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THESIS

**AID AND INFLUENCE: THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE ON U.S. INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA**

by

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**AID AND INFLUENCE: THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
ON U.S. INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA**

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ABSTRACT

Within the last decade, Russia and China have greatly expanded their presence in Latin America—often in ways deemed threatening to U.S. national interests. Partly echoing the first half of the Cold War, the U.S. aims to maintain influence in the region while these states seek to counter any advances. At the same time, the current administration has proposed major cuts to the foreign aid budget. Many experts worry that large cuts could diminish U.S. influence and harm bilateral partnerships. Accordingly, the two case studies contained in this thesis assessed the impact of U.S. bilateral aid on influence in LATAM during the 1950s and 1960s. They both relied on primary U.S. sources (e.g., embassy reporting, congressional hearings, and now-declassified documents), as well as LATAM officials' statements. The research found that bilateral U.S. aid is an effective means to gain influence in the region when it (1) meets needs of recipients, (2) is cooperative and encourages interaction between U.S. personnel and Latin Americans, (3) is somewhat altruistic, and (4) respects recipients' autonomy. Conversely, aid damages influence when these conditions are reversed. Other tools of U.S. foreign policy, as well as many other factors, also contributed to shifts in influence. These are briefly addressed in each chapter to highlight the complexity and fleeting nature of U.S. influence overall.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ASIAA	Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
CARSI	Central American Regional Security Initiative
CBSI	Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOS	U.S. Department of State
EXIM	Export-Import Bank
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FMF	foreign military financing
FY	fiscal year
GPC	great-power competition
IAF	Inter-American Foundation
ICA	International Cooperation Administration
IIAA	Institute of Inter-American Affairs
LATAM	Latin America and the Caribbean
LDC	less-developed country
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MSA	Mutual Security Act
MSP	Mutual Security Program
NIE	national intelligence estimate
PRC	People's Republic of China
TCA	Technical Cooperation Administration
UN	United Nations
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USIA	United States Information Agency
USSR	the Soviet Union

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I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis assesses the impact United States foreign aid has on U.S. influence in Latin America (LATAM) during periods of competition between great powers.¹ Accordingly, my research examines two decades of bilateral aid to LATAM during the Cold War. It evaluates how assistance under the Mutual Security Program (1951–61) and the Alliance for Progress (1961–69) contributed to gains or losses of influence while outside powers challenged U.S. interests. This is done to assess whether cutting aid could weaken U.S. influence—relative to the growing interest of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia in the region.

The study will show that U.S. aid is an effective means to obtain influence and advance U.S. interests in LATAM when it is: responsive to recipient expectations; provided to dependent states; cooperative in nature; perceived to be somewhat altruistic; or employed in a way which respects recipients’ autonomy. Political, economic, and military bonds are strengthened under these conditions. Navy Admiral Craig Faller, the head of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), states: “strengthening partnerships is the best way to . . . maintain the regional balance of power in favor of the United States.”² Conversely, aid is detrimental to influence when it is perceived by recipients as: insufficient to meet needs and development goals; beneficial only to political “in” groups; imperialistic and self-serving; or supportive of despots. The resultant anti-U.S. sentiment weakens inter-American relations and may drive the region to rival actors for support.

Two issues are recognized upfront. *First*, LATAM countries are distinct from one another in their cultural, economic, and political backgrounds. Placing blanket findings on the entire region as one borderless group is risky. To the extent possible, I attempt to respect

¹ The term LATAM generally refers to only the Spanish, Portuguese, and French-speaking countries of Central America, South America, and the Caribbean, in addition to Mexico. Belize, Guyana, Suriname, and Caribbean islands, which have English or Dutch as their official language, are therefore excluded.

² 2020 U.S. Southern Command Posture Statement: Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 116th Cong., (2020) (statement of Admiral Craig S. Faller), https://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/Posture%20Statements/SASC%20SOUTHCOM%20Posture%20Statement_FINAL.pdf?ver=2020-01-30-081357-560, 3.

the individuality of these states and address only the most common trends found. *Second*, several additional factors, both passive (e.g., culture, principles, and policies) and active (e.g., diplomacy, trade, and military action), contribute to shifts in U.S. influence. The evidence presented is primarily focused on the impact of aid, either directly or indirectly.

The Cold War-era was chosen due to its likeness to today's great-power competition (GPC), where the U.S. is again competing for influence against the PRC and Russia. In both periods, LATAM's relevance increased in response to these states' actions deemed threatening to U.S. national security. In 1950, George Kennan wrote: "As things stand today, the activities of the communists represent our most serious problem in the area. They have progressed to a point where they must be regarded as an urgent, major problem."³ Similarly, in 2019, Admiral Faller said that Russia and the PRC are actively present and "working for their national interests in ways that are 100 percent counter to the long-term stability in the region."⁴ In 2020, he stressed the malign actors' presence is part of a "vicious circle of threats" to regional and U.S. national security.⁵

This thesis considers the role of foreign assistance in this challenge. It is a multifaceted and flexible tool of foreign policy which can impact events, resolve issues, and project U.S. values globally.⁶ It works together with the other instruments of national power to advance U.S. interests abroad. Each national security strategy (NSS) issued during this century has underlined the historic impact of aid to some degree. Nonetheless, over the previous four budget cycles, the current administration has proposed a 27 percent

³ George Kennan, "Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department (Kennan) to the Secretary of State," official memorandum (Washington, DC: DOS, 1950), <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v02/d330>.

⁴ Mike Glenn, "Russian and Chinese Activity on the Rise in South America, U.S. Commander Warns," Washington Times, October 4, 2019, <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/oct/4/adm-craig-faller-warns-russian-and-chinese-activit/>.

⁵ Faller, *2020 U.S. SOUTHCOM Posture Statement*, 2.

⁶ Marian L. Lawson and Emily M. Morgenstern, *Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy*, CRS Report No. R40213 (Washington, DC: CRS, 2019), 1, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40213>.

average decrease in funding.⁷ Proposed cuts to LATAM are even greater. Although Congress steadily rejects these proposals, aid to LATAM remains relatively low. In 2016, the Near East was the top aid-recipient region at 27 percent of the total amount, trailed by Africa at 25 percent, then South and Central Asia at 14 percent. LATAM remained at 6 percent on average between 1997 and 2017.⁸

This initial chapter contains six sections to prime readers for the accompanying case studies. *First*, I discuss the significance of the study and its contribution to both policy discussions and academia. *Second*, the variables are defined and explained. This section is vital to understanding what is meant by aid, and more importantly, influence. *Third*, the limited literature tying aid to influence is summarized. *Fourth*, potential answers for the central question are explored. *Fifth*, I describe the methods and sources used. *Lastly*, a roadmap for the remaining chapters is offered to guide the readers' focus.

A. SIGNIFICANCE

Three noteworthy discussions regarding LATAM are currently taking place within national security circles: (1) Is U.S. influence declining in the Western Hemisphere?⁹; (2) What does Russia's and China's interest in the region mean for the U.S.?¹⁰; and (3) How

⁷ Peter J. Meyer, *U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2018 Appropriations*, CRS Report No. R45089 (Washington, DC: CRS, 2018), 4–5, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45089.pdf>; Peter J. Meyer and Edward Y. Gracia, *U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2019 Appropriations*, CRS Report No. R45547 (Washington, DC: CRS, 2019), 4–5, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45547.pdf>; Joe Davidson, “Congress Scorns Trump Plan to Cut, Weaponize Foreign Aid,” *Washington Post*, last modified April 12, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/12/congress-scorns-trump-plan-cut-weaponize-foreign-aid/>; Ayesha Rascoe and Roberta Rampton, “Trump Again Proposes Slashing Foreign Aid in Budget,” NPR, last modified February 10, 2020, <https://www.npr.org/2020/02/10/803897900/trump-to-again-propose-slashing-foreign-aid-in-budget>.

⁸ Lawson and Morgenstern, *Foreign Aid: An Introduction*, 19.

⁹ Meyer and Gracia, *U.S. Foreign Assistance: 2019 Appropriations*, 15–16; Tom O'Connor, “Cold War in the West: Russia Comes to Latin America As U.S. Relations Fail,” *Newsweek*, January 16, 2019, <https://www.newsweek.com/cold-war-west-russia-latin-america-us-relations-1264398>;

¹⁰ Todd South, “Five Key Challenges for SOUTHCOM,” *Military Times*, June 7, 2018, <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/06/07/five-key-challenges-for-southcom/>; O'Connor, “Cold War in the West”; Kiersten Harris, “America's Newest Southern Neighbor?: An Analysis of Russian Influence in Latin America,” American Security Project, August 2018, <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Ref-0214-Americas-Newest-Southern-Neighbor.pdf>; and Evan Ellis, “The New Russian Engagement with Latin America: Strategic Position, Commerce, and Dreams of the Past,” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2015), <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2345.pdf>.

should the U.S. respond to the return of GPC in LATAM?¹¹ This thesis rests at the junction of these deliberations by assessing the role of aid programs in improving influence.

According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), “many in Congress . . . have expressed concerns that significant foreign assistance cuts could weaken U.S. influence around the world.”¹² The House Appropriations Committee asserted that significant reductions will undercut U.S. relationships worldwide.¹³ Their counterpart in the Senate finds that reducing the International Affairs budget “reinforces the perception that the United States is retreating from its preeminent role as the world’s superpower.”¹⁴ More specific to GPC, others contend that decreasing aid will open the door for China and others to increase their capacity to compel regional actors in ways detrimental to the U.S.¹⁵

The 2017 NSS states that rivals strategically invest in the developing world with the goal of countering U.S. influence, while simultaneously increasing their own. Admiral Faller asserted matter-of-factly that “Russia and China are expanding their influence in the Western Hemisphere, often at the expense of U.S. interests.”¹⁶ China has promised more than \$150 billion in loans, provided military equipment, secured Belt and Road deals in 19 states, initiated widespread infrastructure and telecommunications projects, and seeks to

¹¹ David Brennan, “U.S. Will Fight China and Russia Influence in Latin America, Air Force Chief of Staff Says,” *Newsweek*, November 20, 2018, <https://www.newsweek.com/us-will-fight-china-and-russia-influence-latin-america-air-force-chief-staff-1224237>; Lara Seligman, “U.S. Military Targets Growing Russian and Chinese Influence in Latin America,” *Foreign Policy*, November 19, 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/19/us-military-targets-growing-russian-and-chinese-influence-in-latin-america/>; Ted Galen Carpenter, “Enforce the Monroe Doctrine on Russian Moves in Latin America,” *National Interest*, January 7, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/enforce-monroe-doctrine-russian-moves-latin-america-40912>; Benn Steil, “How to Win a Great-Power Competition: Alliances, Aid, and Diplomacy in the Last Struggle for Global Influence,” *Foreign Affairs*, February 9, 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-02-09/how-win-great-power-competition>.

¹² Meyer and Gracia, 16.

¹³ H.R. 115–253, 115th Cong. (2017), <https://www.congress.gov/115/crpt/hrpt253/CRPT-115hrpt253.pdf>.

¹⁴ S. 115–282, 115th Cong. (2017), <https://www.congress.gov/115/crpt/srpt282/CRPT-115srpt282.pdf>.

¹⁵ Adam Ratzlaff, “Soft Power Conflicts in the Western Hemisphere,” *Charged Affairs*, last modified June 16, 2017, <https://chargedaffairs.org/soft-power-conflicts-in-the-western-hemisphere/>.

¹⁶ 2019 U.S. Southern Command Posture Statement: Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 116th Cong., (2019) (statement of Craig S. Faller, U.S. SOUTHCOM Commander), https://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/Posture%20Statements/SOUTHCOM_2019_Posture_Statement_Final.pdf, 6.

mimic U.S. military training programs.¹⁷ Additionally, Russia continues to employ rhetoric to discredit the U.S. wherever possible.

The 2017 NSS, 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and SOUTHCOM Posture Statements all state the importance of LATAM to U.S. national security writ-large. The NDS lists “sustain advantages in the Western Hemisphere” as a key priority for the Department of Defense (DOD) and states that “the U.S. derives immense benefit from a stable, peaceful hemisphere that reduces security threats to the homeland.”¹⁸ Admiral Faller declared: “There is no other region we depend upon more for our prosperity and security.”¹⁹ While national security officials openly acknowledge GPC in the region, the administration simultaneously proposes the aforementioned reductions to aid budgets.²⁰

One principal challenge is that foreign aid is a complex, controversial, and misunderstood portion of government spending. The misunderstanding is twofold. *First*, there is a lack of awareness of the cost of U.S. assistance. Surveys indicate that many believe foreign aid consumes nearly a quarter of the federal budget. It is actually closer to 1 percent.²¹ This miscalculation may lead to ill-informed support for cuts. *Second*, there is disagreement even among experts concerning the underlying motivations, objectives, and effectiveness of aid. Advocates argue that it is rooted in altruism and successful in increasing stability, strengthening governance, and improving security.²² Critics contend

¹⁷ Faller, *2020 U.S. SOUTHCOM Posture Statement*, 4.

¹⁸ DOD, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” 2018, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

¹⁹ Faller, *2020 U.S. SOUTHCOM Posture Statement*, 16.

²⁰ The newly-enacted BUILD Act is one effort in response to China’s rise, somewhat within the sphere of foreign aid (using its broadest definitions). However, it is still being implemented and its effectiveness will not be determined for some time.

²¹ OECD and Brian Keeley, “From Aid to Development: The Global Fight against Poverty,” OECD Insights (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264123571-en.pdf?expires=1558224755&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=2A0EAD208F896140EB8AEC38DECD A744>.

²² Mike Mullen and James Jones, “Why Foreign Aid is Critical to U.S. National Security,” Politico, last modified June 12, 2017, <https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/06/12/budget-foreign-aid-cuts-national-security-000456>.

that it is over-politicized and stimulates corruption, conflict, and dependence.²³ Understanding its effectiveness, even on overlooked outcomes like influence, is vital for policy-makers and lawmakers to ensure they are utilizing all policy tools to their fullest potential. No research thus far has done a deep-dive into this relationship in LATAM. Therefore, this study fills a glaring gap in the academic literature.

B. DEFINING VARIABLES

U.S. foreign assistance, as defined by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, as: “any tangible or intangible item provided by the United States Government [including ‘by means of gift, loan, sale, credit, or guaranty’] to a foreign country . . . including but not limited to any training, service, or technical advice, any item of real, personal, or mixed property, any agricultural commodity, United States dollars, and any currencies of any foreign country which are owned by the United States Government.”²⁴

It is provided on the bases of national security, commercial interest, or humanitarian concern. Some stated objectives of aid include promoting economic growth; reducing poverty; strengthening allies; countering narcotics; improving governance, education and health care; fostering peace and security; and responding to crises. U.S. bilateral aid is provided predominantly through three funding lines: (1) U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—33 percent of total aid since Fiscal Year (FY) 1946. Primarily responsible for economic support, development, and humanitarian aid; (2) DOD—32 percent. Generally comprised of security cooperation and foreign military financing

²³ White House, “National Security Strategy,” 2006, 36, <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2006.pdf>; 2017, 39, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>; and Efe Tokdemir, “Winning Hearts & Minds (!): The Dilemma of Foreign Aid in Anti-Americanism,” *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 6 (November 2017), 822.

²⁴ Marian L. Lawson and Emily M. Morgenstern, *U.S. Foreign Assistance*, CRS Report No. IF10183 (Washington, DC: CRS, 2019), 1, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10183>; Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2394 (1961).

(FMF); and (3) Department of State (DOS)—13 percent. Responsible for global health, counter narcotics (CN), refugee and migration, and security-assistance.²⁵

Defining *influence* requires considerably greater care. For this thesis, it can be understood as the capacity of state A to directly or indirectly change the behavior or opinions of state B in support of, or at least not against, state A's interests.²⁶ In this sense, influence is an inert political force that may climb or descend. Gaining influence is not contingent upon a change in B's actions, only in the improved likelihood that change may occur in A's favor in the future. Thus, influence may sit dormant until drawn upon.

Unfortunately, this term is habitually opaque in its usage. Attempting to appropriately define it is remarkably challenging. When mentioned in scholarly articles and even national security documents, most authors fail to explain what they mean so it is left to the readers' imaginations. It can be used to describe the action of influencing, used as a substitute for the term *power*, or used as a noun (as is the case in this thesis) but lacking explanation of its distinction from power. The kicker is, these are all correct usages of the term in their own right. Still, the appropriate use is dependent on the context and the intent of the author. Accordingly, the term must be clarified in-depth for its use going forward.²⁷

One common use of the term is as the action of one state over another as opposed to a political gain. Baldwin, Nelson, and Wriggins all provide examples of this while focusing on foreign aid at the end of the 1960s. In their respective articles, they each discuss

²⁵ Percentages reflect data from implementing agencies. Some agencies are congressionally appropriated funds for aid programs which are then transferred to others agencies to implement; Lawson and Morgenstern, *Foreign Aid: An Introduction*, 3–10; USAID, *Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations ("Greenbook")*, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2017 (Washington, DC: USAID, 2019), 7, 12, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pbaah600.pdf; FMF accounts for 50 percent of military assistance; In addition to the USAID, DOS, and DOD, 18 other U.S. government agencies are included within the foreign assistance architecture. Together, their funding accounts for 21 percent of all foreign aid.

²⁶ This definition combines two sources' descriptions to generalize and to disaggregate the terms *power* and *influence*. See Jonathan D. Moyer et al., "Power and Influence in a Globalized World," (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 2018), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/Power_and_Influence_.pdf and U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Assessing U.S. Public Diplomacy: A Notional Model*, 2010 (Austin: LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, 2010), 27, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/149966.pdf>.

²⁷ The most detailed breakdown of this definitional struggle can be found in the second chapter of Zimmerling's book on the topic of influence, 97–150; Ruth Zimmerling, *Influence and Power: Variations on a Messy Theme* (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2005).

the use of foreign aid to influence recipients as a form of possible intervention.²⁸ An additional example can be found in Holsti's article "the Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations." Holsti does acknowledge the distinction, albeit very briefly: "Some governments or statesmen may seek influence for its own sake, but for most it is instrumental."²⁹ I recognize that using the term as a verb is definitionally accurate. Still, using it simultaneously as a verb and a noun only muddies the waters. Moyer et al. use both forms of the term, often in the same sentence. This also occurs regularly in Browne's *Aid & Influence: Do Donors Help or Hinder*. For this reason, I avoid its use as a verb outside of this first chapter. Terms such as *affected*, *changed*, and *altered* are used to describe deltas in the attitude or behavior of state B.

Additionally, many use the term only as a verb alongside *power* as the noun. They view power as "something one 'has', and influence is something that 'happens' when power is somehow used."³⁰ This is only partly accurate. Zimmerling refers to this as the "Power-as-Ability-to-Influence View."³¹ This ultimately creates a circular argument in which A has inherent power, uses its power resources (e.g., military, economy, diplomacy) to prompt a change in B, then gains additional power if successful. The view of this thesis is vaguely similar, but clears up unnecessary repetition. I argue instead that the U.S. may create influence, either intentionally or unintentionally, as a result of providing aid to B. If the aid provision directly alters the attitude or behavior of B in a way which it would not likely have done on its own, then the U.S. has demonstrated power over B as well.

²⁸ David A. Baldwin, "Foreign Aid, Intervention, and Influence," *World Politics* 21, no. 3 (April 1969): 425–47; Joan Nelson, *Aid, Influence, and Foreign Policy* (New York: MacMillan, 1968); Howard Wriggins, "Political Outcomes of Foreign Assistance: Influence, Involvement, or Intervention?" *Journal of International Affairs* 22, No. 2 (1968): 217–30.

²⁹ K. J. Holsti, "The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations," *Background* 7, no. 4 (February 1964): 181, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013644>; Another example can be found in Stephen Browne, *Aid & Influence: Do Donors Help or Hinder?* (London: Earthscan, 2006).

³⁰ Zimmerling, , *Influence and Power*, 105.

³¹ Zimmerling, 105.

The term as a noun is frequently conflated with power.³² Uniting these terms is incompatible with this study. Unfortunately, only a handful of scholars delineate them. Zimmerling devotes a full chapter to unpacking the few instances where academics attempted to separate the two.³³ Moyer et al. challenge realist theorists, such as Mearsheimer and Morgenthau, who define them both as: the outcome of A changing the behavior or attitude of B in ways it would not have changed on its own. In the view of these theorists, and many other realists, “the possession of resources *is* power.”³⁴ This implies that if A has more resources, they automatically have influence over B. Considering the U.S.’s immense resources, Reich and Lebow state upfront that “America is unequivocally powerful but only occasionally influential.”³⁵ Merging power and influence into a singular definition leads readers to overlook the presence of a prerequisite capacity to bring about change, as well as the existence of agency.³⁶ Thus, it is necessary to detach them.

In closing, only a few authors attempt to define influence as a noun, separate but related to power. Reich and Lebow define influence as “the ability to persuade others to do what one wants, or refrain from doing what one does not want.”³⁷ Moyer et al. describe the concept of influence as “state A’s potential capacity to influence state B rather than through the analysis of actual outcomes.” Weyland argues that influence “produces only a

³² Moyer et al., “Power and Influence in a Globalized World,” 6; A search for “power” alone on JSTOR yields 1.5 million results. When searching for “influence” within those confines, 600,000 results are returned.

³³ Zimmerling, 97–150.

³⁴ Moyer et al., 6–7; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 57–76; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Random House, 1973), 15; Quotation borrowed from Tom Long, “Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence Through Intrinsic, Derivative, and Collective Power,” *International Studies Review* 19, no. 2 (June 2017): 188, <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viw040>; See also: Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 102–11; Robert A. Dahl, *The Concept of Power* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), 202–3; David A. Baldwin, “Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis,” *International Organization* 34, no. 4 (1980): 5021; and Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: The Free Press, 1947), 152.

³⁵ Simon Reich and Richard N. Lebow, *Good-Bye Hegemony! Power and Influence in the Global System* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), XII.

³⁶ In other words, it assumes LATAM countries, or statesmen, have no say.

³⁷ Reich and Lebow, 6.

certain likelihood of compliance.”³⁸ Within each of these definitions, it is evident that influence rests in the space between a given action by A and the response of B. On one hand, power reveals a more specific and proven capability to produce change. On the other, influence is a more general notion—it is intangible and impermanent. Although they are not synonymous, power and influence can coexist and relate to one another. If A’s actions successfully generate a change in B, A has not only demonstrated some degree of power, but also successfully wielded latent influence.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Literature coupling aid and influence together is scarce and existing work on the variables separately is often conflicting. This is understandable given the extremely complex U.S. foreign assistance architecture, its varying motives and objectives, and diverse explanations for how to define and measure success. When looking at works on influence, we run into a similar issue. In response, this review has three objectives. *First*, improve understanding of influence; *second*, summarize observations on aid’s impact on influence; and *third* describe additional considerations.

1. Understanding Influence

In “Power and Influence in a Globalized World,” Moyer et al. are quick to address the gap in literature relating to influence. They find it striking that the subject is mostly absent.³⁹ Given that very few scholars attempt to define influence in the first place, even fewer offer how to gain it, how it is lost, or how it is measured.

a. Gaining Influence

Moyer et al. argue that influence is dependent on two dimensions: (1) B’s overall access to A’s economic, security, and political resources (“bandwidth”) and (2) “relational, context-specific dynamics between countries A and B, including state attractiveness” (“dependency”). For the bandwidth dimension, influence is gained when A and B share

³⁸ Kurt Weyland, “Limits of U.S. Influence: The Promotion of Regime Change in Latin America,” *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 10, no 3 (2018): 138.

³⁹ Moyer et al., 4.

economic resources (trade), security resources (military alliances), and political resources (representation and intergovernmental membership). For the dependency dimension, influence is gained when B is reliant upon on A for crucial economic and security assets. Foreign aid falls within their description of dependency.⁴⁰

Adding to the dependency factor, many argue that improving B's opinion of A is another method of obtaining influence. Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Wood find that states often attempt to gain influence through "currying favor among foreign elites and publics."⁴¹ Likewise, Mead says that "foreign states can and do seek influence among the citizens of other states."⁴² More related to this study, Crandall asserts that "the United States' enhanced image should not be dismissed as a mere public relations victory; rather, it is indispensable to restoring Washington's influence in Latin America."⁴³

The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy (under DOS jurisdiction) also takes this view. The Commission's observation stems from a 2010 report provided to it by the Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas. In this report, Dr. Matwiczak et al. identify "gaining influence" as one of three key goals of U.S. public diplomacy efforts.⁴⁴ They go on to state that influence is linked to findings of favorability. *Favorability* can be understood as "the approval of U.S. policy or culture—the opposite of Anti-Americanism. It exists across multiple spectra and is demonstrated by the actions, behavior, and opinions of foreign audiences."⁴⁵ In other words, as positive

⁴⁰ Moyer et al., 7.

⁴¹ Benjamin E. Goldsmith, Yusaku Horiuchi, and Terence Wood, "Doing Well by Doing Good: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Foreign Public Opinion," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 9, no. 1 (March 2014): 89–90, 109.

⁴² Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 50.

⁴³ Russell Crandall, "Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 3 (May/June 2011): 93.

⁴⁴ *Assessing U.S. Public Diplomacy: A Notional Model, 2010*, 20.

