



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**A GREATER PERSPECTIVE IN EXAMINING
MILITARY-SECURITY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL**

by

Evan B. Singleton

March 2020

Co-Advisors:

Cristiana Matei
Christopher N. Darnton

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE March 2020	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A GREATER PERSPECTIVE IN EXAMINING MILITARY-SECURITY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Evan B. Singleton				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis explores specific conditions that may indicate a change in military-security relations between Brazil and the United States. Those conditions include Brazil's economic growth, both countries' leadership decisions on foreign policy, and Brazil's involvement in international security institutions. While one condition alone may not lead toward a definitive sign indicating future change of military-security relations, a great deal of these conditions collectively appear to show a framework of how to best forecast a potential change in military-security relations. Using these conditions, as researched between the United States and Brazil, as an initial focus with other emerging countries will enable policymakers to perhaps have a more effective way to develop greater military-security relations in order to facilitate greater cohesion and efforts to achieve global security.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Brazil, military, security cooperation, United States			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 119	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

**A GREATER PERSPECTIVE IN EXAMINING MILITARY-SECURITY
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL**

Evan B. Singleton
Lieutenant, United States Navy
BSBA, Aquinas College, 2010

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(WESTERN HEMISPHERE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2020**

Approved by: Cristiana Matei
Co-Advisor

Christopher N. Darnton
Co-Advisor

Afshon P. Ostovar
Associate Chair for Research
Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores specific conditions that may indicate a change in military-security relations between Brazil and the United States. Those conditions include Brazil's economic growth, both countries' leadership decisions on foreign policy, and Brazil's involvement in international security institutions. While one condition alone may not lead toward a definitive sign indicating future change of military-security relations, a great deal of these conditions collectively appear to show a framework of how to best forecast a potential change in military-security relations. Using these conditions, as researched between the United States and Brazil, as an initial focus with other emerging countries will enable policymakers to perhaps have a more effective way to develop greater military-security relations in order to facilitate greater cohesion and efforts to achieve global security.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION.....	1
B.	SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION.....	2
C.	LITERATURE REVIEW	3
1.	Peace Operations.....	4
2.	Economic Development and Relevance to Military- Security Relations	8
3.	Foreign Policy of the Executive Leadership	11
D.	POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES	13
E.	RESEARCH DESIGN.....	16
F.	THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE.....	18
 II.	 HOW DOES BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INDICATE CHANGE IN MILITARY-SECURITY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES?.....	 19
A.	BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: FROM 1980s DEBT CRISIS TO EMERGING WORLD LEADER BY THE 2000s.....	19
1.	How Brazilian Economic Growth and Soft Power Translates into Hard Power	21
2.	Brazil Establishing Itself within the International Forum.....	23
B.	BRAZIL’S MILITARY SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH.....	25
C.	BRAZIL’S CHANGING SECURITY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES.....	31
D.	BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE OF UNITAS	32
E.	CONCLUSION	34
 III.	 LEADERSHIP AS AN INDICATOR OF CHANGE IN MILITARY- SECURITY RELATIONS	 37
A.	PRESIDENTS AND FOREIGN POLICY	38
1.	Leadership and Legacy of Foreign Policy	39
2.	Autonomy in Leadership to Influence Foreign Policy.....	41
3.	Leadership Characteristics	42
B.	PRESIDENT COMPARISON.....	43
1.	President George H. W. Bush (1989–1993)	43
2.	President William J. Clinton (1994–2000).....	48
3.	GEORGE W. BUSH (2001–2008)	51

4.	Barack Obama (2009–2016).....	56
C.	CONCLUSION	60
IV.	HOW DOES BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE OPERATIONS THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN STATES INDICATE A CHANGE IN MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES?	63
A.	BACKGROUND ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL.....	63
B.	BACKGROUND ON THE OAS.....	67
C.	A U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON PEACE OPERATIONS	69
D.	THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNSC	70
E.	BRAZIL AND THE UNSC	71
1.	Deeper Review of Brazil and the UNSC	74
2.	Brazil’s Effort to Become an Official Member of the UNSC.....	76
F.	BRAZIL, THE UNITED STATES, AND UNSC PEACE OPERATIONS	78
1.	1990–2000 Observations.....	79
2.	2000–2010 Observations.....	81
3.	2010–2016 Observations.....	82
G.	BRAZIL AND UNITED STATES OPERATING WITHIN THE OAS	84
H.	ANALYSIS	86
1.	On Involvement with the UNSC	86
2.	On Involvement with the OAS.....	87
I.	CONCLUSION	88
V.	CONCLUSION	89
A.	FINDINGS	90
1.	Hypothesis One: Findings and Remarks	90
2.	Hypothesis Two: Findings and Remarks.....	91
3.	Hypothesis Three: Findings and Remarks	92
B.	BRAZIL, UNITED STATES, AND GREAT POWER COMPETITION	93
C.	FURTHER RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS	95
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	97
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	105

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement between the United States and Brazil 2000–2016	27
Figure 2.	GDP per Capita of Brazil 1990–2017	28
Figure 3.	Brazil’s Military Expenditure	30
Figure 4.	Official Letter from President Clinton to Franco Provided by U.S. Department of State	46
Figure 5.	Absences Taken by Brazilian Presidents	55
Figure 6.	Peace Operations from 2008–2017 by Organization Provided by SIPRI.....	66
Figure 7.	OAS Peace Missions from 1990 to Present	68
Figure 8.	A Chronological Order of Brazilian Involvement in UNSC Peace Missions	75

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my advisors, Dr. Darnton and Dr. Matei, for their guidance and support in the development of this thesis. Also, I would like to thank Mr. Thomas from the Graduate Writing Center for his guidance and ability to direct my thoughts and writing toward the development of this thesis. I would also like to thank my previous commanding officers for recommending me to participate in the Naval Postgraduate School program of security studies. Finally, I would like to thank my wife for supporting me personally throughout this endeavor.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States and Brazil, one a global power and the other an emerging power, have historically been intertwined in international discussions of economic influence, decisions made by their leaders on foreign policy, or their involvement in global peace initiatives. Brazil, as the largest country in both land mass and population in Latin America, can wield unwavering influence regionally by its evolving consumer demand as well as sustainment through newly explored biotechnology and crude oil reserves. Internationally, Brazil's aspirational agenda to become another global power appears to offer the United States an opportunity to engage in more complex environments. One complex environment involves the military-to-military security relations, as an extension of both countries' political agenda, where Brazil shows a multifaceted effort to enhance its legitimacy to achieve a near-peer relation with United States through enduring attempts at permanent membership in the United Nations. Brazil's economic development has also been complex; efforts in the 21st century to join and influence global institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the association between Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), as well a multitude of other bilateral trade agreements, have facilitated growing interest globally. For Brazil, impactful decisions by its presidential leadership on involvement in peace operations and economic development policies have been criticized and materialized by coinciding leadership in Washington and are areas to be explored further. Given that these relationships have historical importance going back to World War II it is important to have a greater understanding of how to gauge the dynamics of military security relations between the two.

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

What factors explain change in military security relations between the United States and Brazil? This thesis is only concerned with security cooperation between both countries' military forces and excludes any agencies not directly involved with military activity. This thesis will cover the timeframe from President George H. W. Bush and Collor de Mello in 1990 to the end of the Obama and Rousseff presidencies in 2016. The research is structured

to understanding how changes in military relations between the United States and Brazil are influenced by Brazil's economic development, peace operations conducted by both countries, and leadership decisions in foreign policy.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The history between the United States and Brazil in military relations is one that's rooted heavily in realism.¹ The United States initially developed raw military power and partnerships with Brazil with the foresight of being a leader in great power competition globally and defending the western hemisphere from global threat.² This research is relevant to the political and military leadership of both countries as it provides an understanding of how military relations can be strengthened and why ambitious attempts in the past three decades may have fallen short. Historical context shows that a pattern of relations between both countries has ebbed and flowed in the amount of intensity or moderation of global interaction both from the Cold War and debt crisis.³ The amount of engagement and relations developed by both the United States and Brazil is seemingly affected by domestic and national development as well as the creation of foreign policy that is decided upon by leadership of both countries. History has shown that relationships among countries are considered indispensable. A nation's agenda of national security can often become a decision of isolation or autonomy.

The United States sent a group of naval officers to Brazil in 1914 to assist the War College in the development and expansion of the Brazilian Navy.⁴ Why not lend an Army officer? The understanding of sea power being relevant, as Roosevelt's White Fleet showed the world, underscores how strategically important Brazilian military relations are in the

¹ Realism: This concept is referring to one of three international relations paradigms and promoted by scholars like Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbs, and Carl Von Clausewitz. Another follower of realism ideals, though, been described as a neorealist, is Kenneth Waltz. Realism and neorealism refer to the international level of analysis and how a nation's decisions are made in context to how they will affect or are affected by other nations.

² Sonny B. Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms: Brazil-United States Military Relations, 1945–1977* (Boulder, CO: University Press of Colorado, 1996), 1–19.

³ Joseph Smith, *Brazil and the United States - Convergence and Divergence* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2010), 1–6.

⁴ Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, 1–19.

eyes of the United States. Leaders in foreign policy and military strategy in the early 20th century sought ways to bolster security within the hemisphere by choosing to establish relations with Brazil and doing so resulted in stronger ties before and during World War II.⁵ Today, a focus on Great Power Competition (GPC) is again being developed among political and military leadership within the United States as well as the need to revisit ways each country can strengthen military relations.⁶ In this connection, this thesis is relevant because similar to the military ties that were expedited between the United States and Brazil at the beginning of World War II, we may again see a similar occurrence during today's great power competition of global hegemony.

Since sea travel and air travel have been continuously developed and improved upon, the distance between great powers has shrunk considerably. Previously, a World War II strategist looked at the importance of Brazil's size, geographical location, and population to be an imperative asset to other superpowers outside of the hemisphere. Given the great power competition that the United States, Russia, and China are in once again, the time is ripe for renewed interest and relation with Brazil.⁷ This investigation aspires to shed light on how the relations can be influenced in the future and how the past three decades may have provided a best choice for both countries' leadership to follow.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature shows that military-security relations can be broken down thematically into three areas, or indicators, which might explain the occurrence of changing relations between the United States and Latin America, to include Brazil. These indicators are: countries' involvement in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Organization of the American States (OAS) peace operations, economic development, and foreign policy decisions by countries leadership.

⁵ Davis, 1–19.

⁶ David A. Lake, "Economic Openness and Great Power Competition: Lessons for China and the United States," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2018): 237–270, <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poy010>. Lake notes that historically, Great Power Competition as being a rivalry among global leaders in economic influence over zones and spheres around the globe.

