

The Army Reserve Components: Full Partners in National Defense

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Within the past two years, many thousands of words have been written and spoken about the Army reserve components, both publicly and privately, officially and unofficially. If a truly objective analysis could be made of all these utterances, I feel sure that two common denominators would become obvious: first, the reserve components are dynamic by nature and have always existed in a state of progressive evolution; second, the importance of the Army Reserve and National Guard as parts of a well-balanced defense force is greater than ever before.

In this century alone, more than a dozen formal actions have come out of the Congress affecting in some way the mission or structure of the reserve components. Numerous other changes have been made under existing laws and regulations.

Because of the inherent changeability and public interest evidenced in the growth of the reserve components, a historical look at the National Guard and Army Reserve is essential to an understanding of their role today.

Since the earliest colonial days, military forces from local communities have been instrumental in winning and defending American independence. The origins of the modern-day National Guard are found in the detachments of able-bodied young men who manned the defense perimeters of the early colonies. Fore-runners even of the militia, these were the men who stood watch over early settlements such as Jamestown, the Massachusetts Bay Colony, and Plymouth. This same spirit of the Minuteman was later embodied into the concept of the Army Reserve, where men, both in and out of units, stand ready to serve the Nation on call.

What is now known as the National Guard was initially the Organized Militia. The term "National Guard" was first associated with the militia in 1824 when the 2d Battalion, 11th New York Artillery (later the famous 7th Regiment), was selected to serve as guard of honor for the visiting Marquis de la Fayette. The New Yorkers promptly renamed their outfit the "National Guard" in deference to his "Garde Nationale," which he had organized in 1789 to

defend Paris during the French Revolution.

Of great importance to the military structure of the United States was the passage of the Dick Act of 1903 which set the stage for modernizing the Guard along the same lines as the Regular Army. The National Defense Act of 1916 officially bestowed the title "National Guard" upon the elements of the old Organized Militia and ordered the organization of the Guard to conform to that of the Army. This established the Guard firmly as a part of the Nation's organized peacetime establishment as well as an integral part of the Army of the United States when in active service.


The National Guard called up 159,000 men in 1916 for duty along the Mexican Border, and in World War I it furnished 17 divisions, 11 of which saw service with General Pershing in the American Expeditionary Forces.

In August 1940, President Roosevelt again called on the Guard. By the time World War II was over, some 300,000 men in 18 combat divisions, numerous non-divisional units, and 29 observation battalions had seen service. In one stroke, the National Guard was able to double the strength of the Regular Army.

During the period 1950-53, in what was generally called a "partial mobilization" for the Korean War, 183,000 members of the National Guard were called up. Eight infantry divisions, 22 air wings, and hundreds of other units came on active duty; from these, two infantry divisions were rushed to Korea and two others were used to bolster our forces in Europe.

In 1961, the call went out again. This time it was the Berlin crisis. Nearly 450 Army National Guard units of company and battalion size, a separate regiment, and two divisions, and numbering over 44,000 Guardsmen, quickly answered. In the words of President Kennedy, "they were to prevent a war, not to fight a war."

One of the distinguishing features of the National Guard, of course, is its dual status as both a federal and a state military force. When a Guard unit is called to active duty by a state governor, it is under his command and is paid by the state. When ordered to active duty by the President, it is on federal active duty



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and is paid from federal funds.

The state mission of the National Guard is to provide the governor with organized, trained, and equipped military manpower to protect life and property and to preserve peace, order, and public safety. In the 22 years since World War II, the National Guard has been used as a state militia at least 72 times, in 28 different states, to deal with various kinds of civil disorders. During this past summer alone, the Guard was employed by governors on 13 such occasions.

Fortunately there have been only two occasions during the past 45 years when a governor has requested and received the help of federal troops in quelling civil disorders.

This is as it should be, because as a nation we look upon military action in civil disturbance, as—in the words of Under Secretary of the Army David E. McGiffert—"a drastic last resort." We also believe that when military forces are required for the restoration of law and order they should, in so far as possible, be those of the National Guard.

Reliance on the National Guard in quelling civil disturbances places a great responsibility upon appropriate civilian and military leaders in each state for developing specific plans to cope with the problems involved in the event they occur.

