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To

THE ARMED FORCES PROBLEM

GENERAL HEINZ GUDERIAN

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HISTORICAL DIVISION

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Preface

MS # T-113 was prepared as a result of a unique chain of circumstances, for an exceptional purpose, by an unusual man. The chain of circumstances began in early 1946 when the Chief Historian of the European Theater, operating under a directive which charged him with "maximum exploitation of sources of combat information available in the European Theater," began the concentration of more than 200 former German generals and general staff corps officers in a single prisoner-of-war enclosure. By mid-August of that year, this group had been thoroughly organized and was fully engaged in writing narrative histories of German operational units which opposed American troops under the command of SHAEF. At that time it became evident that, among other possibilities, the study of problems incident to the proposed merger of the United States Armed Forces might be facilitated by the preparation of an organizational history of OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres, German Army High Command).

Available to the Chief Historian as coordinators for such a project were two former chiefs of staff of the German Army, Generaloberst Franz Halder (1938-42) and Generaloberst Heinz Guderian (1944-45). Of the two, Halder had more experience in OKH, and any idea of placing Guderian in charge of the OKH project was rendered completely academic by his angry refusal to begin work unless officially assured that he would not be tried for war crimes. Furthermore, the fact that these two men were not even on speaking terms made it impossible, in any case, to employ them as a team. General Halder, therefore, assumed responsibility for the study and had a group of 13 general officers at work by the end of November. His writing staff totaled 15 in January 1947, 26 in March 1947, 33 in May 1947, 35 in September 1947, 46 in November 1947, 38 in December 1947, and 12 in March 1948, by which time most of the writing had been completed. The work of Halder's staff, facilitated in its later stages by the availability of a large body of captured German documents, did not suffer from lack of experienced or high-ranking authorities: in December 1947, for example, the group comprised twelve lieutenant generals, four major generals, nine brigadier generals, nine colonels, and four lieutenant colonels.

The organizational history of OKH was conceived by General Halder as a trilogy: OKH "as it was," OKH "as it should have been," and OKH "as it should be." By March 1948 it had become clear that only the first two parts could be completed under General Halder's direction before European Command policies forced a major reorganization of the

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German Historical Project at the end of June. Sufficient time remained, however, to attempt to compensate for any slant that might have been given to the work by Halder, by securing commentaries on the first two parts from Generaloberst Kurt Zeitzler (Army Chief of Staff, 1942-44) and Guderian, who had become thoroughly cooperative at last. The active participation of all three wartime chiefs of staff, then, completed the first two parts of the OKH project (MS # T-111, approximately 2100 pp.).

Yet it remained highly desirable to salvage the potentially most useful third part, OKH "as it should be." Zeitzler and Guderian, therefore, were commissioned to prepare, separately and unaided, their recommendations for the organization of a future Army High Command, based on their extensive pre-surrender experience and using MS # T-111 as a line of departure. The following study, MS # T-113, includes Guderian's recommended solution to this organizational problem, but is concerned chiefly with the organization of an Armed Forces High Command, rather than an Army High Command. It is possible that Guderian has written thus because he deems the former issue preeminent and the latter comparatively simple, once the greater problem has been solved.

The solution outlined in MS # T-113 was evolved by Guderian without guidance or suggestions from American personnel; its distribution does not constitute endorsement of Guderian's recommendations by the Historical Division or the Department of the Army.

HISTORICAL DIVISION
SPECIAL STAFF, U.S. ARMY
February 1949

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The Author

Heinz Wilhelm Guderian was born on 17 June 1888, the son of a Prussian officer who died a brigade commander in 1914. He received cadet training and, on 28 February 1907, joined the army as an officer candidate (Faehnrich). At the outbreak of World War I, he was a student at the War College (Kriegsakademie); he later served on various staffs as a captain. His military service was not interrupted by the Armistice, and for the next thirteen years he alternated between troop duty and the Reichswehr Ministry, where he was chiefly concerned with motor transportation. In 1931, as a lieutenant colonel, he became chief of staff of the Inspectorate of Motor Transport Troops, was promoted to colonel in 1933, and in 1934 was named chief of staff of the Armored Command. Returning to troop duty as commander of 2d Panzer Division in 1935, he continued a leader in the development of armored warfare, rose to general officer rank, wrote numerous books and articles (including the military best-seller Achtung! Panzer), and was promoted to commander of XVI (Panzer) Corps as a major general (Generalleutnant) in early 1938. After only nine months in this rank and participation in the ceremonial occupations of Austria and the Sudetenland, Guderian was again promoted, to lieutenant general (General der Panzertruppen), and named Chief of Motorized Troops.