⁷ Davis, A Brotherhood of Arms, 1–19.

1. Peace Operations

The first indicator that affects military security relations that scholars agree on is the action taken in peace operations at the international and regional level by Brazil.⁸ Historically, this indicator, according to scholars Britta Crandall, Abraham F. Lowenthal, and Monica Hirst primarily includes the Cold War and the spread of communism which had brought a desire from the United States to strengthen Latin American countries both politically as well as militarily.⁹ Early efforts post-World War II were made by countries in Latin America to gain United States resources to modernize their military especially Brazil, say authors Sonny Davis and Monica Hirst.¹⁰ Additionally, Hirst acknowledges the lasting effect of World War II and Cold War relations in which an implicit ideology or view of Americans that was left in the minds of Brazilians was most prominent in mutual relations.¹¹ She continues in her work titled *The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*, emphasizing the outcome of peace operations toward global conflicts had resulted in building alliances as far back as World War II.¹² She also explains the lasting effect in views of Brazilians as a result of how America, post-Cold War, has moved to the notion that they are the leader of all hemispheric security peace operations and that countries within this hemisphere will defer to their decision.¹³ In other words, Hirst portrays America showing itself in a paternalistic relationship to those in Latin America.¹⁴ Hirst notes the amount of military policy changes made in the '90s such as Brazil signing

⁸ David R. Mares and Harold Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power: Brazil on the Long Road to Global Influence* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 85; Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico, eds., *The United States and Latin America in the 1980s: Contending Perspectives on a Decade of Crisis* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), 596; Britta H. Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants: The Misunderstood History of U.S.-Brazilian Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011), 162; Mônica Hirst, *The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 108, 112.

⁹ Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants*, 9; Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 27–49; Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, 20–27.

¹⁰ Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, 4–8; Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, 24.

¹¹ Hirst, 20–31.

¹² Hirst, 22.

¹³ Hirst, 113.

¹⁴ Hirst, 113–15.

the Treaty on Conventional Weapons, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Anti-Land Mine Treaty, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.¹⁵ Harold Mares and Trinkunas agree with Hirst's paternalistic belief.¹⁶ Crandall notes that this paternalistic belief was met with angst during the first Gulf war when Brazil decided not to engage in the coalition's efforts and maintain a long-standing tradition of respecting sovereignty.¹⁷ Hirst also contends that Brazil's refusal to participate in the Gulf war was caused by Brazil's concern with sovereignty, which hindered closer U.S. and Brazil military-security relations.¹⁸

In this connection, scholars Mares and Trinkunas compliment Monica Hirst's view by stressing that Brazil tends to follow the United Nations' policies on authorized military interaction and has a tendency to favor soft power.¹⁹ The two authors go on by stressing that the importance of soft power and operating under multinational institutions is the policy Brazil follows vehemently in missions developed by following the United Nations under chapter six "which requires agreement by the parties in conflict before deploying a mission and specific rules limiting engagement for the troops."²⁰ Mares and Trinkunas additionally acknowledge that achieving soft power has led the primary purpose of military toward achieving two goals. One goal is the easing of influence from great powers as well as an aggrandizement of their own military presence globally through "scientific and technological development."²¹ The other goal is to become a more influencing role through international institutions such as the UN Security Council and not be in a position to adapt to decisions made on their behalf.²² These goals contradict Hirst's emphasis of Brazil's

¹⁵ Hirst, 30.

¹⁶ Mares and Trinkunas, 60.

¹⁷ Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants*, 165.

¹⁸ Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, 113.

¹⁹ Mares and Trinkunas, 87,99.

²⁰ Mares and Trinkunas, 99.

²¹ Mares and Trinkunas, 87.

²² Mares and Trinkunas, 87.

interest in developing military-security relations being a result of national interest on behalf of the United States.²³

Additionally, Mares and Trinkunas acknowledge multiple occasions where Brazil had given military personnel for peacekeeping operations (PKO) under the direction of the United Nations.²⁴ Doing so resulted in a positive light among relations to the United States as it would show that Brazil was taking a leading role in efforts to grow as a hemispheric power and could project itself abroad or within the region. Projecting itself as a more sizable force, notes Mares and Trinkunas, would essentially lessen the strain on the United States to maintain global dominance on all military affairs.²⁵ The scholars also maintain that the United States “intervention in Iraq, Libya, and Syria violate international rules.”²⁶ Brazil believes that structured organizational institutions should produce military-led engagements which are agreed by multiple parties as noted previously by Mares and Trinkunas. The United States intervention in those wars appeared to have threatened that structure. The scholars’ remarks seem to allude to the fact that Brazil enjoys having the large military power of the United States to defend against hemispheric threats that are deemed to be existential, but any threats that would improve only the interest of the United States seem to be contentious.

Over the last decade, some academics have viewed global peace operations, displayed through efforts to thwart terrorism as the premise for establishing new relations among both countries.²⁷ Mares and Trinkunas have shown a distinction in what has become to be known as “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP) by Brazil. Responsibility while Protecting is in contrast to what is widely promoted among the northern half of the western hemisphere, which is the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). Mares and Trinkunas continue by contending that consideration taken by Brazil for Responsibility while

²³ Hirst, 52.

²⁴ Mares and Trinkunas, 100.

²⁵ Mares and Trinkunas, 101.

²⁶ Mares and Trinkunas, 103.

²⁷ Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, 110; Mares and Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power*, 103.

Protecting explains the country's sidelining itself from institutionally authorized use of hard power under the auspice of following a policy of rendering security solely for those instances deemed of humanitarian necessity.²⁸

On the same note, author Britta Crandall, in *Hemispheric Giants: the Misunderstood History of U.S.-Brazilian Relations*, viewed the lack of Brazilian peace operations in the Gulf War as a "missed opportunity" in advancing military-security relations as it believed the importance of the mission was not in the country's best interest.²⁹ Crandall does note that lost opportunities in advancing relations occurred beyond the Gulf War, that during the Cold War missed opportunities over security concerns and unachieved trade agreements had influenced Brazil's decisions in joining peace operations within the United Nations.³⁰ Like Brazil's stance on participation during the Gulf War, Britta's remarks also contrast with Mares and Trinkunas as well as Hirst in their response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States by showing immediate support being influenced by the national interest of the United States.³¹ She also acknowledges that relations had fizzled away in response to President Bush's priority of terrorism.³² The fizzling of relations does align with Hirst's emphasis on Brazil being again hindered by approaching military-security relations within "multilateral boundaries" which led Brazil to again choose not to engage in Afghanistan and Iraq.³³

Another group of scholars highlight that Brazil's participation in the global war on terror remains stifled by multilateral agreements. In *The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*, Hirst has noted Brazil's decision to participate in UN

²⁸ Mares and Trinkunas, 103.; While Mares and Trinkunas acknowledge the literature that views global conflict or crisis displayed through terrorism, as the premise for establishing new relations among both countries, have shown a distinction in what has become to be known as "Responsibility while Protecting" (RwP) by Brazil. RwP is in contrast to what is widely promoted among the northern half of the western hemisphere (and the UNSC), which is the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P).

²⁹ Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants*, 165.

³⁰ Crandall, 8.

³¹ Crandall, 174.

³² Crandall, 174.

³³ Crandall, 174.

Security Council initiatives, as well as the development of the Brazilian Defense Ministry, has brought the two countries closer by means of joint military engagement and cooperation.³⁴ In contrast to Hirst remarks are comments from Hal Brands in his book, published by the Strategic Studies Institute, titled *Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy*, in which he describes unilateral actions by the United States to be a driver of divergence in relations and that greater autonomy and self-sustainment in military capability is a resulting outcome.³⁵

The authors presented held their perspectives on the connection between global conflict and relations to result in a divergence or convergence. It appears that global conflict would bring both countries to strengthen their communications over intentions and capabilities. Noted by Hirst were Brazil's rampant treaty signing and alignment with United States. Other outcomes produced a minimal transparency between both countries exemplified by Brazil's engagement with the United Nations security council, while backed by the United States, appeared to be view by the United States as taking the sideline to conflict. More importantly, it also appears that given the notion that Brazil has no significant external threats, any global conflict and interest evoked, would be that of the United States which allows Brazil to pick and choose how they want to engage.

2. Economic Development and Relevance to Military-Security Relations

Many authors believe global conflict and the bilateral or multilateral military involvement among Brazil and the United States appear to vary as a result of the economic interest of both countries.³⁶ According to Crandall, Hirst, Mares and Trinkunas where opportunities toward joint military-security relations were missed between both countries, it was the economic interaction that proved to sustain as Brazil and the rest of Latin America would need U.S. investment in overcoming debt from previous decades.³⁷ The

³⁴ Hirst, 56.

³⁵ Hal Brands, *Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy*, Strategic Studies Institute Monograph (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 11.

³⁶ Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants*, 162; Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, 58; Mares and Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power*, 90.

³⁷ Crandall, 162.

academics agree that post-Cold War priority by Brazil was internal development by minimizing debt and inflation accumulated in past decades.³⁸ Additionally, the lack of external threat to the entire western hemisphere had isolated Brazil from drawing any hemispheric pressure to become anything more than economically and politically stable.³⁹

Crandall remarked that relations during the '90s were predominately evolving around the United States economic interest among a swath of Latin American countries.⁴⁰ Interest, according to Crandall as well as Hirst, included the development and implementation of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative—a political ploy to enforce democratic consolidation within the region—as well as the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which would bring on Latin American countries bilaterally one by one.⁴¹ Crandall continues on the institutional developments as being not without conflict in that internal domestic markets were still of priority to Brazil and that arguments over trade agreements had lessons relations that were to sufficiently take the place of previous Cold War relations which emphasized security cooperation.⁴²

Monica Hirst, on economic liberalization, noted that the United States had demanded that Brazil expand their markets which were against the domestic protectionism Brazil was trying to maintain. She continues to remark that the relational economic inconsistencies were a matter of the United States misperceiving the economic stability and nationalist priorities pursued by Brazil.⁴³ The nationalistic economic interest was noted by both Crandall and Hirst as an impediment to coalition efforts in the Gulf War.⁴⁴ Indeed, as they both explain, the Gulf War was a prime example of the economic interest

³⁸ Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants*, 162–71; Mares and Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power*, 89; Tullo Vigevani and Marcelo Fernandes de Oliveira, “Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era: The Search for Autonomy through Integration,” *Latin American Perspectives* 34, no. 5 (2007): 58–80, <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0094582X07306164>.

³⁹ Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants*, 172.

⁴⁰ Crandall, 162–171.

⁴¹ Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, 36; Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants*, 162–71.