Training plays a very important part in any preparation for possible civil disturbance operations. In this respect, the Department of the Army publishes general training programs to assist Guard units to discharge their state missions. In fact, the Department of the Army recently issued a prescribed training program for updating civil disturbance and riot control training for ARNG units. This training was conducted during August and September 1967. However, it is imperative that local leaders, operating within the general guidance, train their men and units to cope with problems peculiar to their specific areas.

Additionally, they must coordinate with all other interested agencies that may become involved in civil disturbance contingencies to insure mutual understanding of the common problem.

The Department of the Army recently established 23 April 1908 as the official "birthday" of the Army Reserve. On that date, Congress created the Medical Reserve Corps as a part of the Medical Department of the United States Army, thereby providing for a reservoir of trained officers in a reserve status. The officers commissioned in the Medical Reserve Corps were subsequently transferred to the Officers' Reserve Corps (ORC) created by the National Defense Act of 1916, the immediate ancestor of our reserve system in its present form. This Act also established an Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC). The ORC was open to civilians, principally those trained in the newly authorized Reserve Officers Training Corps, and to qualified professional men. The ERC was composed of men enlisted for four years in five branches: Engineer, Signal (including Aviation), Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Medical. It was designed to make immediately available in wartime a larger number of specialists than was required in

the peacetime active Army. The National Defense Act of 1920 created the post-World War I Organized Reserve Corps consisting of the old ORC and ERC.

Although the National Defense Act of 1916 came along a little too late to be effective in World War I, the Organized Reserve still made its mark. With our entry into the war in 1917 and the resulting hasty mobilization, the 7,957 Reserve officers on the rolls were sent to officer training camps, the World War I equivalent of OCS. There, depending on their abilities, they were classified either as students or instructors. These reservists trained 30,000 selected civilians in the first groups sent to the camps, from which some 27,000 officers were graduated—not only a good beginning but a promise of greater things to come.

Of the 82 divisions formed during World War II, 26 were mobilized from the Organized Reserve Corps, bringing on active duty more than 120,000 of its officers and enlisted men. Again, in the Korean War, 969 units with 38,000 men, plus approximately 200,000 individual members of the Army Reserve, were called to active duty. In 1961, 69,000 Army reservists and 190 units—including a training division—were mobilized for the Berlin crisis. In Vietnam today, approximately 61 per cent of all officers on duty are Army Reservists.

Early in August 1965, the Secretary of Defense told Congress that a build-up of the Army and its reserve components was necessary "to offset the deployment now planned to Southeast Asia and to provide some additional new forces for possible new deployments . . . and be prepared to deal with crises elsewhere in the world." In response to this requirement, the Department of the Army established the Selected Reserve Force (SRF) of Army National Guard and Army Reserve units. This priority force is required as a part of the Army's strategic reserve to insure national defense readiness; it was especially needed during the active Army build-up phase. Its objective is to greatly increase the operational readiness of a select number of units with a resulting decrease in the post-mobilization training time required before combat missions could be undertaken.

The tremendous task of creating the SRF began in November 1965 and was completed by the end of December 1965. Every state made a significant contribution, either in terms of troops and units or equipment furnished to SRF units. This resultant force, composed of three infantry divisions, six separate brigades, an armored cavalry regiment and many other combat, combat support and combat service support units, became the most ready reserve component force in the Nation's history. The three selected Army National Guard infantry divisions were provided by nine states, using the division base and one infantry brigade from each of the three Immediate Reserve Army National Guard divisions, and supplying the remaining six brigades from six Army National Guard Reinforcing Reserve divisions.

As a readiness objective the SRF units are to be able to respond to a seven-day mobilization alert, and to initiate advanced unit training upon arrival at a mobili-

zation station. This objective, set for 30 June 1966, was met in many cases several weeks early, and in all but a few cases by that date.

The current SRF has a strength of 150,000 in 976 units. Of this total strength, 96,300 are in combat and combat support units, and 53,700 in combat service support units. The Army National Guard contributed 744 units with a full TOE strength of approximately 118,900. These included all of the combat and combat support units and 22,400 officers and men of the 53,700 assigned to combat service support units. The Army Reserve contributed 232 combat service support units, with a strength of 31,100.