On 1 September 1939, Guderian was in the field as commander of XIX Panzer Corps, which led the advance from the Polish border to Brest Litovsk. For his performance in the Polish Campaign, he was awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. The Corps shifted to the West, and in May 1940 Guderian's three panzer divisions knifed into Luxembourg, took Sedan, overran the French positions on the south bank of the Meuse, and swept to the Channel--after Guderian had twice refused to obey orders to halt and had once been threatened with relief for his refusal. On 21 May he turned north to capture Boulogne and Calais, and a few days later obeyed the order to halt, just short of Dunkirk. On 9 June, now in charge of two panzer corps, Guderian began an eight day drive to the Swiss frontier near Pontarlier. On 19 July 1940, he was promoted to general (Generaloberst).

On 22 June 1941, the Wehrmacht having turned to the East again, Guderian began crossing the Bug River with the three panzer corps of his Second Panzer Army; during the following month his forces crossed the Beresina and the Dnieper and captured Smolensk. Having just been awarded an oakleaf cluster to his Knight's Cross, Guderian sent his panzers rolling on to the controversial Kiev encirclement, to Bryansk and Orel, to the abortive assault on Moscow in the cold and rain and snow of a Russian autumn. On 5 December, he was forced for the first time in World War II to break off an attack. On 20 December he flew to Hitler's headquarters to explain the desperate situation at the front and to urge, perhaps a trifle untactfully, a major change in

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strategy. He returned to the front, was accused of insubordination by his army group commander (Field Marshal von Kluge) when one of his corps failed to hold its ground, and was relieved to spend the next fourteen months on inactive duty. During this period he suffered from a heart ailment, possibly aggravated by the circumstances of his relief.

Recalled by Hitler in February 1943, Guderian was named Inspector General of Panzer Troops--a post which made him responsible for organization, equipment, and training of the tank forces and an adviser on armored tactics. His influence on the course of operations was restricted to that resulting from his personal prestige and the advisory function of his office. On 20 July 1944, however, when the Army Chief of Staff (Zeitzler) was relieved in the wake of the assassination attempt on Hitler, Guderian was entrusted with the performance of his duties, but was not relieved as Inspector General of Panzer Troops. With Hitler's distrust of the Army at a peak and with the influence of Himmler and the SS constantly increasing, Guderian could do little more than supervise the collapse of the Eastern Front and observe, impotently, the disintegration of the Wehrmacht. His attempts to regain the lost powers of the Chief of Staff were futile, and the few emergency operational measures for which he could secure approval met with only transient and limited success. In the black days of March 1945, Guderian once too often supported a general (Busse) who had incurred the displeasure of Hitler, and was sent away on sick leave.

The military career of Heinz Guderian is in itself enough to establish his ability as an organizer, a theorist, and an aggressive field commander. Even in an American prisoner-of-war enclosure he retained his exceptional intellectual integrity, his firm and uncompromising attitude, his untactfulness under stress, and his alloy of courtliness and acid humor. He is a man who writes what he thinks and who does not alter his opinions to suit his audience.

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UNIFICATION OR COORDINATION
--- THE ARMED FORCES PROBLEM

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INTRODUCTION

The discussion as to whether a unified armed forces high command is preferable to the hitherto prevailing independence of the military services has not been silenced by the termination of hostilities. This problem has been given practical consideration particularly in the United States of America.

At the request of the Historical Division of the U. S. Army, I have expressed my ideas on this important problem in the following pages.

HEINZ GUDERIAN

October 1948

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Chapter One

EVOLUTION OF ARMED FORCES ORGANIZATION IN GERMANY

1. After the victorious unification wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870-71, the German Army was the main component of the Wehrmacht. At that time, the Army's fellow service was a weak Navy, destined chiefly for coastal protection, and at first the responsibility of the Prussian Ministry of War. But as early as the Bismarckian Era the significance of the fleet increased with the extension of Germany's overseas trade and the acquisition of colonies. As a consequence of this German expansion, the necessity of creating a special top-level agency became more urgent, all the more since the Navy was a national navy and therefore directly subordinate to the Kaiser, while the armies of the major federal states remained subordinate to the federal princes. According to the military agreements concluded in 1871, these contingents were subordinate to the Kaiser only in case of war, while in peacetime his powers went only as far as inspecting them. The troops contributed by the smaller federal states were incorporated in the Prussian Army.