⁴² Crandall, 165.

⁴³ Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, 170.

⁴⁴ Hirst, 17; Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants*, 166.

of both countries resulting in a divergence. She further notes that at the start of the Gulf War, Iraq was one of Brazil's largest arms exporters.⁴⁵ The author also stresses that adding to the complexity is that while Brazil was still recovering from foreign debt and Iraq also owed Brazil money that could not be blocked. Ultimately, she posits the military power brought by the United States coalition proved to be enough, and Brazilian support was not needed. Given the quandary Brazil was in by selling arms to a country the United States went to war with did not help strengthen any greater ties militarily even despite the U.S. acknowledging that their only interest in Brazil was not to engage, as Crandall stresses.⁴⁶

Another argument that complements Hirst is from Roett Riordan in his book titled *The New Brazil*. Riordan delves deep into the economic interest of Brazil in which displays a divergence of relations.⁴⁷ Riordan notes that national interest of the United States toward trade had been organized, according to Brazil, as unfavorable and directed Brazil to seek a more non-U.S. trade agreement elsewhere.⁴⁸ Continuing over the significance of the United States interest in trade and the resulting divergence in relations, Riordan's work implies an understanding that those interests are to be considered a sizable factor in eliminating other relations to develop—military-security relations.⁴⁹ The interests for Brazil, noted by Riordan, are in the regional development and strengthening of trade that has trumped any interest in U.S.- developed free trade agreements.⁵⁰ He continues, by acknowledging that strengthening regional ties has resulted in less security relations by efforts of Brazil to eliminate United States security influence within Latin America.⁵¹ Riordan's comments are unique by noting how Brazil is pushing to eliminate United States

⁴⁵ Crandall, 166.

⁴⁶ Crandall, 166.

⁴⁷ Riordan Roett, *The New Brazil* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 127–48.

⁴⁸ Roett, 127–30.

⁴⁹ Roett, 141.

⁵⁰ Roett, 141.

⁵¹ Roett, 143.

presence from regional trade which has an impact to lessening security relations that may benefit Brazil domestically.⁵²

Mares and Trinkunas take a different view from Riordan in that they emphasize the importance of Brazil's development which gives them the ability or decision to be a soft power vice a hard power globally.⁵³ They note that an increase in ability to express hard power will have positive consequences in soft power and that "both previous military governments and the contemporary democratic state in Brazil perceive that development of defense industries contributes to overall national development."⁵⁴ A lot of defense spending by Brazil is given to companies that already hold a foot in other areas of development. This is similar to how the United States uses the Department of Defense to advance commercial technology and manufacturing.

3. Foreign Policy of the Executive Leadership

Extended hands of welcoming dialogue between country leaders have been a common occurrence in the post-Cold War era. Many authors note the importance of leadership in paving the way toward better relations by highlighting personal relationships between leaders that have bridged the gap of official rhetoric.⁵⁵ With regards to economic interest and global conflict an important topic that surfaces in much of the literature is around how leaders communicated their countries interest and demands as well as a genuine connection, or lack of, between leadership. Literature that emphasized Bush through Obama and Mello through Rouseff acknowledged a great deal of promising rhetoric that relations would develop as presidencies matured.⁵⁶ The level of development that those relationships took was of much debate among authors.

⁵² Roett, 127–33.

⁵³ Mares and Trinkunas, 90–93.

⁵⁴ Mares and Trinkunas, 90.

⁵⁵ Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, 14; Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants*, 162, 174; Roett, *The New Brazil*, 91.

⁵⁶ Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants*, 162–90; Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, 49–51.

Mares and Trinkunas gave great insight into the last two decades, starting from Cardoso and ending with Rouseff. Following the notion that each leader was met with constraints, Mares and Trinkunas advance that constraints both internal and external, ultimately led leaders to choose three options on how to improve Brazil.⁵⁷ One choice was to focus only on internal development and forgo hard power. Another option they note was to use the international institutions to their benefit—trade agreements, security councils, etc.⁵⁸ The last option, the two authors say, was the express overt dominance among global competitors to make initiatives to write the rules in their favor—exemplified by their insistence on earning a permanent position on the UN Security Council.⁵⁹

Crandall delves deeply into the United States position, or lack of, in foreign policy toward Brazil to be indicative of relationships being established. In contrast to Mares and Trinkunas, Crandall does not emphasize the constraints to leadership had in managing foreign policy and improving security relations. Beginning with President Mello (1990–1992) the author makes it a point to note that outside of trade discussions, no other policy interaction was established by both parties. Of the trade talks—or disputes—an in-person visit between both leaders is what brought the most productivity in terms of tangible relations of both countries over trade. Militarily, Crandall notes that a good foundation for relations was created by Mello in his insistence on Brazil halting the use of their nuclear reactors.⁶⁰ Another aspect of Crandall’s review of presidencies is the rhetoric that was commonly used by the incoming United States presidents. He reveals that commonly expressed words like those from Bush in 1990 in Brazil (“...I am here to tell you that you are not only on the right path, but the United States wants you to succeed and supports your efforts every step of the way...”) or those from Clinton in 1995 with Cardoso present (“In the months and years ahead, I look forward to working with President Cardoso to forge an

⁵⁷ Mares and Trinkunas, 59.

⁵⁸ Mares and Trinkunas, 59–83.

⁵⁹ Mares and Trinkunas, 59.

⁶⁰ Crandall, 163.

even stronger partnership between our nations and our peoples”) show patterns of presidents expressing behavior emphasizing cooperation and enhanced relations.⁶¹

Roett’s remarks on leadership were made by emphasizing a significant challenge to relations between the United States and Brazil with Silva’s attempt at international mediation of nuclear proliferation between Iran and the United States. He first notes a rise in the trade as a result of Iran and Brazil’s leadership strengthening their ties, but then gives notice to how impactful a leader’s decisions could be by showing the discourse the United States had in return and essentially affecting any stronger ties between both countries.⁶² Roett’s comments further support how policy initiatives made by leadership, while serving the national interest of their countries, can lead to a divergence in relations.

The scholars’ views have shown a trend on the impact and importance leadership decisions on foreign policy have in creating stronger or weaken relations between the United States and Brazil. Additionally, decisions by the leadership of both countries to shape their foreign policy that shows their focus toward economic development has led to advances, at times, in security relations. Ultimately, scholars appear to emphasize that leaderships decisions to grow internally had created more outcomes and opportunities for the United States and Brazil to become closer as equals, vice, Brazil remaining a subordinate as a result of its domestic realities.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The indicators (independent variables) most suitable in affecting change in military-security relations (dependent variable) between both the United States and Brazil will be explored. The use of deductive reasoning by first making a few assumptions and developing hypothesis to data is paramount to this study. The period of exploration will be during the democratization of Brazil, beginning with presidents Bush and Mello and ending with presidents Obama and Rousseff. In preliminary research, the early indicators and

⁶¹ Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants*, 163,167.

⁶² Roett, *The New Brazil*, 147.

assumptions made evolve around fluctuations in economic development, global conflict, and foreign policy pursued by leadership.

Using theory in international relations, the research will also be tested against a focused perspective in realism, specifically, the balance of power theory. This theory is displayed in the hypothesis on both indicators of global conflict and economic development. Theory rooted in realism is a display of the general findings in the field of international relations and how perceived threat and alliances created or the consequential balancing effect that result is unique to each country.⁶³ A more liberal approach, using hegemonic stability theory that addresses conflict as a driver toward cooperation, will also be taken into consideration when looking into global conflict and the dominant interest between countries.⁶⁴ More importantly, using the hegemonic stability theory may give a deeper understanding of why the United States national interest might be more influencing to relations between both countries than the interest of Brazil alone aspects of global conflict and economic development.

Finally, given the amount of power and influence leaders have in foreign policy, it is important to emphasize the constructivist view over the influence leaders have to relations between both countries. Again, it is of the conventional wisdom that an importance be given to the limitations imposed on leadership of which the decisions made to overcome those limitations can result in difference outcomes.⁶⁵ As such, leadership decisions and their impact will be taken into consideration for hypothesis three.

(1) Hypothesis One

Economic development of Brazil indicates a change in military security relations as displayed in joint operations, treaties, as well as the transfer of material power. This

⁶³ Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985): 3–43, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540>.

⁶⁴ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), Ch4-6, <https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691122489/after-hegemony>.

⁶⁵ Robert Jervis, "Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?," *Security Studies* 22, no. 2 (2013): 153–79, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.786909>.

hypothesis is heavily reliant on the literature that shows the implications of strengthening in military-security relations between both countries as a result of overall economic development of Brazil. Expressed by the scholars is the notion that Brazil will remain a subordinate power to the United States unless it can develop in which being recognized as a larger economy will bring about more attention as well as an impact in military-security relations.

(2) Hypothesis Two

Both countries' executive leadership decisions of foreign policy have led to a change in military security relations. This hypothesis is developed as a result of the reviewed literature which has shown more or less the importance of personal initiatives toward foreign policy that might have a profound impact on military-security relations overall. The basis of policy creation and implementation will be the underlying direction challenging the hypothesis developed.

(3) Hypothesis Three

Both countries' involvement in international and regional security institutions indicate a change in military security relations. Scholars reviewed have expressed the notion that post-Cold War involvement in these institutions appears to be limited in involvement by both countries, and also, that conflict involvement by both countries has come under heavy scrutiny or acceptance resulting in lasting impacts to mutual military-security relations. Theory of IR has shown that because Brazil has been a subordinate power to the United States, they would either join other countries to balance the United States global influence, or join them to achieve greater prosperity as a nation.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

First, in order to discern the presence of military-security relations between the United States and Brazil, guidelines or criteria will be established.⁶⁶ To the extent of how much involvement both the United States and Brazil engage within each area noted above will be taken into consideration among three areas of interest: economic development, global conflict, and leadership relations. Additionally, to deepen the understanding of military-security relations and security cooperation, Professor Derek Reveron of national security affairs at the War College has given remarkable insight in his book entitled *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*. Professor Reveron explains security cooperation within the United States as “all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interest, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”⁶⁷

As noted in the historical recollection of military-security relations between the United States and Brazil that the beginning of military-security relations occurred when the United States sent U.S. naval officers to engage in professional military training. That gesture by the United States was not quantifiably analyzed, but the outcome, through

⁶⁶ Gregory J. Dyekman, *Security Cooperation: A Key to the Challenges of the 21st Century* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), Preface. Those requirements to military cooperation within the security arena will be taken from the personal views and expression of Colonel Gregory J. Dyekman—United States Army—published by the Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, in that involvement will include cooperation in programs as noted: Combined/Multinational Education, Exercises, Training, and Experimentation; Counternarcotic Assistance; Counter/non-Proliferation; Defense and Military Contracts; Defense Support to Public Diplomacy; Humanitarian Assistance; Information Sharing/Intelligence Cooperation; International Armaments Cooperation; Security Assistance which includes Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Peace Operations Funding, International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Excess Defense Articles; Others include Partnerships for Peace (PfP), Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), and Warsaw Initiative Funding (WIF).

