	SOIC VN-S2/S3,S4,Sect Commo DPC for Sec, CofS, Rf/PF, S5 US - S2, RF/PF and Asst, Lt Wpns Inf Adv, S4 Adv PICC-Not available	SCIC Opn'l since 2 Dec 65. PICC does not hold regularly schedule meeting.
KHANH HOA	YES	NO	NO	NO	NONE	Ineffective	VN - Nat'l Pol, MSS, ARVN NCO Acad, 2d Coastal Distr DWC My Tng Ctr, USSF, RF/PF, 12th AB Op, CID,SMIAT, S2/S3. US-S2, S2 NCO, RF/PF and Asst Adv	TOC scheduled to b activated 15 Jan 6 VN personnel Repr is design,not actual.
QUANG DUC	YES	YES	YES	NO	NONE	SOIC - Fairly effective PICC - In-effective TOC - Fairly effective	SOIC-VN-S2/S3,Nat'l Pol US-S2 TOC-VN-S2/S3 US-S2, RF/PF, Ob Anal, USAF. PICC-VN-DPC for Sec, Nat'l Pol,MSS, S2 of US units in Prov	None
LAM DONG	YES	NO	NO	NO	NONE	Moderately effective	VN-S1,S2,S3,S4,S5,S6,MSS, Nat'l Pol, US -ALO	SOIC known also as TOC.
BINH THUAN	YES	NO	NO	NO	NONE	Moderately effective	VN-CofS, S2, S3, Sec Intel Co CO, VNAF ALO, S3 Air, Nat'l Pol, MSS, Arty LNO. US - S2 & Asst Adv	NONE

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PROVINCE	SOIC	PICC	TOC	PCIC	OTHER	EVALUATION	REPRESENTATION	REMARKS
DARLAC	YES	NO	NO	NO	NONE	Effective	VN-DCofS, RF/PF S2, S3, Air O, Comm O, MSS, Nat'l Pol. US - USAF Fac, USAF IntelAnal	None
TUYEN DUC	YES	NO	NO	NO	NONE	Marginally Effective	VN-S2, MSS, Nat'l Pol APA. US - S2	MSS not represented
24th SPECIAL TACTICAL ZONE								
KNOTUM	YES	YES	NO	NO	NONE	Moderately Effective	VN-S2, MSS, Nat'l Pol US - None PICC - Same	None
PLEIKU	YES	NO	NO	NO	NONE	Marginally Effective	VN - S3, FSC US - S3*	*Only during Operations
III CORPS, 5TH ARVN DIVISION								
BINH DUONG	NO	YES	YES	NO	NONE	Fairly Effective	VN - Dy Off, Intel & Opns NCOs US - S2/S3, S5 Adv	TCC - In operation only 3 weeks. PICC - Committee only meets once each week
BINH LONG	NO	NO	YES	NO	NONE	Not effective but improving	VN - S2/S3 US - S2/S3 RF/PF Adv, USAF.	TCC - In operation 6 months
PHUOC LONG	YES	NO	NO	NO	NONE	Effectiva and improving	VN - S2/S3, MSS, RF/PF US - S2/S3 RF/PF Adv, USSF	SOIC - In operation 6 months.

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PROVINCE	SOIC	PICC	TOC	PSIC	OTHER EVALUATION	VN & US REPRESENTATION	REMARKS
III CORPS, 10TH ARVN DIVISION							
BIEN HOA	YES	YES	NO	NO	NONE	Very effective, Both SOIC and PICC	SOIC VN - S2/S3, Nat Pol, MSS US - S3 PICC VN - DPC for Security, CofS, S1, S2, S4, S3, S5, RF/PF, Nat Pol, MSS, ARVN Reps US-Sector Adv, S2 Adv, RF/PF JUSPAO	SOIC and PICC Operational 15 months. PICC meets six days per week.
BINH TUY	YES	NO	NO	NO	NONE	Effective	VN - S2/S3 US - S2/S3	Operational 7 months
LONG KHANH	YES	YES	NO	NO	NONE	Fairly effective	SOIC VN - S2/S3 US - S2/S3 Adv CO of LLDB PICC VN - DPC for Sec, S2 Nat'l Pol, MSS. US - None	SOIC - Established for over 2 years PICC - Established 23 Dec 65.
PHUOC TUY	YES	NO	NO	NO	NONE	Fairly Effective	VN - S2, MSS, Nat'l Pol, Ven K ep Trng Ctr, RF/PF Rep; In w/spec Da-294. US - None	SOIC - Established 1 Sep 64. Sector S2 Adv Advises S2 on SOIC Opns.
III CORPS, 25TH ARVN DIVISION							
TAY NINH	YES	NO	NO	NO	NONE	Fair but improving	VN - S2/S3 US - S2 (2 off, 2 EM)	In operation only 4 weeks.
HAU NGHIA	NO	YES	YES	NO	NONE	Not Given	VN - S2/S3 US - S2/S3 PICC VN - DPC for Security, S2, MSS, Nat'l Pol	PICC meets once per month. TOC in existence 4 months.

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PROVINCE	SOIC	PICC	TOC	PCIC	OTHER	EVALUATION	VN & US REPRESENTATION	REMARKS
Long An	NO	YES	YES	NO	NONE	Effective	TOC VN - S2/S3 US - S2/S3 Adv PICC VN - DPC for Security, S2 PICC Off, C.O. LONG KHANH Capital Mil Dis, ARVN Rgts National Pol, MSS, Spec Br Nat'l Pol, US - None	TOC established Jul 65. SOIC existed 1 year discontinued July 65. PICC meet monthly
IV CORPS - 7TH ARVN DIVISION								
KIEN HOA	YES	YES	YES	NO	NONE	Effective	SOIC/TOC VN - S2/S3 US - S2/S3 Adv PICC VN - DPC for Security, S2, MSS, Nat'l Pol, CIO, RF/PF, S2 US - None	SOIC/TOC co-located US present 24 hours per day Sub Sectors have Intel Coordinating Committee.
GO CONG	YES	YES	NO	NO	NONE	Fairly effective	SOIC VN - S2, S3 US - S2, S3 PICC VN - DPC for Security, S2, MSS, Nat'l Pol. US - None	PICC has met twice since March 1965. S3 in overall control of SOIC.
DINH TUONG	YES	NO	NO	NO	NONE	Fairly effective	VN - S2/S3, Natl Pol US - S2/S3 & S2/S3 NCO Adv	SOIC in existence for three years. U Officer on Duty 24 hours per day.

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PROVINCE	SOIC	PICC	TOC	PCIC	OTHER	DIVISION EVALUATION	VN & US REPRESENTATION	REMARKS
KIEN TUONG	NO	NO	YES	NO	NONE	Effective	VN - S2/S3, Other Staff Sections at Briefing US - S2/S3	SOIC Building under construction. Completion date 30 JAN 66
						IV CORPS - 9TH ARVN DIVISION		
CHAU DOC	YES	YES	YES	NO	NONE	SOIC-Effective TOC, PICC also	SOIC - VN S2/S3, MSS Nat'l Pol, RF/PF, RAG. US - Unknown TOC - VN S2/S3 US - RF/PF Adv. PICC - VN S2, MSS, Nat'l Pol, RAG. US - None	PICC meets monthly-Effectiveness doubtful.
KIEN GIANG	NO	YES	YES	NO	NONE	TOC-effective PICC-ineffective	TOC VN - S2, S3, S4. US - RF/PF, S2 Adv. PICC - S2, MSS, Nat'l Pol, RAG, NAAL	PICC formed Nov 65.
KIEN PHONG	NO	NO	YES	NO	NONE	Effective	VN - S2, S3, RF/PF US - S2 Adv	None
VINH BINH	YES	YES	YES	NO	NONE	All rated effective	SOIC - VN S2 Nat'l Pol, Naval, RAG US - S2 Adv TOC - SOIC & G3, G3 Adv US - RF/PF Adv PICC - Same SOIC	None
AN GIANG	YES	NO	YES	NO	NONE	SOIC - Effective TOC - Ineffective	SOIC - VN S2 Adv TOC VN S2/S3 Combo US RF/PF Adv	None
VINH LONG	NO	NO	YES	NO	NONE	Effective	VN-S1, S2, S3, S5 US-RF/PF Adv	None

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PROVINCE	SOIC	PICC	TOC	PCIC	OTHER	DIVISION EVALUATION	VN & US REPRESENTATION	REMARKS
				IV CORPS - 21st ARVN DIVISION				
PHONG DINH	NO	*NO	YES	NO	NONE	Marginally effective	VN - Rep of S2, S3, S4, S5 US - None	*PICC in planning stage
AN XUYEN	YES	NO	YES	NO	NONE	Both effective	SOIC VN - S2, Nat'l Pol, MSS US - None TOC VN - S2, S3, S4, Commo, Arty. US - None	US Advisors in TOC during Opns.
BAC LIEU	*YES	NO	*YES	NO	NONE	Marginally effective	VN S2/S3 US - S2/S3, Asst S2/S3, S3 NCO, 2 Commo EM	&Actually both same organization.
BA XUYEN	NO	YES	YES	NO	NONE	Marginally effective	TOC VN - S3, Air Obs, Arty. US - None PICC VN - DPC for Security, S2, Nat'l Pol & Spec Br-NP, MSS. US - None	PICC formed July 6
HUONG THIEN	YES	NO	NO	NO	NONE	Effective	VN - S2, Nat'l Pol, Adv Pol Act, MSS S2, ARVN Rgt. US - None	SOIC Also as S2 to Combat Command

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RECAPITULATION	SOIC	PICC	TOC	PCIC	OTHER
*TOTALS	29	16	20	1	1

*Many Provinces have more than one organization.

RECAPITULATION BY CORPS					
Capital Military Rgn Gia Dinh	0	1	1	0	0
*I CORPS (5 Provinces)	2	0	2	1	0
II CORPS (12 Provinces)	12	4	1	0	0
III CORPS (10 Provinces)	6	5	4	0	0
IV CORPS (15 Provinces)	9	6	19	0	0

*No Information on Quang Tri Province

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RECAPITULATION - DIVISION AREAS	SOIC	PICC	TOC	PCIS	JTC	ESTIMATED EFFECTIVES:	SOIC	PICC	TOC	PCIS	JTC
1st Division (2 Provinces) (Quang Tri Not Available)	0	0	0	0	1		0	0	0	0	1
2d DIVISION (3 Provinces)	2	0	2	1	0		1	0	0	0	0
22d DIVISION (3 Provinces)	3	1	0	0	0		2	0	0	0	0
23d DIVISION (9 Provinces)	9	3	1	0	0		1	0	0	0	0
5th DIVISION (3 Provinces)	1	1	2	0	0		1	0	0	0	0
10th DIVISION (4 Provinces)	4	2	0	0	0		2	1	0	0	0
25th DIVISION (3 Provinces)	1	2	2	0	0		0	0	1	0	0
7th DIVISION (4 Provinces)	3	2	2	0	0		1	1	2	0	0
9th DIVISION (6 Provinces)	3	3	6	0	0		3	2	5	0	0
21st DIVISION (5 Provinces)	3	1	4	0	0		2	0	1	0	0
TOTALS (DOES NOT INCL GIA DINH)						13	4	4	0	1	

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

MACV J21

19 June 1965

SUBJECT: MACV Position on Province Intelligence Coordination Committee (PICC)

TO: See Distribution

1. The purpose of this letter is to clarify the interrelation of the Province Intelligence Coordination Committee (PICC) and the Sector Operations Intelligence Center (SOIC) and to furnish guidance to intelligence advisors in the field.

2. The Central Intelligence Coordination Committee (CICC) has recently published an implementing directive for the establishment of PICC's at the province level. The PICC will be composed of representatives from all province intelligence agencies. Each agency will furnish collected information to the PICC, which will collate, evaluate and disseminate the furnished intelligence to the interested agencies. The PICC, when established, will have only coordination authority, while the member intelligence agencies will retain their operational responsibilities. The military intelligence functions will continue to be performed under the direction of the Section S2 in what is now called the SOIC. However, as the representation from National Police and MSS will move from the SOIC to the PICC, the SOIC will take on the character of a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and should be so designated.

3. The SOIC's (TOCs) will continue to operate in their present physical locations and all U.S. military advisory units should continue to develop close working relations between the S2 and S3. Military intelligence will be collected, evaluated, produced and disseminated by the SOIC (TOC) as in the past. It will also be passed to the PICC for further evaluation and use by other agencies. There is apparently a misunderstanding on the part of some U.S. intelligence personnel in the field, as reports are being received that the present SOIC's are to become the new PICC's. This is not the case since the SOIC (TOC) will continue to operate in its present location while the location and the local functions of the PICC will be located elsewhere.

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Encl 15-2

MACV J21
SUBJECT: MACV Position on Province Intelligence Coordination Committee (PICC)(Cont'd)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/RICHARD G. STILWELL

t/RICHARD G. STILWELL
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
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A TRUE COPY

EMIL D. KOVAL
Major, GS
Plans Br, P&O Div
Office, ACofS, G3

QUESTION 16

1. (U) BACKGROUND: Population and resources control measures are an essential element of successful internal defense operations. Military units are employed in the P & RC role only when police and/or paramilitary forces are unable to accomplish the mission.

2. (U) QUESTION:

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a. Have effective P & RC measures been implemented by GVN in those areas which they control? If not, why not?

b. To what extent do US units participate in GVN population and resources control operations?

c. What P & RC measures are required of US and/or Third country units in order to secure their base areas? Are Vietnamese employed to assist in this role?

3. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 16a:

Yes, It is part of the securing process. Revolutionary Development (Rural Construction) Cadres are being trained in increasing numbers for this purpose. See MACV Directive 525-7, Combat Operations Economic Warfare (U) 14 Jan 66, inclosure 16-1, and MACV Directive 525-9, Control Disposition and Safeguard of Vietnamese Property and Food Supplies (U) 2 Feb 66, inclosure 16-2.

4. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 16b:

Generally, US Forces do not exercise civil police powers. Vietnamese cadres, with US or ARVN military forces providing local military security and civic action, conduct interrogations, enumerate the inhabitants, identify VC suspects and sympathizers, and organize hamlet political and defense stuctures.

5. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 16c:

To the extent necessary, base areas and surrounding hamlets have to be pacified and secured. The various steps in the Revolutionary Development process are applicable. All actions, however, are coordinated with appropriate GVN authority in the province or district concerned.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

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DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 525-7

14 January 1966
(MACJ3)

COMBAT OPERATIONS
ECONOMIC WARFARE (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. This directive furnishes basic guidance and instructions for US Force commanders, other Free World Military Assistance Force commanders, and MACV advisors on the implementation of economic warfare measures designed to deny Viet Cong (VC) units those items of supply they need to carry on their war against the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), and to counter VC economic warfare measures against RVN. Necessary action will be initiated by US Force commanders, other Free World Military Assistance Force commanders (subject to their concurrence), and by Corps Senior Advisors, through advisory channels, to develop effective economic warfare measures and plans within each corps tactical zone (CTZ), based on these and future instructions.