2. For the Army or Navy, there was no special commander in chief alongside or under the Kaiser or, in peacetime, the respective prince. A great number of agencies were therefore directly subordinate to the Kaiser and the princes; the representatives of these agencies had the right of direct access and were thereby in a position to influence

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the wearer of the crown. In Prussia, there were among others the Minister of War, the Chief of the Great General Staff, the Chief of the Military Cabinet, the corps commanders, and the inspectors general of the most important branches (Ed: infantry, artillery, etc.); in the Navy, the State Secretary of the Reich Navy Office, the Chief of the Battle Fleet, the Chief of the Naval Cabinet, and the naval base commanders enjoyed the same privileges. The Luftwaffe came into existence shortly before World War I and had at this stage no organization of its own. A number of new organizations originated in World War I, and, in consequence, additional directly subordinate agencies made their appearance.

3. The profusion of agencies directly under the Kaiser resulted in his being overburdened and having to decide on matters of which he understood little or nothing. The contradictory opinions of numerous eager, ambitious, and capable councilors were supposed to be coordinated and uniformly implemented by him. This went beyond the power of any one man, even a genius. After the loss of World War I, our defeat was justly imputed to, among other causes, the defective top-level structure of the state and of the military high command.

4. According to the constitution of the Weimar Republic, the Reich President retained supreme command of the armed forces. The responsibility for their organization was delegated to the Reich Defense Minister, to whom the Army and the Navy were accordingly subordinate. The dictate of Versailles (Diktat von Versailles) prohibited the Reich from maintaining an air force. Directly subordinate to the Reich Defense Minister, the Chief of the Army High Command exercised command authority

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over the Army, while the Chief of the Navy High Command held the corresponding position with the Navy. The sphere of influence of the Reich Defense Minister mainly extended to the representation of the Wehrmacht in external (and political) matters, within the Reichstag and the government, while the chiefs of the Wehrmacht services were granted far-reaching independence in purely military questions. This structure proved effective in its time.

5. With the seizure of power by National Socialism and the ensuing rearmament, the Wehrmacht was faced with several new tasks which also gave rise to major organizational changes. The Reich Defense Minister became Reich War Minister and simultaneously Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht. The position was filled by a professional soldier (Ed: Von Blomberg). The Chief of State held the supreme command powers over this specialist who exercised the command functions. In addition to the Army and the Navy, the Luftwaffe was called into existence as a third service. Each service was under a commander in chief with far-reaching powers. This organizational structure was nearly ideal, in theory. But, in practice, the actual situation was unfortunately quite different.

6. The Reich War Minister and Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht set up a staff to assist him and attempted to unify whatever required uniformity. His first objective was to influence the training of the men in positions of leadership. The Wehrmacht Academy was to serve this purpose. It was significant that he was unable to obtain students for this training college of the future leaders of the Wehrmacht. His second idea was to bring into accord the operations of the Wehrmacht

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services. The direction of operations on land had until then been the mission of the Army--and that for centuries in the past--while naval operations had been the domain of the Navy. Neither of these two services was willing to accept a curtailment of its rights. But the most presumptuous attitude was that adopted by the third service, all the more since its commander in chief (Ed: Goering) held, aside from his military rank, a particularly high position in the Party and in political life. The efforts of the Reich War Minister were resisted by all three services. The flaming struggle for power was, however, not restricted to the sphere of the Wehrmacht proper, but rapidly developed into a struggle against the National Socialist Party, which was striving for complete control of the state; it became a struggle against Hitler himself.

7. Hitler very soon perceived the actual state of unity prevailing within the Wehrmacht. He realized the weakness of the Reich War Minister, who was continuing in his efforts, as well as the animosity of the key generals toward the Minister and his regime, and he drew his own conclusions. On 4 February 1938, he dismissed the Reich War Minister and personally assumed the office; he also replaced the Commander in Chief of the Army (Ed: Von Fritsch) by a new man (Ed: Von Brauchitsch). The means employed in this process were evil.

8. On the surface, the organizational consequences consisted in a strengthening of the central executive, the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Armed Forces High Command). But this progress was outweighed by the inadequacy of the Chief of OKW (Ed: Keitel) who continued in this important office until the collapse of Germany. In reality, the independence

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of the services increased, particularly that of the Luftwaffe; they enjoyed the same privileges and were on the same level as OKW and therefore were, as under the Monarchy, agencies directly subordinate to the Chief of State.

