

Reserve Readiness
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Introduction

The role of the Reserve Components (RC) is to support the Active Component in times of war and national emergencies. They do this by supplying the Active Component with trained, well-equipped units and soldiers (CALL 92-2). Reserve Component readiness has always been a problem during times of war. Some believe that is why President Lyndon B. Johnson did not call-up the Reserve Components during Vietnam. Tough the Reserve Components are much improved from the Vietnam Era, a look at the lessons learned from Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield reveals something shocking about their readiness. Although, 140, 000 Reserve Component Soldiers were call-up and 74, 000 deployed to the Gulf (GAO/NSIAD-92-67). The Reserve Components have many of the same deficiencies today for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. This section will look at one of the deficiencies personnel its effect on overall operational readiness for combat operations. The Reserve Component's operational readiness for combat operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom has shown no improvement from its operational readiness for Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. The delayed deployment of the 81st Enhanced Separate Brigade from the Washington State National is one example of the lack of operational readiness by the Reserve Components.

Reserve Personnel

A Center for Army Lesson Learned Newsletter form February of 1992 cited one personnel deficiency as "Failure to Screen Records before Call-up." Reserve Component soldiers mobilized without a proper screening of their personnel records. As a result, soldiers called up who were non-deployable or did not meet the Army's accession standard. The Army discharged these soldiers shortly after they arrived at the Mobilization Station (Mobilization Station). This cost the Army thousands of dollars in travel and active duty pay, plus allowances and

administrative cost. This also caused a decrease in personnel readiness (P-level) for many Reserve Component units who initially reported to the Mobilization Station undermanned. This happened again for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Reserve Component units reported to the Mobilization Station undermanned and their personnel readiness decreased while there because of the non-deployable Soldiers they carried on their unit manning report (UMR) and carried to the Mobilization Station. Once again, either the Army sent the Soldiers home at a cost of thousands of dollars per Soldier or the Mobilization Station or the Garrison Support Units (GSU) at the Mobilization Stations retained non-deployable Soldiers to perform administrative and support duties. Many of the GSUs assigned to support the mobilization missions reported to their assigned installations under staffed. The Army did not learn, "Personnel who are not fully qualified for active duty in peacetime should not be counted on as mobilization assets (CALL No.92-2)."

To make up for the shortages caused by so many Reserve Component units reporting to the Mobilization Station undermanned, the Army had to cross-level Soldiers with the required Military Occupations Specialties (MOS) out of like units not yet slated for deployment into units at the Mobilization Station who needed to fill vacancies in their UMR so they could validate and deploy to the Area of Responsibility (AOR). This action, "robbing Peter to pay Paul," caused a decrease in the readiness of units needed to backfill-deployed units.

Reserve Readiness Desert Shield/ Storm

The US Army Reserves was not ready for deployment to Desert Shield/Storm. The Reserve Components bear a lot of the blame for their lack of personnel readiness but they should not bear all the blame. This problem was not new to the Army nor was it corrected after

Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. A 1992 GAO report noted the following about the Army's ability to provide adequate support forces:

The Army lacked the specific plans for correcting personnel and equipment shortages under a limited call-up and had to resort extensively to transfer resources among units. This degraded the capability of units that might have been needed later. Despite these transfers, it could not rectify deficiencies and sent support at a lower standard of readiness than combat units.

A 1992 GAO report cited "Unreliable data on unit readiness," as a problem during the Desert Shield and Desert Storm call-up of the Reserve Components. It further stated, "Unit status reports obscured the true readiness levels of individual units and made it more difficult to identify the readiest ones." It has been my experience in working with Reserve Component Unit Status Reports (USR) that almost every soldier is counted as a mobilization asset whether they actually are or not. Reserve Components tend to overestimate their deployable strength to make the unit look better on paper than it actually is. Some units do not understand that USR numbers make their way all the way up to the war planners at the Pentagon. These numbers are used by war planners to determine which units are available and ready for mobilization. Only when mobilization occurs is the unit exposed.