⁴⁵ *Assessing U.S. Public Diplomacy*, 27.

views of the U.S. are generated, recipients would “either support U.S. interests or move from anti-American rhetoric or behavior to a neutral state.”⁴⁶

In general, the U.S. has always craved a favorable foreign opinion of us. Dean Acheson referred to this as “narcissus psychosis.”⁴⁷ Favorability, much like influence overall, is fluid. On this subject, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stated: “nothing is more fleeting or inconsistent than the feeling of one country towards another.”⁴⁸ Because of the impermanence, this research views any sign of favorability as an indicator of rising influence, regardless of its longevity.

b. Losing Influence

If we agree that positive foreign opinion is one possible way to gain influence, then we must ask whether negative opinion contributes to a loss of influence. The literature which helps shed light on this question is generally centered around the topic of *anti-Americanism*. Because of the extremely large pool of sources to draw from, most of which focus on the post-Iraq War period, I offer only a passing review of this subject.

Hollander provides an all-inclusive definition of the concept which is much too detailed to provide here. For brevity’s sake, it can be shortened to: “an adversarial view of American society and culture; it usually entails the misperception and exaggeration of the flaws and failings of American institutions and values.”⁴⁹ McPherson offers a much gentler description: “The expression of a disposition against U.S. influence abroad.”⁵⁰

A former CIA deputy director once said that although it is often seen as just a sociological concept, leaders must understand the impact of anti-Americanism on U.S.

⁴⁶ *Assessing U.S. Public Diplomacy*, 41.

⁴⁷ Alan L. McPherson, *Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.–Latin American Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 22.

⁴⁸ CIA, *Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad Studied* (Washington, DC: CIA, 1953), U.S. Declassified Documents Online.

⁴⁹ McPherson, *Yankee No!*, 4; Paul Hollander, *Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965–1990* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

⁵⁰ McPherson, 5.

foreign policy.⁵¹ Keohane argues that for policy-makers to care about it, they must be convinced that it “has direct political effects that damage U.S. interests and values, or that its indirect effects would be harmful.”⁵² Chiozza views it as a “fluid and contingent” concept.⁵³ I.e., pro-Americanism is not turned off as anti-Americanism is turned on like a switch. They may overlap based on changing views of U.S. culture, policies, and actions. Accordingly, this research views any sign of anti-U.S. sentiment as an indicator of weakening influence, regardless of its longevity.

c. Measuring Influence

In their 2018 Foreign Bilateral Influence Capacity Index, Moyer et al. introduce a new mechanism for measuring relative international influence.⁵⁴ They argue that influence is in-part contingent upon B’s economic dependency on A’s foreign aid. This is measured by U.S. aid as a percentage of the recipient’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Baker and Cupery use this technique as well.⁵⁵ The problem with this approach is that it applies only to the tangible capital being received. It ignores technical assistance, military training, agricultural commodities, and other intangible resources. Also, it discounts whether recipients perceive themselves to be dependent and relies only on raw statistics.

For another useful methodology, we return to Dr. Matwiczak’s Commission. It measures based on varied opinions of a foreign country’s general population, elites, and government officials—before and after program implementation. In their method, they consider the middle-to-lower socioeconomic class, the media, prominent political and religious figures, and social personalities. Their study conducted numerous surveys to

⁵¹ McPherson, 7.

⁵² Robert O. Keohane, “The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism,” in *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Peter J. Katzenstein, 273 (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

⁵³ Giacomo Chiozza, *Anti-Americanism and the American World Order* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 27.

⁵⁴ Moyer et al., 8–13.

⁵⁵ Andy Baker and David Cupery, “Anti-Americanism in Latin America: Economic Exchange, Foreign Policy Legacies, and Mass Attitudes toward the Colossus of the North,” *Latin American Research Review* 48, no. 2 (January 2013): 121.

assess favorability in real-time. For historical analysis, it will be reliant on various publicly available statements and actions.

2. Aid's Impact

The independent variable is the focus of several studies and enduring debates covering a wide range of issues. Many of these center around prescriptive arguments, such as whether aid should be primarily altruistic or politically rooted.⁵⁶ Others contest the best ways to reform assistance programs to address their complexity and effectiveness.⁵⁷ These issues are important in their own right, but do not contribute to this study. As such, this review strays from these matters and places emphasis only on the scarce aid literature related to influence.

Only four discernable studies were found which explore the relationship between U.S. aid and influence. Browne began in 2007 with his book's sixth chapter, dubbed "Aid and Imperialism." Unfortunately, he is concerned more with whether aid successfully influenced improvements in development. When he does roughly adhere to this thesis's definition, it is to say that security-related assistance has had mixed results, commercial assistance has a negative impact, and aid specifically to gain influence is ineffective. For the latter argument, he focused solely on Egypt and Israel.⁵⁸

In 2013, Baker and Cupery reviewed attitudes of the U.S. in relation to economic exchange, which includes aid. They argue that states who are economically dependent on the U.S. have more positive views of it. Their review notes that most literature fails to show

⁵⁶ Thomas Carothers and Diane de Gramont, *Development Aid Confronts Politics: The Almost Revolution* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013); Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, *War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 162; and Michael J. Gerson and Raj Shah, "Foreign Assistance and the Revolution of Rigor," in *Moneyball for Government*, 2nd ed. edited by Jim Nussle and Peter Orszag (Disruption Books, 2015), 76.

⁵⁷ Daniel Runde, Conor Savoy, and Erol Yayboke, *Reforming and Reorganizing U.S. Foreign Assistance: Increased Efficiency and Effectiveness* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017); Lael Brainard, ed., *Security by Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty, and American Leadership* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007); and Gerson and Shah.

⁵⁸ Browne, *Aid & Influence*, 111–117.

which economic exchange variable (i.e., trade, migration, remittances, or aid) matters more. They do state in their results that aid does promote pro-American sentiment.⁵⁹

Goldsmith et al. offer a third take in 2014 with “Doing Well by Doing Good: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Foreign Public Opinion.”

[Aid] may be given altruistically to improve economic and social well-being in developing countries. . . . [It] may be used as a tool of direct leverage over political elites to advance commercial or foreign policy goals important to the donor. . . . Finally [it] may be provided at least in part in the hope of creating favorable public perceptions of the donor in recipient countries.⁶⁰

In their search for literature on whether aid leads to influence, they find that most works involve individual country studies. These typically focused on the Middle East post-9/11 and in Asia following disaster relief efforts. Overall, they contend that “foreign aid that is targeted, sustained, effective, and visible is more likely to affect mass opinion.”⁶¹

In 2017, Tokdemir wrote “Winning Hearts & Minds (!): The Dilemma of Foreign Aid in Anti-Americanism.” His argument is that aid may foster anti-Americanism. He says that “winners” and “losers” are formed in non-democratic recipient states. The losers, those who do not benefit from the assistance, have a poorer view of the U.S. and see aid flows as “corruptible resources” to repressive regimes. In democratic countries; however, aid is shown to improve U.S. national image.⁶²

3. Additional Considerations

Lancaster explores a foundational question involving foreign aid: “Why... would [a state] provide their own scarce public concessional resources to promote, among other things, the well-being of people in other countries?”⁶³ There are countless motivations that

⁵⁹ Baker and Cupery, 116.

⁶⁰ Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Wood, 91.

⁶¹ Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Wood, 89.

⁶² Tokdemir, “Winning Hearts & Minds,” 827–28.

⁶³ Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 3.

are either stated by the donor or perceived by the recipient. At least 15 were found in the literature.⁶⁴ Given the amount of overlap among them, it is safe to place the motives into three groupings: national security, commercial, and humanitarian. Runde et al. and Hjertholm and White all agree that the drivers of aid are a combination between self-interest and benevolence.⁶⁵

Impact on influence may stem from any of these, based on recipient perception. Crandall provides a great example of the importance of this. He notes that Mexico is “sorely in need of U.S. assistance to combat its drug violence. Yet Mexico’s deeply ingrained suspicion of U.S. motives means that any initiatives . . . must be pursued delicately.”⁶⁶

Additionally, several studies and debates center around effectiveness of aid on its stated goals. These studies are often in conflict with one another. After studying 200 cases of “Aid Effectiveness Literature” (AEL) focused on economic growth alone, Doucouliagos and Paldam note: “The highly variable results and the risk of bias in the AEL make it difficult to survey the results.”⁶⁷ Radelet, a proponent of aid, concedes that every instance of aid will not be met with success. He cautions to not equate failures of a few initiatives to failure of the entire system.⁶⁸ Programs failing to achieve primary goals may still have achieved success in unintended ways. It is possible that perceived aid effectiveness, regardless of accuracy, may have an impact.⁶⁹

Others look the usefulness of aid based on its application as hard power (HP) or soft power (SP). Nye describes HP as the use of tangible resources (i.e., force and money)

⁶⁴ Lancaster, 3–8; Lawson and Morgenstern, *Foreign Aid: An Introduction*, 3–4; Browne, 109–17; and OECD and Keeley, 78–80.

⁶⁵ Runde, Savoy, and Yayboke; and Peter Hjertholm and Howard White, “Survey of Foreign Aid: History, Trends and Allocation,” Vol. 00–04 (University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, 2000).

⁶⁶ Crandall, “Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America,” 93.

⁶⁷ Hristos Doucouliagos and Martin Paldam, “Finally a Breakthrough? The Recent Rise in the Size of the Estimates of Aid Effectiveness” (working paper, *Handbook on the Economics of Foreign Aid*, 2017), 2; this review resulted in over 2,000 distinct outcomes.

⁶⁸ Steve Radelet, “Once More into the Breach: Does Foreign Aid Work?” Brookings, last modified May 8, 2017, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/05/08/once-more-into-the-breach-does-foreign-aid-work/>.

⁶⁹ Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Wood, 91.

to coerce outcomes. SP is defined as “the ability to affect others through co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.”⁷⁰ Nye explains that HP resources can produce SP behavior based on the perceived response to the “structural effects of its example.”⁷¹ In other words, even if assistance is not intended to evoke influence, the notion of aid-giving alone may elicit appeal, depending on recipients’ viewpoint. “Attraction depends on the mind of the perceiver.” Conversely, “not all soft power looks so soft to outside critics.”⁷² Singer criticizes HP use, arguing that coercion clouds messaging and is counterproductive.⁷³ Weeks makes an important note that HP in LATAM is met with concern due to a long history of U.S. intervention in the region.⁷⁴ In regard to SP, Brainard says aid is critical and a “key determinant of the face of America seen by poor people around the world.”⁷⁵

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

When assessing the impact U.S. aid has on influence in LATAM, it is necessary to be broad in the response. This is for three reasons: *First*, no extensive research has so-far attempted to answer this question with regard to LATAM. *Second*, applying outright findings to the entirety of LATAM is dicey. The region is comprised of 33 sovereign states, all unique from one another, with varied histories. Framing explanations in broad-terms aims to respect the individuality of each country. *Third*, the U.S. assistance apparatus is extremely complex. It can be labeled, implemented, and delivered in a multitude of ways. Broad analysis opens the door for future research that explores the relationship deeper and tests the findings against specific categories of U.S. aid. With this in mind, I posited that the study would show one of three potential outcomes.

⁷⁰ Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 21.

⁷¹ Nye, 17.

⁷² Nye, 13.

⁷³ Singer, 429.

⁷⁴ Greg Weeks, “U.S. Leverage in Latin America,” Global Americans, last modified January 29, 2016, <https://theglobalamericans.org/2016/01/u-s-leverage-in-latin-america/>.

⁷⁵ *Foreign Assistance Reform: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps*: Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Development, Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Lael Brainard).

Hypothesis 1: Foreign Aid Contributes to an Increase

This first hypothesis joins the findings of two related studies, which both find that U.S. assistance contributes to improved perception of the U.S. by aid recipients. Baker and Cupery argue that recipient states which are dependent on U.S. aid have a more positive view of the U.S.⁷⁶ However, because it is difficult to find a strong link between dependency and honest favorability, I chose to separate these conditions. As such, the dependency factor below (H1a and H2a) is a stand-alone factor. Further, Goldsmith et al. find that “foreign aid that is targeted, sustained, effective, and visible is more likely to affect mass opinion.”⁷⁷ Thus, the remaining three factors (H1b, c, d and H2b, c, d) are linked to the favorability measurement.

H1a: Aid contributes to an increase in influence under conditions of dependency.

H1b: Aid contributes to an increase in influence when perceived as fairly altruistic.

H1c: Aid contributes to an increase in influence when perceived as effective.

H1d: Aid contributes to an increase in influence under conditions of transparency.

Hypothesis 2: Foreign Aid Contributes to a Decrease

This hypothesis expanded upon the central argument from Tokdemir, who contends that U.S. assistance, provided in non-democratic regimes, fosters anti-Americanism. In these instances, aid creates “winners” and “losers,” which can be equated to those who benefit from aid and those who do not.⁷⁸ Relatedly, the perception of aid among the population may be negative when viewed as a benefit to some and not to others. This may be the case regardless of regime type. If this was found to be true, it would challenge Tokdemir’s second finding that aid to democratic regimes creates pro-American attitudes.

⁷⁶ Baker and Cupery, 123.

⁷⁷ Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Wood, 89.

⁷⁸ Tokdemir, 819.

H2a: Aid contributes to a loss of influence when recipients are not dependent.

H2b: Aid contributes to a loss of influence when perceived as self-serving.

H2c: Aid contributes to a loss of influence when perceived as ineffective.

H2d: Aid contributes to a loss of influence when misunderstood.

Hypothesis 3: Foreign Aid Has No Discernable Impact

While not directly tied to any previous findings, this outcome would still hold explanatory value. Even if the conditions considered by the above-mentioned scholars were found to be present, there may be no discernable relationship found.

H3a: Impact on influence is negligible or not discernable due to recipient apathy.

H3b: Impact on influence is negligible or not discernable due to incognizance.

H3c: Impact on influence is negligible or not discernable due to inability to link outcome to U.S. assistance, likely due to intervening factors clouding findings.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

To test these hypotheses, two historical case studies were conducted. The first explored Point Four (1950–53) and the Mutual Security Program (1951–61). The second examined the Alliance for Progress (1961–69). U.S. foreign policy concerns during this era resemble the present-day GPC. “During the Cold War, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy introduced numerous programs to combat Soviet influence in Latin America [T]hese programs closely parallel the current Chinese efforts to increase their soft power with the Americas.”⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Adam Ratzlaff, “Great Power Influence in Latin America: A Historical Comparison,” Charged Affairs, last modified February 27, 2018, <https://chargedaffairs.org/great-power-influence-latin-america-historical-comparison/>.

I acknowledge this is not the only period of rivalry between the U.S. and foreign powers within the region to draw from. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the U.S. contested European powers' activity, leading to the Monroe Doctrine and later Roosevelt Corollary. Then, from the 1930s to the end of World War II, the U.S. competed against Nazi influence. The Cold War was seen as more suitable and comparable.

Additional initiatives within the region could have been useful case study candidates. These include: military aid to contest Axis influence before and during World War II, aid to Central America in the 1980s, Plan Colombia, and the Mérida Initiative. The specific programs are chosen for three reasons. First, they were both significant efforts to combat influence throughout the entire region. Second, they were sustained for roughly equal periods of time. Third, both applied many forms of aid to evaluate. Lancaster states that it would be “irrational and potentially highly misleading to evaluate *all aid* according to only one of its purposes.”⁸⁰

Aid's impact on influence was measured using qualitative observations of: (1) LATAM dependency on aid; (2) favorable views of U.S. policies or values as a result of aid programs; and (3) whether aid was effective in wielding implicit influence to evoke concrete change. Measuring favorable views of the U.S. as a proxy for influence is not indisputable. However, given the scarcity of proven methods to gauge it, this offers a starting point. Additionally, the current NSS states that “a world that supports American interests and reflects our values makes America more secure and prosperous,” and advances U.S. influence.⁸¹

Discerning influence was heavily reliant on diplomatic messages, congressional hearings, studies conducted on behalf of Congress, and now-declassified government reporting. These included countless pertinent statements from U.S. and LATAM officials about the respective foreign aid programs. Secondary sources included books on foreign aid programs, relevant chapters of broader works, scholarly articles, and various reports.

⁸⁰ Lancaster, 222.

⁸¹ White House, “National Security Strategy,” 2017, 4.

Data on the independent variable was gathered primarily from congressional hearings and USAID's "Overseas Loans and Grants" reports. Known as the "Greenbook," this annual report breaks down economic and military aid by region and specific country from FY 1945 up to the publication year.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis contains four chapters subsequent to this introduction. Chapter II contains a cursory historical overview of U.S. aid efforts within LATAM. This aims to place the case study-programs into historical context. Chapter III addresses foreign aid during the 1950s, discerning any discoverable impact on U.S. influence in LATAM. Chapter IV, in-line with the previous, focuses on assistance in the 1960s. The concluding chapter synthesizes the findings of the research, provides avenues for future research, and offers recommendations for improving the use of foreign aid as an instrument of policy.

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II. U.S. FOREIGN AID TO LATIN AMERICA: A PRIMER

The aim of this chapter is to place the two following case studies in context within the larger picture of U.S. aid to LATAM. This is achieved by offering an abridged account of past and present foreign assistance programs implemented in the region. This only scratches the surface of a complex and lengthy history.

Although official sources of aid data do not report figures before FY 1946, the U.S. has aided LATAM through various official and non-official programs since the late-1800s.⁸² Like foreign aid today, this was motivated by commercial, humanitarian, and security interests. The start of formal reporting coincides with the Truman Doctrine of 1947. This is when aid became recognized as an official tool of foreign policy, though there are earlier instances.

Figure 1 shows the ebbs and flows of aid to LATAM since FY 1946. Changes in priorities of U.S. administrations, extra-hemispheric factors, and regional crises have all altered the flow of funding. Spikes illustrated in the graph coincide with noteworthy assistance efforts. For example, the substantial swell in the 1960s corresponds to the Alliance for Progress, growth in the mid-1980s matches aid to Central America to combat unrest, and 1998 and 2010 increases were for disaster relief efforts in Haiti.

⁸² Additional aid occurred in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries to several individual countries. These were often accompanied by military occupation or associated with “Dollar Diplomacy,” which aimed solely to advance U.S. business interests. These were not regionally aimed assistance efforts.




Figure 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to LATAM, FY 1946–2017.⁸³

From FY 1946 to 2017, the U.S. provided \$88.3 billion in assistance to LATAM (\$181 billion in constant 2017 dollars).⁸⁴ Of this, 88 percent was economic aid and the remainder was military aid. Within economic aid, 50 percent came from USAID, 26 percent from DOS, 14 percent from the Department of Agriculture.⁸⁵

For the military aid portion, 43 percent was countering drug and transnational organized crime activity, 31 percent was FMF, and 5 percent was International Military Education and Training (IMET).⁸⁶ Although a small fraction, over the last decade IMET has created opportunities for over 55,000 LATAM students to attend various U.S. training schools. Several individuals later entered important positions of leadership in their

⁸³ Source: CRS presentation of data from USAID’s Foreign Aid Explorer: The Official Record of U.S. Foreign Aid, December 19, 2018, at <https://explorer.usaid.gov/data.html>.

⁸⁴ Meyer and Gracia, *U.S. Foreign Assistance: 2019 Appropriations*, 3.

⁸⁵ USAID, *Greenbook, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2017*, 88; The balance came through other accounts (e.g., Millennium Challenge Corporation, Department of the Treasury, Peace Corps, Inter-American Foundation, and DOD humanitarian aid).

⁸⁶ *Greenbook*, 88; 21 percent was non-specified DOD programs.

countries, including the former president of Chile.⁸⁷ Thus, raw figures are not always indicative of the significance of a particular initiative.

Currently, CN-focused security assistance is predominant. 81 percent of DOS assistance to the region was through its International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) Program. When combined with the DOD's Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug account, LATAM receives nearly half of the total CN aid worldwide.⁸⁸ Even so, Figure 2 exemplifies a decline since FY 2009.




Figure 2. U.S. Security Assistance to LATAM, FY 2000–2020.⁸⁹

The remainder of this chapter covers notable foreign aid initiatives which have been implemented in LATAM. Some are programs intended for LATAM specifically, while others are global efforts wherein the region received a share. Of the 18 total initiatives, 15 are summarized here.⁹⁰ They are divided into four eras: a.) Early-Twentieth Century; b.) World War II; c.) Cold War; and d.) Twenty-First Century.

⁸⁷ Faller, 2019 *U.S. SOUTHCOM Posture Statement*, 10.

⁸⁸ *Greenbook*, 12, 88; IMET and FMF are DOS-funded programs implemented by the DOD.

⁸⁹ Source: Security Aid Pivot Table–Programs–LATAM, Security Assistance Monitor, <http://securityassistance.org/data/country/military/country/2001/2020/all/Latin%20America%20and%20the%20Caribbean//>.

⁹⁰ Programs covered in Chapters III and IV are omitted here. This includes Point Four (1950-53); the Mutual Security Program (1951-61); and the Alliance for Progress (1961-69).

A. EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

1. Health and Sanitation Programs (1900–1930s)

From the early 1900s through the 1920s, the U.S. Army Medical Corps and U.S. Public Health Service aided Mexico, Cuba, Panama Canal, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru in combating diseases such as yellow fever, smallpox, and the plague. The Ecuadorean population, initially opposed to U.S. presence, warmed to the idea and grew to appreciate the provided help. These programs were later extended to Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay.⁹¹ These programs continued under the Rockefeller Foundation.

2. Export-Import Bank (EXIM) (1934–Present)

The EXIM of Washington was founded by Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) in 1934 as part of his New Deal policy. Its intent was to finance and facilitate goods exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (USSR). In the same year, as part the Good Neighbor Policy, FDR founded the Second EXIM Bank of Washington to strengthen U.S.-Cuban economic relations.⁹² Lending authorities immediately widened to include the entire world.⁹³

In its first years, EXIM leaned heavily toward LATAM. The first transaction ever made was a \$3.8 million loan to Cuba in 1935. In 1938, EXIM's first development loan was provided in the amount of \$5.5 million to Haiti for economic growth.⁹⁴ In 1940, a development credit of \$25 million was given to Brazil for construction of a steel mill. In 1941, it began financing construction of the Pan American Highway. Finally, in 1943, it paid \$2.7 million to Panama to balance debt. From 1934 to 1950, over \$1 billion was loaned to LATAM. Asia, the Near East, and Africa combined received around half of this

⁹¹ Merle Curti and Kendall Birr, *Prelude to Point Four: American Technical Missions Overseas, 1838–1938* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1954), 192.

⁹² The Second EXIM Bank of Washington was merged into the first in 1936. EXIM fell under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation until 1939, when it was moved under the Federal Loan Agency. It would move three more times until it became an independent agency in 1945.

⁹³ Export credits are currently not foreign assistance, but are instead considered an instrument of U.S. trade policy. However, EXIM's earliest endeavors were considered foreign aid.

⁹⁴ "History of the Export-Import Bank of the U.S.," EXIM, accessed October 10, 2019, <https://www.exim.gov/about/history-0>.

amount.⁹⁵ Regardless of EXIM's focus today, its first decade is marked by its contribution to LATAM.

B. WORLD WAR II

1. Lend-Lease Act (1941–1945)

In 1936, the U.S. became aware of axis influence rising in LATAM. This led to immediate attempts to expand military aid through arms-sales and training.⁹⁶ Between 1938 and 1940, multiple requests for weapons were received. Because U.S. arms were limited, they were expensive and required cash to purchase. Most countries were unable to afford them. In March 1941, the Lend-Lease Act was signed which served as a workaround.

Although Lend-Lease is mostly known for aiding Europe and Asia, its roots were in defending the Western Hemisphere. Entrance into the war altered this purpose and aid delivered to LATAM was consequently negligible. By 1945, the region received only 1.4 percent of the total.⁹⁷ Nonetheless, agreements were made with 18 LATAM countries. This included nearly \$500 million in grants, equipment, and economic aid. Brazil received the majority at about \$360 million (180 percent of what was officially appropriated). By 1945, “the United States had acquired a monopoly in military assistance to Latin America.”⁹⁸

⁹⁵ S. 1762: *A Bill to Promote the Foreign Policy and Provide for the Defense and General Welfare of the United States by Furnishing Assistance to Friendly Nations in the Interest of International Security: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate*, 82nd Cong. 1 (1951), <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b5149809&view=1up&seq=5>.

⁹⁶ Thomas D. Yeilding, “United States Lend-Lease Policy in Latin America” (PhD diss., University of North Texas, 1983), 1, <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc332292/citation/#top>; John M. Baines, “U.S. Military Assistance to Latin America: An Assessment,” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 14, no. 4 (November 1972): 471, <https://doi.org/10.2307/174767>; and Harold A. Hovey, *United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices* (New York: Praeger, 1965), 49.

⁹⁷ Mark Seidl, “The Lend-Lease Program, 1941–1945,” Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, <https://www.fdrlibrary.org/lend-lease>.

⁹⁸ Baines, 471.

2. Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) (1942–1953)

In 1942, the short-lived IIAA was created to assist LATAM outside of the military domain.⁹⁹ Once again, national security was the linchpin for this program and Nazi influence was the target. Even so, Nelson Rockefeller, the Coordinator of IA Affairs, believed aid was the key to unlocking prosperity and pushing out external influence.¹⁰⁰

Rockefeller began small in 1941 by conducting health and sanitation projects where the U.S. military might set up bases. Understanding that piecemeal funds would not last, he established the IIAA to ensure stable funding. During the war, the IIAA supplied food, improved agricultural practices, and built hospitals, transportation systems, water treatment facilities, and housing. At first, the IIAA funded over half of the project costs. Its portion eventually decreased as LATAM became more self-sufficient.¹⁰¹ After five years, \$40 million was provided to 17 countries in the region. Again, Brazil received the lion's share of assistance at one-quarter of the total. Mexico and Chile combined for another quarter.¹⁰²

In 1946, IIAA was moved within the DOS architecture. Then, in 1948, a speechwriter for the DOS named Benjamin Hardy independently floated a memorandum for the expansion of IIAA's programs into a global effort.¹⁰³ This eventually made its way to the newly-elected Harry S. Truman. At Truman's request, the content of the memo was implemented into his inaugural address. Acheson referred to the IIAA as the "inspiration and the proving ground" for the Point Four program discussed in Chapter III.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ The predecessor to this organization, the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation (est. 1941) (previously the Interdepartmental Committee for Cooperation with the American Republics (est. 1938), was omitted for brevity. For more on this, see: DOS, *The Program of Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation* (Washington, DC: DOS, 1947), <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=txu.059173023676910&view=1up&seq=5>.