⁶⁷ Derek S. Reveron, *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 53. He continues by giving the over-arching goal of security cooperation that entails “creating favorable military balance of power...advancing areas of mutual defense or security arrangements...building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations...and preventing crisis and conflict...”

growing support, was that Brazil developed and modernized its military force, ultimately proving that in the absence of a military force in Brazil there would be no discussion on military-security relations. Looking through the lens of inductive reasoning, in that a military force in Brazil came as a result of United States engagement, evidence of relations using the criteria presented above in defining security cooperation are that it was military-security relations that had occurred between both countries. The definitions provided, along with an explanatory elaboration on what are military-security relations, will be used when reviewing data going further.

The literature suggests economic development in Brazil will bring military modernization and an increased ability to project soft and hard power.⁶⁸ The research, between both countries from 1991 to 2016, will be on overall economic development and how it has or has not materialized into security cooperation between both countries. Various means of data on economic development will be sought out with heavy emphasis on GDP and military expenditures. In other words, will a change in prosperity of both countries affect military development and result in security cooperation?

Using Derek Reveron's theoretical framework, global conflict will be analyzed with the United States involvement as a benchmark.⁶⁹ Additionally, to support the legitimacy of the conflict pursued by the United States and their multilateral military engagements, the conflict approval ratings in the United States will be noted. Brazil's participation, in military security relations as described by Reveron or Dykeman, will also be noted. This analysis will allow the research to show if military-security relations between both countries are influenced by global conflict.

Lastly, leadership relations will be measured by the cooperation that came as result of the foreign policy each leader pursued. The research will look for variations in foreign policy initiatives between both countries expressed by the leadership and if they metricized into an improvement in military relations and security cooperation. Research will delve

⁶⁸ Mares and Trinkunas, 90.

⁶⁹ Reveron, *Exporting Security*, 53. Remarks by Reveron are continuously showing that national interest of the United States is the first priority and that any military-security relations that develop will be in addition to those interest.

into each country's perceptions of policy leaders have created as well as their senior staff members through primary sources. Additionally, a compare and contrast of different presidential terms and the foreign policy they projected and implemented will be reviewed. Noted definitions on security cooperation by Professor Reveron implicate official visits by senior leadership to be a display of relation and therefore official visits by senior military staff and their outcomes will also be reviewed as well.⁷⁰

F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter I, as the intro, has provided the thesis and moving parts to include: historical background on military relations between the United States and Brazil as well as prerequisite definitions. Chapter II delves into how economic development of Brazil as well as corresponding military development has indicated change in military security relations with the United States. Chapter III examines how factors that influence executive decisions in foreign policy have indicated change in military security relations. Chapter IV reviews how Brazilian and United States interaction within international and regional security apparatus has indicated change in military security relations. Chapter V, the conclusion, provides results of the analysis to the chapters presented as well as recommendations for advancing military security relations between the United States and Brazil.

⁷⁰ Reveron, 127.

II. HOW DOES BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INDICATE CHANGE IN MILITARY-SECURITY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES?

The World Bank holds that Brazil's population, since 1990, has grown fairly on pace with the United States and amassing a growth of over 50 million to 2018.⁷¹ Additionally, GDP growth in Brazil from 1990 until 2018 has doubled while the United States has roughly tripled.⁷² Categorizing Brazil's economic growth in relation to indicating a change in military cooperation with the United States, the use of the international relations framework of realism, as developed by theorists such as Kenneth Waltz and Hans Morgenthau, is employed.⁷³ In contrast to the challenging established world order by China and Russia, it appears that Brazil is approaching a mere finesse tactic in achieving soft-power gains created by diversifying its economic growth and sustainment, toward one day obtaining competitive levels of hard power and drawing interest from the United States. This chapter aims at taking ordinary observations of economic gains made by Brazil, such as GDP growth and economic policies, which have translated toward increased capacity for military development, modernization, and which ultimately has established a foundation to advance in military exercises with the United States.

A. BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: FROM 1980s DEBT CRISIS TO EMERGING WORLD LEADER BY THE 2000s

Brazil's economy has grown significantly over the past 25 years and the potential for bilateral relations, both economic and military, are growing in significance. While a focus on Brazil's engagement in new economic institutions is discussed here, it is important to keep in mind the transformative powers of economic development, and specifically a

⁷¹ "Data for Brazil, United States," World Bank Data, November 12, 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=BR-US>.

⁷² World Bank.

⁷³ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Hans Joachim Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1972).

connection of that development extending itself into spheres of military relations. Tullo Vigevani and Marcelo Fernandes de Oliveira capture the true nature of economic changes that had occurred in Brazil from the end of the Cold-War through the '90s and into the 2000s.⁷⁴ In this connection, they note that transitioning from “autonomy through distance” to “autonomy through integration” allowed Brazil to benefit more in global trade and development.⁷⁵ “Autonomy through distance,” though not definitively defined by the authors, appears to encapsulate Brazil’s foreign policy of limited involvement in global institutions as its presidential office was directed by the military regime until the late 80s.⁷⁶ They explain that “autonomy through distance” was possible due to the insistence of the military regime through the 80s on maintaining government restrictions in privatized trade while taking on significant foreign debt from investment of the United States.⁷⁷ Achieving “autonomy through integration” from 1990–2016 involved a wide array of policies undertaken by the Brazilian government, such as the privatization through liberalizing foreign investment, which shows that Brazil embraced globalization.⁷⁸ Again, the authors do not definitively define autonomy through integration, but note how Brazil’s involvement in international institutions such as the WTO (1994) and Mercosur as well as other free trade agreements (FTAs) had been a dramatic change of policies from those under the military regime and proved to be for the betterment of their society as well as relations with the United States.⁷⁹ Adopting neoliberal economic policies in the '90s, in similarity to the United States who made efforts in multilateral trade through free trade agreements, and greater involvement into global trade institutions, positioned Brazil to eventually capitalize on the commodities boom in the early 2000s. This commodities boom, brought on from Chinese economic growth, allowed Brazil to prosper as result of

⁷⁴ Vigevani and Fernandes de Oliveira, “Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era,” 58.

⁷⁵ Vigevani and Fernandes de Oliveira, 58.

⁷⁶ Vigevani and Fernandes de Oliveira, 58–62.

⁷⁷ Vigevani and Fernandes de Oliveira, 58.

⁷⁸ Vigevani and Fernandes de Oliveira, 58.

⁷⁹ Vigevani and Fernandes de Oliveira, 62–64.

its involvement in trade organizations such as the WTO and BRIC that facilitated greater trade.⁸⁰

1. How Brazilian Economic Growth and Soft Power Translates into Hard Power

While economic development may produce a larger capacity for security cooperation both bilaterally with the United States and multilaterally with international institutions, a leading theme around Brazil's initiatives to strengthen their economy is taking on more investment with surrounding countries as well as global hegemony. An inflection exists for how Brazil intended to seek economic development. First, by improving bilateral exchanges with the United States, additional security cooperation could manifest as a result of economic trade. Evidence here is shown simply by the stagnating Brazilian development of the '90s due to differences in free trade agreements and by increased bilateral agreements in the 2000s corresponding to the elevated arms transfers that steadily increased in the twenty year period between 1990 and 2001.⁸¹ Second, Brazil can continue to diversify its economic portfolio, perhaps resulting in a greater capacity for complex transfers and engagement in conducting security cooperation with the United States. Even as China has surpassed the United States in becoming Brazil's leader in exports, SIPRI data holds that from 2010 to 2016 arms transfers to have still increased steadily.⁸²

⁸⁰ Vigevani and Fernandes de Oliveira, 66–67.

⁸¹ Priscilla Yeon, *Brazil and the United States: Trade Agendas and Challenges of the Bilateral Relationship* (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2008), 2–3, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/brazil-and-the-united-states-trade-agendas-and-challenges-the-bilateral-relationship>; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 1990–2001," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed February 21, 2020, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2001–2009.," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed February 21, 2020, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php.

⁸² Carlos Pereira and João Augusto de Castro Neves, *Brazil and China: South-South Partnership or North-South Competition?* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 3, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03_brazil_china_pereira.pdf; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 1990–2001"; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2001–2009.," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2009–2016.," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed February 21, 2020, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php.

An increase in defense spending in Brazil since the military regime transitioned to a democracy in the 80s and recovery from the 1980s and early '90s debt crises have largely been a result of growing trust in civilian leadership as well as greater national wealth.⁸³ Noted by authors Mares and Trinkunas in a transcript of a speech from Defense Minister Amorim in 2013, that “Brazil’s National Defense Strategy, updated in 2012, states that the modernization of the Armed Forces is intrinsically linked to national development.”⁸⁴ Brazil’s emergence as global power is exemplified by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) real GDP long-term forecast which shows that by 2060 Brazil’s GDP growth will double completely.⁸⁵ Additionally, Trinkunas as Mares note that Brazil has comfortably been an economic leader among countries in its region while global aspirations have been limited by governing powers of global leaders.⁸⁶ The authors continue by acknowledging that by gaining access and influence over global institutions, their movement within the global economy will become less restricted or regulated.⁸⁷ When Brazil achieves goals of global influence, it appears necessary that given its size and geographic proximity to the United States, that growing military cooperation and engagement between both countries in efforts to share to burden or global security will evolve.

Delving deeper and considering a more granular explanation of the alignment in U.S. national interest with Brazilian economic development that may result in strengthening military security relations is presented. Obtaining objectivity in understanding U.S. national interest while escaping misconceptions of the capacity of military deterrence, author James Miskel of the Naval War College notes that it is presumed

⁸³ “Brazil Market Report: Executive Report,” August 22, 2019, Jane’s by IHS Markit.

⁸⁴ Mares and Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power*, 89.

⁸⁵ “Real GDP Long-Term Forecast - Brazil,” OECD Data, accessed March 10, 2020, <https://data.oecd.org/gdp/real-gdp-long-term-forecast.htm#indicator-chart>.

⁸⁶ Mares and Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power*, 171–72.

