

Tactical exercises in open situations
with solutions, for the reenforced
infantry regiment and the division.

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TITLE PAGE

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Tactical exercises in open situations
with solutions, for the reenforced
infantry regiment and the division.

~~THIS~~ TRANSLATION *of*

Taktische Aufgaben aus dem Bewegungs-
kriege mit Lösungen im Rahmen des
verstärkten Inf.-Rgts. und der Div-
ision.

AUTHOR

von Cochenhausen, Lieutenant-Colonel

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TAKTISCHE AUFGABEN

aus dem Bewegungskriege

mit Lösungen

im Rahmen des verst. Inf.-Rgts.

und der Division.

Von Oberstleutnant v. Cochenhausen.

Mit einer Karte im Maßstab 1:100 000.

Verlegt bei E. S. Mittler & Sohn, Berlin

1926.

TACTICAL EXERCISES

in open situations

with solutions,

for the reenforced infantry regiment

and the division.

By Lieutenant-Colonel von Cochenhausen.

With a map on the scale of 1:100,000.

Published by E. S. Mittler & Sohn, Berlin

1926.

NOTES

The commander of the infantry is a major or brigadier general commanding the three infantry regiments of a division. See chart page 42.

Landstrum Battalion consists of Headquarters and four Companies, each 100 men.

Infantry Regiment 70 officers, 2300 enlisted

- Regimental Headquarters
- 3 Battalions, each 3 rifle and 1 machine gun company.
Strength 670
- 1 Trench Mortar Company
- 1 Infantry Gun Battery
- 1 Light Infantry Train

Reconnaissance Half Regiment should be Reconnaissance Detachment

- 1 Headquarters
- 2 Squadrons, each 5 officers, 159 enlisted
- 1 Bicyclist Company
- 1 Armored Car Troop

2d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery Regiment

- 2 Long Gun Batteries
- 1 Light Field Howitzer Battery
- 1 Light Artillery Train

Weser River is approximately 100 yards wide and unfordable.

Maps. Map of Hannover and vicinity in pocket of original book.

Preface.

The following series of exercises, which appeared in the "Militär Wochenblatt" from the fall of 1924 to the fall of 1925, treats of the combat of the reenforced infantry regiment and the infantry division in open warfare during a continuous campaign. The exercises give the person using them an opportunity to practice the making of tactical decisions and giving orders. The solutions are not meant to be any faultless solutions, but merely indicate suitable methods of working out such problems. The collection of exercises can be recommended not only to those officers who are preparing for the local examination or for a staff trip, but especially to all those who are striving to improve their tactical training.

The author.

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Tactical Exercise No. 1.

The Weser forms the boundary between a Red State on the west and a Blue State on the east. In consequence of increasing political tension both countries have put their military forces on a war footing and ordered an unusually sharp watch of the frontier by customs officials and local Landsturm troops.

The blue II. Army Corps, which has been given the mission of preventing the crossing of the Weser by hostile forces between Vlotho and Bodenwerder (not inclusive), detrains its left wing division (the 6th) along the Alfeld-Gronau-Koppenbrügge line, the trains following each other at intervals of one hour.

Upon his arrival at Koppenbrügge, at 7 p. m. on October 2nd, the commander of the infantry of the 6th Division receives the following order:

6th Div.
Ia Op. No.

Div. H.Q., Gronau, Oct. 2
5:20 p.m.

Divisional Order

for insuring the detraining of the division.

1. According to aviators' reports, the enemy was marching at noon today in considerable strength (mostly columns of vehicles) from Lengo toward Almena and from Blomberg toward Pyrmont. More activity of the enemy's patrols along the Weser. The boundary was crossed several times by the enemy's aviators.

2. The 5th Division is covering the line of the Weser below Hameln (inclusive) and the 3rd Cavalry Division above Bodenwerder (inclusive).

3. The commander of the infantry of the 6th Division will insure the detraining of the Division in the Weser sector between the 5th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division, which is to take place at the Köppenbrügge, Osterwald, Banteln and Alfeld railroad stations. Sector limits:
on the right: north edges of Gross Berkel and Klein Berkel -

bathing establishment south of Hameln (inclusive) - Hameln, southeast of Hameln - south edges of Afferde and Behrensen - north edge of Koppenbrügge;

on the left: north edges of Ottenstein and Kennade - south edges of Dohnsen and Wallensen.

Any advance of the enemy across the Weser is to be prevented.

The main forces of the division will assemble in the Koppenbrügge-Salzhemmendorf-Esbeck area.

4. In the way of units the following are available at this time:

a. already put in line for watching the Weser: headquarters, 1st Battalion and 4th Co. of 15th Landsturm Regiment at Borry, 1st Co. of 15th Landsturm Regiment at Ohsen, 2nd Co. of 15th Landsturm Regt. at Latferde, 3rd Co. of 15th Landsturm Regt. at Hajen;

b. of the 6th Division: regimental headquarters, artillery battery, and trench mortar company of the 16th Infantry Regiment at Lanenstein; 1st Battalion, 16th Inf. Regt. at Bisperode; 2nd battalion, 16th Inf. Regt. at Salzhemmendorf; 3rd Battalion, 16th Inf. Regt., on the march from Banteln Station to Billets at Esbeck; 16th Light Infantry Train Co. will arrive at Osterwald Station at 11 p.m.; 6th Reconnaissance Half-Regiment headquarters and 1st Squadron at Lanenstein; 2nd Squadron, Bicyclist Co. and Armored Car Troop at Hemmendorf; 2nd Battalion, Headquarters and 4th Battery, 6th Artillery Regt. at Salzhemmendorf; 5th Battery and light artillery train at Eime; 6th Battery at Deinsen; 1st Co., 6th Engineer Battalion, at Eime; 6th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion (consisting of one 8.8 cm., two 7.7 cm. and one 3.5 cm. anti-aircraft battery) at Gross Oldendorf; 1st Co., 6th Signal Battalion, at Benstorf. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 16th Inf. Regt. have been in their billets since early on Oct. 2nd, and the other units since the afternoon of Oct. 2nd.

5. The bridges at Ohsen have been prepared for demolition and are to be demolished if necessary. Boats have been brought to this side, as far as possible.

6. For signal communications see accompanying telephone sketch (it is assumed that all the larger villages have telephone exchanges which are taken possession of by the local Landsturm).

7. The divisional subsistence issue depot will be established at Salzheimendorf early on Oct. 3. For time for receiving supplies see special orders.

8. Collecting station for wounded: Koppenbrügge.

9. Divisional headquarters will remain at Gronau on Oct. 3, where orders are to be received at 8 p. m. The commander of the infantry will report his intentions and his new headquarters by 8 a. m. on Oct. 3. The 2nd Co., 6th Signal Battalion, is ordered to provide communication with it.

A., Major-General.

In writing by orderly officer in automobile.

Soon afterward the following report is made by telephone by the commander of the 1st Battalion, 15th Landsturm Regiment:

From Bßrry, 6:50 p.m., Oct. 2.

To the Commander of the Infantry of the 6th Div.

Officers' patrols reconnoitering at noon today at Bass Hill, south of Ohr, Steinbrügge, west of Grohnde, and Schiff Hill, south of Hehlen. Near Ohr, Hagen and Hehlen the enemy's patrols attempting to cross the Weser were driven off by fire. Shortly before nightfall, one rather long column (cavalry in close formation) was observed on the march on the road north of Hämelschenburg and another on the road from Brückeln to Hehlen. The 1st Co., 15th Regt., has just reported that it has been attacked by a rather strong force and that it has blown up the bridge at Ohsen.

P., Major.

Red has the superiority in the air and is well equipped with modern means of combat (heavy artillery and tanks).

Exercise:

1. Estimate of the situation and the terrain.

2. Orders issued by the commander of the infantry of the 6th Division.

Solution of Tactical Exercise No. 1.

1. Estimate of the Situation and the Terrain.

The reports concerning the enemy make it appear unquestionable that he is on the advance toward the Weser with strong forces and is making preparations to cross the river. He is apparently engaged in forcing a crossing by reconnaissance detachments and rather strong cavalry and appears to be exerting the greatest pressure at Ohsen and Hehlen. While the aviators have determined the presence of trains of vehicles on the march at only two points so far, it is quite probable nevertheless that strong forces of all arms have been brought up to the river by night marches. The columns of vehicles southwest of Bad Pyrmont may, for example, be supply vehicles of a unit which reached the Pyrmont area during the night of Oct. 1, coming from the west, and will be assembled west of the river during the coming night, ready to cross.