¹⁰⁰ Claude C. Erb "Prelude to Point Four: The Institute of Inter-American Affairs," *Diplomatic History* 9, no. 3 (July 1985): 249–69, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1985.tb00535.x>.

¹⁰¹ Erb, 253, 255.

¹⁰² Erb, 261.

¹⁰³ Erb, 266–68.

¹⁰⁴ Erb, 249.

C. COLD WAR

1. Inter-American Foundation (IAF) (1969–Present)

The IAF, established under the FAA of 1969, is an alternative to USAID to deliver small grants direct to the organized poor. These grants are designed for economic growth and social development. Between 1969 and 2017, it delivered over \$800 million to the region.¹⁰⁵ As part of this amount, the Social Progress Trust Fund donated around \$8.5 million per year to repay loans provided during the 1960s. The IAF is currently functioning in 20 LATAM countries, including 8 where USAID no longer operates.¹⁰⁶

The current administration suggests terminating the IAF and moving its responsibilities under USAID. Proposed funds have declined each year since 2017. In FY 2018, \$4.8 million was proposed; in FY 2019, \$3.5 million; and in FY 2020, \$3 million. Each year, Congress rejected the proposals and appropriated the average \$22.5 million.

2. Central American Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative (1980s)

The 1980s saw a considerable rise in U.S. support following a lull in the previous decade. The prime catalyst was the 1979 ouster of Anastasio Somoza by Marxist rebels in Nicaragua—ending his family’s 43-year reign. This contributed to regional instability throughout Central America and fear of communist influence spreading. Once the USSR collapsed in 1991, aid began to scale back again. Human rights abuse, corruption, and instances of illegal funding have eclipsed most discussions regarding aid in this period. As such, this section is deliberately brief to avoid stepping into these controversial topics.

In support of the El Salvadoran government during its 12-year guerilla war, the U.S. increased its military aid six-fold between FY 1980 and 1981. Figure 3 shows that from FY 1981 to 1984, overall military aid to the region grew from roughly \$50 million to almost \$300 million.¹⁰⁷ In FY 1984, Congress passed the Central American Democracy,

¹⁰⁵ Meyer, *U.S. Foreign Assistance: FY2018 Appropriations*, 9–10.

¹⁰⁶ Meyer and Gracia, *U.S. Foreign Assistance: 2019 Appropriations*, 9.

¹⁰⁷ Military aid was funded primarily through the Military Assistance Program and through Foreign Military Sales.

Peace, and Development Initiative to expand economic aid. Accordingly, it increased from \$250 million to over \$950 million between FYs 1981 and 1987.¹⁰⁸ Figure 4 shows a country-by-country breakdown.¹⁰⁹




Figure 3. U.S. Assistance to Central America, FY 1981–1988.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Economic aid was funded via ESF, DA, Food for Peace, and the Peace Corps.

¹⁰⁹ Nancy R. Kingsbury and Joseph E. Kelley, *Central America: Impact of U.S. Assistance in the 1980s*, GAO/NSIAD-89-170 (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1989), 11, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/147879.pdf>.

¹¹⁰ Source: United States General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division.




Figure 4. U.S. Assistance to Central America by Country, FY 1981–1988.¹¹¹

D. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

1. Plan Colombia, Associated Programs, and Successors (1999–Present)

Plan Colombia was created in 1999 by Colombia’s president, Andrés Pastrana, as a six-year program. It had three goals: (1) end conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); (2) eradicate narcotics trafficking and production; and (3) foster development. Although most discussions refer only to the Plan, several programs took its place and no U.S. program was ever actually titled “Plan Colombia.”

¹¹¹ Source: United States General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division.

U.S. aid to Colombia began in FY 2000. It supported its national plan and the entire Andean region, including Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. The Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) was the primary channel through which aid flowed through FY 2009.¹¹² Over time, U.S. objectives expanded from primarily CN to the improvement of regional security, human rights, trade, development, and peace. Although about 80 percent was funded by the DOS, one-third of the Pentagon's aid budget from FY 1999 to 2006 was for this. This went toward training almost 80,000 security personnel.¹¹³

In 2009, Colombia launched a new program—the National Plan for Consolidation and Territorial Reconstruction—aimed to improve state capacity and coordination.¹¹⁴ This largely replaced Plan Colombia. The supporting U.S. aid vehicle was the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative, which served as a gap-filler for Colombia's efforts.

Between FY 2000 and 2016, over \$10 billion went toward supporting Plan Colombia and the Consolidation Plan. In FYs 2017/8, almost \$400 million was appropriated each year for a program labeled “Peace Colombia” by the Obama administration.¹¹⁵ Figure 5 depicts FY 2007 as the peak year of aid to Colombia before a decline and eventual leveling off. Even so, Colombia remains the top aid recipient in the region historically and currently.

¹¹² From 2001 to 2003, ACI was replaced with the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI). In FY 2004, ACI was reinstated. ACI was later renamed the Andean Counterdrug Program; Panama and Brazil were included in the initiative because they each share a border with Colombia, although they are not part of the Andean region; Connie Veillette, *Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY 2007 Assistance*, CRS Report No. RL33370 (Washington, DC: CRS, 2007), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs8778/m1/1/high_res_d/RL33370_2006Apr18.pdf.

¹¹³ George Withers et al., “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy,” Center for International Policy, Latin America Working Group Education Fund, and the Washington Office on Latin America, last modified March, 2008, 3, <https://www.lawg.org/wp-content/uploads/storage/documents/ready%20aim.pdf>.

¹¹⁴ The National Plan for Consolidation and Territorial Reconstruction was first conceptualized in 2004 heeding U.S. SOUTHCOM advice following a failed counter-insurgency offensive, named Plan Patriota. It was first tested by Colombia in 2007 under the name “Policy of Consolidation of Democratic Security.” It became official in 2009 as the “National Consolidation Plan,” then renamed the “Special Management Unit for Territorial Consolidation” in 2011. It was then given its final title; For more on this, see: Adam Isacson, “Consolidating ‘Consolidation’: Colombia’s ‘Security and Development’ Zones Await a Civilian Handoff, While Washington Backs away from the Concept,” Washington Office on Latin America, last modified December 2012, https://www.wola.org/files/Consolidating_Consolidation.pdf.

¹¹⁵ Peace Colombia's intent is to support the peace process between Colombia and the FARC.




Figure 5. U.S. Security Assistance to Colombia, FY 2000–2020.¹¹⁶

2. The President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) (2003–Present)

PEPFAR, created by the Bush administration in 2003, is the world’s largest bilateral HIV/AIDS assistance program. The DOS directs the program, but portions are implemented by USAID, DOD, Department of Health and Human Services, and the Peace Corps.¹¹⁷ Since its inception, PEPFAR has tripled its annual appropriations and apportioned nearly \$90 billion globally.¹¹⁸

The program assists Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and as of 2019, operates a comprehensive Western Hemisphere Regional Program.¹¹⁹ Within it, the Northern Triangle and Jamaica are the current priorities. Brazil, Nicaragua, Panama, Barbados, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago also receive support. Overall, Haiti receives the largest

¹¹⁶ Source: Security Aid Pivot Table–Recipients–Colombia, Security Assistance Monitor, <http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Colombia/2001/2020/all/Global/>.

¹¹⁷ Predecessor programs are Clinton’s 1999 Leadership and Investment in Fighting an Epidemic (LIFE) Initiative and Bush’s 2002 International Mother and Child HIV Prevention Initiative; For more on PEPFAR, see “The U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR),” Kaiser Family Foundation, August 2, 2019, <https://www.kff.org/global-health-policy/fact-sheet/the-u-s-presidents-emergency-plan-for/>.

¹¹⁸ Kaiser Family Foundation.

¹¹⁹ PEPFAR previously operated two sub-regional programs: the Central America and Brazil Program and the Caribbean Regional Program. In January 2019, these were combined into the more comprehensive Western Hemisphere Regional Program. See, Deborah Bix, “Information Memo for Ambassador Luis Arreaga, Guatemala and Chargé D’affaires Eric Khant, Jamaica, Western Hemisphere,” official memorandum (Washington, DC: DOS, 2019), <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Western-Hemisphere.pdf>.

portion of program funding in the region, totaling around \$1.5 billion since FY 2004.¹²⁰ One 2015 report indicated that the Caribbean “has the second highest regional HIV prevalence rate in the world behind sub-Saharan Africa.”¹²¹ Yet, funding for Central America and the Caribbean has been evenly split since 2003—nearly \$145 million to the Caribbean and \$148 million to Central America.¹²² Moreover, available data suggests that LATAM receives only 2 percent of the program’s total allocation. Compare this to South Africa which alone receives 6 percent.¹²³

3. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) (2004–Present)

The MCC is a U.S. government corporation, created in 2004, to provide targeted aid to low-and-middle-income states around the globe. The 27 countries chosen to receive aid under MCC have “demonstrated a strong commitment to political, economic, and social reforms relative to other developing countries.”¹²⁴ The recipients create and implement their own aid packages after proposing them to the MCC for multi-year funding. Countries that do not fully qualify, may still qualify for smaller grant-based “threshold programs.”¹²⁵

Seven LATAM countries have received support through the MCC: Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Guyana, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru. The largest projects have focused on infrastructure, agriculture, health, education, and community-building. Over \$1 billion has been allocated in total.¹²⁶ From FY 2004 to 2017, the region received 9 percent

¹²⁰ Deborah Birx, “Information Memo for Ambassador Michele Sison, Haiti, and Ambassador Robin Bernstein, Dominican Republic,” official memorandum (Washington, DC: DOS, 2019), <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Haiti-and-the-Dominican-Republic.pdf>.

¹²¹ Abigail Vogus and Kylie Graff, “PEPFAR Transitions to Country Ownership: Review of Past Donor Transitions and Application of Lessons Learned to the Eastern Caribbean,” *Global Health, Science and Practice* 3, no. 2 (June 2015): 275, <https://doi.org/10.9745/GHSP-D-14-00227>.

¹²² Birx, “Information Memo for Ambassador Luis Arreaga.”

¹²³ Deborah Birx, “Information Memo for Chargé Lapenn, South Africa,” official memorandum (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2019), <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/South-Africa.pdf>.

¹²⁴ Lawson and Morgenstern, *U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 13.

¹²⁵ Lawson and Morgenstern, 13; and “Latin America,” Millennium Challenge Corporation, accessed October 9, 2019, <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/region/latin-america>.

¹²⁶ Millennium Challenge Corporation, “Latin America.”

of MCC funding.¹²⁷ As of 2019, the only active programs are in El Salvador (compact) and Guatemala (threshold). Since 2014 El Salvador has received \$277 million and since 2015, Guatemala has received \$28 million.

4. Mérida Initiative (2007–Present)

Mérida was formed in 2007 following a request for support from Mexico’s president, Felipe Calderón. The program targets drug and weapons trafficking, immigration, and security and rule-of-law improvements. The first two years included aid to Mexico and Central America. In 2010, the latter portion was stripped and placed under a new program.

The first phase, from FY 2008 to 2010, focused on border security, public security, institution building, and countering drug and terrorist activity. In this time, \$1.5 billion was allotted—the same amount provided to Mexico from 1962 to 2006.¹²⁸ One-third of the aid in phase one was through FMF, primarily for rotary and fixed-wing aircraft purchases.¹²⁹

The second phase, from FY 2011 to 2017, saw the creation of a four-pillar strategy. The pillars were: combat transnational criminal organizations, institutionalize rule of law, strengthen border security, and build communities to address roots of criminal activity. Funding during this phase totaled \$1.7 billion.¹³⁰

5. Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) (2009–Present)

The CBSI was developed in 2009 to address illicit trafficking and improve public safety and security in the Caribbean islands. The program was first announced by President Obama in Trinidad and Tobago at the fifth Summit of the Americas. In 2010, the 13

¹²⁷ *Greenbook*, 12, 88; Note: Nearly 75 percent of LATAM’s funding has gone to El Salvador and 30 percent of the LATAM total was distributed in 2015 alone.

¹²⁸ Clare M. Ribando Seelke, *Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007–2020*, CRS Report No. IF10578 (Washington, DC: CRS, 2019), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10578.pdf>; and USAID, *Greenbook, July 1, 1945-September 30, 2012* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2014), 99, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAEC300.pdf.

¹²⁹ Since 2011, FMF has not been a source of funding for Mérida.

¹³⁰ Ribando Seelke.

recipients depicted in Figure 6 agreed on five focus-areas: (1) maritime and aerial security cooperation; (2) law enforcement capacity building; (3) port security; (4) justice reform; and (5) crime prevention.¹³¹

Between FY 2010 and 2019, nearly \$617 million was distributed. Two countries received the greatest share: Dominican Republic (23 percent) and Jamaica (19 percent). Seven states split 24 percent and the remainder went toward region-wide programs.¹³²

In July 2019, the DOS and USAID issued a report to Congress on the implementation of a new Caribbean engagement strategy.¹³³ Priority areas listed within the 2020 strategy include: security, diplomacy, prosperity, energy, education, and health.



Figure 6. Caribbean Countries Receiving CBSI Assistance.¹³⁴

¹³¹ Mark P. Sullivan, *Caribbean Basin Security Initiative*, CRS Report No. IF10789 (Washington, DC: CRS, 2019), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10789.pdf>.

¹³² Sullivan.

¹³³ Provided pursuant to P.L. 114–291, United States–Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016.

¹³⁴ Source: Congressional Research Service.

6. Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) (2010–Present)

In 2010, Mérida’s aid to Central America was separated and placed into its own program, labeled CARSI. The program provides equipment, training, and technical assistance to law enforcement officials across the region. To a lesser extent, it addresses the roots of regional security issues (e.g., poverty, inequality, unemployment, weak state presence and corruption).¹³⁵

Since FY 2008, around \$1.2 billion has been provided.¹³⁶ The DOS’s INCLE account funds 66 percent and USAID’s Economic Support Fund (ESF) covers 31 percent.¹³⁷ The DOS “has not publicly disclosed how CARSI assistance has been distributed among Central American nations since FY 2012.”¹³⁸ However, the CRS estimates the Northern Triangle remains a priority.

7. U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America

In 2014, CARSI was made a subsidiary program within this broader approach. The current mission of the Strategy is: “to secure U.S. borders and protect American citizens by addressing the security, governance, and economic drivers of illegal immigration and illicit trafficking, and to promote private sector investment in Central America.”¹³⁹

Between FY 2015 and 2018, approximately \$2.6 billion has been issued. Funding for CARSI and this umbrella strategy has been fairly equal given the priority placed on

¹³⁵ Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke, *Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress*, CRS Report No. R41731 (Washington, DC: CRS, 2015), 1, 4–6, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41731.pdf>.

¹³⁶ Although the program officially began in 2010, funding for the region under Mérida is included as part of the initiative’s reporting.

¹³⁷ Meyer and Ribando Seelke, 17; the remaining 3 percent was through the DOS’s Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related programs (NADR) and through FMF.

¹³⁸ Meyer and Ribando Seelke, 18.

¹³⁹ DOS, *Report to Update the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America* (Washington, DC: DOS, 2017), <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/WHA-CEN-Central-America-Strategy-Report-to-Congress.pdf>; and USAID, *Report to Update the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2018), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00N7FB.pdf.

regional security over the years.¹⁴⁰ Overall, appropriations have decreased each year since FY 2016, from \$750 million to an around \$450 million for FY 2020.¹⁴¹ In March 2019, the administration announced its intention to cut assistance to the Northern Triangle due to immigration concerns. By October, portions of the aid were restored following negotiations between the U.S. and the three countries.

E. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Although LATAM has seldom been a priority for the U.S. government, the initiatives within this chapter illustrate it is not been entirely neglected. Total foreign aid to the region since 1946 is pushing toward the \$200 billion marker (in constant 2017 dollars). Even before official sources began recording this data, U.S. resources were expended to address humanitarian, commercial, and national security concerns. Assistance has been provided to achieve a myriad of goals. These include: advancing healthcare, education, and agriculture practices; improving security and military professionalism; strengthening political and economic conditions; relieving effects of natural disasters; countering transnational criminal actors and external influence; among many others. In the ensuing years, current programs will be reformed, replaced or cancelled to meet changing needs of the region and shifting U.S. priorities. The following chapters dig deeper into two decades of U.S. aid to LATAM to assess how effective these programs can be in advancing U.S. policy interests in the region.

¹⁴⁰ Peter J. Meyer, *U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview*, CRS Report No. IF10371 (Washington, DC: CRS, 2019), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10371.pdf>.

¹⁴¹ Meyer.

III. MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM AND U.S. INFLUENCE

This chapter examines the impact U.S. bilateral aid had on U.S. influence in LATAM during the 1950s.¹⁴² It utilizes the overarching aid programs throughout the period—i.e., Point Four and the Mutual Security Program—as a discussion framing tool. The focus is on aid of all types under these programs (technical, economic, and military assistance), though the programs themselves are considered as well.

The analysis uncovered both positive and negative impacts on influence. *First*, it was found that most states were dependent on external support to varying degrees. U.S. control over the wanted resources created implicit influence, where those in need sometimes adjusted political, economic, or social relations to secure aid. *Second*, gratitude for U.S. support and the soft power effect of aid elicited favorable views of the U.S. in general. This increased the capacity of the U.S. to advance its interests. *Negatively*, anti-U.S. feelings surfaced from an extensive belief that the region was neglected and frustration that dictators received assistance. This damaged relations and led some to seek economic and military support from external sources.

Several intervening variables were also found. For example, rhetoric and foreign aid from rivals may depreciate U.S. achievements. Chinese and Soviet messaging aimed to discredit the U.S. whenever possible and was often extremely successful. Additionally, historical U.S.-LATAM relations, intra-LATAM rivalries, rising nationalism, and many other factors also impacted the U.S.'s capacity to advance its interests. Although these issues are given only a cursory review in the chapter, they exemplify that foreign aid is only one of many paths toward U.S. influence shifts abroad. The evidence included in this chapter aims to support only the impact of the foreign aid thread in this web of variables.

¹⁴² This chapter does not fully discuss monetary flows to LATAM from multilateral channels (e.g., International Monetary Fund; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (i.e., World Bank) or its subsidiaries (i.e., International Finance Corporation and International Development Association); Inter-American Development Bank; United Nations; or Organization of the American States. It also does not consider foreign funding lines which are tools of the U.S. trade policy (specifically the EXIM).

The remainder of this chapter is organized into five sections. *First*, the development of the Cold War is reviewed for context. This thesis is not about the Cold War per se; however, it is nearly impossible to examine foreign policy during this period without it enveloping the discussion. *Second*, backgrounds of the 1950s aid programs are provided. *Then*, these programs' implementation in LATAM is reviewed. The *fourth* section assesses influence as a result of U.S. aid. It evaluates recipient dependency and shifts in degree of U.S. favorability in the region. The *conclusion* fuses the findings to offer a succinct closing.

A. ADJUSTING TO THE COLD WAR

This first decade following World War II saw a rapid progression of the Cold War. Significant world events during the late-1940s and early-1950s solidified the competition between the West and East. At the end of 1946, the First Indochina War began and lasted through 1954; in 1948, Czechoslovakia fell under Soviet control and West Berlin was blockaded; in 1949, the USSR detonated an atomic bomb for the first time and the PRC was founded; then in 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. Accordingly, U.S. foreign policies of *containment* and *collective defense* were designed to prevent the spread of communist influence and strengthen the free world's defensive posture. Foreign aid—along with diplomacy, public diplomacy (under the U.S. Information Agency (USIA)), trade, and military force—were all instruments used to support these policies.

The notion of using American aid as a foreign policy tool began soon after World War II. The 1947 Truman Doctrine called for \$400 million to Greece and Turkey to strengthen their respective defenses against the USSR. In Truman's message to Congress, he pleaded: "The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died."¹⁴³ The idea seemed simple: reduce misery among the impoverished and you reduce their vulnerability to communist influence. Immediately following this was the well-known Marshall Plan. From FY 1948 to 1952, the

¹⁴³ DOS, "Aid to Greece and Turkey: A Collection of State Papers," *Department of State Bulletin: Supplement XVI*, no. 409 (May 1947): 823, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=wu.89100094481&view=1up&seq=3>.

U.S. sent over \$13 billion to 16 Western European countries for post-war reconstruction and economic respite.¹⁴⁴ These two efforts sparked the spread of U.S. funds abroad in the name of national security.

The defensive portion of U.S. foreign policy was demonstrated through multiple collective defense agreements—the most renowned being the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, which created NATO.¹⁴⁵ Additional agreements were made in the early-1950s all over the world. However, the first was actually agreed upon in 1945 at an inter-American conference in Mexico City. The resultant Act of Chapultepec pronounced that an attack on any state of the Western Hemisphere was an attack on all. Just over two years later, this led to an official treaty: The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (i.e., the Rio Pact) was ratified by the U.S. and 18 LATAM states on September 2, 1947.¹⁴⁶

At the intersection of offensive containment and collective defense, we find the foreign aid agenda. It was not merely a needle in the Cold War haystack, but a crucial instrument of foreign policy. The following section digs into the creation, organization, and implementation of the 1950s assistance programs. It attempts to illustrate the complexity and bureaucratic challenges involved, but is in no way exhaustive.

B. 1950s U.S. FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND

1. Point Four (1950–53)

After winning the 1948 presidential election, Truman pursued a “bold and new” element of foreign policy to declare to the world at his inauguration. Coincidentally, a memo calling for a global technical aid program reached his desk. Its author, a DOS speechwriter, strategically titled it the “Use of U.S. Technological Resources as a Weapon

¹⁴⁴ Anne M. Dixon, “The European Recovery Program,” George C. Marshall Foundation, <https://www.marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/foreign-assistance-act-1948/the-european-recovery-program/>.

¹⁴⁵ I.e., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

¹⁴⁶ Nicaragua and Ecuador ratified the agreement in 1948 and 1949, respectively.

in the Struggle with International Communism.”¹⁴⁷ Truman was immediately sold once he received it, just 10 days before the inauguration. He had it implemented into his January address as the fourth point: “We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.”¹⁴⁸ Placing it after the other three points was not a reflection of its importance. Truman’s Special Counsel, Clark Clifford, said: “you go through the dog acts and the acrobats on up to the headline, and that’s the last act of the evening. That’s why it was made point 4.”¹⁴⁹

The speech was the catalyst for creation of the Point Four Program—the second-ever aid program funded by the U.S. government to reach multiple regions, behind only Lend-Lease.¹⁵⁰ More importantly, it was the first worldwide program designed for economic development. Established under Title IV of the 1950 Foreign Economic Assistance Act, Point Four was managed by the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) of the DOS. The crux of the program was to use scientific and technical aid to facilitate development at the grassroots level. It aimed to develop human resources through demonstration and training, strengthen capacity for growth, and foster an increase of private investment. One scholar referred to Point Four as the “birth of development.”¹⁵¹

Under the Point Four heading, the program is commonly disregarded in the historiography of foreign assistance. It was later referred to as the “Cinderella of the foreign

¹⁴⁷ See Chapter II.B.2 for more on DOS speechwriter Benjamin Hardy’s memo; Sergei Y. Shenin, *The United States and the Third World: The Origins of Postwar Relations and the Point Four Program* (Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2000), 11.

¹⁴⁸ “Inaugural Address of Harry S. Truman,” Yale Law School, the Avalon Project, accessed October 12, 2019, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/truman.asp.

¹⁴⁹ Jerry Hess, “Oral History Interview with Clark M. Clifford” Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, March 16, 1972, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/oral-histories/clifford6>; Point Four has been referred to as Point IV, Part IV, Four Point, the Technical Assistance Program, and just technical assistance. *Point Four* is the most-widely used title of the program during this period and is used throughout this chapter to refer to any technical assistance.

¹⁵⁰ Lend-Lease aided more than 30 allied countries during World War II by facilitating the transfer of nearly \$50 billion in assistance.

¹⁵¹ Amy Sayward, “Harry S. Truman and the Birth of Development,” in *Foreign Aid and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman*, ed. by Raymond Geselbracht (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2014), 43.

aid family” by Secretary of State Dean Acheson.¹⁵² This is for two primary reasons. *First*, Point Four’s funding was dwarfed by the Marshall Plan. From FY 1951 to 1954, approximately \$480 million was appropriated globally for technical aid.¹⁵³ This was under 4 percent of what the Marshall Plan provided only to Europe in the same amount of time. Of course, technical aid was much cheaper than rebuilding an entire war-torn continent.

Second, the name was technically removed in 1953 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. TCA Administrator Stanley Andrews told Congress that he was ordered not to use the term Point Four anymore.¹⁵⁴ Eisenhower was a critic of the program at first and favored a “trade not aid” policy once he took office.¹⁵⁵ Those sharing this view contended that the U.S. “cannot go on forever being Santa Claus to the world.”¹⁵⁶ Yet, even though “Point Four” was ostensibly dead in the eyes of some, the use of technical assistance to the Third World continued.¹⁵⁷ Many continued to use its old title, and it is used throughout this chapter to refer to technical aid for the sake of consistency.