Such was the case with the 81st Enhanced Separate Brigade of the Washington State National Guard. Prior to mobilization the 81st ESB reported they were at 100 percent strength with personnel. When activated for mobilization their personnel strength suddenly decreased into the low 80s. Then during post mobilization another 10 percent were non-deployable for a myriad of reasons e.g. medical and dental (Hackworth). If a unit cannot muster the required troop strength

as required by their Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) how can they provide the Army with an effective and operational unit for combat operations.

To fix the personnel readiness issue in the Reserve Components. The Army should deactivate units that have a history of poor personnel readiness and transfer their Soldiers into other units to strengthen their personnel readiness. Many of these units are located in small towns where the population cannot support the troop strength required for the unit so the unit has to recruit Soldiers who travel from larger towns to attend drill or set up detachments in larger towns or population centers to increase their personnel readiness.

Allow units to go to 120% of assigned strength. This will benefit the unit when it mobilized and reports to Mobilization Station in that they now have an increased personnel readiness and are more likely to deploy at 100% of assigned strength. If after Mobilization Station validation, the unit assigned strength exceeds 100%, the Mobilization Station can transfer all excess Soldiers to like units at the Mobilization Station requiring additional personnel.

Reserve Strength Prior to 1989

Throughout America's history, military numbers increased during time of conflict and quickly reduced shortly there after. Following Vietnam, the urge to repeat this process was resisted. Although America was not engaged in a direct conflict, we were involved in an armed standoff with Communist Russia. What became known throughout the world as the "Cold war" was an arms race, which would not allow America to return to her pre-Vietnam posture. During the 1980's, under then President Ronald Reagan, the military showed an increase in size. "Between the Fiscal years of 1980 and 1984, the strength of the selected reserve for all military services increased by 177,200 or twenty percent...4.8 percent for the active component" (Duncan 149).

It was during this period that the American military power got its act together. After sending the Russian economy back to the stone age, in an arms race in which she could not compete, the Cold War of the 80s had ended. With this threat gone, or at least perceived by many as gone, America was ready to return to her post Korean War numbers. Although many wanted to slow the process down, economic pressures were great and in 1987, the planning process had begun.

During the summer of 1987, as plans were being laid for the reduction in military ranks, responsibilities traditionally held by the active force were transferred to the reserve component. As the active component prepared itself for a "Draw-Down", a crazed dictator by the name of Saddam Hussein challenged security throughout the southwest Asian region. Military leaders assessed the situation and determined that a build up not down was the better course of action. So, in August of 1989, the build down was placed on hold and America started to gear up for what was to become the largest mobilization since W.W.II. The role of the reservist during Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm will be discussed a little later on.

The arrival of Army Reserve support personnel in theater during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm had an immediate impact, especially on the army ground forces. The reason for this was because as a result of years earlier to increase the number of forward deployed active component combat units, especially in Europe, a high percentage of support units came from the reserves. Over two-thirds of the army's combined combat support and combat service support belonged to the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. Therefore, the arrival of each reserve soldier was felt. One-hundred and Fifty-seven army reserve units participated in the operation (VII Corps publications 17). Two of the most memorable units were the 14th

Quartermaster Detachment from Greensburg, Pennsylvania, and the 352nd Civil Affairs Command, from Fort Meade, Maryland (Duncan 106, Scales 378-379).

After a month of training in Virginia, the 14th Quartermaster Detachment deployed to Saudi Arabia, its mission was water purification. When they arrived, they were housed in a metal warehouse in the Dhahran suburb of Al Khobar. At about eight thirty on the evening of 25 February 1991 after only being in country for less than a week, an Iraqi Scud missile hit their barracks. The reservists had no warning. Thirteen of the sixty-nine members of the unit, including a young female soldier who joined the Army Reserve to save money for college, were killed. The unit's casualty rate was seventy-five percent. Fifteen other army reservists who had been sharing the barracks were also killed, and ninety-eight soldiers were wounded. The twenty-eight fatalities would be recorded as the largest number of casualties from one single enemy attack during Operation Desert Storm (Duncan 108). The 352nd Civil Affairs Commands accomplishments came at the end of the war by helping to restore civil government in Kuwait, so that active Army components could return home (Scales 378-379). The performance of these two units was a testimony to former Chief of Staff of the Army General Abrams' commitment made 18 years before to a fully integrated force of Active and Reserve forces. By war's end, more than 70 percent of all theater combat service support was provided by reserve forces (Scales 378-379). The leaders of the US Military knew something could happen like this but from the mindset of the reservists who had just arrived in country, many thoughts were now changed.

