

Requiem For A Heavyweight? Mid-Intensity Conflict And The Army's Ability To Fight And Win The Nation's Operations Other Than War

**A Monograph
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
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
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ABSTRACT

REQUIEM FOR A HEAVYWEIGHT? MID-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND THE ARMY'S ABILITY TO FIGHT AND WIN THE NATION'S OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR by MAJ David S. Anderson, USA, 56 pages

This monograph addresses the question of whether the U.S. Army can fight and win the nation's wars when those wars bear little or no resemblance to World War II. The question isolates a problem America's military has faced several times since World War II and is increasingly likely to face again: how to obtain clear, recognizable victory in low-intensity conflict and operations other war.

The monograph is a comparative analysis of the different types of war and uses the following as case studies: the low-intensity conflict in Korea (1966-1969), Operation Just Cause, and Operation Desert Storm. It analyzes those conflicts to determine why the U.S. Army continues to emphasize mid-intensity, mechanized warfare at the expense of developing coherent doctrine and skills needed to combat low-intensity threats. The monograph the examines the nature of emerging threats from the Third World and analyzes possible U.S. responses.

The result is an evaluation of how and why the U.S. is still committed to fighting its wars in a style reminiscent of World War II and a determination of the effectiveness of the doctrine to guide operations in mid- and low-intensity conflicts. Finally, it assesses current U.S. Army capabilities to meet future Third World threats.

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INTRODUCTION

Nearly fifty years after its victory, the United States Army continues to view itself through the lens of its experience in World War II. That war saw huge armies engaged in heavy, mechanized combat, practicing the art of operational maneuver and exercising extraordinary amounts of firepower. The Allies fought and won an interstate war on a succession of battlefields, forcing the unconditional surrender of the Axis.

In 1950, forcibly jolted awake from its brief, post-war somnolence, the US exploited its skill at interstate, mid-intensity warfare against the North Koreans. However, the magnitude and intensity of the Chinese intervention surprised the Americans, who considered escalating the conflict to the nuclear level. After rejecting that option, the US adopted an attrition strategy fought along a relatively static, linear front.

Between 1953 and 1990, Americans fought in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama, in addition to participating in other military operations now vaguely termed operations other than war (OOTW). Some of these, such as the low intensity conflicts (LIC)¹ fought in the Dominican Republic in 1965-66 and in Korea from 1966-69, are unfamiliar to an entire generation of American soldiers. Equally obscure is the level of quantifiable success achieved in each of these small wars.

Despite the years of involvement, treasure expended, and blood shed by the army and the nation in these conflicts, the American military paradigm has remained profoundly influenced by World War II.

Today, the American military force structure is based on the perceived need to fight and win two simultaneous, mid-intensity, major regional contingencies quickly and decisively, and with a minimum of both friendly and enemy casualties.

Official army doctrine supports employment of its force structure in such a role. During the Cold War, the US found itself engaging in combat operations with different states, but none of them involved the direct participation of the expected and intended enemy (the USSR) in a mid-intensity, interstate conflict. Quick and decisive victory coupled with the self-imposed requirement to minimize friendly, enemy, and civilian casualties is problematic in mid-intensity scenarios and virtually impossible in low-intensity ones.

The Persian Gulf War resulted in an undisputed military victory by the US-led coalition over a mechanized army purported to be the fourth largest in the world.² In 1991, for the first time since the early days of the Korean War, large numbers of forces mounted in fast-moving tanks and personnel carriers caromed around the battlefield, carving up the Arabian desert in great mechanized maneuvers and distributing an overwhelming amount of direct and indirect fires.

Many soldiers assert that if the army can do Desert Storm, it can do more limited security operations. Undeniably, the ability to retain mid-intensity war-making skills contributed to the peace maintained between the superpowers during the Cold War. Ironically, such strong military muscle did little to prevent intervention and conflict in several limited wars between 1945 and 1990 and arguably had the opposite effect.

The likelihood of two major regional contingencies occurring simultaneously is as speculative as it is serious. If the past fifty years are any indication, it is more likely the US will find itself involved in LIC and OOTW than in a regional mid-intensity conflict

between different countries. Even the counterinsurgent war in Vietnam continued the mid-intensity conflict trend. Infantry fixed the enemy; indirect fires and close air support killed them.³ The army has even formally recognized the likelihood of its involvement in OOTW through the most recent publication of the army's keystone doctrine, FM 100-5, Operations, in June 1993. Its pages included a chapter devoted to OOTW, including humanitarian relief, domestic support operations, and others. Perhaps significantly, only five paragraphs of that chapter address insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, attacks and raids, the OOTW operations most likely to involve American soldiers in combat.⁴ However, the army's focus remains fixed on countering the two major regional contingencies, both of which are presumed to require conventional, mid-intensity combat.

America's tenure as the world's sole superpower is not indefinite. The Americans are not the only people to have embraced the idea that the next war may be a highly technological one fought with a rifle in one hand and a "laptop" computer in the other. The United States is not the only nation to possess or desire high-tech capabilities. Increasingly, advanced technology can be found in crime syndicates, terrorist organizations, and other extra-state actors. Classic interstate warfare may be a thing of the past. The next war may be fought against international terrorism or in response to an intentional act of ecological sabotage.⁵ The Army's dedication to and skill at mechanized, firepower intensive, interstate, mid-intensity warfare would be of little value in such a future scenario.

This monograph addresses the question of whether the US Army can fight and win the nation's wars when those wars bear little or no resemblance to World War II. The question isolates a problem America's military has faced several times since World War II and is

increasingly likely to face again: how to obtain clear, recognizable victory in low-intensity conflict and operations other than war.

The monograph is a comparative analysis of the different types of war and uses the following as case studies: the low-intensity conflict in Korea (1966-1969), Operation Just Cause, and Operation Desert Storm. It analyzes those conflicts to determine why the US Army continues to emphasize mid-intensity, mechanized warfare at the expense of developing coherent doctrine and skills needed to combat low-intensity threats. The monograph then examines the nature of emerging threats from the Third World and analyzes possible US responses. The result is an evaluation of how and why the US is still committed to fighting its wars in a style reminiscent of World War II and a determination of the effectiveness of the doctrine to guide operations in mid- and low-intensity conflicts. Finally, it assesses current army capabilities to meet future Third World threats.

UNDERPINNINGS OF THE MID-INTENSITY APPROACH

For the U.S. Army, the underpinnings of its development as a professional armed force were forged in World War II, and in particular during the actions fought in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). The story of the seven week period from 25 July 1944 (the start of Operation Cobra) to 12 September 1944 and the start of the Lorraine Campaign is the stuff of legend. Commanded by General George S. Patton, Jr., 3rd US Army became operational on 1 August 1944, seven days after the start of Operation Cobra.⁶ Patton ordered the 4th Armored Division to pass through a narrow corridor, take Avranches and secure the bridge across Selune River and break out of the Cotentin peninsula. Twenty-four hours after taking the bridge, two armored and two infantry divisions passed over it and into the German rear.⁷

After rupturing the German lines, 3rd Army fought in all four directions simultaneously, sending troops west into Brittany, north to link with the British near Falaise, south toward the Loire River, and east toward Paris. For the rest of the month and through the first two weeks of September, 3rd Army raced across France, driving much of the German army before it. Armored divisions led the way, carrying infantry on the back decks of tanks. Armored cavalry screened the front while airpower guarded the flanks. These security forces swiftly dispatched any German forces that dared to attempt a counterattack.

When the Falaise gap closed on 21 August 1944, both 12th and 21st Army Groups moved east on a single, huge front.⁸ Six days earlier, 7th US Army had landed in southern France and rapidly moved inland, pursuing the Germans to the banks of the lower Rhine.⁹ By the end of August, General Dwight D. Eisenhower's intelligence summary declared "the enemy in the west has had it."¹⁰ On the western front, the Allied victory now had a palpable feel.

The dramatic performance of 12th Army Group and its subordinate armies during the late summer of 1944 demonstrated the way American commanders thought war should be waged. Large motorized and mechanized formations of soldiers closed with and destroyed the enemy. To American soldiers, these seven weeks of open-throttle maneuver and intense firepower established the US Army as a magnificent apparatus for waging conventional war.

The post-war legacy of these seven weeks of combat is what Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., calls the "Army Concept."¹¹ The experience of World War II in general--and especially the seven weeks of combat mentioned above--created within the army a collective intellectual-cum-emotional trust in that particular approach to the conduct of war.

This same approach created an inverse distrust in insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and other forms of low-intensity conflict.

Irregular Warfare in the U.S.

To American veterans of World War II, unconventional forms of fighting appeared less efficient and ineffective. Though irregular forces organized in those countries defeated by the Axis, they were seldom capable of striking a serious blow against their occupiers.¹² The army's perceptions that irregular warfare was peripheral in nature and therefore could not be considered seriously grew out of the clandestine nature that is the modus operandi of those forces. Throughout the war, the majority of American soldiers had no exposure to irregular forces other than what they might have read in Stars and Stripes. These soldiers emphasized large amounts of firepower used with few restrictions or constraints. The complete destruction of the enemy was the goal of war, not the status quo ante or the resolution of vague political and social problems.¹³

By the beginning of World War II, whatever historical appreciation American soldiers might have had for irregular warfare had completely disappeared. Despite its origins as an irregular force and not inconsiderable experience with enemies that fought in guerrilla-style, the American army consciously adopted a conventional, European-style model for its land based military forces. The army's preferred memories of the pre-World War II era are the revolutionary battles of Saratoga and Yorktown, and the Civil War battles of Antietam, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and Grant's long campaign against Lee in 1864-65.