2. Mutual Security Program (1951–61)

The beginning of the Korean War amplified the importance of aiding the free world through all means of support. Accordingly, the newly-signed Mutual Security Act of 1951 (MSA) made three changes to the execution of foreign aid. *First*, it initiated the Mutual Security Program (MSP) to consolidate the structure of U.S. assistance. *Second*, it

¹⁵² Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 266.

¹⁵³ USAID, *Greenbook, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1961* (Washington, DC: 1963), IV, 1, 42, 62, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACZ068.pdf.

¹⁵⁴ Jonathan B. Bingham, *Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy: Point 4 in Action* (New York: John Day Company, 1954), foreword; and Sergey Y. Shenin, *America’s Helping Hand: Paving the Way to Globalization* (Eisenhower’s Foreign Aid Policy and Politics) (Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2005), 10.

¹⁵⁵ Thomas T. Allcock, “The First Alliance for Progress?: Reshaping the Eisenhower Administration’s Policy toward Latin America,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 89, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/543726>; and Samuel Hale Butterfield, *U.S. Development Aid-an Historic First: Achievements and Failures in the Twentieth Century* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 52.

¹⁵⁶ *A Bill to Amend the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and for Other Purposes: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 83rd Cong. 1* (1953), 652, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b5148820&view=1up&seq=5>; and Shenin, *The United States and the Third World*, 106.

¹⁵⁷ The term “Third World” was coined in 1952 to refer to areas not actively aligned under the Cold War’s East-West rivalry. It has since been used to describe the less-developed world. The “First World” referred to the U.S. and its capitalist allies. The “Second World” referred to the Soviet bloc and the PRC.

supplanted the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950. The Marshall Plan under Title I and Point Four under Title IV were absorbed by the MSP. Accordingly, the Economic Cooperation Administration, which administered the Marshall Plan, was replaced by the Mutual Security Agency. The TCA was retained. *Lastly*, it established the Military Assistance Program (MAP). Overall, three agencies managed aid under the MSP during Truman’s presidency: the DOD directed the MAP, the Mutual Security Agency directed economic aid, and the TCA retained control over Point Four.

Once Eisenhower became situated in office, he found this to be ineffective. He created the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) in 1953 as a temporary executive branch agency to absorb technical and economic aid functions. The DOD retained MAP execution authority. Additionally, in 1954 Eisenhower signed the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480), outside of the MSP. This was the first aid program designed to extend food commodities to countries in need. The primary purpose of the P.L. 480 program under Eisenhower was the reduction of U.S. agricultural surpluses.

By 1955, Eisenhower began to place a much larger emphasis on aid. Foreign policy became centered on the notion that if one country fell to Communism, its neighbors would follow—known as the “domino theory.” In the president’s State of the Union address for that year, he argued that the U.S. should be prepared to expand foreign assistance programs in both duration and scale. His “trade not aid” policy was essentially disappearing.¹⁵⁸ The International Cooperation Administration (ICA) was created within the DOS to replace FOA on a permanent basis. Eisenhower additionally established the Development Loan Fund (DLF) within the MSP in 1957. The DLF provided soft loans to countries for large and long-term economic development projects that were not covered under other programs.

3. Summary

Despite all the bureaucratic changes that took place, U.S. foreign aid continued to flow uninterrupted. Between FYs 1950 and 1961, nearly \$50 billion was delivered under Point Four and the MSP. The approximate breakdown of this amount was: MAP—50

¹⁵⁸ Butterfield, *U.S. Development Aid*, 54.

percent; economic aid—43 percent; Point Four—3 percent; multilateral programs—3 percent; and the DLF—1 percent. The regional breakdown was: Europe—52 percent; Far East—25 percent; Near East and South Asia—15 percent; Latin America—2 percent; and Africa—1 percent.¹⁵⁹ The remaining 5 percent went to non-regionally based programs. Outside of the MSP, an additional \$4 billion was provided under P.L. 480, of which 60 percent went to the Near East and South Asia.¹⁶⁰

These programs were driven by a combination of humanitarian, commercial, and national security concerns, all working in unison to defend against communist inroads. Echoing the Truman Doctrine's philosophy, the MSP design was two-fold. *First*, on the economic front, it sought to decrease misery in the underdeveloped world by reducing poverty, illiteracy, and disease—in turn decreasing vulnerability to communist influence. The *second* front, mutual defense, was designed to bolster defensive capacity of the free world by expanding, strengthening, and professionalizing its armed forces.

With respect to the overall value of these programs, it is impossible to place a blanket statement of effectiveness on them as a whole. Due to the complexity and multitude of sub-goals contained within, effectiveness can only be measured by unpacking various program goals in distinct regions, and sometimes individual countries. What can be said is that Point Four and the MSP gave “the initial impulse and direction for the entire U.S. policy in the Third World, laid the foundation of the further improvement of this policy, and offered very promising set of tools.”¹⁶¹

C. 1950s U.S. FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS: IN LATAM

In each beneficiary region, Point Four and the overarching MSP were dissimilar in their execution, funding levels, achievements, complications, and resultant U.S.-recipient

¹⁵⁹ Africa's lack of funding under MSP was due to their colonial status. Most African countries did not achieve independence from colonial powers until the 1960s.

¹⁶⁰ *Greenbook, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1961*, 62, 1, 8, 28, 42, 62, 87, 114.

¹⁶¹ Shenin, *The United States and the Third World*, 186.

relations. Accordingly, we turn to LATAM exclusively for the remainder of the chapter.¹⁶² This section in particular provides a summary of regional implementation and funding.

World War II brought an economic boom to LATAM. Demand for the region's strategic materials for the war effort skyrocketed. This led to an export-revenue growth of over 4 percent annually from 1940 to 1945. Additionally, because of a decline in imports from Europe and the U.S., intra-LATAM trade expanded during this period. For example, textiles from Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico to other LATAM states grew to 20 percent of their total exports in 1945, compared to almost nothing in 1939.¹⁶³ This contributed to the rise of nationalism leading into the 1950s.

However, the international market began to open up after the war, decreasing dependence on LATAM exports and increasing imports from elsewhere. As the U.S. adjusted to the early development of the Cold War, it looked outward to strengthen both economic and political ties. At the same time, LATAM began looking inward. In the late 1940s to early 1950s, the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model of economic development was adopted throughout much of the region. The fundamental goal of this policy in each country was to grow the economy by decreasing dependency on foreign goods, while industrializing internally to become more self-sufficient. This sparked climbing inflation, fear of dependence on primary exports and extra-LATAM imports, and calls for expansive U.S. aid to facilitate industrial development.

1. Technical Assistance (Point Four)

When the TCA was formed in 1950, the IIAA, which had been conducting technical assistance in LATAM since 1942, was shifted under its control as the regional facilitator. Of the 36 countries receiving Point Four aid in the first few years, 19 of them were in LATAM. The IIAA started new projects and expanded many already underway, amounting

¹⁶² Within this chapter, the term "LATAM" excludes the dependent overseas territories (DOTs) of South America (i.e., British Guiana, French Guiana, and Suriname) and the Caribbean which were under administrative control of the British, French, or the Dutch. Thus, in the Caribbean, only Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Cuba are considered. Guyana (formerly British Guiana), Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados would not reach independence from the United Kingdom until the following decade.

¹⁶³ David Rock, ed., *Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 45–47.

to nearly 2,800 in total by 1953.¹⁶⁴ Of these projects, 35 percent were in agriculture, 23 percent in health, and 17 percent in education. The balance went toward projects in transportation, industry, mining, public administration, labor, among others.¹⁶⁵

For other regions receiving Point Four aid, they began from scratch attempting to mirror the already-established IIAA's structure. This involved U.S. funds and technicians being funneled into a *servicio*—a bureau set up in each recipient country to manage the creation and execution of programs.¹⁶⁶ Each *servicio* was fully cooperative between the U.S. and the recipient. Meaning it was funded, staffed, and managed by both. In 1951, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (ASIAA) stated: “I do not think there is any more effective program of foreign assistance in operation today than the technical cooperation program in Latin America.”¹⁶⁷

Although Eisenhower was unenthusiastic about funding foreign aid programs when he took office, his brother helped kept them afloat in LATAM. After a trip to the region in 1954, Dr. Milton Eisenhower called for an expansion of technical aid, based on the benefits he observed. The president approved this recommendation. Point Four grew modestly from FY 1952 to 1954, by \$6.5 million.¹⁶⁸ Then, it nearly tripled for the remainder of the decade, from \$22.4 million in FY 1954 to \$65.5 million in FY 1961, and covered every country in the region.¹⁶⁹ Cooperation expanded as well, meeting a major goal of the program to

¹⁶⁴ Frederic Ganzert, “The IIAA: Background of Point Four in Latin America,” *World Affairs* 116, no. 1 (April 1953): 17, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1292120510/>.

¹⁶⁵ *A Bill to Amend the Mutual Security Act of 1951, and for Other Purposes: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate*, 82nd Cong. 2 (1952), 714, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b5149809&view=1up&seq=819>; and *The Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1956: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate*, 84th Cong. 1 (1955), 311, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b643238&view=1up&seq=5>.

¹⁶⁶ The *servicio* structure was phased out in the mid-1950s and replaced by U.S. Operations Missions.

¹⁶⁷ *S. 1762: A Bill to Promote the Foreign Policy and Provide for the Defense and General Welfare of the United States by Furnishing Assistance to Friendly Nations in the Interest of International Security: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate*, 82nd Cong. 1 (1951), 409, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b5149809&view=1up&seq=5>.

¹⁶⁸ *The Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1955: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate*, 83rd Cong. 2 (1954), 356, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d02094600d&view=1up&seq=5>.

¹⁶⁹ *Greenbook*, 62.

improve self-sufficiency. Recipient cash contributions to the program expanded by a third, from \$33 to \$44 million. Moreover, by 1959, U.S. technicians in the region totaled about 1,000 compared to the almost 28,000 LATAM nationals involved.¹⁷⁰

U.S. officials found Point Four to be indispensable for long-term economic growth and quality of life improvements. Yet, they recognized it could not act alone: “Economic aid, however, is also necessary in several of the countries if this development is to take place in the next few years at a rate at all responsive to the aspirations of the people.”¹⁷¹

2. Economic Assistance

Economic aid to LATAM was provided mainly through grants amounting to just shy of \$260 million. Eighty-five percent was in the form of “special assistance” to Bolivia, Haiti, and Guatemala. This aimed to complement recipients’ own resources and speed up economic growth. Whereas Point Four was designed as a proactive long-term effort, special assistance was a short-term reactive solution. U.S. policy was to provide economic aid only in times of emergency in LATAM.¹⁷² Officials held that most of the region’s more-politically-stable states were capable of responding to crises on their own, thus negating the need for large flows of reactive capital.¹⁷³ In the case of the three recipients, each was facing severe political and economic instability.

In Bolivia, this aid was first delivered in response to the 1952 Bolivian National Revolution, which moved the country into a political and economic crisis. It was nearly bankrupt with unmanageable inflation levels. The country received about \$130 million in

¹⁷⁰ S. 3318: *To Amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as Amended, and for Other Purposes: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate*, 85th Cong. 2 (1958), 417–19, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b5148832&view=1up&seq=5>.

¹⁷¹ S. 3058: *To Amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as Amended, and for Other Purposes: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate*, 86th Cong. 2 (1960), 347, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112119791165&view=1up&seq=7>.

¹⁷² Allcock, “The First Alliance for Progress?” 90; and DOS, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Volume VII*, eds. Edith James, N. Stephen Kane, Robert McMahon, and Delia Pitts (Washington, DC: GPO, 1988), Document 16, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v06/d16>.

¹⁷³ S., S. 3318: *To Amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954*, 415.

aid from 1953 to 1960. It helped alleviate food shortages and other urgent needs.¹⁷⁴ By 1958, the Boliviano was more stabilized, inflation rates decreased, and agricultural production grew.¹⁷⁵ Yet by 1960, Bolivia held the second worst economy in the region due to internal political instability and mismanagement of funds.¹⁷⁶

Haiti received special assistance in response to Hurricane Hazel in 1954. The U.S. continued to provide disaster relief for various reasons. Droughts, floods, and a devastating coffee crop in 1956 (which comprised up to 70 percent of export income) all left the Hispaniola island in need. U.S. aid, nearly \$32 million in total, was aimed toward agricultural production. In 1960, the ASIAA, Roy Rubottom Jr. stated that this assistance was crucial “in arresting the economic and financial deterioration [of Haiti] and providing a firmer basis for responsible government.”¹⁷⁷ Although it kept the country afloat, Haiti ended the decade with the worst economy in the region.

The Guatemalan revolution of 1954 created a temporary crisis. It had a \$50 million debt and was economically stagnant with high unemployment. U.S. aid totaled approximately \$60 million from FY 1955 to 1961.¹⁷⁸ It went primarily toward public works projects. While the assistance provided was beneficial, political instability remained a hinderance to development in the small Central American state.

The remainder of economic aid was likely provided through a contingency fund set up by the Eisenhower administration. It provided aid for emergency situations which surfaced after annual funds had already been appropriated by Congress. This aid responded to a second crop-induced economic crisis in Haiti, an earthquake in Peru which left nearly 25,000 homeless in 1959, and a 1960 rabies epidemic in Mexico.

¹⁷⁴ S., S. 3058: *To Amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954*, 348.

¹⁷⁵ DOS, *Point Four in Bolivia 1942–1960: Programs of Technical Cooperation and Economic Assistance of the United States of America and Bolivia* (La Paz: DOS, United States Operations Mission to Bolivia, 1960), 10–12.

¹⁷⁶ DOS, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, American Republics, Volume V*, eds. N. Stephen Kane and Paul Claussen (Washington, DC: GPO, 1991), Document 229, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d229>.

¹⁷⁷ *Greenbook*, 83; and S., S. 3058: *To Amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954*, 348–9.

¹⁷⁸ *Greenbook*, 73.

3. Military Assistance

Once the MSA was signed in 1951, the Rio Pact finally began to manifest itself into something tangible. DOD aid to LATAM first began in 1952 following signed agreements with Ecuador, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, and Peru. Between 1953 and 1955, agreements were signed with seven more states. The last country to sign a MAP agreement was Bolivia in 1958. Certain stipulations in the agreements called for limiting Soviet bloc trade and granting exclusive access to strategic resources on which the U.S. was dependent.

U.S. aid was provided through equipment grants, low-price purchases of defensive equipment and weapons, and training. The latter was conducted through DOD missions throughout every LATAM country (less Mexico and Cuba), as well as in U.S. and Panama Canal Zone schools. By 1959, over 10,000 courses of instruction had been completed for LATAM military officers.¹⁷⁹ In 1960, Rubottom testified that U.S. training paralleled the mounting development of constitutional governments in the region.¹⁸⁰ In 1954, the military ruled in 13 countries and by 1959, only 4 had military leaders.¹⁸¹ He argued that this was due to a growing emulation of the non-political character of the U.S. military.

At first, the MAP was focused solely on general defense of the Western Hemisphere. Over time, goals narrowed to center on anti-submarine warfare proficiency, military-to-military relationship improvement, professionalizing armed forces, and the protection of ports, bases, and sea lines of communication. One final aim for the MAP was improving capabilities of internal security forces. The notion was first pitched to the National Security Council (NSC) in a 1955 report, stating that “aid for internal security is insurance for all other programs.”¹⁸² Not until 1959 was this embedded into the MAP

¹⁷⁹ S., S. 3058, 351.

¹⁸⁰ S., S. 3058, 352.

¹⁸¹ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States-Latin American Relations: Post World War II Political Developments in Latin America*, 86th Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print (Washington, DC: GPO, 1959), 1, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112051882519&view=1up&seq=3>.

¹⁸² NSC, Operations Coordinating Board, “Report to the National Security Council Pursuant to NSC ACTION 1290-d” (Washington, DC: OCB, 1955), 10, <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/declassified/fy-2010/1955-11-23.pdf>.

under the training portion. Courses were developed to train military intelligence personnel “to combat Communist infiltration and domination of the Latin American countries.”¹⁸³

Through 1961, MAP funding totaled around \$335 million, just over 1 percent of the total program funding globally.¹⁸⁴ Together, the 13 countries under MAP agreements contributed over \$1 billion per year of their own capital to cover base construction, equipment operation and maintenance, and personnel pay, housing, food, and clothing.¹⁸⁵

4. Other

When the DLF was established in 1957, both houses of Congress made assurances that: “The countries of Latin America will have equal access with other nations of the world to the [DLF].”¹⁸⁶ However, the administration’s focus on trade in the region led to more emphasis being placed on private investment and EXIM loans. Some members of Congress and LATAM officials pushed back on this matter. In 1960, Rubottom testified: “Without minimizing in the slightest degree the importance of trade and investment in the development of the Americas, we nevertheless recognize that there are gaps which these elements cannot fill.”¹⁸⁷ Consequently, between FY 1958 and 1961, \$2 billion (10 percent of total) was provided under the DLF to 17 LATAM countries for long-term development projects.¹⁸⁸ Half of the amount went to Argentina, Peru, and Colombia, and Chile.

Outside of the MSP, an additional \$477 million in P.L. 480 loans were provided to 10 countries from FY 1955 to 1961. This also amounted to just over 10 percent of the total.¹⁸⁹ Brazil received half, while Chile, Colombia, Argentina, and Uruguay each

¹⁸³ DOS, *U.S. Furnishing of Military Training Discussed* (Washington, DC: DOS, 1960), U.S. Declassified Documents Online.

¹⁸⁴ *Greenbook*, 1, 71.

¹⁸⁵ S., S. 3318, 435–36.

¹⁸⁶ *FRUS, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America*, Document 108, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v06/d108>.

¹⁸⁷ S., S. 3058, 346.

¹⁸⁸ The Near East and South Asia received 60 percent of DLF’s overall funding. LATAM received the next highest share.

¹⁸⁹ *Greenbook*, 1, 62.

received between 7 to 10 percent. Even comparatively smaller programs in certain countries were instrumental in staving off disaster. Mexico received nearly \$18 million in 1957 following a drought-induced destruction of its vital corn crop. Further, a near-famine threatened inhabitants of Peru's Lake Titicaca region due to late-1950s droughts. The \$5.5 million in P.L. 480 loans provided in FY 1960 helped alleviate the crisis.¹⁹⁰

5. Summary

Bilateral aid to LATAM was minimal (2 percent of total) when compared to other regions during the 1950s. The sizeable aid to Europe and Asia was at first aimed to relieve the devastation of World War II. Then, various developments kept U.S. policy-makers focused on these regions at the start of the Cold War. Another reason for the low relative percentage is that LATAM received a great deal of capital from outside of bilateral assistance channels. Of the total \$7 billion in EXIM loans made between FY 1946 and 1961, LATAM received 42 percent.¹⁹¹ This was in line with U.S. policy to promote inter-American trade. Also, LATAM received 83 percent of the World Bank's International Finance Corporation's loan amounts; 20 percent of the World Bank's total distributions; and 25 percent of United Nations (UN) technical and special assistance aid.¹⁹²

Even so, the region's comparatively small share does not negate the substantial amounts of bilateral assistance which flowed south. By 1961, LATAM received approximately \$1.6 billion, the equivalent of almost \$13.5 billion in 2019 dollars. Of this total, 29 percent came from P.L. 480 funds, 21 percent from the MAP, 20 percent for Point Four, 16 percent for Economic Aid, and 14 percent from the DLF.¹⁹³ Although Point Four's dollar value was relatively low, it was the leading means of providing aid to

¹⁹⁰ *Greenbook*, 81; and U.S. Congress, Senate, *Latin America and United States Policies: Report of Senator Mike Mansfield on a Study Mission to Latin America*, S. Rep. No. 82, 87th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1962), 65, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=txu.059173018570375&view=lup&seq=5>.

¹⁹¹ *Greenbook*, 62; and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States-Latin American Relations*, 35.

¹⁹² John M. Dyer, *United States-Latin American Trade and Financial Relations* (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, 1961), 114–25; and *Greenbook*, 119, 124.

¹⁹³ *Greenbook*, 62.

LATAM during the 1950s. It is undeniable that many of the MSP goals were achieved and several crises were averted, but U.S. assistance by no means solved the economic struggles faced by much of LATAM. Of course, it was not the duty of U.S. aid to do so alone.

D. DETERMINING INFLUENCE

Moving to the core of the study, we turn now to these programs' impact on U.S. influence in the region. This is gauged in three ways. *First*, whether LATAM was dependent on the aid provided. U.S. control of resources needed by LATAM for development or relief creates implicit influence to varying degrees. The U.S. may offer or withhold aid in these instances to further its interests.

Second, how assistance contributed to shifting views of the United States. In some instances, aid causes LATAM to have a more favorable outlook toward the U.S. In others, it causes anti-U.S. sentiment. Favorable views result in friendlier governments and citizens more inclined to support U.S. interests and values. Resentment had the opposite effect. Even minor shifts in favorability can have lasting effects.

Lastly, whether aid could wield resulting influence to evoke changes in LATAM behavior in advancement of U.S. interests. As a reminder, influence is not contingent on major tangible changes in LATAM's actions. Dependency on the inbound aid and favorable views of the U.S. alone are indications of extant influence which may be called upon at a later time to evoke change. Conversely, I hypothesize that lack of dependency and anti-U.S. sentiment are evidence of weaker or declining influence. Thus, finding evidence of concrete change is of course desired—but not required.

Evidence for the above is found mostly in statements made by U.S. officials involved in the programs, as well as studies conducted at the time. A strong attempt was made to corroborate such statements with related views from LATAM officials. After looking at the effect of aid, several tangential issues found to disrupt influence are discussed. This is to illustrate its multidimensional and vulnerable nature and show how aid fits within the larger picture.

1. General Influence

Throughout the 1950s, one could argue that LATAM as a whole was generally in the U.S. sphere of influence.¹⁹⁴ More than half the region had banned communist parties by 1954 and only a few maintained diplomatic ties with the Soviet bloc. With the exception of 1955, a majority of LATAM voted in-line with U.S. interests in the UN 70 percent of the time on average.¹⁹⁵ This is depicted in Figure 7. Most of LATAM's governments were friends of the U.S. by decade's end.



Note: Those voting with the U.S. 67–100 percent of the time (black shading) were considered to be in the U.S. sphere of influence by the source author.

Figure 7. U.N. Voting Data Depicting Support of U.S. Interests: 1954–1955, and 1956–1959.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ Sphere of Influence defined as: “The geographical region surrounding a great power or its identified interests in which the great power attempts to influence events in the region to bolster its position of security by extracting a positive behavioral output on the part of the peripheral States with said positive behavioral output determined by the great power. As distance from the great power or its interests increases, the ability and desire of the great power to influence events diminishes as the security threat diminishes” in Bryan J. Elliott, “Latin America: The United States Sphere of Influence,” (master’s thesis, University of Arizona, 1994), 24, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1034.360&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.

¹⁹⁵ Elliott, 115–24.

¹⁹⁶ Source: Elliott, 108–9.

Nevertheless, there was alarming evidence that U.S. influence had declined markedly among the people by 1961. One aide reported to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: “The preponderance of U.S. influence in Latin America is being challenged.”¹⁹⁷ Vice President Nixon was even attacked in Caracas during a LATAM goodwill tour in 1958, following non-violent criticism from students in Uruguay and Peru. In Venezuela, his limousine windows were smashed and him and his wife were spat on. Then, violent riots took place in Panama over Canal Zone-control in 1959 and 1960. And most-notably, Cuba’s U.S.-backed dictator was forced to flee and relinquish power to Fidel Castro in 1959, sparking fear of a communist takeover in the region. It is evident that influence is fragile and temporary. Accordingly, this section assesses how foreign aid specifically impacts the nuanced subject.

2. Dependence

The notion of dependence is precarious. Rising LATAM nationalism was accompanied by hesitation to admit reliance on external forces. Rubottom testified in 1958: “Its people are proud, with an historical background that antedates [sic] our own. They rightly maintain strong beliefs of independence and freedom. Their development warrants our help, but it must not be extended in such a way as to deter this self-reliance.”¹⁹⁸

Even in countries capable of furnishing a military or developing their economies on their own, there was a general need for expanded agricultural production, public facilities, and improved living conditions.¹⁹⁹ This was even found to be the case in Mexico, arguably the strongest country in the region economically. LATAM’s population grew drastically from 1946 to 1960, from 141 million to 200 million. This significantly exceeded agricultural production and increased the amount of people living in poverty. Additionally, at the start of the decade the region averaged only 70 miles of highway per 1,000 square miles, compared to the U.S.’s one-to-one ratio. They produced on average 170 kilowatt-

¹⁹⁷ McPherson, *Yankee No!*, 9.

¹⁹⁸ *The Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1958: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate*, 85th Cong. 1 (1957), 313, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d02094661t&view=1up&seq=5>.

¹⁹⁹ S., *Latin America and United States Policies: Report of Senator Mike Mansfield*, 31, 36.

hours of electricity per capita, compared to the U.S.'s 3,165.²⁰⁰ Lack of technical skills and high unemployment rates hindered improvements in these fields. Moreover, while higher education saw a boost, illiteracy still remained an inhibitor to growth. In a 1958 trip to Central America, Dr. Eisenhower and other officials met with 1,200 LATAM leaders from nearly every trade. The conversations held, and thousands of pages of data provided, all led to one conclusion—the countries needed technical help to improve social capital, agricultural production, health practices, and education systems.²⁰¹

During this period, most of LATAM lacked the technical know-how to advance grassroots development on their own. Where the capability and willingness of the U.S. to provide it was appreciated, stronger relationships were seen. One report found this to be true in seven of the eight countries visited.²⁰² Overall, the relationship between supply and demand strengthened the conditions for U.S. influence to thrive.

