

LOSING AN EMPIRE AND FINDING A ROLE – WHY SHOULD
WEST AFRICA MATTER TO THE UNITED KINGDOM?

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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ABSTRACT

LOSING AN EMPIRE AND FINDING A ROLE – WHY SHOULD WEST AFRICA MATTER TO THE UNITED KINGDOM? by Maj Harry Willies, UK Army, 130 pages.

Many of Africa's emerging security threats are transnational, including issues such as migration, disease, conflict, and environmental degradation. Most of these problems are often well outside of the scope of any one individual developing nation to resolve. In light of the UK's decision to leave the European Union (EU) and the significant security concerns evolving within West Africa, this thesis will argue why a strategic shift in the UK's approach is required. This thesis will also argue that a shift towards West Africa (particularly Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone) will help the UK to; build reliable partners, strengthen the UK's own internal security, prevent the proliferation of failing states, and support UK National Security Objectives. This in turn will achieve the UK's overall intent of being a truly 'Global Britain'.

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ACRONYMS

DE	Defense Engagement
STTT	Short Term Training Team
UK	United Kingdom
EU	European Union
BREXIT	The UK's extraction from the EU often coined as Brexit, an amalgamation of Brussels Exit
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative. China's wide economic and infrastructure development foreign policy scheme
U.S.	United States of America
PN	Partner Nations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa
SDSR	Strategic Defense and Security Review
NSS	National Security Strategy
MOD	Ministry of Defense
NSO	National Security Objectives
SIG	Special Infantry Group
NA	Nigerian Army
UN	United Nations
DfID	Department for International Development
EWMR	Ends, Ways, Means, and Risks
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
BSOS	Building Strategy Overseas
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations

HR	Human Rights
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
DAOTO	Defense Activity Other Than Operations
CSSF	Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
EVD	Ebola Virus Disease
AFRICOM	U.S. Africa Command
PM	Prime Minister
RN	Royal Navy
HMS	Her Majesty's Ship
SCS	South China Sea
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
NDC	National Defence College (Nigeria)
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peace Support Training Center (Ghana)
CoEs	Centers of Excellence

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Your new-caught, Sullen peoples, Half devil and half child, Take up the
White Man's burden.

—Rudyard Kipling, *The White Man's Burden*

We are building on longstanding economic ties and mutual
security interests to ensure the UK is the partner of choice for trade and
investment in West Africa.

—UK Department for International Development,
Nigeria Country Profile

It is my belief that Britain has its greatest opportunity in 50 years to
redefine our role. As we leave the EU, and the world changing so rapidly,
it is up to us seize the opportunities that Brexit brings.

—Gavin Williamson, former UK Defence Minister, Press Release

Purpose and Significance

Demographic trends, and specifically population growth, dictate Africa will
present the dominant threat and opportunity for the next generation. For more than 100
years, Africa has seemingly held little strategic or economic importance or significance to
the United Kingdom (UK). Preferring to forge closer ties to European, Asian and North
American partners, Africa has played second fiddle to the UK's Strategic ambitions. In
terms of UK security threats; Russia, China, and the Middle East have all been prioritized
well above all else - with West African concerns almost barely worthy of mention.

This thesis argues the grand strategic threat and opportunity for the next
generation will emanate from Africa, and the UK is well placed to exploit historical and
present links to address these and achieve its objectives through West Africa. In terms of

threat assessment, Russia is the immediate strategic threat to the West. If a resurgent China is the next in line, reaching the peak of its capabilities in 2030, then Africa will be the grand strategic concern from 2050 with Nigeria a crucial part of the problem and solution.

Russia lacks the economic resilience to mount a serious, concerted, and conventional challenge to the West. The limited fielding of the battle-winning T14 tank demonstrates the debilitating effect of the United States' (U.S.) sanctions.¹ However, Russia can present a significant disrupt function. Reported Russian involvement in the 2016 U.S. elections and the employment of 'Gerasimov Doctrine' demonstrate this disruption and the increased competition and weaponization of the information domain.² China is a realistic threat to U.S. hegemony requiring the focus and attention of strategic planners across the Western hemisphere. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a comprehensive method of expanding their reach. The BRI simultaneously increases Chinese access to foreign markets, resource security, and significant influence through the use of their economic instrument of national power. However, China has a significant demographic challenge in a rapidly aging and shrinking population. By 2050, between 330 and 480 million Chinese will be over age 65, representing up to 35% of the country's population and with no social safety net to protect the aged, China is uniquely ill-

¹ Joseph Trevithick, "Russia Can't Afford Its New T-14 Armata Tanks, Turns To Updated Older Designs Instead," *The Drive*, August 2, 2018, accessed April 25, 2019, <https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/22600/russia-cant-afford-its-new-t-14-armata-tanks-turns-to-updated-older-designs-instead>.

² Gerasimov Doctrine is the term coined to describe Russia's combination of small expeditionary force with "information" operations as seen with the annexation of the Ukraine and the reported disruption to the US 2016 Presidential elections.

prepared for the societal changes this ‘gray wave’ will bring.³ The concern about an aging population is in addition to an anticipated and terminal population decline once their population has peaked at 1.44 billion in 2029. While demography is not a determining factor to the challenge China will pose to the West, it is a consideration.

Africa, on the other hand, has a demographic challenge of an exploding population which will represent a third of the world’s population by 2050, with the highest growth expected in West Africa.⁴ Additionally, the most rapidly expanding age bracket is in the youth where currently more than 60% of the population is under 35. A young population could lead to substantial economic growth potential if adequately harnessed. However, many of the institutions and governments in West Africa lack the depth, expertise, and capacity to provide adequate employment opportunities. The lack of institutional capacity increases the risk of disenfranchised youth, easily susceptible to frustration and malign influences. In turn, this threatens the internal security of many of the UK’s partner nations (PNs) which could undermine the UK’s national interests. The key to addressing these threats are resilient and robust security institutions better able to lead responses to regional security crises. Also key to addressing these threats is a stable and secure Nigeria. In the regional context, Nigeria’s economic potential and military strength has firmly established its place at the head of the table, and its influence spans

³ Chi Dehua, “China’s Elderly Population to Peak at Half a Billion in 2050,” *GBTIMES*, July 20, 2018, <https://gbtimes.com/chinas-elderly-population-to-peak-at-half-a-billion-in-2050>.

⁴ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “World population projected to reach 9.8 billion in 2050, and 11.2 billion in 2100,” June 21, 2017, accessed May 28, 2019, <https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/world-population-prospects-2017.html>.

across the African continent. If the UK could support Nigeria in addressing its security challenges to become a more stable partner, growth would follow, and security concerns would atrophy for the benefit of the region.

Many of Africa's emerging security threats are transnational, including issues such as migration, disease, conflict, and environmental degradation. Most of these problems are often well outside of the scope of any one individual developing nation to resolve. In light of the UK's decision to leave the European Union (EU) and the significant security concerns evolving within West Africa, this thesis will argue why a strategic shift in the UK's approach is required. This thesis will also argue that a shift towards West Africa (notably Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone) will help the UK to; build reliable partners, strengthen the UK's internal security, prevent the proliferation of failing states, and support UK National Security Objectives (NSOs). A shift to West Africa will support the UK's overall intent of being a 'truly Global Britain'.⁵

Britain's interwoven history with West Africa frames the current relationships which carry geo-strategic implications for the region and Britain.⁶ The purpose of this study is to identify how an adjustment of the UK's strategic approach to West Africa

⁵ "Global Britain" has become a catch phrase for the UK's Prime Minister since it was introduced six months after the Brexit vote and just prior to the negotiations for the separation to start. The speech on 17 Jan 2017 mentioned "Global Britain" ten times. *The Independent*, "Theresa May's Brexit speech in full: Prime Minister outlines her 12 objectives for negotiations," January 17, 2017, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/fulltexttheresamaybrexitspeechglobalbritaineuropeanunionlatest-a7531361.html>.

⁶ In 1893 West Africa was defined as Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, and the Niger Protectorates (Northern and Southern Nigeria), which were joined in 1914 and became Nigeria. For the purposes of this study West Africa will be defined by a primary country, Nigeria, and two secondary countries, Ghana and Sierra Leone.

could better achieve the UK's national security aims. The thesis examines the developing security threats in West Africa and will highlight how an adjustment of British engagement strategy will better support West Africa partners for mutual benefit.

Issues

At the time of writing, the UK is facing a dynamic and challenging situation due to frictions with the EU.⁷ The process of leaving the EU presents risks and opportunities. For instance, the increased international attention from Brexit could be leveraged to propel the 'Global Britain' with foreign policy initiatives to generate momentum. Having retained its place as one of the world's leading 'soft powers', with the right policies and strategy, the UK could once again project itself as an independent global actor.

Similarly, West Africa is also facing several significant but different challenges. This thesis will propose why the UK, albeit with fewer resources than other global actors, should use the means at its disposal to support regional institutions within West Africa to addressing its threats to build more resilient international partners. Increased regional security will reduce any spillover effect on Europe, such as the flow of African migration and the perceived impact on politics in Europe.⁸ Supporting increased regional security

⁷ Brussels or British Exit, often amalgamated to Brexit. It refers to the UK's decision on June 23, 2016 to leave the European Union after a 50-year membership. The result defied expectation and has subsequently caused a significant amount of political disruption in the UK.

⁸ 2015 saw the highest number of African arrivals in Europe, 1,015,078. John Campbell, "Africans Comprise a Large and Growing Share of Migrants to Europe," Council on Foreign Relations, December 14, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/africans-comprise-large-and-growing-share-migrants-europe>.

through the deployment of soft power will also strengthen UK energy and resource security.

This thesis will identify and examine a new and modern competition for Africa. It will also highlight why the UK's close links to West Africa could provide an opportunity to achieve the access and influence the UK desires, while also meeting West Africa's strategic challenges. Nigeria plays a prominent role in this thesis, given its regional importance. However, the scale of Nigeria's security issues have led to warnings it is approaching a failing state.⁹

This thesis will also explore the issue of whether West African nations are willing or receptive to support as was seen in 2015 and the sudden rift between the U.S. and Nigeria.¹⁰ Offers of foreign assistance, no matter how enticing, are not always welcome or accepted for domestic political reasons. Foreign aid is ultimately a two-way street, and more advanced nations are not necessarily pushing against an open door. Receiving or denying support from another nation is an inherently political decision based on a range of factors. West Africa has relatively mature and regionally admired defense institutions. However, these are not ubiquitous, and they have limited utility beyond preparation for Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

⁹ Nigeria is currently ranked 14th worst out of 178 assessed countries in terms of state fragility. The Fund for Peace, "Fragile States Index," accessed April 18, 2019, <https://fragilestatesindex.org/>.

¹⁰ Max Siollun, "No Helicopters for You," Foreign Policy, February 3, 2015, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/03/nigeria-boko-haram-obama-goodluck-jonathan/>.

History

From a purely geographical perspective, the limited British presence in Africa during the slave trade was only in coastal areas in the form of trading posts and ports on route to the more lucrative markets of the Middle East and China. However, this changed due to a confluence of factors. Britain and other nations had the means and motive to aggressively expand their economic and functional points of presence, which supported trade routes, into something far wider reaching. One trigger for the higher tempo of expansion and increased weight of presence in Africa was the Industrial Revolution. This technological advantage allowed the European powerhouses to project themselves further afield and in more significant number than had previously been possible. It also provided these countries with the wealth, expertise, and motivation to look beyond their homelands. As European industrial production increased and spread, raw materials became harder to source.¹¹ Other factors affecting the expansion into Africa included the discovery of America and the development of the slave trade. The names given to areas in West Africa are indicative of how the European powers perceived the Continent. With little regard for the interiors of individual countries, the sole focus was on the outputs that could be taken from them: The Gold Coast, The Ivory Coast, and The Slave Coast.¹² Britain's exploitative approach lasted until the

¹¹ Vern Cleary, "The Causes and Motivations for the Scramble for Africa," *Modern World History Textbook*, Bellarmine College Preparatory, accessed February 14, 2019, http://webs.bcp.org/sites/vcleary/modernworldhistorytextbook/imperialism/section_6/causesmotivations.html.

¹² Global Security, "The Scramble for Africa," accessed February 14, 2019, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/scramble-for-africa.htm>.

Somerset's Case of 1772, which reconfirmed slavery as illegal in Britain. In 1807 the UK abolished the colonial slave trade and between 1808 and 1860 the West African Squadron, which accounted for a third of the Royal Navy's assets, helped to suppress the slave trade internationally. During that period, they seized over 1,600 slave ships and freed over 150,000 slaves.¹³ The abolition of slavery in 1833 led to politicians to ask whether there was any value in continuing endeavors with this part of the world, "When the slave trade was abolished, the main interest which Great Britain had in West Africa entirely disappeared. The Government was most anxious to withdraw if possible."¹⁴

Even as late as 1865, a select Parliamentary Committee reported 'that all further extension of territory, or assumption of government, or new treaties offering any protection to native tribes would be inexpedient.'¹⁵ Britain's position changed once Belgium's King Leopold I executed plans to realize his dream of a vast African empire. Belgium's aggressive approach provided the spark for the French and German efforts to seek access to Africa's natural resources to recover following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. The increased competition precipitated the UK's efforts to consolidate their African holdings, and further them where possible. In turn, this led to the dawn of ruthless European geopolitical competition within Africa, widely referred to as the 'Scramble for Africa.'

¹³ Jo Loosemore, "Sailing against Slavery," *BBC*, September 24, 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/devon/content/articles/2007/03/20/abolition_navy_feature.shtml.

¹⁴ C. P. Lucas, *A Historical Geography of the British Colonies*, vol. 3., *West Africa* (Gloucestershire, England: Clarendon Press, 1893), 12.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, continued to drive the clear economic agenda about how British colonies should support the Empire on his assumption of office in 1895.¹⁶ “Progress and prosperity in Britain, he preached, depended upon developing the empire.”¹⁷ The question was how to do this without the previous foundation of the slave trade? Increased economic ties, a developed network of alliances, and an evangelical anti-slavery approach seemed to be the most appropriate answer. In response to increased global competition and hard economic realities, the “expansion was not simply a necessity without which industrial growth might cease, but a moral duty to the rest of humanity.”¹⁸

In the continuing efforts for economic and resource security to fuel its industrial revolution, Britain continued its expansion. The expansion followed a cycle of processes and mechanisms whereby the UK would formalize its standing through the formation of treaties and arrangements. Knowingly or unknowingly this created momentum which brought these nations increasingly under the banner of the Union Flag, much more so than expected.

The story of the cession of Lagos [c. 1851] illustrates what took place everywhere else along the coast of West Africa. British philanthropy warred against the slave trade; British interests followed close on the heels of philanthropy; native chiefs were bound over by treaties; treaties implied

¹⁶ The Colonial Secretary was the British Cabinet Minister in charge of managing the UK’s various colonial dependencies. Joseph Chamberlain remained in office until 1903.

¹⁷ Chamberlain to West African Railways Deputation, 24 August 1895, in Lucas, *West Africa*, III 20.

¹⁸ Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, and Alice Denny, *Africa and the Victorians – The Climax of Imperialism* (Prescott, AZ: Anchor Books, 1968), 2.

supervision by the stronger of the contracting parties; and in the end philanthropy and interest combine to bring sovereignty or Protectorate..¹⁹

This momentum gained pace and with more agents of empires arriving in Africa to secure their and their nation's fortunes. Unfortunately, this 'scramble' relentlessly continued at the expense of the new "partner" nations. Records from the UK National Archives shed some light on such expansionist activities.

The [One] document had the air of a proud pupil seeking congratulations from his teacher for his industry: in one 20-day period in July 1889 alone, the [Royal Niger] Company recorded that it struck six separate deals. According to British government records, the Royal Niger Company made between 340 and 500 of these arrangements in total, to take spurious legal control over many territories of the River Niger..²⁰

These arrangements served to fuel the nearly exponential growth of the European foothold in Africa, ever increasing the divide between those who exploit and the exploited. However, from 1902, there was a developing notion that the British Empire was unsustainable. This realization required a more comprehensive approach to be used to support both the Empire and those nations contained within it. Joseph Chamberlain, then still the Colonial Secretary, stated, "The weary (British) titan struggled under the too vast orb of his fate, and he invited the vigorous young Dominions to help share the burden."²¹

The vast richness of South Nigerian oil continued to increase the region's importance to the British Empire. The extraction of its precious resources, "served as a

¹⁹ Lucas, *West Africa*, 128.

²⁰ Michael Peel, *A Swamp Full of Dollars* (Lawrence Hill Books, 2009), 37.

²¹ Frank Underhill, *The British Commonwealth – An Experiment in Cooperation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1956), 39.

lubricant, to stop the machines that were driving Europe's industrial prosperity from wearing out."²² The importance of crude oil continued to grow within the British Empire were, by the early 20th Century saw this commodity regarded with the highest National strategic significance.

In one of those curious twists of fate, the creation of Nigeria [1914] coincided almost exactly with an awakening interest in the country's potential as a source of oil. The hunt for crude had become a British Strategic priority after Winston Churchill, the first Lord of the Admiralty, had decided in 1913 to change the fuel of Britain's battleship fleet from coal to oil. This marked the start of a century shaped in good part by the geopolitics of crude.²³

With an increasing awareness of the increasing geopolitical competition from the European powerhouses, the Empire made a conscious effort to rebalance its diplomatic landscape. Efforts were made to form legislative links with developing resource-rich countries to consolidate gains and offer protection from other international actors. These links often took the form of agreements and treaties, which acted to formalize ties to Britain and provide it with access to the resources it required. In reply, the British would often offer protection in the form of the Royal Navy or British Army deployments. Later, the onset of World War One, again saw Africa fall victim to the aggressive foreign policies of nations seeking to secure resources. However, instead of just oil, this new demand also sought a workforce. With colonial rulers tightening their grip, hundreds of thousands of Africans served as soldiers and porters and saw their lands

²² Underhill, *The British Commonwealth*, 39.