On 25 August 1991, ninety-six percent of all reservists and national guardsmen who had been activated for the operation had been released. Only 1,315 reserve component forces, most of whom were army reservists, remained in the Gulf area. On 19 November 1991, the Army Reserve's 118th Transportation Terminal Unit-the last reserve unit to remain on active duty other

than those that volunteered to do so—returned to its base in Mobile, Alabama. America's citizen warriors were home (Duncan 382).

New Structure Design Enhances Readiness

Restructuring has allowed the Army Reserve to reshape itself and to adjust to the changes made in active forces. America's Army Reserve is quite proud of the fact that 93% of its forces are relevant to the tactical and operational requirements of the Army. The remaining 7% perform critical training missions that better enable soldiers to be full players and partners in the nation's defense.

Approximately 30% of the Army Reserve units are required to be supplied and trained at a Condition-2 or better level of fill. These units must be capable of response within 14 to 31 days in order to meet wartime obligations. Another 59% of Army Reserve units are required to be resourced or supplied at a Condition-3 level of fill. These units include regional training sites, area maintenance support activities, equipment concentration sites and the remaining units on the Army master priority sequence.

These requirements are a clear indication of the dramatic change in the role of the Army Reserve. Just as importantly, they are also a clear indication of the Army Reserve's place on the Army's first team and of its increased importance to the nation's defense.

Simply stated, America's Army Reserve is a defense bargain and a national asset. The ability to make improvements in the face of personnel and organizational turbulence is due to prioritization, well managed resources and the dedication of thousands of citizen-soldiers. Army Reserve training are rigorous, innovative and technologically advanced. The Army Reserve is a full partner in America's Army: trained and ready for the 21st Century.

Demobilization and Build-down

Following America's 100 Hour victory (defeating Saddam's Republican Guards), America wasted no time in resuming its business in restructuring the force. As the talks between the U.S. led coalition and Iraq on the terms of a permanent cease-fire continued, pressure began to build at home for the rapid return of reservists from the gulf. The lack of understanding the critical role the reservists played in sustaining and redeploying the force, resulted in frustration amongst families, employers, and even members of congress. A feeling that the same amount of urgency placed on mobilization should be placed on demobilization. In fact, rushing this process was one of the concerns, "the American propensity for running, never walking, through demobilization" (Observer Times) that held merit. Policy makers soon found out that the same efforts put into mobilization of the reservists would be necessary during the demobilization and transition back to civilian life. Many lessons were learned from our experience during the Gulf war, lessons that will make us even more effective next time.

Upon completion of our demobilization, the Army once again resumed with restructuring the force. As the army structure began to decline, personnel strength in all categories were reduced using a timetable established in the 1987 planning stage. The desired end strength was originally set for a 495,000 active force and 208,000 for the army reserve force. This base figure did not include the Army National Guard.

Over the next few years, well into the build down, the Army's active and reserve forces were reduced to the following strengths.

	<u>Active Duty</u>	<u>Reserve Component</u>
FY94	541,300	259,900
FY95	508,600	241,300
FY96	491,103	226,200

With the decrease in personnel by one third or more since the Cold War, the United States remained stronger than any other country. The build down, or as some put it the reorientation away from those capabilities needed to meet the Soviet threat, has not diminished our ability to deploy and fight (Strategic Assessment 1997).