The question then is, what measures are to be taken at once to prevent the enemy from making a crossing of the river. According to the report of the commander of the Landsturm battalion, there appears to be danger of the enemy forcing a crossing at Ohsen. The conditions there are undoubtedly favorable for him (possibility of approaching and assembling under cover, weakness of the blue garrison, presence of the bridges, which perhaps have been only partly blown up). If the enemy succeeds in establishing a bridge-head tonight at and to the north of Ohsen, even tomorrow it will be hard to throw him back across the river again. It is therefore necessary to move forward a rather strong fighting force to Ohsen at once, in order to prevent this. The trouble caused to the units concerned by this will perhaps save them from a hard attack later on. To perform the mission, the 1st Battalion of the 16th Regiment, the 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment and the 4th Battery of the 6th Artillery Regiment can be considered first of all, and they appear adequate to do this.

As to the use of the other units on the following day, two possibili-

ties can be considered, allowance for which must be made in the plans formed. On the one hand, the units hastily thrown forward will not have succeeded so far in throwing the enemy back across the Weser; in that case all of the main body must be used for a counter-attack. Or on the other hand (the more probable case under the circumstances) the near bank of the Weser will still be entirely in our possession on the following morning; in that case the troops must be formed up in depth in such a way that they will be in a position to repulse any new attempt at crossing, even by strong forces of the enemy. Both possibilities will best be met by a concentration around Lauenstein on the morning of the next day.

The order even for the second case must now be prepared beforehand, so that it can be issued immediately at the place of concentration. In posting the units and in placing certain ones under the orders of certain others the various possibilities of crossing and the lay of the land on this bank must be taken into consideration. For the crossing of the river by the enemy there are to be considered primarily, besides Ohlen, the bends in the river projecting toward the west at Ohr and at Hajen-Hehlen. The former, to be sure, allows an approach under cover only to a very limited degree. A further advance on the eastern bank of the river is rendered difficult, moreover, by the wooded heights of Obensburg, Hasselburg and Hellburg. On the contrary, the bend in the Weser from Hajen to Hehlen offers the enemy the advantage that he can assemble his means of crossing and his infantry under cover of the village of Hehlen and the forest to the west of it and can take the defender under flanking artillery fire from the heights west of Grohnde and south of Hehlen. When the enemy has gained a firm footing on the right bank there and gained the Eichburg, he will not find any more difficulties on the terrain to amount to anything until he reaches the Ith. From these considerations it follows that the bend in the Weser at Hajen-Hehlen and the bridge site at Ohlen must be held strongly with troops of first quality, while weaker forces will suffice along the front of the rest of the sector.

The subordination of the troops in the sector will be determined by the Hell Hill, running along at right angles to the river as a barrier, by which the action of the artillery toward the side is also restricted. This leads to a division of the sector into two parts, in which the southern sub-sector is to be occupied more strongly. The reserve of the commander of the infantry will also be drawn up back of it, but in such a way that the northern sub-sector can also be supported quickly. The commanders of sub-sectors will likewise assemble their own reserves at Voremburg and Brockensen. It will be advisable to place the Landsturm battalion in the center of the sector, with active units on each side of it. The artillery will, owing to the great width of the sector, be placed under the orders of the commanders of sub-sectors, in doing which more attention must be paid to the southern sub-sector than to the other. All batteries must be placed at some distance from the river, so as not to be silenced immediately by the fire of the enemy's artillery, which is superior.

I.

2. Orders to be Given.

From Koppenbrügge, 8 p.m., Oct. 2nd.

6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment,
Lenzenstein.

The enemy is attacking the 1st Co., 15th Landsturm, at Ohsen. The 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment, with the 1st Battalion, 16th Inf. Regt., and the 4th Battery, 6th Art. Regt., under its orders, will prevent the enemy from crossing the river at Ohsen. Troops to be notified at once and started on the march toward Voremburg. Men to receive orders to be sent ahead to the church there, where the commander of the 6th Reconnaissance Detachment will give more detailed instructions. The units of the 1st Battalion, 15th Landsturm, fighting at Ohsen will, upon arrival of the reenforced 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment, be placed for the time being under the orders of the latter. The 1st Battalion, 16th Inf. Regt., 1st Battalion, 15th Landsturm, and 2nd Battalion, 6th Art. Regt., will be

notified directly. Reports to report center Neuhaus Farm (3 km. northwest of Harderode).

Infantry Commander II Corps.

Telephone.

Same to: 1st Battalion, 16th Inf. Regt., 2nd Battalion, 6th Art. Regt.,
16th Inf. Regt. (by way of information), 1st Battalion, 15th
Landsturm (by way of information).

II.

Inf. Commander 6th Division.

Headquarters, Koppengröße,

I. Nr.

8:30 p.m., Oct. 2.

Detachment Order for Assembling for the

Advance on Oct. 3rd.

1. The thrusts of the enemy's patrols were repulsed by the 1st Battalion, 15th Landsturm, which is guarding the stretch of the Weser from Hameln to Bodenwerder (not including these towns), at Ohr, Hagen and Hehlen. For $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours a rather strong enemy has been endeavoring to force a crossing at Ohlen. Bridges over the Weser blown up.

2. The units of the 6th Division under my command that have arrived already have the mission of preventing a crossing by the enemy in the sector between Hameln and Bodenwerder (not including these towns).

3. The 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment, under the orders of which the 1st Battalion, 16th Inf. Regt., and the 4th Battery, 6th Art. Regt., are placed, has already been started on the march via Vorenborg by special order, to prevent the enemy from crossing the river at Ohlen.

4. The other units will be drawn up as follows at 7:45 a.m. on Oct.

3, ready to march and well concealed from observation by aviators:

Hq. 16th Inf.
Hq., 2nd Bn. 6th Art.
16th Inf. Gun Batry.
16th Trench Mortar Co.
2nd Bn. 16th Inf.

Group I
on and on both sides of the Lauen-
stein-Neuhaus Farm road, head at the
edge of the wood 1 km. northeast of
Neuhaus Farm.

1st Co. 6th Sig. Bn.
3rd Bn. 16th Inf.

Group II at Lauenstein.

5th and 6th Btries. 6th Art.

Group III at Salzheimendorf.

1st Co., 6th Pioneer Bn.
Light Inf. train
Light art. train

Group IV at Hemmendorf.

5. The 6th Anti-aircraft Bn. will cover the assembling of Groups I and II from 7:30 a. m. on with two batteries and that of Groups III and IV with one battery.

6. The subsistence and baggage trains will remain in billets until 10. a. m. The former will then assemble in groups, with intervals of 20 paces between vehicles, on the roads leading from Lauenstein, Hemmendorf and Ahrenstein to Salzheimendorf, with heads at the latter village, to receive supplies at the divisional subsistence issue depot. The baggage train will occupy billets at Gross Oldendorf and Benstorf in accordance with the orders of Capt. P.

7. Collecting station: Koppenbrügge.

8. At 7. a.m. I will move from Koppenbrügge via Bisperode to Neuhaus Farm, where men to receive orders for the units mentioned under headings 4 and 5 and the artillery commander will report at 7:30. By utilizing the permanent system, the 2nd Signal Co. of the 6th Battalion will establish telephone connection with that point from the division headquarters at Gronau. From said point the 1st Co., 6th Signal Battalion will push signal communication heads forward to Voremberg and Bessinghausen first of all.

F., Brigadier-General.

Dictated to the men designated to receive orders for the 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment, 16th Inf., 2nd Bn. 6th Art., 1st Co. 6th Eng. Bn., 1st Co. 6th Signal Bn., and 6th Anti-aircraft Bn.; in writing by motorcyclist to the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm.

III.

Infantry Commander 6th Division
I. Nr.

Neuhaus Farm, morning Oct. 3.

Draft.

Detachment Order for the Defense of the Weser Sector

South of Hameln.

1. Enemy (to be filled in).
2. The 5th Div. is protecting the Weser line at and below Hameln, the 3rd Cav. Div. at and above Bodenwerder.