⁸⁷ Mares and Trinkunas, 170–71.

that U.S. national interest is derived from economic interest.⁸⁸ Previous interaction included a prevalence of American investment into many Latin American countries including Brazil. The investment by the United States was predominately in agricultural-based goods in which Brazil consequently became an export led economy as exemplified by their leading the world in soybean exports at 40 percent. Author Edmund Amann suggests that other areas of growth exist, in that “the names Embraer, Petrobás, and Odebrecht are fast becoming as globally recognized in their sectors as Boeing, Shell, and Bechtel.”⁸⁹ Amann continues over the importance on technology transfer as both an obstacle as well as the gateway toward further growth and relations between Brazilian multinational corporations and global hegemony.⁹⁰ Therefore, Brazil’s limitations of economic flexibility appear to dampen efforts to improve technology and weapon’s modernization making them incomparable to other great powers. Even more so, while these obstacles are present in the Brazilian defense sector, any defense contracts and growing military relations with the United States appear to be equally limited as technology transfer restrictions remain in place by the United States.⁹¹

2. Brazil Establishing Itself within the International Forum

Luiz Pereira and Carlos Bresser noted that “In development economics, the failure of the ‘big push’ industrialization theories, which were behind the dominant import substitution model of industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s, gave rise in the 1970s to an export-led, market-oriented theory of growth, whose basic tenets were privatization and trade liberalization.”⁹² While the 80s were overrun with debt as a result of state-run industry, heavy subsidization, and external investment, some scholarship has cast this

⁸⁸ James F. Miskel, “‘Being There’ Matters--But Where? [Military Forward Presence],” *Naval War College Review* 54, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 26, <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss3/3/>.

⁸⁹ Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, *Brazil as an Economic Superpower?: Understanding Brazil’s Changing Role in the Global Economy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 187.

⁹⁰ Brainard and Martinez-Diaz, 188.

⁹¹ Mares and Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power*, 90–92.

⁹² Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, *Economic Crisis and State Reform in Brazil: Toward a New Interpretation of Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 39–40.

decade as the “lost decade” in economic growth as inflation soared and GDP declined.⁹³ This “lost decade” came as result of government strategies that included import substitution and outside barrowing as well as large investments in public spending.⁹⁴ To counter these previous strategies, gaining access into organizations such as the WTO, the G20, as well as the newly formed association of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) that has recognized Brazil “as one of the four very large, rapidly emerging economies that are key growth engines of the global economy” proved to be an advantage.⁹⁵ Gaining access to these institutions appears to allow Brazil to grow not only its soft power through economic development, but also receive the prestige that surrounds the membership of these global institutions which might be necessary to achieve its long-time goal of becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.⁹⁶

The economic development achieved by Brazil, that has placed it in the same arena or size as other BRIC nations, should not include an aspiration for world dominance given the polar opposite political environment of which Brazil has grown their economy—a democracy. Noted by Pereira, on the fall of the authoritarian regime to have come as a result of economic calamity⁹⁷ and the resulting push toward democratization shows a large difference in authoritarian regimes among other BRICS—China and Russia—who have held on to their government structures that have led them toward a Cold War with Russia and now the GPC with both countries. This democratization or the preservation of it during major financial crises of the late 80s and ‘90s may be the most important factor coupled with economic development that results in Brazil not being discussed as a threat in Great Power Competition (GPC) that the United States has embarked upon against China and Russia and affords Brazil an opening to strengthen ties with the United States as they gain

⁹³ Brainard and Martinez-Diaz, *Brazil as an Economic Superpower?*, 2.

⁹⁴ Brainard and Martinez-Diaz, 6.

⁹⁵ Brainard and Martinez-Diaz, 1.

⁹⁶ Mares and Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power*, 2.; The authors remark that Brazil has led all non-permanent seat members in participation in UN activity and by gaining permanent membership to the UNSC will it allow Brazil greater control over the influence that great powers within the institution impose upon them.

⁹⁷ Pereira, *Economic Crisis and State Reform in Brazil*, 119.

greater access to the international forum. There might also be the notion that Brazil's involvement in the GPC debate is limited purely on the grounds of their combined incompatible soft and hard power that produces no concrete threat to global powers. While economic development in other BRICS nations has opened new markets for Brazil and fueled its growth, Brazil's infatuation with restructuring the global economic institutions such as the WTO and UNSC has increased as well.⁹⁸ Thankfully, values of democracy holding firmly in place within the Brazilian political society have not resulted in the use of its economic development or soft power as a leverage to gain access to global institutions.

Given that Brazilian economic development through globalization has occurred, going further the intention is to provide how that development displays an indication of changing bilateral military security cooperation with the United States. While the United States has emphasized that the spread of democracy in Latin America has resulted in regional stability, it has become more appropriate to believe that the spread of security cooperation efforts has become equally stabilizing, and more importantly, has facilitated increased economic development throughout the region.⁹⁹ A survey conducted in 2014, on the United States support for other countries, displayed a near unanimous agreement at 83 percent.¹⁰⁰ This survey, which was noted by Derek Reveron, acknowledges that "strong U.S. leadership in the world is desirable, so there is broad support for the indirect approach of assisting other countries."¹⁰¹

B. BRAZIL'S MILITARY SPENDING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Reveron has implicated an importance of data gathered by the state department, specifically the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, on how important it is that the money provided to our allies for military enhancement aligns with U.S. national interest. This data source, as noted by Reveron, displays key facts and figures in how we "manage capabilities of friends, allies, and coalition partners and to ensure that the transfer of US-origin defense

⁹⁸ Brainard and Martinez-Diaz, *Brazil as an Economic Superpower?*, 3.

⁹⁹ Reveron, *Exporting Security*, xi.

¹⁰⁰ Reveron, 121.

¹⁰¹ Reveron, 121.

equipment and technology supports U.S. national security interest.”¹⁰² In other words, the United States has invested more into military security relations with Brazil as a result of growing U.S. interest throughout the region.

Data provided in Figure 2 attempts to bring together Brazil’s economic growth in relation to the United States engagement in security cooperation since the 2000s (see Figure 1). As displayed, the Brazilian GDP growth in Figure 2 falls nicely in line with the cooperation accomplished by both the DOD and DoS, displayed in Figure 1. Unfortunately, despite significant economic growth in the early 2000s and limited U.S. interest in the region, Brazil’s military force and war industry have remained unable to achieve the level of technological modernization in through cooperation they desire.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Reveron, 124.

¹⁰³ Mares and Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power*, 102.




Figure 1. Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement between the United States and Brazil 2000–2016¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁴ Adapted from U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest,” Government, U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action, Accessed February 21, 2020, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/index.htm>.



Figure 2. GDP per Capita of Brazil 1990–2017¹⁰⁵

Reveron also says the importance of coalition led military engagements, he says that “security cooperation is the way to develop other people’s armies.”¹⁰⁶ In managing expectations for the outcomes of security cooperation with Brazil, historically, Brazilian military engagement with the United States was purely an effort to modernize and expand both military and economic capability.¹⁰⁷ On that premise, along with the fact that Brazil political stability in democracy has weathered two major financial crises—’80s and ’90s

¹⁰⁵ Source: World Bank, “GDP (Current US\$) - Brazil,” accessed February 21, 2020, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=BR>.

¹⁰⁶ Reveron, 22.

¹⁰⁷ Davis, *A Brotherhood of Arms*, Ch 1.

domestic debt crises and late 2000s in the United States—by doing so, it was allowed to decide when and how security cooperation would transpire.

Finding a way to grow the Brazilian economy without the prevalence of U.S. investment appeared to be another point of contention that hindered greater security cooperation between both countries. Author Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira contends that the Cardoso administration was viewed by Brazilians to align with the United States interest on more economic matters than developing new levels of autonomy and divergence.¹⁰⁸ He continues to note that officials in Washington knew that, in a very subtle way, the Brazilian government was shifting positions on that alignment toward initiatives to become a regional hegemon among Latin American countries and increasing partnerships with those of the south.¹⁰⁹ Views on becoming a regional hegemon also aligned with Vigevani and Oliveira’s idea of “autonomy through integration,” except instead of integrating with the United States with other major economies, Brazil strengthened its alignment regionally through Mercosul. Mercosul developed as a response to Brazil being left out of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) established by Washington in the ’90s.¹¹⁰ This arrangement of the FTAA was widely viewed by Brazilians, as Bandeira quotes President Silva, saying it “isn’t really a free-trade pact. Rather, it’s a policy of annexation of Latin America by the United States.”¹¹¹

The autonomy in economic development sought by Brazil shows a relation to its view toward global economic institutions in that Brazil intends to have a diversified portfolio eliminating the prevalence of any one global hegemon from influencing them, especially United States. That economic development, created without a tie to the United States, is part of a larger plan to build soft power that shows potential for translating into hard power—military power. Noted from the World Bank is Brazil’s military expenditure as a percentage of their GDP from 1990 to 2016 (see Figure 3).

¹⁰⁸ Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, “Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations with the United States,” *Latin American Perspectives* 33, no. 3 (2006): 20–24, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X06287338>.

¹⁰⁹ Bandeira, 20–24.

¹¹⁰ Bandeira, 24.

¹¹¹ Bandeira, 24.

Military expenditure (current USD) - Brazil

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.

License : Use and distribution of these data are subject to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) terms and co



Figure 3. Brazil's Military Expenditure¹¹²

In this graph it appears that overall spending is up, which would also show a relation to Figure 1, as with a growing economy it could be expected that more money would be allocated toward the military. Bandeira also notes that Brazil's ability to strengthen ties with the other regional countries through Mercosul does increase its diversity in economic development as well as soft power needed to gain access to global institutions such as the UN Security Council.¹¹³ It appears that the access to institutions that Bandeira emphasizes bring about major decision of whether the United States intends to use this as an opportunity to welcome Brazil into international security cooperatives or obscure any

¹¹² Source: "Military Expenditure (Current USD) - Brazil," World Bank, accessed October 21, 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?locations=BR>.

¹¹³ Bandeira, "Brazil as a Regional Power," 24.

attempts,¹¹⁴ the former being in the best interest of both countries. A first step toward welcoming Brazil to the international security cooperative, and enhance its soft power and legitimacy, would entail assisting them in weapons modernization. Doing so may lead to a greater capacity in Brazil's international security initiatives alongside the United States.

C. BRAZIL'S CHANGING SECURITY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Given Brazil's economic development and the data on increasing security cooperation shown previously, it is fairly evident that any economic development created would transpire into a larger interest by the United States to improve relations with Brazil. From information presented by the Wilson Center on Brazil-U.S. military relations dating from 1942, was that from 1978 to 2010 "U.S-Brazil defense cooperation remained in place without a framework agreement. During most years, both countries conducted terrestrial and naval exercises..."¹¹⁵ Naval exercises consisted of UNITAS, which is the longest standing exercises conducted by the United States in Latin American since 1959, which although has inconsistent data on participation among countries appears to hold Brazil as a continual participant through many reports submitted by the United States Navy.¹¹⁶ The Wilson Center notes that in 2010 both countries signed an agreement that was "a broad treaty defining the rules for cooperation, and General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)" which ultimately led to the United States accepting placement of a Senior Brazilian Military within the Army South command structure.¹¹⁷ Unfortunately, this agreement was not viewed by Brazilian policymakers as a substantial gesture of strengthening military relations but just another way the United States is establishing hegemony.