As the military worked to achieve these goals, the cold war and the Gulf War seem to become a distant memory. The army, in an attempt to maintain as many “teeth” (war fighting units) on active duty, shifted many of the “tail” (support) responsibilities to the reserve. In 1994, the Strategic Studies Institutes reported the 1996 projected strengths of the total force package (all components) by percentages as follows; of the total package 53 percent will be either Army National Guard or Army Reserve, the remaining 47 percent will be active duty.

To further break this down, of the combat structure (Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Air Defense, Combat Engineers, SOF, and Aviation) for percentages of active duty, 48 percent. The Army Guard has 48 percent and the reserves a staggering 4 percent. In combat support and combat service support (signal, intelligence, chemical, military police, civil affairs, engineers, Psyops) active duty will consist of 35 percent, Army Guard 29 percent, and reserves 36 percent.

Although the combat arms arena continues to be active duty dominate, one can see the reliance on reserve capabilities in the service support arena. Doctrinally, the nine to one tooth-to-tail ratios can only be met utilizing the reserve component. With the shift of responsibilities in critical career fields such as medical, logistics, transportation, and civil affairs; the reserve component has become a necessity for combat operations. It was believed by many, and equally argued, that at the reduced strength whether America’s armed forces would be able to remain a global power - capable of fighting two major regional contingencies (MRC), simultaneously. By

1997, military leaders working with congress to have better define our National Military Strategy, redefined the requirements for global power as “Capable of fighting two nearly simultaneous MRCs” (National Military Strategy).

The force structure projected in the 1997 Bottom-up Review (BUR) is predicated on the requirement to achieve decisive victory in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. To achieve this capability in the face of major budget reductions, the BUR rejected a traditional proportional reduction strategy and recommended higher force levels for the Guard and Reserve, than had been programmed in the base force plan. As a result, the reserve components are counted upon to provide compensating leverage to off set the risks of a smaller active duty force (Annual Report to the president and congress, 1997).

During the Cold War Era the Reserve components were viewed as the back up force, now attitudes are changing. This move has impacted positively on the active forces, while greatly enhancing the effectiveness of the total force. Although, many feel that the Reserves were not ready, some signs show that they were better prepared than most thought.

Reserve force strength as reported in the Army budget analysis for the fiscal year 1998 places the total Active duty (Army) at 495,000. Total reserve and guard component at 575,000. Total Force Package 1, 070,000. Reserve and guard components made over half of the fighting force.

Reserve Readiness Bosnia/Kosovo

The Army realized during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm that the reserve forces were not ready to deploy to war. After the war was over, the Army looked at ways to correct this problem. After extensive research, the Army developed the training support battalion (TSB). Despite the active duty army’s dedication to the TSB program, the reserve component

units are no more ready to deploy today than they were during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Army saw this in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the global war on terrorism.

There are several reasons for the readiness problems that the reserve component faces. In 1993, the Rand Arroyo Center for Army Research set out to find the underlying causes of these problems. The first problem they found was the fact that during FY 1993, 17% of the Army Reserve soldiers changed their military occupational specialty (MOS). By the end of the year, only one-third of these soldiers were duty military occupational specialty qualified (DMOSQ).

The second problem the researchers uncovered was that thirteen percent of the reserve forces were still waiting to receive their initial military training. Despite the fact that these individuals had not yet attended basic training, the reserve units counted them on their readiness reports as members of the unit.

The final personnel problem that the researchers discovered was the fact that during the same year period, 20 percent of the personnel left the reserve component altogether. This further reduced the readiness of these units and created additional new training requirements. The bottom line of this research shows that the average reserve component unit has only 89 percent of their authorized numbers. Only 63 percent of the unit's soldiers are fully MOSQ.

(RB/RB3017)

Being short on deployable personnel is not the only problem the reserve forces face. Once the Army notifies a unit that they are deploying, the unit higher headquarters transfers deployable soldiers to the deploying unit. The unit will deploy with 100 percent of their required personnel. Even with 100 percent manning, these units have not been prepared to deploy when called upon. Bosnia was the first time since Desert Storm, that the Army used reserve forces for major operations. After 4 years of only regular army units rotating through Bosnia, the Army

announced that Army National Guard divisions would command Stabilization Force rotations to Bosnia.