3. F.'s detachment will prevent the crossing of the Weser by the enemy south of Hameln and for that purpose will be disposed as follows:

A. Northern sector. Commanding officer: the commander of the 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment. Units: 1st Bn. 16th Inf. with one platoon of light trench mortars and one of infantry guns, 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment, 4th Btry. 6th Art., 1/3 of 1st Co. 6th Engr. Bn., 1/3 of light artillery train. Right boundary: north edge of Gross Berkel and Klein Berkel, bathing establishment south of Hameln (included), Hamel, southeast of Hameln, south edge of Afferde and Behrensen; left boundary: south edge of Kirchohsen, south edge of the woods east of Hagenohsen, Bessinghausen-Lauenstein road (not included). Center of the defense at Ohsen. If not yet done, bridges to be completely destroyed. Artillery action chiefly against Ohr and Kirchohsen, but also against Hameln bridge. 1st Co. 15th Landsturm in Ohsen is to be relieved as soon as the situation allows.

B. Southern sector. Officer in command: commander of the 16th Inf. Units: 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm, 2nd Bn. 16th Inf., Trench Mortar Company and 16th Infantry Gun Btry. (each less one platoon), 2nd Bn. 6th Art. (less 4th Btry.), 1/3 of 1st Co. 6th Engr. Bn., light infantry train, 2/3 of light artillery train. Protection extending as far as the line from the north edge of Ottenstein and Kemande to the south edge of Dohnsen and Wallensen. Center of the defense in the bend of the Weser from Hajen to Daspe. 6th Btry. is to be put in such a position that it can sweep the crossings at Mehlen and Bodenwerder with flanking fire and that at Hajen with frontal fire. 5th Btry. must, in addition to the missions in its own sector, also sweep the bridges at Ohsen with flanking fire.

4. Any attempt of the enemy to cross is to be nipped in the bud by immediate counter thrust by the sector reserves, which are to be strongly equipped with heavy infantry arms.

5. Close billets will be occupied by the following, which will remain at my disposal: $\frac{1}{2}$ of 3rd Bn. 16th Inf. and 1st Co. 6th Signal Bn. at Bisperode; $\frac{1}{2}$ of 3rd Bn. 16th Inf. and 1/3 of 1st Co. 6th Engr. Bn. at

Harderode.

Neuhaus Farm.

6. I will remain at ~~Neuhaus Farm~~ Neuhaus Farm. The 1st Co. 6th Signal Bn. will connect the headquarters of the two sectors, will provide lamp signal communication with the observation station to be established on the Haselburg and will establish communication with the Division by means of the permanent system. The commander of the 2nd Bn. 6th Art. will place a liaison officer at my disposal.

Distribution as for Order II.

F., Brigadier-General.

Tactical Exercise No. 2.

When the Infantry Commander arrives at Neuhaus Farm (3 km. southwest of Lauenstein) by automobile at 7:30 a.m. on Oct. 3, the men detailed to receive orders report that all the troop units have received the assembly order correctly and are on the march to the points of concentration. The following reports are on hand.

I.

Ohsen, 6:35 a.m., Oct. 3.

6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment.

To the Commander of the Infantry of the 6th Div.

Enemy forced his way into Ohsen yesterday evening over incompletely destroyed highway bridge and drove Landsturm company into wood on Bucke Hill. 1st Bn. 16th Inf. and Cyclist Co. made a surprise attack on Ohsen from the north and northwest at 5:30 a.m. after a short burst of fire from the 4th Btry. 6th Art. and took the town again. 60 prisoners belonging to the 5th Dragoon Regt., 6 machine guns and 2 armored cars captured. Enemy streamed back across the bridge in disorder, suffering severe losses. The bridge was again demolished, this time permanently. An attack by the enemy on Hameln has been going on for an hour. Heavy artillery fire on Hameln, not so strong on Tündern and Ohsen (coming from the direction of Bass Hill). I am leaving only the Cyclist Co. in Ohsen and withdrawing the 1st Bn. 16th Inf. and 1st Co. 15th Landsturm (only 50 men left) to the eastern slope of Bucke Hill as a reserve. An cover-

ing the Weser below Ohsen with both squadrons. 4th Btry. 6th Art. is going into position at Schmiede-Brink. Heavy artillery fire to the south has also been audible for half an hour. I am going to the farm 2 km. to the northeast of Ohsen and will get in touch with the signal communication head at Voremberg.

P., Lieutenant-Colonel.

In writing on report blank by Bicyclist Z.

II. From Signal Communication Head at Bessinghausen,
7:15 a.m., Oct. 3.

Commander of Infantry, 6th Division.

Since 6 a.m. the enemy has been laying a heavy harassing fire on the villages in the Latferde-Hajen-Heyen-Esperde area, has crossed the Weser at Grohnde and apparently at Hajen and is advancing with strong forces across Ilse Hill toward Kleine Hill. I am defending BÜrry with 2nd and 4th Cos. Nothing heard from the 3rd Co. Urgently ask for support, as I can not hold out long. Bauer has just reported from Broekensen that 2 armored cars are already moving through the village toward Esperde.

Telephone.

P., Major.

Hardly have these reports been read to the commander of the Infantry by the staff officer when he is urgently called for on the telephone by the 3rd Cav. Div. The commander of this division gives him the following information:

"The 9th Cavalry Regiment has just reported from Werder Hill, south-east of Bodenwerder, that it frustrated the enemy's attempt to cross at Hehlen, by the use of the artillery platoon stationed on Eck Hill, north-east of Kemnade, but that the enemy has crossed at Hajen. Ten minutes ago several armored cars were observed at Point 100, moving at full speed from Hajen to Heyen. At the same time, deployed infantry emerged from Hajen. I will move my divisional reserve (one bicycle company and one squadron), stationed back of the northern sector, from Kirchbrak to Kruck Hill, south of Dreipke. I can not do more. What do you intend to do?"

At this moment the 1st Anti-aircraft Battery, stationed at Bisperode,

opens a lively fire against a hostile bombing squadron, which shortly afterward drops 10-15 bombs over ^{Neuhaus} ~~Harkness~~ Farm and flies on in the direction of Lauenstein. Of the men assembled to receive orders, two are killed and several wounded.

Weather: sunny, mist close to the ground.

Exercises: 1st. What answer does the Commander of the Infantry of the 6th Division give to the Commander of the 3rd Cavalry Division (word for word)? 2nd. What orders does he issue?

Solution of Tactical Exercise No. 2.

1. What answer does the Commander of the Infantry of the

6th Division give to the Commander of the 3rd Cavalry Division?

"At Hameln the enemy is apparently attacking in considerable strength; more details not known as yet. At Ohlen the enemy's attempt to cross was frustrated by a counter attack. The enemy has crossed at Grohnde and Hajen and is attacking Borry, which is defended by the Landsturm.

I will start everything that I can make available for an enveloping counter attack against the enemy's left wing at Borry. Attack will be effective in $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 hours. I ask you to prevent an advance of the enemy from Hajen to the eastward with the forces available on the right wing of the 3rd Cavalry Division.

I am going to Bessinghausen and request that information on the situation be communicated frequently to the telephone exchange there."

2. What orders does he give?

I.

^{Neuhaus}
From ~~Neuhaus~~ Farm, 7:50 a.m., Oct. 3.

6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment.

The enemy has gained this bank to the east of Grohnde and is making an attack on the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm at Borry. My group will throw him back across the river. The Reconnaissance Half-regiment will keep its former mission, will find out as soon as possible just what the situation is at Hameln and will then send the 1st Bn. 16th Inf. into the piece

of woods north of Latferde. The battalion will make a surprise attack from there on the enemy's left wing at Latferde and will again come under the orders of its regiment, the intervention of which, to be expected in $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours, is not to be waited for. I am going to the signal communication head at Bessinghausen.

Telephone conversation.

Infantry Commander 6th Div.

II.

Commander of Infantry, 6th Div.

Combat headquarters,
Neuhaus Farm,
8 a.m., Oct. 3.

To Commander, 16th Inf.

16th Inf. (less 1st Bn.) will start for Bessinghausen, with two or three times the usual marching intervals, for protection from aviators; look out for the enemy's armored cars, which are to be expected from Harderode. Engr. Co. should likewise follow. Transmit order to the latter. Light infantry train to follow only as far as Lauenstein. Commander of 16th Inf. and commander of engr. co. will go ahead to the western turn of the highway on Tappen Hill.

Verbally by orderly officer Lieut. B.
(written by the latter in code).

Inf. Commander 6th Div.

III.

Orally to the commander of the 2nd Bn. 6th Artillery at 8:10 a.m.:
"The battalion (less 4th Btry.) is to be rushed forward to Tappen Hill, trotting past the infantry on the right with extended march intervals. Light artillery train to be moved up only to Lauenstein for the present. You will follow me to the most westerly bend of the highroad on Tappen Hill."