With regard to economic aid, there existed a pervasive dependency on sizable loans to promote industrial development. Following a 1956 meeting of Presidents of the American Republics, the USIA found that most of the region looked to the U.S. to “supply the wherewithal needed to accelerate the economic development of Latin America and to raise the levels of living of its people.”²⁰³ This sentiment existed throughout the entire decade. In Panama for example, U.S. expenditures declined following World War II which led to a severe depression. The U.S. was fully expected to solve this crisis through aid.²⁰⁴ In 1960, Haiti’s leader argued that economic and social misery was rampant and opening the door for revolutions to occur. It could only be solved by expansion of U.S. assistance

²⁰⁰ S., *The Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1956 (Statement of M. N. Hardesty, Regional Director for Latin America, Foreign Operations Administration)*, 310.

²⁰¹ DOS, *Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1958), 16, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d03554986i&view=1up&seq=1>.

²⁰² S., *Latin America and United States Policies: Report of Senator Mike Mansfield*, 31–68.

²⁰³ USIA, *Analysis of Latin American Reactions to the Panama Meeting of Presidents of the American Republics* (Washington, DC: USIA, 1956), U.S. Declassified Documents Online.

²⁰⁴ DOS, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV*, eds. N. Stephen Kane and William F. Sanford, Jr. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983), Document 615, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d615>.

programs to improve the region's conditions.²⁰⁵ It "needed a massive injection of U.S. assistance to forestall economic paralysis and possible social and political chaos."²⁰⁶ In nearly every discussion between the U.S. and LATAM governments on economic matters, there were pleas for greater shares of economic development aid.

The widespread want for economic aid created conditions for influence to thrive. This was recognized by some officials toward the end of the decade. The DOS even proposed using Haiti's dependence in the U.S.'s favor. The Ambassador suggested aid be used to secure more humane behavior by Duvalier and to spur economic reforms. Although the administration did not follow through with the recommendation, it suggests that severe need created an environment where the U.S. recognized its leverage could be exerted.

Dependence on military aid was less clear. On average, LATAM covered roughly 90 percent of their own armed forces. Compare this to countries like Korea and Taiwan, which only furnished around 30 percent.²⁰⁷ Because no "hot war" with the USSR came to the region, it is impossible to fully gauge whether LATAM depended on U.S. support. Even so, most agreed that LATAM alone could not defend the Western Hemisphere. The professionalization of LATAM militaries was positively correlated to U.S. training and deliveries of more advanced equipment.²⁰⁸ In light of this, had there been a kinetic war between the East and West in the hemisphere, it can be argued that LATAM was dependent on U.S. military aid to contribute effectively. Fortunately, we can only speculate.

Although some contended that LATAM dictators were dependent on U.S. military aid to maintain control, one expert found this to be inaccurate. In a report to the DOD, RAND advisor Charles Wolf Jr. agreed that dictatorships were troubling and chronic, but

²⁰⁵ DOS, *President Duvalier Requests Economic Assistance from U.S. Since Economic and Social Misery Breed Revolutionary Violence That Endangers Democratic Progress* (Washington, DC: DOS, 1960), U.S. Declassified Documents Online.

²⁰⁶ *FRUS, 1958–1960, American Republics*, Document 309, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d309>.

²⁰⁷ Foreign Policy Research Institute, President's Committee to Study the United States Military, *A Study of Military Assistance Programs in the Underdeveloped Areas* (Washington, DC: University of Pennsylvania, FPRI, 1959), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, 70.

²⁰⁸ DOD, *Brigadier General James W. Coutts Sums up the Successes of the Military Assistance Program in Latin America* (Arlington, VA: DOD, 1959), U.S. Declassified Documents Online.

he argued: “their occurrence and recurrence is not properly attributable to simple causes like military aid or defense programs. Indeed, these factors do not appear to play a significant role in the process at all. Rather, the explanation lies in a complex set of influences rooted in Latin American history, social structure, and political tradition.”²⁰⁹

Overall, dependence on U.S. aid could be seen on a wide spectrum. Countries such as Bolivia, Haiti, and Guatemala were in desperate need of U.S. help to avoid becoming failed states. Others only depended on support during short-lived crises (e.g., Mexico during a corn famine in 1957). Still, almost every state perceived themselves as needing some degree of economic or technical aid to meet industrial or social development goals. The degree of need coincided with degree of U.S. leverage gained.

3. Shifts in Degree of Favorability

Of the formally-stated goals of Point Four and the MSP, “buying friends” was not one of them. Yet, the administration admitted a favorable view of the U.S. was a desired ancillary result.²¹⁰ Suitably, this section assesses shifts in favorability based on perceptions of U.S. aid. These shifts serve as indicators of gains or losses of influence.

To discern views toward the U.S., I look to the most influential groups in society—the levers of power. The central government and the military held the most power and provided a majority of the observable evidence. This includes democratic presidents, dictators, military juntas, and the region’s military officers. Other groups (e.g., elites, the church, media, labor unions, and teacher and student groups) are by no means ignored.

a. Favorable Views

The foremost factor leading to positive views of the U.S. was the soft power effect of Point Four and MAP training initiatives. The cooperative nature of the programs, as well as daily interaction with U.S. persons on matters of interest to LATAMs, elicited a positive

²⁰⁹ Charles Wolf Jr., *The Political Effects of Military Programs: Some Indications from Latin America* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1963), 28, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/419474.pdf>.

²¹⁰ Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, *U.S. Foreign Aid: Its Purposes, Scope, Administration, and Related Information* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1959), 83, [https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.\\$b544218&view=1up&seq=5](https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.$b544218&view=1up&seq=5).

attraction toward U.S. values and related policies. One U.S. Senator reported: “the program, properly administered, can undergird all our relations with others with an element of friendly personal contact of durable value to this country.”²¹¹

At the onset of Point Four, the expectation was that recipients’ interaction with program personnel would lead to both an appreciation of the U.S. way of life and the development of good will. In turn, this would contribute to support of U.S. policies and interests.²¹² This was later confirmed as officials reported that the program resulted in “astounding warmth” toward the U.S. at the grassroots level.²¹³ The ASIAA, along with others, held that technical aid was the most effective method of improving views of the U.S.²¹⁴ While some skepticism remained within central governments early on, this faded over time. Dr. Eisenhower affirmed that “[Point Four] has made firm friends for the United States among governments and individual citizens throughout the Hemisphere.”²¹⁵

MAP training yielded similar results among the military ranks. In 1953, the Director of the DOD’s Office of Military Assistance contended that LATAM personnel trained under U.S. programs returned to their home country as spirited allies.²¹⁶ The Chief of Staff of the U.S. Caribbean Command stated in 1960 that trainees “almost without exception” returned oriented toward the U.S. and often entered positions of extreme importance within LATAM governments.²¹⁷ He said their friendship was a major benefit of the MAP. Lastly, a special congressional committee assigned to study the MSP found that: “The growth of mutual respect and understanding which results from

²¹¹ S., *Latin America and United States Policies: Report of Senator Mike Mansfield*, 55.

²¹² Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, *Point Four: Background and Program* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1949), 3, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uiug.30112118029922&view=lup&seq=5>.

²¹³ S., *A Bill to Amend the Mutual Security Act of 1951* (1953), 652; and S., *The Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 1955*, 335.

²¹⁴ S., *A Bill to Amend the Mutual Security Act of 1951* (1953), 370; S., *Latin America and United States Policies: Report of Senator Mike Mansfield*, 57; and DOS, *Evaluation of Military, Technical and Economic Aid to Latin America* (Washington, DC: DOS, 1957), U.S. Declassified Documents Online.

²¹⁵ DOS, *Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations*, 22.

²¹⁶ S., *A Bill to Amend the Mutual Security Act of 1951* (1953), 371.

²¹⁷ DOD, *Brigadier General James W. Coutts*.

the interchange and association between military personnel is of real value in establishing the basis for American hemispheric solidarity and security.”²¹⁸

Another factor was general gratitude for U.S. support. On economic aid, ensuing appreciation could really only be evaluated in the three countries which received the bulk of it. A 1954 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Bolivia reported: “When the MNR first came to power, domestic political exigencies and its uncertainty as to U.S. intentions made it quite critical of the U.S. As a result of subsequent U.S. aid . . . the MNR has become increasingly pro-U.S. in its outlook and has taken the position that Bolivia’s interests will be best served by cooperating with the U.S.”²¹⁹ Additionally, the DOS tied favorable relations with Guatemala in 1957 to the positive impact economic aid had on its economy.²²⁰ Assistance to Haiti did not yield the same results. However, Magloire and Duvalier were both alleged to have sought aid only for personal gain and mismanaged funds after receiving them. The aid which was provided did not reach their expectations.

The gratefulness of other forms of aid sometimes alleviated negative feelings of the U.S. caused by other policies. In Peru, for example, as influence declined due to tariffs placed on tuna exports, U.S. military and technical assistance helped to reduce the frustration felt by their leaders.²²¹ One study found that: “While once widespread distrust of ‘Yankee Imperialism’ . . . existed, a consistent course of conduct as a good neighbor has caused us to be regarded, generally, as sincere friends, although not invariably free from misguided sentiments.”²²² The CIA stated that even a minor escalation in aid could lead to a sharp incline of U.S. prestige and popularity in LATAM.²²³ Senate Majority Leader

²¹⁸ U.S. Congress, the Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, *Foreign Aid Program*, S. Doc. No. 52, 82nd Cong. 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1957), 1523, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015055064573&view=1up&seq=11>.

²¹⁹ The Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) is a Bolivian political party which first came to power in the Bolivian National Revolution of 1952; *FRUS, 1952–1954, the American Republics*, Document 165, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d165>.

²²⁰ DOS, *Achievements of U.S. Foreign Aid Programs* (Washington, DC: DOS, 1957), U.S. Declassified Documents Online.

²²¹ CIA, *Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad Studied*, 20, 55.

²²² S., Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, *Foreign Aid Program*, 1267.

²²³ CIA, 15.

Mike Mansfield later specified that increasing aid would not buy goodwill inevitably but “if such undertakings are pursued with professional dedication and without undue fanfare,” they would result in friendly feelings.”²²⁴ Accordingly, the launch of the DLF in 1957 helped alleviate many negative views by expanding LATAM’s access to economic aid.²²⁵

Another area where favorability rose was when aid was perceived to be effective. The significance of the link between effectiveness and favorability was addressed early on. TCA Administrator Henry Bennett hoped that “both the people and their governments will feel proud of the fact they have been able to advance themselves through American assistance, and their friendship and understanding for the United States will be much greater.”²²⁶ In 1957, one unnamed LATAM official said of Point Four: “We thank the U.S. for its aid. . . . The U.S. has given the lie to 30 years of Communist propaganda that the U.S. will not support popular social reform, and will only support dictatorships.”²²⁷ Perceptions of effectiveness were limited to MAP training and technical assistance.

b. Anti-U.S. Sentiment

Although governments remained friendly toward the end of the decade, anti-U.S. sentiment was undoubtedly extant throughout the region. This largely resulted from disapproval of U.S. Cold War policies and the Communists’ propaganda which underscored it. However, it was also due to the MSP failing to meet expectations. LATAM resentment was centered on two core issues regarding U.S. aid. *First*, there was a universal feeling of neglect. The relatively low amounts of aid led LATAM to view the MSP as ineffective in the long-term. *Second*, there was major frustration with MSP support to dictators. Much of the anti-U.S. reaction can be attributed to a lack of understanding, policy incongruities, or misdirected blame, but it existed nonetheless.

²²⁴ S., *Latin America and United States Policies: Report of Senator Mike Mansfield*, 57.

²²⁵ NSC, *Progress Report on U.S. Policy Toward Latin America* (Washington, DC: NSC, 1957), 5, <https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/declassified/fy-2010/1957-09-11.pdf>; S., Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, *Foreign Aid Program*, 1263.

²²⁶ S., *S. 1762: A Bill to Promote the Foreign Policy* (statement of Dr. Henry G. Bennett, Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration), 413.

²²⁷ DOS, *Evaluation of Military, Technical and Economic Aid to Latin America*, 4.

LATAM perception that the U.S. was neglectful came from both economic aid and the MAP. *On the economic front*, there was extensive frustration that economic aid was not more-widely distributed. Many considered the U.S. to hold “*the major* responsibility for improving the economies of the underdeveloped countries.”²²⁸ This stemmed from an economic policy mismatch. More specifically, the U.S. aimed to develop recipient economies through long-term projects under Point Four and provide economic aid only in times of crisis. Conversely, LATAM economic policies called for rapid expansion of the industrial base, which required large sums of instantaneous capital.

Because of the misunderstanding surrounding U.S. responsibility, political leaders under fire for economic failures often blamed the U.S. publicly for not providing enough aid. The U.S. Ambassador in Chile, calling for a “truth-telling campaign,” stated: “This not only has damaged the position of the United States in Latin America, but it also has retarded economic development by removing pressure from the Latin Americans to do for themselves the things they should do and must do in their own interest.”²²⁹

The region’s share of MSP totals was taken as an insult. This gave rise to two related beliefs which fueled resentment. These were that the U.S. took friendships for granted and did not care about LATAM’s welfare. Many Brazilians, for example, felt that as a strong World War II ally, they were owed a greater share of economic aid from the U.S. This overlooked the fact that Brazil received 20 percent of LATAM’s MSP share.²³⁰ Chileans distrusted U.S. intentions in the region due to their share of aid compared to Europe and Asia. One report warned that “this feeling may in effect be causing permanent damage to U.S. prestige in Chile.”²³¹ A Panamanian paper stated that the MSP “does not orient itself towards those who are America’s most loyal friends.”²³² This was even seen

²²⁸ FRUS, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Document 376, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v07/d376>; and CIA, *National Intelligence Estimate: Conditions and Trends in Latin America*.

²²⁹ FRUS, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America, Document 376, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v07/d376>.

²³⁰ CIA, *Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad Studied*, 52; and *Greenbook*, 62, 65.

²³¹ CIA, 55.

²³² USIA, *Analysis of Latin American Reactions*.

in Haiti, one of the three countries which received special assistance. President Magloire wanted added capital from the U.S. for industrialization and believed the U.S. was not interested in aiding Haiti's development.²³³ Even if these feelings were misguided, Dr. Eisenhower admitted in 1958, it still matters because "leaders and peoples think it is so."²³⁴

The MAP found similar issues regarding policy incongruities and neglect. Whereas U.S. military aid policy was centered on hemispheric defense, many LATAM states were fixated more on internal defense, stability, and prestige. Evidence of resulting frustration was found throughout the hemisphere.²³⁵ In 1952, President Odría stated that Peru was "100 percent on the side of the United States . . . and that we could count on her whole-hearted cooperation at all times," but in order for the relationship to remain sturdy, "Peru must be strong and able to defend herself internally as well as externally," indicating MAP was not meeting expectations.²³⁶ Additionally, Colombia demanded certain military equipment that was clear would be used for maintaining internal security. The U.S. recommended declining the request, even though it feared this would anger Colombia and cause it to withdraw its battalion supporting in Korea.²³⁷

Further feelings of mistreatment stemmed from receiving outmoded and sometimes obsolete equipment from the World War II period. Congress advised: "this represents a complaint very real to them and should not be lightly discounted."²³⁸ Relations were heavily strained with both Venezuela and Peru over this issue.²³⁹

²³³ S., *Latin America and United States Policies: Report of Senator Mike Mansfield*, 30.

²³⁴ DOS, *Report to the President*, 2.

²³⁵ FPRI, *A Study of Military Assistance Programs in the Underdeveloped Areas*, 71; *FRUS*, 1952–1954, *the American Republics*, Document 569, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d569>; Document 269, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d269>; and Document 673, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d673>.

²³⁶ *FRUS*, Document 673.

²³⁷ *FRUS*, Document 269.

²³⁸ S., Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, *Foreign Aid Program*, 1274.

²³⁹ *FRUS*, Document 731, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d731>; *FRUS*, 1955–1957, *American Republics: Central and South America*, Document 520, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v07/d520>.

Another major source of LATAM anger was the charge of U.S. support to dictators. This was found among the public under the authoritarian regimes and from the region's democratically elected leaders.

Providing aid to authoritarian states actually had mixed results. For one, the MSP funds sometimes allowed dictators to maintain a hold on power by touting economic improvements as a result of their own actions. The DOS reported that the "Dominican propaganda media hail all bilateral and international assistance programs as fruits of Trujillo's diplomacy."²⁴⁰ Although relations with the Dominican despot crumbled by the end of the decade due to his increasingly cruel nature, dealings were quite strong beforehand. The U.S. additionally held constructive relations with Paraguay's Stroessner and Nicaragua's Somoza family. Any anti-U.S. sentiment within their populations had relatively no bearing on policy under these regimes.

Yet, due to political instability, influence gained with dictators was tenuous. The short-term gains severely damaged long-term influence inside the countries themselves. Venezuela's Jiménez, Cuba's Batista, and Peru's Odría were all forced to relinquish power in the late-1950s. Profound anti-U.S. feelings immediately followed. This was demonstrated in 1958 by impassioned protests in Peru and the attack on Nixon in Caracas.

Furthermore, this support fueled antagonism regionally. In the 1970s, former Costa Rican president José Figueres stated: "If I were to blame the United States for something in the twentieth century in Latin America, it would be for connivance with corrupt dictatorships."²⁴¹ This feeling was not confined to Costa Rica. Many called for cutting support to non-democratic states. However, Secretary of State Christian Herter told the Senate in 1961: "Our influence can often be felt more effectively through an educational process than what you might call the tough tactics of making the people suffer as a result

²⁴⁰ *FRUS, 1952–1954, the American Republics*, Document 367, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d367>.

²⁴¹ "Jose Figueres Ferrer Oral History Interview," Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, July 8, 1970, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/oral-histories/ferrerj#32>.

of the act of some dictator.”²⁴² In other words, aid cuts may meet the desires of those pursuing harm to autocrats while simultaneously hurting those it was often intended for.

With respect to this “educational process,” the U.S. failed to reach the region’s population to the extent necessary regarding the goals and challenges surrounding aid. Nixon acknowledged this after being attacked. He highlighted an interaction with a Colombian General as evidence. It was clear that the General and other Colombian leaders were aware and appreciative of U.S. aid, as well as strongly pro-American. On the other hand, “the people of Colombia, the ordinary run of people, were not aware of such U.S. assistance.”²⁴³ This sentiment was echoed by the New York Times in 1960: “We are not reaching [the common man] with facts about the many fine things being done in his country. . . . He does not read newspapers, so he does not know much about what is going on in the world. He does not own a short-wave radio, so he cannot hear the truth.”²⁴⁴ In short, the LATAM people outside of government circles could not be widely favorable of the U.S. policies or practices if they were not cognizant of them.

Further, due to a preconceived cynicism, those acquainted with U.S. aid, but ignorant to its benefits, made assumptions. To them, aid served only those in power, or solely U.S. interests. Contrarily, communist propaganda was a much more effective messaging campaign. Nixon added: “Our task, therefore, is to create a means by which our true objectives may become known particularly among those new elements of the population which represent the public support of the new governments.”²⁴⁵

²⁴² S., S. 3058, 14.

²⁴³ *FRUS, 1958–1960, American Republics*, Document 56, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d56>.

²⁴⁴ Loring M. Hewen, “Central America’s Amity: Radio Broadcasts Urged, Beamed to ‘Common Man’ of Area,” *New York Times*, August 31, 1960, <https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/115182813/fulltextPDF/B4588B2A4E1041D2PQ/1?accountid=12702>.

²⁴⁵ NSC, *Principal Points Made by Vice-President Nixon in His Oral Report to the NSC Concerning His Visit to Latin America* (Washington, DC: NSC, 1958), U.S. Declassified Documents Online.

4. Latent Influence Wielded

The next logical question is: to what degree did dependence and favorability lead to more concrete changes in the region's actions? When intrinsic influence surfaced as a result of these factors, the U.S. could additionally use its aid to wield that influence. It could provide, withhold, or revoke aid in order to evoke changes in furtherance of its interests. However, MSP aid was rarely used as a bargaining tool during this period. Yet, sometimes the U.S. did not need to apply pressure at all. LATAM occasionally undertook changes on its own recognizing the extant U.S. leverage.

Sometimes this manifested itself through notable improvements in relations. Argentina provides the most striking example. Juan Perón accepted that genuine support of the Argentine population was contingent upon the strength of the economy. This reliance alone led him to improve relations with the U.S. in early 1954 in an attempt to initiate a U.S. aid program.²⁴⁶ At this time, Argentina was the only LATAM country where no aid had been provided under the MSP. Although no financial assistance was provided before Perón's 1955 expulsion, the major shift away from his previously antagonistic relations with the U.S. serves as a powerful indicator of dependence on aid. NIEs of 1953 and 1955 showed similar findings in Chile and Brazil, respectively.²⁴⁷ Additionally, the ambassador to El Salvador found that "close political, social, and economic ties with the United States have been strengthened by U.S. interest as manifested through technical assistance."²⁴⁸

Other times, more direct impacts were noted. For example, the embassy in Peru reported that the MSP generated a pro-U.S. government. They found that this orientation guaranteed the continued sale of strategic materials to the U.S. and decreased the likelihood

²⁴⁶ *FRUS, 1952–1954, the American Republics*, Document 125, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d125>; and CIA, *National Intelligence Estimate: Probable Developments in Argentina* (Washington, DC: CIA, 1954), 290, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000119709.pdf.

²⁴⁷ *FRUS*, Document 240, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d240>; and *FRUS, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America*, Document 307, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v07/d307>.

²⁴⁸ *FRUS*, Document 395, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d395>.

of its acceptance of communist ideology.²⁴⁹ Then, a 1954 NIE reported that Bolivia's policy toward the U.S. was predominantly determined by its need for U.S. economic aid. Although the MNR was initially skeptical of U.S. intentions, "with increasing realization of its own lack of capabilities to meet its long-range economic objectives, let alone immediate food requirements, the MNR regime, hoping for U.S. assistance, began to reverse its stand." Bolivia immediately began to follow U.S. advisement, by moderating its economic policies in favor of U.S. interests. Furthermore, the MNR announced to the population that cooperation with the U.S. was the best course of action.²⁵⁰

Another indicator was seen in UN voting. To be sure, UN votes alone are far from being a strong indicator of influence. Even Cuba's votes matched with U.S. interest 40 percent of the time on average during the decade following Castro's takeover. However, some noteworthy patterns were observed. While small shifts in aid did not produce significant changes, large changes were more evident. Brazil voted along U.S. lines 78 percent of the time on average from 1951 to 1953. U.S. aid jumped from \$59 million in 1952 to \$389 million in 1953. After the jump, Brazil voted with the U.S. 96 percent of the time on average for the remainder of the decade. In Peru, an increase from \$2.5 million to \$110 million boosted voting with U.S. by 40 percent the next year. Mexico's voting with the U.S. increased 58 percent after a jump from \$2.2 million to \$53 million. Although these results cannot be credited solely to aid, the connection is thought-provoking.²⁵¹

On the other hand, anti-U.S. sentiment had some clear deleterious effects. One CIA report appropriately assessed that failure to act favorably on LATAM economic problems might cause a decline in U.S. status.²⁵² Some in the region openly repudiated U.S. requests for this reason. Costa Rica's president Mario Echandi struggled to find justification to sever

²⁴⁹ *FRUS, 1952–1954, the American Republics*, Document 680, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d680>.

²⁵⁰ *FRUS, 1955–1957, American Republics: Central and South America*, Document 270, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v07/d270>; and CIA, *National Intelligence Estimate: Conditions and Trends in Latin America* (Washington, DC: CIA, 1955), 15, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R01012A006100040005-7.pdf>.

²⁵¹ Elliott, 125–27.

²⁵² CIA, *Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad Studied*, 15.

ties with Castro's Cuba because of slow U.S. response to needs.²⁵³ Others turned directly to the USSR for economic respite. Brazil, a strong ally of the U.S., became increasingly more open to engagement with the USSR when they felt the U.S. was not meeting its needs.

Resentment generated by perceived MAP neglect also had consequences. It led to a rising trend of military equipment purchases from external sources. For example, Brazil purchased a dated aircraft carrier from the United Kingdom and subsequently requested U.S. aircraft and funds for refitting. U.S.'s denial to fulfill the request complicated military relations and base negotiations already underway.²⁵⁴

5. Impediments to Gaining Influence

The 1955 decline in UN voting support is illustrative of the fact that unrelated U.S. policies and actions can simultaneously galvanize or weaken influence. There were two probable causes in this case. *First*, LATAM was generally unhappy with U.S. economic policies.²⁵⁵ The U.S. was insistent on expanding trade and private investment—reflective of a U.S. embrace of the mutual economic dependency. By 1960, 22 percent of U.S. exports went to LATAM, 45 percent of LATAM exports were to the U.S., and nearly 33 percent of U.S. private investment was to the region.²⁵⁶ LATAM sought to free itself from this dependency. The *second* issue was the perceived U.S. involvement in the 1954 overthrow of Guatemala's democratically-elected president, Jacobo Arbenz.²⁵⁷ This involvement, later-uncovered as a CIA operation, violated Article 15 of the 1948 Organization of the American States (OAS) Charter barring intervention in the affairs of another state.²⁵⁸

²⁵³ *FRUS, 1958–1960, American Republics*, Document 304, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d304>.

²⁵⁴ NSC, Operations Coordinating Board, *Progress Report*, 7.

²⁵⁵ *FRUS, 1952–1954, the American Republics*, Document 13, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d13>.

²⁵⁶ S., S. 3058, 346.

²⁵⁷ *FRUS*, Document 647, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d647>.