The American experience with irregular warfare began in October 1780 when Major General Nathaniel Greene assumed command of the Southern Army.¹⁴ To subdue the British, Greene incorporated previously independent partisan groups to augment his regular and militia forces

and introduced the concept of mobile war to North America.¹⁵ Rather than formally challenge the British for territorial control, Greene planned and coordinated the disparate movements of his smaller forces. His forces interdicted British lines of supply and communication and overwhelmed small and isolated enemy detachments. Overall, Greene's forces allowed the British to control only that land which they could physically occupy.

Trained to fight linear war, use rigid formations, fire by volleys, advance to the beat of a drum, and expect the enemy to rarely appear anywhere but at the direct front, the British found themselves forced to fight an enemy that thought less of conventional tactics than of winning. Technically, Greene never won a battle, but he forced the bewildered British army to overextend its supply lines and march to Yorktown for replenishment.¹⁶

Few irregulars, if any, fought in the Civil War battles. The commanders on both sides were either West Pointers or introduced to warfare by military academy graduates. All were familiar with the European style of war and were heavily influenced by the theories of Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, and his descriptive writings of Napoleonic warfare.¹⁷ The American army's experience with irregular warfare continued throughout the nineteenth century. Militia and regular forces fought in the various Indian Wars contested before the Civil War. After 1865, the American army experienced again the effects of guerrilla warfare at the hands of the Indian tribes of the Great Plains and the desert southwest.¹⁸

Selecting the European Approach

The American army that fought the Indian Wars was small but dreamed big. It consciously compared itself to European armies, whose professionalism and tradition established a paradigm. The indigenous Indian tribes of North America proved a numerically formidable enemy

for the small, constabulary force that garrisoned the western territories. To fight and win against a stateless nation, the army had to employ ever larger forces, increased firepower, and develop a willingness to see the Indian people and the army of braves as a single entity. Jominian battlefield geometry--so helpful, commonplace, and conventional in the Civil War--broke down when applied to the American frontier.¹⁹

From 1865 to 1914, the army reinforced its paradoxical choice of theoretical underpinnings through its formal school system, particularly Fort Leavenworth.²⁰ In the process, it ignored its own historical experience (e.g., the American Revolution, the Indian wars, the Philippine Insurrection and the Punitive Expedition of 1916) as well as important lessons learned by its European models in their colonial wars.²¹ Throughout, the American army concentrated exclusively on learning how to conduct conventional warfare. It was as if the army consciously prepared itself for war in Europe without any tangible indication that it would ever fight there.

Trench warfare in World War I reinforced the idea that armies had to be large enough to survive as entities but small enough to remain mobile. Firepower had to be both accurate and overwhelming; small, lightly armed, irregular forces could hardly expect to win much of a battlefield that resembled Flanders. During the interwar years (1919-1939), the lessons learned by U.S. Marines fighting irregular forces in Nicaragua and Haiti were barely noted by the army, if at all.

World War II - The "Dream War"

When it finally took up arms in earnest preparation for World War II, the army still had a great deal of work to do. Budget restrictions and the lack of an legitimate, identifiable threat kept the American army relatively small and neglected during the

formulation of U.S. national policy.²² When the army mobilized, a complete transformation was necessary from what existed to what previously had been only a dream.

To meet the anticipated challenge of fighting the Germans, then considered the mightiest army on the planet, the Americans practiced hard to win the kind of war it wanted to fight. A series of maneuvers held in the American south and southeast were wholly conventional, but did incorporate the new technologies and emphasis on offensive maneuver that had replaced the defensive concepts of World War I.²³ Years of focussed study of large European battles and trial and error effort had gone into the development of an optimum mechanized force structure, technology to support it, and battlefield tactics. Modified somewhat to account for actual conditions encountered in northern Africa, Sicily, and Italy, the final cast of the American army mold was 12th Army Group.

In Eisenhower's Lieutenants, Russell Weigley posits that many of the difficulties America and her Allies have had since 1945 can be traced to the abrupt and extraordinary transformation of the American army from 1940-1945. Instead of fighting small wars on the periphery of international interest (World War I excepted) as it had for much of its history, America and its army had faced and destroyed world-threatening nations and armies. After 1945, the army faced unwanted but not completely unexpected security responsibilities for much of the globe.²⁴

Adherence to the Mid-Intensity Approach

After its victory in the European campaign, the American army recognized the danger to Europe posed by the Soviet Army. It also recognized that only the US had the economic, political, and military power to counter Soviet ambitions, and so it assumed for itself the central role and "responsibility for the military defense of the west

against a Red Army that had grown mightier than the Wehrmacht at its zenith."²⁵

Thus, at the end of World War II, another war in Europe--this time against the Soviet Union--emerged as the primary American contingency. The army worked hard to develop force structure and techniques for conducting conventional combat on the European nuclear battlefield. Throughout the army's experimentation and application phases in the 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Army remained both the "worst-case" enemy and the "preferred" threat.²⁶ In line with its mid-intensity mindset, the army codified attrition doctrine in its 1949 edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Triumph in conventional operations depended on the primacy of firepower. What had worked in Germany was the direct confrontation with and complete destruction of the enemy through firepower. Ultimately, the goal was to destroy the effectiveness of the enemy's armed forces and his will to fight.²⁷

Quietly and reluctantly, the army began to look at counterinsurgency warfare and low-intensity conflict. To maintain its focus on conventional warfare, however, the army continued to reject its own military history as well as that of its allies as it tried to devise a doctrine and design force structure to conduct unconventional war. Looking no further than the twentieth century wars, which were overwhelmingly mid-intensity, the American army approached LIC in conventional fashion, e.g., by using overwhelming firepower and massive infusion of material resources. In doing so, the army played to its strengths. American industry "the Arsenal of Democracy," remained untouched by World War II and could be expected to remain out of reach by all non-strategic weapons. Because of this phenomenon, the American army alone retained the capability to experiment and expand through technology. The army could literally acquire not only

more firepower and firepower systems, but also the most sophisticated systems available.

The army's insistence on maintaining its conventional dominance contributed to the antipathy for counterinsurgency and low-intensity conflict. Proponents of unconventional warfare were considered heretics and skeptics throughout the army, beginning with the Chief of Staff, General George Decker, who said, "Any good soldier can handle guerrillas."²⁸ Though the British and French fought low-intensity wars in Vietnam, Malaya, and Algeria, wars that differed greatly from that experienced in the European Theater, the American army remained prepared and focussed on fighting and beating the preferred threat in mid-intensity conflict.

After its experience in Vietnam, senior army leaders worked hard to raise standards, upgrade material, increase morale, and codify doctrine.²⁹ Ultimately, the goal was to prevent large-scale commitment of military forces without a corresponding mobilization of the reserves. It emphasized fighting a mid-intensity war in central Europe beside strong and willing allies. A compromise appeared between the army, the elected officials, and the informed public: America would avoid long-term military involvement in those miscellaneous situations that did not demand large-scale US involvement in accordance with the established, conventional, mid-intensity idiom. Among these situations were counterinsurgency, counterinsurgency, LIC, peacemaking, or OOTW.

This philosophy endures unopposed within the US military and without serious challengers in either the elected leadership or the public at large. American military leaders now proclaim in one breath the absolute superiority of the army to conduct conventional, mid-intensity conflict and anything less warlike. Such pronouncements are

eerily reminiscent of the Army Chief of Staff's feelings and statements about President Kennedy's interest in counterinsurgency.³⁰

SMALL WARS

This section examines American victories in three wars, two small and one conventional: the low-intensity conflict waged in Korea from 1966 to 1969, Operation Just Cause, the December 1989 invasion of Panama, and the Persian Gulf War, fought from 1990 to 1991. The first two conflicts are important because they were US victories in wars that did not resemble World War II. The third is important because it represents the largest commitment of American ground forces since Vietnam and is recognizable as a conventional, mid-intensity conflict.

The Second Korean Conflict, 1966-1969³¹

When the Korean War ended in 1953 with an armistice and cease-fire instead of a peace treaty, American troops remained behind to share the security responsibilities of the Republic of Korea (ROK) with the ROK Army. The armistice prohibited large-scale conventional fighting, but promised little else because it was "purely military in character."³² During the forty-one years of the armistice, only ephemeral and hesitant attempts have been taken to reach a peaceful solution to the stalemate.

In 1964, Kim Il-Sung, the North Korean dictator, announced his displeasure with the progress of reunification. He ordered a complete overhaul of the unconventional capabilities of the Korean People's Army (KPA) and embraced the "peoples' war" doctrine of Mao Tse-tung. Kim believed that an insurgency would encourage oppressed South Koreans to overthrow their government and demand a withdrawal of all United Nations forces.³³ Further, he suggested his intention was to soften the ROK and its American allies with unconventional warfare. The KPA would then use its conventional forces to deliver the knockout

blow against a weakened and irresolute ROK and achieve reunification.³⁴ The insurgent war envisioned by Kim began with an attack during a visit to Seoul by President Lyndon B. Johnson in November 1966. The North Korean People's Army (KPA) ambushed and killed seven members of a patrol of soldiers assigned to the 2d Infantry Division.³⁵ In a similar attack on a ROK army patrol, two soldiers were killed. The Second Korean Conflict had begun.