Thereupon the Commander of the Infantry goes to Tappen Hill by automobile and has the telephone exchange at the Bessinghausen signal communication head occupied by an officer, who transmits the following telephone message to the commander of the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm:

IV.

From Bessinghausen, 8:30 a.m., Oct. 3.

1st Bn. 15th Landsturm.

Börry is to be held. The reenforced 16th Inf. will attack from Ohsen and Bessinghausen. The enemy is to be thrown back behind the river. Reports to be sent to Bessinghausen.

Telephone message.

Commander of Infantry, 6th Div.

Tactical Exercise No. 3.

When the Commander of the Infantry reaches the westernmost point of the highway on Tappen Hill at 8:20, he meets 5 wagons of the combat train of the 1st Battalion of the 15th Landsturm, which come toward him at a gallop, with horses very tired. The commander states that the enemy has penetrated into Börry and that he and his men escaped being captured by a hair's breadth. The Commander of the Infantry sees through the scissors telescope that has been set up in the meantime that numerous isolated men are retiring along the roads leading from the eastern exit of Börry to the north and to Bessinghausen. Scattering rifle shots are still being fired. From Kleine Hill (south of Börry) light skirmish groups are advancing on Brockensen. The enemy's artillery is dropping bursts of fire on Esperde and Heyen from time to time.

Soon afterward the officer in command of the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm comes riding up and reports: "Greatly superior enemy with numerous machine guns and infantry guns made an enveloping attack on Börry from the west and the south. As the town was besides under heavy artillery fire from the other bank of the Weser, I had to evacuate it. Both of my companies have been badly ^{cut} ~~knocked~~ up. What little is left of them is no longer under my control."

The Commander of the Infantry now hears brisk machine gun and rifle fire to the rear of him. At 8:30 a.m. the commander of the 16th Infantry arrives with the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions and reports that 3 of the enemy's armored cars had pushed forward from Harderode to Neuhaus Farm, but had been shot to pieces by the fire of the infantry gun battery. He states that the foremost battalion can reach the edge of

the wood on the highroad north of Tappen Hill in about 10 minutes. The commander of the 2nd Bn. 6th Art. reports that he has found a favorable emplacement just north of Bessinghausen, allowing fire to be directed on Borry and Broekensen. But the battalion can not arrive before 9:45 at the earliest.

Then the following message is brought by an orderly from the Bessinghausen telephone exchange:

Vorenberg, 8:30 a.m., Oct. 3.

Commander of Infantry, 6th Div.

The 5th Division has just reported that a strong force of the enemy has taken Hameln. Two battalions have been started from Holtensen for a counter attack. The 4th Btry. has started firing from Schmiede-Brink at the enemy's infantry at the southeast edge of Hameln. The 1st Bn. 16th Inf. kept by me at Point 110 (2.5 km. east of Hagenohsen). I ask that it be placed under my orders again, as the Bicycle Co. at the brickyard 2 km. southeast of Hameln is not sufficient for flank protection.

P., Major, Commander of 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment.

Exercises: A. decision of the commander of the infantry, giving reasons;
B. orders.

Solution of Tactical Exercise No. 3.

a. Decision of the Commander of the Infantry, reasons being given.

Although Hameln and Borry have been lost, the Commander of the Infantry sticks to his decision to make an enveloping attack on the northern wing of the enemy who has crossed at Grohnde and Hagen and thrown him back across the Weser.

Reasons: The 1st Battalion of the 15th Landsturm has been thrown out of Borry with heavy losses. That was to be foreseen, in view of the superiority of the enemy in numbers and equipment. But the prospects of the success of an attack on the northern wing of the enemy are not greatly reduced by this. The reenforced 16th Inf. is in just as good condition

for fighting as before and has the proud consciousness of having just beaten off the attack by the enemy's armored cars. In fact, the attack has even become more likely to succeed, because the enemy, by his further advance to the eastward, is exposing his open northern flank to attack more than before. If the Commander of the Infantry should decide to defend Tappen Hill, the enemy would keep moving more forces across the Weser and would soon force the position. An attack from Tappen Hill would lead over open country and strike the enemy in front.

Nor can the news of the capture of Hameln by the enemy make any change in the decision formed. In all probability, the counter attack by the reserves of the 5th Division from Holtensen against Hameln will at least prevent the enemy from penetrating further to the east or southeast from Hameln for the time being. But if this does happen, he can be held up for some time on the entirely open terrain by the Reconnaissance Half-regiment and the fire of the 4th Btry. Therefore it is scarcely to be assumed that he can intervene directly today in the fighting at Borry.

The situation demands that a rapid success be gained at Borry, so that the forces there will soon be released and can subsequently assist the 5th Division in driving back the adversary at Hameln. This quick success at Borry can only be obtained, however, if all available forces are employed in it and if the thrust strikes the enemy's flank unexpectedly. To do this, a new front must be presented to the enemy southwest of Bessinghausen and the bulk of the infantry sent against Borry from the north. The commander of the Reconnaissance Half-regiment must immediately cancel the arbitrary retention of the 1st Bn. 16th Inf. and with the rest of his forces keep the rear of the reenforced 16th Inf. clear.

b. Orders.

1. Orally to the commander of the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm and the commander of the 16th Inf. in the presence of the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions and the commander of the artillery; written down by the adjutants in code:

"The commander of the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm is to form a new fire front with his battalion there at Point 119 southwest of Bessinghausen, exposing his person recklessly, and cover the 2nd Bn. 6th Art. going into position at Bessinghausen.

The commander of the 16th Inf. will bring up two machine gun accompanying platoons and the available bicyclists as soon as possible and will post them on the front stated as stays for the Landsturm. These men will be under the orders of the commander of the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm.

I will remain here."

2. Orally to the commander of the 16th Inf. and the commander of the 2nd Bn. 6th Art. in the presence of the battalion commanders; written down in code by the adjutants at the same time;

"The 16th Inf. (less 1st Bn.) will turn off from the highway still more to the west, north of the boundary of the State, and will reach the piece of woods west of Point 195 (2 km. northeast of Berry). The 1st Bn. 16th Inf. will be started on the march by the Reconnaissance Half-regiment to the crossroads 500 m. east of Hell Hill.

The regiment will then form up for the attack on Berry, completely concealed in the wood, echeloned in depth on the right wing, and will leave two companies back of its center at my disposal. Report to be made when in readiness. Attack to be started at my command. The attack is to be supported by the 2nd Bn. 6th Art. (less 4th Btry.), which will go into the position located at Bessinghausen as soon as possible and will first of all provide fire protection for the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm.

I will remain here and will have wire connection with the battle headquarters of the regiment establishment by the Signal Co."

3. Telephone message to the 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment.

From Bessinghausen, 8:50 a.m., Oct. 3.

6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment.

The reenforced 16th Inf. will attack from the forest north of Berry the northern wing of the enemy who has captured Berry.

The 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment will keep the area back of the regiment free of enemies coming from Hameln and will immediately place the 1st Bn. 16th Inf. at the disposal of the regiment and start it on the march for the crossroads 500 m. east of Hell Hill. Report performance.

Armored car troop will move via Bisperode to Neuhaus Farm, to be placed at my disposal.

Reports to the Bessinghausen signal communication head.

Commander of Infantry, 5th Div.

4. Orally to the commander of the Engr. Co. which has arrived in the meantime: "Company, at my disposal, will move to Point 233 on Tappen Hill."

Tactical Exercise No. 4.

The orders of the Commander of the Infantry succeeded in bringing to a halt again southwest of Bessinghausen the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm, which was streaming back from Berry. At 9:20 a.m. two machine gun accompanying platoons arrived and about 50 bicyclists of the 16th Inf., who strengthened the front and caused heavy losses to the far superior enemy pressing after the Landsturm from Berry. The enemy succeeded in working his way forward to the bend in the highroad one km. southwest of Bessinghausen. He lay down there and stopped. Other hostile forces advanced across Kleine Hill and from Brockensen in a northeasterly direction against the left wing of the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm, but likewise suffered severe losses from the fire of the 2nd Bn. 6th Art. (less 4th Btry.) which went into position northwest of Bessinghausen about 10 o'clock, so that the foremost portions did not extend much beyond the Berry-Esperde road. From 10:15 a.m. on, the enemy's artillery fired on Bessinghausen from the vicinity of Neuhaus Frenke. Esperde and the road from ~~Neuhaus~~ Farm to Bessinghausen were kept under constant bursts of fire from the other side of the Weser, from the region of Grohnde Forest.