9. At the end of September 1938, the Chief of Staff of the Army (Ed: Beck) was relieved (Ed: and replaced by Halder) because he did not approve of the foreign policy of the Chief of State--because he considered a long span of peace necessary for strengthening the state and its military force. The leading generals of the Army--and they were the only ones involved--did not at that time show any externally visible reactions to the measures directed against them by the Chief of State. They did not resist the abolition of the office of Reich War Minister, the replacement of the Commander in Chief of the Army under false pretenses, or the change in the position of the Chief of Staff of the Army. As a consequence of this passive attitude, Hitler's disdain for them only increased. In addition, Hitler's foreign policy proceeded from one success to another against the predictions made by the generals.

10. In 1939, the Wehrmacht entered its fateful struggle with a structure which, though it had in theory a unitive top in OKW, was in reality similar to a commonwealth of rival command agencies directly subordinate to an energetic dilettante.

11. The first campaigns against Poland and Norway, as well as the subsequent fighting in the West, repeatedly contravened the skepticism of the Army High Command and justified Hitler's plans, which were based on a more realistic psychological approach. The result was

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a further increase in his self-assurance and his disdain for the generals. Opposed by the inspiration of the moment, military orthodoxy steadily lost ground; the result was that the importance of the top-level structure was lessened in Hitler's mind while he considered his intuition infallible and believed that it could replace the knowledge and advice of the experts. Incidentally, this over-evaluation of himself was not restricted to the military sphere but embraced all fields of public life; it rapidly transcended into dangerous megalomania.

12. In this mental condition Hitler went, in 1941, into the gigantic struggle with the Soviet Union, suffering from the delusion that he would be able to crush this immense country within a short time, without first having reached a final settlement with the enemy in the West. The first reverses during the hard winter of 1941-42 in no way undeceived him, but instead led to a new increase in his own powers, for he dismissed the Commander in Chief of the Army and took over both his official functions and his responsibilities. The Chief of Staff of the Army now was no longer responsible for all ground operations. He had to surrender a major part of his functions to OKW; the so-called OKW theaters of war came into existence, the operational control of which now devolved upon the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, while the supply services, organization, and training of the entire Army remained without change within the scope of the Army High Command.

13. Hitler subordinated the Army Personnel Office directly to himself and thereby created a new military cabinet. He interested himself personally in armament details and often intervened in order to

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accelerate matters. He developed tremendous solicitude for all spheres of the war effort. Yet all his efforts produced only greater confusion.

14. These excessive demands, combined with an unreasonable schedule of daily activities and immoderate use of dangerous and partly untested drugs, finally caused the man, whose physical resistance never was too strong, to be taken ill. The unsuccessful attempt (20 July 1944) on Hitler's life resulted not only in an increase in his mental irritability, but also in a number of organizational changes which led to a further splintering of the military command authority. Thus, the Commander of the Replacement Training Army, who hitherto had been subordinate to OKW, was now directly under Hitler. The post was filled by the appointment of a military novice, Reichsfuehrer-SS Himmler.

15. By the year 1944 there was nothing left of the original unified command authority over the Wehrmacht. Only the Supreme Commander united in his person all the many directly subordinate agencies he had created, but this Supreme Commander was no longer equal to the task because of his deficient background, his failing health, and, finally, his spiritual deterioration. A State which had arisen through the perfection of its governmental and military institutions in three victorious wars, and which owed its ascent to the wisdom and moderation of its rulers, perished now because of the lack of these qualities.

16. The following proposals result from the bitter experiences of the last years of the War. They are of a purely academic nature. Human beings with their divergent opinions and their manifold ambitions will never permit their realization. The geographic, economic, and

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political characteristics of each country will entail divergences. The proposals can therefore serve only as a clue to future organizations which may be extensively influenced, in addition, by the development of new technical possibilities.

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Chapter Two

UNIFICATION OR COORDINATION

I. The Significance of Technical Developments

The past century has brought about a complete change in the evaluation of weapons.

17. During the German wars for unification as well as during the American Civil War there were only the old major arms of the service--infantry, cavalry, and artillery. But as early as the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars, the influence of modern automatic weapons and the use of heavy artillery by the field forces resulted in a strengthening of the defense. These facts, insufficiently appreciated by the time of World War I, led to positional warfare. The war of position lasted for years without either side being able to bring about a decision. Finally, certain technical advances, such as the introduction of the tank and the development of the air force, in conjunction with a tremendous superiority in numbers and war potential, provided the Allies with their victory in World War I. Materiel was victorious over spirit.