¹¹⁴ Bandeira, 21.

¹¹⁵ "Brazil-U.S. Defense Cooperation," Brazil-U.S. Relations, April 22, 2019, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/brazil-us-defense-cooperation>.

¹¹⁶ Carol McKenzie, "UNITAS Atlantic 2015 to Begin in Brazil," Navy News Service, November 13, 2015, https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=91995.

¹¹⁷ Wilson Center-Brazil Institute, "Brazil-U.S. Defense Cooperation."

Fast-forward to the early 2000s, it appears that seeing emphasis toward modernization in the 70s by Brazil has largely remained. As the country has grown in size economically it is likely that participation in these bilateral exercises will only bring about more and more advances in tactics and weaponry. *A Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, one hundred sixth congress*, conducted in June of 2000, gave insight into how advanced capabilities are shared in which “Raytheon’s SIVAM Amazon Monitoring System Project, which will help Brazil improve its control over its territory, including air space, to better combat narcotrafficking in the Amazon region.”¹¹⁸ Again, on UNITAS, improvements on exercise planning and execution have largely included the efforts and knowledge of the United States in developing realistic targeting.

D. BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE OF UNITAS

A widely accepted gesture of strengthening relations, established since 1959, is the UNITAS exercise, which has a longstanding history of building the relations between the United States and South America. UNITAS allows countries the opportunity to take the lead on planning, organizing, and executing various strategic, operational, and tactical events by facilitating military training environments welcoming all participants. This facilitation includes convention space and planning rooms, access to ports and detailed maritime information including shipping traffic and zones available for naval exercises. This event allows the United States and Latin American senior military level planners an opportunity to gain a full-picture overview of the event from start to finish. Operational and tactical leaders also meet within the country that facilitates the exercises, including battle group commanders down to unit level commanders. So mutual engagement in this exercise, specifically between the United States and Brazil, serves as another way of exemplifying changes in military relations.

¹¹⁸ U.S. Congress. House., U.S. Relations with Brazil: Strategic Partners or Regional Competitors?: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., July 26, 2000, 4.

Over the last decade, Brazil has led the way in maintaining a close connection with U.S. military leaders as they insisted that the bilateral exercise evolve over time. Emphasizing the need to push the evolution of the exercise, as noted in a commemorative booklet released by U.S. Southern Command in 2009, “the Brazilian Navy proposed redirecting UNITAS operations to encompass a broader range of modern naval warfare missions and to incorporate greater realism into the exercise.”¹¹⁹ This proposal by Brazil appears to have a much larger implication than meets the eye as an early signal showing an importance to developing and obtaining a highly modernized and effective military. This proposal also shows an effort by Brazil to gain legitimacy and relevance as another way of achieving new defense agreements and getting closer to permanent membership on the UNSC. Additionally, the publication notes that other Latin American countries were excitingly responsive to the proposal and full endorsement was reciprocated by even the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations.¹²⁰ This evolution included the involvement of nuclear attack submarines as well as destroyer squadron commanders and an early workup co-opt that included officers from participating countries to plan the exercises and ultimately increasing a knowledge base throughout Latin America.¹²¹

Southern Command publication on latest efforts of UNITAS mentions that the United States has developed and delivered drone vessels to the exercises which have significantly improved partner nation’s ability to deter small boat threats that would otherwise have left their navy vulnerable to non-state actors. Born primarily from terrorist threats that had affected the USS Cole bombing as well as others, additional innovations include the SDST which was delivered in UNITAS 2002. SDST “consisted of a remote-controlled personal watercraft, operated through a data link system.”¹²² Growing involvement in technology and modernization by the United States was transferred into an expansion of UNITAS into three geographic categories which include the Pacific, Atlantic,

¹¹⁹ U.S. Southern Command, *UNITAS 50: A History of Naval Cooperation* (Miami, FL: U.S. Southern Command, 2009), 41.

¹²⁰ U.S. Southern Command, *UNITAS 50*.

¹²¹ U.S. Southern Command, 45.

¹²² U.S. Southern Command, 111.

and the Caribbean as well as developing amphibious focused exercises.¹²³ After the expansion, Brazil appears to take the leading role in the Atlantic phase as they have hosted numerous events.¹²⁴ Overall, growing participation by Brazil through general numbers of ships and personnel as well as modernized warfare capacity used during UNITAS by Brazil appears to develop alongside their economy. Brazil's economic development affects its ability to maintain, train, and equip their forces, therefore affecting its ability to participate in UNITAS.

Aiding the argument in economic development indicating more or less opportunities in security cooperation between both countries is from the Subcommittee hearing discussed previously. Mentioned by the committee was that "Brazil's increasing economic and political integration into global and hemispheric affairs has created common U.S. and Brazilian interest on a range of regional and multilateral issues and led to a new era of bilateral cooperation."¹²⁵ Noted later in the excerpt by Linda H. Eddlemen, is the close mirroring of economic ties to security ties between both countries.¹²⁶ This link signifies the importance of not only a growing Brazilian economy, but also that the United States maintains a close partnership at every step of the way which can ensure that interest, specifically those of security, remain tightly bound. This partnership also allows for greater projection to other great power competitors, such as China and Russia, that the United States and Brazil are aligned.

E. CONCLUSION

It appears in reviewing the Brazilian economic profile as well as its historical changes made by its government to liberalize and globalize, a growing capacity for military security engagement has occurred. While other factors may contribute to displaying indications of change in military relations, factors such as such preferred foreign policy decisions by presidents, or even the changing security environment both regionally as well

¹²³ U.S. Southern Command, *UNITAS 50*.

¹²⁴ U.S. Southern Command.

¹²⁵ U.S. Congress. House., 4.

¹²⁶ U.S. Congress. House., 43.

as globally, Brazil's capacity to participate and improve military relations appears to revolve around their economic development. Additionally, engaging in international economic institutions such as the WTO and Mercosul also appears reinforce the demand for establishing greater security collaboration and efforts while Brazil's leading role in international exercises such as UNITAS show implications of that they are willing to mutually engage in greater complex military involvement with the United States.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. LEADERSHIP AS AN INDICATOR OF CHANGE IN MILITARY-SECURITY RELATIONS

As Brazil is looking to continue its growth economically, by joining international organizations such as the WTO and BRICS, a pivot in this chapter is directed toward observations of the executive power and foreign policy decisions by both countries leaders. As noted in Chapter II Brazilian economic growth indicated new opportunities for advancing security relation through its economic development, additionally presidential options to influence foreign policy had also changed. Brazilian presidents prior to the 1990s had only been concerned with their domestic economic agenda but as a result of globalization through commerce increasing their soft power, presidents were afforded the opportunity to look beyond their territory and truly express new initiatives in foreign policy with other countries, specifically the United States. The diplomatic interaction that occurred had risen significantly from what had taken place during Brazil's military regime as well as the first decade of democratization. Another significant change in decisions of foreign policy made by Brazil was from the military regime (1964–1985) and first half decade of democratizing (1985–1990) with the control of foreign policy by the bureaucratic administration being handed over to the presidents.¹²⁷ Foreign policy concerns for U.S. presidents during the Cold War largely encompassed the use of containment of the USSR and preventing the spread of communism. Post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy interest was similar to that of the post military regime led Brazil, in that foreign policy interest had significantly expanded. This expansion had perhaps rejuvenated new dialogue with Latin American countries, specifically Brazil.

Similar to the time periods that were covered in the discussion of economic development, presidential terms of both sides will be reviewed between 1990–2016. The first pairing will be between President George H. W. Bush (1989–1993) and Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–1992) as well as Itamar Franco (1992–1995), followed by Bill Clinton (1993–2001) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2003) finishing the '90s. The

¹²⁷ Michael Reid, *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 100.

early 2000s will review decisions made by George W. Bush Jr. (2001–2009) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2011) while continuing on with Barack Obama (2009–2016) and both Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016). Additionally, surrounding the coverage from president to president is the notion that the United States security interests have largely been directed in regions for fairly specific reasons as exemplified by the GWOT and the United States interests in South and Central Asia as well as the Middle East in support of operation Iraq Freedom that has gone on since 2001.¹²⁸ Understanding the U.S. security interest in Latin America in the 21st century, author Emil Coletta wrote in the *Security Assistance Monitor* that United States distribution of security assistance within the Western Hemisphere since early 2000s is primarily focused on “transnational security interest.”¹²⁹

A. PRESIDENTS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Presidents only have so much power to achieve aspirations of economic development as well as military growth and modernization. Largely based on the economic development and stability, especially by Brazil, are presidents afforded the luxury of engaging more or less on the international forum. Viewing domestic political gain as a basis for improving security cooperation, as Coletta notes, over the last 20 years Latin America as a whole has not seen a significant fluctuation in their importance to U.S. security interest which leaves room to speculate over the ability of American presidents to revive relations from term to term.¹³⁰ While there appears to be a consistency of limited interest in security cooperation in Latin America as a whole, decisions made or relationships gained by leaders of both countries appear to have far-reaching impacts on military security relations.

Derek Reveron opens his book regarding changes in foreign policy of the United States by noting that the change in foreign policy came as a result of instability created by

¹²⁸ Emily Coletta, “Then and Now: Distribution of U.S. Security Assistance in the 21st Century,” *Security Assistance Monitor* (blog), October 23, 2019, <http://www.securityassistance.org/blog/then-and-now-distribution-us-security-assistance-21st-century>.

¹²⁹ Coletta.

¹³⁰ Coletta.

global hegemons as well as domestic disputes within the developing world.¹³¹ He continues by acknowledging a drastic change to combat that volatility by saying “In an effort to reach for peace, the United States responds to foreign policy crises like these not by sending combat forces to confront aggression, but instead by sending weapons, trainers, and advisors to help other countries tackle their security deficits.”¹³² Understanding this change in foreign policy with regards to military to military engagement and cooperation it may be significant to note that presidents in the '90s and those in the 2000s were given a different set of circumstances in security concerns that resulted in a change of application in military relations.