The insurgency lasted three years before Kim realized any further efforts were hopeless and ended the unconventional campaign. During those three years, over 1,200 American and ROK soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured. While most of the casualties occurred in firefights along the DMZ, two related incidents provoked large US responses.³⁶

First, the KPA infiltrated a thirty-one elite operatives whose mission was to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung Hee at his official residence. Though compromised shortly after infiltrating, the group managed to sneak into an alerted Seoul and on 21 January 1968 got within 800 meters of the presidential mansion before being challenged. The group scattered, and in the effort to exfiltrate back to North Korea, killed seventy-one ROK and American soldiers and police and wounded ninety more. Twenty-five KPA operatives died, one was captured, and the remainder escaped.³⁷

Two days after the attempt on President Park, the North Korean Navy seized the electronic surveillance ship USS Pueblo, killing one and capturing eighty-two. President Johnson saw evidence of a communist master plot when the Tet Offensive of 1968 began seven days after the Pueblo seizure. In response, he ordered the mobilization of 14,787 US Air Force and Navy reservists, deployed 200 fighter aircraft from the US to bases in South Korea and Japan, and directed U.S. Seventh Fleet to make a show of force in northeast Asian waters.³⁸ In

addition, hazardous duty pay was authorized for all U.S. soldiers serving north of the Han River.³⁹

President Park also took several steps to improve the reputation of his regime. With the support of the US he authorized a popular militia, the Homeland Defense Reserve Force, which eventually numbered over two million volunteers. He also established villages near the border, modeled after the Israeli kibbutzim. Finally, he organized groups of medical teams that spread friendly propaganda along with medicine.

In 1966, strategic American interest in the Korean peninsula was primarily historical and military.⁴⁰ When the Korean War ended in an armistice in July 1953, 50,000 soldiers assigned to the 8th US Army remained in Korea, a tripwire to guard against further North Korean aggression. Like the American experiences in the Congo, the Dominican Republic, and Thailand during the 1960s, the counterinsurgency campaign waged in Korea during the 1960s has been forgotten and repressed in the analysis of Vietnam. Paradoxically, in 1969, when US Army leadership perceived a victory in Korea, it recognized its loss in Vietnam.⁴¹

In November 1966, American soldiers had been fighting in Vietnam for more than eighteen months and had just completed their role in the Dominican Republic.⁴² Interest in and opposition to the Vietnam War, the Americans' second major land war in Asia, increased with each new report from Southeast Asia. Troops remained deployed along "the other DMZ," in Korea, the legacy of an earlier Asian land war.

The Second Korean Conflict was a counterinsurgency campaign, not a conventional, mid-intensity conflict. American leaders made most of the decisions and provided some essential combat forces and large amounts of material support, but the ROK Army did the bulk of the fighting and suffered the bulk of the casualties. The American

commander in Korea, General Charles H. Bonesteel III, knew that his was an economy of force theater, and that the main US effort in Asia was in Vietnam. He vowed not to dilute the main effort in any way.⁴³ Fortunately for Bonesteel, he held three crucial jobs simultaneously that literally ensured him unity of command. He served as Commander, 8th US Army; Commander, US Forces in Korea; and, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. In this third capacity, he assigned himself operational control of the ROK Army.⁴⁴

Bonesteel's mission was simple: defense of the Republic of Korea. He knew that a second Asian land war was not in US interests and that an increase in American activity could both imperil his situation as well as jeopardize the main effort in Vietnam. He sought little credit for his work, ensuring little interest from the press and American public. Complicating his work was the threat. North Korea possessed both large conventional and unconventional forces.⁴⁵

Doctrinally, the American army possessed little beyond conventional solutions inappropriate for unconventional problems. When asked what method he preferred for defeating insurgents and guerrillas, General William C. Westmoreland (Commander, U.S. Army Vietnam, 1964-1968) gave a one-word answer that spoke volumes: "Firepower."⁴⁶

The primary doctrinal manual for echelons above corps was FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations: Larger Units; it was an ambiguous edition, identifying the extremes of the military spectrum as cold war and general war.⁴⁷ It included several short paragraphs on counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, but the rest of the manual was devoted to mid-intensity conflict, the "firepower" approach. Everything in between cold war and general war was limited war (described in FM 100-15 as "overt engagement" for limited ends with limited means) and was divided into three subcategories: "local

aggression, conventional war, and limited nuclear war."⁴⁸ The definition of limited war that appeared in FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations, was no better: "a limited war is any conflict which does not involve the unrestricted employment of all available resources."⁴⁹

The doctrinal void forced 8th Army planners to develop its own tactics, techniques, and procedures. Three types of tactical operations were necessary to defeat the KPA infiltrators. First, an effective anti-infiltration guard developed along the DMZ. Second, the ROK Navy increased its surveillance of the seacoast, since many infiltrators entered in small boats or swam ashore from submarines. Third, anti-guerrilla operations began in the southern interior. All of these operations had the potential to divert attention and thus jeopardize the conventional defense of the ROK.

Effective anti-infiltration evolved into a four-layered approach that both complied with the armistice and conserved troop strength in order to maintain a credible conventional defense along the DMZ. First, guardposts were established along the entire length of the DMZ. Manned by ten to thirty personnel, guardpost duty lasted between seven and ten days, during which ninety percent of the force operated at night. Second, combat patrols in front of, behind, and between the guardposts denied the KPA entry and searched for signs of enemy activity. The majority of U.S. casualties occurred on these patrols. Patrols had been conducted since the 1953 armistice, but they had degenerated into numb routine. The ambush on 2 November 1966 changed that attitude. Third, ROK and American forces erected a barrier defense system consisting of fencing, antipersonnel mines, tanglefoot and triple-strand concertina wire, and platoon defensive positions designed with interlocking fields of fire. Fourth, a quick reaction force (QRF) was formed for all echelons, from company to division.

Equipped with armored personnel carriers, heavy weapons, and indirect fire assets, the QRF existed to neutralize KPA intruders. Artillery and mortar fire was authorized against identified KPA operating south of the DMZ and for counterbattery fires.⁵⁰ Finally, the new rules of engagement permitted U.S. and ROK troops to fire on any infiltrator before being fired upon. A key realization was that the U.S. and ROK forces would stop North Korean infiltration with manpower, not firepower. The American method to this conflict broke with the customary "send a bullet, not a man," and they were prepared to take some casualties in order to prevent escalation to mid-intensity conflict.

The senior American and ROK leadership recognized that any artillery fired against infiltration squads and small patrols amounted to overkill. Additionally, it would have alienated the majority of South Koreans, most of whom endured some privation under the quasi-dictatorial government of President Park. General Bonesteel recognized that indiscriminate fires would be counterproductive. He had no desire to aid the North Koreans in any attempt to capitalize on the already sour reputation of the Park government.

The North Koreans concluded their insurgency in late 1969, when they signalled that they had had enough.⁵¹ Piecemeal infiltration of special forces operatives, each with a dual mission to subvert the ROK government and convert the South Korean people resulted in a failure to mass the insurgency effort. This failure, coupled with President Park's involvement of his people in their own security, a correct assessment of the threat, and selective but predominantly military counteractions defeated the North Koreans. In addition, Americans followed a four-part framework for victory; first, they pursued a combined (and where appropriate, joint) effort. They worked with the allied ROK government and army as an equal partner and ensured that it

was their fight. Unlike Vietnam, American military forces in Korea retained the supporting role. Second, they recognized that though Korea was an economy-of-force theater (for Americans), they could perform well in a counterinsurgency. They enforced this uncustomary supporting role by remaining in their forward-deployed camps, performing the DMZ security mission and reducing the temptation to escalate the conflict by involving American soldiers in a more active role. This used American material strengths, conventional capabilities, and improved technologies to their best advantage. By setting the standard for DMZ security, they influenced the ROK units to toughen their standards and improve their tactics and techniques as well. Third, they recognized the weakness of the LIC doctrine available and took steps to develop an acceptable and appropriate solution.⁵² Finally, by their actions before and during the conflict, the Americans reaffirmed their commitment to ROK security and freedom. The combination of these efforts provided the American and ROK forces with a counterinsurgency victory.

Operation Just Cause, 1989-1990

Unlike the Second Korean Conflict, Operation Just Cause occupies a prominent place in American military history. For one thing, it was not overshadowed by a much longer and much more controversial intervention elsewhere in Latin America. For another, it reminded Americans that the use of military power could have unarguably positive benefits, especially when diplomatic actions and economic sanctions proved impotent. Finally, at the time of the US intervention in Panama, the Berlin Wall had just fallen, symbolically ending the Cold War. In a very real sense, Panama was the only war the US had, and thus a large proportion of national assets, media, and attention could be pressed into service in its cause.

From its conception, Operation Just Cause was a hybrid operation. Like the insurgency in Korea, Operation Just Cause also took place in a mature theater--where thousands of US troops already served and the history of American interests ran long and deep.⁵³ It mixed the traditional (conventional, mid-intensity warfare) with the untraditional (LIC) and blurred the boundary between deliberate and contingency action. As operational art and as an example of AirLand Operations Doctrine, it is the best example of operational synchronization and non-linear operations in U.S. Army history, and will be long studied for those reasons.

The US and Panama signed a treaty in 1978 to transfer ownership of the Panama Canal to the Panamanian government on 31 December 1999. US military forces will be withdrawn completely, leaving Panama without a US military garrison for the first time since 1903, when construction on the canal began.⁵⁴ Relations between the US and Panamanian governments, cool and perfunctory since the 1977 decision to hand over control of the canal, began to deteriorate rapidly after the unexpected death of General Omar Torrijos in a 1981 airplane crash. Torrijos' successor was Brigadier General Manuel Noriega, the demonstrably corrupt leader of the Panama Defense Force (PDF). Suspected in US political circles as a narcotics trafficker in the employ of the Colombian cartels, Noriega was publicly accused of complicity in Torrijos' fatal accident after he fired the chief of staff of the PDF, Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera.⁵⁵ Ironically, Noriega was also a paid CIA informant.⁵⁶ Under Noriega, who soon assumed dictatorial powers, Panamanian society and economic structure deteriorated while official corruption and repression of dissidents expanded.