²³ Ibid.

become battlegrounds for the warring European nations.²⁴ Following the enormous human and financial cost incurred during World War One, the Covenant of the League of Nations was created to protect against another global war and to form a new global order.

The mandate system, set up by Article 22 of the Covenant, formalized the responsibility of sovereign nations for the wellbeing of other nations. This mechanism and moral framework ensured “colonies had to be ruled in a way that looked after the interests of the native peoples as well as Whites.”²⁵ In addition to the League of Nations’ notion of Trusteeship, Britain was already setting the conditions for a new network of like-minded nations in order to develop more collaborate working practices with the nations within this framework.

The Dominion status was given to nations under the control of the British Crown and was used to signify an independent Commonwealth realm. The Commonwealth brought a common forum and an involvement which had been lacking in the Empire. However, after WW1 Britain created the new Commonwealth, gave increasing legislative control to the semi-independent polities, and new statuses given to Dominion states.²⁶ The first Commonwealth came into being in 1917 and “had none of the precise

²⁴ Michael Pesek, “Making Sense of the War (Africa),” *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, November 13, 2017, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/making_sense_of_the_war_africa.

²⁵ The National Archives, “The Cabinet Papers: Glossary – T,” UK Government, accessed February 16, 2019, <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/help/glossary-t.htm#trusteeship>.

²⁶ Underhill, *The British Commonwealth*, 31.

commitments of a formal alliance, yet it functioned as an unwritten treaty of mutual guarantee.”²⁷ As nations continued to be supported and exploited under the umbrella of trusteeship, and following World War 2, there emerged a second Commonwealth - one of the Elizabethan age. The membership included not only the young overseas nations peopled mainly by European stock but also older nations in Asia with a view of incorporating African nations too.

Through the post-war years, the British economy was increasingly reliant on the collaboration of those nations within the Commonwealth. Throughout this period, and with a striking similarity to current reactions to Brexit, some political commentators were concerned about the increasing decline of the British Empire. Sir Fred Clark, a key figure in the internationalization of education in Britain, wrote an article in 1936 titled, “British, with a small ‘b.’”²⁸ He suggested as British power declined, “her influence might expand, if she continued to cherish those values which were British, with a small ‘b.’”²⁹ The qualities of this curious classification are the “long tradition of the freedom and dignity of the individual, the habit of reaching decisions by discussion, the spirit of toleration, the flair for compromise, a sense of limits, social solidarity, free press, and free political parties.”³⁰ If these are the qualities that the British have long known for,

²⁷ Underhill, *The British Commonwealth*, 51.

²⁸ Sir Fred Clark, British with a Small ‘b’,” *Nineteenth Century* 119 (April 1936): 428-439.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

are they enough in today's world, in conjunction with the Commonwealth, for the UK to project influence on to the global stage?

Competition

Currently, there is increasing competition for access and influence within Africa, which has characteristics of the late 19th-century 'scramble.' However, sovereign nations no longer seek to claim land and the totality of the natural resources held. International actors now seek a more nuanced approach in securing the raw materials, energy, finance, and influence that enable and drive economic growth. The expected return on investment incorporates consumer market development, with an aspiration of increased reciprocal trade and economic benefits. Within Africa, the emerging antagonists and benefactors of this 'new scramble' are China and Russia. The many tentacles of the BRI provide a prominent example of the importance of Africa to China. Although the U.S. still retains an important role, new policies and political capital have focused less on Africa and more on the Middle East. From an EU perspective, the UK and France remain critical players due to their colonial links

The scale of Chinese investments and schemes in Africa is substantial. Although not formally within the BRI, Kenya, Ethiopia, Angola, Djibouti, and Nigeria have all had railways funded by China. Chinese money has also built the African Union (AU) headquarters in Ethiopia and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) headquarters in Nigeria. However, in a meeting with 53 African leaders on September 4, 2018, President Xi Jinping laid out plans for the BRI to align with the development

strategies of those nations. The plans included a comprehensive suite of offers to support industrial development, youth employment, humanitarian aid, and food security.³¹

Russia is following suit in the form of arms and military services deals – often with few conditions attached – in exchange for diplomatic support, and potentially lucrative mineral extraction contracts, currently focused in Eritrea and the Central African Republic.³² With China and Russia identifying a market for their niche engagement areas, the onus is on the West to strive to respond.

Brexit may increase competition in Africa, further adding the risk of ‘Great power’ competition in the region. If Brexit serves to strengthen the resolve and identity of the EU block, there is no assurance its foreign policy objectives will align with the UK. The more extensive EU trading block may attempt to fill the financial void left by the UK through increased engagement with Africa. A recent visit by French President Macron to Ghana saw him offer European funds for investment, education, and green infrastructure to generate prosperity – placing the EU in direct competition with the UK.³³

³¹ An Baijie, “President Xi Aligns Belt and Road with African Nations,” *The Telegraph*, September 26, 2018, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world/china-watch/politics/belt-and-road-initiative-africa-strategy/>.

³² Peter Beaumont, “Russia’s Scramble for Influence in Africa Catches Western Officials off-Guard,” *The Guardian*, September 11, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/sep/11/russias-scramble-for-influence-in-africa-catches-western-officials-off-guard>.

³³ Charles Bremner Paris, “Macron Eyes Former British Colony Ghana as Jewel of Francophone Africa,” *The Sunday Times*, December 1, 2017, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/macron-eyes-former-british-colony-ghana-as-jewel-of-francophone-africa-fzqjbq3hk>.

An indication of the UK's position as a partner of preference in the region follows the signing of a bilateral security and defense agreement with Nigeria in 2018. At the same time, the EU has still been unable to secure an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Nigeria. The EPA in question aims to establish a free trade area between 16 West African countries (and Mauritania) and the EU.³⁴ If agreed, it will be the most substantial trade agreement since the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Nigeria's rejection of the EPA presents an opportunity to the UK. By rekindling its long but checkered history in Nigeria, the UK could offer the hope of improved institutional resilience and security support in return for access to growing markets and resources.

Structure

This study will examine the demographic, economic, and security and military considerations for the West African region before a more in-depth analysis of Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone. The thesis will examine U.S. foreign policy towards Africa and its geopolitical implications. A case study will support an appraisal of the UK's foreign policy towards Africa through the descriptive mechanism of DIME.³⁵ The thesis will examine the ends, ways, means, and risks (EWMR) of UK engagement. The thesis will identify how the UK can simultaneously support West African regional defense infrastructure and achieve its foreign policy objectives.

³⁴ Chris Giles, "Nigeria's Buhari Rejects Another Free Trade Deal," *CNN*, June 4, 2018, accessed March 21, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/06/africa/nigeria-free-trade-west-africa-eu/index.html>.

³⁵ Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economic.

Research Questions

Primary Research Question

Why should West Africa matter to the UK?

Secondary Research Questions

1. How can the UK better employ the means at its disposal to achieve its NSOs in West Africa?
2. How can the UK simultaneously achieve success in the long and short term?
3. How can the UK compete with China and Russia in the new scramble for Africa?

Assumptions and Delimitations

This study uses one assumption and two delimitations, providing a framework to explore the subject matter. Although a new NSS is due to be published imminently, the assumption is that the UK will not give a higher priority to West Africa. This lack of priority is in line with the trend from the capstone strategic documents since 2015.

The first delineation is that this study will be focused only on West Africa. Although many of the challenges faced by Africa are trans-regional nature, in order to provide a narrow aperture for this thesis, the focus will solely be on West Africa. Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone will receive specific focus will be applied to in large part to their regional reach. The second delimitation is to scale down the scope of this thesis. The deductions and recommendations will be firmly rooted in the military instrument of national power, and more specifically, the British Army. The reason for the focus on the British Army is the current currency of engagement activity is primarily on

tactical level, land based, training. Training PNs in the Air and Maritime domain requires a level of organizational maturity and defense spending to possess platforms, i.e. ships and jets.

Summary and Focus

The UK is in a relatively unique position to support West Africa's security challenges, which have the potential to become trans-regional. Nigeria's wealth, populations size, and institutional maturity ensure it will be a critical component to any regionally focused solution. Also, in the context of West Africa, the British Army has the most pronounced presence in Nigeria with the presence of the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT).

Additionally, Nigeria's security concerns are a microcosm of the threats facing the region and also the continent. Therefore, if the UK can support Nigeria through its challenges of demography, security, economics, and chronic corruption, it will be better placed to be a regional 'partner of choice.' With Nigeria's growing business markets, this will result in a boost to the UK's prosperity agenda – especially in the area of energy security. Conversely, Nigeria's challenges could have considerable repercussions if not adequately addressed with potential impact on the UK's economy and security.

This thesis will focus on historical case studies, think tank assessments, and UK strategy and doctrine to understand the importance of West Africa to the UK. Think tank and historical projections will be used to demonstrate why West Africa should be afforded a higher strategic priority – especially in a resource-constrained environment. In answering the research questions, this thesis will remain focused at the strategic level. This thesis will, however, make a case for the utility of tactical level activity to deliver

the required strategic effect. Specifically, “Defense Activity Other Than Operations” (DAOTO) will be assessed as a mechanism for addressing the challenges of West Africa.³⁶ The purpose of this study is to highlight how an adjustment of UK engagement strategy will better support the West African region security concerns to deliver regional effect. An enhanced engagement strategy will enable the UK to achieve its NSOs and project ‘Global Britain’ at a time of increased global competition.

³⁶ DAOTO is defined as the use of defense assets and activities, short of combat operations, as part of a soft power approach to achieve influence.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Background

This thesis requires a non-traditional literature review. There is no body of work on the subject of the UK's NSOs in West Africa against the backdrop of Brexit through a lens of EMWR. Therefore, it was not possible to undertake a gap analysis from an existing body of work on the subject. As such, the author has approached this literature review thematically using strategic level policy documents, primary documentation, and press releases to ascertain the importance of West Africa to the UK from as wide and varied a filter as possible.

Introduction

Chapter 2 will explore why the UK is well placed to be a partner of choice in West Africa to reduce regional threats in order to achieve its NSOs. A regional overview is followed by an examination of the primary and secondary countries through the lens of demography, economics, and security and military means. The chapter will also examine U.S. current foreign policy on Africa and its strategic implications. The chapter will end by examining the UK approach to West Africa through the descriptive mechanism of DIME identifying strategic trends which may inform future geopolitical actions.

West Africa

Introduction

I dread to think of the scenes we may be contemplating in, say, 20 years if we do not make a massive consolidated effort to create jobs and opportunities in West Africa.

— Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Special Representative for West Africa

This section will examine the challenges facing West Africa through the lens of demography, economics, security, and military to highlight the strategic threats posed and the opportunities which exist. This section will argue why high levels and population growth and a growing middle class present both a strategic threat and opportunity, respectively.³⁷

Demography

Africa's rapidly growing population is projected to double by 2045 to 2.3 billion. The increasing population growth will also result in the youngest population on the planet, with a mean age of just 18 years old - resulting in a dependency ratio of 13:1.³⁸ While this potentially equates to a huge workforce, the pressure is on governments within West Africa to provide the framework (education, training, and employment) to enable

³⁷ It defines as middle class someone who has a daily income of between \$4 and \$70. He or she also has a disposable income; is employed or is running a business or studying at college; and has some secondary school education. According to this criteria 60% of the urban population surveyed fall into this definition of middle class.

³⁸ The dependency ratio is defined as the number of working-aged people compared to children and the elderly. Ministry of Defence (MOD) UK, *Global Strategic Trends: The Future Starts Today*, 6th ed., HM Government, 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/771309/Global_Strategic_Trends_-_The_Future_Starts_Today.pdf, 61.

this growth. Otherwise, these countries run the risk of disenfranchising a significant proportion of their populations. A young population without education or employment presents a genuine security threat. Without the right conditions, rapid expansion can compound poverty and restrict economic opportunities. Many West African governments do not currently invest adequately in human capital and struggle to create jobs for a growing workforce.³⁹ However, if properly harnessed, the population growth could bring considerable benefits to Africa. For instance, the growing middle class could represent an increasingly significant market and may lead to an increasingly aware and politicized population. The middle class may induce a social change that could help counter the corruption which pervades West Africa.

Noting the high rate of West African population growth and the weakness of government institutions, unsupported population growth could lead to significant internal security issues. However, if West African governments and institutions are supported, their populations could thrive to become increasingly important partners for the UK.

Economics

Since 2000, West African economies have approximately doubled in size. By 2045 they are expected to have quadrupled. High levels of rapid population growth are expected to inflate and influence economic growth. West Africa and primarily Nigeria, could therefore soon become essential markets for big business and state-supported

³⁹ Human capital investment defined as training and education. Julia Bello-Schunemann, "Population Boom in West Africa: Burden or Opportunity?" *The Broker*, June 14, 2017, <http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Sahel-Watch-a-living-analysis-of-the-conflict-in-Mali/Population-boom-in-West-Africa-burden-or-opportunity>.

commercial enterprises. However, support and reform, in the form of capital investments and regulation will be required to achieve this potential. Furthermore, the lack of infrastructure to support this growth will put pressure on poorly resourced governments within the region. A government unable to adequately provide for its people may raise tensions and increase the possibility of conflict.

West African economic growth is stymied by endemic and entrenched corruption. Transparency International has a corruption perception index ranking 180 countries by assessed levels of public sector corruption.⁴⁰ Nigeria is currently ranked 144th out of 180 with a score of just 27; Ghana is ranked 78th out of 180 with a score of 41, and Sierra Leone is ranked 129th out of 180 with a score of 30.⁴¹ There is a recognized correlation which links corruption to poverty and political unrest. Indeed, the most pressing security concern in Nigeria, the Niger Delta insurgency, is “fueled by claims that communities in the area do not see tangible benefits from oil extraction on their land. It is alleged that much of the oil revenue meant for the Delta’s citizens is siphoned off by government officials.”⁴²

Despite the anticipated economic growth driven by population growth, and perhaps affected by corruption, the levels of absolute poverty in West Africa will

⁴⁰ Based upon experts and businesspeople, it uses a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean.

⁴¹ Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2018,” accessed February 18, 2019, <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018>.

⁴² Stephanie Hanson, “Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 6, 2009, accessed February 18, 2019, <https://www.cfr.org/background/corruption-sub-saharan-africa>.

continue, as demonstrated in Figure 1. With approximately 5% of West Africans remaining in absolute poverty and the widening gap with other classes as they get increasingly affluent, there is the increased likelihood of raised tensions and internal security issues.




Figure 1. A Projected Decline of Absolute Global Poverty and Sub-Saharan Africa's Continuance

Source: HM Government, "International Defence Engagement Strategy 2010," https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/73171/defence_engagement_strategy.pdf; MOD UK, *Global Strategic Trends*, 282.

However, there is an aspect of West African economies, which will become increasingly sought after by international actors. Africa has one of the fastest-growing consumer markets in the world, presenting opportunities for expansion and retail from international businesses. For example, Nigeria is set to become one of the world's largest

consumer markets by 2030.⁴³ With the increasing middle and upper class set to continue the growth of consumer markets, the UK would benefit from building increase networks in the region which the military can support.

Security and Military

Both the 2006 United Nations' (U.N.) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its 2015 Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism acknowledge poverty and youth unemployment support the spread of violent extremism.⁴⁴ Without jobs, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) can be an attractive source of income. VEOs are increasingly prolific when there are limited employment opportunities for their young people. The U.N has attempted to address this concern with a plan prescribing youth empowerment in decision-making, mentorship programs, and entrepreneurial support. It also advocates improved education, skills development, and employment facilitation.⁴⁵

Microsoft founder and philanthropist, Bill Gates also notes the risk of a young African population lacking education and employment opportunities. "They can be either an asset or a source of instability. I believe that the right investments will unlock the

⁴³ Landry Signé, "Africa's Consumer Market Potential," *Brookings* (blog), December 12, 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/africas-consumer-market-potential/>.

⁴⁴ Office of Counter-terrorism, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*, United Nations, 2015, <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/plan-action-prevent-violent-extremism>.

⁴⁵ Gertrude Ansaaku, "Youth Unemployment and the Fight Against Terrorism in West Africa," *World Policy* (blog), August 15, 2017, <https://worldpolicy.org/2017/08/15/youth-unemployment-and-the-fight-against-terrorism-in-west-africa/>.

continent's enormous potential.”⁴⁶ He goes on to add, “young Africans will shape the future of not only their communities but the entire world.”⁴⁷ Without investment, dissatisfaction will grow between the unemployed youths and their governments, possibly making them susceptible to VEOs. Using job creation and a preventative rather than reactive stance will support security and economic concerns. Prevention should be a vital component of a strategy to reduce the risk of the youth bulge in West Africa from taking the wrong path.

Conclusion

There are challenges in West Africa but in terms of the disillusioned youth and supporting the growing middle classes. There is, however, a window of opportunity for the UK to make a significant contribution to the PNs while simultaneously supporting NSOs. Countering the VEO threat and working with the increasing politicized middle class could counter chronic corruption and reduce widespread disenfranchisement. The analysis also reveals that due to population growth over the next 30 years; West Africa will be one of the most strategically important regions in the world. With UK guidance and assistance, internal and regional security threats can be addressed supporting the development of robust and comprehensive networks. These networks can be exploited by other elements of UK national power to engage and work with the growing consumer market for mutual benefit.