As the result of experience gained since its initial organization the structure is presently being remolded in order to achieve a more balanced force. A force structure equivalent to three divisions, stressing the proper balance between combat, combat support, and combat service support units is the objective, eliminating units that have since become obsolete to our structure or excess to our current requirements. This planning for restructuring and the other needed actions that will result in better manned, trained, and equipped units is now under way.

The actual reorganization will be on a phased basis, in two increments, in order that we will maintain a capability during the transition. Then, by melding these two parts together during the period 1 January to 30 June 1968, we will form an SRF better suited to our needs and more capable of deployment if needed. However, I do not want to leave the impression that our current SRF is not a capable force or that it has not served its purpose well. As in all areas, we must continually improve and refine. The restructured SRF will be a product of our experience.

This much is already certain: the Selected Reserve Force has attained the highest state of readiness of any reserve component force not on active duty in the history of American arms.

Most of the discussion and controversy concerning the reserve components has evolved around recent proposals to "realign" or "reorganize" both elements—seeking more responsiveness to contingency needs and increased readiness. "The Army reserve components are out of balance," Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor recently told a Senate subcommittee, "as between manpower, equipment, and the requirements of current contingency plans. This was true two years ago when we discussed a different reorganization plan with the Congress. It remains true today."

The imbalance Secretary Resor mentioned was created by the more than a thousand undermanned and poorly equipped units in the reserve components structure which had no assigned missions, while, at the same time, there was a need for almost a thousand units which we did not have.

The Congress frowned on proposals made in 1965, and again in 1966, to reorganize the Guard and Army Reserve, and included language in the fiscal 1966 and 1967 Appropriations Acts which required the Guard and USAR to be maintained at specified minimum

strengths as currently structured.

As a result of these objections, the Joint Chiefs of Staff restudied the problem in their annual review of our military forces and submitted new recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Based on these recommendations the Army staff developed a detailed plan, later submitted to the Congress, to reorganize the reserve components during fiscal 1968 into eight divisions, 18 brigades and supporting forces, with a total paid drill strength of 640,000. The plan allocated to the Guard all combat units, all combat support units, those combat service support units required for maintaining them, and such other units as are required to create a total force adequate to meet state needs. The USAR was allocated all mobilization and training base units and most of the combat service support units. It was considered that this distribution of units would provide the governors with the most suitable units for maintaining law and order and would create a functional distinction between the Guard and the USAR, thus establishing a basis for more rational administration.

The plan was built around these principles:

- Alignment with JCS-stated strategic requirements.
- Elimination of the "merger"; paid drill units would continue in both the ARNG and the USAR.
- Units within the proposed structure would be manned at an average of 92 per cent of full wartime strength, as contrasted with the present average manning of 75 per cent (50 per cent within Reinforcing Reserve units).
- Adequate and appropriate units would be allocated to the National Guard to fulfill the requirements of the several states of maintaining law and order and for coping with natural disasters. To that end, it was considered necessary to allocate to the Guard all eight divisions and 18 brigades and a total paid drill strength of 400,000.
- Units in the new structure would be located geographically and in relation to population so that in the event of selective mobilization, the burden of mobilization would be shared equitably among states and populations.
- The organization of units in the new structure would conform to modifications made in the active Army tables of organization in recent years, including realignment of technical service units in conformance with the functional service support concept (COSTAR, or combat support of the Army).

During the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on this plan, the chairman, Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia, said he thought some combat and combat support structure should be maintained in both the National Guard and the Army Reserve. When other members of Congress voiced the same thought, Secretary Resor submitted an Army staff compromise which included these paragraphs:

"... the Chief of Staff and I have subjected the Army Plan to further analysis. While we continue to believe that it is the best plan to meet Department of the Army objectives, altering it so that combat and

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support units would remain in the USAR is feasible. This alteration could be accomplished by adopting a reorganization which we have characterized as the Three Brigade Plan, so called because the USAR would have three brigades rather than none as in the Army Plan.