In November 1987, MG Bernard Loeffke, then Commander, US Army South (USARSO), ordered his planners to consider options for an armed

intervention into Panama. Initially, this group met informally and without strategic guidance, in February 1988, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) determined that the PDF constituted a threat to the Panama Canal and formally issued a planning order to US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM).⁵⁷ The eventual result was a family of operations plans grouped under the title Prayer Book. Two of the more important subordinate plans were Blue Spoon (offensive military intervention) and Blind Logic (post conflict restoration), later renamed Just Cause and Promote Liberty just prior to their execution. The objectives of the plans were ambitious: first, protect American lives and property; second, secure key sites and installations in Panama; third, capture General Noriega and deliver him to US marshals; fourth, shatter the PDF; fifth, replace the Noriega government with a democratically elected one; and, sixth, reconstitute the PDF as a professional force whose members placed the national interest first.⁵⁸

From early 1988 to May 1989, relations between the PDF and US forces deteriorated. Several incidents of violence and harassment of US nationals occurred, creating the unusual situation of Americans legally stationed in a land where the host government was decidedly unfriendly.⁵⁹ In May 1989, Panama held elections during which Noriega's preferred candidate was soundly defeated, an event that prompted the dictator to invalidate the entire electoral process. The US responded by deploying nearly 2,000 troops to Panama in Operation Nimrod Dancer. In addition, US forces began exercising their rights under the 1978 treaty through a series of small operations, code-named Sand Fleas and Purple Storms, stressing the PDF command and control structure.⁶⁰

Soldiers deploying on Nimrod Dancer thought they were headed into combat. On arriving, they discovered a relatively benign situation. The majority of the Panamanian population was friendly,

many expatriate Americans lived and worked happily in Panama City, and the soldiers assigned to USARSO and USSOUTHCOM seemed relaxed, even complacent. Some of the leaders experienced difficulty understanding and adapting to an untraditional reversal of roles, where political concerns conspicuously dominated military actions.⁶¹

When events in Panama forced the execution of Operation Just Cause on 20 December 1989, the U.S. Army successfully combined many elements of mid-intensity, conventional combat with low-intensity, unconventional combat. The initial assault involved thousands of US soldiers from mechanized, armored, airborne, light infantry, and special operating forces parachuting, walking, and riding in personnel carriers to seize objectives and key facilities, block enemy forces, and attack major targets, twenty-four in all.⁶² In the space of eight hours, the US Army executed a coup de main that crushed the PDF, overthrew the Noriega government, and began the efforts necessary to reestablish the elected Panamanian government.

Despite the number of and emphasis on light and special operating forces that participated in Operation Just Cause, combat forces used firepower appropriate for a mid-intensity environment, especially during the initial assault and subsequent early morning hours. For example, though mortars and indirect artillery played a minor role, AH-64 attack helicopters fired Hellfire laser-guided missiles in support of a ground attack on La Comandancia (PDF Headquarters) by mechanized infantry. In addition, F-117A fighters (which dropped two two-thousand pound bombs), AC-130 Spectre gunships, AH-64s, and AH-6 attack helicopters fired on targets on and adjacent to the Rio Hato airfield as part of pre-assault fires requested by the 75th Ranger Regiment, who executed their parachute assault moments later. During actions that destroyed a number of PDF personnel carriers, army soldiers fired LAW and AT-4 anti-tank weapons.⁶³

Missing from the assault on Panama was the kind of sweeping, operational, armored maneuver that forms the second half of the mid-intensity paradigm. But, while massed armor was missing (U.S. forces used a lone platoon of M551 Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicles sparingly) from most combat activity in Panama, the all-at-once assault on the PDF itself comprised a kind of sweeping maneuver, light-style, comprised of six different task forces. These were further broken down into subordinate task forces, consisting of elements of the army, navy, air force, and marines, along with their special operations forces elements.⁶⁴ Each task force had objectives and protection missions. The PDF was the enemy center of gravity, and to destroy it, US forces synchronized its assault to strike all major PDF concentrations nearly simultaneously. Well-trained, motivated soldiers were armed with the most technologically advanced equipment, including night-vision devices, satellite communications, and highly accurate fire support systems. In addition, the Americans had advantages in intelligence, command and control, and enjoyed the support of the local populace, an element crucial to the success of any low-intensity operation. Perhaps the greatest technical advantage was the ability to fight at night, thus guaranteeing the freedom of maneuver to friendly forces and minimizing civilian casualties.⁶⁵

The numerically small PDF had no night-fighting capability, had few pieces of technologically advanced equipment, and was poorly trained. Its leaders were more concerned with improving their social and political position within the PDF and personal lifestyle than with serving the nation. Had the PDF been better trained, US casualties would have been more severe. In addition, the US intervention did not transform into a Panamanian war. Nightmarish fears that the PDF would melt into the jungle and start an insurgency proved unfounded. The PDF preferred its soft, urban-oriented lifestyle and had no political

stomach for guerrilla war. In this respect it resembled the Mafia more than it did an army.⁶⁶

The American execution was far from perfect, however, suffering from some embarrassing lapses. Though the deployment of MC-130 (Volant Solo) aircraft assumed control of some frequencies while airborne, the radio and television stations remained unsecured well into the second day and pockets of potential hostages went unsecured. The worst problem was the short shrift given to post-conflict operations, especially the establishment of democracy, code-named Operation Promote Liberty.⁶⁷ Fortunately, General Noriega could not generate the support necessary to take advantage of these lapses. Nevertheless, they are problems inherent in the mid-intensity mindset, where military power and execution is largely separate from strategic and political consequences.

The American invasion of Panama was not a counterinsurgency campaign but a carefully synchronized coup-de-main that decapitated the Panamanian leadership before it could organize effective resistance. First, the Americans fought a joint campaign, using many assets with diverse capabilities from different services. Throughout the operation, the effort remained unified. The hostility of the PDF provided a unique twist and prevented any possibility of a combined effort, but the isolation of the average Panamanian from the PDF provided some compensation and aided the intelligence effort. However, once the campaign objectives were accomplished, including installation of the democratic government the majority of American soldiers were on their way back to the US. The only soldiers that remained behind were those that were permanently stationed in Panama. Second, the Americans used their conventional, mid-intensity arsenal and training to their advantage. Employing sophisticated weapons systems to fight with near-impunity at night, American soldiers took

the initiative away from the PDF and Noriega. Third, the Americans recognized that employing a low-intensity response like a simple demonstration of force was not likely to work and could even exacerbate the situation; an assault by air and ground was required. In so doing, the Americans moved from an environment where they avoided combat to one where they sought it. Then, almost as quickly, it was over and the low-intensity environment returned, but with an emphasis on establishing security through nation-building. Though no doctrine existed outlining how these transitions were to be made, American troops successfully improvised, returning Panama to a condition of stability and peace.

The Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991

"The results of this battle will be great, and all the world and future generations will talk about it."

Saddam Hussein⁶⁸

Many books and periodical articles have been written about the recent Persian Gulf War--and many more are yet to come. Most of these correctly regard the defensive and offensive operations as a decisive victory, albeit over what is now considered an over rated enemy. A few have challenged the veracity of US and coalition claims of danger and difficulty, pointing to the speed of the operations as a clear indication that the war could have been won with far fewer dollars spent and fewer lives placed at risk. This section does neither of these things, nor does it attempt to condense the war to a few pages. It uses the Persian Gulf War to analyze the army's continued emphasis on mid-intensity, conventional warfare as the cornerstone of its doctrine, despite the short duration of the ground phase.

In February 1991, nearly forty years after the maneuver phase of the Korean War settled into bitter trench warfare and exhaustion

replaced annihilation as the strategy of choice for America's adversaries, the US Army launched a huge, sweeping, AirLand envelopment of the Iraqi Army. At least one observer has favorably compared the "Hail Mary" and "Left Hook" operations to those conducted by the American army fighting its way across France during World War II, the last "good" war.⁶⁹

The Persian Gulf War began when US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, failed to convey adequately to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein the anger and depth of feeling the American president and people would have if he ordered the invasion of Kuwait.⁷⁰ On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and Saddam Hussein then proclaimed Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. In three days, 120,000 Iraqi soldiers supported by 850 tanks occupied Kuwait. More tanks, artillery pieces, and Iraqi soldiers were in place along the Kuwait-Iraq border and along the Iraq-Saudi Arabian border, posing a significant threat to Saudi Arabia. Four days later, the first of over three hundred thousand American soldiers landed in Saudi Arabia to defend that nation and guarantee the free flow of oil to the rest of the world. The military deployment was called Operation Desert Shield, and before it ended, over 500,000 Americans participated in it and the subsequent liberation of Kuwait, called Operation Desert Storm.⁷¹

At the time, the US conduct of the Persian Gulf War seemed to have come leaping from the pages of FM 100-5, Operations virtually intact. Strategically, operationally, and tactically, the US and its army found in Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi army everything they could wish for in an enemy. The US forces demonstrated the advantages of a strong, well-trained, military designed to fight mid-intensity, conventional war.⁷² In retrospect, however, while the forces employed tried to adhere to the 1986 doctrine, they actually practiced a

modification. This alteration, specifically a collection of eight new themes, would become the army's official doctrine in 1993.⁷³

The 1986 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, addressed two strategic considerations for the US Army. First, future wars would be coalition efforts. Second, most of the army's combat service support units were in the reserves, compelling the government to order first a "selected reserve" call-up and then partial mobilization to sustain the fighting force.⁷⁴

The strategic goal of the allied coalition that fought Iraq in the Persian Gulf War was disarmingly simple: the complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi military forces from Kuwait.⁷⁵ Beginning in August 1990, the UN imposed economic sanctions that grew progressively tougher as time passed and Iraq refused to withdraw. Finally, after five months of sanctions, allied force build-up in Saudi Arabia, often delicate diplomatic negotiations, and large media coverage, the US-led coalition used military power to forcibly remove the Iraqi army from Kuwait. Once Kuwait was liberated and the Iraqis withdrew, American and allied forces began to return their native lands, something the US and its allies had agreed to months before. Thus, the ends were objective, clearly defined, steadily escalating and acceptable to the international community, and the ways sufficiently limited in duration and geography.