That was the situation when at 10:45 a. m. the lining up of the 16th Inf. in the wood north of Berry was completed. Close reconnaissance had

shown that there were only weak covering forces on the roads leading out of the village toward the north, while the left wing of the enemy lying opposite the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm was about in the ravine 1 km. west of Point 119, with the front curved back to the north. At 10.50 a.m. the 2nd Bn. 6th Art., the 16th Trench Mortar Co. and all available heavy machine guns of the 16th Inf. threw a violent burst of fire lasting for five minutes on the enemy's covering troops north of Berry, while at the same time the 16th Infantry Gun Battery took them under point-blank fire from concealed emplacements in the woods. Then the 16th Inf. dashed to the attack with two battalions in the front line. The 1st Bn., advancing on the right, headed for Berry, overran the enemy's sentries and penetrated, almost without fighting, into the village, which was filled to overflowing with vehicles. When the foremost portions of the battalion reached the southwest exit of the village, two of the enemy's batteries which were in position west of Kleine Hill were bringing up their limbers to change position. They were overwhelmed by fire and captured after a brave resistance. In the meantime the 2nd Bn. had advanced beyond Berry in a more southeasterly direction, likewise met with only slight resistance and struck unexpectedly in the flank and rear of the foe engaged in combat southwest of Bessinghausen. Three to four hundred prisoners, sixteen machine guns, and several infantry guns and trench mortars were captured. The enemy sought to escape by fleeing to the south, but suffered heavy losses in doing so.

Pursuit was taken up at once and led the 1st Bn. as far as Frenke and the 2nd Bn. as far as Brockensen; during the pursuit the number of prisoners was augmented considerably. The 3rd Bn., which had followed the 1st, was started across Ilse Hill toward the ferry at Grohnde. The enemy, who, as was learned, had finished a bridge at Grohnde in the meantime, formed a new fire front along the Hajen-Latferde road. At 3 p. m. the attack of the 3rd and 1st Battalions against this front was started, which was supported by the 2nd Bn. 6th Art., which had advanced in the

meantime to Kleine Hill. But the attack moved forward only slowly, because the enemy's artillery fire from the west bank of the Weser was gradually strengthened considerably. At 4:30 p.m., at nightfall, the foremost attacking groups had only come up even with the Ilse Mill. But the attempt to destroy the pontoon bridge at Grohnde by artillery fire had been successful. At that time the other units were located as follows: the 2nd Bn. 16th Inf., in advancing to Eich Hill, had stumbled across the enemy in the wood there, with whom it was in violent combat; the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm (still 150 men), with two accompanying machine gun platoons of the 16th Inf. and the 1st Co. 6th Engr. Bn., at Brockensen, was at the disposal of the Commander of the Infantry; the troop of armored cars had moved forward to Bërry.

The commander of the 16th Inf., who is directing the attack against the bridge site at Grohnde, is 1 km. south of Bërry. He still has at his disposal one platoon of medium trench mortars and one of infantry guns.

Reports had been received several times from the 3rd Cav. Div., next in line on the left, stating that its weak forces (1 bicyclist company, one squadron, one artillery platoon) had succeeded in checking the enemy who had pressed forward from Hajen at Point 158, southeast of Heyen. After 1 p. m. the latter (about one battalion) had withdrawn again into the wood on Eich Hill. On the other hand, a greatly superior enemy had crossed the Weser during the morning hours at and south of Dölme and had broken through the very thin line of the 3rd Cav. Div. According to the last reports, the enemy was already in front of Eschershausen.

The 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment had reported, on the basis of reports received by it from the 5th Division, that the counter attack of the two battalions of the 5th Division made from Holtensen had been unsuccessful and that the enemy, who was constantly being reenforced, had captured Rohrsen and Afferde. Shortly after 2 p. m. a rather strong force of the enemy had also attacked the bicycle company at the brick-yard 2 km. southeast of Hueseln. The company had to retreat, under flanking artillery

fire from the direction of Klein Barkel. At the same time, the enemy's armored cars, together with cavalry and bicyclists, dashed out from the eastern exit of Hameln toward Hastenbeck and captured the place, during which action the 1st Squadron suffered the loss of a number of prisoners. The commander of the Reconnaissance Half-regiment reported at 3:30 p. m. that nothing had been heard from the bicycle company and that he intended to defend Katz Hill, southeast of Vörsenberg, with the 1st and 2nd Squadrons, 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm and 4th Btry. 6th Art.

At 4:30 p. m. the 2nd Staff Officer of the 6th Div. reaches the headquarters of the Infantry Commander by automobile and brings the following order:

6th Division
1a No.

Div. Hq. Gronau, 3 p.m. Oct. 3.

To Commander of Infantry of 6th Div.

Wide penetration of the enemy in the area of the 3rd Cav. Div. makes it necessary to use the main body of the 6th Div. for a counter attack in the direction of Eschershausen. The 3rd Cav. Div. is placed under the orders of the 6th Div. On the left wing of the 5th Div. the foe has taken Hameln. But a counter attack is said to be going on. Impossible to get into communication with them since 2 p.m.

The Commander of the Infantry of the 6th Div. will retain command in the sector assigned to him, will throw the enemy in it back across the Weser and is to check the enemy's penetration at Hameln in cooperation with the 5th Div.

Report soon to Weenzen on situation there and intentions.

A., Major-General.

Soon afterward the following radio message from the 5th Div. is received:

Commander of Infantry, 6th Div.

Left wing of 5th Div. is to face the enemy from Hachsdahlen to Koppengrünge. You will protect left wing at Lauenstein.

5th Div.

Exercises: 1. Estimate of the situation and decision of the Commander of Infantry of the 6th Div.

2. Orders.

Solution of Tactical Exercise No. 4.

1. Estimate of the Situation and Decision of the Commander of Infantry of the 6th Division.

The troops of the Infantry Commander of the 6th Division have won a brilliant victory. The enemy who had advanced through Grohnde and Hajen has been thrown back almost to the Weser, suffering heavy losses, and the bridge at Grohnde has been destroyed. According to the mission assigned by the commander of the 6th Division, the elements of the enemy still on the near bank must be driven across the river and then the enemy who has crossed at Hameln must be attacked. But the order of the 5th Div. of 3 p. m. on Oct. 3 is based on a conception of the situation that is no longer correct, the situation having been changed by subsequent events. It is no longer a question, as the Division apparently still believes, of a penetration of the enemy at Hameln into a limited area, which can be wiped out again by a combined counter attack of the left wing of the 5th Div. and the troops of the Commander of Infantry of the 6th Div. On the contrary, the counter attack of the 5th Div. made from Holtensen has failed, and its left wing must be in full retreat to the Hachenthalen-Koppengrütze position, which is about 13 km. away from the river. From this and from the request of the 5th Div. for protection of its left flank at Lauenstein it follows that the latter division has temporarily given up the intention of driving the enemy facing it back across the Weser.

The troops under the Commander of Infantry of the 6th Div. are not capable of accomplishing this mission by their own strength, for it must be assumed that the enemy will move quite considerable forces to this side of the Weser via Hameln during the night. Besides, such an attack would have a prospect of success only if the enemy along our own front were first driven back across the Weser. But there is little prospect of that, con-

sidering the enemy's strong artillery on the left bank of the Weser, which has got the range well by firing. What was not successful today by daylight will hardly be any more successful at night. But if we wait until tomorrow morning the enemy from Hameln may appear on the right flank, via Voremborg and Bisperode. As we do not know either, whether the right wing of the 3rd Cav. Div. is still holding out at Bodenwerder or how long it can do so, the left flank is also menaced by the enemy's forces which have crossed south of Dülme.

It follows from this that extrication from the enemy is advisable as soon as possible. How far to withdraw depends on the new plan which the Commander of Infantry of the 6th Div. must work out for himself. If he were merely to block the defile of Lauenstein, acting on the defensive, as asked by the 5th Div., the enemy who has crossed at Grohnde and Hajen might turn to the southeast, via Halle, against the right wing of the main body of the 6th Div. The counter-attack of the latter might be frustrated thereby. Hence a position will have to be selected from which we can prevent the enemy facing us from marching off to the southeast and yet can cover the left flank of the 5th Div. A formation with one rather weak group (1 bn., Reconnaissance Half-regiment, and 1 btry.) at Neuhaus Farm and a stronger one (main forces of the detachment) on Langel's Hill, west of Bremke. The first group, at the easily blocked Lauenstein gap, will prevent a turning of the left wing of the 5th Div.; the second one will flank any advance of the enemy either toward Neuhaus Farm via Berry or toward Halle via Heyen.