2. (U) BACKGROUND.

a. The basic US concepts for economic warfare and the substantive guidance on the subject contained in this US directive have resulted from the work of a US Mission economic warfare committee and are aimed at focusing ongoing programs toward the objectives of economic warfare. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) Joint General Staff has already brought together guidance on several economic warfare measures in Appendix G to its Directive AB 140. Further instructions on this subject will be disseminated in the future by both US and Government of Vietnam (GVN) agencies.

b. Intelligence estimates indicate that there are certain basic items which are essential to the VC for their operations and which we can effectively deny to them - money, foodstuffs, salt, and medicines. Presently, they have little difficulty obtaining these items; their main problem is in distributing them to their units in need.

c. Economic warfare measures are designed both to separate the Viet Cong from their sources of supply and to disrupt the distribution of supplies they already have on hand.

d. All agencies of the US Mission, as well as many agencies of the Government of Vietnam, have a role in economic warfare. To be effective, the measures adopted must be coordinated between these agencies at both the local and the national level. For example, FWMAF units do not have the authority to exercise police powers over the Vietnamese people; hence, the majority of controls will have to be established by the National Police, Army of Vietnam (ARVN) Military Police, other ARVN military units, and Regional and Popular Force (RF/PF) units as appropriate.

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
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INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31 72.

3. (C) POLICY.

a. Controlled Items: Control measures will be established in order to limit Viet Cong access to the following specific items - rice, salt, money, and medicine - consistent with the guidelines outlined below.

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(1) Rice: Rice harvests will be controlled on a planned basis, within the overall capability of available military forces. Rice fields or rice which cannot be controlled will be destroyed, except that whenever rice is destroyed, the legitimate food needs of the local populace must be anticipated and provided for by local GVN provincial authorities, and monitored and assisted by the US members of the Provincial Team. If this cannot be done, the rice should not be destroyed.

(2) Salt: Major salt-producing areas in RVN will be secured to reduce the availability of salt for VC use. The major salt producing areas are listed in Annex A. FWMAF unit commanders and MACV advisors will assist and monitor RVNAF security efforts in these areas and will furnish appropriate assistance to the local United States Overseas Mission (USOM) representatives if required for their agency's support of the salt control effort.

(3) Money: The VC rely heavily on extortion of money from the RVN populace to finance their aggression. The best estimate of this effort indicates that they have extorted from 2 to 4 billion piasters during the past twelve months. About 75% of this money was extorted from the people in the form of an alleged tax on agricultural produce and industrial goods; the balance was extorted from the commercial civilian traffic on the roads, trails and waterways of RVN. Many of these "tax collection" points are in areas which are accessible to our side and can be successfully interdicted. FWMAF, ARVN, RF, and PF will coordinate activities aimed at neutralizing VC sources of money and money instruments by attacking VC "tax collection" points on roads and waterways and by assisting the local populace in evading so-called VC taxes and bond-selling efforts.

(4) Medicines: The VC obtain medicines from Communist countries and by direct or indirect purchase in RVN from commercial establishments. People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) units bring a basic supply of medicine with them from North Vietnam and thereafter depend primarily on local purchase. Medicines are transported from the cities and towns by every means of transportation - using roads, trails, and waterways, - to VC distribution points. Some medicines are also obtained by selective hijacking of civilian traffic. Local VC sources of medicine must be identified and neutralized. Captured stocks of medicines will be reported and disposition made in accordance with MACV directives.

b. Checkpoints.

(1) The National Police of Vietnam have the authority and responsibility, by law, for the control of resources in an effort to deny manpower and material (items of strategic value) to the enemy. However, the National Police (CANH SAT) have no authority over any person wearing a military uniform or driving a military vehicle (including the enemy when disguised in friendly force uniforms). This authority is reserved exclusively for the ARVN Military Police

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(QUAN CANH). Hence, the responsibility for control measures must largely rest with these two organizations. Neither ARVN military units or the RF/PF have the authority, responsibility or training to engage in resources control measures. These units can and should be used in supporting or securing roles for the civilian and military police where and when necessary.

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(2) Joint control teams should be used on all checkpoints - National Police and ARVN Military Police, supported by Regional and Popular Forces as described above. In areas of US or other FWMAF troop concentration and on roads with a dense US traffic flow, FWMAF Military Police (MP) will be used but only to inspect their own personnel and vehicles, and to set the example for proper and correct procedures.

(3) Personnel delayed by any of the control procedures will be treated courteously and have explained to them that their inconvenience is being caused by the acts committed by the Viet Cong. Handbills should always be given to the people who are delayed explaining to them the economic warfare program.

c. Contraband. Procedures will be developed at corps, division, province, and district levels to insure that all contraband seized by FWMAF and GVN and US agencies is disposed of through accountable channels.

(1) When contraband is seized, prompt action will be taken to determine its source and destination. Judicial Branch Police, Special Branch Police, and ARVN Military Police CID are ideally suited for this type mission. Their services may be obtained by contacting the nearest GVN Chief of Police or ARVN Provost Marshal.

(2) Contraband seized by the US or other FWMAF Military Police from US or other FWMAF personnel and vehicles will be turned in on receipt to the appropriate US or other FWMAF Property Disposal Officer.

(3) Items of FWMAF equipment seized by GVN forces that have not been furnished to the GVN by the Military Assistance Program (MAP) or USOM support should be turned in by the GVN authorities to FWMAF authorities.

(4) Contraband not originating from US support programs which is confiscated by GVN forces should be turned over to the appropriate GVN officials on receipt. MACV Advisors will work with their counterparts to establish strict controls so that seized contraband is used to advantage.

4. PROCEDURES.

a. Rice Harvesting. The protection and controlling of rice harvests, especially in the Delta and along the coastal provinces of I and II Corps, requires detailed and coordinated planning. This planning can be divided into the following phases:

(1) Determine the areas which produce large quantities of rice and establish priorities for protecting these areas.

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(2) Conduct joint and combined military and police operations to protect the people during rice harvesting.

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(3) Protect convoys transporting rice harvests to agricultural cooperatives and farmers associations.

(4) Initiate propaganda activities, using Psywar and Rural Construction Cadre, urging the people to sell their rice only to GVN authorities or legal rice traders.

(5) Deny to the Viet Cong rice from paddies farmed or controlled by the VC. If the VC rice paddies are not accessible, consideration will be given to the use of herbicides to destroy the crop. Final decision to use herbicides always rests with the GVN and always requires complete coordination of US and GVN agencies involved. Herbicide uses are discussed further in Appendix 3.

b. Convoy and Curfew Measures. Successful implementation of convoy and curfew measures will limit VC access to money and materials they are now extorting from civilian and commercial traffic. These measures include careful selection of key stretches of roads and waterways, imposition of a strict nightly curfew for all traffic, enforcement of travel by convoy during the hours of daylight, and careful inspection of commercial vehicles. Execution of these measures would include:

(1) Selection of key lines of communication (LCC).

(2) Action to standardize curfew times in the selected areas.

(3) Coordination with RVNAF, National Police, USOM, JUSPAO, local GVN officials and local merchants as required and appropriate.

(4) Selection of the proper security force for each convoy with provision for fast reaction forces to include "instant" air support.

(5) Scheduling of convoys based on the local enemy situation.

c. Checkpoints. Two types of checkpoints are common to counterinsurgency operations -- fixed and mobile (both land and water). Technical details for establishing checkpoints are contained in USOM Public Safety Division publications on resources control. One important feature of checkpoint operations is the requirement for absolute control in the search area so that personnel and vehicles can be efficiently searched and processed. On heavily traveled roads and waterways, only a selected number of vehicles can be thoroughly searched so as not to delay the normal traffic flow any longer than necessary. Personnel not subject to thorough inspections should at least have their identity established. Vehicles and ships not thoroughly searched should be given a cursory check and permitted to proceed. The selection rate for complete inspection should be changed frequently in order not to establish a pattern. A list of possible checkpoint discrepancies and a diagram of a typical road block turn-out are included in Annex B.

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d. Action Against VC "Tax Collection" Points. VC tax points are usually located along main RVN LOC's in areas where the terrain favors the security of the point. Escape routes are close by and the operation is highly portable; that is, they can move to another point on the LOC on short notice without missing traffic going in either direction. The extortion parties consist of from ten to as high as fifty personnel and include a security force capable of covering the actual extortion operation by fire. Therefore, operations against these points must be carefully planned, and in implementation, great care should be taken to vary the techniques used and avoid establishment of set patterns of operations or means. One successful ARVN operation involved the use of civilian vehicles with heavily armed ARVN soldiers hidden inside. Some were detailed to neutralize the VC security and others to eliminate the VC extortion party. It was very successful, with no friendly casualties. Techniques used successfully in the past include:

(1) Sleeper Assault Vehicle. As cited above, a civilian type truck or other vehicle suitable for the concealment of armed men and/or arms.

(2) Armed Helicopter Patrol. A HU1 type armed helicopter flying low and fast along selected LOC's can surprise extortion operations. Great care must be exercised for positive identification. A flight of two to four helicopters following the patrol aircraft could land armed personnel around the point to preclude VC escape.

(3) Sleeper Assault Craft. In much the manner as described in (1) above, civilian river craft should be used to knock out extortion operations on rivers and canals.

(4) Electronic Warning Device. To complement other techniques and for use as a separate measure, small transmitting devices could be hidden in vehicles or hand carried to or through collection points. These devices could be activated at the appropriate time to transmit signals for alerting a waiting armed force.

(5) Armed Infiltration Groups. Properly trained personnel infiltrate to preselected positions near "tax collection" points. Action is then taken against the VC in coordination with support forces.

e. Control of Coastal Routes and Inland Waterways. US Navy and Vietnamese Navy forces can contribute significantly to the economic warfare program when their operations are a coordinated portion of the corps, division, province, and district economic warfare plan.

(1) The Coastal Surveillance Force will:

(a) Conduct operations with forces assigned to detect, interdict, and destroy seaborne infiltration into South Vietnam.

(b) Pay particular attention to stopping the coastal trans-shipment of Viet Cong resources.

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(c) Coordinate the above operations with those of the Vietnamese Navy.

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(2) The River Patrol Force, Vietnam, will:

(a) Conduct operations on the principal rivers of the IV Corps area with forces assigned to detect, interdict, and destroy Viet Cong forces.

(b) Pay particular attention to resources control in areas to which responsibility is assigned.

(c) Coordinate the above operations with those of the Vietnamese Navy.

f. Import Commodity Control. Diversion of resources to the Viet Cong is taking place anywhere from the entrance of the cargo into Vietnamese waters until it reaches its final destination. The following actions will be taken, in coordination with USOM and local GVN officials, to limit import losses:

(1) Cargo manifests will be examined in the office of the Transportation Management Agency (TMA) to determine which ships carry commodities desired by the VC for their own use or for re-sale on the black market.

(2) The various agencies involved in controlling port and harbor operations - the harbor or river police or the waterfront police - must have their operations coordinated by one headquarters directly connected with port operations and in continuous liaison with customs authorities. The specific headquarters selected for this task in each port will depend on the local situation. The selected headquarters would insure that:

(a) Manifested cargo was in fact aboard the ship when it came into port.

(b) The cargo is moved into secure warehouses in the port.

(c) Ships waiting at berths are not hijacked.

(d) Commodities leave the port area in the custody of responsible persons.

5. (C) PROGRAM EVALUATION.

a. FWMAF commanders and MACV advisors will insure that the economic warfare programs developed for their areas include effective procedures for review and evaluation of specific measures.

b. This headquarters does not require separate reporting of economic warfare activities; significant operations will be summarized and included in

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the appropriate currently required MACV operational reports. Any special requirement for reports or evaluations will be originated by MACV J3.

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FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

L. M. HARRIS
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

3 Annexes
A. Key Locations for Economic Warfare Measures
B. Checkpoint Deficiencies
C. Use of Herbicides in Economic Warfare

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KEY LOCATIONS FOR ECONOMIC WARFARE MEASURES

1. This annex contains current intelligence information, as of 15 December 1965, for use in the application of economic warfare measures.

2. As additional information becomes available, the attached appendixes will be updated.

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Appendix I: Salt Producing Areas

II: VC Tax Collecting Points

III: VC Sea Transhipment and Infiltration Points

Annex A to MACV Directive Number 525-7, 14 January 1966

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MAJOR SALT PRODUCING AREAS IN RVN

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NAME	LOCATION
Bac Lieu	WR8125
Ba Ria	YS405580, YS410570
Phan Thiet	AN8609
Ca Na	BN720550
Phang Rang	BN8278
Hon Khoi	CP070875
Tuyet Diem	CR090015
Sa Huynh	BS9224

NOTE: There are many other salt pans along the RVN coast, some of which are probably used by the VC. The eight areas cited above are estimated to supply 80 percent of the RVN needs.

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VC TAX COLLECTION POINTS

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POINT		ROUTE NUMBER
1.	YT610410	20
2.	YT620435	20
3.	YS790980	1
4.	YT680460	20
5.	YT630450	20
6.	YT760570	20
7.	XT787460	13
8.	BR899520	1
9.	BR902554	1
10.	ZT182018	1
11.	ZT189037	1
12.	ZT235098	1
13.	BQ150140	21

NOTE: The above listing includes only those points where VC collections have been substantiated - - there are probably many more throughout the country. Some tax parties operate at several different locations as a security and deception measure.

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VC SEA TRANSHIPMENT AND INFILTRATION POINTS

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I CTZ

Known/Reported

Name	Location	Remarks
None		
Suspected/Likely:		
Song Cua Dai	BT2058	
Song De Sa Ky	BS7684	
Vung Chon May	ZD190080	

II CTZ

Known/Reported

Tam Quan	BS920130	On 7 Dec 65, unknown number of junks left Tam Quan for the mouth of the river (BR980895) and returned with 3-5 tons of supplies. Defense positions have been put in along the canal at the mouth of the river.
Vung La	CQ160820	
Vung Ro	CQ290220	DRV steel ship was sunk 16 Feb 65 while infiltrating arms and equipment.
Eastern Ban Goi	CP250950	

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Hon Khoi	CQ081867	
Chanh Qai	CR105515	Reported as a rice storage area and dispensary.
Xom Bai Xep	CR092117	
Phu Hiep	CQ269349	Contains secret shelters and storage areas.
Nui Binh Nhon	BN179198	
Dieu Quang	BR977963	Suspected rice supply area.
Phu Thu	BR980895	Reportedly contains well-developed trenches and storage areas. Activity noted on canal.
Degi	CR066605	Suspected rice supply and storage area. Numerous foxholes and automatic weapons positions in area.
Suspected/likely:		
Vung Mu	CQ140960	
Vinh Hy	CN040960	

III CTZ

Known/Reported		
Cho Phuoc Hai	WS460475	
Bai Bien Long Hai	YS453482	Also reported as a storage area.
Long Thanh	YS096485	Numerous foxholes and automatic weapons positions, piers and trenches.
Long Ke Ca	ZS245195	

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Suspected/Likely:

Song Ray	YS580580

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IV CTZ

Known/Reported	
Hon Chon	VS595225
Tho Son	VS890150
Ile De Phu Quoc	US875245
Ha Tien	VS450460
Soi Rap	XS950540
Ap Phu My	XS940200
Song Bo Da	WQ250670
Rach Goc	WQ030530
Rach Khan Bang	XR790900
Song Dong Cung	VQ840940
Hon Dat	VS890160

Two junks make monthly trips of 15 days duration to Cambodia. They are off-loaded at the mouth of Luynh Quynh canal (VC839212) or Cay Me canal (VS859174). Junks are painted blue and dark brown, numbered 1435 and 3546, and are hidden at VS843210 and VS866177.