⁴⁶ Bill Gates and Melinda Gates, “We Didn’t See This Coming,” GatesNotes, accessed February 17, 2019, <https://www.gatesnotes.com/2019-Annual-Letter>.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Nigeria

Introduction

Nigeria is on the road to becoming a failed state. The signs and portents are everywhere.

—Franklyne Ogbunwezeh, “Nigeria A Failed State in the Making”

Nigeria is the primary country focus for this thesis due to its military strength, economic growth, and population issues ensuring it is of regional importance. The predicted growth and comparable military strength to its neighbors in the region ensure Nigeria remains a regional powerhouse. However, its security concerns are such it requires external support in order to address them. Analysis of Nigeria’s demography, economics, and security and military will highlight similarities with the definition of a failed state. Indeed, in the last ten years, Nigeria has been, at times, assessed as a failing state. However, this thesis will identify how, with the right support, Addressing Nigeria’s security concerns through an institutional and strategic approach would allow economic growth to flourish. A more secure, prosperous, and anti-corrupt Nigeria would result in an increasingly important partner to the region and the UK.

Demography

Within two generations, Nigeria is expected to surpass the U.S. to become the third-most populous country on Earth without the accompanying governmental infrastructure. In his 2012, David Kilcullen noted the severity of the population growth in Lagos. “By 2025 it [Lagos] is expected to be the third largest city in the world . . . With

the population of a mega city and the infrastructure of a mid-sized town.”⁴⁸ Current estimates put the population of Lagos between 15 and 18 million people. With an annual growth rate of 6%, it is one of the fastest growing cities on the planet. While most pronounced in Lagos, the population growth in Nigeria is the engine which elevates the opportunities and threats to strategic and geopolitical levels. Nigeria needs to harness the potential of its burgeoning youth population. If it can, the youth will boost economic development, reduce widespread poverty, and channel large numbers of unemployed youth into productive activities, away from ongoing religious and ethnic violence.⁴⁹

Economics

Nigeria has the largest and fastest growing economy in West Africa. The UK has already benefited from this with the UK-Nigeria trade deal worth £4 billion in 2015 with the expectations of significant growth.⁵⁰ However, Nigeria’s economy relies so heavily on the petroleum industry it is described as “oil dependent, rather than oil-rich.”⁵¹ Relying on oil as its primary source of foreign exchange earnings and government revenues makes it vulnerable to market shifts and fluctuations. Given the technological

⁴⁸ David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains* (London, England: Hurst Publishers, 2013), 36.

⁴⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook? Africa: Nigeria,” accessed February 18, 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html>.

⁵⁰ UK Government, “DFID Nigeria,” accessed March 20, 2019, <https://www.gov.uk/world/organisations/dfid-nigeria>.

⁵¹ John Campbell, “Nigeria Is Oil Dependent, Not Oil Rich,” Council on Foreign Relations, February 13, 2019, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigeria-oil-dependent-not-oil-rich>.

advancement in fracking, market instability is likely. Developments in agriculture, telecommunications, and services have driven Nigeria's economic growth since the 2008-09 global financial crisis. However, economic diversification and steady growth have not translated into a significant decline in poverty levels.

Security and Military

The Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF) dwarf other countries in West Africa with 181,000 military personnel, of which 124,000 are on active duty. Although the NAF ranks 4th in size in Africa, it only spends 0.4% GDP (USD 2.152 billion) on defense expenditure. ECOWAS, however, provides the correct frame to contextualize Nigeria's importance in regional affairs. "From the Liberian Civil War experience of Nigeria's leadership . . . we began to witness the birth and development of *Pax Nigeriana* . . . becoming the big brother (superpower) of West Africa."⁵²

The Nigeria-led intervention in the Sierra-Leonean Civil War (1997-2002), the second Liberian Civil War (1998–2003), and mediation in the Côte D'Ivoire Civil War are examples where Nigeria has spoken with a loud regional voice.⁵³ Despite questionable motivations behind involvement in these crises, the deployments indicate development and maturation in Nigerian pursuit of foreign policy objectives. From the inception of ECOWAS in 1975, the initial Nigerian contribution was leadership and a

⁵² Campbell, "Nigeria Is Oil Dependent, Not Oil Rich," 42.

⁵³ Cyril I. Obi, "Economic Community of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte D'Ivoire," *African Security* 2, no. 2-3 (November 30, 2009): 119-35, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19362200903361945>.

significant portion of troop strength. However, in later crises, Nigeria decided not to employ military strength to remedy a situation. Instead, it used diplomatic access and pressure to intervene, with support from the U.N. This demonstrates that Nigeria has been central to the support of conflict resolution in Africa throughout the last decade.⁵⁴

Given the size, diversity, and youth of Nigeria, it is not surprising that preventing and containing internal security threats are a challenge. From June 2011 through to June 2018, the Nigerian Security Tracker (NST) documented 2,021 incidents involving Boko Haram alone. It estimates these actions resulted in 37,530 deaths, nearly double the conventionally cited estimate of 20,000.⁵⁵ The level of violence required the creation of a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to prevent further escalation. This MNJTF comprised military forces from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, along with intelligence support from the U.S. and the UK. Although Boko Haram is still active and operational, the MNJTF reduced levels of violence to those seen before its inception. However, the threat from insecurity remains. Following the UK Prime Minister's (PM) visit to Nigeria, the UK's Defence Secretary visited the North Eastern region of the country in November 2018 to demonstrate bilateral defense cooperation. Alluding to the risk of regional destabilization, he stated, "[This visit] made it clear why we must continue to support our

⁵⁴ In the past Nigeria also provided the bulk of troops for the UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), and many of the troops to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Global Security, "Nigeria - Foreign Relations," accessed April 23, 2019, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/nigeria/forrel.htm>.

⁵⁵ John Campbell and Asch Harwood, "Boko Haram's Deadly Impact," Council on Foreign Relations, August 20, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/article/boko-harams-deadly-impact>.

Nigerian partners in the fight against violent extremism. The work we are doing in Nigeria is vital to ensure a corridor of terror does not open up.”⁵⁶

The most significant existential threat to Nigerian democracy and stability is not assessed to originate from the borderland areas in the North East of the country, but from the Niger Delta. The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) threatens the lifeblood of the Nigerian economy. By strangling access to, and control of the vast oil reserves, it presents the most substantial security threat to the Nigerian government. The significance of this threat derives from MEND’s ability to undermine government security efforts in protecting oil company personnel and assets. Examples of such actions include attacks on Shell’s Forcados oil pipeline; Chevron’s Okan platform; and ExxonMobil’s Qua Iboe terminal (Nigeria’s most giant). These attacks have had a crippling effect on Nigeria’s vital oil exports, reducing production to a 25-year low. From a production peak of 2.2 million barrels per day, the outcome of MEND’s campaign saw output drop to just 1.4 million by 2016.⁵⁷

Environmental issues also play a role in Nigerian internal security issues. Due to desertification to the once fertile northern states of Nigeria, Fulani herdsmen have migrated south to find land suitable for raising and supporting their cattle. An ethnically

⁵⁶ Ministry of Defence (MOD), “Defence Secretary Reaffirms Commitment to Fight against Terror in Nigeria,” UK Government, November 20, 2018, accessed March 21, 2019, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-reaffirms-commitment-to-fight-against-terror-in-nigeria>.

⁵⁷ University of Houston Energy Fellows, “Oil And Violence In The Niger Delta Isn’t Talked About Much, But It Has A Global Impact,” *Forbes*, February 13, 2017, accessed February 18, 2019, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2017/02/13/oil-and-violence-in-the-niger-delta-isnt-talked-about-much-but-it-has-a-global-impact/>.

diverse people, the Fulani, traditionally originating from the core northern states, derive predominantly from a pastoral background, generally leading a nomadic existence. This encroachment south has brought them into contact with established Nigerian farmers sparking violent clashes. With increasing escalation, both groups have increased the sophistication and levels of violence, with whole communities being targeted and destroyed.

According to the Nigerian Watch Organization, the crises between farmers and Fulani Herdsmen in Northern Nigeria's communities claimed about 14,000 lives in 2018 alone.⁵⁸ The seriousness of Fulani led aggression is only now being recognized by the UK Government. In November 2018, a UK parliamentary debate on Nigeria noted that the violence caused at least 300,000 people to be displaced. The chair of the debate, Jim Shannon, stated, "real people have been devastated, disfigured and dismembered. [Compared to the] Boko Haram crisis of 2018 — [it is] six times more horrible, more horrific, eviler and more brutal."⁵⁹ The minister closed the opening address by stating, "instability, displacement, death, famine, civil war and mass migration are all . . . happening now and will continue to happen unless action is taken."⁶⁰ At the time of

⁵⁸ Chris I. Nwagboso, "Nigeria and the Challenges of Internal Security in the 21st Century," *European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies* 4 (July 24, 2018): 15, <https://doi.org/10.26417/ejis.v4i2a.p15-33>.

⁵⁹ House of Commons – Hansard, "Nigeria: Armed Violence (Rural Communities)," UK Parliament, November 27, 2017, [https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2018-11-27/debates/818A5775-5E16-4C15-84CB-8DA497FD0FBB/NigeriaArmedViolence\(RuralCommunities\)](https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2018-11-27/debates/818A5775-5E16-4C15-84CB-8DA497FD0FBB/NigeriaArmedViolence(RuralCommunities)).

⁶⁰ Ibid.

writing, no further debates or ministerial media releases have occurred in a targeted response to the Fulani issue.

Nigeria's instability and violence are causing perceived effects further afield. Indeed, in August 2017 the then UK Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, remarked during an official visit to Nigeria of the "profound knock-on effects" that Boko Haram violence has brought to UK shores. He added the "consequences of this catastrophe are felt in our country. . . driving great waves of migration . . . [and] refugees to our country".⁶¹ Although it is hard to prove comprehensively, Mr. Johnson went on to attribute the effect of Nigerian instability in the heart of mainland Europe. "[Boko Haram] played a huge part in causing a political crisis in Italy and other European countries. When we fail to cure one sore, the infection spreads."⁶²

The question emerges, therefore, as to whether the NAF can address the sum of these security challenges. The Nigerian Army (NA) is described as being "in distress" and a "flawed force" despite its relative size and funding. The NA is also described as the most chaotic in terms of stability, social cohesion, and corruption compared to its regional neighbors.⁶³ The slow and cumbersome response to the Boko Haram insurgency also raises grave concerns.

⁶¹ Nic Robertson, "UK Government Doubles Nigerian Aid Package to Help Fight Boko Haram," *CNN*, August 30, 2017, accessed March 20, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/30/africa/uk-foreign-secretary-boris-johnson-nigeria-visit-boko-haram/index.html>.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Marco Jowell, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Politics, Security and the Failure of Foreign Military Assistance* (London, England: I.B. Tauris, 2018), 149.

Along with its less than impeccable human rights record, this underscores a significant disconnect between the NA and the Nigerian people. It would appear the size of the NAF is insufficient given the number of security challenges facing Nigeria. Reports on the NA also state “training institutions are short of facilities and instructors, lack training modules and ... are largely focused on conventional operations”⁶⁴

Furthermore, the NAF has only been somewhat successful in countering the threat from Boko Haram. Even then, it has only done so with “help from the forces of Nigeria’s poorer neighbors and support from foreign technicians and mercenaries.”⁶⁵ The inability to address internal security concerns and the reliance on mercenaries conflate to project an image of a force which has lost the trust of the people it is supposed to protect and represent.

Despite the importance of Nigeria to the UK across the instruments of national power, the UK remains wary of association with gross violations of human rights (GVHRs). In 2015 a report was released by Amnesty International titled “Stars on Their Shoulders. Blood on Their Hands”. The report states, “Nigerian military forces have been complicit in the extrajudicial execution of more than 1,200 people; arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000 people, and have committed countless acts of torture”.⁶⁶ Despite the uncorroborated report, the accusations by an established international body provided

⁶⁴ Jowell, *Peacekeeping in Africa*, 149.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Amnesty International, *Stars on their Shoulders. Blood on Their Hands: War Crimes Committed by the Nigerian Military*, 2015, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4416572015ENGLISH.PDF>.

significant policy questions across the UK government. In response, human rights training and adherence to IHL now form a deliberate thread weaved through all interactions, training, and business conducted between the UK and Nigeria. As an example, the UK/Nigeria Defence Partnership signed on 29 August 2018 closes with, “To enable closer security and defense partnerships, we have agreed to establish enhanced human rights dialogue to ensure our joint work is in line with international HR standards.”⁶⁷

Nigeria has received military support from a host of international partners, including the U.S. and the UK in the form of tactical level training. The thesis refers to this as ‘tactical push.’ However, despite the investment from Nigeria’s partners, the internal and regional security concerns still exist. The thesis argues this is due to a lack of development at the operational and strategic level. Without robust institutions to receive, manage, and employ the trained troops, no enduring gains will be achievable. Trained soldiers will be unable to deliver operational effect without the supporting higher headquarters. Therefore, Nigeria and the other nations in West Africa, would benefit more readily from a focus at the operational and strategic level to build their capacity. The thesis refers to this as ‘strategic pull.’

Conclusion

The definition of a ‘failed state’ is a state unable to perform the two fundamental functions of the sovereign nation-state in the modern world system: it cannot project

⁶⁷ Prime Minister’s Office, “UK and Nigeria Step up Cooperation to End Boko Haram Threat,” UK Government, August 29, 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-nigeria-step-up-cooperation-to-end-boko-haram-threat>.

authority over its territory and peoples, and it cannot protect its national boundaries.⁶⁸

Having reviewed Nigeria's security concerns, there is a case to argue it is approaching, if not already, a failing state with an inability to address the internal and border-area threats. However, the UK's delicate position post-Brexit ensures an active stance is required to achieve a 'Global Britain.' The entwined history between the countries frames Nigeria's significance to the UK. However, Nigeria's current significance is as a significant trade and investment partner to the UK with the potential for substantial growth. The UK should invest more in Nigeria going forward due to Nigeria's regional voice, energy reserves, and projected economic growth. By supporting internal and regional security, the UK will support the development of a more resilient international partner for mutual benefit. The thesis, therefore, makes a case for the military to support the economic instrument of national power. To date, the military and specifically the British Army's contribution has focused at the tactical level. However, tactical training will not adequately address Nigeria's security concerns given their scale. The NAF may be better able to project authority over its territory with operational and strategic development resulting in a 'strategic pull' rather than a 'tactical push.'

Ghana and Sierra Leone

Introduction

Although Nigeria takes most of the attention when discussing strategic priorities in West Africa, Ghana and Sierra Leone also need to be considered. Ghana is emerging

⁶⁸ Naazneen Barma, "Failed State," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed May 3, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/failed-state>.

as an increasing priority with its regional outlook, stability, and bounty of natural resources. Sierra Leone remains fragile and in recovery from the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD). An analysis of the demography, economics, and security and military concerns will demonstrate why both countries need to remain included in the UK's approach to West Africa.

Demography

Compared to Nigeria, Ghana has a relatively low birth rate of 2.5% a year, but it has a young population with nearly 39% of the population under 14 and another 19% up to 24.⁶⁹ Sierra Leone has a high birth rate, with an average of almost five children per woman, with approximately 60% of the population under the age of 25. An estimated 60% youth unemployment rate links to high levels of illiteracy and unskilled labor, a lack of private sector jobs, and low pay. Of note, one of the significant causes of the 1991 – 2002 civil war was high levels of unemployment.

Economy

Despite the presence of natural resources, Ghana is historically reliant on the oil industry and therefore vulnerable to the fluctuations of the petroleum market. In Ghana, Tullow Oil has four offshore oil operations while two other LSE-listed companies own a majority stake in a significant onshore/offshore oil exploration block in the west of the

⁶⁹ Oxford Business Group, "Ghana's Abundance of Resources and Strong Democracy Provide a Strong Outlook for 2018," January 30, 2018, <https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/still-glittering-wealth-resources-and-strong-democratic-practices-bode-well>.

country, with potential for ‘multi-billion’ barrels of oil..⁷⁰ Other UK companies have significant investment and permissions to mine for gold in Ghana with the assessment of access to over 1 million ounces. Ghana’s importance to the UK is not limited to energy and resource security but also due to its geography and the access it provides. For example, the U.S.D 1.5 billion development of Ghana’s Tema Port will increase the current capacity from one to 3.5 million teu by 2020..⁷¹ However, there are significant concerns that “the land infrastructure in Ghana will be ready to cope with this extra capacity.”⁷² However, Ghana’s economy is showing signs of diversification and therefore increased resilience. These developments support economic growth to such an extent Ghana was a contender for the worlds fastest growing economy in 2018..⁷³

Security and Military

In terms of size of the military in Africa, Ghana is ranked 20th with a total military force of 13,500. In 2017 Ghanaian military expenditure increased from USD 161

⁷⁰ Clontarf Energy Plc and Petrel Resources Plc.

⁷¹ A TEU (twenty-foot equivalent unit) is a measure of volume in units of twenty-foot long containers. For example, large container ships are able to transport more than 18,000 TEU (a few can even carry more than 21,000 TEU). Flexport, “TEU (Twenty-foot equivalent unit),” <https://www.flexport.com/glossary/twenty-foot-equivalent-unit>.