18. After World War I, the countries which were free to do so attempted to draw conclusions from past events. This happened in the most varied ways. The simplest method was, no doubt, to pursue an ostrich-like policy and leave everything unchanged. This was the method employed by most of the professional general staffs. It was everywhere

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left to outsiders to grasp new ideas and to carry their point through infinitely tough struggles against the orthodox. In many cases they failed in their efforts: Fuller in England, De Gaulle in France, and Douhet in Italy. In other countries they achieved partial successes. When World War II broke out there probably was not one really modern military establishment.

19. In pre-World War II days in Germany it had been clearly realized, however, that in the air force and the armored corps two new major arms had been created which were capable of replacing the old cavalry and of surmounting the repelling firepower of the defense, thereby restoring to the attack its significance on the battlefield. This realization, however, was even in Germany restricted to a relatively small circle. The majority of the routinists tenaciously clung to tradition and hampered progress so much that they succeeded in preventing the extension of initial successes into complete victory.

20. Nevertheless, 1939-40 saw spirit victorious over materiel. Our adversaries, so far as they were accessible to our first onslaught, were beaten by our new methods. They did not hesitate to learn from their defeats and, supported by their recurring numerical and material superiority, they then turned our own combat methods against us with the same result as in World War I.

21. Because of their industrial productivity and their self-sufficiency in fuel, the British and the Americans reappeared in Europe with fully motorized armies. Horses had been eliminated from their ranks. The commitment of American armor was achieved according to the

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principles which had been applied so successfully by the German armored units during the overthrow of France in 1940. The air forces of the two major western powers completely dominated the air. They not only exerted strong influence on the development of the situation at and closely behind the front, but also, by extensively paralyzing the lines of communication and the armament industry, weakened to a singular degree the efficiency of the Wehrmacht. The strategic bombing of defenseless German cities was supposed to terrorize the civilian population and prepare the people to ask for peace. Although this type of warfare led to terrific losses of precious lives and to the destruction of great cultural treasures, the expected military objective was only very ineffectively obtained.

22. The following new means of warfare made their first appearance: the V-Weapons, a new type of artillery, based on the rocket principle, possessing very great range with corresponding inaccuracy, and doubtless only on the threshold of their development; and the Atomic Bomb, a new type of bomb with terrifying force, the active effectiveness of which has not yet been fully determined, and against which there is for the time being no adequate defense. It remains to be seen whether these two new means of warfare can, in the future, increase the intensity of warfare against the civilian population behind the front to a decisive degree. There may be objections to their use in the forward combat zone because of the danger they present to both sides.

23. From a purely military point of view one can state that the old arms of the service in their hitherto prevailing form are certain

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to disappear. In Western and Central Europe, the maintenance of infantry is justified only in fully motorized formations. In the East, other means of transportation may also be taken into consideration. An essential mission of the infantry will be cooperation with tanks. Cavalry has been replaced by armor; only in the East will it still be possible to employ mounted units. Artillery must be motorized and the majority of the guns must be self-propelled so that they can be used in combination with the tanks. The development of V-weapons (rockets) will transform the artillery completely. Armor, partly replacing cavalry, will, however, beyond that be an assault force of primary importance; it will play the leading part in ground combat, closely linked with the other modernized arms. Engineers and signal communications units will have to be adapted to the requirements of modern times. The air force will have to take over a major part of the reconnaissance work. Its primary mission, however, will consist in fighting the enemy air force, both in providing fighter-protection against enemy bombers and in carrying out bombing missions in an air offensive.

II. The Separate Air Force

24. In all countries, the army and the navy will be inclined to request the assignment of air reconnaissance units to their respective services, and one cannot deny that these requests are quite justified. Reconnaissance operations executed for the army or navy require the pilots' thorough training in the combat methods of the forces which they serve.

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One cannot demand, for instance, that the same pilot carry out missions in connection with artillery adjustment fire, strategic railroad reconnaissance, combined operations with armor, and reconnaissance for submarines. These tasks are very diversified in nature and their successful accomplishment can only be expected if the pilot is familiar with the characteristics and procedures of the service concerned.

25. For certain types of air combat formations, also, knowledge of ground or naval combat methods is essential if success is to be achieved with minor losses. Cooperation with armored forces in ground combat can only be successful if the air combat formations are well coordinated with the armored units. The combat activities of air force units based on aircraft carriers can only achieve success if these units have previously undergone thorough training. Combined operations of air combat formations with submarines certainly require equal practice.