Small canal near:

Da Bac Island	VR792142
Dong Cong River	VQ790920
Bay Hap River	VQ895730

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Cua Long River	VQ840610
Duong Keo Canal	WQ005495
Bo De River	WQ260660
Cai Hoc Canal	WQ148430
Ganh Hao River	WQ463955
Ap Dai Hoa	XR3030
Ap Hau Cu	XR5050
Ap Hoa Thanh	XR6060
Cung Hau River	XR7084
Song Ba Lat	XS8574
Xom Gions Cu	XS9010
Song Cua Tieu	XS9030
Suspected/Likely:	None

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CHECKPOINT DEFICIENCIES

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1. Inefficient search of vehicles and personnel by checkpoint personnel.

2. A lack of operational procedures to move traffic quickly, in order to help the public and assure the search objectives.

3. Poor location of checkpoints where security during the search could not be maintained.

4. Failure to search thoroughly loaded buses because of the trouble that would be involved.

5. A lack of qualified and trained personnel and equipment.

6. A marked lack of supervision, discipline and initiative.

7. Checkpoint personnel sleeping on post during night hours of operation.

8. No coordinated effort with the adjacent provinces.

9. The acceptance of bribes and gratuities by some checkpoint personnel. Checkpoints should not be located in the same area as traffic control points and GVN tax collection points.

10. Since permanent checkpoints are easily bypassed, their use should be avoided. When used, they should be complemented by mobile check points.

Appendix I: Typical Turn-Out

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TYPICAL TURN-OUT

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

A. Vehicle stops here for routine check

B. Vehicle continues to here for complete search

C. Rain/Sun shelters for bus passengers.

Appendix I of Annex B to MACV Directive Number 525-7, 14 January 1966

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USE OF HERBICIDES IN ECONOMIC WARFARE

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1. General:

a. The use of herbicides for crop destruction and defoliation is primarily a Republic of Vietnam (RVN) venture which is supported by the United States, subject to policy guidance established by the U.S. Defense and State Departments.

b. Present delivery systems available in country for herbicide operations are C-123 aircraft equipped with 1,000-gallon spray systems, 100-gallon ground based power spray buffalo turbines, and 3-gallon hand sprayers. Approval authority for employment of these three systems, subject to the provisions outlined in MACV Directive 525-1, are as follows:

(1) C-123 Aircraft - COMUSMACV/US Ambassador to RVN.

(2) Buffalo Turbine - Senior Advisor, CTZ.

(3) Hand Sprayer - Senior Advisor, DTA.

c. Current policy prohibits crop destruction in IV CTZ; however, defoliation is permitted when damage to crops is not likely. Crop destruction is permitted in the other CTZs when the crops are known to be VC or are located in VC controlled areas. Herbicide operations in the proximity of rubber plantations require special consideration due to the sensitivity of the rubber tree to the herbicide presently in use.

d. The success of either crop destruction or defoliation operations depends primarily upon targeting by U.S. Advisory personnel and the proper advising of Sector/Province Chiefs to initiate the appropriate action. Thus, it is incumbent upon all advisory personnel from sector level and above to thoroughly understand the herbicide program and emphasize its importance, if it is to be a key factor in economic warfare.

2. Crop Destruction: Crop destruction operations as a part of economic warfare are being conducted in I, II, and III CTZs to deny food (rice, cereals, and broad leaf crops) to VC and VC sympathizers, to direct VC manpower to crop production and to weaken VC strength in these areas. Since most of these areas are located in remote regions, C-123 aircraft delivery systems must be used. The most important factor to be considered for this program to be effective is for advisory personnel

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to insure that Sector/Province Chiefs initiate their requests early so that the area can be attacked while the crops are in their maximum growth period. Consultation with the regional USOM representative will assist in this determination. Sector/Province Chief requests should be forwarded to JUS, RVNAF, at least two months prior to time of attack to insure that timely processing can be effected.

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3. Defoliation:

a. Defoliation operations can assist the economic warfare program as follows:

(1) Clearing of growth around depots and supply points to prevent pilferage.

(2) Clearing of areas around fixed checkpoints to prevent ambush and by-pass of these areas.

(3) Uncovering VC safe havens and storage sites to improve vulnerability of these areas to air strikes.

(4) Uncovering known or suspected VC infiltration routes (land and water) to improve vulnerability of these areas to air strikes.

b. Defoliation operations in the proximity of crops should be reviewed carefully to minimize accidental damage to these crops.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

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DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 525-9

2 February 1966
(MACJ3)

COMBAT OPERATIONS
CONTROL, DISPOSITION, AND SAFEGUARDING
OF VIETNAMESE PROPERTY AND FOOD SUPPLIES (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. To establish policies and procedures for the control, disposition, and safeguarding of property and food supplies during search and destroy operations.

2. (C) GENERAL.

a. In carrying out search and destroy operations in VC controlled areas, US and other Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) must take all practicable measures to minimize the destruction of indigenous private property and to insure proper control, disposition, and safeguarding thereof. That people have lived under VC control does not make them irrevocably hostile, nor is it necessarily of their own choosing. To treat them as the enemy and deny them essential resources is incompatible with long-term Government of Vietnam (GVN) and US objectives.

b. Minimizing destruction of private property and supplies, coupled with proper control and disposition of excesses, requires continuous command emphasis. Plans must include procedures for the protection of private property and the reporting, securing, and disposition of excess supplies.

c. Procedures to be followed during other than search and destroy operations are contained in MACV Directive 525-7 (C), Economic Warfare (U), 14 January 1966.

3. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. US and other Free World Military Assistance Force Commanders and USMACV advisors with RVNAF units should make every effort to minimize destruction of indigenous private property and to insure that captured supplies which are excess to local needs are used to enhance the GVN image. If extraction of these excess supplies is not possible, action will be taken in accordance with policies outlined below to deny permanently these supplies to the enemy.

b. MACV sector advisors will furnish liaison to accomplish coordination between tactical units and local GVN officials.

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4. (C) POLICY. The following policy is established for US Forces. FWMAF and GVN Forces and agencies should be encouraged to adhere to this guidance.

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a. Disposition of indigenous private property and food supplies is the responsibility of GVN officials.

b. Civilian dwellings will not be burned, nor will private property, including livestock, be destroyed except as an unavoidable consequence of combat actions.

c. The destruction of dwellings and livestock, as a denial measure, is to be left to GVN authorities or RVNAF units. Requests by Vietnamese authorities for employment of US Forces to destroy Vietnamese property will be referred to Headquarters, MACV, for the personal decision of COMUSMACV or, in his absence, of DEPCOMUSMACV.

d. Large food caches, obviously over and above the needs of the local population as determined by local GVN officials, will be extracted whenever possible and redistributed under supervision of province and district officials using Vietnamese resources and transportation to the extent practicable. For extractions, a receipt system should be utilized where private ownership is claimed. General security for extraction operations and the furnishing of packaging materials and transportation may be provided upon request from GVN officials. Plans should provide for the availability of these resources.

e. Responsibility for the decision that a tactical situation clearly precludes opportunity for extraction of excess food stocks, thus making destruction necessary, will not be delegated below brigade or senior tactical commander in the area.

5. (C) PROCEDURES.

a. At corps, regional, and division levels, representatives of USAID and JUSPAO, in their role as civilian advisors to tactical commanders, should be encouraged to persuade GVN officials of the need to avoid unnecessary destruction of private property and to use excess captured supplies for civic action purposes. Appropriate psychological operations should be planned to exploit this approach.

b. The following measures, as a minimum, should be coordinated with local GVN officials:

(1) Procedures for informing GVN officials of locations and amounts of food supplies discovered.

(2) Procedures for provision of necessary labor, packaging materials, and transportation to permit extraction.

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(3) Provision for GVN to furnish receipts for supplies extracted when private ownership is claimed.

(4) Procedures for use of US forces to furnish security elements during extraction operations.

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6. (U) REFERENCES.

a. Joint Directive 2-65, US Agency Field Relationships, 1 September 1965.

b. MACV Directive 525-3 (C), Minimizing Non-Combatant Battle Casualties (U), 7 September 1965.

c. MACV Directive 525-4 (C), Tactics and Techniques for Employment of US Forces in RVN (U), 17 September 1965.

d. MACV Directive 525-7 (C), Economic Warfare (U), 14 January 1966.

e. RVNAF/MACV Campaign Plan, AB 141, 31 December 1965.

f. RVNAF/JGS Directive AB 140, 15 December 1965.

7. (U) SUPERSESSIONS.

a. Letter MACPD, Hq MACV, (C), 24 November 1965, subject: Disposition of Captured Rice Stocks (U).

b. Message 00262, Hq MACV, (C), subject: Destruction of Vietnamese Property, Including Livestock (U).

FOR THE COMMANDER:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM
OFFICIAL
☆☆☆☆

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QUESTION 17

1. (U) BACKGROUND: Inclosure 17-1 is a list of intelligence indicators used in College instruction to predict enemy capabilities. These indicators pertain to a more conventional force and situation than found in Vietnam. Consequently, the applicability and validity of the indicators to the Vietnamese situation is unknown.

2. (U) QUESTION: Are intelligence indicators listed in inclosure 17-1 valid in Vietnam? If not, what specific additions or deletions are required?

3. (U) ANSWER: Comments on each of the indicators, keyed to inclosure 17-1 are as follows:

a. Attack:

(1) Indicator 1. Not necessarily valid. Assassinations and abductions are to facilitate Viet Cong (VC) control and further deplete the limited Government of Vietnam (GVN) resources of leadership. Systematic assassination of key officials is a good indicator of increasing level of enemy interest in an area but does not necessarily precede a specific attack. It is a technique which is necessary to the insurgent prior to complete domination of the district, village, hamlet, etc. This tactic is normally conducted over months and years rather than days.

(2) Indicator 2. A valid indicator, the VC tend to abduct young men for supply and labor forces preceeding an attack.

(3) Indicator 3. Indicator has some validity. Most sabotage is designed to impede commerce, which in turn is designed to preclude GVN distribution of goods. In some instances, however, increased sabotage activities in a particular area are reflections of the activity level of the local forces and the guerrilla - militia and may have no relationship to main force tactical plans. These activities may be directed by either the country, province, district, or village level political leaders to satisfy a "quota," or may be in support of Main Force operations.

(4) Indicator 4. Sudden absence of an entire village population is an extremely good indication of an impending attack. Along this same line, sparse attendance at schools is an indicator.

(5) Indicator 5. A weak indicator. VC infiltration from out of country appears to meet enemy requirements for weapons and ammunition, based upon sustained firepower the VC have been observed to apply in pitched battles. Captured documents indicate that the VC are successful in raising funds for in-country purchase of items from normal wholesale and retail outlets.

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(6) Indicator 6. A weak indicator. Demonstrations by minority groups are a function of the VC political arm and would appear to have little bearing on attack plans particularly since most demonstrations are held in the more populated areas and most attacks are on military or para-military installations in less populated areas.

(7) Indicator 7. Not necessarily a valid indicator. Often used to enhance a deception plan. Most warnings tell only "what", but the "when" is often incorrect by months, the daily warnings or threats far exceed the actual attack capability of VC units.

(8) Indicator 8. This is not a valid indicator of attacks but does indicate VC control of an area.

(9) Indicator 9. Concentration of watercraft indicates a VC movement or supply activity which could relate to an attack capability.

(10) Indicator 10. A high rate of defection probably would invite a VC attack.

(11) Indicator 11. Valid indicator.

(12) Indicator 12. Valid indicator.

(13) Indicator 13. A friendly action will frequently result in VC counter action, particular in areas of predominant local force control where a "status quo" is maintained between ARVN and VC.

(14) Indicator 14. Valid indicator. Captured documents indicate that offensive operations frequently are used to raise morale. The attacks for morale building purposes are against easily obtainable targets.

(15) Indicator 15. There is no doubt that in the final stages of attack preparations that the VC provide at least some of the indications associated with conventional forces preparing for an attack.

b. Defense:

(1) Indicator 1. Detection of a high proportion of heavy weapons is an indication of main force VC or NVA units. Heavy weapons are also a sign of an attack or a harrassing mission. The preposition of weapons has little relationship with the type of mission.

(2) Indicator 2. Valid indicator of defense or delay to eventually elude the attackers through an intricate system of tunnels and

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covered routes of withdrawal.

(3) Indicator 3. Does not necessarily indicate defense.

(4) Indicator 4. Gradual withdrawal of guerrilla units can be an indicator of defense but more likely it would show a change in location of forces from one area of operations to another.

(5) Indicator 5. The VC will take advantage of any opportunity to obtain arms and ammunition, this fact destroys the validity of the indicator.

(6) Indicator 6. In addition to defense, the presence of these obstacles can also indicate terrorism, protective tactics to hinder pursuit, or permanent obstacles for safe guarding VC base areas.

(7) Indicator 7. Base areas of certain VC regiments often have large areas under cultivation but this fact bears no relation to the mission of the regiment as they are away from their base a large percentage of the time and the agricultural areas are tended by their families.

(8) Indicator 8. The mere location of bases in an area does not indicate that the main force units will adopt a defensive posture.

(9) Indicator 9. Presence of infiltration routes in an area indicates nothing about the mission of the VC units in the area. So much of the country is controlled by the VC at night and so much is laced with infiltration routes that no correlation can be drawn between mission and routes.

(10) Indicator 10. The presence of road blocks often precede or coincide with the passage of a main force unit through an area prior to an operation but may have little bearing on a defensive mission. Road blocks are also used for tax collecting activities. Occupation of good defensive terrain is a valid indicator of defense used for ambush purposes. Stockage of supplies could predict attack as well as defense.

c. Control:

(1) Indicator 1. Valid

(2) Indicator 2. Valid. Experience with VC controlled areas has provided evidence that the local populations will refuse to have any associations with government forces. In some instances, individuals

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will secretly provide intelligence if they can be assured of adequate protection.

(3) Indicators 3 - 10 are valid.

4. (U) Question: What are the movement rates, maximum and normal, of enemy elements?

5. (U) Answer: There are many variables such as terrain, weather, type of unit and type of armament. Evidence indicates that normal foot movement rate during infiltration through Laos from North Viet Nam to South Viet Nam is 20 km per day. The maximum rate is approximately 30 km per day. In the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) the average movement rate would be about 1.5 km/hr during the dry season and about 1 km/hr during the monsoon season. Moves of 20 km in one day are common for a main force unit enroute to an operational area. Moves of up to 40 km in one day have been recorded but are not common and usually are accomplished in part by motorized sampan. The VC also have a definite truck capability which can not be ignored, particularly in their movement of supplies.

6. (U) Question: Information is needed on the criterion applied in establishing intelligence collection mission responsibilities between Army and other services; doctrinal criteria applied in the operational employment of ground or aerial systems, ground and aerial systems.