A large emphasis by Reveron is on the changing structure of foreign assistance from purely aid given predominantly by the Department of State and various NGOs that are met with limitations and consequent gaps that are now being filled by the military.¹³³ A search in this chapter is to uncover a truth, based on the preponderance of qualitative evidence, that presidents and policymakers can lay the foundation for impactful change in military security relations by extending amicable overtones, collaborative and engaging behavior, and ultimately filling positions within their cabinets that display an effort to engage with Brazilian leadership. An attempt at observing how presidents and policymakers visibly produce an indication of change in military relations as a result of a greater understanding in the significance of using an adaptive and effective military force within their foreign policy is the primary focus. As noted previously by Reveron, military security cooperation and support can occur in many different ways such as providing forces, equipment, or training. The next sections will look at how leaders are influenced to make decisions on foreign policy, which may indicate changes to military relations.

1. Leadership and Legacy of Foreign Policy

Presidents come into office with pressure from the international forum, domestic foreign circumstances, or personal leadership goals. As noted by Kehoe Genevieve in

¹³¹ Reveron, *Exporting Security*, 1.

¹³² Reveron, 1.

¹³³ Reveron, 10–12.

Presidents and Terminal Logic Behavior: Term Limits and Executive Action in the United States, Brazil, and Argentina one key difference in the focus of foreign policy between United States presidents and Brazilian presidents, and as also discussed in the previous chapter, that as a result of their economic differences and levels of development versus developing, Brazilian presidents are more concerned with domestic security while growing their economy and conversely the United States presidents are pressured to uphold the status quo of American superiority and global dominance.¹³⁴ Kehoe continues on their differences as a matter of how each president desires to be seen in history and where they can contribute more as a result of making change domestically versus globally. In her words she notes,

I expect these countries to diverge in the policy area in which their presidents seek to fulfill their legacy agenda. For instance, I hypothesize that presidents in the United States seek to fulfill their legacy agenda in foreign affairs. In contrast, I expect the legacy agenda of presidents of Argentina and Brazil to be more directly related to issues in the country and less so to issues surrounding the country's interests in world politics.¹³⁵

She also notes that the United States presidents are afforded the opportunity to look abroad as a result of its great economic development.¹³⁶ Adding to Kehoe's remarks is her hypothesis that presidents of both countries deliver more declarations at the end of their term as opposed to the beginning as a result of the pressure exerted by the allotted time given in each term length.¹³⁷ Kehoe offers no relation toward an indication of presidents announcing or formulating new plans of a change in military relations within their respective foreign policies, but implications were levied toward U.S. presidents being more inclined to direct more promises in foreign policy and Brazil remaining focused on their domestic priorities.¹³⁸ This information enables more focus toward the overtones,

¹³⁴ Genevieve M. Kehoe, *Presidents and Terminal Logic Behavior: Term Limits and Executive Action in the United States, Brazil, and Argentina* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2014), 54.

¹³⁵ Kehoe, 54.

¹³⁶ Kehoe, 54.

¹³⁷ Kehoe, 143–61.

¹³⁸ Kehoe, 144.

collaborative and engaging behavior through physical interaction, and Brazil or even Latin American focused positions established within U.S. Presidencies. In other words, it may have been preconceived views toward presidential action in foreign policy may have dictated the decisions made by presidents.

2. Autonomy in Leadership to Influence Foreign Policy

Generally, as is the case for Brazil, presidents that come to office with surmounting domestic stability, are potentially afforded opportunities to devise ways in which they can transform their soft power development into hard power. Despite the presence of indifference in Brazil toward developing a hard power without gaining soft power, as noted by Mares and Trinkunas in previous work, Brazil's goal of being a regional hegemon still relies on their development in hard power, such as the noted development of the Amazon surveillance equipment as well as their interest in developing a blue water fleet to secure offshore oil recently discovered.¹³⁹ Harold Trinkunas and David Pion-Berlin in their work titled *Attention Deficits: Why Politicians and Scholars Ignore Defense Policy in Latin America* noted that challenges in establishing a defense policy in Latin America remained in the lacking international threats, longstanding military ruling that could re-emerge given greater capability, and the general consensus over the irrelevance in the politicization of military strength which is apathetically constant among a majority of Latin American countries.¹⁴⁰ Also, to ensure their hard power is developed without the suspicion of nefarious intentions allows each country's leaders to display relations making them more and more significant.

Another significant indicator of how each country's leadership plays a role in security cooperation is how much power or influence the top leadership, specifically the presidents, have in foreign policy decisions. This question is especially important when

¹³⁹ Andrew Fishman and Max G. Manwaring, *Brazil's Security Strategy and Defense Doctrine* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011), 1–4, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2125.pdf>.

¹⁴⁰ David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, "Attention Deficits - Why Politicians Ignore Defense Policy in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* 42, no. 3 (2007): 76–79, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4499390>.

considering how Brazil has evolved economically as well as politically. Jeffrey Cason and Timothy Power, in their work titled *Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making in the Cardoso-Lula Era* discuss how the power and influence of presidents over foreign policy has changed since the '90s. They contend that as a result of economic policy changes moving away from import substitution, which brought a major debt crisis, and toward liberalization politics also followed this role in allowing presidents to achieve greater interaction with the leaders of other nations.¹⁴¹ They noted that the government control of their foreign policy, in a similarity to their domestic economy, was not only controlled by the Itamaraty but also became highly bureaucratized. This bureaucratic control by the Itamaraty appears to have resulted in little to no major strategic efforts in developing foreign policy.

3. Leadership Characteristics

Finally, the last contributing theorist whose work includes the levels of analysis theory and that specifically focuses on how individuals can effect international relations is author Robert Jervis, whose work titled *Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?* acknowledges key indications in characteristics of leaders that may present a level of openness toward reciprocating acts of foreign policy and even if doing so does not result in the betterment of a leader's position.¹⁴² One element of a leader's persona, emphasized by Jervis, is that of trust. On the importance of trust, Jervis contends that

Trust, assuming it is a stable characteristic that acts across domains, can have a more straightforward impact on policies. Presidents who are more trusting will be willing to enter into more and riskier agreements than will those who are low on this dimension. They will place a higher likelihood on others cooperating and will accept arrangements in which reciprocity is delayed and inexact, in part out of the belief that the other will see the long run advantages of a sustained relationship.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Jeffrey W. Cason and Timothy J. Power, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making in the Cardoso-Lula Era," *International Political Science Review* 30, no. 2 (2009): 125, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512109102432>.

¹⁴² Jervis, "Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?," 164.

¹⁴³ Jervis, 164.

In this excerpt, Jervis remarks a resemblance in connection between liberalism and trust and that decisions in foreign policy were merely a response to the changing international order after World War II.¹⁴⁴ Taking Jervis's views of trust and liberalism as a consequence to the changed world order post World War II, to the period of post-Cold-War reviewed here, and how a bipolar international order morphed into the unipolar as American interest expanded, may have aided in allowing leaders of both countries to gravitate toward each other.

As the proceeding sections show, leadership's influence in military relations appears to be determined by legacies, autonomy in influence of foreign policy, and personal leadership characteristics. Using those three factors as a framework for each president within the period noted may provide further clarity to the dynamics of indicators to change in military relations. Provided below is a snapshot of each presidency, and notable events, agreements, and actions they have taken in foreign policy that may have indicated a change in military security relations through the time period noted.

B. PRESIDENT COMPARISON

1. President George H. W. Bush (1989–1993)

Beginning with Presidents George H. W. Bush (1989–1993) and Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–1992) and Itamar Franco (1992–1995), their expressions made of extending relations in the public sphere as well as key members in their cabinet are noted followed by notable changes in foreign policy engagement to that of military cooperation. Bush's 1990 visit to Brazil presented rhetoric that would implicate deepening relations between the two countries. During this visit Bush is recorded as saying "Brazil today is poised to enter the 21st century as a leader among nations. . . . I am here to tell you that you are not only on the right path, but the United States wants you to succeed and supports your efforts every step of the way."¹⁴⁵ This rhetoric, while comforting, appeared to be only

¹⁴⁴ Jervis, 164.

¹⁴⁵ Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants*, 163.

background noise in what lay ahead as Collor's first year in office delivered a significant shock to Brazil's domestic economy.

The Bush administration's embarking on an initiative to liberate Kuwait from an Iraqi invasion, while insisting that Brazil discontinued arms transfers to their largest buyer—Iraq—as noted by Monica Hirst (see Chapter I), appeared to hinder early opportunities in military security relations. Additionally, Collor, who some advance that ceasing arms transfers to the Saddam regime was only a result of not receiving payment, also began strategizing a way for Brazil to lessen its economic disarray. The legacy of Bush, while heavily surrounding his actions in the Middle East, appears to be bound by the United States magnifying its reach on global security as a result of ending the Cold War.

a. Collor de Mello (1990–1992)

Remarks on Collor's short time in office by Juliana de Brum Fernandes's excerpt in the *Encyclopedia of Political Communications* referenced his tough economic policy decisions that were labeled appropriately as the *Collor Plan* in which “was to stop government spending, prevent inflation, and modernize the economy.”¹⁴⁶ She continues that reducing inflation was a success but consequently he “triggered an economic recession, a collapse in industrial production, the closure of industries, and an increase in unemployment.”¹⁴⁷ His next plan, labeled *Collor Plan II* initiated to reverse the cascading recession also proved inadequate and ultimately brought on corruption charges and corresponding impeachment as “the Senate declared him guilty of corruption.”¹⁴⁸

Collor's ability to further relations with Bush also appears to be clouded by both President Bush's actions in the Middle East and his own domestic economic turmoil. Collor might have been handcuffed by those in Washington who insisted that his country remain out of the conflict and discontinue arm sales to Iraq. U.S. soldiers identified Brazilian

¹⁴⁶ Juliana de Brum Fernandes-Fernandes, “Collor De Mello, Fernando (1949–),” in *Encyclopedia of Political Communication*, ed. Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2008), 2, <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412953993>.

¹⁴⁷ de Brum Fernandes-Fernandes, 2.