26. On the other hand, one is equally justified in stating that the commitment of large bomber formations and their protection by fighter and reconnaissance units seems feasible only if uniform training and command are assured. It may be said that technical development of planes and weapons, installation of air bases, and air raid protection can only be accomplished under a unified command and by close cooperation of flying personnel with ground and technical personnel.

27. The installations of the civilian air services will have to be integrated with the military in one way or another; the technical development of the two cannot be separated. Furthermore, one must admit that the development of flying is still in its initial stage

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and that it can only be rendered economical and remunerative by combining all efforts. The great tasks which the future holds for aviation can be most effectively accomplished by strict centralization of the available forces and means. Necessary cooperation with other authorities need not suffer from this.

28. One must therefore affirm the necessity of creating a separate air force which, in addition, will be granted the necessary influence on the development of civil aviation. It will also be appropriate to assign to this air force the organization of air raid protection.

III. Independent Services versus Inspectorates General

29. The preceding exposition leads to the proposition that in the future a national military establishment consist of three major services:

The Army, consisting of all ground forces, with the exception of the ground units and personnel of the air force (including the air raid protection troops) and the coastal organizations of the navy.

The Navy, which includes all seagoing combat forces and their bases and organizations on land.

The Air Force, consisting of all flying units and their ground elements and organizations, as well as the units and agencies for air raid protection.

30. There is no doubt that these three principal components have to be subordinated to a joint top-level agency. The only uncertainty

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lies in the degree of independence they should maintain in order to work with maximum efficiency. At all events, a structure consisting of three independent services directly subordinate to the chief of state and coequal with an armed forces high command lacking command authority, proved faulty in Germany during the last world war. Another solution must therefore be found.

31. Now the question arises whether it is necessary to subordinate each of the three major services to a high command of its own, and, if so, what authority can be conceded to the commander in chief of each service in relation to the supreme commander of the entire armed forces; or whether it suffices to have an inspector general supervise each service while the command authority is exclusively concentrated in the commander in chief of the armed forces and his staff--the armed forces high command. The answer to this question depends essentially upon the characteristics of the country and upon the missions its armed forces presumably will have to undertake. An island state will be inclined to adopt a different solution from that arrived at by a country with open continental borders. A country whose main interests lie overseas must come to an organization different from that adopted by a nation with mountainous borders and no overseas interests.

32. If we take nations like Great Britain or the United States for examples, it will always occur in case of war that only parts of the ground forces, i.e. of the army, have to be transported overseas; that they will therefor require the transportation facilities and the protection of the navy; that upon arrival at their destination they will

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have to be combined with units of the air combat forces; that, therefore, a unified command over those forces of the three services which are destined for a joint mission will become necessary. Thus, as a rule there will be need not for the commanders in chief of the services, but rather for a joint commander in chief of a task force composed of elements of all three services.

33. Will the situation be very different in the case of a purely continental power, as for instance the Soviet Union, if it were implicated in a war? Of course, the navy will be of considerably less importance, but the army and air force units will have to be subordinated to a unified command no matter whether they are to be employed in the Far East, in Iran, or in Western Europe. In this case, also, unrestricted command authority will have to be requested by and granted to the theater commanders and not to the commanders in chief of the services.

34. The commanders in chief of the services will therefore in future wars have to find their main field of activities in their own country, in the "home" or replacement training army, and in the corresponding elements of the air force and the navy; armed forces commanders in chief will have to command the combined formations of the army, navy, and air force in the respective theaters of war. In order that this important problem may be solved it will be necessary to train the top-level commanders and the potential members of their staffs, the general staff officers. In pre-war Germany there was the Wehrmacht Academy for the accomplishment of this task; as already mentioned, it failed because of the negative attitude and passive resistance of the military services.

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Since there are indications that similar difficulties also exist in other countries, the reference to the importance of sufficient mental schooling of the top commanders and their assistants is perhaps not superfluous.

35. One may therefore state that an armed forces high command is necessary, that commanders in chief for the services at home--the army, navy, and air force of the zone of the interior--are feasible but not indispensable, and that inspectors general of the military services are better suited to the limited missions assigned these agencies.

IV. Functions of the Armed Forces High Command

36. After having concluded that a command agency with complete command authority over the entire military establishment is essential, we must clarify the functions with which this high command should be entrusted and the functions which, not being of common concern to the armed services, should therefore remain under the supervision of the individual services. For this purpose, we shall proceed from the assumption that the new central agency will become very large in any event, and that nothing superfluous should be incorporated into it. Otherwise it would become top-heavy and would soon show inclinations toward falling apart.