7. (U) Answer: Collection requirements and responsibilities beyond Field Force (Corps Hqs) capabilities are supported by U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, GVN, and other U.S. resources, as required. Within the Field Force area of responsibility collection mission requirements are based on known capabilities.

8. (U) Question: What battlefield information requirements are satisfied by other services?

9. (U) Answer: All battlefield information requirements are satisfied in whole or in part by Army. Air Force supplements with aerial photography, infrared and visual aerial surveillance and reconnaissance. Navy supplements, on a voluntary basis, with information collected incident to their offshore and inland waterway operations. The primary supplementary sources are the US Army advisory to GVN ground forces, and US Special Forces Units, both of whom pass to Field Force and subordinate units that information collected from Vietnamese military, police, and political elements.

10. (U) I Field Force Victor (a U.S. Corps-type Headquarters) submitted the following comments which may be of some interest at the Command and General Staff College.

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INDICATORS:

"Despite the fact that "intelligence indicators" have been used traditionally in classrooms as a convenience in presenting a simple approach to predicting probable courses of action (not enemy capabilities), the validity of standardized lists is yet to be proven. The use of generalized listings without reference to localized conditions and environmental factors and other variables implies that human behavior can be predicted on the basis of "plugging in" known quantities into a simple arithmetic formula, and predicting a certain course of action. In the case at hand, the list pertains to indicators of "Attack," "Defense" and "Control" without further definition as to what is meant by each term, e.g., "attack" - by whom against what or whom for what purpose is not clear. It further does not take into full consideration the complex structure of the VC/NVA military and paramilitary forces, Communist "revolutionary warfare" tactics, Communist political objectives and their ideological basis, and the variations in local conditions from one area of Vietnam to another. An item by item discussion of each indicator listed would be excessively lengthy. However, it is recommended that consideration be given to the following factors if the "indicator list" methodology is to be taught and a revised list is desired:

a. The initiator of the type of action indicated should be considered. The enemy forces in South Vietnam are currently categorized as "Militia" (Guerrillas, village and hamlet "defense" forces), "Local Force" (village, district, and provincial regular units of platoon to battalion size), and "Main Force" (regional mobile forces of battalion and regimental size, to include NVA units). All elements can and do coordinate their operations. However, each element has distinct functions and missions.

b. In addition to the initiator of actions, the opposing friendly element, in relation to the specific enemy force and the course of action, should also be considered more specifically. That is, there are US, FWMAF and RVNAF elements, with various categories of paramilitary organizations within the RVNAF structure. Additionally, the types of facilities, installations and positions (logistical, administrative, combat support, etc), should also be considered, along with the actions being taken by friendly elements.

c. The categorization of the various types of action should be defined and be more specific. "Attack" can range from individual or 3-man cell "attacks" against security posts and fixed installations through harassing attacks by local forces to full scale attacks by battalion and larger-size regular formations assisted by locals and militia. "Defense" should not be considered entirely in terms of positional warfare, but

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again in terms of locale and what specific enemy installation or facility is to be defended, why it is to be defended, and by whom. Doctrinally, the VC avoid contact except in areas and under circumstances of their own choosing. When engaged unexpectedly they will react vigorously in an effort to inflict maximum losses on the engaging force and to permit disengagement and withdrawal unless circumstances warrant or dictate maintaining contact for a longer period. A unit may be directed to defend sufficiently long to enable another maneuver element to strike the attacking force. As to "control," the fundamental objective of all insurgent operations is to ultimately gain control over the population of ever-widening areas. The tactics employed are tailored to the requirements for specific areas, and will always include psychological efforts ranging from simple propaganda through "friendly persuasion" to intimidation, terror and ultimately physical takeover and installation of enemy governmental control mechanisms in the guise of the Front. Control of certain geographic areas is also necessary for the establishment of bases, infiltration stations and supply dumps or caches.

d. Whatever tactic or technique is employed, political considerations are paramount in the selection of courses of action by the enemy and the decision to implement or not to implement prescribed plans. As an example, a recently captured VC document reveals that a certain plan called for the destruction of an ARVN battalion following the usual "bait and trap" play. However, though the destruction of the ARVN battalion was a military objective, this plan was not to be implemented unless there was reasonable assurance that the successful achievement of the military objective would also assist in the successful achievment of the primary political objective, i.e., the extension of VC popular control over a larger area. In this case, the initial phase of the operation was launched, but the follow-up phase was cancelled and the major forces (two regiments) which had been provided by higher headquarters to carry out the second phase were withdrawn without having been committed because the desired circumstances did not develop as visualized, i.e., military victory still would not have guaranteed VC control over the area as desired." (IFFV paper)

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ATTACK

1. Systamatic assassination and abduction of government officials, including health, agricultural, and educational officers.

2. Abduction of young men. Frequently seemingly unimportant persons are abducted for a source of information. Others are abducted for training and indoctrination, etc., as well as for a labor source.

3. Increased sabotage activities in a particular area.

4. Subben absence or increase of guerrilla activity and/or the civilian population.

5. Shortage of a particular type of supply, e.g., ammunition, medical supplies, footgear, etc., frequently indicates attack on friendly installations stocking the item short in supply.

6. Demonstrations by minority groups.

7. Increased propaganda in a certain area. Guerrilla forces will frequently issue propaganda to include the general time and date of a forthcoming attack. This is a positive indicator of the actual attack. Such actions serve to build up the guerrilla image; therefore, assisting him in control of the population.

8. The local population to include children in a particular area will not talk or associate with the US forces or the forces of the host country. This is a dual indicator, of guerrilla control and/or attack.

9. Concentration of local watercraft or other modes of mobility, especially if an attempt has been made to conceal them.

10. High rate of defection of regular and paramilitary forces of the host country.

11. Visits in villages, towns, etc., by strange women, men, boys and girls.

12. Disappearance of suspected insurgents, who normally spend all of their time in one particular area.

13. Friendly attack, of a guerrilla secure area, supply dump, or the destruction or capture of key guerrilla personnel of great value toe the guerrilla force. Normally this will indicate that the guerrilla will initiate an offensive act of his own.

14. Low morale. This is not a positive indicator of attack; however, frequently guerrilla commanders will use the attack as a vehicle to boost the morale of his force.

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15. Additionally, many indications applicable to conventional forces are applicable to guerrilla forces, e.g., increased reconnaissance and radio traffic, demonstrations, feints, massing of forces, change in location of headquarters, medical facilities, and other supporting forces.

DEFENSE

1. Detection of high proportion of heavy weapons among guerrilla forces.

2. Establishment of "combat or fortified villages." This is a dual indicator of defense and control.

3. An increase in kidnapping and the capture and retention of prisoners.

4. Gradual withdrawal of guerrilla units from aggressive action against the counterguerrilla force.

5. Supply ambushes designed to obtain arms and ammunition. This is a dual indicator of attack and defense.

6. Presence of foot-traps, spikes, etc., in the area.

7. Establishment of agricultural areas.

8. Location of large, permanent type field headquarters, training areas, etc.

9. Presence of infiltration routes in the area. This is a dual indicator of defense and control.

10. Additionally, many indications applicable to conventional forces are applicable to guerrilla forces, such as: road blocks, canal blocks, occupation of good defensive terrain and stockage of supplies.

CONTROL

1. Failure of village officials to take strong precautions against being kidnapped or murdered as an indicator that an agreement or compromise has been made with the guerrilla force.

2. Refusal of the local population to furnish intelligence to government forces.

3. Evidence of foodstuffs being stocked for and delivered to the guerrilla force. Close observation of the local population will normally reveal some unusual behavior, such as: failing to do their daily chores; returning from work at odd hours; and returning from work without their food baskets being full.

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4. Inability of the constituted government to collect taxes.

5. Cessation of guerrilla raids on inhabited areas.

6. The population continues to work but carefully moves away from the counterguerrilla force, i.e., plows or hoes their way out of the field.

7. New homes, newly cultivated fields, new roads, trails, and canals in areas other than those controlled by friendly forces.

8. Agricultural equipment, including animals left unattended.

9. Absence of people but signs of inhabitation, such as smoulder-ing fires, smoke, foodstuff, and footprints.

10. Imposition of taxes on plantation owners or operators.

[redacted]

QUESTION 18

1. (U) BACKGROUND: Information from Vietnam indicates that U. S. and ARVN forces are conducting joint operations of up to brigade size.

2. (U) QUESTIONS:

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18a. What are the major problems of coordination?

18b. How is coordination effected?

3. ([redacted]) ANSWER TO QUESTION 18a:

a. (U) Coordinated operations have been conducted at the division level, with one U. S. and one ARVN division acting in close coordination in the execution of a single tactical plan. While such operations may have striking success, they cannot be termed either joint or combined operations in terms of the accepted U. S. definitions. Actual coordination is accomplished at several levels of command, beginning with close cooperation and acceptance of common military aims by the U. S. Field Force Commander, who is also Senior Advisor to the ARVN Corps Commander sharing the same geographical area of responsiblity, and the Commander of the ARVN Corps. When the two commanders are in agreement on common military objectives, the direction of the major tactical headquarters can be made along uninational command lines. However, the spirit of cooperation and close coordination extends to each echelon of command, from division to company, where operations are coordinated by the respective commanders concerned. If the Field Force Commander and the ARVN Corps Commander find common ground on which to prosecute the common war against a common enemy, coordination and cooperation among subordinate commands of both nations will normally follow. The degree is dependent on the leadership exercised by each of the commanders concerned.

b. ([redacted]) The somewhat loose arrangement of "cooperation and coordination" argues against intricate tactical plans. Despite this arrangement and the obvious requirement it poses for even closer and more extensive coordination than usual, very successful cooperative operations have been conducted by US and ARVN forces and, in many cases, other FWMAF troops. Two good examples of highly profitable operations conducted in this manner by the US 1st Cavalry Division, the Capital ROK Infantry Division, and various ARVN units are Masher/White Wing (24 Jan 66 - 12 Mar 66) and Crazy Horse (16 May 66 - 5 June 66). In such operations the provision of additional assets, particularly airlift, by US to ARVN forces requires very careful coordination to achieve optimum use of critical resources. Certain advantages have accrued from use of other than the usual joint operation arrangement, such as avoidance of problems concerning frequency coordination, communications equipment compatibility, and code and cipher matters. In addition, this arrangement has minimized difficulties resulting from the language problem.

c. (U) The basic national "personality" of U. S. and ARVN officers differ. Generally, U. S. officers are well-trained, confident,

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years

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INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31 75.

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aggressive, and have a sense of urgency in all of their activities. In many cases the ARVN counterparts have not yet achieved the same degree of confidence; however, this will come with their continued tactical successes, and the gradual diminishing of enemy combat power. More obvious is the fact that the ARVN are not inspired to win the war in a twelve month period coinciding with the normal tour of U. S. personnel in Vietnam, but are conditioned to a longer term approach by the fact that they have been at war for twenty years and more. The difference in basic philosophies is clearly evident in this area. The best means of achieving the desired sense of urgency has proved to be through example. Where U. S. and ARVN forces have operated side by side, the ARVN have tended to become more aggressive.

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d. (U) Some difficulty in coordination of U. S. and ARVN operations has been encountered because of deficiencies in training and experience on the part of the ARVN leadership. This is particularly true in the more complex operations, where use of highly sophisticated equipment is standard, and where closely coordinated combined arms actions are conducted. On the more basic level of small unit tactics, other than the use of combined arms teams, the ARVN will in some cases excel the U. S. units; this is exceptional, but understandable in view of the wealth of battle experience which the surviving non-commissioned officers of ARVN may have acquired over a very long period of time.

e. (U) In intelligence matters, coordination of the collection effort and passage of intelligence and information pose the major problems of coordination. Logistics matters pose no problems, as US and ARVN elements each draw all of their support through their own channels. US advisory personnel have experienced problems of coordination stemming from the language barrier and differences in terminology, dual command authority, allocation of roles to respective units, dissemination of information, and determination of resources priorities. It is natural that, as the "bridge" between US and ARVN forces, the burden of achieving effective coordination should be felt most heavily by the advisor. It should be emphasized, however, that highly successful cooperative operations have been and continue to be mounted by US and ARVN forces. The problems of coordination, although they are real, are such that they can be overcome by careful planning, patience, and responsive and resourceful action.

4. (S) ANSWER TO QUESTION 18b:

a. (U) Coordination is normally effected through the senior US advisor with the ARVN force. Direct coordination is sometimes employed where availability of interpreters permits.

b. (S) For a given operation, boundaries are established between US and ARVN units. Each functions under the operational control of its respective headquarters. Although ARVN forces operate independently during these "combined" operations, US units normally provide them with additional artillery and airmobile assets.

c. (U) In the intelligence area, establishment of a Joint Intelligence Center, such as the one employed during Operation Masher/White

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Wing, proved highly effective in facilitating the exchange of information and coordination of intelligence activities. This center, chaired by the G2, 22d ARVN Division, was not a control center, since the participating ARVN units were not under the OPCON of I FFORCEV, but it served as a coordination and information brokerage facility. Participants included I FFORCEV, 22d ARVN Division, and 1st Air Cavalry Division. G2, ARVN II Corps and representatives of II Corps Advisory Group participated part-time.

d. (U) In signal matters, each force has its own radio frequencies assigned, and advisor radio and telephone channels provide most of the communications means for coordination.

e. (U) Engineer coordination is accomplished directly on a person to person basis at the working level whenever possible, followed by planning conferences. Rapid transportation facilitates this approach, which helps break down the stilted formality developed by transmitted messages. Agreements are confirmed and details transmitted by normally available communication methods. In the case of ARVN projects where support may go either way, in most cases the possibilities are discussed and tentatively decided upon between US and ARVN counterparts. The Deputy Senior Advisor to the ARVN Corps and his staff are then used as the coordinating units to officially develop a joint operation or task.

f. (U) In providing aviation support to ARVN units, especially close coordination is required, to include:

(1) The elements of the operation that should be known by the aviation commander prior to a joint reconnaissance are the tactical plan, number of troops, the type and number of supporting weapons to be moved, the type of prestrike to be employed, the weather delay acceptable, the enemy situation and whether a standby or extraction is planned.

(2) The joint aerial reconnaissance should be conducted as late as possible the day preceding the helicopter assault. The reconnaissance party should consist of the aviation mission commander, his operations officer, the gun platoon leader, artillery forward observers, and the ground unit commander with his advisor and interpreter. Use of a polaroid camera is recommended to produce current photographs of the LZ's for use in briefing aviation and ground personnel. Questions arising after the reconnaissance between US and ARVN can more easily be solved with photos available.

(3) The most important points for both commanders to agree upon are the exact location of the LZ's, approach and departure routes, direction of landings, the freefire zones and where preparations and suppressive fires should be placed.