⁷² Corianne Egan, “Ghana Port to Triple Capacity with \$1.5 Billion Expansion,” JOC.com, November 18, 2014, /port-news/international-ports/ghana-port-triple-capacity-15-billion-expansion_20141118.html, https://www.joc.com/port-news/international-ports/ghana-port-triple-capacity-15-billion-expansion_20141118.html.

⁷³ Tim McDonnell, “What’s the Worlds Fastest Growing Economy?” *The New York Times*, March 10, 2018, accessed May 29, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/world/africa/ghana-worlds-fastest-growing-economy.html?smid=tw-nytimesworld&smtyp=cur>.

million to USD 185.80 million. Sierra Leone ranks as the 33rd largest military force in Africa with a total of 10,750 personnel. A weak economic outlook means that it faces a shrinking defense budget. In 2017, military expenditure dropped from USD 26.80 million to USD 24.90 million which represents 0.799% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Although Ghana's military is relatively small compared with Nigeria, it has a long history in peacekeeping operations. With consistent participation in the UN peacekeeping operations since the 1960s, of 117 participating nations, it is currently the fifth largest troop-contributing country for UN deployments. Ghana is also a lead nation in the development of the regional security infrastructure, primarily through the support of the development of ECOWAS in 1975. ECOWAS has subsequently deployed to many of the Nigerian-led missions, including Cote D'Ivoire (2002), Liberia (1990-1996), and Sierra Leone (1997).

Ghana is seen as a reliable and stable partner in the West African region. Such stability may prove to be useful as the UK and its allies compete with the increased competition in the region from other international partners. A USAFRICOM staff visit to the GAF in April 2019 noted, "enlisted education program has the potential to be one of the strongest in Africa," and, "Ghana's willingness to empower, educate, and care for their NCOs is exemplary."

Sierra Leone still holds a special significance to the UK. Initially founded by the British to support the relocation of freed slaves, it remained part of the British Empire until 1961. Since independence, Sierra Leone commenced an economic decline until 1991, when an insurgency led by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attempted to

topple the government. A bloody civil war followed which lasted for over a decade, resulting in at least 50,000 deaths. The conflict displaced two million people, and hundreds of thousands were affected by violence.⁷⁴ The conflict necessitated a massive response on behalf of the U.N., with a Multinational force 17,500 military personnel deploying across the country. Over a decade of engagement, this U.N force is estimated to have cost USD 2.8 billion.⁷⁵ In order to break the countries deadlock, the UK deployed over 1,200 troops in 2002. This highly successful, limited military intervention, proved to be one of the most significant achievements of PM Tony Blair's premiership.

In 2011 the head of the U.N. Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) described the country as previously "the symbol of a failed State, [but] is now gradually evolving into a model country for overcoming old divisions and developing into a peaceful, democratic and prosperous country."⁷⁶ Despite the optimism, he noted Sierra Leone's remaining fragility and vulnerability to sudden economic, social, and political shocks. In 2014 this shock came in the form of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD).

⁷⁴ Shekou Sesay, "Sierra Leone - Civil War," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed April 23, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sierra-Leone>.

⁷⁵ World Peace Foundation, "African Politics, African Peace - United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) Brief," July 2017, <https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/07/Sierra-Leone-brief.pdf>.

⁷⁶ Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, United Nations Security Council, "Sierra Leone, Once Symbol of Failed State, Gradually Evolving into Model for Developing into Peaceful, Prosperous Country, Security Council Told," United Nations, 2011, accessed April 16, 2019, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10208.doc.htm>.

The President noted, “It attacked us with a ferocity that stunned the world.”⁷⁷ At the height of the epidemic in November 2014, there were over 500 new cases reported every week, resulting in an infection of an estimated 28,616 people. EVD caused an estimated 11,310 deaths across Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, the three worst-affected countries. Sierra Leone suffered the highest number of cases with every district being affected.⁷⁸ The response required a multinational effort with a significant contribution from the UK. The circumstances which allowed the UK to take on a leading role were due to the “extraordinary level of influence” born from the long-standing and, healthy relationship with Sierra Leone, including close ties between the two militaries.⁷⁹

The relationship is, however, unsustainable in the long term with the risk of dependence on the UK increasing. With the fragility from EVD remaining and a long road to recovery ahead, there is a requirement to provide support to Sierra Leone at the institutional level to increase resilience and mitigate the risk of further crises. If the international community provides no support, internal security crises could rapidly develop, which may require prolonged multinational intervention.

⁷⁷ National Ebola Response Centre (NERC), *Lessons from the Response to the EVD Outbreak in Sierra Leone May 2014–November 2015 Summary Report* (Sierra Leone: NERC, undated), iii.

⁷⁸ Emma Ross, Gita Honwana Welch, and Philip Angelides, “Sierra Leone’s Response to the Ebola Outbreak: Management Strategies and Key Responder Experiences” (Research Paper, Chatham House, March 31, 2017), <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/sierra-leones-response-ebola-outbreak-management-strategies-key-responder>.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

Conclusion

Ghana and Sierra Leone are significant actors in the West African region, albeit for different reasons. Ghana is a proven and stable democracy with a diverse and growing economy with a regional outlook. These are attractive propositions for the UK looking to develop its global network. Sierra Leone, however, remains fragile following the devastation of the EVD. With a young and unemployed population, there is a requirement for international support to prevent a deteriorating security environment. Therefore, Ghana represents an opportunity to further the UK's aims of being 'global.' In contrast, Sierra Leone represents a situation where increased international engagement is required to prevent a return to a failed state. Although this thesis is primarily for a UK audience, the international engagement previously referred to alludes to UK and U.S. engagement. An enhanced UK engagement strategy can only be valid when U.S. policy is understood.

U.S. Foreign Policy towards Africa

In December 2018, President Trump issued an update to U.S. strategy towards Africa comprising of three strands: Prosperity; Security; and Stability.⁸⁰ The first point mentioned under the Security pillar was; "Continue to help our African allies build security forces to counter these threats and strengthen the rule of law."⁸¹ The focal point and common thread throughout the document centered on countering China's

⁸⁰ U.S. President, "President Donald J. Trump's Africa Strategy Advances Prosperity, Security, and Stability," The White House, accessed January 22, 2019, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-africa-strategy-advances-prosperity-security-stability/>.

⁸¹ Ibid.

commercial, security, and political influence in Africa. There also appeared to be a shift in policy from the once proposed cut of financial aid, to an acknowledgment that Africa has utility in the face of China's BRI. The policy document also placed the onus on African nations to 'step up' in addressing their security challenges. The U.S. intends to reduce its military footprint in Africa by 10% to 7,200 by 2021, at a time when China is developing its military presence in Djibouti.⁸² What appears to be occurring now is a concerted effort by China to continue its expansion and influence in Africa during a perceptible shift in the U.S. stance; often referred to as, "Africa Last." Accompanying the rhetoric of African aid reductions (c.30%), the current administration, now more than 24 months in office, is still to assign an Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. The lack of investment paints a picture of a reprioritization and to divert energy and resources to other areas. The reduced prioritization of Africa leaves a space which China and its BRI seems willing to fill. The plethora of infrastructure projects which are almost ubiquitous across the African continent demonstrates China's presence. From a military perspective, China's establishment of a naval base in Djibouti is rather worrying. The Djibouti base "may be a harbinger of more to come in the region... (and) may not be just a military outpost but also a learning experiment for future bases on the continent."⁸³ In this era of

⁸² Joe Gould, "US Africa Strategy Hinges on Local Forces Stepping up as Pentagon Ramps down: Bolton," *Defense News*, December 13, 2018, <https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2018/12/13/us-africa-strategy-hinges-on-local-forces-stepping-up-as-pentagon-ramps-down-bolton/>.

⁸³ Tyler Headley, "China's Djibouti Base: A One Year Update," *The Diplomat*, December 2018, accessed February 5, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/chinas-djibouti-base-a-one-year-update/>.

increased global competition, the West needs to address China's developing network of economic-based alliances to secure access and influence.

Like the UK, the U.S. is also wary of association with human rights abuses. The 'Leahy laws,' which came into effect in 1997, placed human rights as a core element of international security. They prevent the U.S. Government from directly providing funds to foreign security forces where there is credible information implicating them in the commission of GVHR.⁸⁴ Sanctions are applied when credible Human Rights (HR) violations are confirmed. The UK, by comparison, has no formal International Humanitarian Law (IHL) policy, however, with diminished means to project hard power, indeed in the Land domain, it seeks to project its influence through the means of best practice and the delivery of tactical training including IHL.

In April 2019, USAFRICOM indicated that methods of supporting training were too expensive and inefficient for both the U.S. and PN's. "The current method of training requires too much travel for the training audience detracting from key operational outputs."⁸⁵ To resolve this issue, USAFRICOM informed their new goal as "to help our African partners create Regional Centers of Excellence (CoEs) for NCO development."⁸⁶ The realization of the value of Regional CoEs as an efficient method of persistently

⁸⁴ U.S. Department of State (DOS), Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor, "Leahy Fact Sheet," March 9, 2018, <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/fs/2018/279141.htm>.

⁸⁵ United States, Africa Command (AFRICOM), "Capable Partners Make Enlisted Development Strategy a Reality," April 24, 2019, <https://www.africom.mil/media-room/article/31783/capable-partners-make-enlisted-development-strategy-a-reality>.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

getting access to the training audience desired is along the same lines as the proposed course of action later described in Chapter 4.

UK Foreign Policy Towards West Africa

Introduction

This is our moment to be that true global player once more – and I think the Armed Forces play a really important role as part of that.

—Gavin Williamson, former UK Defence Minister, Press Release

The decision to leave the EU on June 23, 2016, caused significant political disruption. The UK found itself in an uncomfortable position on an elevated global platform risking significant reputational damage. Since the referendum, there has been a deliberate effort from across UK Government to demonstrate its global outlook. UK Defence is enabled and directed to support the global outlook through increased DE. The shifting context of the UK's place in the world, a new relationship with Europe, and the need to deliver more with finite resources require the UK to evolve and enhance how it achieves its goals.⁸⁷

Supporting increasingly strategically valuable partners in a regional context will increase security, gaining the UK the access and influence it desires to achieve the intent of being a 'Global Britain.' This section will use of the descriptive mechanism of DIME to gain an appreciation of the UK's position and will end with a case study which outlines

⁸⁷ UK Government, "Global Britain: Delivering on Our International Ambition," last updated September 23, 2019, accessed January 28, 2019, <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/global-britain-delivering-on-our-international-ambition>.

how economic factors drove diplomatic and military responses resulting in the UK's engagement in Nigeria in 1997.

Diplomatic

UK Strategic Documentation

The evolution of UK strategic and defense white papers will identify trends and anomalies, which will highlight a gap in the UK's policy infrastructure. Chapter 4 will identify a proposed solution. Despite what one may expect, there were only eight defense reviews between 1945, up to and including the Defense White Papers in 2003/04.

However, since that time and formalized in 2010, there has been a tempo of strategic updates to UK government policy. The trigger in 2010 was the formation of a coalition government. One of their first actions was the release of a National Security Strategy (NSS) and the announcement of a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).⁸⁸

The 2010 NSS emphasized the value of the UK's "unique network of alliances and relationships" and the requirement to maintain it.⁸⁹ It is a truism to claim policy is anchored in the strategic security threats at the time of publishing. At the time of the 2010 NSS, the UK found itself embroiled in costly and increasingly unpopular foreign campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, it noted that the UK could project influence abroad, where it should maintain a broader global outlook. There is a lack of targeting in this, apart from a mention of Pakistan, and in terms of the opportunities and

⁸⁸ Nigel Walker and C. A. Mills. "Brief Guide to Previous British Defence Reviews," House of Commons Library, UK Parliament, London, 2015.

⁸⁹ Great Britain and Cabinet Office, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy* (London: Stationery Office, 2010).

threats in Africa, there is one reference acknowledging “the strong historical and economic links” to the African continent. The detail which is present does little else than chart the potential risk of spillover effects into the global economy from conflicts in Africa.⁹⁰

The first SDSR which accompanied the NSS in 2010 had a regional focus in terms of established allies and frameworks, i.e., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU. The only reference to West Africa is the “threat of criminal gangs,” however, the security challenges of the day defined the 2010 SDSR with the document focused on ending the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.⁹¹

Of interest, and perhaps due to the assimilation of lessons identified from those campaigns, the UK released a new Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) in 2011. This document noted a genuine shift of UK policy from supporting large scale combat operations (LSCO) to a focus on stabilization. As such, and unbounded by the immediate crisis planning of current operations, it took a more holistic approach to the world and the UK’s part in it. The BSOS noted that the tensions of population growth, resource scarcity, climate change, and increased number of conflicts would be acutely intense in the arc running from West Africa across the Sahel to the Horn of Africa. It noted the threat from external actors, alluding to the realization of the growing competition for resources, and good examples of established democracy (Ghana) and bad examples (Cote D’Ivoire).

⁹⁰ Great Britain and Cabinet Office, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty*, para 2.15.

⁹¹ Ibid.

As a response to these crises, the BSOS stated a strategic response was required, including investment in upstream prevention to help build reliable and legitimate institutions.⁹² The document warned that the UK needed to maximize its capabilities, with Defence playing a vital role within a broader 'Whole of Government Approach' to, "develop accountable security services that can win the trust of their people."⁹³ Importantly, it noted the requirement for an integrated approach to upstream conflict prevention in both the medium and long term. The strategy pledged to support the education of an additional 800,000 children in Northern Nigeria as an example of the long term approach. The BSOS also provided specific thoughts on peacekeeping and PSOs in support of wider development and capacity building agendas.⁹⁴ By training significant numbers of African peacekeepers, the goal was to create a pool of personnel able to respond as conflict managers to a variety of crises. The intended second-order effect was to instill a liberal democratic ethos into these individuals who, it hopes, become the next crop of senior managers, policy makers, and leaders within Africa.⁹⁵

⁹² Department of International Development, Foreign Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, *Building Stability Overseas Strategy*, HM Government, 2011, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67475/Building-stability-overseas-strategy.pdf.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Peace Support Operations (PSO) is a military term used to denote multi-functional and multinational operations conducted impartially in support of a UN/OSCE mandate involving diplomatic efforts, humanitarian organization/agencies and military forces. Headquarters, International Peace Force South – Eastern Europe Brigade, *Peace Support Operations Handbook*, part 1, December 2000, https://www.seebrig.org/publications/info-booklet/doc_download/50-pso-handbook-1.html.

⁹⁵ Jowell, *Peacekeeping in Africa*, 149.

Four years passed before the next NSS and SDSR (2015), the first time the two strands of policy were brought together in one document. The 2015 NSS and SDSR stated three pillars to national security: (1) Protect our people; (2) Project our global influence, and (3) Promote prosperity. Weaved into the document is the UK Armed Force's role in applying soft power to reach a global audience. Key to this was the recognition and codification of Defence Engagement (DE) and support of UK exports as vital military activities for the first time. As such, the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) brought these tasks into core Defence funding streams.⁹⁶ It noted that “strong alliances and partnerships worldwide are more important than ever. In almost every aspect of our national security and prosperity, we must now work with others, not because we have to, but because the threats and opportunities are global.”⁹⁷

This document was also more forward-leaning and engaging than its predecessors, clearly setting the National agenda to “position the UK as a partner for growing powers, to enable us to protect and promote our interests into the future.”⁹⁸ In

⁹⁶ Defense Engagement is the use of our people and assets to prevent conflict, build stability and gain influence. It is a major component of making defense international by design. We build strategic relationships with key countries and act as a leader in international organizations such as NATO and the UN. Ministry of Defence (MOD), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), *UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy*, HM Government, 2017, accessed February 26, 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/596968/06032017_Def_Engag_Strat_2017DaSCREEN.pdf.

⁹⁷ HM Government, *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom* (Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, November 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf, para 5.18.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, para 5.20.

Sub-Saharan Africa, it noted the UK would strengthen support to Nigerian authorities in tackling terrorism, where the UK presence would be bolstered to create a British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) and as well as providing a variety of Short Term Training Teams (STTTs). These actions sought to deliver more training and capacity building support to the NAF. Also, the UK government pledged to increase funding on the African Union to the tune of USD 1.3 billion..⁹⁹

An increased rate of UK government published white papers followed the subsequent political churn. The NSS and SDSR 2015 “First Annual Report 2016”, coincided with Russia’s consolidation of gains in Crimea, Russian nationalists fighting in Ukraine, and the increased presence of Russia in Syria. Despite a weight of writing on the resurgence of state-based threats and the growing strategic threats of mass migration, this publication focused on ‘Projecting our Global Influence.’ Within that context, the document highlighted the importance of DE to the UK in order to project, build, and maintain global influence. However, the UK strategy of the day still placed an overwhelming focus on the Middle East and the Asia Pacific regions. The only reference to West Africa, or indeed Sub-Saharan Africa, was within the Right Honorable Theresa May’s introductory remarks as PM. However, noting the disconnect with capstone government strategies, during this period, the UK had been involved in Operation TURUS..¹⁰⁰ The UK’s strategic position was also in contrast to the UK MOD

⁹⁹ HM Government, *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015*, para 5.68.