²⁵⁸ In the Charter's current version, this provision is found as Article 19, Chapter IV. "Charter of the Organization of American States," Organization of the American States, accessed November 9, 2019, http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_A-41_charter_OAS.asp#Chapter_IV.

While this is one extreme case, several subtler examples were found as well. Individual officials, questionable policy, negatively perceived public statements, and many other factors all contributed to influence in some way.

One CIA report from 1953 found that influence in the region improved solely because Eisenhower was elected. It “brought a halt to the decline of our prestige and popularity in Latin America.”²⁵⁹ The decline was due to displeasure with Truman’s appeals for raw material production in support of the Korean War—at the cost of industrial development. The same report stated that influence was negatively affected when legislation restricting trade passed, or was even introduced, in Congress. This was found to be true in Venezuela (with limits on petroleum imports) and Peru (with tariff increases on tuna, lead, and zinc).²⁶⁰ Public statements from government officials and the press were also a hindrance when perceived as offensive. Brazil felt that certain comments made relegated them into a category of just “another Latin American republic,” instead of the important ally it saw itself as.²⁶¹ Moreover, the sole focus on the Cold War clashed at times with LATAM’s internal focus on its economy.²⁶² Finally, and most damning was political support of LATAM dictators—as allies against Communism. Going so far as to provide the Legion of Merit to the later-deposed Venezuelan dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez.

Adding to these factors, five significant issues were found which more directly impeded the ability of aid to create influence. Whereas the above matters stemmed from U.S. actions during the period covered, these were largely outside of U.S. control.

First, was historical U.S.-LATAM relations.²⁶³ There was found to be a “hangover from an earlier day when [the U.S. was] widely characterized as the ‘Colossus of the

²⁵⁹ CIA, *Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad Studied*, 18.

²⁶⁰ CIA, 20, 55.

²⁶¹ White House, *U.S.-Latin American Relations Discussed*, 2, 20.

²⁶² *FRUS*, Document 78, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d78>.

²⁶³ For historical U.S.-LATAM relations, see: Gregory B. Weeks, *U.S. and Latin American Relations* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008); James D. Cockcroft, *Latin America: History, Politics, and U.S. Policy* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1998); and Samuel F. Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943).

North.”²⁶⁴ Therefore, there was ever-present skepticism of any U.S. involvement. It was recognized that no U.S. policy would serve as a cure for this: “These attitudes can be softened but they will persist for some time to come and occasionally will break forth in angry statements or unfriendly acts.”²⁶⁵

The *second* involved intra-LATAM relations.²⁶⁶ These relationships are too-often overlooked in the common view of LATAM as a single cohesive unit. Long-standing social and territorial disputes existed throughout the region. Any activity perceived to favor one side even slightly was viewed as an affront to the other. For example, Uruguay was insulted by Dr. Eisenhower’s visit there falling on a weekend after a weekday visit to Argentina.²⁶⁷

Third, was political instability in the region. The 20 sovereign LATAM countries underwent 47 head-of-state changes during the decade.²⁶⁸ Of these, 13 were coups d’état and approximately 14 involved either the ingress or exodus of a military ruler. This impermanence of leadership made influence at the highest levels of government rather vulnerable. In 1962, Senator Mansfield wrote: “an approach of policy which is heavily and indiscriminately dependent on incumbent wielders of power and little concerned with the sources of power or the changing nature of power in Latin America is one that is full of pitfalls for the interest of this Nation.”²⁶⁹

Fourth, was the rise of nationalism and related LATAM agency. This was partly a result of a growing middle class and higher education. Most countries saw college

²⁶⁴ S., *Latin America and United States Policies: Report of Senator Mike Mansfield*, 7; For drivers of this characterization, see: Fred Rosen, ed., *Empire and Dissent: The United States and Latin America* (Duram, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); and Mark T. Berger, *Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and U.S. Hegemony in the Americas, 1898–1990* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

²⁶⁵ S., *Latin America and United States Policies: Report of Senator Mike Mansfield*, 8.

²⁶⁶ For intra-LATAM relations during the Cold War, see: Christopher N. Darnton, *Rivalry and Alliance Politics in Cold War Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014) and Hal Brands, *Latin America’s Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

²⁶⁷ FRUS, 1952–1954, *the American Republics*, Document 706, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d706>.

²⁶⁸ This does not include any provisional heads of state holding power for less than six months.

²⁶⁹ S., *Latin America and United States Policies: Report of Senator Mike Mansfield*, 8.

enrollment grow by nearly 100 percent.²⁷⁰ The emergent voice of the citizens of LATAM led to an “oversensitivity to any appearance of infringement by the United States on their sovereign rights and a tendency to blame [the U.S.] for many of their own difficulties.”²⁷¹

The *final* impediment was that of communist influence. It falls last on this list not due to lack of importance. This was a significant obstacle. Anti-U.S. propaganda underlined the aforementioned issues to weaken the status of the U.S. Each week, the Chinese Communist Party directed around 20 hours of Spanish broadcasts. These were heavily weighted with charges of U.S. imperialism and exploitation.²⁷²

E. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The 1950s was a period of major adjustment for both the U.S. and LATAM. The Cold War quickly intensified following a 1949 Soviet nuclear weapons test and the Korean invasion of 1950. Accordingly, U.S. officials began adjusting foreign policy objectives and the means by which to achieve them. Diplomacy, military activity, trade policy, and the newly-implemented foreign aid programs all sought one central goal—contain the impending expansion of the Communist Party. At the same time, LATAM was undergoing many internal changes. It was testing a new economic model which called for rapid industrial development and large amounts of supporting capital. This coincided with a population swell, an emerging middle class, rising nationalism, and high rates of inflation. These issues combined, among others, shaped the nature of U.S.-LATAM relations.

This chapter specifically reviewed bilateral U.S. assistance to LATAM. It analyzed how the Point Four Program and the more-expansive MSP impacted U.S. influence. Exogenous to foreign aid, numerous intervening factors which contributed to influence shifts were noted. Some of these (U.S. officials’ public statements and economic policies) were within U.S. control, while others (political instability and communist propaganda) were not. These, among others, were discussed to exemplify the impermanence and

²⁷⁰ Brands, *Latin America’s Cold War*, 21.

²⁷¹ CIA, *Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad Studied*, 16.

²⁷² CIA, *Chinese Communist Interest in Latin America Outlined* (Washington, DC: CIA, 1960), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, 14.

fragility of political influence. Accordingly, credit given to foreign aid for influence shifts cannot be overstated, but should not be understated either.

U.S. aid yielded several outcomes on influence during the period covered. A range of factors were found to be constructive, while others were detrimental. *First*, it was found that most states were dependent on external support to meet industrial and social development goals. Some needed aid to avoid collapse, others required temporary reprieve from unexpected crises, and some depended on technical know-how to advance social capital. U.S. control of needed resources created implicit influence, which roughly coincided with the degree of need. At times, political forces in LATAM recognized this leverage and adjusted political, economic, or social relations with the U.S. to secure aid.

Second, the research found that favorable views of the U.S. were elicited by: (1) general appreciation for aid received. At times, this alleviated anti-U.S. feelings caused by outside factors and led to more amenable partners; and (2) the soft power result and effectiveness of certain features of the MSP. The cooperative nature of Point Four and MAP training, in addition to daily interaction with U.S. persons, promoted mutual respect and understanding. This contributed to LATAM support for U.S. policies and interests which was manifested via expanded trade, UN voting, and censures of Communism.

Lastly, anti-U.S. sentiment stemmed from extensive feelings of neglect, MSP support to dictators, and misunderstanding of U.S. responsibilities and programs. Perceived neglect was the most damaging factor. LATAM received only 2 percent of the bilateral foreign aid distributed during the decade and viewed this as an affront. As a result, relations were strained and some states even turned to the USSR for support.

IV. ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS AND U.S. INFLUENCE

This chapter evaluates the impact of U.S. bilateral aid on U.S. influence in LATAM throughout the 1960s.²⁷³ The Alliance for Progress, used to frame the ensuing discussion, was the overarching development initiative employed in the region during this period. Much like in the preceding chapter, both encouraging and undesirable effects resulted.

An undeniable link between influence and recipient dependency was noticed. Most of LATAM relied on support for economic or political stabilization. To secure funding, dependent states were more inclined to cede to U.S. requests. Concessions were often made despite political risk in doing so. Still, when severe political risk was probable, governments were less likely to yield even when aid was greatly needed. Thus, benefits were vast, but not without limits. Additionally, the combination of dependence and pro-U.S. sentiment resulting from aid created promising conditions. The influence gained often overshadowed what was lost due to unfavorable U.S. policies or actions which created antagonism. Yet, favorable views of the U.S. surfaced only when the Alliance was perceived to be sufficient, effective, cooperative, moderately altruistic, and implemented in a way which respected recipients' autonomy. Under opposite conditions, anti-U.S. sentiment reappeared and U.S. influence deteriorated.

Chapter III revealed that pro-U.S. sentiment appeared under similar conditions. However, LATAM dependence on aid during the 1950s actually resulted in antagonism when the U.S. was unwilling or unable to meet the region's needs. Relationships were damaged as a result and some consequently sought support from external sources. This demonstrated that any implicit leverage gained from dependency on U.S. resources was fragile if needs were not subsequently met. In addition to the prevalent feelings of neglect, anti-U.S. sentiment also surfaced in the region as a result of aid being provided to dictators.

This chapter unpacks the above findings through the following sections. *First*, a contextual section highlights the principle interests of the U.S. and LATAM during the

²⁷³ Again, this chapter does not fully discuss monetary flows to LATAM from multilateral channels or foreign funding lines which are tools of the U.S. trade policy (specifically the EXIM).

1960s. *Then*, the 1961 shift in U.S. aid policy is briefly explained. The *next* section describes the Alliance for Progress specifically. *Fourth*, U.S. influence is gauged by discerning dependency and U.S. favorability in the region. The *concluding* section summarizes the findings.

A. 1960s DEVELOPMENTS

1. U.S. Foreign Policy

In 1959, after Castro's takeover in Cuba, LATAM became a focal point of U.S. policy. Still operating under the domino theory and containment, the fear was that Communist-backed revolutions—inspired by Castro—would spread. The Cuban situation provided the chief motivation and justification for all major policy initiatives in the region.

Several events exacerbated the Cuba-related anxiety. In April of 1961, the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion took place on Cuba's southern coast.²⁷⁴ Although plans began during Eisenhower's presidency, John F. Kennedy (JFK) approved the assault. The failure was an embarrassment to his administration. Later in 1961, Kennedy green lighted Operation Mongoose to conduct covert operations with the aim of removing Castro. Then, in October 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the Cold War directly to the hemisphere. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State during the entirety of the 1960s, warned in 1962 that Castro's regime "supplied communism with a bridgehead in the Americas, and it has thereby brought the entire hemisphere into the frontline."²⁷⁵ USSR involvement in the region and continuous Cuban rhetoric forced the U.S. to remain incessantly engaged.

Of course, events in Cuba were not the only noteworthy developments driving U.S. attention. In May 1960, a CIA U-2 spy plane was shot down while inside Soviet airspace. Its pilot, Francis Gary Powers survived and was captured by the KGB, increasing tensions

²⁷⁴ The Bay of Pigs was a failed attempt by the U.S. to topple Castro by using CIA-trained Cuban exiles to invade the island and rid it of Castro.

²⁷⁵ DOS, "American Republics Unite to Halt Spread of Communism in Western Hemisphere," Statement before First Session of the Punta del Este Conference, Digital National Security Archive, January 25, 1962, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679068228/>, 274.

between the two rivals until a prisoner exchange took place the following year.²⁷⁶ In April 1961, the USSR intensified the space race by sending the first man into space. This led to the creation of the National Reconnaissance Office and NASA's Apollo program. Further, in August 1961, the Berlin Wall construction began. It served as a physical symbol of the worsening divide between the East and West. JFK called for increased military spending not only to protect Berlin, but to win the Cold War.

Under Johnson, the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, and subsequent Resolution, led to an escalation of involvement in Vietnam. This consumed the majority of LBJ's attention. Undersecretary of State George Ball, quoted by Taffet, said: "Vietnam constricted the American government's vision like a camera focused on a near object with little depth of field."²⁷⁷ That is, Vietnam was in focus while the rest of the world was blurred. Finally, concerns in Asia also grew with the PRC's first nuclear weapons test in 1964. Each of these events required the expenditure of U.S. resources and attention in one way or another.

2. Latin America Struggles

In LATAM, major transformations were underway during the 1960s. Economies were stagnant due to unfavorable market prices and trade terms at the end of the 1950s. Many states were heavily dependent on single-resource exports. Early in the decade, 78 percent of Colombia's earnings (and 62 percent of Brazil's) were from coffee. Chile's copper accounted for 71 percent of its income and over half of Bolivia's came from tin. Inequality, inflation, and illiteracy were extensive. The population, half of which was under the age of 20, continued to expand faster than any other region. Finally, agricultural production could not match growth and urban migration outstripped job creation.²⁷⁸

Chilean president, Eduardo Frei, announced: "The Latin American revolution, as a force for rapid and substantial change, has been germinating for the last decade; it is now

²⁷⁶ This prisoner exchange is depicted in the 2015 film *Bridge of Spies*, directed by Steven Spielberg.

²⁷⁷ George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern* (New York, 1982), 336, quoted in Jeffrey F. Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 177, 186.

²⁷⁸ Ronald Scheman, ed., *The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective* (New York: Praeger, 1988), 4.

a permanent and dynamic torrent which is weakening the political and social institutions of the continent.”²⁷⁹ In 1963, the USIA conducted a public opinion survey in the urban areas of seven countries. It found that almost 80 percent were extremely dissatisfied with current standards of living. However, it showed only 6 percent called for a radical change in the political or economic systems.²⁸⁰ They did demand jobs, lower costs of living, increased wages, greater participation in government, dismantling of oligarchies, fair income distribution, and land and tax reform.²⁸¹ They sought these changes immediately and leaders were vulnerable because of it.

By the time LBJ took over, the political environment was spiraling. Thomas Mann, then ASIAA, said the hemisphere was in the worst shape he had seen it in 20 years.²⁸² The CIA assessed that “revolution or attempts at revolution are definite possibilities in twelve of the twenty-three countries to our south.”²⁸³ This reality was acknowledged by the U.S., the USSR, the PRC, and especially Cuba. Guevara said: “We are deeply convinced of the possibility of seizing power in a number of Latin American countries, and practice shows that it is possible not only to seize it, but also to hold power.”²⁸⁴ Thousands of guerilla fighters had already traveled to Cuba for training at this point.

B. AID TRANSFORMATION AND EXPANSION

Kennedy, much like Truman twelve years earlier, used his inaugural address to call for greater assistance to the less-developed countries (LDCs).

²⁷⁹ Eduardo Frei Montalva, “The Alliance That Lost Its Way,” *Foreign Affairs* 45, no. 3 (April 1967): 437, <https://doi.org/10.2307/20039248>.

²⁸⁰ USIA, *The Economic and Political Climate of Opinion in Latin America and Attitudes toward the Alliance for Progress* (Washington, DC: USIA, 1963), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, i.

²⁸¹ Frei, 438; and Brands, 40.

²⁸² DOS, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, South and Central America; Mexico, Volume XXXI*, eds. David C. Geyer, David H. Herschler (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), Document 2, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d2>.

²⁸³ Brands, 40.

²⁸⁴ Brands, 40; and James G. Hershberg, “Bulletin: Issue 5,” Cold War International History Project, Wilson Center International Center for Scholars (Spring 1995): 180, last modified July 13, 2011, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_Bulletin_5.pdf.

To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.²⁸⁵

This comment cannot be taken entirely at face value. These altruistic aspirations were combined with Cold War anxiety. The administration recognized that poverty bred unrest, a condition in which Communist ideology thrived. Therefore, addressing it was intended to remove this vulnerability among the masses. At the political level, Darnton finds that this call for assistance had another goal: shore up Western economic and military allies.²⁸⁶

In his subsequent message to Congress, he referred to the period as the “decade of development” and called for replacing the MSA with new legislation, the FAA. JFK criticized the inherited MSP for being too short-sighted and for its focus on individual projects vice state-wide development.

The new philosophy was that aid should be expanded and provided until recipients no longer needed it. Yet, Kennedy was clear that responsibility could not fall solely on U.S. shoulders. Assistance would be granted to those “willing to undertake necessary internal reform and self-help.”²⁸⁷ Although there were some exceptions to this, conditional aid remained predominant during the period covered, especially under LBJ. Additionally, JFK requested five-year aid authorizations; emphasized long-term, low-interest loans; and sought the creation of a single agency to administer all foreign aid functions.

In September 1961, JFK signed into law the FAA of 1961.²⁸⁸ This mandated the creation of USAID to administer non-military foreign aid. It absorbed functions of the ICA

²⁸⁵ “President John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address,” January 16, 2011, posted by CBS, video, 15:36, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PEC1C4p0k3E>.

²⁸⁶ Christopher N. Darnton, “Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in U.S.-Latin American Relations: Rethinking the Origins of the Alliance for Progress,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 14, no. 4 (2012): 55, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_cold_war_studies/v014/14.4.darnton.html.

²⁸⁷ Butterfield, *U.S. Development Aid-an Historic First*, 58.

²⁸⁸ The FAA of 1961, as amended, remains the primary legislative vehicle for U.S. foreign aid.

and DLF and took over management of P.L. 480 (renamed Food for Peace). The DOD retained control over the MAP.

Foreign aid policy under Kennedy was centered around large flows of economic development funds. This policy used Walt Rostow's "Five Stages of Economic Growth" as its foundational principle as he was a key advisor to JFK at the time.²⁸⁹ In its simplest terms, the idea was that large transfers of immediately-available capital would spark economic takeoff in the LDCs. As a result of the impetus, recipients would move toward economic maturity over time. This strategy placed the role of Point Four on the back-burner. Technical aid's subordinate function was to strengthen preconditions for economic growth in order to avoid backsliding.

Although USAID maintained a technical assistance program, this brand of aid was somewhat re-imagined through a new initiative called the Peace Corps. The concept was proposed in 1959 by Congressman Henry Reuss as the "Point Four Youth Corps." Then, in an unexpected campaign speech at two o'clock in the morning at the University of Michigan, JFK announced the idea. Based on the reaction, the Peace Corps was officially established the next year. Its mission: to send U.S. volunteers abroad to promote peace and friendship by conducting technical assistance. In the first six years, programs were established in 55 countries with nearly 15,000 volunteers. Almost \$850 million was allocated worldwide during the 1960s.²⁹⁰

The purpose behind Food for Peace also changed. Under Eisenhower it was intended for agricultural surplus liquidation, with only slight focus on the humanitarian aspect. Kennedy appreciated its philanthropic elements but also embraced it as a foreign policy tool. Funds were released to encourage agricultural reform, gain support for U.S. interests abroad, and also to serve those in desperate need. About \$12 million in grants, loans, and emergency relief funds were provided under Food for Peace. This more than doubled the previous decade.

²⁸⁹ W.W. Rostow, "The Five Stages-of-Growth—A Summary," in *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1960), 4–16.

²⁹⁰ "Peace Corps," New World Encyclopedia, accessed October 25, 2019, https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Peace_Corps.

With respect to the MAP, non-NATO states were now placed into one of three categories: (a) those requiring aid to meet external threats; (b) those requiring aid to meet internal threats; and (c) those having no aid requirement but received it largely for political reasons. The latter two were a major shift from the previous decade. Policy planners also acknowledged a variety of ancillary purposes. Equipment and training were sometimes provided as a *quid pro quo* for base rights, for development of facilities used by U.S. forces, to professionalize armed services, to maintain pro-U.S. regimes, to assure pro-U.S. militaries, and to deter the pursuit of aid from communist states.²⁹¹ Around \$9.8 billion was provided for the MAP during the 1960s.²⁹²

Although the LATAM-focused Alliance received a majority of public attention with respect to foreign aid, other regions were not neglected. Twenty-five African countries were liberated between 1960 and 1963. Both primary Cold War rivals saw this as an opportunity for investment. Kennedy criticized the previous administration's handling of Africa and expanded U.S. involvement. Assistance to the region more than tripled what was provided in the 1950s. Aid to the Near East and South Asia also increased by about 65 percent. At \$60 billion, total U.S. aid to the LDCs doubled the MSP's funds.²⁹³ It was evident that JFK viewed foreign assistance as an essential foreign policy instrument. LBJ continued Kennedy's legacy; however, his attention became increasingly pulled toward Vietnam and Southeast Asia in general.

U.S. assistance peaked in FY 1966. Both parties in Congress and the U.S. public became increasingly more critical of the use of foreign aid. In one 1968 letter to Johnson,

²⁹¹ DOS, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Foreign Economic Policy: Foreign Assistance Policy, Volume IX*, eds. Evans Gerakas, David S. Patterson, William F. Sanford Jr., and Carolyn B. Yee (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995), Document 84, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v09/d84>.

²⁹² USAID, *Greenbook, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1971* (Washington, DC: USAID, 1972), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACZ080.pdf, 9.

²⁹³ *Greenbook*, 9–10, 82.

an official stated there was a “mood of malaise and withdrawal” in the U.S. that undermined development aid initiatives.²⁹⁴ Aid to Vietnam skyrocketed however.

C. ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

1. Background

Following increasing anti-U.S. sentiment toward the end of the 1950s, JFK pledged to strengthen relations in the region. He aimed to use more liberal means than his predecessors to improve economic conditions in order to disrupt communist inroads. He suggested a loan of over \$20 billion to those dedicated to political, social, and economic reforms. The U.S. was to cover half through public capital. This proposal was branded the Alliance for Progress.

Although JFK is given almost complete credit for the initiative, its roots are actually found in LATAM.²⁹⁵ After years of region-wide pleas for greater economic aid, Brazil’s president Juscelino Kubitschek took the initiative and proposed a plan in 1958. He sent an *aide-mémoire* to all governments in the hemisphere calling for an expansion of U.S. economic and social assistance in what was termed Operation Pan-America.²⁹⁶ Two months later, Secretary of State Dulles called for comprehensive reforms to motivate the flow of U.S. resources. These ideas (i.e., reform→ aid) were later implemented into the Act of Bogotá, adopted by the OAS in 1960.

Even if the Alliance was not an original idea devised by JFK, his firm dedication to its ideas, and to LATAM as a whole, was imperative. Three events in 1961 cemented the initiative as the hemisphere’s foundational policy. Kennedy first mentioned it in his inaugural address: “To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge—

²⁹⁴ DOS, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, International Development and Economic Defense Policy; Commodities*, Volume IX, eds. Carolyn B. Yee and David S. Patterson (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), Document 79, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v09/d79>.

²⁹⁵ For more on this, see Darnton, “Asymmetry and Agenda-Setting in U.S.-Latin American Relations: Rethinking the Origins of the Alliance for Progress,” 57.

²⁹⁶ *FRUS, 1958–1960, American Republics*, Document 248, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d248>; *FRUS*, Document 255, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d255>; and Scheman, *The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective*, 198.

to convert our good words into good deeds—in a new alliance for progress—to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty.”²⁹⁷ Two months later he invited the entire LATAM diplomatic corps to the White House. In his message to nearly 200 LATAM diplomats, he referred to the Alliance as “a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose to satisfy the basic needs of the [Latin] American people for homes, work and land, health and schools.”²⁹⁸ He delicately criticized the U.S. and LATAM governments for past failures in strengthening relations and improving quality of life. Finally, in August, the tenets of the program were agreed upon by the OAS (less Cuba) at Uruguay’s Punta del Este resort. The resultant Charter officially created the 10-year development program.

Therefore, the Alliance was not just a one-sided foreign assistance program. It was a multilaterally-recognized regional policy. Most of the recommended reforms and plans were put forth by OAS-established committees of LATAM experts. The Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) held annual meetings with the region’s countries to review development plans. CIAP’s meetings were referred to as “the fulcrum of the Alliance and the principal mechanism that gave it multilateral substance.”²⁹⁹

After JFK’s assassination, LBJ continued the Alliance, though its priority was diminished. Kennedy used aid for the strengthening of democracies, social reform, and economic growth. This was expected to inherently reinforce U.S. alliances. LBJ saw this the other way around. Demonstration of support for U.S. interests motivated aid flows. His assistance policy was to focus on economic development and political stability, protect U.S. business interests, and avoid discrimination based on regime type. Ultimately, the priority was keeping LATAM on the U.S. side economically, militarily, and politically.

²⁹⁷ “President John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address,” January 16, 2011, posted by CBS, video, 15:36, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PEC1C4p0k3E>.

²⁹⁸ “Alliance for Progress (Alianza para el Progreso),” JFK Presidential Museum and Library, accessed December 17, 2019, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/alliance-for-progress>.

²⁹⁹ Butterfield, 65.

When Nixon took over in 1969, the Alliance was virtually dead. By the mid-1970s, it was rarely even discussed.³⁰⁰ According to Gaddis Smith, as quoted in Taffet: “Latin America fell off the mental map of high Washington officials in the late 1960s.”³⁰¹

2. Aid under the Alliance

Although the Alliance was created and managed multilaterally, *bilateral development assistance* from the U.S. was the principal means used to achieve its objectives. This included economic and technical aid channeled through the USAID, Food for Peace, and the Peace Corps.

Under JFK, certain reforms were prerequisites for major resource allocations. This is what was agreed upon in the Charter by all signatories. In using the “carrot and stick” approach, JFK favored the former and used it tactfully. Johnson used both, but favored the latter. He was arguably less diplomatic in his approach. At times, aid was suspended to democratic allies as punishment for actions harmful to U.S. commercial interests. At the same time, aid continued to dictators just for assertively condemning Communism.