The first unit to perform this mission would be the Texas 49th Armored Division. It took 49th Armored Division 108 days of training, including a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Ft. Polk, Louisiana, before they were ready to assume the mission. (Defense link/Feb 2000) In a normal year, a reserve component unit has 38 days to train. The training they conduct during these 38 days is supposed to keep them prepared to deploy if called upon. This means that the unit took the equivalent of 2.8 years of training time to prepare for their Bosnia deployment.

The next several paragraphs are personal observations of MSG Neil Hamilton, currently assigned to the United States Sergeants Major Academy. During my 8 months in the Balkans, I saw first hand the problems that the reserve component units had. My first month in the Balkans I was responsible for the security and force protection of the processing station in Croatia. We were only supposed to be here for 1 month. A National Guard unit was supposed to have that mission but failed their certification at the Joint Readiness Training Center. My platoon ended up taking the first month of their mission while they retrained and re-certified. Upon the unit's arrival, they were still not ready to assume mission. I ended up spending an additional 2 weeks in Croatia training them to standard before continuing to Bosnia for the remainder of my tour.

Another National Guard unit was responsible for replacing us at Guardian Base, Bosnia when our tour was complete. Once again, this unit showed up unprepared to assume mission. Luckily, they deployed 3 weeks prior to our scheduled departure date. This allowed our unit the time to properly train them on the required tasks without having to spend additional time deployed.

These problems should not have been a surprise to anyone. In 1995, congress requested that the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) review the Army National Guard's combat brigades' war-readiness. (GAO/NSIAD-95-91) The GAO found that in general, none of the 7 enhanced brigades achieved the training proficiency required during the first 3 years of the Bold Shift training strategy. In 1993, combat platoons mastered only 14 percent of their mission-essential tasks and less than one-third of the battalions met their gunnery goals. The brigades could not meet staffing and personnel goals since many personnel were not receive sufficient training in their individual job and leadership skills. The brigades training problems are long-standing and will be difficult to improve. Although training strategy revisions are underway, the improvements will take years to be effective. The bottom line of this report was that it is highly uncertain whether the brigades could be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization since the Guard's peacetime training is inadequate. The GAO estimated that these brigades would need up to 154 days of post-mobilization training before deployment. It also estimated that the best-trained brigades in the National Guard would require 102 days to be ready to deploy.

These problems were still prevalent during the Kosovo campaign. When the Army alerted 1st Armored Division to deploy to Albania, my Avenger platoon was on the first 4 planes in to provide air and ground defense for Tirana International Airport when we took it over. A second platoon of Avengers followed a week later. After 5 months in Albania, the Army transitioned into Kosovo.

The third platoon from my battery went into Kosovo with the first element of 1st Armored Division for a 6-month rotation. Upon the completion of their 6 months, the 4th and final Avenger platoon in our battalion took over the mission. After these next 6 months were up, my platoon was re-deployed, this time to Kosovo. For 2 years, my Battalion provided support for

every air defense requirement in theatre. We tried to find out why our unit was the only one performing this mission. After sending the request up the chain of command, Division told us that a National Guard Avenger unit was supposed to replace us but they were not ready to deploy on time.

Reserve Readiness Global War on Terrorism

After 11 September, the Department of Defense notified the air defense branch that it had a new mission. We were responsible for providing ground based air defense for the national capital region. We were to provide this with avenger and stinger weapon systems strategically positioned throughout the D.C. area. The Avenger Battalion of 1st Cavalry Division performed this first rotation of this mission. The Department of the Army decided to make this a National Guard mission. They notified the Mississippi National Guard that they would be replacing the 1st Cavalry unit after their year was up. With a whole year to prepare, the unit was not ready to assume mission when the time arose. Since I was working at the 1-362nd TSB during that time, the Army sent my unit to Mississippi to retrain this unit even though it was not in our area of responsibility. The Army then notified the next 3 National Guard units that were assuming the mission. The next unit would be from the Florida National Guard, followed by New Mexico and Georgia. Both the Florida and the New Mexico units failed their initial certification and required retraining prior to assuming the mission. The Georgia unit has just started the certification phase in 2005.