¹⁰⁰ Operation TURUS is the UK’s contribution to the recovery of the schoolgirls abducted from Chibok, Nigeria by Boko Haram.

independent think tank and their assessment on the severity of the threat from an unstable Africa.¹⁰¹

Although “Future Operating Environment 35” did not represent the official position of Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) it noted, “West Africa has the potential for creating significant economic and political opportunities for the UK. However, the region is likely to be characterized by enduring instability and conflict.”¹⁰² It also cited threats of demography to West Africa with the potential “reservoir of disaffected young men more susceptible to radicalization.” It also assesses Nigeria is likely to have increasing regional significance while the West African region is likely to be characterized by “enduring instability and conflict, and non-state groups that threaten the UK or its interests.”¹⁰³ An accompanying report also notes that the largest increases in population are likely to occur in already densely populated areas such as Nigeria.¹⁰⁴

The following year, the UK updated it’s International DE Strategy (IDES). Released in February 2017 it identified five broad DE objectives distilled from the 2015 NSS and SDSR with which to achieve the intent.¹⁰⁵ It noted, “DE is the key means by

¹⁰¹ Ministry of Defence (MOD), *Strategic Trends Programme: Future Operating Environment 2035*, 1st ed., HM Government, 2015, accessed February 26, 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/646821/20151203-FOE_35_final_v29_web.pdf.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ministry of Defence (MOD), *Strategic Trends Programme: Regional Survey – Africa out to 2045*, UK Government, accessed February 26, 2019, https://dcdc.mod.uk/content/Strategic_trends/pdfs/futures_gst_regions_africa.pdf, xii.

¹⁰⁵ Figure 1.

which this international approach is delivered, crucial to delivering our vision of a secure and prosperous UK with global reach and influence.”¹⁰⁶ Despite the growing realization of the importance of Africa, there was very little specifically cited about West Africa. While it acknowledged DE activity conducted up to that point, its focus was on the security threats of Boko Haram. Interestingly, it made no mention of other threats to the region or how the UK could support them.



Figure 2. The Lineage of DE Objectives Nested in NSS Objectives

Source: Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy*, HM Government, 2017, accessed February 26, 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/596968/06032017_Def_Engag_Strat_2017DaSCREEN.pdf.

¹⁰⁶ MOD FCO, *UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy*.

IDES 2017 was followed two years later by the 2018 National Security Capability Review (NSCR). The NSCR noted the creation of, and full operational capacity of British Defence Staffs (BDS) located in the Gulf (Dubai), Asia-Pacific (Singapore) and West Africa (Abuja). In terms of partners, allies, and global engagement, the document noted that the UK's "focus on Africa would change and expand to match challenges and opportunities."¹⁰⁷ It highlighted that by 2030, around 80% of the extremely poor would live in poorly governed, fragile states, particularly in Africa. Furthermore, it proposed that this poverty would contribute to irregular migration. As such, the strategy tasked the Department for International Development (DfID) to ensure "its programs are targeted more acutely on the underlying drivers of fragility, conflict, and instability faced by rapidly growing, young populations across the continent."¹⁰⁸ The sole focus on DfID appears to be at odds with "Fusion Doctrine," introduced within the same document. Fusion Doctrine sought to "strengthen the UK's collective approach to national security... and create a more accountable system to support collective Cabinet decision-making".¹⁰⁹ Placing a responsibility as broad as "development for African institutions" solely with just one junior government department stymies Fusion Doctrine and the comprehensive approach the UK government want to employ.

¹⁰⁷ Cabinet Office, *National Security and Capability Review*, HM Government, March 2018, accessed February 26, 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

Developed at the same time, but published six months later, the UK DCDC Strategic Trends Program “Global Strategic Trends (Out to 2045)” was released. Amongst other things, it identified two global trends that required action: Increasing environmental stress; and pressures of population growth.¹¹⁰ It proposed, environmental stresses will consist of ever increasing and more intense: floods, droughts, storms, heatwaves, and heavy rainfall. It predicts rising sea levels threatening coastal communities, with developing countries at significant risk.¹¹¹ It is clear that a whole of government approach will be required to tackle the scale of these issues. The requirement for a comprehensive approach is even more apparent when examining the relationship between the FCO and DfID. A recent UK Government report noted, “British foreign policy risks being less than the sum of its parts because it is divided between so many departments.”¹¹² The report goes on to suggest the FCO should absorb DfID to generate greater coherence. This point has added relevance to a post-Brexit Britain where the UK must seek to maintain its global relevance.

Wider UK Government Considerations

Of all the countries in West Africa, most of the UK’s recent efforts have unsurprisingly targeted Nigeria. Even so, the UK’s policies, intentions, and priorities

¹¹⁰ MOD, *Strategic Trends Programme*.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Bob Seely MP and James Rogers, *Global Britain – A Twenty-First Century Vision*, Henry Jackson Society, February 2019, <https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HJS-Global-Britain-%C2%AD-A-Twenty-first-Century-Vision-Report-A4-web.pdf>.

towards Nigeria are still far from clear. Combined with the current parliamentary decision making paralysis following Brexit, the UK risks falling behind its competitors. For example, French PM, Emmanuel Macron, has made nine trips to the African continent since taking office in May 2017.¹¹³ In response, the UK's efforts need to be demonstrable and coherent across government. One firm outcome from the UK Government's efforts to reignite its relationship with Nigeria resulted in the first ever UK and Nigeria Security and Defence Partnership policy document signed on 29 Aug 2018. Under the new partnership, the UK intends to expand its provision of equipment and training for the NAF. This bilateral military cooperation seeks to enable the Nigerian Military to protect themselves from the threat of improvised explosive devices used by regional terrorist groups.

The Commonwealth is a valuable forum to energize and launch a post-Brexit Britain. In light of the shared history, language, values, and ambitions, the links into West Africa could act as a means of reaching an Africa-wide audience. In Spring of 2018, the UK PM hosted the Commonwealth Heads of State Summit, which had the theme of "Towards a Common Future." The four themes of the meeting were prosperity, security, fairness, and sustainability.¹¹⁴ After that, the PM visited South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya announcing the UK's ambition to become the largest G7 foreign direct investor in

¹¹³ Sir Richard Ottaway, "Our Special Relationship with Nigeria Is a Model for UK-Africa Relations," *Reaction*, September 28, 2018, <https://reaction.life/special-relationship-nigeria-model-uk-africa-relations/>.

¹¹⁴ Prime Minister's Office, "PM to Call for Revitalised Commonwealth at Reception Ahead of 2018 Heads of Government Meeting," UK Government, September 19, 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-to-call-for-revitalised-commonwealth-at-reception-ahead-of-2018-heads-of-government-meeting>.

Africa by 2022.¹¹⁵ While much of the UK effort in Africa to date has centered on the economic instrument of national power, going forward, a more balanced approach that also leverages diplomatic, informational, and military strands will need to be applied to ensure consistency of policy.

The shared history between the UK and Nigeria and their continued partnership as Commonwealth members provides the UK with a level of access and influence not afforded to all.¹¹⁶ Additionally, Nigeria's most significant diaspora resides within the UK, with over 16,000 Nigerian students studying at UK universities, which presents another link in the chain of the relationship.¹¹⁷

Information

The international community is recognizing the impact of the UK's protracted and costly transition from the EU. When the UK/Nigeria Defence Partnership policy document was signed, the Nigerian PM noted, "We are nervously watching Brexit because we know that the relationship had been on for a long time. I assure you that I am

¹¹⁵ Ottaway, "Our Special Relationship with Nigeria Is a Model for UK-Africa Relations."

¹¹⁶ The Commonwealth trade advantage is significant where trade between countries within the organization is 19% cheaper to do so than it would be outside. The Commonwealth. "Harnessing the Commonwealth Trade Advantage," April 26, 2018, accessed April 5, 2019, <http://thecommonwealth.org/media/news/harnessing-commonwealth-trade-advantage>.

¹¹⁷ Jake Sumner, "Why Post-Brexit Britain Needs Nigeria," *Prospect*, March 6, 2017, accessed March 20, 2019, <https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/economics-and-finance/%e2%80%8bwhy-post-brexit-britain-needs-nigeria>.

prepared to strengthen the relationship between our two countries.”¹¹⁸ If the UK’s potential partners are nervous, then the UK has to do as much as it can to reassure and demonstrate competence and leadership. As one might expect, Pro-Brexit Ministers are painting an opportunistic picture of the future landscape, with the then Defence Minister broadcasting, “[the UK] now [has] an unparalleled opportunity to consider how we can project and maximize our influence around the world in the months and years ahead.”¹¹⁹

Military

Successful engagement and projection into PNs depend on the UK’s ability to influence others, which in turn depends upon the UK’s credibility.¹²⁰ Almost two decades of intervention in the Middle-East has raised the UK’s military profile as a credible reference nation. As such, many countries currently facing their internal security challenges have sought training and advice from the UK. Despite the recent cessation of significant land campaigns, the UK still maintains a substantial portfolio of operational deployments amounting to approximately 11,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines

¹¹⁸ Bukola Adebayo and Stephanie Busari, “Nigeria ‘nervously Watching’ Brexit Development, Buhari Tells May during Visit,” *CNN*, August 28, 2018, accessed March 3, 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/29/africa/nigeria-theresa-may-brexit-trip-intl/index.html>.

¹¹⁹ Talal Hussein, “UK Global Defence Role to Increase after Brexit, Says Defence Secretary,” *Army Technology* (blog), February 11, 2019, <https://www.army-technology.com/news/uk-global-defence-brexit/>.

¹²⁰ Ministry of Defence (MOD), The Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/15, *Defence Engagement*, HM Government, January 4, 2016, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/570579/20160104-Defence_engagement_jdn_1_15.pdf.

deployed on 35 operations in 30 countries across the globe..¹²¹ Given the relatively small size of its military, while not engaged in kinetic combat, the nature of the UK's persistent deployable global defense footprint enables some international credibility. In turn, this has driven an ever-increasing appetite and a demand for the provision of UK military expertise with many of our PNs.

The UK has stepped up its offer to help Nigeria militarily in the form of training for full army units before they deploy into the heavily contested North Eastern region of the country. The UK is also hoping to implement a new Nigerian crisis response mechanism, allowing the government to respond to incidents such as terror attacks.

Economics

Within the frame of the UK's finite resources, and noting DE is a single aspect of governmental aid, there has been a perceptible shift in the outlook, use, and expectations of UK Aid. PM Theresa May made a significant departure from standing policy while on an official visit to South Africa in September 2018, announcing that UK aid "should be aligned with Britain's security priorities and support Britain's national interest." The announcement caused ripples in certain 'left-leaning' areas of the UK political arena, with objectors responding that aid should not link to prosperity. However, in a fiscally constrained environment, the PM made clear that UK Aid must do more for the country in terms of reciprocation in the arenas of British trade, investment, exports, defense, and

¹²¹ Forces.net, "Where Are The Armed Forces Deployed This Festive Season?" Forces Network, November 29, 2018, <https://www.forces.net/news/where-are-armed-forces-christmas>.

security.¹²² The implications for the UK MOD are that the current financial support from UK Aid to enable tactical level activity for no discernable output cannot continue. More must be demanded from UK Defence to better support the pursuit of a ‘Global Britain.’

Policy divisions were further highlighted in January 2019, between the FCO and DfID, with the then UK’s International Development Secretary, Ms. Penny Mordaunt, supported the argument for a more ambitious, targeted, and efficient use of UK Aid. Ms. Mordaunt described the current system as “unsustainable.”¹²³ Current UK policy attributes spending 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) (£13.4B in 2016) on international development. However, Ms. Mordaunt has sought to identify efficiencies through a comprehensive and cross-government approach. By undertaking this endeavor, she seeks to align the aid budget more closely with NSS priorities. By seeking a more federated approach, with other governmental departments proposing projects, the International Development Secretary believes the model for UK Aid will be more sustainable and less reliant on the public purse. It is informative that the International Development Secretary, who also has an overview of the totality of the UK Aid, sees the

¹²² Michael Binyon, “Is May’s Foreign Aid Doctrine Good for Britain?” *The Sunday Times*, accessed January 31, 2019, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/is-may-s-foreign-aid-doctrine-good-for-britain-68xplmbcq>.

¹²³ DFID Media Team, “Penny Mordaunt on Working Closely with the Ministry of Defence and Doing Our Bit for Commonwealth Veterans,” *DFID in the News* (blog), UK Government, June 28, 2018, accessed April 30, 2019, <https://dfidnews.blog.gov.uk/2018/06/28/penny-mordaunt-on-working-closely-with-the-ministry-of-defence-and-doing-our-bit-for-commonwealth-veterans/>.

British military as an equal partner with DfID in the identification, shaping, and delivery of UK aid.¹²⁴

So while the cross-government intent has been to increase the tempo and output of the UK's international focused endeavors, including DE, the financial means in which to achieve this within the MOD have not commensurately increased. The UK defense budget received a 1.7% increase in 2017/18 and a 2.1% increase in 2018/19, which is below the inflation rate and includes the construction of the Dreadnought submarines. Although the UK is spending more on strategic level platforms such as submarines, F35s, the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, they are few. The presence of British Army personnel, however, provides the enduring presence and the human face to build the links key to military diplomacy.

The UK has a well-resourced Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF)¹²⁵, with elements of it aligned to NSO 2 (Projecting Global Influence). Specifically, it is to support the UK's contribution to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, with a focus on tackling sexual violence.¹²⁶ The UK Armed Forces are eligible to use the funds

¹²⁴ DFID Media Team, "Penny Mordaunt on Working Closely with the Ministry of Defence and Doing Our Bit for Commonwealth Veterans."

¹²⁵ The CSSF provides development and security support to countries which are at risk of conflict or instability. It's the only government fund which uses both Official Development Assistance (ODA) spend and non-ODA spend to deliver and support security, defence, peacekeeping, peace-building and stability activity. DFID Media Team, "Penny Mordaunt on Working Closely with the Ministry of Defence and Doing Our Bit for Commonwealth Veterans."

¹²⁶ UK Government, "An Overview of the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund," accessed January 23, 2019, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-cssf/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-an-overview>.

with a total of USD 1.18 billion available in 2017/18, which was a 7% increase on the previous year.¹²⁷ Although less significant in the arena of international defense spending, for the British Army this amount would enable an enhanced engagement strategy. Therefore, in the face of increased commitments, and financial pressures, such an increase in the budget is a useful means to use diplomatic ‘ways’ through a military ‘means.’

There is also the question of why the UK and other international actors are seeking engagement opportunities with Africa at this time and with increasing urgency. It is evident that resource security is at the heart of this connection. However, the scale of ambitions from international actors in Africa is larger and more diverse than expected. A 2016 report titled “The New Colonialism” explores how Africa’s vital mineral resources (gold, platinum, diamonds, copper, oil, gas and coal) are being controlled and exploited by foreign powers and multinational corporations alike. It documents how “101, mostly British, companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), have mining operations in 37 sub-Saharan African countries, collectively controlling over USD 1 trillion.”¹²⁸ The sheer volume illustrated in this report alludes to a level of coordination, which would require the support and control of the UK Government. A close-knit relationship between

¹²⁷ HM Government, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), *Conflict Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2017-2018*, July 2018, accessed April 30, 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/727383/CSSF_Annual_Report_2017_to_2018.pdf.

¹²⁸ Mark Curtis, “The New Colonialism: Britain’s Scramble for Africa’s Energy and Mineral Resources,” War on Want, July 5, 2016, <https://waronwant.org/resources/new-colonialism-britains-scramble-africas-energy-and-mineral-resources>, 9.

a Government and the big businesses is not unheard of, but in the instance of stripping a continent of its natural resources, it becomes increasingly controversial. Indeed the closeness of the relationship is illustrated by the frequency of senior civil servants leaving their posts for directorships on the Boards of these companies. Recent examples highlighted in the table below.¹²⁹

Table 1. Links between the UK Government and business		
Name	From	To
Baroness (Shriti) Vadera	Labour Government MP (2007-2009). DfID Business Department	Director of BHP Billiton
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard	UK Diplomatic Service for 36 years and former Permanent Under-Secretary at the FCO	Non-executive director of Rio Tinto from 2003 to 2015 and deputy chair of Royal Dutch Shell plc from 2005 to 2012
Ann Grant	FCO Director for Africa and the Commonwealth and British High Commissioner to South Africa (2000-05)	Non-executive director of Tullow Oil

Source: Mark Curtis, “The New Colonialism: Britain’s Scramble for Africa’s Energy and Mineral Resources,” War on Want, July 5, 2016, <https://waronwant.org/resources/new-colonialism-britains-scramble-africas-energy-and-mineral-resources>, 11.

Another report alleges further controversy driven by UK business and supported by UK Government controversy. “Armed Extraction: the UK in Nigeria” examines the role of the UK Government in fueling human rights abuses and conflict in Nigeria and its

¹²⁹ Curtis, “The New Colonialism,” 11.

relation to controlling access to fossil fuel resources.¹³⁰ It alleges that Shell successfully lobbied for increased UK military aid to Nigeria in order to secure their oil fields. The pronounced links between business and government required a blind eye to be turned to the reportedly significant human rights abuses by the NAF. The association increased the risk of the UK being complicit in internal repression. Such was the scale of the investment by Shell and their importance to the UK government that the military deployed specialist trainers to support the conflict in the Niger Delta. In 2008, the MOD established a more permanent UK defense footprint in Abuja and Lagos.

Case Study: Genesis of Recent UK Intervention in Nigeria

The global financial crisis of 2008 provides the start point for the UK's most recent intervention and overt support in Nigeria. During this time, the most significant investment bank in the U.S. - Lehman Brothers, collapsed, sparking an unprecedented crisis in the global financial system. Stock markets tumbled across the world as the scale of the problems facing all banks became clear. In the UK, the Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds and HBOS had to be rescued with taxpayers' money.¹³¹ Ten years later while reviewing the crisis, it was noted that "a huge storm of rage" was coming towards governments once the public realized what a giant hole had been dug for them by the

¹³⁰ Sarah Shoraka, *Armed Extraction: The UK in Nigeria*, Platform, April 2013, https://platformlondon-org.exactdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/ArmedExtraction_web_final-4.pdf.