The Commander of the Infantry of the 6th Div. therefore decides to withdraw the 1st and 2nd Bns. 16th Inf., the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm, the 2nd Bn. 6th Art. (less 4th Btry.) and the 1st Co. 6th Engr. Bn. to Langel's Hill via Esperde after nightfall, leaving weak covering parties facing the enemy, and the 3rd Bn. 16th Inf. and reenforced 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment to Neuhaus Farm. The breaking off of contact with the enemy will be screened by a flanking advance of the armored car troop through Latferde.

2. Orders of the Infantry Commander of the 6th Div.

1. Communicated personally by telephone to the commander of the 16th Inf. (the commanders of the 2nd Bn. 6th Art., 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm, 1st Co. 6 Engr. Bn. and 1st Co. 6th Signal Bn. listen in, as does the aide-de-camp of the Infantry Commander).

"The situation on the front of the 5th Division, whose left wing is retreating to Keppenbrügge, compels us also to withdraw to the line from Neuhaus Farm to Langel's Hill, west of Bremke. Break off contact of your combat group with the enemy beginning at 9 p. m., and that of the 2nd Bn. about three-quarters of an hour later. Prior to that, all the vehicles of the combat train that are not absolutely necessary for the combat are to be sent back to Salzheimendorf via Neuhaus Farm, as are all wounded who can be transported. Prisoners and booty are to be sent to Brockensen by 8 p.m., from whence they will be taken on along the same road by a detail from the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm.

The retreat is planned in such a way that the 3rd Battalion will withdraw to Neuhaus Farm, all other organizations to Langel's Hill. The retreat of the 3rd Battalion will be covered by the 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment on Katz Hill, southeast of Voremborg. On the other hand, elements of the Battalion that can move at once must be sent to Bisperode, as an advance of the enemy from Diedersen in that direction is possible.

My telephone line to you and the permanent line from Brockensen to Bessinghausen and Neuhaus Farm will be dismantled starting at 7:30 P. M. A written order will follow about 5:30 p.m. You will move your combat headquarters to my post at Brockensen as soon as you have made your arrangements."

II. The aide-de-camp, who has written this down in cipher, takes the first two copies of the above order to the 2nd Bn.

III. Orally to the commander of the 1st Co. 6th Engr. Bn. (written down by the latter in code): "Your company will march at once to Bremke. You will reconnoiter the roads leading from the school 1 km. north of

Bremke to Salzhemmendorf and from Bremke to the stone mill in the ^{pond} ~~pond~~ southwest of Ockensen and tonight will prepare the better of the two for use by artillery. Report on the result of the reconnaissance to Bremke."

IV. Commander of the Infantry of the 6th ^{Div.} ~~Div.~~ No. I.

Combat Hq. at Brockensen, 5:15 p.m., Oct. 3.

Detachment Order.

1. The enemy has advanced from Hameln through Rohrsen, Afferde and Hastenbeck. The 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment is holding Katz Hill southeast of Voremborg. The left wing of the 5th Div. is facing the enemy again at Koppenbrügge. The main body of the 6th Div. is advancing through Weenzen toward Eschershausen for a counter attack against the enemy who has broken through the 3rd Cav. Div.

2. In spite of its brilliant success, the detachment must withdraw to the line from Neuhaus Farm to Langel's Hill, to the west of Bremke, in consequence of the menacing of its flanks. It will offer obstinate resistance there to the further advance of the enemy.

3. (a) The North Combat Group (under the Commander of the 3rd Bn. 16th Inf. and consisting of the 3rd Bn. 16th Inf., 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment, including armored car troop, and 4th Btry. 6th Art.) will retreat through Borry to Neuhaus Farm. It will bar the defile at Lauenstein and cover the left flank of the 5th Div., with which it will get in touch ~~touch~~ as soon as possible. Bisperode, Hasselburg and Tappen Hill are to be occupied by rearward parties. Reconnaissance will determine as soon as possible whether the enemy has crossed the Behrensen-Diedersen-Voremborg line and if so, how far.

The South Combat Group (under the Commander of the 16th Inf. and consisting of the 16th Inf., less the 3rd Bn., the 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm, the 2nd Bn. 6th Art., less the 4th Btry., the 1st Co. 6th Engr. Bn. and 1st Co. 6th Signal Bn.) will retreat through Esperde to Langel's Hill, west of Bremke. It will prevent the advance of the enemy to the east through Esperde and toward Halle through Heyen. Strong echelonning on the left. Rebenstein, Esperde and Hain Hill, northwest of Wegensen, are

to be occupied by rearward parties. Connection with the right wing of
3rd
the ~~3rd~~ Cav. Div. is to be sought for by reconnaissance.

The rearward parties must not allow themselves to be involved in any decisive combat.

4. The 3rd and 1st Bns. will break off contact with the enemy at 9 p.m. Shortly before that, the armored cars under the orders of the 16th Inf. will dash forward through ^{Latferde} ~~Brenke~~ against the enemy's left wing as a diversion, a brisk fire being kept up all along the front. The 2nd Bn. will disengage itself as soon as the 1st Bn. has crossed the Heyen-Berry road. Small parties of picked men will remain in contact with the enemy.

5. The 2nd Bn. 6th Art. (less 4th Btry.) will lay down short bursts of fire on the enemy's position every half hour from 5 to 9 p. m. and will then retreat. The Light Art. Train will place ammunition in new positions on Langel's Hill and then will march to Hemmendorf to refill.

6. The 1st Co. 6th Engr. Bn. has orders to prepare a road over the Ith, from the neighborhood of Brenke, for use by artillery.

7. The 1st Co. 6th Signal Bn. will lay a wire connection from my new combat headquarters at Brenke along the ridge of the Ith to the North Combat Group and will also establish connection with the peacetime system at Salzhemmendorf.

8. The subsistence train for the North Combat Group will be assembled at Lauenstein, and that for the South Combat Group at Salzhemmendorf. The rolling kitchen will be filled up there. Fodder for the horses is to be purchased in the nearest villages. The baggage train is to be assembled at Banteln.

9. I will remain at Brockensen until 9:30 p. m. and will then go to the new battle headquarters at Brenke.

B., Brigadier-General.

Dictated to persons designated to receive orders by the 16th Inf., 3rd Bn. 16th Inf., 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm, 2nd Bn. 6th Art., 1st Co. 6th Engr. Bn. and 1st Co. 6th Signal Bn.

In writing by cyclist to 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment.

V. Infantry Commander of the 6th Div. No. 1.

Combat Hq. at Brockensen, 5:30 p.m., Oct. 3.

1. After a brilliant victory over the enemy, the Detachment will have to retreat to Neuhaus Farm-Bremke because of menace to its flanks.
2. The Subsistence Train of the 3rd Bn. 16th Inf., 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment, and 4th Btry. 6th Art. will move to Lauenstein and that for the other units to Salzheimendorf; the rolling kitchens are to be filled there.
3. The baggage trains of all units will go to Banteln.
4. Men to receive orders will be sent to Bremke.

B., Brigadier-General.

In writing by motor-cyclists.

Tactical Exercise No. 5.

The breaking off of contact with the enemy by the troops of the Commander of Infantry of the 6th Division was completed according to orders on the evening of Oct. 3. The enemy did not follow until the morning of Oct. 4, and then hesitatingly. The 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment was moved back to Neuhaus Farm via Hasselburg, as the foe drove our covering detachments out of Bisperode at daybreak. Toward noon, a rather strong enemy advanced through Bessinghausen. In spite of the very effective flanking fire of the 2nd Bn. 6th Art., which had gone into position east of Langel's Hill (west of Bremke), he got possession of Tappen Hill at 2 p.m. Under the protection of fire from two or three batteries in the neighborhood of Kleine Hill (south of Berry) and two or three near Wein Hill (west of Heyen), the enemy's infantry advanced at the same time from Brockensen and Heyen on Esperde, which was occupied by the adversary toward 3 p. m. after light fighting with the blue rearguard troops. The enemy gradually extended his right wing as far as the school one kilometer northwest of Wegensen. On the other hand, the South Combat Group had occupied the piece of woods on Langel's Hill (1st Bn. 15th Landsturm less 1st Co., with the

northern half facing toward the west, the 2nd Bn. 16th Inf. with the southern half facing toward the southwest, and one company pushed forward to Main Hill). The 1st Bn. 16th Inf. was at the disposal of the Commander of the Infantry at Welliehausen; one platoon was still holding the southeast corner of the wood on the Rebenstein. The 1st Co. 6th Engr. Bn. has made the Welliehausen-Salzhermendorf road passable for vehicles and is resting in the wood northeast of Welliehausen. It has reported that the road from Bremke to the stone mill in the pond can not be used by vehicles. The commander of the 16th Inf. had his battle headquarters at Bremke and was connected with the observation post at Point 367, west of Ockensen, by telephone.

