We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War
Abstract
On 12 July 2006, a well-trained, highly motivated detachment of Hezbollah* fighters crossed from southern Lebanon into northern Israel killing three Israeli soldiers and abducting two others. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert called the incursion an act of war and proclaimed Lebanon will suffer the consequences of its actions. Convinced they could force Hezbollah to disarm and withdraw from southern Lebanon by initiating an effects-based air campaign, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) began pounding targets across Lebanon. Although initially taken aback by the destructive air strikes, Hezbollah unleashed its own attack within 24 hours, launching an extensive rocket barrage from southern Lebanon into Israel. Despite Israel assuring the United States of a quick and decisive resolution to the conflict, Hezbollahs short-range Katyusha rockets continued to rain down on the Israeli population. As days went by, it became increasingly apparent to both the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and western military analysts that the IAF was having little effect on Hezbollahs rockets. When the IDF reluctantly moved its ground forces into southern Lebanon, the apparent ineffectiveness of the operation and the stubborn resistance of Hezbollah fighters stunned military observers worldwide. After years of highly successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations against the Palestinians, the IDF appeared remarkably inept to conduct a successful conventional ground campaign against Hezbollah.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 2008
- Accession Number
- AD1111543
Entities
People
- Matt M. Matthews
Organizations
- Fort Leavenworth Combat Studies Institute Press