¹³¹ BBC News, "The Story of the Downturn," *BBC*, April 25, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-22283940>.

financial system in collusion with their leaders..¹³² To try and balance the checkbook in the great recession that was developing, and in the prevailing chaotic situation, the UK government raised taxes and levies on utilities including fuel. With fuel at a ten year high and the cost at \$165 a barrel, there was a public uproar from families and businesses uncomfortably squeezed by the rising expense of fuel and food.




Figure 3. Cost of Oil in the UK, 2006-2018

Source: MacroTrends, “Crude Oil Prices - 70 Year Historical Chart,” <https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart>.

¹³² John Lanchester, “After the Fall: John Lanchester on the Decade of Doom That Followed the 2008 Financial Crash,” *The Sunday Times*, September 9, 2018, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/after-the-fall-john-lanchester-on-the-decade-of-doom-that-followed-the-2008-financial-crash-cxscrmj9>.

Amid large-scale protests in July 2008, the PM offered UK military support to Nigeria. To stabilize the oil markets by tackling a multi-billion criminal racket, the UK would train security forces in its primary oil-producing region.¹³³ Aside from the desired effect, and noting that both campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan were still very much ongoing, this caught policymakers in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and military chiefs off guard. The announcement also derailed a tentative ceasefire with the leading militant group in the Niger Delta, which further inflated the costs of crude oil on the global market. The PM informed a broad audience that “[the UK] stands ready to give help to the Nigerians to deal with the lawlessness that exists in this area and to achieve the levels of production that Nigeria is capable of.”¹³⁴ In another interview, Mr. Brown revealed further context about the proposed intervention when he noted that, “The price of oil requires us to look round the world where sources of production can be found. One of the areas where we can make the greatest progress most quickly is the Niger Delta.” At the time of the interview, no further details about the specifics of the military support followed, but one government official said it would involve “military experts providing military advice.” This thesis will argue that not much progress has followed since in terms of strategy and operational approach in West Africa. This thesis will suggest a

¹³³ Financial Times, “UK Offers Nigeria Help to Train Security Forces,” July 16, 2008, <https://www.ft.com/content/5f37c5e4-5378-11dd-8dd2-000077b07658>.

¹³⁴ Daniel Howden, Colin Brown, and Claire Soares, “Brown Blunders in Pledge to Secure Nigeria Oil,” *The Independent*, July 11, 2008, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/brown-blunders-in-pledge-to-secure-nigeria-oil-865035.html>.

more coherent way to secure presence, influence, and ultimately resource security with the reduced means which the UK has at its disposal.

Conclusion

West Africa will become of increasing strategic interest to the UK due to its unrelenting population growth at a time when other nations and regions are aging and decreasing. The population growth is a double-edged sword, and if PN governments can be adequately supported, it can be harnessed to ensure the UK has increasingly viable international partners. The growing West African middle class and diversification of financial markets will become increasingly contested international markets, and UK Defence and the British Army has a part to play in enhancing UK presence in PNs. West Africa will also become increasingly important due to nations seeking resource security at a time of increased global competition. Due to the long-term nature of these factors, and in response to the competition posed by the BRI, the UK should exploit historical ties to address regional security concerns and support economic growth.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Based on the primary research question, the purpose of this study is to identify why West Africa is vital to the UK, and how the UK can better employ the means at its disposal to achieve its NSOs in West Africa? Against this backdrop, as figure 5 illustrates, this study follows a four-step methodology of EWMR, with its outputs assessed against the screening criteria of Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability.




Figure 4. UK Strategic Policy Nesting Diagram

Source: HM Government, “Fact Sheet 1: Our Approach to the National Strategy,” 2015, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62483/Factsheet1-Our-Approach-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.

The rationale behind this approach is to identify the UK’s geopolitical intentions, to see in greater detail how the UK currently intends to achieve these, and then assess the

resources the UK has to achieve its aims. By aligning these three lenses, this thesis will identify inconsistencies with the UK's approach to West Africa, which can then be compared to the developing foreign strategy for the UK following its exit from the EU. In turn, this will identify the risks associated with the UK's current approach. The base for the research method is on open source government whitepapers, including strategy and policy documents. A seminar source for this work is "Peacekeeping in Africa: Politics, Security, and the Failure of Foreign Military Assistance" by Marco Jowell. The book has a depth of detail on International Peace Support Operations and their regional span of training and execution, which this study will lean on heavily.

Data Collection

Much of the UK's relevant policy documents are classified Official-Sensitive.¹³⁵ The relevant policies include the Regional Strategy for West Africa and country strategies for the countries relevant for this thesis. Although this presented significant friction, these issues of access and ownership have been circumvented by UK Government Whitepapers in conjunction with press releases. An important document which ties together many of the strands investigated in this study, and is an example of Government documentation on the open internet, is the UK's IDES (2017). IDES (2017) provides an increased level of detail on the UK's general policy to DE, which is of sufficient depth to support this thesis. At the time of writing and due to the dynamic

¹³⁵ Official-Sensitive is the security classification which means it cannot be shared or used in an open forum.

nature of the UK's exit from the EU, for the collection, analysis, and interpretation of any adjustment to UK foreign policy open source government comments will be used.

The majority of strategic level direction used to support this thesis derives from official primary source government publications and is considered credible. However, research focused on West African military activity was gleaned from open source reporting requiring the development of criteria to determine the veracity of the information. To validate the quality of information, where appropriate, material used within this thesis will be referenced by at least two separate association news sources before consideration. The method of authenticating reports will ensure a certain level of rigor to the information supporting this thesis. However, this still carries risk as some of the best sources of information originate from unverifiable social media platforms noting, "despite extreme poverty in vast swathes of the country, a significant portion of Nigerian citizen have smartphones, speak English, and form an active cohort of citizen reporters."¹³⁶ However, unless two reputable association news agencies release the reports, they will not be in consideration.

Data Analysis and Synthesis

The EWMR methodology ensures the data is organized in a sequential manner. The analysis of geopolitical and strategic information ('Ends') will flow into the operational level ('Ways'). Capstone documentation and British Army press releases provide the 'Means.' All three will provide a holistic perspective when assessing the

¹³⁶ Harry Willis, "#desertrats," *Combat Magazine* (May 2016).

‘Risk’ of the UK’s current approach (Chapter 4) and the proposed recommendations (Chapter 5).

The research framework will provide a top-down and resource focused view of the UK’s policy towards West Africa while highlighting possible courses of action to increase the access and influence the UK desires. By beginning with the UK’s ‘Ends,’ this methodology begins by detailing the UK’s desired geopolitical profile, i.e., an important presence on the global stage. With this as a start point, the thesis hopes to provide transferable recommendations to situations wherever the UK has strategic interests where the PN’s militaries are developing. As has already been identified, in light of the new scramble for Africa, this thesis will also be of interest to Allies with similar aims.

Summary and Conclusion

The conceptual model of EWMR will provide a widely known systemic approach to solving a problem of reconciling what the UK wants to achieve with regards to its global posture, West Africa and specifically Nigeria, and what it can achieve with the means it has at its disposal. This model will examine the flow from the strategic level, through the operational level, to the tactical level, identifying shortfalls articulated under ‘risk.’ Assessing the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of the current and proposed courses of action will provide a level of rigor to a highly subjective area.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Our security, prosperity, and freedom are interconnected and mutually supportive. They constitute our national interest.

—Great Britain and Cabinet Office, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*

The purpose of this study is to highlight how an adjustment of British Army engagement strategy will better deliver regional effect in West Africa to support a ‘Global Britain’, and how Nigeria is key to these efforts. Nigeria has the ingredients to be a long term success on the global stage – an abundance of natural resources and a young and expanding demography. However, this glowing potential is undermined and placed at significant risk by endemic corruption and institutional fragility. Whether West Africa succeeds or not will have a direct correlation on the prosperity and security of the UK and other international partners over the next 20 years. The thesis seeks to identify ways the UK could mitigate the threat to future West African successes through the lens of the Military component of DIME and specifically the British Army. The thesis will use the conceptual model of EWMR to clearly and methodically understand where policy inconsistencies exist. The chapter will also highlight areas where a readjustment of the UK’s engagement policy may bring mutual benefit to both West Africa and the UK.

Contextualizing the EWMR model, the ‘Ends’ are from the NSS, which provides the capstone policy document which defines what the UK seeks to achieve through the NSOs. The ‘Ways’ are from the SDSR, which focuses on what activities need to take place for the UK to achieve its aims and expands on the NSOs. The SDSR also contains

the details and government policy on what the UK can devote to action the ‘Means’ in terms of priority, human resources, and funding.¹³⁷ By assessing the imbalances between the EWM, this thesis will be able to identify and articulate the Risks. These will lead to suggested courses of action and conclusions (Chapter 5). The EWMR mechanism will, in turn, provide answers to the primary and secondary research questions.

‘Ends’

The NSS 2015 stated three NSOs which form a thread through subsequent national security documents. These provide the Ends: Protect our people (NSO 1); Project our global influence (NSO 2) and Promote our prosperity (NSO 3). The vision that accompanies these objectives is one of “a secure and prosperous UK, with global reach and influence.”¹³⁸

Table 2. UK Expanded NSOs		
NSO 1	Protect our people	At home, in our overseas territory and abroad, and to protect our territory, economic security, infrastructure, and way of life.
NSO 2	Project our global influence	Reducing the likelihood of threats materializing and affecting the UK, our interests, and those of our allies and partners
NSO 3	Promote our prosperity	Seizing opportunities, working innovatively and supporting UK industry

Source: HM Government, *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom* (Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, November 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf.

¹³⁷ Louisa Brooke-Holland, *The 2015 SDSR: A Primer* (Briefing Paper Number 07235, The House of Commons Library, UK Parliament, November 2015), <http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7235/CBP-7235.pdf>.

¹³⁸ Cabinet Office, *National Security and Capability Review*.

In addition to the NSOs, the NSC established two further ends to cover the NSOs. The first is to “ensure a secure and resilient UK by protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, territory, and ways of life from all major risks that can affect us directly.” The second is to “shape a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or British interests overseas, and applying our instruments of power and influence to shape the global environment.”¹³⁹ Figure 5 and these additional objectives are the enduring waypoints which the ‘Ways’ and ‘Means’ seek to support. It is also these Ends which provide the framework for the UK to achieve the elusive and intangible term of being a ‘Global Britain.’ The UK defense organization is supporting this aim, and in light of the UK’s friction with the EU, long-established policies such as the withdrawal of forces ‘East of the Suez’ are being ‘ripped up.’

‘Ways’

NSO 1 (Protect Our People)

The ‘Ways’ come from the NSO subordinate tasks and the NSS. NSO 1 (Protect our people) has a number of subordinate tasks, two of which are appropriate for the focus of this thesis: (1a) Deter and defend against threats to UK bases and territories overseas; (1b) and Conduct operations to restore peace and stability, unilaterally or as part of a coalition/alliance.¹⁴⁰ The UK needs to remain a credible force if it is to deter threats to its territories and interests, which requires the UK to have significant operational reach.

¹³⁹ HM Government, Fact Sheet 1.

¹⁴⁰ Ministry of Defence (MOD), *Mobilising, Modernising & Transforming Defence: A Report on the Modernising Defence Programme*, HM Government, December 2018, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/>

The UK's credibility was recently demonstrated during the 2017 Caribbean Hurricane season, in tackling the aftermath of Hurricane Irma. The UK used maritime and air platforms to rapidly deploy humanitarian aid and Armed Forces personnel to support the restoration of order and routine services in the UK's Caribbean territories. From a standing start, Operation RUMAN rapidly deployed over 3,500 soldiers and marines, with comprehensive aid packages from the UK to the Caribbean in little over 24 hours.¹⁴¹ Although a significant drain and burden on resources, it provided evidence of the UK's unwavering commitment and ability to protect its interests with a credible force package.

Outside of environmental emergencies, in the context of DAOTO, regular deployments such as this are not sustainable in an immature operational environment. The UK lacks the resources to maintain mature and persistent operational footprints with the ability to respond to any new global crisis. The UK, therefore, needs to mitigate the threats of crises before they develop which could be achieved through an enhanced engagement strategy. The UK has sought to mitigate this risk through the deployment of the enduring footprint, which 'Means' will explore.

NSO 2 (Project Our Global Influence)

NSO 2 (Project our global influence) has four subordinate tasks, or 'Ways,' which are appropriate to this thesis.

uploads/attachment_data/file/765879/ModernisingDefenceProgramme_report_2018_FIN AL.pdf.

¹⁴¹ Specifically, to the UK overseas territories of the British Virgin Islands, Anguilla, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

Table 3. Subordinate tasks of ‘Projecting Global Influence’	
2a	Contribute to understanding the global security environment through forward presence and intelligence gathering
2b	Resource core staff posts within the Global Defense Network, including Defense Attaches, Advisors, Loan Service personnel, key exchange posts, and British Defense Staffs
2c	Contribute to the wider Global Defense Network and non-NATO international posts, including other Exchange posts, Liaison Officers, embeds and other cross-Government partners
2d	Conduct capacity building with partners, allies and multinational organizations in support of UK strategy

Source: Ministry of Defence, *Mobilising, Modernising & Transforming Defence: A Report on the Modernising Defence Programme*, HM Government, December 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/765879/ModernisingDefenceProgramme_report_2018_FINAL.pdf.

NSO 2 is the primary focus of this thesis and the ‘Ways’ it provides present the UK with viable routes to pivot towards enhanced engagement with West Africa.

This thesis contends NSO 2a – NSO 2d are a more consistent and efficient way of protecting our global influence than the recent procurement of two aircraft carriers and a fleet of F35 Lightning IIs. It moves away from ‘gunboat diplomacy’ which the RN appear to be increasingly using. The use of this type of diplomacy was seen in August 2018 when HMS Albion, an amphibious warship, exercised United Nations Convention of the Sea (UNCLOS) in the vicinity of the contested Parcel Islands in the South China Sea (SCS). China responded with a Frigate and two helicopters to robustly escort HMS

Albion out of the area and a correspondingly robust diplomatic call from China for the UK to explain itself.¹⁴²

HMS Queen Elizabeth, one of the UK's two aircraft carriers, is due to follow up HMS Albion in 2021 to demonstrate the UK's non-recognition of China's territorial claims in the SCS. Without a supporting fleet, this type of diplomacy is high risk and may be reliant on support from allies.

This case study serves to highlight a conundrum with the UK's current procurement policy at a time of heightened global tensions. By investing in low volume, high impact strategic assets, the UK can present strategic force packages around the world. However, in terms of the RN, the lack of a supporting fleet ensure any action will lack depth degrading the intent to deter. With a 'Comprehensive Spending Review' due in autumn 2019, against the backdrop of a funding shortfall of between £7 billion and £15 billion (U.S. \$8.8 billion and \$18.9 billion) in equipment budgets over the next ten years, austerity and financial constraints on UK Defence could be set to continue.¹⁴³

Defense points of presence allow the UK to project influence from the tactical to the strategic level, which in turn provide an open forum and dialogue between to current and prospective PNs. The enduring footprint and the Defense Attachés network provide

¹⁴² Bill Hayton, "Britain Is Right to Stand Up to China Over Freedom of Navigation," Chatham House, June 1, 2018, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/britain-right-stand-china-over-freedom-navigation>.

¹⁴³ Andrew Chuter, "Britain Eyes a More Lethal Force in Newly Revealed Defense Modernization Review," *Defense News*, December 18, 2018, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/12/18/britain-eyes-a-more-lethal-force-in-newly-revealed-defense-modernization-review/>.

an interface with PN military personnel, which is critical to the understand function and projecting presence. The development of close professional relationships with PN personnel is a crucial component of the maintenance of military diplomacy. These relationships provide the timely and actionable information generated which allow policyholders and decision makers to create the conditions for successful security cooperation..¹⁴⁴

NSO 3 (Promote Our Prosperity)

The UK defense industrial sector is one of the world's most active, with an annual turnover of £22 billion and supports 260,000 jobs, many of which are highly skilled and well paid. The UK is among the world's leading, responsible, exporters of defense capability, securing export orders worth £5.9 billion in 2016. However, at a time of increasing global competition, the UK needs to ensure it remains relevant and at the forefront of the industry.

During the UK PM's visit to Africa in August 2018, she noted the requirement for security and stability for economies to prosper, in turn, developing increasingly valuable trade partners. The PM pledged to make the UK top investor in Africa by 2022, and to “create a new partnership . . . built around shared prosperity and security.”¹⁴⁵ She further

¹⁴⁴ Muamer Hirkić, “Why Is Military Diplomacy Important?” *Young Diplomats*, October 11, 2018, <http://www.young-diplomats.com/why-is-military-diplomacy-important/>.

¹⁴⁵ Ian Mitchell, “The New UK Partnership with Africa: From Rhetoric to Reality,” Center For Global Development, August 31, 2018, <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/new-uk-partnership-africa-rhetoric-to-reality>.

commented on the driving focus will be to ensure African governments “have the . . . institutions and support to attract sustainable long term investments.”¹⁴⁶

The UK Government recognizes West Africa’s economic potential but also notes external support is required to realizing it. In 2011, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the FCO, Mr. Bellingham stated, “with the right reforms and approach from government, growth can . . . make a real difference to the lives of millions of West Africans”.¹⁴⁷ If security and economic growth are two sides of the same sheet of paper, supporting security in West Africa will lead to economic growth, providing the UK with increasingly viable economic partners.