Fifteen years ago, the Army identified a problem with the reserve forces and their ability to deploy when called upon. These problems come down to both personnel and training. Despite the fact that the Army has identified the problems and incorporated active duty training support battalions to fix this problem, it still exists. The problem still existed in Bosnia, Kosovo and

numerous homeland defense missions since 11 September. This problem still exists today and does not look like it will go away any time soon.

Reserves Were Ready Desert Storm

The reserve component has met and exceeded the requirement of an effective combat force during Operation Desert Storm. About 140,000 of the 200,000 reservists called up for the Gulf War were from the Army reserve components. The Gulf War was the first major test of the Total Force policy.

The need for the combat units in the reserve components was few; however, the support units deployed extensively. According to a study by the Institute for Defense Analyses for DOD's Commission on Roles and Missions, many reserve components combat service and combat service support units that deployed for the war performed to standard with little post mobilization training. For example, the Marine Corps called up and deployed more of its Reserve combat units than the other military services, and the units carried out their missions successfully. The Air Force deployed few of its reserve component combat forces, but the forces that deployed demonstrated that they could perform in a war, if needed.

The Army did not deploy National Guard combat brigades that were associated with active divisions because those divisions needed extensive post mobilization training. Following the invasion of Kuwait, the services began preparing for action in Southwest Asia without knowing when or whether they would be able to call up the guard and reserve. As a result, they relied on active-duty forces and volunteers from the reserve components in developing their early responses, while laying plans to use the reserve components whenever they became available.

On August 22, 1990, the President invoked section 673b of Title 10 of the United States Code, stating, "It is necessary to augment the active armed forces of the United States for an effective conduct of operational missions in and around the Arabian Peninsula." This permitted calling to active duty as many as 200,000 selected reservists. However, the authority that Secretary Cheney gave to the services on August 23, 1990 was for 48,800 not 200,000 and it had a number of restrictions. It allocated 14,500 for the Air Force, 3,000 for the Marine Corps, 6,300 for the Navy, 25,000 for the Army; specifically excluding combat troops Active-duty service was limited to a total of 180 days.

Access to individual replacements vital to filling critical skills in mobilizing units was limited to volunteers because section 673b permits no access to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR remained unavailable until January 17, 1991, when Operation Desert Storm began. These initial call-up limits reflected the caution of the President and his advisers about tapping the reserve components, particularly combat units.

The specific units called up to deployed reflected General Schwarzkopf's priorities for Southwest Asia. Those priorities were more airlift and sealift to move the people and the equipment to Southwest Asia (available from Air Force guard and reserve units supporting MAC and SAC, and from Army and Navy port support units). More support for the combat forces; for example, truck transportation, water purification, postal, military police and medical services (available from the Army guard and reserve units providing combat service support and from Navy medical services units).

Reserves Were Ready Kosovo

Nearly 2,200 Army reservists and 1,000 guardsmen are supporting the Bosnian peacekeeping mission. About the same number are poised to replace the reservists who are

rotating home. Air Force reserve component participation, which peaked at 421 in March, had dropped to about 160 by mid-June.

In coping with an increasingly demanding security environment, the role of our Reserve Components has grown markedly as the active force has drawn down. In virtually every domestic and overseas mission, from disaster relief in the continental US to humanitarian assistance in Central America to ongoing operations in Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo, our Reservists and National Guardsmen have performed magnificently in important and, in many cases, indispensable roles.

Since the beginning of operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, more than 19,000 Reserve Component personnel have been activated for duty in the Balkans. Another 5600 were activated for NATO's Operation ALLIED FORCE against Milosevic's forces under the authority of a Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC). Almost 10,000 Reservists and National Guardsmen have served throughout Southwest Asia since the end of the Gulf War.