(4) The final and most critical phase of coordination is during the execution of the airmobile assault. In most cases the aviation commander, the ground commander, his advisor and interpreter,

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the artillery liaison officer and/or FAC and the ground commander's S3 will control the execution of the airmobile operation in a command and control UH-1D.

g. (U) From the standpoint of US advisors, the single most essential and effective means of effecting coordination is the establishment of collocated tactical operations centers. This establishment provides for an easy flow of information between the headquarters concerned by permitting the ARVN staff with advisors to work in the immediate vicinity of the US staff. Each staff maintains its own maps and is free to exchange information with the other staff. Briefings are conducted by both staff through interpreters. Such an arrangement permits ready identification of friendly forces and provides maximum utilization of all assets assigned both elements. Operational control by US forces of CIDG companies, VNSF psywar and intelligence elements, and ARVN units proves to be successful through US advisors. The support coordination is effected by establishment or combat support coordination centers. Joint planning conferences as required have proved effective. Improved coordination can be achieved by exchanging liaison teams. For best coordination, liaison should occur from the initial planning phase to the conclusion of the operation, consistent with security limitations. An example of an ARVN liaison team to a US brigade: one Capt LNO, one 1st Lt G3 representative, one 1st Lt G2 representative, and three communications personnel. One US advisor is provided to assist and advise the ARVN team to report information received through advisory channels.

5. (U) EXPERIENCES WITH THE CSCC:

a. (U) In the area of fire support, the experience of the Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC) indicates that it is a sound concept that facilitates the allocation, coordination and control of all combat support resources. Two recent operations in which the CSCC was employed support this view. Operations JEFFERSON and VAN BUREN were conducted by US, Vietnamese and Korean forces unilaterally operating in the Tuy Hoa area on a cooperative basis in January and February 1966. No overall combined command was established in the field. Operation VAN BUREN was a continuation of Operation JEFFERSON. During these operations the CSCC was first employed in Vietnam. It was organized as a division level CSCC, coordinating the support of three separate brigades. Initially this CSCC was organized as outlined in the attached MACV directive (Inclosure 18-1). The combat support coordinator was a US Army Colonel. As the operation progressed, changes were made which resulted in the organization shown on the attached chart (Inclosure 18-2). During the operation, TAC air, US Army and Marine aviation, and naval gunfire were all coordinated through the CSCC:

(1) Tactical air was employed as needed by the force commander despite language difficulties. Through the facilities of the CSCC, pin-point bombing was adjusted by both ROK and ARVN ground observers.

(2) The placing of US Army and Marine aviation companies under the operational control of the CSCC provided necessary coordination for the efficient employment of their aircraft for all supported units.

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Priority and emergency requests from all forces were expedited through the facilities of the CSCC.

(3) The presence of the naval gunfire element in the CSCC provided supported units with direct access to naval gunfire support.

(4) US, ARVN and ROK artillery was widely spread over the area of operations. Contact was maintained through the presence of representatives located in the CSCC. The artillery support element executed planned preparations and other fires. Control of air space was coordinated and artillery fires were controlled in order to permit safe movement of helicopters and other aircraft through the area of operations.

b. (U) During Operation JEFFERSON, the CSCC did not have an intelligence section on the CSCC director's staff; therefore, intelligence information did not reach all participants. Furthermore, each task force processed its requests for reconnaissance and photo missions directly to G2 Air, thereby creating problems of communication and coordination. During Operation VAN BUREN, however, requests were centrally coordinated at the CSCC, eliminating this problem.

c. (U) In Operation Masher/White Wing, conducted by elements of two ARVN divisions and the US 1st Air Cavalry Division during January - February 1966, a different solution was employed. Initially each ARVN division organized its own CSCC in accordance with the attached MACV directive. The 1st Air Cavalry Division controlled its fires through a FSCC. Although this was a workable solution, since each division operated in a different geographical location, it did cause some duplication of effort for TAC air and some problems in the safe movement of Army aircraft. The communications between the ARVN CSCC's were initially ineffective; this was corrected by the installation of sole-user circuits. In one ARVN division CSCC, the director was a captain. His relative lack of prestige and influence on the division staff made it impossible for him to be a "Director" in the strict sense of the word. In this case the CSCC simply provided a place for the representatives of the various combat support elements to meet and coordinate by mutual consent. As a result, US Artillery and TAC air tended to fight separate wars and in some instances got in each other's way. Eventually, this CSCC made a definite contribution to the success of the operation. All Army aircraft were either under control of the 1st Air Cavalry Division or had communications with Division FSCC. As the operation progressed it became necessary for all US artillery units to obtain clearance to fire from the 1st Air Cavalry Division FSCC. ARVN artillery units cleared with their CSCC, which in turn cleared with the 1st Air Cavalry Division FSCC. This proved to be a satisfactory solution.

d. (U) Additional documents pertaining to the operation and organization of the CSCC are attached as Inclosures 18-3 and 18-4.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96243

6 May 1966
(MACJ3)

DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 525-12*.

COMBAT OPERATIONS
COMBAT SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER

1. PURPOSE. To establish policy and procedures for the organization and functioning of a Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC).

2. GENERAL. In order to insure the effective and coordinated use of all available combat support, a standardized combined Combat Support Coordination Center is needed at those levels of command required to integrate plans and combat operations in which US, RVNAF, ROK, and other FWMA forces participate in a coordinated effort. A CSCC should be organized for regimental or smaller operations to insure that all combat support elements are coordinated. In operations involving combined forces which taken in combination exceed those of regimental size, a CSCC will be established and may be modified as necessary to suit the combat support elements available for the contemplated action.

3. RESPONSIBILITY. Senior Corps, Division, Brigade, and Regimental Advisors; Commander, III MAF, CG, I FFORCEV, and CG, II FFORCEV, in coordination with RVNAF and FWMA Force Commander, will insure that a CSCC, as described herein and in applicable RVNAF and FWMA Force Directives, is established prior to and during each combat operation.

4. DEFINITION. Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC). CSCC is a facility within which are grouped representatives of artillery, air, naval gunfire, psychological warfare, and other agencies as deemed necessary by the commanders. These representatives assist the commander(s), through the G2/G3, in planning, coordinating, and controlling all means of combat support available in an operation.

5. ORGANIZATION OF CSCC.

a. As a minimum, the CSCC will be staffed with the following:

(1) Coordinator.

(2) Aviation Support Element.

*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 525-6, 3 December 1965

(3) Artillery Support Element.

(4) Tactical Air Control Party.

(5) Psychological Warfare Element.

b. Additionally, the following shall be represented in the CSCC as required at the discretion of the Commander:

(1) Naval Gunfire Support Element.

(2) Intelligence Element.

(3) Logistics Support Element.

(4) Liaison Officers from US and/or FWMA artillery units supporting the operation.

(5) Liaison personnel from Province or District to advise on territorial matters which may be effected by the tactical operation.

(6) Other support elements (e. g, River Assault Group Element, Junk Fleet Element).

c. Specific duties of individuals are listed in Annex A. A typical CSCC organization is shown in Annex B. A typical CSCC communications net is shown in Annex C.

d. Sufficient personnel must be provided to maintain a 24-hour capability in each element during field operations. Additionally, sufficient communications and operations personnel will be provided to insure a smooth and orderly flow of information and the timely posting of maps and status boards with all pertinent operational data. The CSCC will have shelter, maps, radios, status chart, and other equipment necessary for planning operations and maintaining records on all means of combat support.

6. GENERAL OPERATING PROCEDURES.

a. Prior to an operation, the CSCC elements will work in coordination with the G2/G3 planning group and prepare detailed combat support plans based on the scheme of maneuver of the supported forces. These plans must include both preparatory and on-call air strikes and artillery concentrations, suppressive fires, objective area surveillance, special considerations for the employment of heliborne assault forces, and other controls which allow for the concurrent application of all firepower means. Psychological warfare representatives will be included in this planning phase.

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b. Once an operation begins, combat support operations are coordinated through the CSCC. Tactical information is transmitted to the CSCC so that an accurate, detailed, and up-to-date record of the situation is maintained and immediately available. Close coordination will be required in the selection of air and artillery targets, landing zones, corridors for air strikes, and lanes for entry and exit of helicopters to assure effective and continuous support. Requests for support will be made and processed in accordance with existing Standing Operating Procedures.

c. Standing Operating Procedures will be continually reviewed in an effort to shorten reaction times. The organization and procedures outlined herein may be modified by the commanders and Senior Advisors to improve operations and shorten reaction times, but not at the expense of denying the supported units any available support.

d. This directive emphasizes simultaneous and continuous support. Prior plans will be made to deliver suppressive fires and air strikes during the movement of troops and landing of heliborne units.

7. COMMUNICATIONS. A rapid and reliable system of voice communications will be maintained with the force commander, higher headquarters, and supporting units. Provisions will be made for airborne and ground relays as required.

8. LOCATION AND DISPLACEMENT.

a. The CSCC will be centrally located between task force CP's or collocated with the division Tactical Operations Center or other tactical command posts established to conduct the operation. Essential elements of the CSCC will operate from a command helicopter when the situation requires.

b. The CSCC will be organized to facilitate and insure a continuous operational capability during displacements.

9. SUPPORT FOR CSCC. Initially, the CSCC will be organized and established from existing resources. Each element will provide its own transportation, communications equipment, maps, and other equipment and supplies. Messing facilities must be prearranged. After sufficient experience has been realized, major commanders/advisors may recommend CSCC manning and equipment requirements and appropriate action will be taken to obtain any additional personnel and equipment deemed essential.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

E. D. BRYSON
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

3 Annexes
A. Functions and Responsibilities
B. CSCC Organization
C. Typical CSCC Communications Net

DISTRIBUTION:
E
Plus 1 - COMUSMACV
1 - DEPCOMUSMACV
1 - DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Ops
1 - Chief of Staff
1 - JUSPAO
200 - MACAG-ARP
25 - MACJ3
2 - MACAG-AO

18-1

FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. COORDINATOR. The Coordinator is responsible for coordination of all combat support and is designated as may be mutually agreed upon by commanders concerned.

2. AVIATION SUPPORT ELEMENT (AVSE).

a. Supervises and coordinates requirements for Aviation Support. This includes command and control helicopters, armed helicopters, transport aircraft, and observation and radio relay aircraft. Programs observation and radio relay aircraft on a day-to-day, hour-by-hour basis.

b. Coordinates use of air space in the operational area.

c. Maintains current status of planned operations and availability of all types of light aircraft.

d. When all parts of the air support is provided by other services, the organization providing the support will be represented, as required, to insure proper coordination and control of the air elements.

3. ARTILLERY SUPPORT ELEMENT (ATSE). In lieu of a G2/G3 Air element, the Artillery Fire Support Coordinator will also determine priority for air strikes. The ATSE maintains control of artillery fire support by:

a. Supervising and coordinating artillery fire support operations.

b. Coordinating artillery fire support with other tactical support operations.

c. Allocating artillery fire support means.

d. Maintaining information on current status and location of weapons, capabilities, and other pertinent operational information.

4. TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY (TACP). The TACP maintains control of all tactical air support (AF, VNAF, USMC, and USN) by:

a. Supervising and coordinating requirements for tactical air support.

b. Requesting air support over and above that allocated, if required.

c. Recommending targets to be attacked by tactical air.

d. Maintaining status charts of current and planned air support, FAC's available, capabilities of supporting air (USAF, VNAF, USMC, USN), and all other pertinent operational matters.

e. Assuring continuous communication as presently provided for in the USAF/VNAF TAC Air Control System Communication nets.

f. Supervising and coordinating requirements for employment of observation and reconnaissance aircraft, to include flare ships, with appropriate units.

g. Supervising and coordinating the employment of FAC's. This function must be programmed with adequate background information.

h. Monitoring activities of ALO's of all participating units within the objective area.

i. Processing requests for psychological warfare aircraft submitted by the Psychological Warfare Element.

5. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ELEMENT (PWE).

a. Coordinates psychological warfare activities.

b. Establishes priorities for psychological warfare support and allocates psychological warfare resources available.

c. Controls use of psychological warfare aircraft to support the tactical operation.

d. Arranges for back-up printing support.

6. NAVAL GUNFIRE ELEMENT (NGE):

a. Coordinates the integration of naval gunfire with the tactical operation and other fire and air support.

b. Maintains current status of available naval gunfire support to include fire capability charts, caliber of weapons, quantity and types of ammunition.

c. Assures proper location and orientation of naval gunfire spotters.

7. INTELLIGENCE ELEMENT (INTE):

a. Supervises and coordinates all intelligence gathering media.

b. Keeps intelligence information current and promptly informs the CSCC coordinator of new and pertinent developments. Analyzes and interprets intelligence information.

c. Avoids duplication of effort by intelligence agencies and promotes rapid dissemination of actual combat intelligence.

d. Works in close coordination with the Psychological Warfare Element.

8. LOGISTICS ELEMENT (LOGE).

a. Supervise the planning phase to insure that necessary supplies and materials will be available for operation of the CSCC.

b. Consolidate and coordinate logistical requirements for combined operations in order to provide economy of supplies and effort.

c. Maintain a consolidation of expenditures and resupplies.

9. LIAISON ELEMENT(S) (LNE). Performs normal liaison functions and is drawn from participating and supporting agencies to include liaison personnel from provinces or districts to advise commanders on territorial matters which may be affected by the tactical operation.

CSCC ORGANIZATION



*When required.

Annex B to MACV Directive 525-12, 6 May 1966



(1) Monitors unit intelligence nets

(2) Intelligence Element should have contact with Province or District Headquarters if they are not represented in the CSCC

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7 February 1966

ORGANIZATION CHART
COMBAT SUPPORT COORDINATION CENTER
OPERATION VAN BUREN
VICINITY OF TUY HOA, RVN

AVC-66-3 6d06

DIRECTOR & STAFF

Director	Col	1193
Deputy Dir	Lt Col	1193
Opn Off	Maj	2162
Intel Off	Maj	9301
Tgt Analyst	Capt*	1193
S4 Off	Capt	4010
Opns Sgt	E-8	13E40
Intel NCO	E-6*	13E40
Opns Spec	E-4	13E20

*Obtain from S-2 Section Support Artillery Battalion

Ad Hoc Committee for Rice Harvest
1 representative from each element re presented in the CSCC, plus local USAID representative.

Artillery Support Element

FSC	Lt Col	1193
S-3	Capt	2162
2 Asst S-3's	Lt	2162
2 Opns Sgts	E-6	13E40
2 Opns Specs	E-5	13E20
3 Clk Typists	E-4	71B40
6 RTO's	E-3	13A10

Army Aviation Support Element

S-3 Avn Bn	Maj	2162
2 Asst S3's	Capt	2162
2 LNO's	Maj	2162
Opns Sgt	E-8	71P50
2 Flight Specs	E-5	71P20
Clk Typist	E-4	71B40

(US Marine Corps counterparts, then participating)

Tactical Air Control Element

ALO(US-ROK)	Maj	1456
ALO(ARVN)	Maj	1456
2 FAC's	Capt	1444
Radio Maint	Sgt	30474
RTO	A/1C	29350
Maint/Oper	A/2C	30454
Clerk	A/2C	27150

Naval Gunfire Element

NGLO	Lt JG	Spotter
Tech	USMC-Sgt	0849
RTO	USMC-Lepl	2531
RTO	USMC-Lepl	2531
RTO	USMC-Lepl	2533

Psychological Operations Element

Psy Opns O	Lt	9305
U-10 Pilot	Capt	
Interpreter	(As required)	

1st Bde, 101st Abn Div Liaison Party

LNO	Capt	2163
Opn NCO	Sgt	13E40
RTO	E-4	13A10

2d ROK Marine Brigade Liaison Party

LNO	Maj	Arty
LNO	Capt	Arty
LN NCO	Sgt	Arty

47th ARVN Regt(22d ARVN Div) Liaison Party

Advisor*	Capt (U)	82162
LNO	Lt(ARVN)	Inf
LNO	Lt(ARVN)	Arty
Opn Sgt	E-7 (US)	11F40
2 LN NCO's	Sgt (ARVN)	

* Part Time

Phu Yen Province Liaison Party

Advisor	Lt	US
LNO	Lt	ARVN
LNO NCO	Sgt	ARVN
Junk Flt Adv	Lt Comdr	USN

Field Force Vietnam Tactical Opns Center Liaison Party

LNO		Maj	BI
Opn	Sgt	E-6	13E40

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HEADQUARTERS
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96225

REGULATION
NUMBER 525-1

20 May 1966

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Combat Support Coordination Center

1. Purpose: To establish policy and procedures for the organization and functioning of a Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC) of the 25th Infantry Division to be utilized for operations conducted in coordination with ARVN units at Division level.