Of the North Combat Group, the 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment (2 sq., 20 bicyclists and 1st Co. 15th Landsturm, 50 men) had its left wing at Neuhaus Farm and was facing to the northwest, toward a rather strong enemy who had occupied Bisperode. South of it and in touch with it lay the 3rd Bn. 16th Inf. along the Neuhaus Farm-Harderode road, in combat with the enemy who had worked his way from Tappen Hill up to within about 600 m. One of the enemy's batteries was firing from the region of Bisperode and one from the vicinity of Vorenberg, chiefly at the 4th Btry. 6th Art., which was standing in very extended order on the edge of the wood east of Harderode House, had already suffered considerable losses and was combatting the enemy's infantry. The Gronau Landsturm Battalion (400 men) has reached Lauenstein and has been placed under the orders of the North Combat Group. The armored car troop has moved back to the same point.

The Commander of Infantry of the 6th Division, who is at Point 320 (2 km. northeast of Bremke), and is connected with the commanders of the two combat groups by telephone, has heard the sound of heavy fighting to the north and south all day long. He has learned from the 5th Division that its left wing has been under a strong attack at Heerburg (west of Koppentrage) since noon. From his own 6th Division he has heard that

on advancing through Weenzen in the morning it had encountered the enemy even at Fölzhausen and had thrown him back to Kapellenhagen. But at noon a stronger force of the enemy had advanced over the Ith against its right wing, so that about 3:30 p. m. its own line of battle ran from the coal mine on the west edge of the Weenzer Forest through Fölzhausen to one km. north of Kapellenhagen. The enemy is greatly superior in artillery, but has suffered very heavy losses during the attack. Since that time it had been impossible to get into communication with the Division. The Bicycle Co. of the 16th Inf, which had gotten in touch at Dohmsen with P.'s combat group of the 3rd Cav. Div. ($\frac{1}{2}$ -3-1), which had got separated from the main body, reported at noon that a rather strong enemy with artillery, coming from Halle, had gone into action against P.'s Combat Group, and that the latter probably could not hold out much longer on the edge of the wood west of Elsenstein. At 3. p. m. the enemy also was occupying Wegensen and Dohmsen. The Bicycle Co. retreated to the forks of the road north west of Dohmsen.

After filling up the rolling kitchens the subsistence train is resting at Salzhamendorf. The refilled light ammunition column is at Eggersen and the baggage train at Banteln.

This is the situation when shortly after 5. p. m. the following two reports are placed before the Commander of the Infantry of the 6th Div.:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Intelligence Officer of the Commander of Infantry of the 6th Div., with the 5th Div. | Ruh Brink south of Brunnigh., 3:10 p. m., Oct. 3. |
|---|---|

To Commander of Infantry of 6th Div.

Enemy forced his way up to Heerburg. Left wing 5th Div. must therefore be moved back to Brunninghausen-Dorpe after nightfall. Forces not available for barring the defile of Voldagsen here. Divisional headquarters to be moved to Springs.

In writing by Motorcyclist Z.

L., Lieut.

2.

From Thüste, 4:40 p.m., Oct. 3.

6th Div.

Enemy is attacking Wallensen; must evacuate the place.

Radio.

P., Major 3rd Cav. Div.

Exercises: (a) brief statement of the decision of the Commander of the Infantry of the 6th Div., giving reasons; (b) orders.

Solution of Tactical Exercise No. 5.

(a) Brief Statement of the Decision of Inf. Com. 6th Div., with Reasons.

Decision: To withdraw behind the Ith. The passages across the Ith at Harderode House and to the east of Welliehausen to be blocked by Landsturm. The Voldagsen defile to be protected by the Reconnaissance Half-regiment. Attack with all other forces against the enemy's flank at Wallensen, early on Oct. 5.

Reasons: Impossible to remain west of the Ith on account of the menace to the flank from Koppenbrugge and Wallensen. Therefore withdrawal must be made to the Hemmendorf-Salzchemmendorf line. In this position it would be possible to check frontally for some time longer the enemy pressing after us through Voldagsen and Lauenstein and from Brenke. But support of adjacent units is precluded if this decision is made. Such support must be striven for, however, to provide a powerful check to the enemy's advance. An advance of the detachment against the right flank of the enemy pursuing the 5th Div. through Voldagsen, similar to an attack, not very likely to succeed, for our own rear would be menaced by the enemy at Wallensen. Even if a local success is gained at Voldagsen, it will hardly be lasting, as the 5th Div. apparently has only little fighting power left and the detachment is too weak to bring about a decisive change there.

It will be different if the detachment engages in the combat of the 6th Div. The latter is still fresh and has already caused the foe very heavy losses. If a surprise attack by the detachment is driven into the enemy's exposed left flank at Wallensen on the following morning, starting from Ockensen, a decisive victory may be gained here in cooperation with the 6th Div. The main body of the 6th Div. can be relieved thereby, to take some of the pressure off the 5th Div.

It is a prerequisite for the success of the undertaking, that the enemy at present on our own front be prevented from exerting any action.

After the severe beating that the detachment inflicted on him yesterday, he apparently has no great attacking power for the time being. Therefore in conjunction with the Ith, which is hard to cross, this duty can be performed by Landsturm.

b. Orders.

I. By telephone to the commander of the North Combat Group (commander of 3rd Bn. 16th Inf.), 5:20 p.m.

"At 7. p. m., retreat to Lauenstein, leaving sentries in your present position. The Gronau Landsturm Battalion, with the 1st Co. 15th Landsturm, the 3rd Machine Gun Co. 16th Inf., and one gun of the 4th Btry. 6th Art., will also block the Lauenstein Gap (main fighting line on the ridge of the Ith, combat outposts on the west edge of the wood). All parts of the train that can be spared are to be sent to Deilmissen. The following will be ready at 10 p. m. for further use: 3rd Bn. 16th Inf. (less Machine Co.) and $\frac{1}{2}$ 4th Btry. 6th Art. at the northwest entrance to Salzheimendorf; and 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment \begin{array}{l} \text{and} \\ \text{one gun of the 4th Btry. 6th Art. at} \end{array} Spiegelberg; men to receive messages at the telephone exchanges there."

II. By telephone to the Commander of the South Combat Group (Commander of the 16th Inf.), 5:30 p. m. (sent at the same time to the commander of the 1st Co. 6th Engr. Bn.).

"At 7 p. m. you will withdraw to Salzheimendorf, leaving sentries in your present position. 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm and one gun of the 2nd Bn. 6th Art. will also bar the Welliehausen-Salzheimendorf road. All elements of the train that can be spared are to be sent back to Deilmissen at once. The 1st Co. 6th Engrs. will be employed by me for barricading and wiring the Bremke-Ockensen road."

III. Commander of Infantry, 6th Div.

Point 320 (2 km. north-east of Bremke) 5:40 p. m., Oct. 4.

"To the Commander of the Subsistence Train, Salzheimendorf.

Move at once to Deilmissen. Occupy billets from which you can move quickly, with covering parties toward Esbeck and Heinsen. Report arrival by telephone message to Salzheimendorf.

Infantry Commander, 6th Div."

IV. Orally to the commander of the 1st Bn. 16th Inf., who has been summoned.

"The detachment is going to retreat behind the Ith after nightfall and will make an outflanking attack on the enemy tomorrow morning at Wallensen with its main forces.