The number of countries contributing forces demonstrated an international solidarity on a level unprecedented in the post-World War II era. The US, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabian forces were joined in their fight by soldiers, sailors, and airmen from thirty-six other nations, including Syria, France, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bangladesh.⁷⁶ Though some proved to be militarily insignificant, all contributed to the diplomatic efforts and proved that nations with

significant cultural, ethnic, and religious differences can form a coalition against a common enemy.

In addition, the American people rallied behind the cause to remove Iraq from Kuwait. The efforts of the Bush administration painted the strategic picture as a fight between pure and sinister forces. The news media helped by exploiting this angle, both in local and national news stories. As reserve and national guard units were mobilized, local support for the army's mission grew. Selected units were mobilized from all over the country, ensuring few communities would remain unaffected.

Operationally, the war demonstrated the foolishness and ignorance of challenging the US armed forces to a mid-intensity war. The US Army spent the years 1973-1991 productively. It created and developed new weapons, progressively raised standards for enlistment and retention of soldiers, modified force structure, and developed a workable, sensible, and understandable doctrine.⁷⁷ When the time came to put the efforts of twenty years of development, testing, and analysis to the test in Kuwait and Iraq, the result was the previously mentioned "Left Hook," an enveloping maneuver that simply overwhelmed the Iraqi army. The American army drew considerable satisfaction from its victory in the Persian Gulf War; it had developed force structure and doctrine into a paradigm for war that the nation with the fourth largest army in the world felt compelled to challenge--and it had badly embarrassed that army.

Preceding the ground phase was a thirty-eight day "air campaign," that interdicted Iraqi strategic, operational, and tactical targets and virtually paralyzed the political, economic, and military structures of the country. FM 100-5 addressed the uses and effects of firepower to neutralize, destroy, and exploit the enemy, in concert

with ground maneuver or alone. It included air delivered munitions as one of the means of firepower.⁷⁸

Coalition air forces established air superiority almost immediately after attack helicopters fired the first anti-air defense rockets and never relinquished it.⁷⁹ Though retrospective reports and studies that raised doubts about its overall impact, there is little doubt that the incessant pounding of Iraqi army formations from the air contributed immensely to the swiftness of the ground assault, the low numbers of allied casualties, and large numbers of Iraqi prisoners of war. Thus, though "victory" in the air came first, followed by "victory" on the ground, it was really a matter of firepower (significant naval and ground-based fires included) providing the protection and opportunity for maneuver forces to make the decisive impact on the campaign.

Tactically, the army fought the Persian Gulf War as a pursuit. In part, this was due to the lack of organized, coherent Iraqi defenses and the enveloping operational maneuver that moved the army literally hundreds of miles around rather than through most of the defenders. However, unlike the old cavalry of the Indian Wars that rode to battle and then dismounted to fight, the army that fought in the Persian Gulf fought mounted as well.⁸⁰ In addition to the armor and aviation crewmen who fought from their vehicles, the infantrymen fought from M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles.⁸¹

After the breach of Iraqi border defenses, the ground maneuvers strongly began to resemble an exploitation and pursuit rather than a deliberate attack. Overall resistance on the ground was so slight that many company-sized actions lasted less than one hour, albeit a very intense hour. When Americans were challenged, they responded with overwhelming firepower, shooting thousands of cannon, rocket, tank, and Bradley rounds.

Modern technology, more than anything else, allowed the army to prosecute the war in its swift, bold, and mounted fashion. Among other innovative devices, enemy army formations could be acquired by Joint Surveillance Attack Radar System (J-STARS) aircraft, individual vehicles moved through trackless desert using hand held Global Positioning System (GPS) devices, and AH-64 Apache helicopters attacked Iraqi armored formations with impunity. Unlike previous wars, most of the technology used in the Persian Gulf War already existed in the military inventory. Though many had never been employed in combat before, soldiers and leaders were familiar with how to use them, logisticians were familiar with how to sustain them, and the devices themselves worked as advertised.

The American army thus fought and utterly defeated an army once regarded as one of the largest in the world and one of the best in the Third World. The army was able to do so because its leaders and soldiers had consciously and subconsciously worked for nearly twenty years developing the doctrine, force structure and improved capabilities, standards, and morale that would most closely approximate those which exemplified the victorious 12th Army Group in France and Germany during World War II. Simply put, the army wanted to be able to replicate the exploits of its chosen paradigm. By 1991, it had succeeded.

Third World Challenges for the U.S. Army

After the army returned to the US after the Persian Gulf War, the Bush Administration turned its attention toward restructuring US military roles and responsibilities, an action that had been planned but postponed until after the Iraqi threat had been eliminated.⁸² As it did so, four trends were already underway: the rise of assertive regional power blocs, the proliferation of military technologies

across the spectrum of capabilities, and the concurrent breakdown of the political nation-state and rise of extra-national actors, especially in the Third World.⁸³

While America prepared for and then fought a large, integrated battle using large numbers of forces, several lesser known low-intensity operations involving other U.S. military forces occurred around the world. During the seven month period between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the signing of the armistice, US marines evacuated Americans from the African countries of Liberia and Somalia, guerrillas executed two army aviators shot down in El Salvador, and US bases in the Philippines remained under tightened security following anti-American demonstrations. Simultaneously, anti-narcotics operations involving military (active duty, reserve, and national guard forces) and federal law enforcement agencies occurred along the Mexico-US border. In the Third World, conventional challenges like the Iraqi army and unconventional challenges like the "technicals" of Somalia and the stateless marauders of Liberia awaited the victorious army of Operation Desert Storm.⁸⁴

The Third World has never been more vulnerable. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the post-World War II international system of bilateral and multilateral arrangements used by nations to protect themselves lost some of its stability. The continued need, existence, and capabilities of NATO have been questioned, especially over its inability to reach consensus over the Yugoslav Civil War. Without the Soviet Union to stimulate the US to compete for their attention, the nations of the Third World were suddenly cast adrift.⁸⁵

However, the Third World is too vast and diverse to be treated as a single entity. Though some individual states command American attention because of their sheer size, anti-American bias, or wealth, it is best to examine them through regional groupings. First, few

security matters can be resolved on a purely bilateral basis. For example, the US dealt with Somalia after negotiating with the UN over its mission, purpose, and endstate and after insisting that the UN assume the mission from the US after stability and security for the humanitarian effort had been established. Second, individual policies for the more than 100 states of the Third World are neither practical nor reasonable.⁸⁶ Aggregating them into regions simplifies the scope to a workable level, though this is of decreasing utility, thanks to the fragmentation now occurring in the Third World. However, the focus here is to examine the variety of threats that exist in the Third World, not to assess US policymaking strategies.

Determined bands of terrorists armed with commercially available technologies have the capability to inflict large numbers of casualties and disrupt the economy of major countries, as the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center demonstrates. However, terrorists with bombs are not the only threat the Third World can muster, nor are weapons of mass destruction the only technological threat. Sophisticated air and naval power, missile technologies, and chemical, biological and nuclear weapon systems are particularly important to Third World nations.⁸⁷ For example, Syrian, Indian, and Iraqi air forces fly advanced MiG-29 fighters, the Afghan mujihadin possess Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and Iran possesses Silkworm anti-aircraft missiles. The predominance of littoral fleets poses a threat to American abilities to project force over the shore. Anti-ship mines are relatively inexpensive, can be detonated in a variety of ways (acoustic, magnetic, pressure, etc.), and can be laid in fields, at random, and by small, fast cutters. Some navies also possess a limited blue-water capability, most notably Brazil and India.⁸⁸

In addition to the anti-aircraft missiles mentioned above, anti-ship missiles like the Exocet are in use by several nations, including

Iraq and Argentina. A ballistic missile threat persists as well, exemplified by the SCUD-B attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel during the Persian Gulf War, the unsuccessful Libyan attack on the Italian island of Lampedusa,⁸⁹ and reports of a North Korean ballistic missile capable of striking all of Japan.