2. General: A combined US/RVNAF Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC) will be established to effect coordinated use of all available combat support during the planning for and execution of operations to be conducted by the 25th Infantry Division in coordination with ARVN units at division level. Brigades of the 25th Infantry Division will organize CSCC's for use when conducting operations in coordination with ARVN units at regimental level.

3. Definitions: Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC). The CSCC is a facility within which are grouped representatives of Artillery, Air Force, G2 Air, G3 Air, Army Aviation and other Combat Support units. These representatives assist the commanders in planning for the use of and controlling all means of combat support available for a coordinated US/ARVN operation.

4. Responsibilities:

a. The Fire Support Coordinator will take the necessary action to establish a CSCC prior to any operation to be conducted in coordination with an ARVN unit of Division level.

b. The Division Signal Officer will establish the necessary communications for support of the CSCC.

5. Organization:

a. The 25th Infantry Division/ARVN Division CSCC will function on a codirector basis with the CSCC providing information and recommendations to both commanders.

b. The 25th Infantry Division Fire Support Coordinator will serve as the U.S. Codirector of the CSCC.

c. The CSCC will include the following U.S. elements:

(1) Fire Support Element.

dupd 18-3
~~ACC 240 Incl 3~~

(2) USAF Air Liaison Officer.

(3) G2 Air.

(4) G3 Air.

(5) 25th Division Assistant Aviation Officer.

(6) Other combat support organizations as required for a particular operation.

d. Every effort will be made to obtain paralled representation from the ARVN division level unit within its staffing capability. U.S. Advisors to ARVN units will be used as a connecting link. Where a language barrier exests, assets of the advisory group as well as the 25th Infantry Division will be used to provide necessary interpreters.

e. RVNAF personnel operating in the CSCC must be cleared for access to U.S. information of Confidential classification.

i. A division level CSCC will be established in the DTOC/FSE Facility.

6. Operating Procedures:

a. The US/ARVN CSCC will be established in sufficient time to prepare detailed fire plans to cover the schemes of maneuver of the participating units.

b. After initiation of an operation, combat support operations for both U.S. and ARVN units participating will be coordinated through the CSCC. Requests for support will be made and processed in accordance with existing unit Standard Operating Procedures.

7. Communications: A rapid and reliable system of voice communications will be maintained with the respective force commanders, higher headquarters, supporting artillery, Air Force and army aviation units.
(AVTLOP)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

THOMAS W. MELLEN
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

/t/Philip U Bondi
/s/PHILIP U BONDI
Capt, AGC
Asst AG

Appendics
I - CSCC Organization
II - CSCC Communications Diagram

DISTRIBUTION:
A; C

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CSCC ORGANIZATION

(25th Infantry Division - ARVN Division Level)



APPENDIX I (CSCC Organization) to Reg No 525-1, HQ 25th Inf Div

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CSCC COMMUNICATIONS NET

(25th Infantry Division - ARVN Division Level)



APPENDIX II (CSCC Communications Diagram) to Reg No 525-1, HQ 25th Inf Div

3

TO: Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
APO 96225

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: After Action Report-Combat Support Coordination Center

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1. Operation MAKIKI, 3-9 Jun 1966.

a. Control Headquarters: 25th US Division and 25th ARVN Division.

b. Command Headquarters: 2d Bde, 25th US Div, and 49 Regt., 25th ARVN Div.

c. Type of Operation: A coordinated S&D operation involving US and ARVN troops.

d. Area of Operation: Tay Ninh and Long An Provinces.

2. A Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC) was established and co-located with the Fire Support Element of the 25th US Infantry Division Tactical Operations Center at 021400 June 1966 for Operation MAKIKI.

3. Organization of CSCC:

a. The CSCC was organized in accordance with Regulation Number 525-1, Headquarters 25th US Infantry Division. (See Tab A)

(1) Co-directors: Col. Williams, CO, 25th Div Arty, Major Khi, CO, 25th ARVN Div Arty.

(2) Co-director's representatives in CSCC: Lt. Col. Nicholas (US); Maj. Thi (ARVN), Maj. Richards (US), Artillery Advisor to 25th ARVN Div.

(3) Artillery Element: Maj. Davis (US), Lt. Duc (ARVN).

(4) G3 Air: Maj. Simonds (US), Lt. Thuan (ARVN), Capt. Mann, G2/G3 Advisor to 25th ARVN Div.

(5) G2 Air: Capt. Latour (US); Lt. Triam (ARVN).

(6) Tactical Air Control Party: Lt. Col. Jones, USAF Air Liaison Officer 25th US Div; Major Books, USAF Air Liaison Officer Advisor 25th ARVN, Cadet ASP Phu, Air Liaison Officer 25th ARVN Div.

(7) Army Aviation Element: Maj. Young (US). (ARVN does not have Army aviation but uses Air Force Air Liaison Officer to request Army air support.)

b. CSCC utilization of Maps:

(1) Four map boards 8'x8' with maps scale 1/50,000:

(a) US Artillery and ARVN Artillery each used a separate map to post arty positions and capabilities, location of friendly troop, Fire Coordination Lines, No Fire Line, and area of operations.

(b) The G3 Air US and G3 Air ARVN both used the same map for posting air strike location.

(c) The G2 Air US and G2 Air ARVN both used the same map to post surveillance plans and red haze, SLAR, and photo missions.

Incl 1-4
Incl 1 to Incl 3

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(2) A map board 5'x5' map scale 1/50,000 of the area of operation was used by Army Aviation to plot flight routes for air mobile operations.

c. Communications:

(1) The 25th ARVN Div provided a communication team consisting of one officer and eight enlisted men. This team provided radio communications to ARVN artillery forward observers with 49th ARVN Regiment and to the ARVN Direct Support Artillery.

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(2) The regular established telephone and radio communication in the FSE was used by both the US and ARVN working in the Combat Support Operation Center.

(a) The CSCC Artillery Element used one table where both US and ARVN officers worked. Six telephones provided communications to 25th Div (US) switchboard plus direct circuits to: division artillery
II FFV FSE
25th ARVN TOC
5th ARVN TOC
1st Div TOC

(b) G3 Air used one table where both US and ARVN G3 Air and Air Liaison Officers worked. Five telephones provided direct circuits to:
2d Bde (US) TOC
Direct Air Support Center
1st Bde (US) TOC
3/4 Cav
IIFFV G3 Air

(c) G2 Air used one table for both US and ARVN with a telephone to the 25th Div (US) Switchboard.

(d) Army Aviation Element (US only) used one table. Six telephones provided a circuit to the 25th Div (US) switchboard, plus direct circuits to: 25th Div air field
1st Bde TOC
2nd Bde TOC
S3 Operation Aviation Battalion
IIFFV AAE

5. Operations:

a. The ARVN personnel arrived at the 25th (US) DTOC the day prior to the operation. They established radio communication with the ARVN Direct Support artillery. The ARVN artillery was in position to support the air landing portion of the airmobile assault by the 49th ARVN Regiment.

b. The US Artillery was also pre-positioned to give fire support in the LZ's for 2nd Bde.

c. Information was received by CSCC from ARVN Regiment and US Brigade. The information was jointly posted and dissiminated to other headquarters. A single daily journal was maintained entering information from both ARVN and US sources. An example of Combat Support Coordination Center operation follows:

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(1) At 041[illegible] June 66, the 25th ARVN Div requested a light fire team of two gun ships from 25th US Div to look for a reported VC platoon vic coor. XS 604 804.

(2) The fire team was dispatched to the target area by Army Aviation.

(3) At the same time, sensing that there was a potential TAC Air target, the US Co-director requested the ALO with 25th ARVN to also recon the area.

(4) The fire team was diverted to support operation HAWK by covering the extraction of a 25th US infantry company which was supported by 25th ARVN artillery.

(5) The FAC located an estimated VC platoon & directed a Vietnamese Air Force strike of [illegible] AIH into the target area. This was repeated with a second Vietnamese strike & then again with a third USAF F100 strike.

(6) Upon completion of the Air Strike, 25th ARVN troops searched the target area and reported 44 VC KIA (BC), one VCC, 1 M-79, 1 carbine, 1 shot gun and 1 pistol.

6. Miscellaneous Considerations:

a. Billeting of ARVN personnel must be a responsibility of the headquarters setting up a CSCC. The ARVN are short on tentage and the US should make every effort to be a good host. The required tentage should be set-up prior to the arrival of ARVN personnel.

b. ARVN personnel were briefed on the location of the latrines and where guards were posted around the DTOC. Guards were briefed that ARVN personnel were in the area and where they worked and slept.

c. The ARVN officers went to meals with their US counterparts, ARVN enlisted personnel were escorted to meals by a US enlisted man.

d. Language barrier: Language was no problem because three of the ARVN officers spoke and understood English well; the fourth ARVN officer's English was considered fair.

e. Coordination of fires: Fire Coordination Lines were used extensively throughout the operation to effect maximum safety. They were put into effect for different phases of the operations and terminated upon the completion of each such phase.

7. Conclusion:

a. The CSCC was highly effective.

b. The practical application of fire coordination between ARVN and US did much to instill confidence in both US and ARVN personnel.

c. The ARVN personnel were highly trained and functioned in a highly professional manner.

/t/BILLY B. NICHOLAS
Lt. Col., Arty
AFSC

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QUESTION 19

1. (U) BACKGROUND: To keep pace with current situations, the college has increased its airmobile instruction. However, detailed reference material applicable to Vietnam is lacking.

2. (U) QUESTIONS:

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19a. Based on experience in Vietnam, how much Army Aviation would be expected to support a two-brigade (six battalion) airmobile operation?

19b. How would supporting aviation units be controlled? (Division control? or attachment to battalions/brigades?).

19c. What is a typical helicopter availability rate?

3. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 19a: The following Army Aviation assets are desirable for a two-brigade (six infantry battalion) combat operation in Vietnam. These represent an average on division operations.

a. Initial assault for each brigade (one infantry battalion in one lift):

(1) UH-1D 76 aircraft (unarmed, i.e. slicks) (7 troops per aircraft).

(2) UH-1B 12-18 (armed helicopter escort).

(3) UH-1D 2 (command and control).

(4) OH-13 6 (organic aircraft).

(5) Artillery displacement: CH 47 4 required to move one 105mm Howitzer battery, 6 tubes, and 600 rounds of ammunition. Total sorties, 12.

(6) Bde. Hq element 1 CH 47 6 sorties to move Bde TAC CP and signal support.

b. Sustained operations: Each brigade requires one direct support airmobile company to support company size airmobile operations and resupply. Additional augmentation is required for battalion size operations.

(1) UH1D - 10 (slicks)

(2) UH1B - 4 (armed helicopters)

(3) UH1D - 1 (command and control)

(4) OH13 - 6 (organic aircraft)

c. Logistics Support: Brigade requirements vary significantly depending on logistical concept, distance of log base and availability of fixed wing airfields. Average requirements per brigade are:

(1) CV-2 4 to 6 (when fixed airstrips are available)

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.

dud 19

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[redacted]

(2) CH-47 1 (when fixed wing airstrips are available) -- Use: for artillery ammunition resupply)

(3) CH-47 6 to 8 (when no fixed wing airstrips are available and resupply is by air)

d. General Support: (Division)

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(1) UH-1D 3 (command and control)

(2) UH-1D 3 (liaison and staff)

(3) OH-13 4 (recon and staff)

(4) U1A 2 (radio relay - airborne CP)

4. (C) ANSWER TO QUESTION 19b: Each committed brigade requires an air-mobile company in direct support; remainder of aviation assets are in general support of division.

5. (C) ANSWER TO QUESTION 19c: The present MACV goal is to have eighty percent of the assigned (UH-1D) helicopters in a mission ready status. The term (MISSION READY) as used here, means a helicopter that is fully operational and ready for combat employment on a moments notice. The desired goal of eighty percent, it is felt, is a realistic goal, and one that can be maintained when the availability of repair parts and maintenance floats are at the prescribed stockage level. At the present time, some of the units have not been able to meet this desired goal while still others are attaining it. This difference has been caused by the rapid buildup of units and increased usage of aircraft on hand. The supply therefore has not caught up with this increased demand. The mission ready aircraft availability reported by the 1st Cavalry Division with an experience factor from September 1965 to June 1966 is shown below.

OH-13	63.3%
OH-1B	69.0%
UH-1D	61.6%
CH-47	41.5%
CH-54	60.2%
CV-2B	51.2%
OV-1B/C	43.3%
O-1	65.7%

Incl 19

[redacted]

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QUESTION 20

1. (U) BACKGROUND: Students frequently question the feasibility of conducting airmobile operations at night. An example of a successful night airmobile operation would strengthen the college contention that such operations are feasible.

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2. (U) QUESTION: Have successful night airmobile operations of battalion size been conducted in Vietnam? (If so, request details of the operation be provided).

3. (U) ANSWER:

a. The 10th Aviation Battalion, 17th Aviation Group, has participated in two such operations since the 1st of March. The 17th Aviation Group is presently compiling, for the 1st Aviation Brigade, a complete report on one of these operations, which when compiled, will be forwarded to the college under a separate cover.

b. Night airmobile operations in Vietnam have, for the most part, been limited to platoon and company size actions. This has been due to the lack of tactical situations requiring such an operation rather than any doubts as to the capability or feasibility of conducting such an operation.

c. Some of the considerations which have limited the frequency of this size operation may be of interest. Night operations, whether land or airmobile, should be planned in advance and rehearsed. Up to the present time, this often meant cutting back on daylight operations in order to conduct this planning and training. Another limitation has been the lack of suitable and reliable navigational aids. Navigation in Vietnam, especially at night, is at best, very difficult. Flight routes at night for large airmobile forces, such as would be involved, must be accurate, reliable and easily followed from the pickup zone to the landing zone. There can be no room for error when the arrival of aircraft over certain air control points is often tied closely to the fire support plan, air support, and illumination plan (if used). A critical shortage of sufficient and adequately trained pathfinders has also hindered night operations. Pathfinders, when properly trained and employed, can make the difference between a successful operation and one that is plagued with difficulties. The nature and size of operations conducted in many areas is dictated by the terrain. Landing zones and pickup zones at night must be considerably larger than those used in daylight operations.

d. In summation, it is felt that night operations are feasible. Many platoon and company size operations have been conducted at night. Battalion size night operations have been limited in the past due to many considerations. However, as experience is gained, training improves, and additional equipment and personnel become available, more night airmobile operations involving larger units will be conducted.