Between FYs 1962 and 1969, LATAM received nearly \$6 billion in development assistance.³⁰² This amounted to over a quarter of aid to all LDCs globally. Compare this to the 1950s when the region received only \$1.3 billion, about 2 percent of the MSP’s total. The breakdown of the \$6 billion is as follows: USAID economic development—65 percent; Food for Peace—20 percent; USAID technical aid—11 percent; and Peace

³⁰⁰ Sebastian Edwards, “Forty Years of Latin America’s Economic Development: From the Alliance for Progress to the Washington Consensus” (working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009), 5–6; Scheman, 13.

³⁰¹ Gaddis Smith, *The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine: 1945–1993* (New York, 1994), 129, quoted in Taffet, 177, 186.

³⁰² Of the \$10 billion proposed by JFK in 1961, the remaining \$4 billion was provided by the EXIM Bank; Some additional funds were provided by the Contingency Fund set up under the Eisenhower administration. These provided aid during times of crisis after Congress had already appropriated Alliance funds for the FY.

Corps—4 percent.³⁰³ LATAM remained a fairly consistent priority for the U.S. throughout the first half of the decade. Between FY 1963 and 1964, U.S. assistance declined 11 percent globally; however, LATAM's share increased by \$200 million.³⁰⁴ Still, aid programs peaked in FY 1966 and by FY 1969, amounts declined by half.

Within the region, 62 percent of aid was provided to four countries. Brazil received just shy of \$2 billion at around 30 percent of the total; Colombia received \$850 million at 13 percent; Chile received the third most at \$735 million; and the Dominican Republic (DR) received over \$400 million—almost 60 times what it received under the MSP.³⁰⁵ The rest of the region was by no means ignored. When compared to the 1950s, every country except for Haiti saw an increase.

The use of economic aid was a major policy shift from the previous two administrations. Under the MSP, it was provided mostly for emergency situations in only three countries. Under the Alliance, it was the largest percentage of aid for every country except Venezuela. Sizable provisions of public capital were expected to catalyze growth in LDC economies—the largest source of vulnerability for leaders throughout the region. This was expected to ease public frustration and stabilize political systems. The hope was that LATAM would be grateful to the U.S. and support its policies and interests as a result.

Whereas economic aid aimed to foster extensive economic growth and political stabilization, Food for Peace (renamed Food for Freedom in 1966) and the Peace Corps sought to improve quality of life from the bottom-up. The carrot and stick approach was rarely, if ever, used for these types of aid. For example, when USAID's economic funds were cut from the Dominican government in 1963, these two programs remained active. This was found in Colombia as well. Much like Point Four, the Peace Corps sent volunteers

³⁰³ Reported USAID data does not distinguish between economic and technical aid, however, it was broken down to Congress during hearings on the FAA; *H.R. 10502: To Amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, and for Other Purposes: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives*, 88th Cong. 2 (1964), 274, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b3605638&view=1up&seq=7>; and *Greenbook*, 9, 33.

³⁰⁴ *FRUS, 1964–1968, International Development and Economic Defense Policy*, Document 1, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v09/d1>.

³⁰⁵ *Greenbook*, 33, 38, 40, 41, 44.

to strengthen indigenous development in rural communities. Volunteers trained locals to use their own resources in the most-effective ways possible. Nearly \$200 million was funded for projects in 18 LATAM countries. USAID also maintained a technical assistance program to continue the past work of the ICA. Additionally, Food for Peace provided \$1.3 billion in loans and emergency relief to the region (about 11 percent of the program's total).

The *military assistance* portion of the Alliance was also adapted. The MSP's focus on hemispheric defense and anti-submarine warfare was downgraded and internal security became the top priority. JFK quickly ordered more MAP funds, the creation of military-led civic action programs, and the development of training courses on riot control, psychological warfare, and counter-guerilla operations.³⁰⁶ Although some similar training began in 1959, it was not to the same degree. Between 1961 and 1964 alone, nearly 23,000 military personnel were trained at the DOD-funded School of the Americas.³⁰⁷ The MAP was conducted similarly under LBJ.

Countries where internal threats were less of a concern (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, and Chile), received assistance mainly for political reasons. JFK "used military aid to preserve access and influence with the arbiters of Latin American political life, the military establishment."³⁰⁸ This continued with LBJ's adherence to the Mann Doctrine. For example, aid to Brazil sought to weaken its left-leaning government by strengthening the right-wing military. The military ruled Brazil for the next two decades. In some areas, Mann saw the military as better fit to lead the state toward stability and economic growth.³⁰⁹ Although democracies were preferred, it was less important than having a competent authority able to manage the state.

³⁰⁶ Stephen G. Rabe, *The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 117.

³⁰⁷ H.R. 7750: *To Amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, and for Other Purposes: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives*, 89th Cong. 1 (1965), 352, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d020918149&view=1up&seq=7>.

³⁰⁸ Rabe, *The Killing Zone*, 119.

³⁰⁹ Rabe, 113.

While the MAP took a subordinate role, it was still a fundamental tool within the Alliance. Through FY 1969, almost \$700 million was provided to 18 states. Support was provided to an extra third of the region and doubled what was provided during the 1950s.

3. Outcomes

This section objectively reviews the positive and negative results of the Alliance. It is important to recognize these outcomes to fully grasp perceptions of the program in LATAM. Countless authors have judged the program's efficacy to exhaustion.³¹⁰ Based on who you ask and what goals are being discussed, there are strong arguments for both critics and advocates. What is evident is that the Alliance achieved many things while falling short of its primary goals.

When considering the end-state desired by JFK, the Alliance failed to meet expectations. By 1967, most conceded that complete success was impossible. "The framers of the charter erected a goal structure which anticipated too much too soon."³¹¹ Democratic governments were a minority, economic growth was unimpressive, land reform laws were stagnant in legislatures, inflation control was slow, and employment levels and agricultural production declined—largely due to the extensive population growth.³¹²

The population problem undermined many achievements. For example, although 150,000 hospital beds were built, the number of beds per person actually decreased.³¹³ Some officials argued for population control as a condition of aid, but it was not widely supported. Relatedly, some problems were just too great to be solved by the Alliance alone. Ecuador for instance faced a housing crisis requiring a half-million units. It would have cost about \$1 billion in and of itself.

³¹⁰ See: Taffet, *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy*; and Scheman, *The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective*.

³¹¹ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, *A Review of Alliance for Progress Goals: A Report by the Bureau for Latin America, USAID*, 91st Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print (Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), 1, [https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.\\$b654732&view=1up&seq=5](https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.$b654732&view=1up&seq=5).

³¹² Rabe, 110; and DOS, *Analysis on a Region-by-Region Basis of Economic Assistance to Various Countries and the Value of the Program to the U.S. National Interest* (Washington, DC: DOS, 1965), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, 4.

³¹³ Taffet, 51.

The overall review of the MAP was mixed. Six countries faced formidable guerilla threats during the decade with varied results. One survey of the program speculated that most of the region's smaller countries would be deficient if faced with an uprising.³¹⁴ Contrarily, a CIA report from 1968 found that anti-guerilla capabilities of the region had decidedly increased.³¹⁵ Further, some U.S. ambassadors in the region were doubtful of the MAP's success. It was difficult to tout professionalism of the armed services after officers in Honduras and El Salvador funneled civic action aid for personal and political gain.³¹⁶ Lastly, the turn toward military rule for many countries was viewed as another failure.

Even to the harshest critics, it is hard to deny its many achievements. One author found that it set in motion a wave of creative thinking on development from many of LATAM's most moderate leaders.³¹⁷ More evidently, progress was made in public health, education, transportation, agricultural practices, and many other fields. Numerous examples of critical achievements can be found. E.g., potable water furnished to 70 percent of the region's urban population; 1,200 health centers built and placed into operation; road mileage increased from 530,000 to 985,000; primary, secondary, and university enrollments increased by 23, 50, and 39 percent; more than 160,000 teachers trained; and 1.1 million acres of land irrigated.³¹⁸ This list is not all-inclusive. The overall program may have failed, but its contributions cannot be ignored.

³¹⁴ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress: The Latin American Military*, 90th Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print (Washington, DC: GPO, 1967), 28–29, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.31822017265711&view=1up&seq=1>.

³¹⁵ CIA, *National Intelligence Estimate: The Potential for Revolution in Latin America* (Langley, VA: CIA, 1968), Declassified Documents Online, 5.

³¹⁶ Rabe, 119.

³¹⁷ Scheman, 7.

³¹⁸ House Committee on Government Operations, *A Review of Alliance for Progress Goals*, 6; and S.J. Res. 53: *A Joint Resolution to Support the Other American Republics in a Historic New Phase of the Alliance for Progress: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, Senate, 90th Cong. 1 (1967), 2, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951p007373251&view=1up&seq=1>.

D. DETERMINING INFLUENCE

This section assesses the impact of Alliance aid on U.S. influence.³¹⁹ Numerous senior-level government and military officials stated clearly that foreign aid generated influence among LDCs. They warned that cuts to the programs would have deleterious effects. These declarations were made in assorted memos, reports, and studies between 1965 and 1967. Officials included Rusk; Rostow (serving as NSA); USAID Administrator William Gaud; and General Andrew P. O'Meara, U.S. SOUTHCOM Commander.

In a memo to the president, Rusk said: "Economic and military aid remain far and away the most powerful means at our command to influence the massive forces at work in the less developed nations." Going further, he stated that the economic effect of aid "is dwarfed in value by the influence it can exert" on recipients.³²⁰ Rostow told LBJ that foreign aid is the "most powerful single lever available to maintain our influence."³²¹

On the risk of cutting aid, Rusk reported that aid increases the ability to promote U.S. interests where military, diplomatic, and commercial activities prove limited. "It would be folly to dispense with, or seriously to impair, these programs."³²² Gaud reported to Congress that cuts would have "severe political and economic consequences and substantially weaken U.S. influence in the less developed world."³²³ Specifically for LATAM, a NSC staffer argued that the U.S. "cannot opt out of participation in the most

³¹⁹ The section excludes the DOTs of South America (i.e., British Guiana, French Guiana, and Suriname (Dutch Guiana)) and the Caribbean which were under administrative control of respective European states. In the Caribbean, only Haiti and the Dominican Republic are considered. Cuba received no aid from the U.S. after 1961. Although Guyana (formerly British Guiana), Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados gained independence from the United Kingdom during the decade, they are not considered here due to minimal available data.

³²⁰ DOS, *Secretary of State Dean Rusk Reviews the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program for Less-Developed Nations* (Washington, DC: DOS, 1966), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, 1; and *FRUS, 1964–1968, International Development and Economic Defense Policy*, Document, 47, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v09/d47>.

³²¹ *FRUS, 1964–1968*, Document, 49, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v09/d49>; Although Rostow leaves LATAM off of his list in this quote, he recommends Johnson hold the line on U.S. aid during his upcoming trip to Mexico.

³²² DOS, *Rusk Reviews the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program*, 1.

³²³ DOS, *Details on the Consequences of a \$2.5 Billion Foreign Aid Appropriation for FY 1968* (Washington, DC: DOS, 1967), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, 5.

important event in the third world--the struggle for modernization--and still expect to remain influential and relevant there. Withdrawal from development aid is a sure recipe for isolating ourselves from the southern part of the world.”³²⁴ On MAP cuts, a 1965 DOD study recommended a gradual drawdown of funding and the DOS objected to this solely on the potential loss of influence.³²⁵

Some may stop here and conclude that aid leads to considerable influence outright. While these statements are extremely useful, they cannot be taken at face-value without understanding what motivated them. Thus, it is important to dissect those findings and determine what leads to this influence, what undermines it, and what limits exist. This is done through the following sections: (1) discussion of general influence in LATAM; (2) assessment of dependency; (3) evaluation of the ways aid alters LATAM perceptions; and (4) concrete evidence of influence. In the fourth section, I examine the extent to which dependency and favorability were able to change LATAM actions in U.S. favor. Evidence for both variables is found mostly in statements made by U.S. officials involved in the Alliance and LATAM recipients. This real-time commentary by those involved offers a closer look than retrospective sources alone can provide.

1. General Influence

Throughout the 1960s, overall political influence began strong but gradually weakened. The 1950s saw rising anti-U.S. sentiment culminate in violent riots and an attack on the U.S. vice president. Following Kennedy’s pledge to restore relations, influence dramatically increased. However, it began to decline almost immediately after his death. This is not wholly surprising given the lower priority LBJ placed on the region. His continuation of the Alliance appeared to be more out of respect for JFK’s legacy than it was for LATAM progress.

³²⁴ NSC, *Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis Provides Text of a Paper on Foreign Aid* (Washington, DC: NSC, 1969), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, 1.

³²⁵ DOD, *Study of U.S. Policy toward Latin American Military Forces* (Arlington, VA: DOD, 1965), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, 1, 11.

Early on, most at the top-levels in LATAM were highly appreciative of Kennedy's commitment to the region and remained on the side of the U.S. in the Cold War. Even those who favored neutral foreign policies at times, like Mexico and Brazil, leaned more toward the U.S. In 1962, the U.S. was able to exert its influence and urge the OAS to bar Cuba. By 1964, only Mexico continued to hold diplomatic ties with Castro. Even so, they remained a close friend.

At the public level, favorability was at an all-time high under JFK. In stark contrast to Nixon's reception, Kennedy was praised during his visits to Costa Rica, Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico.³²⁶ In 1961, USIA polled nearly 10,000 LATAM citizens on their views. The majority supported U.S. over Soviet involvement in the region and expressed overwhelming dissatisfaction with Cuba's actions. A 1963 poll reported that 79 percent of those surveyed believed the U.S. had significant influence in the region. About half sided with the U.S. ideologically and wanted to see U.S. influence grow, while the others remained neutral or wanted this influence to decrease.³²⁷

After Johnson took over, a range of factors sparked the decline of influence. For one, his reduced interest and policy approach returned LATAM cynicism. Then, military intervention in the Dominican civil war greatly damaged the status of the U.S. The DOS Bureau of Intelligence and Research said it "set off a movement of widespread popular protest in Latin America virtually unprecedented in its scope and in its hostility."³²⁸ Evidence at the political level can be found at the UN. Most states that supported U.S. policies toward Cuba and Vietnam were critical of the intervention and voted against it.³²⁹


Figure 8 illustrates a wider trend. LATAM votes which fell along U.S. lines decreased markedly by decade's end.

³²⁶ Scheman, 197.

³²⁷ Gregory M. Tomlin, *Murrow's Cold War: Public Diplomacy for the Kennedy Administration* (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2016), 72; and USIA, *The Economic and Political Climate of Opinion*, ii.

³²⁸ DOS, *The Dominican Experience: A Watershed in Inter-American Relations* (Washington, DC: DOS, 1966), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, i.

³²⁹ DOS, *The Political Performance of Latin American Countries* (Washington, DC: DOS, 1965), U.S. Declassified Documents Online.



Note: Those voting with the U.S. 67–100 percent of the time (black shading) were considered to be in the U.S. sphere of influence by the source author.

Figure 8. U.N. Voting Data Depicting Support of U.S. Interests: 1960–1966, 1967, and 1969.³³⁰

Where the map shows that influence remained (Brazil, Colombia, and the Northern Triangle), it was only by a thread. Percentages did not exceed 70 percent.³³¹ One area where a decline was less palpable was in the military. The DOD reported that the U.S. was the leading military influence in the region. They cited the fact that the military had the least anti-U.S. sentiment of any political group and generally heeded U.S. advice.³³²

Shrinking influence did not mean that none existed. It only exhibited its vulnerabilities and limits. Furthermore, it did not mean that communist influence was stronger. In his book, Hal Brands writes that both the U.S. and USSR failed to achieve their goals for the region by 1970. “A decade defined by intervention wound up revealing the limits, rather than the extent, of foreign influence in Latin America.”³³³

³³⁰ Source: Elliott, “Latin America: The United States Sphere of Influence,” 109–10.

³³¹ Elliot, 128.

³³² DOD, *Study of U.S. Policy toward Latin American Military Forces*, 44; and H., *H.R. 7750: To Amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*, 346–47, 351.

³³³ Brands, 38.

2. Dependence

This section looks at whether LATAM was dependent on aid. I hypothesize that U.S. control of resources needed by LATAM for development or relief creates implicit influence to varying degrees. The U.S. may offer or withhold aid in these instances to further its interests. In 1961, Rostow told JFK: “there is reason to believe that the degree of long-term dependence on American or Communist aid may be one significant factor in determining how neutrals align themselves on the major world issues.”³³⁴ It was also reported that aid donors are certainly considered when LDCs take political positions.³³⁵

Mounting LATAM nationalism made finding public acknowledgements of dependence challenging—though, it did occasionally occur via official channels. For this reason, dependence was discerned mostly from U.S. government reporting. The commentary provided was often based on discussions with LATAM officials. Measuring based on statistical data, like aid as a percentage of GDP, would be misleading. U.S. assistance comprised less than 1 percent of LATAM’s GDP in 1966.³³⁶ The region provided around 90 percent of the capital toward the Alliance’s economic initiatives during the decade.³³⁷ Additionally, for the six larger countries which regularly spent over \$100 million on military expenditures, MAP funds comprised only 6 percent. For the smaller states, the percentage was 14 percent.³³⁸ This strategy is more fitting to measure economic dependence on issues such as trade. For aid, these percentages alone do not tell us whether LATAM viewed these ratios as sufficient or not. Thus, we look more to empirical evidence.

³³⁴ *FRUS, 1961–1963, Foreign Economic Policy: Foreign Assistance Policy*, Document 118, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v09/d118>; and White House, *Neutralism and Foreign Aid; or Belgrade Reconsidered* (Washington, DC: White House, 1961), U.S. Declassified Documents Online.

³³⁵ White House, *Neutralism and Foreign Aid*, Appendix, 2.

³³⁶ This reporting uses GDP figures from the World Bank and aid data for 1966 specifically (converted to 2010 U.S. dollars to match the World Bank). 1966 was the peak year for U.S. aid.

³³⁷ Butterfield, 69.

³³⁸ CIA, *Assessment of Latin American Military and Arms Needs Discussed* (Langley, VA: CIA, 1966), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, 5; and *Greenbook*, 34–60.

First, USAID's purpose was, and still is, to aid states until they exhibited self-reliance. Accordingly, programs were ceased in 26 states by 1966. None were cut in LATAM for this reason. Therefore, the lead foreign aid organization saw the region as reliant upon U.S. support.

After persistent calls for increased support during the 1950s, it is hard to argue LATAM did not see themselves as dependent to some extent. During the 10-day conference at Punta del Este, this was confirmed. The embassy in Uruguay reported that requests for immediate aid packages was a major priority.³³⁹ Later, in 1966, a congressional study reported that "Latin American leaders have regarded their chances for transition from stagnating to dynamic economies as slim without U.S. assistance."³⁴⁰

Multiple countries faced severe balance-of-payments problems and inflation, especially Chile and Colombia. With the exception of Mexico and a few others, this was a pervasive issue. To break out of these trends and spark growth, every one of these states needed assistance at some level. Sometimes this meant large amounts of capital and occasionally it was just technical know-how. Furthermore, the overwhelming population growth degraded quality of life almost everywhere. Those who wanted to implement reforms to tackle these issues, like Frei in Chile, needed the capital to do so. According to Taffet, "for the Christian Democrats in Chile, without economic aid, reform and growth was impossible."³⁴¹

Some saw the need for aid purely for political purposes. Goulart in Brazil told the U.S. ambassador that he required aid in order to maintain stability to keep communists

³³⁹ DOS, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics*, Volume XII, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar, and W. Taylor Fain III (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996), Document 28, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d28>.

³⁴⁰ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, *United States Foreign Aid in Action: A Case Study*, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., Committee Print (Washington, DC: GPO, 1966), 69, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=txu.059173031977515&view=1up&seq=1>.

³⁴¹ Taffet, 80.

from taking power.³⁴² A 1966 NIE, titled “Prospects for Stability in the Dominican Republic,” concluded that any real progress would be impossible without U.S. support.³⁴³

On military aid, senior officials saw the region as reliant on equipment, training, and funding. In 1964, USAID’s Administrator told the president: “Forces responsible for maintaining law and order have neither the equipment nor the trained personnel to counter well-conceived and well-executed plans to subvert the State. . . . They are turning to us for help in developing the special capabilities to . . . deal effectively with disorders in the cities.”³⁴⁴ Seventeen countries of the region requested U.S. help in combatting the possibility of insurgency. Contrarily, a survey of the MAP in 1967 argued this dependency was limited to the smaller states. Ninety percent of U.S. military aid went to six countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela). Each of these had fairly modern and large militaries. They were seen as capable of preserving security and conducting hemispheric defense alone.³⁴⁵

The information above leads to the conclusion that, with few exceptions, LATAM was dependent on U.S. aid. Of course, the degree of this need varied. At times it was required only for emergency relief, occasionally for balance-of-payment reprieve, and sometimes to avoid economic or political collapse altogether. This deduction is based on the continuation of USAID programs; requests for immediate development aid during the Charter of Punta del Este; continuous requests for military assistance from 17 countries; statements made by some LATAM heads-of-state; and comments pulled from USAID, DOS, and Congressional reporting. This dependence gave the U.S. the ability to use its aid as a bargaining tool to advance its interests in the region.

³⁴² Taffet, 99–112.

³⁴³ DOS, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana*, Volume XXXII, eds. Daniel Lawler and Carolyn Yee (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005), Document 171, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d171>.

³⁴⁴ *FRUS, 1964–1968, International Development and Economic Defense Policy*, Document 5, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v09/d5>.

³⁴⁵ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress: The Latin American Military*, 30.

3. Shifts in Degree of Favorability

Perceptions of the U.S., and the degree to which they impacted influence, varied considerably. At first, the response to the Alliance was generally positive. Following Kennedy's speech at the White House, the U.S. ambassador to Honduras found that it created "almost electrifying" interest from LATAM officials.³⁴⁶ Some saw JFK as the re-embodiment of FDR—the last revered U.S. president in the region. The issues from the past decade had been virtually forgotten. The USIA reported that nearly every demographic in LATAM found something appealing about the initiative.³⁴⁷

While many saw it as a reversal of previous inattention, some remained skeptical of U.S. motives.³⁴⁸ Further, some landed elites and government officials were content with the status quo. Therefore, the Alliance's plan for reform did not appeal to their worldview. When Johnson inherited the program, fears of possible neglect grew and skeptics increased. Some claimed that there were two Alliances because of LBJ's deviations—others argued it had just "lost its way."³⁴⁹ Now, these are mostly opinions about the Alliance as a whole, and how each president managed it. This section focuses primarily on the resource aspect, though there is some overlap.

One report stated that aid directed toward the government level tends to gain support for U.S. policies almost immediately.³⁵⁰ While this statement sounds promising, "foreign aid should not be expected to win support from each recipient for our view on every international issue."³⁵¹ Where aid may lead to increased favorability from one group, it can simultaneously decrease favorability among opposing groups. Thus, we cannot look

³⁴⁶ Tomlin, *Murrow's Cold War*, 57.

³⁴⁷ Tomlin, 59.

³⁴⁸ Frei, 441; Scheman, 6–7; and Tomlin, 72.

³⁴⁹ Rabe, 113; Scheman, 71; Frei; and Jerome Levinson and Juan De Onis, *The Alliance That Lost Its Way; a Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970).

³⁵⁰ *FRUS, 1961–1963, American Republics*, Document 39, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d39>.

³⁵¹ H., *H.R. 10502: To Amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*, 2.

at single events or groups and place comprehensive statements about aid's bearing. It is important to look over the course of the entire decade and discern common trends.

To discern views toward the U.S., I look to the most influential groups in society: the levers of power. The central government and the military held the most power and provided a majority of the observable evidence. This includes democratic presidents, dictators, military juntas, and the region's military officers. The military was a critical target for gaining influence. By 1968, it had controlling authority in at least 14 states. Meaning they either controlled the state or kept the leader in power. In only four countries did they not hold political influence (Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay).³⁵²

Other groups are by no means ignored. This includes elites, the church, media, labor unions, and teacher and student groups. In 1962, one official warned against focusing only on the present governments or their supporters: "To create and strengthen moderate groups in a society serves the United States long-term interests, whether or not these groups are in power at a given moment."³⁵³ Additionally, popular opinion played a fairly minor role. Early on, it had impact only in Costa Rica and some South American states. Its role gradually increased but was often hindered by either political apathy or suppression.³⁵⁴

a. *Favorable Views*

The first factor which led to positive views of the U.S. was a feeling of genuine respect coming from the North at the start of the Alliance. This was due mostly to the cooperative nature of the program. Listeners of the Spanish service of the Voice of America praised the calls for active participation of LATAM citizens. One journalist even called it "the greatest contribution to Pan Americanism in one hundred years."³⁵⁵ During Frei's first-year anniversary message, he told the Chilean public: "We have maintained a loyal

³⁵² DOD, *Study of U.S. Policy toward Latin American Military Forces*, 26.

³⁵³ FRUS, 1961–1963, *American Republics*, Document 39, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d39>.

³⁵⁴ CIA, *The Role of Public Opinion in Latin American Political Stability* (Langley, VA: CIA, 1965), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, 1–3.