Fusion Doctrine

An enhanced engagement strategy with Regional CoEs provides a mechanism for other elements of national power to dock into the network established through military diplomacy. Although ‘Global Britain’ is the unifying task for the UK government post-Brexit, a strategy defining it is yet to be released.¹⁴⁸ Fusion Doctrine (Figure 6) is the proposed mechanism to deliver the strategy-led design of policy and planning, and improved decision making while leveraging cross-departmental commonalities. Fusion Doctrine provides the framework and forum to achieve the government’s objectives over

¹⁴⁶ Mitchell, “The New UK Partnership with Africa.”

¹⁴⁷ Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), “The UK Prosperity Agenda – Growth, Open Markets and Good Governance,” UK Government, February 17, 2011, accessed April 26, 2019, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-uk-prosperity-agenda-growth-open-markets-and-good-governance>.

¹⁴⁸ Seely and Rogers, *Global Britain*.

the long term. The intent is for Fusion Doctrine to anticipate how adversaries and allies could react to avoid unwanted second and third order effects. It allows for a whole of government approach to responding more comprehensively to the threat the UK faces, extending if required to the private and third sector. Many technological challenges need a partnership between the public and private sector. This approach is also vital internationally where security, trade, and development partnerships are often mutually reinforcing.




Figure 5. UK Fusion Doctrine

Source: Cabinet Office, *National Security and Capability Review*, HM Government, March 2018, accessed February 26, 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf, 10.

From a UK military and specifically British Army perspective DE supports the NSOs and Fusion Doctrine through four broad categories of activity: defense diplomacy, defense support to UK prosperity, building capability and enabling capability. Examples of the activities are given in Figure 7, though they are frequently interdependent or contribute to more than one of the NSOs.¹⁴⁹




Figure 6. Defense Engagement Activities

Source: Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy*, HM Government, 2017, accessed February 26, 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/596968/06032017_Def_Engag_Strat_2017DaSCREEN.pdf, 11.

¹⁴⁹ MOD FCO, *UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy*, 11.

The presence of the UK's Stabilization Unit, born out of the MOD, FCO, and DfID in 2004 signals the UK is aware of the importance of cross-governmental work and the success it can bring.¹⁵⁰

Means

UK Facing

The UK may want to raise its brand, access, and influence around the globe, but it has increasingly reduced personnel. The British Army is the smallest it has been since the Napoleonic Wars (1815), the RAF has more than halved in size since the 1990s, and the Royal Navy is struggling to protect the UK's new aircraft carriers with a full fleet. In the face of increasing global competition and with the threat of LSCO increasing, the UK needs to employ non-traditional means to maximize its ability to achieve foreign policy objectives.

The British Army has two Divisions and only one, 3rd (UK) Division, at continual operational readiness, providing the UK's strategic land warfare asset.¹⁵¹ This division can bring to bear the full spectrum of warfighting capability with considerable firepower and forces including Reconnaissance, Armored Cavalry, Armored, and Mechanized Infantry, Aviation, Artillery, Engineers, and Logistics. It is the UK's Reactive Force (RF) and the UK's contribution to an Allied Corps deployment. However, the requirement for maintaining readiness results in these forces being unsuited for DE.

¹⁵⁰ Seely and Rogers, *Global Britain*, 16.

¹⁵¹ The British Army, "3rd (United Kingdom) Division," UK Ministry of Defence, accessed April 8, 2019, <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/formations-divisions-brigades/3rd-united-kingdom-division/>.

In order to meet the requirement to complete and contest DAOTO the UK task organized 1st (UK) Division to be the primary Adaptable Force (AF), optimized for the challenges of today, both in the UK and abroad. It is at one time committed to UK resilience tasks¹⁵², responsible for the British Army's contribution to DE, and ready to deploy echelons below brigade to support the British Army's global operations providing warfighting mass and persistent engagement overseas.¹⁵³ The British Army achieves persistent engagement of the dynamic footprint through 1st (UK) Division, its subordinate brigades and the Specialized Infantry Group (SIG). They seek to understand PN security requirements, prevent conflicts, promote prosperity, enable interoperability, and maintain access and influence. The most common form of employment is in Short Term Training Teams (STTTs).¹⁵⁴ Most often brokered between the DA and PN military, 1st (UK) Division and the SIG routinely supply the personnel.

Established in December 2016, the SIG is a new capability to enhance the UK's ability to work alongside PN armed forces overseas to encourage stability, security, and support conflict prevention. It does this by supporting PNs develop their Armed Forces' capacity and capability and by forging critical partnerships which will promote stability. The SIG and their subordinate battalions have the training, structure, and equipment to work alongside chosen PN armed forces. They increase the Army's contribution to countering terrorism and building stability overseas, thereby supporting the UK efforts to

¹⁵² Defense Support to Civilian Agencies (DSCA).

¹⁵³ The British Army, "Core Script," October 11, 2018.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

project global influence and deter threats. The SIGs unique selling point is their regional alignment, their unique framework of policies and permission, and their ability to respond to extreme short notice training requirements often driven by the lack of PN organizational maturity.

The 1st (UK) Division, including the SIG, form the dynamic footprint of the British Army.¹⁵⁵ The ‘dynamic footprint’ conduct training and education to support internal security, to deter enemies and adversaries, and to develop the UK’s prosperity agenda. The objectives of the dynamic footprint are to deter threats to the UK and protect UK citizens abroad, to build PN capability, capacity, and will.¹⁵⁶ It is the combination of the Enduring and Dynamic footprints with the responsibility to deliver DE effect as illustrated in Figure 9.

¹⁵⁵ The dynamic footprint covers all other deployed Defence Engagement force elements on routine engagement tasks. It encompasses exercises, short-term training teams visits, high-level international engagement and short duration exchanges and attachments. MOD, DCDC, JDN 1/15, 62.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 23.




Figure 7. Defense Engagement Activities through Time

Source: Ministry of Defence, The Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Joint Doctrine Note 1/15, *Defence Engagement*, HM Government, January 4, 2016, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/570579/20160104-Defence_engagement_jdn_1_15.pdf.

The requirement for the dynamic footprint to deploy is identified and sanctioned by the enduring defense footprint.¹⁵⁷ The enduring footprint is the interface between the PN's military and the UK and is where the majority of military diplomacy takes place. Military diplomacy is the mechanism of exercising national power through a long-term

¹⁵⁷ The enduring footprint involves UK Defence personnel who are permanently based in the region and includes: the overseas network of Defence sections in embassies; loan service personnel (including military missions and permanent training teams); exchange officers; and other government-to-government arrangements. MOD, DCDC, JDN 1/15, 62.

approach to nation-building and fostering stable future partners. Military diplomacy is known for its robustness and is often considered a “last resort” in times of crisis, which can result in the military having a direct impact on foreign policy.¹⁵⁸ Military relationships are often the foundation upon which further connections develop.¹⁵⁹ The UK’s enduring footprint is tasked to develop interoperability, cooperation, and understanding to develop influence in support of UK NSOs to develop the UK’s position and influence.¹⁶⁰ The UK’s global defense and diplomatic network spans 168 countries and territories and is crucial to achieving the UK’s aims of presence and influence. The ‘enduring footprint’ also develops, nurtures and maintains strategic dialogue and cooperation.¹⁶¹ While the majority of DAs are at OF4 (LTC) level; the SDSR directed the strengthening of the global defense network with new BDSs at OF6 level (Brig Gen) in Africa, the Gulf and Asia-Pacific.

Since DE became a recognized, and then mandated and funded task, it has experienced huge growth. From 74 STTTs deploying globally in 2015, the Army deployed 256 STTTs in 2017. The last officially released figures for 2018 remained on the upward trend with over 240 teams deployed by July 2018 achieving nearly 100% of 2017’s total in just six months. In 2017, over 70% of these deployments were to Sub-

¹⁵⁸ Amy Ebitz, “The Use of Military Diplomacy in Great Power Competition,” *Brookings* (blog), February 12, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/12/the-use-of-military-diplomacy-in-great-power-competition/>.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ MOD, DCDC, JDN 1/15, 23.

¹⁶¹ MOD, FCO, *UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy*.

Saharan Africa. In addition to training, the teams often worked in direct support of generating access for UK business, thereby contributing to the prosperity agenda. Where required, STTTs also set conditions for the delivery of UK and international aid as well as contributing towards institutional growth in the supported nations and their neighbors. As an example, British soldiers have helped train Nigerian forces to conduct African security missions under a UN mandate.¹⁶² These figures are a clear demonstration of the UK Government's desire to use the British Army proactively abroad to support UK interests and support our allies.

Partner Nations Facing

The thesis has assessed the strength and challenges facing the NA in a regional context. However, an analysis of their means to address internal and regional security threats is illustrative of the institutional challenges it faces. The NA has specified pathways for soldiers and officers. The soldiers receive nine weeks of training at the NA depot in Zaria before receiving further specialist training at one of 18 Corps training schools. Following the successful completion of this, the recruits will move to one of eight fighting formations with many deploying straight into the operational theater in the North East. The NA Officer candidates complete a separate five-year program which includes four years of academic study and one year of military training.

The UK employs a targeted approach to training by focusing on the Corps training schools with the majority of effort and support directed at the NA School of Infantry in Jaji. Soldiers attending this training rarely come from a particular unit, and

¹⁶² The British Army, "Core Script."

once training is complete, they are routinely re-task organized and pushed forward to the North East. The lack of formality in force generation presents issues such as continuity, ownership of the narrative, the capture of lessons identified, and being culpable for any GHRV.

Ghana is the oldest democracy in West Africa (c.60 years) and in the last 30 years is seen as a steady and reliable presence in the region. Ghana's stability is such it has drawn the attention of European heads of state, as noted in December 2017 with the visit of the French and Dutch Prime Ministers. The Ghanaian Armed Forces (GAF) comprises of only six Infantry battalions with the primary focus of PSO. The GAF is currently the fifth largest troop-contributing country for UN deployments out of 117. The scale of involvement in PSOs ensures the GAF have a regional outlook, with supporting infrastructure and networks, which the British Army could exploit.

The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) has received a steady flow of support from the British Army in the form of tactical level training since the end of their civil war in 2002. The British Army initially supported the RSLAF through the establishment of an International Military Advisory & Training Team (IMATT) and subsequently through DA sanctioned STTTs. British Army has enabled restructuring and enhanced training leading to increase resilience, a characteristic of the RSLAF greatly respected by the Sierra Leonean people. Since 2016 the focus has been to support the recovery from EVD, where all recruitment and training stopped for three years due to concerns of spreading infection, and the qualification for UN PSOs which brings personal and institutional financial benefit. However, as witnessed by the author in 2016, the RSLAF were trained to a level whereby it was technically able to deploy on UN PSOs

but lacked the funding to acquire the requisite vehicle fleet. They also lacked the institutional and organizational maturity to maintain the level of training while they organized a lend/lease deal with another nation which required another cycle of training.

What links all the primary and secondary countries within this thesis is the importance and pursuit of deployments on PSOs. There is an individual and organizational financial benefit which PNs rely on and which the UK can support to achieve its NSOs better. The PN peacekeeper training infrastructure is relatively established with regional recognition with attendance from nations across the African continent.

Regional Peacekeeping Training Centers

These training centers have become a playground. And not an African one!

—Unnamed observer at Peacekeeping Training Center, quoted in Marco Jowell, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Politics, Security and the Failure of Foreign Military Assistance*

All three PNs covered in this thesis have the means to deliver a broader regional effect, with affiliations to the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS, through training and deployments on peacekeeping operations. By focusing on the regional effect, the UK more effectively protects itself from GVHRs and also is seen to support the U.N. It also ensures the UK has access to a greater audience than it would otherwise have which will support the achievement of a ‘Global Britain.’

The Nigerian National Defence College (NDC) in Abuja, addresses the strategic decision-making general officer level. Ghana has the Kofi Annan International Peace Support Training Center (KAIPSC) focused at the operational level for the West African

Region, training mid-level to senior officers and police and civilian equivalents from Captains to General Officers. Finally, Sierra Leone has the Horton Academy focused on mid-level and senior officers from throughout West Africa. It is significant to note that the peacekeeping industry brings with it substantial individual and institutional fiscal gains, which may explain the foreign policy direction of the primary and secondary countries within this thesis. As an example, in 2010, Ghana received USD\$74 million from the UN for deploying on peacekeeping operations. Expenditures amounted to USD\$42 million, which resulted in a profit of around USD\$32 million, which was able to be reinvested in procurement.¹⁶³ Much of the focus in Sierra Leone is to achieve the qualification for deployment on UN peacekeeping operations to gain access to this additional funding stream including taking a large vehicle lease loan from China in order to reach the qualifying criteria.

The NAF has tactical training for soldiers deploying on PSOs at the Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Centre (NAPKC). Additionally, due to the size, scale, and leadership of Nigeria's involvement in regional peacekeeping, the Nigerian NDC was developed to support operational and strategic level commanders before deployment on PSOs. The thesis argues that the NDC could provide the UK with the opportunity to reach a broad audience of strategic leaders from across Africa. The NDC is an apex military training institution for the NAF and a regionally recognized center of excellence for strategic PSOs training for an audience from across West Africa. The Commandant of the NDC

¹⁶³ Jowell, *Peacekeeping in Africa*.

noted the institutions “critical influence on policies and decisions at both the grand-strategic and military strategic levels.”¹⁶⁴

The KAIPTC is the most developed peace training center in West Africa in terms of infrastructure and delivery of training, which attracts an international audience. As an example the KAIPTC has trained UN and ECOWAS peacekeepers, UN staff and African Standby Force personnel and since its creation has delivered over 170 courses for more than 5,400 senior personnel from over 86 countries.¹⁶⁵ It has a regional and international focus supporting demand for improvement, reform, and integration from across West Africa and a more broad audience of African countries.¹⁶⁶ This thesis argues that the UK should seek to gain a leading role within this institution in order to have a multiplying effect on the presence and influence it desires. By sponsoring courses and senior, permanent presence in the KAIPTC, the UK will continue to support key partners within West Africa. The UK will also have the ability to shape and influence those going through the training. By maintaining a presence at the KAIPTC, the UK will have more ownership of the narrative, and it will be able to shape the training objectives to achieve its NSOs more efficiently. The delivery of a Conflict Studies Master of Arts at KAIPTC, firmly outside the requirement of peacekeeping operations, implies flexibility of course

¹⁶⁴ National Defence College Nigeria, “National Defence College Nigeria,” accessed April 23, 2019, <https://www.ndc.gov.ng/>.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

design and the ability to use KAIPTC as a vehicle for reaching a wider audience for the UK's DE.¹⁶⁷

The Horton Academy in Sierra Leone, although smaller and less developed than its sister CoEs, still generates access to a significant audience of 8 out of 14 ECOWAS countries and 3 out of 4 Mano River Union countries.¹⁶⁸ The training throughput in 2018 was over 280 senior officers with instruction delivered by instructors from the UK, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Ghana, and Liberia. The Horton Academy receives attendees from Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, the Gambia, and most recently from Mali and Niger, with Burkina Faso also demonstrating an intent to attend. Aside from the interaction with the Horton Academy, the UK has little to no involvement with Guinea, Liberia, the Gambia, Niger or Burkina Faso. The opportunities for projected presence increased access, and influence through the Horton Academy and other Regional CoEs are evident.

Enhanced support to the regional peacekeeping training centers will provide the UK enduring footprint a better view of the inner working and dynamics within the African militaries. The enhanced presence will bring the UK guaranteed long-term engagement with a PN's military to develop relationships. Importantly it will also build formal and informal entrance points such as with the Director of a regional CoE who would routinely be a regime loyalist and a link to the executive branch of the PN

¹⁶⁷ Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC), "Master of Arts Degree in Conflict, Peace, and Security (Executive Weekend)," KAIPTC (blog), April 21, 2017, <https://www.kaiptc.org/academic-programmes/masters-programmes/master-of-arts-degree-in-conflict-peace-and-security-executive-weekend-emcpsKAIPTC/>.

¹⁶⁸ Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea.

government.¹⁶⁹ Seconding suitably senior military advisers provides the access and, in time, a more significant opportunity of influence “reminiscent of colonial and post-independence modalities of military assistance.”¹⁷⁰

Risks

Reputational

Despite HRs being a consistent element of every UK interaction with Nigeria, reports of abuses and HR violations continue. These reports include accusations directed at the Department of State Security Services (DSS) by Nigeria’s own National Human Rights Commission. Violations reportedly include unlawful arrests, prolonged detention without trial, and torture of detainees.¹⁷¹ In April 2018, the arrests of 115 Shia Islamic Movement of Nigeria IMN members in Abuja followed a protest for the release of their leader Sheik Zazaky and his wife. Soldiers reportedly killed at least 42 more in Abuja during similar protests in October. On August 17, 2018, 112 women were arrested and prosecuted in Owerri, Imo State, for protesting the disappearance of the leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) separatist group.¹⁷²

The UK may not want to engage with partners with continuing accusations of HR violations, but there is a political and economic reality which takes precedence. The UK’s

¹⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch, “Nigeria: Events of 2018,” December 19, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/nigeria>.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

stance has been to admit it can only support the shift to HR compliance if it is involved. If the UK were to disengage with every nation with checkered HR records, it would be part of a tiny community with other international competitors unconstrained by the politics associated with HRs, such as China, willing and able to take the UK's role, and the expected access and influence it brings.