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.
Qual 20

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Command, Vietnam
CLASSIFIED BY US Military Assistance
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31 72.

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QUESTION 21

1. (U) BACKGROUND: Organization charts show the division G-2 section consisting of an administrative branch, operation branch, and a G-2 Air branch. The attached military intelligence detachment augments this organization by staffing a counter-intelligence branch, order of battle section, imagery interpretation section and interrogation section. This organization is believed valid for a general war situation. However, operations in Vietnam usually are of short duration and seldom involve the entire division.

2. (U) QUESTIONS:

21a. How is a typical Division G2 Section organized?

21b. Have there been any deletions or augmentations to TO/E? If so what?

21c. Does the division G2 section augment brigade S2 sections for brigade operations?

21d. What changes to TO/E or normal augmentation are required?

3. (U) ANSWERS TO QUESTION 21a. Each Division G2 Section is tailored to fit the needs of the type of operations engaged in by the division. Personnel and equipment are shifted on a temporary basis to provide a flexible organization which can be altered to conform to new requirements. Inclosures 21-1, 2 and 3 represent samples of three division G2 sections presently employed in South Vietnam.

4. (U) ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 21b, c and d. Since each Division has its own concept concerning the conduct of operations in the field, the answers are found below.

1ST INFANTRY DIVISION

1. (U) The 1st Infantry Division G2 section is organized as shown in inclosures 21-1. This organization is tailored to fit the needs of the type of operations engaged in by the Division. It does not represent a change in the TO, merely a shifting of personnel and equipment on a temporary basis. It is a flexible organization which can be altered to conform to new requirements. Comments on each sub-division are as follows:

a. The G2 Administrative Branch is under the direct supervision of the G2 sergeant major. The 1st Division G2 section does not utilize an Executive Officer as such. These duties are performed by the sergeant major. This realeases an O-4 to assume the position of G2 Plans Officer.

Incl 21

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b. The G2 Operations Branch is generally organized in the textbook fashion. It serves as the representative G2 organization in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) where it maintains a twenty-four hour watch. It shares the supervision of the OB section, MI Det, with the G2 Plans Branch (see below).

c. The G2 Air Branch is charged with its normally accepted operating functions. It also supervises the operation of the Photo and Map Libraries at Division Headquarters and the ASTA Platoon of the Division Aviation Bn. It shares the supervision of the II section, MI Det, with the G2 Plans Branch (see below).

d. The G2 Plans Branch has been created by diverting the officer normally assigned as G2 Executive Officer to the plans desk. He is responsible for close liaison with the G3 Plans Officer on future operations. He is also responsible for analysis of target areas and objectives for planning purposes. To assist him in these analysis, an Integrated Intelligence Center (IIC) has been created. The IIC embodies in one location the technical talent necessary to focus all available information on the individual target areas and objectives under consideration. It contains an Imagery Interpretation Section, Order of Battle Section, Targets Section, and when available, a Collection Section. Additionally one NCO is assigned to perform necessary liaison with sources not physically represented in the IIC and to coordinate the necessary housekeeping requirements between each subordinate section of the IIC. The net product of the IIC is a series of the following: Infared, SLAR, photo readout, agent, rallier, captive and patrol reports, order of battle information, electronic intelligence, visual reconnaissance reports from other agencies. By physically locating the four subordinate sections in one room, the efficiency of each and of the group is enhanced due to the resulting collation of information. The IIC of necessity shares the output of the OB Section with G2 operations based on priorities existing at any particular time. It also coordinates closely with the G2 Air on the use of its II resources. The IIC levies its own requirements for information on supporting intelligence agencies in order to ensure the most complete analysis of each target area. The capability exists to incorporate into the IIC products the results of Special Intelligence when required. An Automatic Data Processing capability is utilized in the IIC for recording raw data on VC installations, secondary explosions, possible landing zones, and all non-transient information which can be easily catalogued onto cards. This enables the IIC to recall enemy OB information by area, type, validity, source, or in any combination required. This capability is especially useful in planning operations and for retrieval of information on short notice when the division moves forward to an unexpected area. This capability is kept up to date and the printouts will eventually replace many of the voluminous OB notebooks. The computers used are those in the Division AG section.

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e. The CI Branch has been created by assigning on orders the CI Section of the MI Detachment as the CI Branch of G2. This provides for closer coordination of CI activities between the G2 and the CI Branch Chief.

f. The relationship of the division with the Special Security Office (SSO), MI Detachment, and Radio Research Unit (RRU) is that normally found between supporting and supported units of this type. The collection detachment relationship is that of direct support with operational control vested in the parent unit of the collection detachment.

2. (U) As of this time there has been no official change of the TO&E of the G2 section. However, due to the frequent requirement for a split division headquarters and the necessity for twenty-four hour operations, the following personnel have been physically incorporated into the organization from available resources.

a. One additional driver. The heavy workload of the assigned clerk-typists prevents them from performing their secondary duties as a driver. The abnormal amount of travel required of the G2 officers in effecting coordination with other intelligence agencies (US, ARVN, and FWMAF) necessitates a minimum of three available drivers.

b. Two additional company grade officers and two NCO's in the G2 Operations Section. This provides the personnel necessary to ensure twenty-four hour operations in the TOC Forward and TOC Rear.

c. One additional company grade officer, one additional NCO and one Pfc for G2 Air. This permits an officer and NCO to be continually on twenty-four hour watch and provides for a draftsman/map clerk. The latter position is a full-time manning requirement due to the large number of maps required within the headquarters as well as the overlay requirements for a draftsman.

d. One NCO for the IIC under the G2 Plans. This is discussed under 1d above.

3. (U) The division G2 augments the subordinate intelligence staffs by placing CI and Interrogation teams in direct support of each brigade and division artillery. These teams operate permanently with the supported units; yet operational control remains with the parent section at division headquarters. The II section is split with the headquarters and largest capability at the division fixed wing airstrip and about 20% of the capability within the IIC.

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4. (U) Changes to the TOE would vary from division to division. The number of base camps, division main and alternate headquarters, and the personality of the G2 himself play important parts in adopting changes. The system described above is designed for extended division operations away from base areas and allows for a planning organization not previously provided for in the TO. The necessity for such an organization becomes readily apparent in the Southeast Asia environment when the volume of raw information and the available organic agencies are taken into consideration. Some apparatus must be created to digest all of this information, discard that of no value, store some in a readily retrievable fashion, and produce intelligence from the remainder.

Incl 21

Enclosure 2(J-1)



NOTES:
1. CI section appointed CI Branch of G2
2. Priority of OB support to opns branch
3. Part of II capability physically located in IIC majority of II capability remains with G2 Air and is co-located with ASTA Platoon.
4. Physically located with IIC but only in direct support of division. Opn'l control vested in MI Bn.

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1ST CAVALRY DIVISION

1. (U) The organization of the division G2 Section is shown on Appendix 21-2a.

2. (U) Augmentation to the TOE is as follows:

a. G2 Section.

RANK	MOS	NO REQUIRED	POSITION
Major	9301	1	Plans and Estimates Off
Major	9301	1	Asst DTOC Chief
Captain	9301	1	Analysis and Reports
E-4	96B40	2	Intel Analyist
E-4	71B20	2	Clerk Typist

b. 191st MI Det.

RANK	MOS	NO REQUIRED	POSITION
1st Lt	9318	3	Order of Battle
1st Lt	9666	1	CI
1st Lt	9316	1	IPW
E-6	96B40	1	OB
E-6	97B40	1	CI
E-5	96B40	1	OB
E-4	96B40	6	OB
E-4	97B40	1	CI

3. (U) During brigade operations the attached Military Intelligence Detachment provides IPW personnel and Counter Intelligence Agents to the committed brigade.

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Encl 21-2

1ST
CAVALRY DIVISION
(ORGANIZATION)



Inclosure 21-2

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25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

1. (U) Fifteen additional officer and enlisted positions have been requested in the MTOE in order to properly collect, process, evaluate and disseminate combat intelligence on a 24 hour basis. Specific changes to TO & E 7-4E, 15 July 1963 requested are as follows:

LINE	DESCRIPTION	GRADE	MOS	BRANCH	STRENGTH
02	Asst G2	MAJ	9301	AM	3
	NOTE: XO, Op Off, Plans & Analysis Off				
04	Asst G2 Air	CPT	9304	AM	2
	NOTE: Additional CPT for 24 hour capability				
08	Intel Asst	E5	11F20		0
	NOTE: Deleted				
10	Intel Clerk	E3	71A10		0
	NOTE: Deleted				
12	Intel Sgt	E6	96B40	NC	4
	NOTE: 3 Operations Shift NCO's and 1Plans NCO				
13	Clerk Typist	E4	71B20		6
	NOTE: 3 Operations shift clerks, 3 Admin clerks				
14	Intel Analyst	E5	96B20		3
	NOTE: 3 G2 Air shift NCO's				
15	Draftsman	E4	81B20		1
	NOTE: Assigned to Plans & Analysis				
16	Asst G2	CPT	9301	AM	2
	NOTE: Operations shift Officers				

2. (U) Military intelligence specialist support is attached to Brigades during operations contingent upon operational requirements.

This support is generally in the form of attached interrogators and CI agents although during any extended operations which cannot be properly supported by Division from the Base Camp a small composite MI element will be attached to the Brigade.

3. (U) All required changes have been incorporated into the MTOE described above. The 25th MI Det organization has been slightly reconfigured to meet the current needs of the division. Shortly after the Division Headquarters arrived in Vietnam and with the experience gained from two Brigade level combat operations, it became obvious that there was a need for a central location to receive, collate, evaluate and store all raw intelligence information coming into the Division Headquarters. The G2 Operations Section in the DTOC was too involved with the hour by hour conduct of tactical operations to be considered for this function. It was decided to organize a Military Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC) which would combine the four specialized intelligence capabilities of the 24th MI Detachment with the MID Commander acting as the Operations Officer. The combined efforts are colocated and consist of the Counterintelligence Section, Imagery Interpretation Section, Order of Battle Section, and an Exploitation Section which includes IPW, Captured Documents and Captured Material (Incl 21-3b).

4. (U) Intelligence information obtained through these efforts is normally furnished in verbal and written form to the OB Section for evaluation. The OB Section at the hub of the MIOC analyzes the information and forwards all reports with comments and evaluation to the MIOC Operations Officer who then submits it to the G2. The MIOC Operations Officer or the OB Officer present numerous briefings on current OB holdings and enemy capabilities within the TAOR to the Command section and visiting officers. Among the recurring reports submitted are periodic OB Summaries, the Intelligence Situation to Operation Orders and Plans and Special Area Studies as requested.

Encl 21-3

25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

Office of the ACofS, G2

ORGANIZATION



——— OPN CONTROL

Incl 21-3

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2

Incl 21-3

25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS CENTER
(MICC)

ORGANIZATION



Incl 21 - 3

QUESTION 22

1. (U) BACKGROUND: The college is developing an exercise dipicting the employment of an infantry division using concept and techniques developed in Vietnam. Detailed references on unit operations are not available at the College. Available information indicates that combat support and combat service support units are required to provide security for unit base camps while maneuver units are away from the base on operations.

2. (U) QUESTIONS:

22a. What type missions and area responsibility are assigned to support units for base security?

22b. Does the requirement to provide security adversely affect combat service support capabilities? If so, to what degree?

22c. What missions are assigned to maneuver units on a day-to-day basis while they are at base camps?

22d. How are command and control personnel and facilities divided at brigade level to provide for control of operations and simultaneous control of base camps?

3. (C) The answers to each of the sub-questions, as received by the three division headquarters which were queried, are listed below.

a. (U) 1st Infantry Division.

(1) It is customary within the 1st Division to denude the base camps of infantry troops who are needed for combat operations. On the other hand, we always leave at least one light field artillery battery at 4 of the 5 base camps. Because there are no combat troops much of the time at the rear echelons of the infantry and field artillery battalions, the Engineers, Ordnance, Supply and Transport, Medical and Signal elements man the defensive perimeters at night and each soldier in the 1st Division, regardless of his MOS or branch, participates in one combat patrol or ambush in the vicinity of base camps once each two weeks.

(2) The man who is on patrol all night needs some sleep on the following day; and, therefore, we lose some of his effectiveness in combat service support. However, by participating in the war and understanding the problems of infantry combat, the 5-10% loss in combat service support in terms of hours is more than offset in terms of pride, confidence and overall effectiveness.

(3) Maneuver units are only at their base camps long enough to change clothing, replace weapons, find relief from combat duty for about 48 hours at the maximum and then conduct patrols and ambushes and platoon, company, and battalion operations out to distances 10-15-20 kilometers. During the last three months, maneuver battalions have been in base camps less than 10% of the time.

DECLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
dwb 22

~~GROUP-4~~
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
~~Declassified after 12 years.~~

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31 72.

(4) We have asked for and received approval for one Lieutenant Colonel at each base camp for rear area command and we are now asking for one Major per battalion to command and control the rear echelon while battalions are gone. These requirements are a must.

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b. (U) 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

(1) The base development concept of this Division was to establish a single base with the smallest possible perimeter in order to reduce the number of troops required for base defense. This concept is practical in view of the enemy's current lack of an offensive air capability and since the airmobile division is able to move quickly from An Khe which is centrally located within II Corps TZ to any part of this tactical zone. The present base perimeter is approximately 17.5 Km and encompasses all division units to include airfields plus non-division support units. A strong barrier has been constructed around the entire perimeter. This barrier is 100 meters in depth and is strengthened with AP mines, Claymores, flame devices, floodlight and searchlight illumination, ground radars, and observation towers each 200 meters. An area 500 meters forward of the barrier is being cleared by civilian labor. Active patrolling, heavy H&I fires, continuous night airborne countermortar aircraft patrols, and countermortar radar are used to detect and prevent or allow prompt response to any enemy mortar attack. To date over 60% percent of our infantry battalion days, artillery battalion days, and cavalry troop days have been devoted to operations outside the Division base. Currently this percentage is moving higher as the barrier nears completion. The Division base is capable of being defended by one infantry battalion and one artillery battalion. All of the above background information is provided to place the answers to the C&GSC questions in perspective.

(2) When only one infantry battalion is available for base defense division, non-division support units are levied for an average of 350 augmentation personnel to man perimeter positions during the hours of darkness. Augmentation personnel are integrated into the existing infantry command structure. Division and non-divisional combat and service support units are also responsible under the division base defense order for forming provisional infantry units. In the event of a general alert or actual attack certain of the provisional units move to predesignated sectors on the barrier and participate in defense under control of the existing infantry control structure. Other provisional units are held in a reserve status, under operational control of the brigade responsible for base defense prepared to execute specified reinforcement or counterattack plans. Neither the augmentation or provisional unit requirements have any significant adverse effect on support unit mission accomplishment. This Division is considering a plan under which the division and non-divisional provisional infantry units would assume full responsibility for base defense in the absence of an infantry battalion for short periods - three or four days. The base defense units would be controlled by a brigade headquarters or a skeleton staff from Division under an ADC. This plan would have significant impact on support unit missions something on the order of a 33 1/3 to 50% reduction in capability.