Effective integration and utilization of the men and women in our Reserve Component will continue to be key elements of Joint Personnel Readiness and are critical to the success of the Total Force. Often the capabilities they provide -- such as civil affairs, psychological operations, and civil support -- are found predominantly in the Reserve Components. We have made a number of steps in creating a true Total Force, and I am enthusiastic about the opportunities inherent in the "Chairman's Ten" -- the Reserve Flag and General officers provided by the Congress for assignment to the CINCs. This program will allow us to tap the tremendous skill and expertise in our Reserve and Guard officers, and aid the CINCs in the full range of their responsibilities. The first assignment -- Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support -- has already been made. We will have the rest in place by the end of this calendar year, including

such key positions as Deputy Director for Operations, Plans, and Policy at SOCOM, Chief of Staff to TRANSCOM, and the Director for Logistics for STRATCOM.

Clearly, the wide range of contributions by the Reserve Components continues to be a bright spot as we strive to match available resources to a demanding mission load. Their service also demonstrates the enduring value and relevance of the citizen-soldier. We will continue to look for innovative ways to capitalize upon the strengths of our Reserve Components, our trump card for maintaining high readiness levels in these challenging times.

Even in confronting the Smaller-Scale Contingencies that followed in the 1990s- including Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Southwest Asia no-fly zones-DOD officials realized that Presidential reserve call-ups would be essential. Not only did active duty forces stressed by a high operation tempo need to share some of their burden, but also some of the skills most critical to peacekeeping operations in particular turned out to be reserve specialties.

Reserve component personnel have been involved in virtually every contingency operation since the Gulf War. For example, over 1,300 Army Reserve and National Guard personnel were activated for Uphold Democracy in Haiti to replace individuals deployed from home stations, provide transportation and logistics, and bolster special operations capabilities such as civil affairs. The Air Force relied on reserve component volunteers to provide airlift, aerial refueling, and operational relief of fighter squadrons for Provide Promise and Deny Flight in Bosnia and Provide Comfort in Iraq. Marine Corps reservists provided security for refugee camps at Guantanamo Bay, and Naval reservists participated in Caribbean operations to intercept refugee vessels. Thousands of reservists have participated in recent peace operations. For example, the President, using his Selected Reserve Call up authority, authorized the activation of up to 4,300 reservists to support operations in Bosnia. As of February 22, 1996, 3,475 reservists

had been mobilized, and according to DOD Reserve Affairs officials, the first reserve rotation is in place. Additionally, about 960 volunteers have been deployed. Our recent work on the use of volunteers has shown that they have had the necessary skills and qualifications to perform their jobs and have performed well.

In December 1995, the president authorized the call-up of Reserve Component forces as part of America's support to the NATO peacekeeping forces in the Bosnia-Herzegovina area. Within a short period of time the Army Reserve provided civil affairs, postal, medical, engineer, transportation, psychological operations and firefighting units, the first arriving in Bosnia in mid-January 1996. The initial manpower ceiling from the Reserve Component was 3,888, with soldiers activated for up to 270 days. In May 1996, the ceiling increased to 7,000 to allow overlap of deploying and redeploying units and individual soldiers. The majority of Army Reservists ordered to active duty served as backfill for active Army soldiers in Germany, but substantial numbers pulled duty in Bosnia and Hungary.

Today, the Army Reserve has almost 40 percent of the Army's combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. With over 92 percent of those units assigned a role under Army regional operational plans, the USAR is positioned to support almost any type of mission worldwide.

Reserves Were Ready OIF

The mission of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA), as stated in Title 10 USC, is the overall supervision of all Reserve components' affairs in the Department of Defense. He take this responsibility very seriously because our Guard and Reserve perform vital national security functions at home and around the world, and are closely interlocked with the states, cities, towns, and communities in America.