In general, the Third World views western antipathy toward chemical weapons as an illogical, sentimental, phobia. The chemical industry is an international one and an easy place to hide the development of weapons. Petrochemicals, fertilizers, and insecticides are necessary for countering disease and boosting agriculture--and place arsenals of chemical weapons at public disposal. They were used in the Yemeni Civil War in the 1960s, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and again during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.⁹⁰ They may have been used against US and Arab coalition forces during the Persian Gulf War. The threat of their use during that war is beyond dispute.⁹¹

Biological weapons have yet to be used in modern combat; the threat persists and is made more serious because of the small amount necessary to poison water supplies. The threat alone can be used to create widespread panic and danger. The prevailing opinion that biological weapons are militarily insignificant is unsustainable.⁹²

Once controlled by a few nations, nuclear weapon possession and development has mushroomed throughout the Third World. Many Third World nations either possess or are suspected of possessing nuclear weapons technology, including North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and South Africa. Despite its repulsiveness to most western nations, chemical, biological, and nuclear warfare lies largely in the realm of conventional warfare. Each US division has a chemical company and each battalion has a chemical operations officer. Soldiers are trained in nuclear and chemical defense and protection techniques.

Thus, though emotions might regard weapons of mass destruction as unconventional threats, they are treated as part of the mid-intensity battlefield.

The majority of Third World nations do not possess the conventional capabilities outlined above. To a large degree, this is due to a concurrent breakdown of the political nation-state and the rise of extra-national actors. In his article, "The Coming Anarchy," Robert D. Kaplan describes the approaching death of several West African countries, especially Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.⁹³ He recounts scenes of disappearing natural resources and a continuous migration of large numbers of people in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, and Guinea and claims that the president of Sierra Leone controls the capital of Freetown only during the day. Kaplan characterizes the Sierra Leonian army, ostensibly fighting rebels based in the Liberia-Sierra Leone border region, as an "unruly rabble," portions of which are aligned with local tribal chiefs. He describes West African civilization as limited to a series of coastal trading villages and visualizes a return to the descriptions found on old sea charts, meaning large portions marked "blank," or "unexplored." Because the descriptions found in it apply throughout the Third World, the West Africa of "The Coming Anarchy," is a metaphor for violent, volatile activity.⁹⁴

Third World natural resources are growing scarce, especially forests, which leads to soil erosion and the loss of topsoil necessary for both commercial and subsistence farming. The interior of many regions are torn by cultural and ethnic violence; no outsider is safe without armed escort. The loss of natural resources drives people to urban areas, where they live in shantytowns, survive through crime, and grow increasingly angry with those who possess any sort of wealth. In many Third World countries, the "haves" belong to one ethnic or

cultural group and the "have nots" belong to one or more other groups, further straining the situation by adding race and culture to the mix.⁹⁵

To survive, those who can afford it hire private guards or emigrate. In some cases, most notably the Mafia and the international drug cartels, private, well-armed armies have arisen to protect the members of the cartel and the economy of narcotics trafficking. Military power can be translated into political power, and members of the cartels or their representatives can gain increased political legitimacy through control of localities. Because these organizations are extra-national, the world's established states fail to recognize them, preferring to stick with borders that may only exist on the pages of an atlas.⁹⁶ Poverty, mass migration, tribalism, crime, and disease will grow at an ever increasing rate in much of the Third World, especially Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. Nations that can afford conventional weapons and to support conventional standing forces will continue to do so, despite their own internal problems.

The US involvement in the Third World was once limited to support for former colonial powers, which were recognized as have special relationships with many Third World countries. However, the former colonial powers have begun to cut their economic and historical ties, depriving them of their anchor for political and economic stability. In many cases, the drifting states will not survive, disintegrating like Yugoslavia but into borderless groupings of humanity, not ethnic enclaves.⁹⁷

Revolutions, insurgencies, and civil wars like those in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Yugoslavia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Mexico will continue to produce anarchy and demand intervention by the United Nations in order to prevent wholesale slaughter and to protect lives. As it did in Somalia and tried to in Yugoslavia, the UN will turn to

the United States to provide either military or humanitarian assistance.

If the US responds positively--and if Somalia is any example, then it will--the American army will be called upon to confront the challenges of anarchy more and more frequently. Three times during 1993, in Somalia, in Macedonia, and in Haiti, American soldiers found themselves involved in tense situations where the mid-intensity paradigm was inappropriate.

CONCLUSION

For more than forty-five years, US national security planning and army doctrine focussed on conventional war in Europe--a war that has not yet come--and which was fought vicariously in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991. American efforts in the Gulf notwithstanding, the immediate likelihood of mid-intensity, conventional war involving the US exists only in Korea. Underscoring this reduced conventional threat, the US military and in particular the army have shrunk dramatically during the past three years because of the absence of any discernable threat save this one. Therefore, the nation and the army are looking away from Europe and toward the world at large and in the process are reconsidering the role, condition, and importance of the military in furthering national policy.⁹⁸

Until 1989, US military efforts in the Third World were primarily anti-communist, supplemented by emphasis on economic development and democratization. With rare exception, such as the interventions in Grenada and Panama and the airstrike on Libya, these military efforts have been non-combat support operations. Counterinsurgency campaigns involving the US like the Second Korean Conflict of 1966-1969 have not reoccurred. However, the army has increased its emphasis on these operations by codifying several non-combat roles in

the keystone doctrine, FM 100-5, Operations, and among the types of missions now included are security assistance, nation assistance, anti-terrorism, peace enforcement and counterinsurgency.⁹⁹ Including these and other subheadings acknowledges the army's role in developing democratic political institutions, improving physical infrastructures, and guiding nations in responsible, civilian control of their militaries. Unfortunately, the army may not be ready for that part of the mission.

The army neither trains its own soldiers nor those of other nations adequately in either nation-building or unconventional warfare skills. Five Special Forces Groups exist in the active army, each with a regional focus, and each trained in unconventional warfare. While some part of those groups are deployed overseas year-round, they are not enough, and more are needed, possibly as many as twelve.¹⁰⁰ To transfer this mission to the traditionally trained conventional army would require a major rearrangement and rebalancing of military skills, capabilities, training and a major shift in military doctrine, whereas an expansion of the force that was created for precisely this mission is what is needed. The soldiers of other nations sent to the US attend classes along with their American counterparts, learning the same conventional doctrine and force structure applications. For many, especially those from Africa and Latin America, lessons in the appropriate role of the military in a democracy, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism would be more appropriate than conventional military subjects.

Operation Just Cause demonstrated the ability of the army to conduct simultaneous strike operations and win the fighting war in the space of a single night. The mid-intensity portion of the battle took place after months of rigorous planning, rehearsals, and clandestine prepositioning of the equipment needed to accomplish the mission.

Though not without its problems, especially in the planning for post-conflict, low-intensity operations, the American intervention in Panama not only accomplished all of its operational and tactical objectives quickly, but managed to successfully transition from a low-intensity environment to a mid-intensity one, and back again, all within a single twenty-four hour period and with a with a minimum of casualties. Operation Just Cause thus demonstrated the tempo, the level of detailed planning, the different types of military operations, and the changing intensity of warfare within a single, small theater that American soldiers are most likely to confront during the remainder of this century.

Centering attention on threats now emerging in the developing world does not mean the US can ignore the likelihood of violence elsewhere. However, a few broad characterizations can be made. First, an interstate, conventional war in Europe that would threaten vital US interests appears an unlikely prospect for the six years remaining in the twentieth century, made so by the decomposition of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and the accompanying organizational problems of the newly independent, former Soviet militaries. However, once these new military structures find their footing, either individually or collectively, their potential to threaten western Europe will have to be reassessed. For example, the largest post-Soviet state, Russia, is beset with internal problems and is no longer a legitimate superpower, but rather a Third World state with intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads. Its once-formidable conventional military forces are straining for balance in the midst of restructuring, down-sizing, and the transfer of major equipment items (tanks, cannon, ships) from one nation to another. However, while Russian soldiers suffer in a state of unreadiness now, their leader development and theoretical and

doctrinal education and debate continue, just as they did in the US during the interwar years of 1920-1940.

The United States is not likely to repeat its victory of Desert Storm in the near future, if only because potential and likely adversaries noticed the imprudence of challenging the U.S. to a mid-intensity conflict and then giving it six months to gather a friendly coalition and mass forces in preparation for military action. Other reasons exist for the lack of viable mid-intensity threats, chief among them the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

Nevertheless, army doctrine and training continue to revolve around conventional, mid-intensity conflict, a concept justified by the disclaimer that the mission of the army is to protect and defend the Constitution, through deterrence and by achieving quick, decisive victory when deterrence fails.¹⁰¹ When deterrence fails and the challenge is conventional, the US Army is capable of achieving that victory, with a minimum number of casualties, at record speed, and with decisive battlefield results. Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm demonstrated that the surest way for a Third World nation to lose a war with the US is to test the American army's paradigm and fight its way of war.

Paradoxically, just as the Persian Gulf War demonstrated the futility of challenging the US to its own game, it served as a signal to would-be challengers that America would not seek involvement in anything it felt it could not win in a comparable fashion. Further, it sent a signal that the US would only accept such missions as it felt it could not avoid, such as the humanitarian relief of Somalia. The victors of the Persian Gulf have been left without a challenger. Thus, the requiem for AirLand Operations Doctrine began with a victory in the Gulf.

The twenty-five year old lesson of the Korean-American victory in Second Korean Conflict is that the army can fight and win wars that fall outside the paradigm as well, but within parameters derived from the conventional pattern. The US can fight and win small wars, but to do so decisively, the army should first take advantage of its material, and technological might, something it has done and must continue to do. Whether fighting a guerrilla band capable of protracted war or a sophisticated, wealthy, extra-state drug cartel, the greatest advantage available to the US is ready access to leading edge technology--and lots of it.

Second, the forces involved must have a clear and achievable endstate. In the wake of Vietnam, many leaders have chanted this mantra and have been accused of undercutting diplomatic efforts by publicly indicating an unwillingness to support with force lawful governmental policies.