The UK has a finite number of trained troops able to deliver training credibly and will be unable to support the continued growth of tactical level STTTs. When the UK is unable to support short notice training demands, there is an increased risk of reputational damage. Failure to adequately support a PN opens the door for other international competitors to take the UK's place, attriting the UK's access and influence. The current UK overemphasis of tactical level training does not take into account the operational and institutional immaturity of the PNs. As an example, the NA lacks any sustainable readiness model with an irregular cycle for deploying and redeploying force packages. Soldiers come out of Depot to be trained by UK instructors, to then be re-task organized into bespoke packages to deploy into the operational theater in the North East with no knowledge of when they will be relieved and return home. These soldiers are under considerable pressures facing a vicious counter-insurgency with little or no pay, supervision and oversight, increasing the risk of HR abuses. If the UK has delivered the training before deployment, it remains culpable for what occurs in the operational theater.

Placing a higher international headquarters, such as the UN, between the troops trained by the UK and the operational output provides a buffer from reputational risk. Supporting the UN through PSO training at West African Regional CoEs will bolster meaningful bilateral relationships and enhance UK leadership within the UN Security

Council. Support to the U.N. could result in more considerable influence on the security council's strategic direction, thereby giving the UK a better platform to project 'Global Britain.'

Institutional Immaturity¹⁷³

A lack of PN organizational maturity ensures that the UK is unable to identify any lessons from the training delivered. There is no feedback loop, and units are formed and adjusted incoherently. The lack of a feedback loop results in the UK unable to measure what effect, if any, is achieved. The UK has previously stated it has trained up to 6000 Nigerian soldiers since its first involvement in 2014, with the US having trained a similar amount in the same period.¹⁷⁴ However, what does the training entail? What constitutes a "trained" soldier? Is it a PowerPoint slide pack rapidly clicked through in an austere classroom? How complete is this, and what were the lessons identified? How useful was the training in the operational theater? The lack of a formal or informal feedback loop ensures there can be no lessons identified, and the British Army continues pushing trained soldiers through an opaque system.

The UK could protect itself from association with the GHRV, increase its organizational visibility, and control of training with associated measurement of effect, through an adjusted focus and increased prioritization on the Regional PSO CoEs. The

¹⁷³ Organizational maturity is defined by the author as: a measure of the organizations readiness and capability expressed through its people, processes, mechanisms, and the consistent measurement practices which are in place.

¹⁷⁴ Vitor J. Tossini, "British Forces in Nigeria - A Long Partnership in West Africa," *UK Defence Journal* (blog), August 29, 2017, <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/british-forces-in-nigeria-a-long-partnership-in-west-africa/>.

UK will be able to shape course content with a demonstrable record of who was taught what with the increased organizational infrastructure and rigor provided by the Regional CoEs. The CoEs would protect the UK from the number of increased variables, and therefore risks, of the tactical level. These Regional CoEs focus on middle to senior ranks resulting in the second order effect of influencing their chain of command and by extension, their institutions. If successful on PSO qualifications and deployments bringing financial gain to their personnel and institutions.

Risk to Life

There are two aspects to risk to life; firstly, there is the risk of troops deploying to austere locations and requiring medical aid due to accidents such as road traffic incidents or illness. Secondly, UK troops deploying to higher threat areas in order to meet the requirement of the PN. As the UK's enduring footprint's access and network grow PN increasingly want training to be delivered close to soldiers barracks which are often in increased threat areas. The PN lack of organizational maturity drives the short notice requirement for training at unsuitable locations from a UK force protection perspective. The lack of organizational maturity also results in the inability to rotate the troops out of an area of conflict in order to receive the training.

In some cases, from a PN perspective, only training delivered directly to the training audience in their barracks or austere posts will achieve the intent. Although the British Army rarely deploys to high threat areas as part of its DAOTO, the UK lacks the operational medical care pathway to provide immediate support up to a Role 3 facility.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷⁵ Role 3 provides the most advanced medical care available outside the United States, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Role 3 facilities provide significant preventative

Often PN facilities are folded into medical contingency plans, which opens up the possibility of increased medical risk.

Compensative Reductions

Despite the increased global competition, the British Army maintains a steady decline in recruitment with a 3.1% reduction from October 2017 to October 2018.¹⁷⁶ Accepting there will be less personnel to achieve ‘Global Britain,’ the UK needs to generate Majors and Lieutenant Colonels, the primary currency for foreign engagement, from within its current organization. With the suggested pivot of engagement strategy to the CoEs of West Africa, the positions/billets will either need to be reassigned from priority tasks within the country or reinvested from other existing deployments. There are three possible ways of approaching this: 1) De-enriching the current grade for defense attachés, so Majors can be the primary defense point of contact within a given country, thereby releasing Lieutenant Colonels to focus on regional defense organizations. 2) Reducing the UK’s footprint within the CENTCOM area of operations (AOO), and re-investing it in the AFRICOM AOO. 3) Moving the current Defense Attachés into the Regional CoEs, using those locations as the base from which the UK can project presence while demonstrating the UK’s visible commitment to their premier institution.

and curative health care. Examples include Army combat support hospitals, Air Force theater hospitals, and Navy expeditionary medical facilities.
<https://hitinfrastructure.com/news/dod-restructures-management-of-medical-treatment-facilities>

¹⁷⁶ Ministry of Defence (MOD), *UK Armed Forces Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics: 1 October 2018*, UK Government, last updated November 15, 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/quarterly-service-personnel-statistics-2018>.

Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable

Current Course of Action (COA)

The British Army currently sends STTTs to support the tactical development of West African armies at an ever-increasing tempo. This approach is unsustainable and risky and fails to address the institutions receiving the trained soldiers. If the British Army is to support the HMG aims of being a ‘Global Britain’ it can do so through an adjustment of its engagement strategy in West Africa.

The current approach of endless tactical STTTs will achieve some superficial benefit for the PN armies but misses the enduring benefit due to institutional weaknesses and susceptibility to corruption and cronyism. For instance, the NA is relatively large in a regional context, but they lack essential equipment to address the insurgency threat in the North East of the country. The lack of equipment includes equipment to counter the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat and necessary protection measures such as Hesco barriers used by militaries across the world. A focus on a target audience of operational and strategic leaders of the PNs is required to achieve long-term and sustainable change. With the current engagement strategy, primarily tactical level STTTs, the UK engagement is unable to reach the proposed target audience. However, with the PN pursuit of financial gain from PSOs, the regional CoEs provide a forum whereby the UK can have unrestricted access.

The British Army is keen to exploit military diplomacy and roles to project itself overseas and has committed to steadfast and extensive security cooperation with PNs. However, as the British Army develops the trust of the PN and grants access to

increasingly high threat locations the Army has to ask itself whether it is willing to accept the increased risk to its soldiers' lives for no demonstrable gain.

Table 4. Screening Criteria for Current COA		
Criteria	Score (based on how many NSO it currently achieves)	Comment
Feasible	0	No indication of what tactical success looks like and whether this will deliver operational and strategic aims
Acceptable	1	The costs and risks (to life) are increasing with a method of employment which will not achieve the NSOs; however, it does achieve the short term view of many West African militaries
Suitable	0	A consistent trickle of "trained" soldiers will not help West African security concerns
		Total: 1

Source: Created by author.

NOTE: Ranged scoring from 0-3.

Proposed COA

The proposed shift of UK engagement in West Africa from the tactical to the regional and institutional level will better deliver NSOs but will require patience. The current course of action will not adequately deliver the intent of a 'Global Britain' and runs an increasing chance of reputational damage to the British Army through potential involvement in human rights issues, no measure of performance, and increased risk to deployed troops.

The immediate constraint in transitioning to the regional and institutional level, is available personnel. The UK could reinvest the means at its disposal to have a credible presence at the Regional CoEs, however, the presence may be intermittent rather than persistent before new established posts. Adjustments to the UK's career structure can be a lengthy process once funding has been agreed and adequately resourcing the new positions may take up to two years. However, due to the volume of deploying training teams, the British Army could find credible instructors of suitable seniority within the immediate timeline. Another option is to re-task personnel within the enduring footprint, although it would result in a reduction in tactical level output.

The second constraint is the willingness of the PN Regional CoEs to receive personnel from another nation. The Nigerian Defence Academy, the precursor to the NDC, was established in 1964 and developed out of the British managed Royal Military Forces Training College (RMFTC). Mindful this was in the immediate aftermath of independence from the UK, and a lot has changed in terms of societal and social development, there is historical precedence for the UK supporting the Nigerian premier defense institution with enduring posts. With the maintenance of military diplomacy and the close ties between the British and Nigerian Armies, there is no reason to suspect the NDC will not accept a credible candidate.

In terms of Ghana's Regional CoE, the British Army has supported the delivery of 'Military Management' courses at irregular intervals over the past five years. When these courses are delivered, they have had a high level of political endorsement demonstrated by addresses from the Ghanaian Defense Minister. The endorsement indicates a willingness to receive support and the value in which the Ghanaian government and

military attach to the UK supported and delivered courses. The Horton Academy in Sierra Leone has an assigned British Lieutenant Colonel assigned to it, but the role is a split post with the responsibility of also advising their Joint Force Command. A full-time position, if the UK wanted it, is therefore entirely feasible.

The proposed course of action is also acceptable. Enduring positions at the Regional CoEs within West Africa will reduce the overall risks to the UK. The CoEs, located in the PN capital cities next to established UK defense infrastructure, are often near the British High Commissions. A reduction of tactical level deployments to austere locations with the corresponding increase in strategic and institutional level training will significantly reduce the risk to British troops. The advantage gained will be a more valuable output in terms of a secure and coherent UK narrative, increased protection against reputational risk, and a higher number of potential PN militaries and agencies engaged and influenced. For the PN, the increased value is in the access to the UK's operational and strategic experience leading to an increase in institutional resilience coming from the enhanced training received by their strategic commanders. The importance of supporting the development of a stable and prosperous West Africa, with the UK reaching a vastly increased customer base and effecting a 'Global Britain' is of such importance, UK investment in Regional CoEs should happen as a matter of urgency.

The proposed course of action is also suitable. Continuing to train PN personnel at the section, platoon, or company level will do nothing for the long term benefit of the PN if the institutions they are going to are not of a suitable standard. The British Army has trained approximately 6000 NA soldiers during a six-year period, which equates to only 3% of the NA. It would, therefore, take over 65 years to train just half of the NA. 'Global

Britain’ requires a better return on investment which will come from a focus at the operational and strategic levels where institutional development can follow. The proposed model for supporting PN military development is, therefore, a shift to a ‘strategic pull,’ which is entirely more suitable than a ‘tactical push,’ which the British Army currently pursues. Being credited with the development of a first-rate institution will better serve the UK’s global ambitions than a company of trained infantrymen.

Table 5. Screening Criteria for Proposed COA		
Criteria	Score (based on how many NSO it will achieve)	Comment
Feasible	2	Despite some adjustment and anticipated friction in terms of developing roles/billets, the proposed COA will better achieve the NSOs
Acceptable	3	An enduring presence at the Regional CoEs will cost less than the exponential growth of tactical training teams with the significant advantage gained. However, there are questions as to how acceptable a shift of engagement focus will be for the PN
Suitable	2	The proposed COA will better achieve the NSOs and the intent of being a “Global Britain.”
		Total: 7

Source: Created by author.

NOTE: Screening Criteria for Current COA. Ranged scoring from 0-3.

Chapter Conclusion

The primary research question is ‘Why should West Africa important to the UK?’

A summary from the analysis from Chapter 4 informs that West Africa is important because of overwhelming demographic trends. The analysis in Chapter 4 also indicates the UK can better employ the means at its disposal to achieve NSOs through enhanced engagement in the Regional CoEs. Despite the short term pain in terms of generating new enduring positions and of getting them at appropriate seniority, the strategic benefits far outweigh any short term concerns. UK military engagement at the Regional CoEs will provide a platform for the UK to generate soft power reach, access, and influence over an increased customer base. This suggested approach will also protect the UK from the risks and costs of the current approach. The UK enthusiastically spends tens of millions of dollars delivering intermittent training to elements of PN armed forces, which lack organizational or institutional maturity to receive, maintain, and recover these soldiers, with no accompanying measurement of effect from the UK side. By elevating the level of engagement to the Regional level, the UK will reduce the reputational risk of being responsible for the training of over-stretched and under-resourced forces.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Africa doesn't need strongmen. It needs strong institutions.

—Barak Obama, Cape Coast, Ghana, July 11, 2009, *The New York Times*

The purpose of this study is to understand why West Africa should matter to the UK and how the UK could better achieve its NSOs in West Africa. This thesis sought to highlight the immense future security threats West Africa faces but also the enormous economic opportunities if regional security can be maintained. The UK finds itself with a limited window of raised international profile, and an adjustment of engagement strategy could better promote access and influence across West Africa, thereby support the achievement of 'Global Britain.' This chapter is broken down into the following sections: a conclusion summarizing the demographic trends within West Africa and the threats and opportunities they pose; the complicated relationship between the UK and West Africa; and how an adjustment of engagement strategy would better achieve the NSOs. The recommendation section includes suggested changes to UK policy and areas for further research.

Conclusion

Africa has the fastest global population growth, which is set to account for half of all global population growth over the next twenty years. West Africa is a critical component of this data set accounting for c.30% of African population. West Africa also has the youngest population in Africa. As has been examined, a predominantly young

population comes with a series of social risks.¹⁷⁷ With the prevalence of corruption and developing internal security threats, there is a genuine concern about the capability of the PN governance to adequately support the population explosion leading to regional security crises. However, if PN governments can be adequately supported and regional security can be maintained, the economic potential of West Africa has a better chance of being realized. A focus on West African regional defense infrastructure and organizations, will give the UK greater access and influence over a more significant number of national armies. A regional approach will also better protect the UK from the risk of reputational damage by overexposure to the variables of the tactical level, which include human rights violations.

The UK has officially supported the development of PN military since it became a mandated task in 2014. However, the current method of engagement is set up for failure. By enhancing the engagement strategy, and transitioning to a regional and institutional approach, the UK will be able to reach a more considerable customer base. A larger audience will generate access and influence, and will support the premier military institutions in West Africa benefiting UN and regional security operations.

‘How can the UK simultaneously achieve success in the long and short term?’ The proposed course of action would achieve the short term gains the PNs require while working towards sustainable long term gains. However, there is a question about how suitable this would be for Nigeria. Their internal security concerns are more immediate than Ghana and Sierra Leone, and any diversion of vital training support may not be

¹⁷⁷ Bello-Schunemann, “Population Boom in West Africa.”

palatable. However, a steady trickle of trained soldiers does nothing except breed reliance, and with little focus on reducing institutional fragility, the effectiveness of these troops will be a fraction of what it could be. With many of the operational and strategic leaders of the PN armies going through the Regional CoEs, this is where the UK should focus its attention, and it is by training of the higher echelon the most considerable benefits will follow. The Regional CoEs also represent a stable platform for the employment of Fusion Doctrine. The military can present a gateway for the other instruments of national power to use. The military will develop the understand function and presenting options and awareness to the other instruments of national power. Using the elevated global platform provided by Brexit, and in order to achieve the ‘Global Britain’ the government desires, the UK needs engage with the West African Regional CoEs as an efficient way to gain the access and influence it desires.

Recommendations

Firstly, this thesis recommends a reduction of tactical level training for PN armed forces. The current course of action presents entirely too much risk for HMG, and without regional institutional development, continued tactical training will only increase that risk.

Secondly, the finance made available from the reduction in tactical level training funds the focus on regional institutional development. By investing in regional defense infrastructure, the UK can reach a far greater audience. A more diverse audience will ensure the UK is reaching a broader audience to achieve the access and influence it desires to achieve a ‘Global Britain’ post-Brexit. Despite being a defense lead, the

Regional CoEs will provide a platform for other UK governmental interactions in the employment of Fusion Doctrine.

Thirdly, the British Army will need to assess the force structure of the Defence Attaché network if the UK is looking to achieve the intent of re-energizing the international brand of ‘Global Britain.’ Presence matters, and if the UK seeks to surge its personnel to reach a more considerable customer base, it will need to accept a re-prioritization is required. An example could be to re-investing the personnel capital currently aligned to the CENTCOM AO to focus on regional engagement. To date, the UK MOD has done this to a limited extent, as demonstrated by the creation of the BDSs in West Africa, Asia Pacific, and the Gulf. However, within the enduring footprints, there is yet to be a role dedicated to the regional security apparatus and the CoEs. A regional figurehead such as a BDS is useful to cohere activities across several countries, but they do not directly tie into the U.N. or other regional organizations. Without a dedicated presence in the Regional CoEs at an appropriate rank, the UK is missing out on gaining access to several emerging nations.

Through the course of developing this study, several areas for further investigation have stood out. The first is to focus on the delivery, prioritization, and politics behind the increasingly weaponized international aid economy. The U.N. PSOs is an industry in itself, and the impact of PSOs on PN foreign policy would be fascinating. The second area for the future researcher is the increasing competition to deliver capacity building activities in other resource-rich regions such as West Africa. New terms aligned to this phenomenon are appearing in Western military lexicon such as “Remote

Warfare.”¹⁷⁸ If this is the realm of the new “grey area” of war, further study to identify and refine its operational art could add value.

¹⁷⁸ At its most basic, remote warfare refers to the countering of threats at a distance, without the deployment of large military forces. Abigail Watson, “The Perils of Remote Warfare,” *Real Clear Defense*, December 8, 2018, accessed May 16, 2019, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/12/08/the_perils_of_remote_warfare_114012.html.

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