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(3) Maneuver units located within the Division base are assigned these typical missions -

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(a) Base defense.

(b) Offensive operations with the Div Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR).

(c) Highway security operations.

(d) Units returning from extended offensive operations are allowed 2 - 3 days maintenance and recreation.

(e) Reserve/reaction force (i.e. one company move within 1 hour; battalion move within 3 hours).

(4) This Division does not split brigade missions between areas of operation and the base. One brigade headquarters is tasked for base defense - this same brigade may also be charged with offensive operations in the TAOR and highway security operations if two or more battalions are placed under the brigade. Two brigade headquarters, separate battalion TF under Div control, and attachment of infantry to the cavalry squadron provide adequate means to control the employment of all available infantry battalions in offensive operations.

c. [redacted] 25th Infantry Division.

(1) Missions and area responsibilities assigned to support units are as outlined in 25th Infantry Division OPORD 11-66 (CU CHI Base Defence), a copy of which is being mailed separately. Missions vary from defense of a sector of the base camp perimeter to responsibility for reinforcement of the bunker line in the event ~~of~~ all combat troops are committed and/or there is an immediate threat of attack.

(2) Under normal circumstances the requirement to provide security does not adversely affect combat service support capabilities. Normal division operations allow for maintaining at least one company or company equivalent of each committed maneuver battalion in the base area for defense of the perimeter. These units also serve to provide a division rapid reaction force if required. When these forces are committed, combat support units are required to reinforce the perimeter.

(3) Missions assigned maneuver units on a day-to-day basis while in base camp include combat patrols in assigned sector of the perimeter, establishment of ambushes, local security, defense of the bunker line, provisions of rapid reaction forces and maintenance of bunkers, tactical wire and minefields.

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(4) When major elements of the brigade are engaged in combat operations, small brigade and battalion rear detachments remain in the base camp area. These detachments are commanded by the brigade and battalion executive officers, and consist of only the minimum staff representation required for local operational requirements and administrative and logistical activities. The rear detachment performs a dual function in that it controls those personnel required for base defense as well as accomplishing activities necessary to insure the timely and continuous support of committed elements. Since forward command and control facilities are kept to the absolute minimum required for operations, division of personnel to maintain forward and rear facilities has caused no significant problems.

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QUESTION 23

1. (U) BACKGROUND: The College is developing an exercise depicting the employment of an infantry division using tactics and concepts being developed in Vietnam. Reference material in some operational areas is lacking. Information available indicates that the 1st Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division are in a static base and that much of the resources of these divisions are tied up in operating this static base. This raises two questions in command and control.

2. (U) QUESTIONS:

23a. What is available and utilized as the tactical operations center when the division takes to the field for division size operations?

23b. How is control of the division base effected when the command groups of division and brigades are in the field?

3. (U) ANSWERS: As with question 22, each division's answers to the two questions are justifiably different and they are therefore reiterated below in total.

a. 1st Infantry Division.

(1) The 1st Infantry Division is not located in a static base with much of its resources tied up in operating the static base. On this date, for example, out of 10 maneuver elements including the cavalry squadron, 9 are in field positions on operations.

(2) Secondly, we do have combat service support units remaining at our 5 base camps along with small stay behind elements of the combat troops. They perform essential maintenance and supply functions, but I suspect they also maintain a great deal of equipment we do not need. I would prefer to reorganize along the lines of air mobile infantry battalions, and I am confident that it will come along supported by the recently approved ARCO study.

(3) When the division is in the field, which is 90% of the time, we operate a forward command post using about 60% of our assets. This provides us all the essential operating staff sections except G1 and the majority of AG. Our rear echelon division headquarters base camp is very austere but does provide a necessary communications link to higher headquarters and our other base camps.

(4) The major subordinate commander, i.e., brigade commander, division artillery commander, and support command commander are also our base commanders. They utilize the stay behind elements of their command groups to control the base area when they are in the field. Similar to division headquarters, this is usually their S1. We have asked for and have interim approval for the assignment of one additional Lt Colonel at each base to act as a deputy commander for base activities. This will materially improve the command and control continuity.

b. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

dwl23

(1) The composition of the various Division CP echelons is described in Annex O, Div TAC SOP which is being mailed separately. When the bulk of the division is engaged in operations beyond the range of which control can be exercised from the division base the Division Forward CP will include the bulk of the division staff and the Forward CP will be the "Main CP." In this case the Main CP controls all operations and renders operations and intelligence reports to higher headquarters. A skeleton staff at division base submits feeder information to the Forward (Main) CP. One brigade headquarters is tasked for base defense/TAOR operations. A CH-54 "pod" is used as the nucleus of the physical facility for the Forward CP. An ADC operates from the Forward CP when this facility is not acting as the Main CP - the CG operates from the Forward CP when this facility assumes control as the "Main CP."

(2) One brigade headquarters is tasked for base defense regardless of the location of the Division "Main CP."

c. 25th Infantry Division.

(1) Information stated in background is erroneous. The 25th Infantry Division (minus one brigade task force) is located at a static base at Cu Chi in Hau Nghia Province. Much of the resources of the division are NOT tied up in operating this static base. There are six maneuver battalions at Cu Chi. Habitually, these battalions, reinforced with direct support artillery, engineer, and cavalry elements and supported by organic aviation, conduct operations for extended periods outside of the base area. As an example, during the past 60 days (1 May - 1 July) battalion-day operations throughout Hau Nghia Province were as follows:

6 battalions	20 days
5 battalions	15 days
4 battalions	7 days
3 battalions	2 days
2 battalions	9 days
1 battalion	2 days

(2) The mission of the division has not yet required displacement of the division command post in order to effectively control division size operations. Vehicular and/or airmobile forward command post configurations have been developed for use as the tactical situation dictates. The division rear command post is manned by representatives of general and special staff sections not required in the forward area. These personnel operate under the control of the Assistant Division Commander and are concerned primarily with defense of the base area and support of deployed units. All matters of an operational nature are handled at the forward CP with a complete exchange of information with division rear. These procedures and CP configurations have been tested in a recent command post exercise and found to be adequate.

(3) Using the concept described above, control of the division base is not significantly affected when command groups of division and brigade are in the field.

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QUESTION 24

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1. (U) BACKGROUND: Conflicting information is available to the College regarding the effectiveness of riot control agents in support of combat operations.

2. (U) QUESTION: What is the estimated effectiveness of riot control agents for:

a. Tunnel flushing?

b. Offensive operations in heavily forested terrain?

c. Suppressing enemy fire in counter-ambush action?

d. Preparatory fires?

3. (U) ANSWER TO QUESTION 2a: The 1st Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division report effective to highly effective results from the use of riot control agents (RCA) in flushing tunnels. The 1st Cavalry Division reports relatively little experience in this type operation due to the absence of extensive tunnel systems in its area of operation. By forcing the agent throughout the tunnel with an appropriate blower such as "Mity Mite", the 1st Div and the 25th Div were successful in forcing Viet Cong from tunnels. Use of the blower in this manner was reported simple and the required equipment moderately rugged. Tunnel denial has been accomplished by dispersing powdered agent throughout the tunnel (the 25th Div reports exploding bags of CS throughout the tunnels) and sealing entrances with explosives. The 1st Div's experience indicates effectiveness for five to six months if the tunnels remain sealed. Once opened, the tunnel may be traversed without a mask in one week. In related operations, the 1st Cav Div has successfully used CS hand grenades to flush VC from caves, villages, and houses. By driving personnel outside it was possible to determine the presence of armed VC among civilians and to capture VC suspects with a minimum of enemy injury. While the "Mity Mite" blower, used in conjunction with CS, has proved effective in flushing VC from relatively small unsophisticated tunnels, MACV has pointed out that tunnel systems presently encountered in Vietnam have a network of multi-leveled tunnels, interconnected with vertical shafts and cross drifts. Some tunnels have as many as six different levels, with the top level at a depth of three to four feet and bottom levels as much as thirty to thirty five feet deep. Tunnel complexes contain underground rooms connected to tunnels by short drifts. Against such large complex tunnel systems the "Mity Mite" is inadequate.

GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.
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INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31 72.

4. (C) ANSWER TO QUESTION 2b: The 1st Div and 25th Div have tested the use of RCA during offensive operations in heavily forested terrain. The 1st Div reports highly effective results when uniformly applied at the rate of 3000 lbs powdered CS-1 per square kilometer. The 25th Div complains of the lack of any accurate large area contamination system which could prove most effective in harassing the VC and forcing him to move. The 25th Div also does not consider it advisable to cause friendly forces to mask in the temperatures of Vietnam during search and destroy operations.

5. (C) ANSWER TO QUESTION 2c: The 1st Div has used RCA in suppressing enemy fire in counter-ambush action and reports it highly effective for approximately 10 minutes under unfavorable atmospheric conditions (strong lapse). The 25th Div is programmed to receive the E-8 CS launcher, E-158 CS disperser and the XM-3 adapter system in FY 67. Without the required equipment, the division reports no experience yet in this type operation. The 1st Cav Div, not having been subjected to ambush situations, also reports no experience in actual counter-ambush operations. The division does note, however, the use of RCA in markedly reducing the effectiveness of aimed fire and in reducing enemy firing at helicopters.

6. (C) ANSWER TO QUESTION 2d: The 1st Div reports RCA marginally effective for preparatory fires because of the necessity to rapidly exploit the agent within ten minutes after delivery under unfavorable atmospheric conditions. The 1st Cav Div cites its experience at the IRON TRIANGLE where CS followed immediately by artillery and rocket fires was used to drive the VC from their entrenchments and greatly increased the effectiveness of the artillery fires. The 25th Div reports no munition available for employing RCA in preparatory fires. The division has suggested the use of CNB and CNS (tear gas) in artillery and 4.2 mortar shells.

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QUESTION 25

1. (U) BACKGROUND: The College curriculum contains a subject on division operations in jungle regions. The areas of command and staff emphasized in this subject are listed in the attached summary. The primary doctrinal basis for this instructional unit is FM 31-30, Jungle Training and Operations. Faculty experience and judgment provide the basis for interpretation of published doctrine and selection of areas for emphasis.

2. (U) QUESTION: Does the attached summary cover all of the areas of command and staff peculiar to jungle operations that should be emphasized in instruction of the Command and General Staff College?

What else should be emphasized?
Should all of these be covered?
Should any item be revised to state more explicitly or accurately what should be covered?

3. (U) ANSWER: The 25th Infantry Division feels that the attached summary adequately covers the areas of command and staff peculiar to jungle operations. The division suggests covering all points with the possible exception of reference to the Honest John and Little John systems in paragraph 2. As a result of its experience in the jungle, the 1st Div feels the following additional points should be emphasized:

a. The Viet Cong move only on rivers and trails.

b. All base camps are located near rivers and trails.

c. While the inability to observe units moving through the jungle off trails is common to both US troops and the VC, the VC has the advantage of knowing where the trails are.

d. To increase control of small units in the jungle, the use of vectoring aircraft giving small units position fixes through the use of colored smoke is considered a must.

e. Maneuver in the jungle is difficult because control cannot be maintained visually. As a result, units tend to operate on narrow fronts, giving the VC the advantage of engaging large numbers of troops in killing zones of their choice. This increases the demand for good leadership and communications in small units.

f. In the rainy season, US troops can operate for 5 or 6 days in combat in the jungle after which they become tired and careless. During the dry season the troops' combat effectiveness can be extended to 7 to 10 days. They can recover only if they are brought into an easily defended area where at least 2/3's of the troops can sleep each night. During jungle fighting the greatest wear and tear is on company and battalion commanders and platoon leaders.

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g. American troops can move at night through the jungle with great success when ordered to do so. After doing it once, they lose their fear of night jungle movements. However, they do not fight effectively in the jungle at night on the move, nor should this be attempted except in dire emergencies.

h. Air mobile operations with an infantry division are characterized by the employment of separate artillery batteries, secured by rifle companies, as bases of fire. The field artillery battalion becomes a command and control organization which rarely commands its own batteries, but which often will command and control two to five batteries from other battalions with a mixture of calibers. Rifle battalions have a very loose connection with their parent brigades, serving with them not more than 30 to 40% of the time.

i. FM communications are the backbone of the command and control system in rapid reaction air mobile jungle operations. The 60 foot antenna is a must at brigade level and often at battalion. Retransmission equipment in aircraft or on mountain tops is highly desirable and in some cases absolutely necessary.

j. The CH-47 Chinook helicopter is the pacing factor in air mobile jungle operations. With it the division has a maximum flexibility. Without it, the division cannot move successfully against the VC in the jungle.

Incl 25

Section V, Lesson 2. Summary (UCS)

1. The principles of war, current tactical doctrine, standard methods of terrain evaluation, and basic considerations for conduct of offensive and defensive operations are applicable to infantry division operations in jungle environments.

2. The infantry division is tailored for operations in jungle environments by determining what capabilities are required to accomplish the division missions in light of the enemy situation, weather and terrain conditions, and friendly situation. Means of providing required capabilities include augmentation, attachment, addition and deletion of equipment, and modification of equipment. There is no need to change the organization of the division base, but mobility can be improved greatly by replacing M101 howitzers with M102 howitzers and replacing the Honest John system with the Little John system.

3. Off-road overland mobility of infantry battalions, airmobile means, man-portable communications, and capability to provide adequate combat and combat service support for maneuver elements operating off existing routes are typical force capabilities that are required for successful operations in jungle environments. Tanks normally will be used in small formations as part of a tank-infantry team.

4. The general availability of concealment in jungle areas—

a. Provides opportunities to achieve surprise in both offensive and defensive operations.

b. Favors the use of tactical infiltration, raids, and ambushes.

c. Facilitates withdrawal of forces in contact.

d. Enhances the capability of small forces to delay along restricted routes, and

e. Requires use of perimeter defense techniques.

5. In jungle, most fire fights occur at close ranges. Unless assault of a position is involved, fire fights usually begin as surprise encounters and last for relatively short periods.

6. The scarcity of position areas for weapons and limitations on observation cause particular difficulties in providing indirect fire support.

7. Airmobile means lessen terrain-imposed limitations on maneuver, control, and combat support and combat service support capabilities.

8. Dense growth and rough terrain shorten the effective range of communications equipment.

9. Major increases in engineer support are required when heavy equipment and normal tonnages of supplies must be moved overland to support operations in jungle terrain.

10. All classes of supply deteriorate more rapidly in jungle environments. Maintenance requirements are increased because of the operation of equipment in difficult terrain and effects of the climate. Transportation employment must be carefully planned to minimize effects of limitations imposed by scarcity of roads and vulnerable ground lines of communication.

11. In jungle operations, there will be more nonbattle environmental losses than in temperate zone operations. Command emphasis on preventive medicine, including comprehensive advance planning, is essential. The morale values of prompt medical treatment and casualty evacuation are greater than in more favorable combat environments.

12. It is characteristic of operations in jungle areas that engagements break up into isolated small-unit actions. In addition, decentralized control is necessary for conduct of wide envelopments, tactical infiltration operations, ambushes, and raids. Together with the requirement for enforcement of high standards of sanitation and personal hygiene, these situations require well-trained and self-reliant small-unit leaders.

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