Third, unity of command and unity of effort are essential. Unity of command is a principle of war, accepted as immutable within the military. Unity of effort is less formally compelling but applies across the broader spectrum of involved parties, from diplomats to ordinary civilians.

Fourth, when the army is committed to low-intensity activity, the army, the government and the people may have to redefine the definition of the words, "quick and decisive" or modify their expectations. The US involvement in World War II lasted forty-four months, from December 1941 to August 1945; it was not a quick war. The 12th Army Group's European campaign lasted eleven hard, bloody, months, but ended quickly compared to the overall six year war. The Second Korean Conflict lasted three years--a long time, but not when one considers that American forces have been permanently stationed on the Korean peninsula for forty-four years. The five-day ground phase

of Operation Desert Storm was an anomaly; American forces--primarily naval--had served in the Persian Gulf for several years prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Winning the nation's wars takes time.

Last and perhaps impossible to develop is the acceptance that if conflict escalation is to be avoided, American soldiers and civilians in the conflict area may have to die. Americans abhor the idea that their soldiers may have to die violently, in a distant land, and for people who fail to share either their political or moral values. The Nevertheless, to win peacetime engagements, that is exactly what can be expected. The ends change in each area of LIC or OOTW, the means will remain a soldiers' tasks, but the ultimate means of such low-intensity conflicts is containment--avoidance of escalation, and the waging of peace.¹⁰²

If the army is to fight and win wars that fall outside the mid-intensity paradigm, these conditions will have to be addressed. If they are not, then the army will find itself in an intolerable situation, clinging to hope as the method for success.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, (Washington, DC, 1990), p. 1-1. The term "low intensity conflict (LIC)" was dropped from the 1993 edition of the Army's keystone doctrinal manual, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, and replaced by the term "operations other than war (OOTW)." However, FM 100-20 has yet to be replaced, thus leading to possible confusion. This monograph includes the discriminating use of both terms. OOTW, though the broader of the two terms, refers to Army operations that do not involve force-on-force actions, such as humanitarian or disaster relief missions. LIC refers to situations where conflict is apparent and expected, such as the American intervention in Grenada in 1983.
2. Edward B. Atkeson, "Iraq's Arsenal: Tool of Ambition," Army, (March 1991) pp. 26-27. Atkeson's article gives a good thumbnail sketch of Iraqi weaponry.
3. Aaron Blumenfeld, AirLand Battle Doctrine: Evolution or Revolution? A Look Inside the U.S. Army, (Unpublished Thesis, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and Governmental Affairs, Princeton, NJ, 1989), p. 10.
4. U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (Washington, DC, 1993), pp. 13-0 - 13-8. See also Major Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976, (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1979), p. 26. Doughty's study points out that the army's interest in counterinsurgency began in the early 1950s, but that interest waned until the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy in 1960. The new president's personal interest in counterinsurgency prodded the army to devote some attention to that form of conflict. According to Doughty, the 1962 version of Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, included a chapter on military operations against irregular forces. Nevertheless, most tactics for counterinsurgency resembled conventional small unit tactics.
5. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly, (February 1994), pp. 44-76.
6. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, (Bloomington, IN, 1981), p. 170.
7. Ibid., p.174.
8. Ibid., pp. 214, 224.
9. Ibid., p. 224.

10. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President, (New York, 1990), pp. 154-155.
11. Major Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam, (Baltimore, 1986), pp. 4-6.
12. Anthony Cave Brown, Wild Bill Donovan, The Last Hero, (New York, 1982), pp. 447-448, 567-568, and Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts, (New York, 1993), p. 45. For example, the Yugoslav Partisans, considered among the most famous and effective of all World War II guerrilla groups, spent much of their time fighting the rival Chetniks and slaughtering ethnic Albanians rather than fighting the Germans. The Partisans' leader, Josip Broz Tito, spent most of his time on the Adriatic island of Vis than on the mainland fighting. Despite their individual bravery, skill at sabotage, and unquestionable propaganda value, irregular forces like the French Maquis remained too weak to break into full-fledged insurrection even on the eve of D-Day. Brown reports that in April 1944, a syndicate of Anglo-American officers discussed the possibility of a Maquis-led insurrection in conjunction with the Normandy invasion. Proponents stressed the amount of confusion a simultaneous conventional and guerilla war would cause the Germans, especially in their rear as they tried to reposition reserves and transport supplies. Opponents (the syndicate contained no French officers) argued that even if preoccupied with Normandy, the Germans would remain strong enough to decapitate the exposed Maquis leadership, leaving the entire resistance movement prostrate and bleeding. The senior American officer in the syndicate was Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel III, who would later command 8th U.S. Army in Korea from 1966-1969.
13. Krepinevich, p. 5.
14. John M. Dederer, Making Bricks Without Straw, (Manhattan, KS, 1983), pp. 29-30.
15. Ibid., pp. 36-39.
16. Ibid., pp. 42-45, 54-55.
17. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War, (Bloomington, 1973), pp. 82-83. Weigley writes about the contributions of Dennis Hart Mahan to the development of an entire generation of West Point graduates. Mahan introduced the cadets to Baron Jomini's writings, which formed the core of American military and strategic thought until World War I.
18. James W. Shufelt, Jr., "Operational Art in the Sioux War of 1876," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1993) pp. 36-38. See also Weigley, p. 162-163.
19. Ibid., pp. 727-729.
20. Ibid., p. 728.

21. Krepinevich, p. 5.
22. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, (Bloomington, 1981) p. 727.
23. Geoffrey Perret, There's a War to be Won, (New York, 1991), pp. 38-45. The U.S. Army began large scale maneuvers with the amphibious assault of the 3rd Infantry Division into Monterey Bay, California, in January 1940. Further large maneuvers took place, culminating with the 1941 series in Tennessee, Louisiana, Texas, and the Carolinas. Collectively, these maneuvers are referred to as the Louisiana Maneuvers, though only one set actually took place there, in September 1941.
24. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants, p. 728.
25. Ibid., p. 727.
26. Krepinevich, p. 5.
27. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, (Washington DC, 1949), p. 80.
28. Krepinevich, p. 37.
29. Herbert, p. 77. Specifically, the material items were a new main battle tank (the M1 Abrams), a mechanized combat infantry vehicle (the M2 Bradley), an new attack helicopter (the AH-64 Apache), a new utility helicopter (the UH-60 Blackhawk), and a short-range air defense artillery system (the Stinger).
30. Krepinevich, p. 37.
31. Major Daniel P. Bolger, Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969, (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1991), pp. 37-38.
32. Ibid., p. 1. Bolger quotes the report of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The United States and the Korean Problem: Documents, 1943-1953, 83d Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, D.C., 1953) Document 74, Preamble to the Korean Armistice Agreement.
33. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph C. Kun, "Behind North Korea's New Belligerence," Military Review, (July 1968), pp. 70-75.
34. General Charles H. Bonesteel, "On Korea's DMZ: Vigil Seals the 'Porous War,'" Army (October 1969), p. 60.
35. Colonel James L. Wroth, "Korea: Our Next Vietnam?," Military Review (November 1968), p. 34. During the previous thirteen years of the armistice, only eight U.S. servicemen had been killed as a result of North Korean action. The attack on the 2d Division's patrol effectively doubled the death toll to that point.

36. Bolger, pp. 111-113. See also Rick Atkinson, Crusade, (Boston, 1993), p. 492. During the three years of counterinsurgency warfare in Korea, ROK and U.S. forces suffered a total of 1,220 casualties (killed, wounded, and taken prisoner). In comparison to Vietnam, where nearly 1,200 casualties occurred each month of 1968, the human toll is small. However, the war cost the ROK army 84 percent of all casualties lost to DPRK military actions since the 1953 armistice. U.S. casualties were 75 killed, 111 wounded, and 85 taken prisoner. All American prisoners were either members of the USS Pueblo, which was seized in January 1968 or members of a U.S. helicopter crew shot down in August 1969. ROK casualties were 399 killed, 550 wounded, and 0 taken prisoner. KPA casualties were 397 known killed, 12 taken prisoner, and 33 defectors. An accurate number of KPA wounded is not available. By contrast, the U.S. suffered Persian Gulf War casualties of 390 dead, 458 wounded, and 33 taken prisoner. Allied (non-U.S.) casualties during the Persian Gulf war numbered 510

37. Kun, pp. 72-74. See also Bolger, pp. 62-71.

38. Bolger, pp. 71-72. Eventually, the Navy's contribution totalled six different carrier battle groups.

39. Ibid., p. 76.

40. Though today South Korea enjoys a strong, bustling economy, in 1966 it was just developing and was very dependent on foreign aid. It is important not to superimpose the Korea of the 1990s onto the Korea of the 1960s.

41. Bolger, p. xiv.

42. Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966. (Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1988), p. 186.

43. Bolger, pp. 13, 45.

44. Bolger, p. 7.

45. William R. Guthrie, "Korea: The Other DMZ," Infantry, (March-April 1970), p. 17. See also Bolger, pp. 13-18, 26. When mobilized, the Korean People's Army was estimated to be able to field thirty-four division equivalents that included mechanized, armored, and light infantry formations. The Korean People's Air Force included 500 fighter-bombers and light bombers. The Korean People's Navy was little more than a coastal defense force, but did possess some small submarines, missile boats, and torpedo boats. Unconventional forces numbered an estimated 3,000 operatives assigned to the National Intelligence Committee and the Reconnaissance Bureau of the DPRK Ministry of Defense. Though small, each operative was trained to recruit, train, and supervise up to 100 informants and guerrillas. They preferred violent ambushes over direct contact, since few carried more than a submachine gun and light

demolitions. To avoid capture, they would often commit suicide with a hand grenade. American combat formations in Korea consisted of the 2d and 7th infantry divisions, both understrength and underequipped.