You will transfer the command of your battalion to the senior company commander and are given the duty of preventing an advance of the enemy now facing us across the Ith as long as possible. There are at your disposal:

A. at the Lauenstein Gap: the Gronau Landsturm Battalion (400 men), 1st Co. 15th Landsturm (50 men), machine gun company of the 3rd Bn. 16th Inf., one gun of the 4th Btry. 6th Art.;

B. on the Welliehausen-Salzheimendorf road: 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm (less 1st Co.) and one gun of the 2nd Bn., 6th Art. x;

C. on the Brenke-Öckensen road: 1st Co. 6th Engrs.

In addition, one platoon of the 1st Co. 6th Signal Bn., the lines constructed by which from Point 320 to Harderode House and Brenke will be taken over by you.

The main thing is to deceive the enemy as long as possible concerning your weakness. In view of the superiority of the enemy's artillery, it will be advisable to place the main fighting line in the forest."

V. Commander of Infantry, 6th Div.
No. I

Point 320 (2 km. north-east of Brenke), 6:30
p. m., Oct. 4.

Detachment Order.

1. The badly shattered enemy has nowhere dared to attack us sharply. The left wing of the 5th Div. will retreat tonight to Brünninghausen-Dorpe. The main forces of the 6th Div. have driven the enemy out of Fülzhausen today and have beaten off several attacks by the enemy with ^{very} heavy losses to him. P.'s Combat Group of the 3rd Cav. Div. held Wallensen until evening, but then apparently had to retreat before the enemy to Thüste.

2. In view of the threat to both flanks the detachment will withdraw behind the Ith. In cooperation with the main forces of the Division it

will attack the enemy at Wallensen early on Oct. 5.

Distribution of units:

A. 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment, Major R. in command.

1st and 2nd Troops 15th Cav.

Bicycle Co.

1 gun, 4th Btry. 6th Art.

Armored Car Troop.

1 light radio station of the 1st Co., 6th Bn.

B. L.'s Mixed Detachment, Major L. in command.

Gronau Landsturm Battalion.

1st Bn. 15th Landsturm.

Machine Gun Co. of 3rd Bn. 16th Inf.

2 guns, 2nd Bn. 6th Art.

1st Co. 6th Engr. Bn.

1/3 of 1st Co. 6th Signal Bn.

C. Reinforced 16th Inf., under the commander of the 16th Inf.

16th Inf., less 3rd Machine gun Co.

2nd Bn., 6th Art., less 3 guns.

3. The 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment will reach Voldagsen before midnight on Oct. 4 and will bar the defile there against the enemy at ~~Koppenbrügge~~ ^{Koppenbrügge}. In case of an attack by a superior foe it will retreat slowly, offering stubborn resistance, through Hemmendorf, to the north edge of the wood on Thüster Hill.

4. The mixed detachment under Major L. (commander of the 1st Bn. 16th Inf.) will protect the right flank and rear of the main detachment at the passages across the Ith between the Lauenenstein Gap and Hammerslust (including both).

5. The reinforced 16th Inf. will retreat to Lauenstein and Salzheimendorf at 7 p. m. and from 10 p. m. on will rest, receiving warm food at Eggersen and Salzheimendorf. The 3rd Bn. 16th Inf. and 1/2 of the 4th Btry. 6 Art. have already been started on the march to the northwest entrance of Salzheimendorf. Continuation of the march in the direction of Wallensen at 4. a. m.

on Oct. 5 is intended. Reconnaissance as far as Hackenrode and Thüste will determine the location of the enemy's north wing and the whereabouts of P.'s Combat Group.

6. The subsistence train has been started on the march toward Deilmissen. The baggage train will remain at Banteln.

7. From 10 p. m. on I will be at Salzhemmendorf (town hall), where one person (officer) designated by each of the three combat groups to receive orders will report to me. 1st Co. 5th Signal Bn. will form wire connection with L.'s Combat Group and will establish radio communication with the 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment.

Commander of Infantry of the 6th Div.

Dictated to persons designated to receive orders by the North Combat Group, the South Combat Group, the 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment, the 1st Bn. 16th Inf., the 1st Co. 6th Engr. Bn. and the 1st Co. 5th Signal Bn.

Tactical Exercise No. 6.

The troops of the Commander of the Infantry of the 6th Division completed the breaking off of contact with the enemy during the evening of Oct. 4 at Neuhaus Farm and at Langel's Hill without this being noticed. The reenforced 16th Inf. reached the halting-places at Eggersen and Salzhemmendorf at 10 p. m. and was given warm food (for the second time on that day). Toward 1 a. m. the 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment reached Voldagsen and barred the defile there. The Armored Car Troop pushed on to ^{Koppenbrügge} ~~Koppenbrügge~~ and found the place occupied by the enemy at 5. a. m. During the course of the night L.'s Combat Group disposed itself on the Ith for an obstinate defense between the Lauenstein Gap and Hammerslust (including both places), with the main fighting line along the ridge and combat outposts on the western edges of the woods. The engineer company laid an abatis of felled trees across all roads, together with wire, and

made the highway through the Lauenstein Gap impassable by vehicles by blasting at two points.

After it had been determined during the night that Wallensen was occupied by the enemy and that F.'s Combat Group of the 3rd Cav. Div. was disposing itself for defence at the southwest exit of Elzste, the reinforced 16th Inf. started on the march toward Wallensen at 3:30 a. m., moving from Eggersen through Ockensen. The advance-guard battalion, the 2nd, did not strike the enemy's covering parties until just outside Wallensen, at 5:30 a. m.; the latter were swept aside after a short machine gun preparation. While it was still dark the battalion penetrated from the west into the village, which was densely occupied by troops. After half an hour's street fighting the majority of the enemy laid down their arms. 600 prisoners were captured (of the 15th Dragoon Regt. and the 10th Jäger Bn.), as well as 30 machine guns, 4 cavalry guns and 700 horses. The main body (1st and 3rd Battalions 16th Infantry) was not used in this action, but marched on through Hackenrode and was assembled for the attack at Point 205 when it became light, facing toward the southeast, under the protection of the 2nd Bn. 6th Art., which was going into position. The enemy developed a new front facing northwest, with his left wing on the edge of the forest eastward of Hill 398. The two battalions moved to the attack at 7:30 a. m. during short violent bursts of fire from the artillery and heavy infantry arms. When the right wing of the main body of the 6th Division also attacked toward 8 a. m., coming from Marienwald, the enemy's resistance collapsed. The enemy streamed back into the Wallenser Forest, suffering very heavy losses from the strong pursuit fire of the blue artillery; at the north edge of the woods, however, he came under the protection of machine guns just put in line and several batteries recognizable by the flashes; the left wing of the enemy's forces was about on the hard-surfaced road running from Wallensen into the wood.

Toward 9:30 a. m. the situation is as follows: The Commander of the infantry of the 6th Div., who is with the Commander of the 16th Inf. at Hackenrode, sees that his own infantry has come to a standstill about

500 m. this side of the enemy's new front. Its right wing lies opposite the enemy's left wing in open country. All forces are in line. The left wing has become pretty much mixed up with the 18th Inf., which adjoins it on the left. The 6th Div. states that the 18th Inf. has captured several hundred prisoners, that they are apparently fighting the red 2nd Division, and that everything depends on completely shattering the enemy's left wing. The Division is putting its last available battalion into action toward the eastern edge of Kapellenhagen to outflank the enemy's right wing. P.'s Combat Group of the 3rd Cav. Div. has received orders to place itself under the orders of the Commander of Infantry of the 6th Div.; the 3rd Cav. Div., in Kaierde, has reported that there seems to be only a rather weak enemy facing it and that it hopes, with the aid of two Jäger battalions that have just arrived, to drive the enemy back across the Weser on this same day. The following report is received from L.'s Combat Group, from the direction of which the sound of heavy fighting has been heard since as early as 6:30 a. m.:

L.'s Combat Group.

Hq. at Eggersen, 8:40 a.m., Oct. 5.

To Commander of Infantry, 6th Div.

The enemy is making a strong attack, supported by 5 or 6 batteries, Neuhaus from ~~Neuhaus~~ Farm and Welliehausen. Gronau's Landsturm Bn. has just reported that it will have to retreat to Salzheimendorf, its right flank having been turned. The 1st Bn. 15th Landsturm is retreating to Eggersen, completely disbanded. The 6th Reconnaissance Half-regiment reports that the 5th Div. has received considerable reinforcements today and will hold position at Dorpe without fail. The reconnaissance Half-regiment has been attacked by a superior enemy since 7:30 a. m. and will have to withdraw to the Tilly Linden, north of Hemmendorf.

I will try to get the Landsturm to form a front again on the Salzheimendorf-Eggersen line, which appears doubtful to me, however, without immediate support by regular units.