"Under the Three Brigade Plan the USAR paid drill strength is increased from 240,000 to 260,000 and the paid drill strength of the National Guard would be 400,000. The total structure provided in the Army Plan is retained. The number of combat maneuver battalions is the same as in the force structure recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The proportion of combat, combat support and service support within each component would be approximately the same as exists today. . . .

"The Three Brigade Plan accommodates the major objections which have been raised to our original proposal. It provides the USAR with approximately 41,000 paid drill strength in combat and combat support units and a total paid drill strength of 260,000. The National Guard would have 8 divisions and 18 brigades. We have eliminated all cases of activating in one component a unit comparable to one inactivated in the other component. This maximizes the use of existing assets in both components. It minimizes organizational turbulence. At the same time, our basic reorganization objectives are met."

I believe—and I so testified in August to a special subcommittee of the House of Representatives—that the National Guard of each state is today adequate in personnel strength and unit composition to respond to state emergencies except in extraordinary circumstances. The envisioned reserve components reorganization will increase the capability of the National Guard to perform its state as well as its federal mission.

As concluding thoughts, I would like to consider two questions that are today both common and persistent. First, what has happened to the One-Army concept? Second, if the reserve components are so necessary, why have they not been used in South Vietnam? For answers I will refer in turn to statements by our Chief of Staff, General Johnson, and Mr. Cyrus Vance, who until recently was Deputy Secretary of Defense.

In an address last year to the Mississippi National Guard Association, General Johnson said: "A few years ago Secretary of the Army Brucker and General Bruce Clarke came up with the expression 'The One-Army Concept.' This can mean various things to various people. To me it means a cohesive, responsive defense posture embracing both active and reserve forces. To me it does not mean an intermingling of active and inactive units dependent upon one another, to such an extent that neither can carry out a mission independently. Standards of readiness will vary within each force and between the forces. Standards of readiness are scaled to conform to the times that forces are required and can be accommodated in the area of conflict—which, in turn—determines the deployment time. But the relationship and balance were never

static, are not now static, and are not going to be static in the future. In my opinion this dynamic relationship, changing with the times to produce a cohesive operational capability consistent with our security requirements, describes the partnership between active and inactive forces and is aptly expressed by the term 'One Army'."

In a 1967 memorandum discussing the importance of the reserve components to national security, the then Deputy Secretary Vance wrote: "I have been keenly aware for several years of the vital part played by the Nation's Reserve Forces in our national security. Now that large segments of our active forces are deployed overseas, the Reserve Forces serve a vitally important role in national defense. They shall always be needed as an integral part of our military posture. Despite the fact that we have deployed nearly a half million men of our active forces to Southeast Asia, our capability for meeting treaty commitments and reacting to other contingencies elsewhere in the world has not been diminished. This is primarily because we have retained our Reserve Forces as a ready force in being and have increased their strength and readiness to respond promptly when and where needed."

The thought I would leave is this: the issues today are clearly not those involving the status of the reserve components or the necessity of these forces. They are now, as before, full partners of the active forces; they are absolutely vital to the defense posture of our Nation. The challenges to our Nation's security have never been greater, nor have our responsibilities as a world power been heavier. The real issue is one of arriving at the proper structure.

In arriving at this structure, difficult personal adjustments may, in some cases, result from the necessary changes. The leaders of the active Army are sympathetically aware of this impact. As much as possible will be done to continue all units with proud traditions and strong regional, state, and local ties. But, in the overall national interest, the demands of realignment require adding many new units while discontinuing others that have served the nation well.

The trend is toward making the reserve components units combat ready forces, prepared to respond to contingencies as needed rather than forming a mobilization base. This concept, of course, demands that manning and equipment levels for all reserve components be at least equal to those of the Selected Reserve Force today. It also visualizes serviceable and deployable equipment in the hands of the units—with an adequate back-up of repair parts in the unit loads. The threat to the security of our Nation is such that the Army will require deployability of its reserve components in terms of weeks rather than months.

The National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the active Army have always responded to necessary change which has evolved throughout their action-packed histories. There is no reason to believe that the response of this "One Army" team in meeting its responsibilities to state and nation will be any different today.