46. Krepinevich, p. 197.

47. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations: Larger Units, (Washington D.C., 1966) pp. 3-5. See also Bolger, p. 41.

48. Ibid, p. 5.

49. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Service Regulations: Operations, (Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 5. Only one manual, FM 31-16, Field Service Regulations: Counter guerrilla Operations, directly addressed unconventional warfare. It stressed the use of indigenous allied forces to guard the frontier while stronger, more capable, U.S. units would remain mobile, destroying the enemy when they appeared in the country's interior.

50. Guthrie, pp. 17-22. See also Bolger, p. 52. Significantly, the U.S. never used artillery fires against the KPA. The ROK Army, which had the majority of the DMZ to defend, used indirect fires only three times.

51. Bolger, p. 108. North Koreans have continued to try and infiltrate into South Korea and have on several occasions, succeeded in assassinating ROK political leadership and other acts of terrorism. However, the concerted effort to infiltrate across the DMZ and over the beaches ended in November 1969.

52. Ibid., pp. 116-118 and 121-123.

53. Dr. Thomas M. Huber, "Claiming the Night: Operation Just Cause, 1989-1990," Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939, ed. Dr. Roger J. Spiller, (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1993), p. 193.

54. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama, (New York, 1991), pp. 2-3.

55. Ibid., p. 12.

56. Ibid., pp. 5-7. When Noriega assumed control, the PDF was known as the Guardia Nacional.

57. Richard H. Schultz, Jr., In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 1993), p. 18.

58. Donnelly, et al, p. 398.

59. Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, "The U.S.-Panama Crisis, 1987-1990," Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939, ed. Roger J. Spiller, (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1993), pp. 207-209.

60. Dr. John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama, (Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1992), p. 3. Dr. Fishel's book is an analysis of the Blind Logic plan to restore democracy to Panama and Operation Promote Liberty, which was the civil-military restoration operation conducted with Operation Just Cause.
61. Yates, p. 205
62. Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, "Operation Just Cause, December 1989," Combined Arms in Battle Since 1939, ed. Roger J. Spiller, (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1993), p. 203.
63. Donnelly, et al, pp. 323-349.
64. Ibid., pp. 75-77.
65. Huber, p. 196.
66. Donnelly, et al, pp. 350-352, 401.
67. Fishel, p. 65.
68. "Chronology of Events," Military Review (September 1991), p. 71.
69. Daniel P. Bolger, "The Ghosts of Omdurman," Parameters, (Autumn, 1991), pp. 34-37.
70. Robert D. Kaplan, The Arabists, (New York, 1993), pp. 278, 281-297. Kaplan's book on the American expatriate community in the Middle East from its inception in the early nineteenth century through 1992 is invaluable for students seeking to understand how the U.S. diplomatic corps "missed" all the indications that Iraq would invade Kuwait in 1990. A history of American involvement in the region, the book also provides insight on U.S.-Arab relations in general, especially the long history of Americans in Beirut, Lebanon, and the recent tragedy of American hostages in that city.
71. MAJ Jeffrey Schloesser, "The Limits of Power: America's Twenty Years in the Gulf," Military Review, (January 1992), p. 27.
72. COL Harry G. Summers, Jr., "Military Doctrine: Blueprint for Force Planning," Strategic Review, (Spring 1992), pp. 16-19.
73. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. iv, 1-2, 2-0, 2-2, 2-5, 2-8, 2-9, 6-1, and 6-11 - 6-12. The eight new themes are: force projection, operations other than war, joint, combined and interagency operations, versatility, simultaneity, clear articulation of the end state, a new definition of the battlefield framework, and overwhelming combat power.
74. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington, DC, May 1986) pp. 1-7, 63-64.

75. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, et al, Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War, (New York, 1992), pp. 416-450. See also "UN Resolutions," Military Review, (September, 1991), p. 79. The U.N. Security Council resolutions on the Persian Gulf War are included verbatim in Triumph Without Victory and were reduced to two-sentence synopses in Military Review.

76. "Forces Committed," Military Review, (September 1991), pp. 80-81. Syria contributed 21,000 troops and 300 armored vehicles to serve in the Saudi-led multinational corps. Another 50,000 troops garrisoned the Syria-Iraq border and 2,000 more served in the United Arab Emirates. France strengthened the coalition with 20,000 troops, 350 tanks, 14 ships (including an aircraft carrier) and 75 combat aircraft. Czechoslovakia contributed a 200-man chemical defense unit and a 150-man medical team. Romania dispatched a mobile field hospital and a 180-man chemical warfare team. Bangladesh sent 2,000 troops.

77. Major Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1988) p. 1. See also LTG John J. Yeosock, "H+100: An Army Comes of Age," Army, (October 1991), pp. 45-58. The army's rejuvenation after Vietnam can be traced to the efforts of Generals Creighton Abrams and William E. DePuy. Together, these two World War II veterans drew from their wartime experiences (in units subordinate to 12th Army Group) and launched the army away from its unhealthy obsession with Vietnam and maneuvered it toward the twenty-first century.

78. FM 100-5, Operations, (1986) pp. 12-13. "Air campaign" is an incorrect and non-doctrinal term in the U.S. Army, for it implies that air and ground operations are somehow separate and distinct. U.S. Army doctrine regards airpower as an integral part of AirLand operations doctrine (hence the unusual spelling) that cannot be divorced from land-based power. Use of the term also implies the contributions made by surface fires and airborne components of the U.S. Navy are part of an air-directed effort. The U.S. media and popular culture has divided the Persian Gulf War into two unequal parts to refer to the periods when airpower and then ground maneuver occupied the public attention. The term is used in this monograph in a pejorative sense.

79. Rick Atkinson, Crusade, (Boston, 1993), pp. 17-19.

80. Bolger, "The Ghosts of Omdurman," pp. 38-39.

81. Zuckerman, et al, pp. 88-89, 313-315. Two non-mechanized divisions deployed to the Persian Gulf, the 82d Airborne and the 101st Airborne (Air Assault). The 82d and 101st deployed in August 1990, strategic signature units whose moves demonstrated American resolve. Once there, both divisions were largely foot-mobile, especially the 82d, which didn't have the large number of helicopters assigned to the 101st. During the ground maneuvers in February 1991, the 82d moved across through its zone mounted on commercial and military trucks. To move by foot would have taken

weeks; to execute the unit's preferred method of parachute assault would have monopolized too many air force transport planes.

82. David C. Morrison, "The Build-Down," The Atlantic Monthly (June 1989), pp. 60-64.

83. Debra van Opstal and Andrew C. Goldberg, Meeting the Mavericks: Regional Challenges for the Next President, (Washington, DC, 1988), p. xiii.

84. Bolger, "The Ghosts of Omdurman," p. 39. U.S. Navy and Marine personnel conducted Operation Sharp Edge in Liberia during August 1990 and Operation Eastern Exit in Somalia in January 1991. Both were non-combatant evacuations of several thousand American citizens.

85. John Q. Blodgett and David B. Rivkin, "World Environment to the Year 2000," Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000, eds. Robert H. Kupperman and William J. Taylor, Jr., (Lexington, MA, 1984), pp. 65-66.

86. Thomas Perry, The Challenge to U.S. Policy in the Third World: Global Responsibilities and Regional Devolution, (Boulder, 1986), p. 19.

87. Van Opstal, pp. 11-13.

88. Ibid., p. 12.

89. Ibid., p. 13.

90. J. Bowyer Bell, "Unconventional War: The Army in the Year 2000," Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000, eds. Robert H. Kupperman and William J. Taylor, Jr., (Lexington, MA, 1984) p. 171.

91. Atkinson, pp. 85-87.

92. Robert H. Kupperman, Yonah Alexander, Debra van Opstal, and David Williamson, Jr., "Terrorism," Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000, eds. Robert H. Kupperman and William J. Taylor, Jr., (Lexington, MA, 1984), p. 192.

93. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," The Atlantic Monthly, (February 1994), pp. 44-76.

94. Ibid., pp. 47-48. According to Kaplan, 400,000 Sierra Leonians are internally displaced, 280,000 more have fled to Guinea, and 100,000 have gone to Liberia. Concurrently, Liberians fleeing civil war have crossed the borders in the opposite direction; 400,000 have gone to Sierra Leone, 600,000 to Guinea, and 250,000 to the Ivory Coast.

95. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993), pp. 23-27.

96. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," p. 72.

97. Ibid., p. 52.

98. Jennifer Morrison Taw and Robert C. Leicht, The New World Order and Army Doctrine: The Doctrinal Renaissance of Operations Short of War? (Santa Monica, 1992), p. 1.

99. FM 100-5 Operations, (1993) pp. 13-5 - 13-7.

100. James J. Schneider, "Ambushing the Future," unpublished manuscript, School of Advanced Military Studies, 14 April 1994, p. 20. Dr. Schneider suggests that Special Forces will be the hinge on which the army completes the pivot into the twenty-first century and beyond. Because Special Forces is the only institutional military force designed, trained, and capable of combat and performing the non-combat roles included in OOTW, it will often find itself the primary focus of future army operations instead of a supporting player. Schneider suggests that the conventional army needs Special Forces on a ratio of 3:1, and to achieve this, the army must create as many groups as there are divisions and corps.

101. FM 100-5, Operations, (1993), p. iv.

102. Schneider, p. 11, 16.

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