Full Partners in the Total Force

Because the Reserve components (RC) now comprise 46% of the Total Force, they are an essential partner in military operations ranging from Homeland Defense and the Global War on Terrorism to peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, small-scale contingencies and major crises. Significantly, this is only 8.3% of the overall DOD budget, which represents a great return on investment. Included are funding increases to support full-time and part-time personnel, and the required sustainment of operations. It also continues last year's effort toward RC equipment modernization and interoperability in support of the Total Force policy. These fiscal year 2005 funds support 870,900 Selected Reserve personnel. The Selected Reserve consists of the following: Army National Guard 350,000; Army Reserve 205,000; Naval Reserve 83,400; Marine Corps Reserve 39,600; Air National Guard 106,800; and Air Force Reserve 76,100; Coast Guard Reserve 10, 000 (funded by the Department of Homeland Security). Our total Ready Reserve, which also includes the Coast Guard Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard, is approximately 1.2 million personnel.

Mobilization and the Global War on Terrorism

Today, we are in the midst of one of the longest periods of mobilization in our history. However, one certainty remains - that when called upon, the men and women of the National Guard and Reserve will respond promptly and performs their duty. From September 11, 2001, through December 31, 2003, we had mobilized 319,193 Reserve component personnel in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The military are managing these call-ups in a prudent and judicious manner, assuring fair and equitable treatment as we continue to rely on these citizen-soldiers.

As of December 31, 2003, 181,459 Reserve component personnel were on active duty - here at home and in every theater around the world supporting the Global War on Terrorism. They are providing a very broad range of capabilities, from Special Operations and Civil Affairs to personnel and finance support. The Service component breakdown is as follows:

- Army National Guard (ARNG): 91,079
- Army Reserve (USAR): 65,079
- Air National Guard (ANG): 6,420
- Air Force Reserve (USAFR): 9,376
- Navy Reserve (USNR): 1,562
- Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR): 6,774
- Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR): 1,169

Morale is high. Reservists are proud of their contribution and ready to serve. They will continue to respond to the call to active duty as long as there is meaningful work and we only keep them on duty for the absolute essential period of time. The men and women with whom I have spoken are proud of their service, fulfilling important missions and contributing to the needs of their country. We know there is a clear correlation between job satisfaction and proximity to the action and it is our intent to make sure when we call Guardsmen or Reservists we assign them to the full range of military missions.

Managing Force Capabilities in High Demand

With the Global War on Terrorism and the ongoing mobilization of Guard and Reserve members, we are monitoring the capabilities in the Reserve components that have been in high demand and, where necessary, identifying actions necessary to reduce the demand on these

capabilities. To assess the capabilities that are projected to be in demand as we prosecute the war on terrorism, the Department has conducted an analysis of what elements of the RC have been called-up—evaluating their usage in terms of:

- Frequency of call-up—the number of times members have been called to active duty since 1996.
- Percentage of available pool—what percent of the RC force has already been used to support current operations.
- Duration—how long the members served when they were called-up.

Frequency of call-up—empirical data have revealed that, to date, a relatively small number of RC members have been called up in support of the current operation who were called up for other contingency operations in the last eight years. Through December, 2003, overall, 27,784 Reserve members, or about 3.2% of our Selected Reserve force of 875,609, had been involuntarily called-up more than once since 1996 (11,802 called-up for more than one contingency operation – Bosnia, Kosovo, Southwest Asia, and ONE/OEF/OIF - and another 15,982 called-up more than once for the current contingency - ONE/OEF/OIF). This indicates that from a macro perspective the frequency of call-ups does not indicate an excessively high demand on the Reserve force at this time.

Summary

The role of the Reserve Component is to support the Active Component in times of war and national emergencies. The Reserve component also, has answered the nations call whenever it called. There remains the issue of readiness and there have been several governmental studies

and reports that conclude that the Reserve Component is not successfully measuring up to its task. These studies and reports clearly show that the Army did not use its lessons learned from Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in regards to noted personnel deficiencies. As such, the Reserve Component's operational readiness for combat operations for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom has shown no improvement from its operational readiness for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. How long can the US Army afford to retrain the Reserve component to accomplish its wartime mission? Moreover, to what cost?

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