³⁵⁵ Tomlin, 59.

and frank friendship with the United States. In that country we have found understanding for our endeavor and an economic cooperation which is fundamental for the country.”³⁵⁶

Nationalism was the strongest force operating in the region at the time. “It provide [d] the emotions and slogans for political action through the ideological spectrum.” It had powerful impacts on the government, the military, and the student and labor unions. By showing dedication, and encouraging and respecting LATAMs role in their own development, the U.S. avoided pouring aid into a “psychological void.”³⁵⁷

Part of this was due to greater awareness. During the 1950s, the U.S. failed to adequately inform LATAM leaders and citizens about the programs and their impacts. This changed in the 1960s. First, JFK’s White House message to the LATAM diplomatic corps was a clear statement of U.S. intentions and program goals. This was admired. For the rest of the public, USIA spread information on the Alliance through radio broadcasts, films, a 26-part television mini-series, brochures, comic books, and the distribution of thousands of lapel pins.³⁵⁸ In Colombia, Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, 71 percent of the people surveyed were aware of the program and a majority voiced approval because of it. It was increasingly seen as sympathetic to LATAMs.³⁵⁹

General appreciation for U.S. resources and involvement was another contributing factor. Previous aid initiatives were often regarded as selfish, inadequate, and unevenly distributed. The Alliance on the other hand was viewed differently. The USIA found that an overwhelming majority approved of U.S. aid and the surrounding policy. Some initiatives within the Alliance, such as raising standards of living and boosting economies, were viewed as largely altruistic.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁶ Senate Committee on Government Operations, *United States Foreign Aid in Action*, 71.

³⁵⁷ *FRUS, 1961–1963*, Document 44, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d44>.

³⁵⁸ Taffet, 43, 77.

³⁵⁹ Tomlin, 74–75.

³⁶⁰ USIA, *The Economic and Political Climate of Opinion*, ii.

Although military intervention in the Dominican conflict was widely condemned internationally, aid helped ease some hostility in-country. U.S. troops were used to disperse emergency humanitarian aid which alleviated food shortages and health concerns. This dispelled much of the public's antagonism toward the military presence. Furthermore, Peace Corps volunteers were mostly valued by locals with whom they worked on local projects. Technical aid appeared to lessen anger at the grassroots level. Nonetheless, any latent influence gained by improving the public opinion was marred at the political level by U.S. support for Balaguer. Still, this exemplifies how seemingly altruistic support can improve perceptions even during crises.

Another group appreciative of U.S. support was the military. Most surveys of the Alliance found them to be the most pro-U.S. political force in LATAM.³⁶¹ This was attributed to both training programs and equipment grants and sales. Of course, it is possible that the region's militaries were intrinsically pro-U.S. dating back to Lend-Lease deliveries. At the very least, the MAP strengthened this bond. A year before becoming the fifth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor told Kennedy that the officers who attend U.S. schools gained a greater understanding of, and gratitude toward, the U.S.³⁶² Secretary of Defense McNamara reported to Congress that this was "the greatest return on any portion of our military assistance investment—dollar for dollar."³⁶³

Lastly, many have criticized the Alliance for not achieving its central aims. But, even secondary and tertiary accomplishments can impact perceptions. As a result of U.S. technical and financial support, improvements were seen in fields of education, public health, transportation, agriculture, community development, and some economic sectors. This was not ignored by LATAM leaders. Frei even conceded this in his criticism of the Alliance. He expressed sincere appreciation for the many positive results and credited them

³⁶¹ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress: The Latin American Military*, 30.

³⁶² *FRUS, 1961–1963, American Republics*, Document 87, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d87>.

³⁶³ H., *H.R. 7750: To Amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*, 783.

to U.S. aid.³⁶⁴ This demonstrates that when programs are perceived to be effective, recipients are likely to develop favorable views.

b. *Anti-U.S. Sentiment*

After the Alliance was announced, the concerns of the previous decade had subsided considerably. Yet, many other issues led to unfavorable views in the 1960s. One U.S. Senator conducted a case study of the Alliance in 1967. After two trips to LATAM, he found few who criticized the program could provide evidence for their critiques. He stated that lack of evidence did not matter: “The pervasiveness of the discontent made it evident that the program was somehow failing.”³⁶⁵ This section aims to summarize the common criticisms across the region.

The most damaging condemnation of the program was alleged self-interested paternalism. The conditions placed on aid were viewed with strong resentment. This is not surprising given LATAM’s sensitivity to outside intervention in their affairs. To be sure, it was accepted risk by policy-makers. They expected some criticism from governments and especially the elites. “We will be subjected in country after country to powerful attacks by the local oligarchy which will equate every reform we propose with radicalism.”³⁶⁶

Growing demands from the U.S. under LBJ led LATAM to believe the cooperative nature of the Alliance had faded. They saw the U.S. as overbearing. “It is unnecessary to point out names or dates, but at some stage the imaginative, dynamic commitment of countries united by a common ideal was gone. . . . The Alliance in fact became just one more source of assistance instead of a concerted program of mutual cooperation.”³⁶⁷

Although conditional reforms were agreed upon by participants, the pressure placed on their implementation was detrimental. One leader later said “it is inadmissible that the mere fact of making available financial aid gives any nation the right to demand that

³⁶⁴ Frei, 442.

³⁶⁵ Senate Committee on Government Operations, *United States Foreign Aid in Action*, VII.

³⁶⁶ *FRUS, 1961–1963, American Republics*, Document 34, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d34>.

³⁶⁷ Frei, 444.

another implement specific types of structural changes.”³⁶⁸ Belaunde Terry in Peru claimed “excessive interference” on the part of the U.S.; Duvalier in Haiti regularly criticized the U.S.’s complete control over the release of funds; and municipal leaders in Brazil said aid created “foreign zones of influence,” that destroyed Brazilian autonomy.³⁶⁹

Another factor, nearly impossible to combat, is the effect aid had on recipients’ oppositions. Many student groups, which were influenced strongly by the Left, remained antagonistic toward aid to governments which they did not support. These students saw it as support for the “ins,” as opposed to the masses.³⁷⁰ So, aid provided direct to governments may garner their support for the U.S. while simultaneously increasing bitterness among opposing groups. In other words, short-term influence can also result in long-term influence losses if the opposing elements move into positions of power.

Similarly, the MAP was found to gain considerable influence among the region’s militaries. Yet, this had adverse effects among those opposed to the military’s role in politics. The DOS warned: “We cannot afford to be identified with any step backward either to repressive dictatorship or military intervention in political life. Accordingly, every move we make to strengthen our ties with the Latin American military must be done on a selective basis with careful attention to the sensitivities of the country concerned.”³⁷¹

In another report, they foresaw that if U.S. military equipment or training was used to suppress peaceful demonstrations, it would strengthen popular appeal of anti-U.S. forces.³⁷² This was proven in 1970 with the kidnapping and murder of USAID employee Dan Mitrione in Uruguay. He worked in various capacities with the Office of Public Safety, the security assistance arm of USAID. In 1987, the guerilla group admitted that Mitrione

³⁶⁸ Frei, 447.

³⁶⁹ Jeanne Kuebler, “Progress of the Alianza,” *Editorial Research Reports II* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1963), <http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1963121100>; CIA, *Survey of Latin America* (Langley, VA: CIA, 1964), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, 131; and Taffet, 111.

³⁷⁰ *FRUS, 1961–1963, American Republics*, Document 39, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d39>.

³⁷¹ *FRUS*, Document 92, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d92>.

³⁷² *FRUS*, Document 86, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d86>.

was kidnapped due to his role in training the police in torture tactics.³⁷³ Three other U.S. officials were kidnapped or killed between 1968 and 1970 in Guatemala and Brazil.³⁷⁴

Even though feelings of neglect waned at first, there was minor frustration with relative aid shares to neighbors. For example, a 1967 New York Times article published a map showing U.S. aid per capita in each LATAM country. Peru's president expressed his "astonishment and embarrassment" at the comparative amount the country was receiving.³⁷⁵ While most appreciated the larger sums received compared to the previous decade, sensitivity still existed among those facing inter-state rivalries.

As Congress and the public began to lose interest in foreign aid, fears of neglect began to surface again. Once again, I draw on comments made by Frei, who was the most vocal LATAM official on the subject during the time period. The U.S. ambassador, citing Frei, said that a "psychological gap exists in the entire continent because of annual autopsy and surgery of [the Alliance]."³⁷⁶ He said reports in the press about desired cuts brought about fears of desertion.

Whereas positive perceptions of the Alliance's success rate led to more favorable views, the converse was also true. The CIA found two common misinterpretations.³⁷⁷ First, that attainment of Alliance goals was dependent on the U.S. alone. Second, that results were expected faster than what was reasonably possible. This indicated a lack of awareness on how the Alliance worked and what its impacts were. Regardless of USIA's contributions to regional awareness, its limits were demonstrated here.

Consequently, the U.S. was used as a scapegoat during announcements to the public and criticized in bilateral relations. Heads of state in Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru complained

³⁷³ This incident is depicted in the 1972 film *State of Siege*, directed by Costa-Gavras.

³⁷⁴ The kidnapping of Charles Burke Elbrick, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, is depicted in the 1997 film *Four Days in September*, directed by Bruno Barreto.

³⁷⁵ DOS, *President's Views on U.S. Aid and Other Bilateral Problems* (Washington, DC: DOS, 1967), U.S. Declassified Documents Online.

³⁷⁶ DOS, *Ambassador Korry Discusses Meeting between Ambassador Linowitz and Chilean President Frei Regarding Alliance for Progress* (Washington, DC: DOS, 1968), U.S. Declassified Documents Online.

³⁷⁷ CIA, *Survey of Latin America*, 8.

of the bureaucratic slowdown of aid flows. Brazil argued that it decreased the program's value to citizens and Peru threatened to "knock on other doors" if progress was not seen.³⁷⁸

4. Latent Influence Wielded

This section looks at whether aid was effective in wielding influence to evoke concrete change—mainly whether economic, political, or social reforms were implemented as a result of latent influence gained. More specifically, it considers reforms which were favorable to the U.S. and implemented hesitantly due to some degree of political risk. This is because some states joined the Alliance already reform-minded. Many though were unenthusiastic about major reforms or wished to maintain the status quo.

Status of diplomatic relations with Cuba and Cold War alliances were also of importance. Most states were entrenched in their positions by this point and all countries (less Mexico) severed ties with Cuba. This is mostly credited to the missile crisis or Castro's encouragement of revolution, though U.S. aid was found to be a contributing factor in some instances.

I found that most concrete behavioral changes were due to reliance on aid. Often, this overpowered influence lost to growing resentment. The clearest evidence was found in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, DR, and Peru (the recipients with the largest share). A direct link between sentiments and tangible influence was found mostly in the region's militaries. This does not suggest favorability is a poor measure of influence, only that a clear link to aid was difficult to discern.

Several significant signs of aid's strength were seen in the DR. After the assassination of Trujillo in 1961, Joaquín Balaguer took his place. Following negotiations with the U.S., he agreed to resign and hold elections to secure aid for the country.³⁷⁹ Later, during the short tenure of Juan Bosch in 1963, relations with the U.S. were poor. Officials said he held a "bitterness which cannot readily be erased," yet believed he would follow

³⁷⁸ CIA, 8; Tomlin, 78; and Taffet, 112.

³⁷⁹ Taffet, 128.

U.S. lines on foreign policy due to much-needed aid.³⁸⁰ The DOS found that in the past, “when the opposition assumed power, it quickly turned to the United States despite past bad feeling, because there was no alternative source of the aid necessary to maintain the new government in power.”³⁸¹ Even so, Bosch was ousted after only seven months. Under the new Triumvirate, leaders pursued economic reforms pushed by the DOS in return for aid.³⁸² After years of crisis, Balaguer returned to power in 1967 with U.S. support. He publicly conceded U.S. influence based on need.³⁸³

In 1962, Manuel Prado was overthrown by the military in Peru. JFK severed diplomatic ties, ceased U.S. aid, and called for elections. To return aid to the country, the junta scheduled elections for 1963. They later annulled the election unfortunately, but allowing it to happen was indicative of their need for assistance.

In Chile, Jorge Alessandri made only minor reforms and was seen by the DOS as the worst performer under the Alliance. He was strongly opposed to the reforms which were made, but picked his battles in order to alleviate balance-of-payments problems.³⁸⁴ Under Frei, the U.S. often refused to make payments when performance was poor. This pushed the government to act. “In spite of a precarious political situation and impeding elections in the spring, the present Liberal Government . . . has agreed to a needed devaluation of the currency, increase in income and sales taxes, and promised a new look at tariffs and budgetary restraints.”³⁸⁵ Frei additionally cut the price of copper after the U.S. threatened to cut \$80 million in previously-agreed-on aid. This was done at considerable political risk.³⁸⁶

³⁸⁰ *FRUS, 1964–1968, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana*, Document 171, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d171>.

³⁸¹ *FRUS, 1961–1963, American Republics*, Document 39, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d39>.

³⁸² Taffet, 136.

³⁸³ *FRUS, 1964–1968, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana*, Document 197, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d197>.

³⁸⁴ Taffet, 67, 71–73.

³⁸⁵ DOS, *Analysis on a Region-by-Region Basis of Economic Assistance to Various Countries*, 6.

³⁸⁶ Taffet, 83–85.

Also needing to manage balance-of-payments problems with U.S. help, Colombia agreed early on to devalue its currency. Guillermo Valencia made minor reforms over the next few years, but none which had significant political risk. Consequently, from FY 1964 to 1965 economic aid was cut from \$80 million to \$4 million. As a result, Valencia finally agreed to major economic reforms knowing his stability depended on economic support.³⁸⁷

In Brazil, when the military ousted leftist president João Goulart in 1964, U.S. aid grew by \$50 million. As a result, Castelo Branco implemented new reforms and almost immediately severed ties with Cuba. The latter can be only somewhat attributed to aid.

The pro-U.S. sentiment resulting from the MAP also led to concrete results. “If military assistance is viewed as the price the United States must pay for the political collaboration of Latin America’s armed forces, the programs have done much to achieve this objective.”³⁸⁸ By 1965, over 450 officers trained by the U.S. were reported to be in positions of importance.³⁸⁹ The MAP contributed to a robust partnership in the fight against Communism. In part, strong relations led militaries to urge reluctant governments to break ties with Cuba.

There were of course limits. At times, conditions on aid exceeded what some leaders were willing to do. This was for fear of losing popular support and being ousted. For example, although Brazil received the largest MSP share, Goulart maintained relations with Cuba and the USSR. Then, under the friendly military regime, requests for Brazil to send troops to Vietnam were not honored. They did provide coffee and medical supplies, indicating some degree of policy support.³⁹⁰ Other times, leaders were reluctant to cede to U.S. pressure, which pleased the nationalistic public. Restrepo in Colombia even publicly turned down aid in order to gain political support for standing up to U.S. pressure.³⁹¹

³⁸⁷ Taffet, 149, 160, 165; *FRUS, 1964–1968, International Development and Economic Defense Policy*, Document 44, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v09/d44>.

³⁸⁸ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress: The Latin American Military*, 29.

³⁸⁹ H., *H.R. 7750: To Amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*, 792.

³⁹⁰ Taffet, 118.

³⁹¹ Taffet, 165.

A final takeaway is that aid tended to give LATAM considerable leverage as well. Some governments used the U.S. fear of Communism against us. According to one report, “the best way to pry aid from Uncle Sam is to keep alive a ‘Communist scare.’”³⁹² Additionally, some others promised reforms to secure aid knowing full-well they would be stalled in legislatures.³⁹³

5. Impediments to Gaining Influence

Again, many outside factors simultaneously pulled on the strings of U.S. influence. Intra-region rivalries and historical U.S.-LATAM relations continued to play a role.³⁹⁴ Skepticism of U.S. motives often surfaced and there remained unease about U.S. presence in the region.³⁹⁵ This stemmed from past administrations’ gunboat and dollar diplomacy strategies and covert involvement in Guatemala in 1954. It continued following the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Rostow told Kennedy this harmed the Alliance because LATAMs were forced to condemn intervention in its affairs. At a time when cooperation was moving in a positive direction, this stalled progress.³⁹⁶ Then, sending nearly 25,000 troops to the DR was hugely detrimental. Other matters such as nationalism, instability, external influence, and apathy were outside U.S. control.

³⁹² Senate Committee on Government Operations, *United States Foreign Aid in Action*, 114.

³⁹³ Frei, 443.

³⁹⁴ See Chapter 3 for more detail on these matters.

³⁹⁵ For more on this subject, see: John D. Martz, *United States Policy in Latin America: A Quarter Century of Crisis and Challenge, 1961–1986* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1988); Martha Cottam, *Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1994); Rabe; and William M. LeoGrande, *Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–1992* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).

³⁹⁶ Taffet, 30; and Tomlin, 63.

Ideologically, nationalism was the strongest political force in LATAM.³⁹⁷ It led to growing pride, autonomy, and anti-U.S. views. The latter was due to the U.S. role as the dominant foreign presence in the region and LATAM desire to break from this routine.³⁹⁸

Political instability remained a concern. The decade saw the beginning of the long-lasting Guatemalan civil war (1961–96) and the enduring Colombian conflict against the FARC (1964–ongoing). The DR faced a short but deadly civil war and several other countries confronted some degree of guerilla threat. Coups occurred in 17 states and 11 countries were under military rule at some point. Stable constitutional governments existed only in Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay. Overall, there were 46 total changes of power—Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Haiti remained under authoritarian rule. Holding influence in this political environment was challenging.

Communist influence was exhibited primarily through Cuba and via propaganda. The USSR used Castro’s popularity to encourage widespread subversion. Recognizing the role of nationalism, they attributed many of LATAMs struggles to U.S. involvement. Communists dominated student political groups in a majority of the region, except for Bolivia, Chile, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Most students were actually pro-West, but communist movements at this level were more organized and motivated. Consequently, they filled most of the leadership positions.³⁹⁹

Apathy was common among the general population. “Only in the heat of well-publicized political campaigns or when the mass man himself comes under unusual economic stress, does he become an aroused entity striving to make his opinions felt.”⁴⁰⁰ Part of this problem was illiteracy in some areas. Guatemala’s literacy rate was 25 percent

³⁹⁷ NSC, *Review of the International Situation* (Washington, DC: NSC, 1969), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, II-40; and Scheman, 8.

³⁹⁸ See, for example: Virginia Garrard-Burnett, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Julio Moreno, eds., *Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow: New Histories of Latin America’s Cold War* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2013); and Peter Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

³⁹⁹ CIA, *Intelligence Handbook: Communist Influence Among Latin American Youth* (Langley, VA: CIA, 1967), U.S. Declassified Documents Online, 5–6.

⁴⁰⁰ CIA, *The Role of Public Opinion in Latin American Political Stability*, 2, F-1.

and Haiti's was 10 percent.⁴⁰¹ These people look for jobs and housing and not much more. The problem here is that aid programs designed to improve quality of life at the grassroots level had little political impact.

E. CONCLUDING REMARKS

With the exception of FDR in the early 1930s, the early 1960s were the only time in U.S. history where LATAM was prioritized by a U.S. administration. In the confines of the Cold War, this meant increased cooperation and expansion of assistance under the new Alliance for Progress. Aid was provided to strengthen economic, political, and social conditions. In turn, LATAM countries would be less vulnerable to communist inroads and hemispheric relations would be robust. After the death of JFK and the Gulf of Tonkin incident, U.S. interest in LATAM began to decline. By 1970 the Alliance was dead. Nonetheless, between FY 1962 and 1969, LATAM received nearly \$6 billion in bilateral development assistance and \$700 million in military aid. This amounted to one-fourth of the Third World's assistance.

Many issues shaped U.S.-LATAM relations during this period. Some of these were within U.S. control, though many were not. Historic U.S. involvement in the region continued to drive cynicism toward current motives. This was exacerbated by U.S. intervention in Cuba and the DR, as well as various other policies. Within LATAM, numerous factors contributed. Most notably: economic stagnation, rising nationalism, political instability, external influence, and widespread apathy keeping the general population from contributing politically.

This chapter looked specifically at how foreign aid under the Alliance translated to influence. Several high-ranking U.S. officials concluded outright that assistance was a useful means to achieve influence and warned that cuts to the program would damage it.

To validate these claims, I assessed dependence on U.S. support and various ways which aid altered views of the U.S. A majority of the region was, to varying degrees, dependent on aid for economic and political stabilization. As far as the MAP was

⁴⁰¹ CIA, 3, K-1.

concerned, roughly two-thirds of the region relied on training and resources to maintain internal security. This increased the capacity of the U.S. to advance its interests. Measuring concrete evidence proved simpler than under the MSP. Conditional assistance under the Alliance provided a clear line between aid and a resultant act. Several instances occurred where LATAM need resulted in concessions to the U.S. at some risk to those in power.

Aid had varied results on LATAM sentiment. Favorability surfaced when LATAMs: (1) felt the Alliance was altruistic and respected recipient autonomy; (2) had a general appreciation for U.S. aid; (3) were aware of the Alliance's goals and impacts; and (4) perceived the aid to be effective. These conditions contributed to latent influence, which was effectively wielded through cooperation with the region's militaries. Additionally, pro-U.S. governments were found to be easier to negotiate with on desired reforms.

Conversely, anti-U.S. sentiment arose when aid was perceived to be: (1) paternalistic and self-interested; (2) more beneficial to the "ins" of society; (3) imbalanced relative to neighbors; (4) neglecting the region; and (5) ineffective and slow-moving. These issues contributed to declines in U.S. influence. Yet, even when these conditions existed, the influence gained through dependence and favorability coupled together was often enough to counter them.

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V. CONCLUSION

Within the last decade, both Russia and China have greatly expanded their presence and activity in Latin America and the Caribbean—often in ways deemed threatening to U.S. national interests. Somewhat echoing the first half of the Cold War, the U.S. aims to maintain influence in the region while these states seek to counter U.S. advances. At the same time, the current administration has proposed major cuts to foreign aid programs in LATAM over the previous four budget cycles. Many experts worry that large cuts could diminish U.S. influence and damage bilateral relationships.⁴⁰² Accordingly, the two case studies contained in this thesis assessed the impact of U.S. bilateral foreign aid on U.S. influence in LATAM during the 1950s and 1960s.

A. FINDINGS

Based heavily on primary U.S. sources and available LATAM commentary, I conclude that under certain conditions, foreign aid is an effective means to acquire influence and advance U.S. interests in LATAM. I argue that influence is gained when recipients: (1) are dependent on resources the U.S. is willing to provide; (2) find that aid effectively meets their needs; (3) perceive aid programs to be somewhat altruistic; (4) perceive programs to be cooperative and have regular interaction with U.S. personnel; and (5) perceive that execution of aid respects LATAM sovereignty. In these instances, aid is an effective soft power tool where large cuts would be counterproductive. Latin American appreciation creates attraction, to varying degrees, toward U.S. policies and values. Correspondingly, political, economic, and military bonds are tightened and the U.S. grows its capacity to advance its interests abroad.

Under opposing conditions, foreign aid can also weaken U.S. influence. I argue that influence is diminished when: (1) recipients are dependent on resources the U.S. is unwilling to provide, leading to feelings of neglect; (2) aid is perceived to benefit only the

⁴⁰² Meyer and Gracia, 16; H.R. 115–253, 115th Cong. (2017), <https://www.congress.gov/115/crpt/hrpt253/CRPT-115hrpt253.pdf>; and S. 115–282, 115th Cong. (2017), <https://www.congress.gov/115/crpt/srpt282/CRPT-115srpt282.pdf>.

“ins” of society; (3) execution of aid is viewed as imperialistic and self-serving; (4) aid is ineffective in meeting LATAM goals; and (5) support is provided to authoritarian governments. The resultant anti-U.S. sentiment weakens inter-American relations and may drive the region to rival actors for support.

It is important to note some additional findings: *First*, many of the damaging conditions can be countered by increasing awareness of U.S. policy and program effects. *Second*, short-term gains from employing aid as a hard power tool often produce long-term resentment in LATAM. It is counter to the soft power impact of aid which produces goodwill. *Third*, where aid may lead to influence among certain actors, it can simultaneously damage influence among opposing groups. *Lastly*, influence is shaped by a multitude of factors in addition to aid. Diplomatic activity, military action, trade, historical relations, and changing political, economic, and societal settings all contribute.

B. SOURCE LIMITATIONS

The aim of this thesis was to discover broad trends which explained the relationship between aid and influence. Although the intended goal was reached, it was not without limitations. For one, I relied heavily on the statements of U.S. officials involved in the respective aid programs. On several occasions, these proved extremely useful. Yet, they could not always be taken at face-value. For example, findings presented to Congress were carefully scrutinized. Advocates habitually praised programs to secure funding, often leaving out unfavorable facts. On the other hand, critics were often not acquainted with the programs or even with LATAM. Additionally, I intended to combine U.S. findings with similar commentary from LATAM officials, but this was not always possible. This was due to lack of access to LATAM’s primary sources. In order to combat these limits, a broad array of sources were used to provide objective findings.

C. FUTURE RESEARCH

The hope is that this thesis will catalyze more expansive research. The lack of literature covering the impact of U.S. aid on influence is surprising. This can be studied in much more detail. Suggested areas include other aid programs employed in LATAM as-a-whole, or considering impacts in specific countries. Also, particular types of aid can be

broken out and studied individually. Economic, technical, and military aid are all distinct in their application and effects. Of course, this is not limited to LATAM. This relationship should be explored in other regions. Moreover, bearing in mind the importance of GPC, applying these findings to China's foreign aid endeavors would also be beneficial for those looking at China's influence.

Even more astounding is the scarcity of literature on U.S. influence in general. Future studies should explore this phenomenon in greater detail. More specifically, they should discuss how influence is affected by other U.S. activities abroad. I suggest probing the impact of other instruments of foreign policy (i.e., government diplomacy, public diplomacy, trade, and military action). This thesis identified several other factors which contribute to shifts in influence. These are all potential avenues for later research.

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