37. The tremendously increased operational significance of the air force, which is destined for further expansion because of developments to be anticipated, makes it obvious that joint operations of the three services can only be directed by an operations branch of the armed

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forces (the former Armed Forces Operations Staff (Wehrmacht-Fuehrungsstab) of OKW). There will be no differences of opinion as to the indispensability of this branch.

38. Enemy intelligence must be made accessible to this staff. The staff must be in a position to influence the collection of such information. The information must be comprehensive and satisfactory to all three services. The procurement of intelligence will therefore be, in the future, an armed forces function. Security measures against enemy intelligence must also be included in the armed forces functions, for similar reasons.

39. In war or in peace, military supply, utilizing all available means of transportation--whether land, sea, or air--is an armed forces function. The general staff officer in charge of supply should therefore be an armed forces man. Transportation should become one of the armed forces functions.

40. National fortifications, formerly an army engineer matter, have, in view of the close interrelation between the services, outgrown their former narrow framework. Determination of which objectives will, in the future, need the protection of fortifications requires thorough investigation. For this purpose, a single command system must be devised for territorial and coastal fortifications, as well as for the air defense installations for ground fortifications, the lines of communication, the supply establishments, the armament industry, and the civilian population. In this connection one might discuss the impact of both V-weapons and atomic bombs on modern city planning, and on

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traffic installations and industrial enterprises.

41. The necessity of uniform training of leaders by an armed forces academy has already been mentioned. Furthermore, there will have to be an agency for the uniform direction or influencing of the press, an armed forces press office. Finally, one might consider the formation of an agency for the procurement of maps for the entire military establishment, though its existence may perhaps not be absolutely essential.

42. We have outlined the Armed Forces High Command General Staff by enumerating the above functions.

43. Let us briefly consider armed forces armament. There should be a general armed forces office to coordinate all fields of armament. The weapons office directs the development and testing of weapons and maintains contact with the armament industry, provided no civilian ministry for armament and war production exists which can take over this task. The administration office is in charge of all real estate, buildings, food, clothing, civil servants, and pay rolls. The economics office handles all problems connected with national economy, particularly the procurement of raw materials required by the war industries, the development of factories working on armed forces contracts, and stockpiling for war. The personnel replacement office is in charge of procurement and allocation of manpower--registration, induction, and discharge of those liable for service; maintenance of their records; and assignment to the individual services according to their requirements and the aptitude of the selectee. The legal office handles judicial matters and legal problems of the armed forces. The medical

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office is in charge of the armed forces health services. The pensions office takes care of the veterans, particularly the disabled ones. The budget office is in charge of the finances of the armed forces and submits the armed forces budget to the legislative body.

44. All these functions can be uniformly administered for the entire military establishment. If the services administer them separately as hitherto, the result is double work and widespread controversy and overlapping in general; the right hand does not know what the left is doing, and administration becomes much more expensive.

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Chapter Three

THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF MODERN ARMED FORCES

45. The Chief of State

The chief of state is, as a rule, the person who exercises decisive influence on the conduct of foreign policy, and who has to declare war and make peace. For this reason he must also be granted supreme command over the instrument of state power, the armed forces. Since the chief of state frequently is not a military man, a trained professional must exercise the actual supreme command functions under the chief of state. In normal circumstances there ought not to be any objections to the person of the chief of state. If, however, there are any objections, then the person in question is not suitable for his high office and should be declared incapable of governing by a supreme judiciary and removed from his office. The lack of this supreme judiciary in Germany led to the situation that a licentious dictatorship came into power against which there were no legal remedies. But, in determining the constitutional basis of the position of the chief of state, one should not base his judgment on a flaw in the constitution.

46. The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and his Staff

Directly under the chief of state and dependent upon his decision in all policy matters, a military man should exercise the top command over the entire military establishment. He would be appointed

and dismissed by the chief of state, perhaps with the consent of the cabinet. Subordinate to the commander in chief are his staff (the armed forces high command) and the commanders in chief (inspectors general) of the services. The staff of the commander in chief of the armed forces should be subdivided into the personal secretariat, the armed forces general staff, and the armed forces armaments office.

47. The Armed Forces General Staff

In summary, then, the armed forces general staff should consist of:

- a. operations branch,
- b. foreign branch (military attaches and liaison with those from foreign countries, intelligence information on foreign armed forces),
- c. counterintelligence branch,
- d. chief of armed forces supply,
- e. armed forces signal communications service,
- f. armed forces transportation service,
- g. chief of national fortifications,
- h. armed forces academy,
- i. armed forces press office, and
- j. armed forces map service.

48. The Armed Forces Armaments Office

The following agencies would be incorporated into an armed forces armaments office:

- a. general armed forces office,

- b. armed forces weapons office,
- c. armed forces administration office,
- d. armed forces economics office,
- e. armed forces personnel replacement office,
- f. armed forces legal office,
- g. armed forces medical office,
- h. armed forces pensions office, and
- i. armed forces budget office.

49. The Military Services

Each field of military activity which does not pertain to all the services would have to remain under the supervision of the respective service in order not to inflate unnecessarily the armed forces high command. In conformity with this idea, the direction of operations which involve only one service would devolve upon that service. The organizational details, the training, armament, personnel problems, and technical direction of the individual arms of the services would have to be left to the service concerned. Finally, the services must retain such functions as are of interest only to them.

50. The Army

At the top of the army organization is the commander in chief (inspector general) with his staff, the army high command. The army high command is composed of the following agencies:

- a. operations branch, the instrument for the execution of directives received from the armed forces high command;
- b. organization branch, for the organization of

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individual arms of the service and combined-arms units up to and including corps level;

c. training branch, for the training of the individual arms of the service and army units;

d. personnel office, for personnel matters concerning the army;

e. branch inspectorates, for the execution of directives received from the armed forces high command (general armed forces office) with regard to organization, training, armament, and equipment of the arms of the service; and

f. army veterinary service.

51. The Navy

At the top of the navy organization is the commander in chief (inspector general) with his staff, the navy high command. The navy high command is composed of the following agencies:

a. operations branch (as above),

b. organization branch (internal organization of naval units),

c. training branch,

d. navy personnel office,

e. "branch" inspectorates of the navy, and

f. naval vessel construction branch.

Naval experts should be consulted as to which additional agencies of the service could be added to the above list.

52. The Air Force

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At the top of the air force organization is a commander in chief (inspector general) with his staff, the air force high command. The air force high command is composed of the following agencies:

- a. operations branch (as above),
- b. organization branch,
- c. training branch,
- d. air force personnel office,
- e. "branch" inspectorates of the air force, and
- f. aircraft construction branch.

Air force experts should be consulted as to which additional agencies of the service could be added to the above list.

53. Theaters of War

World War II extended over so vast an area that several theaters of war were created on both sides; these theaters were nearly independent of each other as far as the fighting was concerned. Although the supreme direction of operations were centralized, each theater of war acted more or less independently in the execution phase. On the German side, we were unable to establish armed forces commanders of all units employed within each designated theater of war. The consequences of this were serious. On the Allied side this mistake was avoided. The consequences of unified command were beneficial. In the future there will have to be, for each theater of war, one armed forces commander in chief, who will have unrestricted command authority over all units employed within his area; and it will be immaterial to which service or even to which ally they belong.

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54. Occupied Areas

Whenever a successful campaign leads to the occupation and administration of enemy territory for a long period of time, such an area is usually placed under military administration. During the last war, the Germans made the mistake in many cases of replacing the military administration by a civilian one under the direction of Party officials. Military governments are certainly not ideal permanent solutions, but still they are preferable to civil administrations, which usually are composed of second- and third-rate personnel. The military commander of an occupied area must have unrestricted command authority over all military and civilian agencies stationed within his area. As a rule, he will be directly under the commander in chief of his country's armed forces.

55. Colonial Territories

In peacetime, it will be appropriate to subordinate military installations and troops in the colonies to the governors, while their organization, training, armament, and strength are controlled by the commander in chief of the mother country's armed forces. In time of war, the type of command structure will depend on the importance of the colony to the total war effort and its geographical relationship to the principal combat actions.

56. Mandates

A similar arrangement to that recommended for colonies should be adopted for mandates, unless an international body such as the United Nations issues special directives. We are at present witnesses

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to such a situation in the Palestine conflict. Only the future can tell whether the solution adopted in this instance is to be considered ideal.

57. The Armed Forces of the United Nations

As far as I know, the original intention was to provide the U.N. with armed forces of its own. Up to now this project has probably not gone beyond the stage of nominating a commission for discussion of the matter. But it cannot be denied that the plan for U.N. armed forces is sound and that the organization of such forces is essential to the future vitality of the U.N. The position of the U.N. mediator in the Palestine conflict would have been easier if he had had at his disposal an up-to-date, well-equipped armed force. The U.N. armed forces can only become effective if they are subordinated to a United Nations Armed Forces High Command. But we probably have a long way to go before we come to that.

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