¹⁴⁸ de Brum Fernandes-Fernandes, 2.

weapons in the hands of Iraq soldiers, which may have also left a dark cloud over increasing relations with the Bush administration.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, Collor's administration was using arms sales to grow the economy, and after the United States directed a foreign policy of containment as a means to strangle the Saddam regime, Brazil's future potential in arms sales to the middle east also dried up while limiting military relations with the United States at the time. It is also conceivable that corruption charges levied against Collor tarnished not only any prospective legacy toward Brazil's economic advancement but slighted the views of those in Washington to improve any relations.

b. *Itamar Franco (1992–1995)*

Franco, taken from being Collor's vice president to being sworn in to presidency in August of 1992, waited only until December to impose a new economic policy that was directed toward further reducing inflation but limited Brazil's efforts toward increasing globalization through opening its markets. While notable relations with Bush Sr appear to be limited given their term periods, a convergence in relations with Clinton administration had been achieved. As for Franco moving closer to strengthening ties with Washington during the Clinton administration, from a declassified document given from President Clinton to Franco in 1994, you see actions by the Franco presidency in nonnuclear proliferation within Brazil drawing both direct appreciation and implications for closer relations with the United States (see Figure 4). As Clinton writes in page 2 of 2, paragraph two ("As I mentioned..."), which shows the impact of Franco's decision to align Brazilian security interest with the United States and perhaps creating an increasing trajectory in future relations. Additionally, reviewing SIPRI arms transfers during the Franco presidency, 1992 was noted at 7 million, which is in line with the letter from Clinton, which had gone to 34 million in only two years by 1994.¹⁵⁰ Also, the letter appears to signify a significant decision made by Franco, especially given his short time in office, that perhaps provided a great hand-off in relations to the next president, Cardoso.

¹⁴⁹ Gamaliel Perruci, "The North-South Security Dialogue in Brazil's Technology Policy," *Armed Forces & Society* 21, no. 3 (1995): 378, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9502100304>.

¹⁵⁰ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 1990–2001."

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
n/a

Page: 1

RELEASED IN FULL

<<<>>>

CONFIDENTIAL

E68

PAGE 01 STATE 140543 260237Z
ORIGIN ARA-01

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-17	ACDE-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	OASY-00	DOEE-00
	EB-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	ADS-00	NRC-01	NRRRC-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OES-09	PM-00	P-01	SNP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	T-00	SSD-01	PMB-00	/032R			

DRAFTED BY: ARA/BR:J D CASWELL:JDC
APPROVED BY: ARA:A F WATSON
ARA/BR:D MILLER, ARA:E A CASEY, ACDA/SP/NST:D P FITE,
PM/CBM(B):E O MONROE, PM/RNP:J M DETHOMAS, T:JBARKER, P:B THOMAS,
NSC:KAKENNEY, S/S:RLWILSON, S/S-O: CHEINECK
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:

-----4AFB5B 260238Z /38
O R 260234Z MAY 94
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
AMCONSUL RECIFE
AMCONSUL PORTO ALEGRE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 140543

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: KNNP, PARM, TRGY, KSCA, BR
SUBJECT: CONGRATULATORY PRESIDENTIAL LETTER ON NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION RATIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 140543 260237Z

REF: (A) 94 BRASILIA 3798, (B) 94 BRASILIA 1366

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANT STEPS BRAZIL HAS TAKEN
SINCE FEBRUARY TO MEET ITS DECLARED NONPROLIFERATION
COMMITMENTS, AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER, AFTER
PRESIDENT FRANCO SIGNS THE TLATELOLCO RATIFICATION BILL,
THE FOLLOWING CONGRATULATORY LETTER FROM PRESIDENT
CLINTON TO FRANCO. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. DATE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN L MILLS
DATE/CASE ID: 14 JUN 2004 200204072

n/a
CONFIDENTIAL

Pag»

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1 of 2

Figure 4. Official Letter from President Clinton to Franco Provided by U.S.
Department of State¹⁵¹

¹⁵¹ Source: William J. Clinton, "Congratulatory Presidential Letter on Nuclear Nonproliferation Ratification," Confidential, Cable (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, May 26, 1994), Digital National Security Archives.

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
n/a

Page: 2

E LETTER ONE DAY FOLLOWING FRANCO'S SIGNATURE.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ALLOW ME TO CONGRATULATE BRAZIL, AND YOU PERSONALLY, FOR
BRAZIL'S RATIFICATION OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATY OF

TLATELOLCO. THIS ACTION IS BUT THE LATEST OF BRAZILIAN
ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO STRENGTHEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS, LAWS, AND STANDARDS TO PREVENT GLOBAL
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION.

AS I MENTIONED TO YOU IN MY LETTER OF LAST AUGUST,
OLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THEIR
DELIVERY SYSTEMS POSE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT FOREIGN
POLICY AND SECURITY CHALLENGES OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA.
WE SINCERELY APPRECIATE YOUR SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO RATIFY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 140543 260237Z
AND BRING INTO FORCE BOTH THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO AND
E QUADRIPARTITE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT. BRAZIL'S
LEADERSHIP HAS MADE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO BANISHING
FOREVER THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM LATIN AMERICA,
D THE INNOVATIVE NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS APPROACH PIONEERED
BY BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA IN THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT
PROVIDES AN EXAMPLE FOR OTHER NATIONS.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

ED TEXT
CHRISTOPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

n/a
CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2 of 2

Figure 4. (Con't) Official Letter from President Clinton to Franco
Provided by U.S. Department of State¹⁵²

¹⁵² Source: Clinton.

c. Bush/Collor/Franco

Using arms transfers as a way to measure change in military relations, during the years that Bush and Collor as well as Franco were in office, appears to have first declined before gaining new heights. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database shows that arms transfers from United States to Brazil from 1990–1993 were in decline from 37 million in 1990 to 0 in 1993.¹⁵³ Shortly after and on through Franco and Cardoso’s terms had arms transfers risen dramatically.¹⁵⁴ Authors Sean Burges, Bastos Chagas, and Fabricio H. note that scholars believed lasting impressions of the foreign policy imposed by the Collor presidency evolved around three areas of focus. Those areas, noted by the authors, were “...(i) adapting Brazil to the ‘new world order’; (ii) rebuilding the relationship with the USA; and (iii) an effort to de-characterize Brazil as a Third World country.”¹⁵⁵ They also acknowledged that Franco essentially maintained the status quo of foreign policy established by Collor as he was being overcome by Brazil’s civil society being reconstructed and aligned with the new liberalized economic structure.¹⁵⁶

2. President William J. Clinton (1994–2000)

President Clinton has always been revered as holding deep intellect with the ability to make logical and effective political decisions. The intellect and comprehension for making important policy decisions was also noted by author Michael Takiff in his biography titled *A Complicated Man: The Life of Bill Clinton as Told by Those Who Know Him*. Takiff writes that “he had been a successful and long-serving governor of Arkansas. His upbringing had left him with the ability to understand and identify with the problems of ordinary people.”¹⁵⁷ Clinton’s primary focus in his run against President Bush and

¹⁵³ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 1990–2001.”

¹⁵⁴ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

¹⁵⁵ Sean W. Burges and Fabrício H. Chagas Bastos, “The Importance of Presidential Leadership for Brazilian Foreign Policy,” *Policy Studies* 38, no. 3 (2017): 280, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2017.1290228>.

¹⁵⁶ Burges and Chagas Bastos, 282.

¹⁵⁷ Michael Takiff, *A Complicated Man: The Life of Bill Clinton as Told by Those Who Know Him* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 1.

following the inauguration, was the establishment of universal healthcare, which given Brazil's lacking civil society and welfare might have combined parallel interests that brought them closer together.

a. *Cardoso (1995–2002)*

During the Clinton administration, Cardoso moved closer to strengthening ties with Washington. For Cardoso, noted by authors Chagas, Burges, and Fabricio, an impactful and influential personal background had prepared him well for allowing his approach to foreign policy to encompass the engagement of world leaders.¹⁵⁸ They remarked how “Prior to starting a political career in the early 1980s, the fluently quadrilingual Cardoso had already established himself as a leading international intellectual in the fields of development, authoritarianism and democratization, building a deep network of political and scholarly friendships across Latin American, the USA and Western Europe.”¹⁵⁹ This background also included roles within the Itamar Franco office which reinforced his belief over the necessity of Brazil to align themselves both with the United States and also the international world order. The authors also note how his beliefs of aligning Brazil to the international order and his emphasis on globalization had brought him directly to the signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT; signed in 1997), a decision that was highly contested by others in Brazil yet made possible by his beliefs alone.¹⁶⁰

Data from SIPRI shows that after Clinton took office, arms transfers increased from 37 million in 1994 to as high as 131 million in 1997 and finishing at 111 million by 2001.¹⁶¹ Additionally, information shared by Cason and Powers displayed a significant uptick in presidential meetings between these world leaders.¹⁶² Military spending in Brazil

¹⁵⁸ Burges and Chagas Bastos, “The Importance of Presidential Leadership,” 282–84.

¹⁵⁹ Burges and Chagas Bastos, 282.

¹⁶⁰ Burges and Chagas Bastos, 283.

¹⁶¹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 1990–2001.”

¹⁶² Cason and Power, “Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty,” 122–25.

based on GDP, of data collected by SIPRI, shows the majority of the '90s remaining constant, around 2 percent.¹⁶³

An intellectual like Clinton, Cardoso's biographical information includes a great deal of academic achievements, to include holding a prominent role in the development of the economic policy that would take over Latin America—dependency theory—as well as holding many leading collegiate and doctoral positions in sociology in Brazil as well as the United States and Europe.¹⁶⁴ It appears that because of these achievements in academia he developed a sense of understanding of the purpose and importance of relationships and how those relationships can develop into new tangible benefits toward Brazilian growth. While Cardoso emphasized reaching out to the international community in ways to attract new investment as well as seeking views from other world leaders on the legitimacy of Brazilian growth, President Clinton appears to have taken a liking to Cardoso's direction. Speaking in Brazil in October 1997, Clinton asserted how important it was that

the people of Brazil understand that just as with the trade issue and Mercosur, the United States would never knowingly make any suggestion that would undermine the growth of Brazil or any other country. It is not in our interest. . . . The vocation of Brazil and the United States is to stand together. I believe we stand together today as never before.¹⁶⁵

Now trade between Brazil and the United States may not have gone as well as Cardoso may have insisted as Brazil appeared to not desire the terms of a proposed Free Trade Agreement of the America's (FTAA) drafted by the United States as well as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and looked elsewhere. Elsewhere, brought Brazil toward joining the World Trade Organization and increasing its role in Mercosul, but despite the misalignment in economic trade agreements at the time, security

¹⁶³ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Military Expenditure by Country as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1988–2018," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988–2018%20as%20a%20share%20of%20GDP%20%28pdf%29.pdf>.

¹⁶⁴ Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *The Accidental President of Brazil a Memoir* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 52–53; "Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1931-)," Thomas E. Skidmore Collection, accessed February 7, 2020, <https://library.brown.edu/collections/skidmore/portraits/fernandoHenriqueCardoso.html>.

¹⁶⁵ Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants*, 168.

interest still aligned as Cardoso signed the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty in 1997 that appears to also converge the relations as noted by Clinton in his address.

Cardoso's foreign policy decisions appear to have resonated with Jervis's approach to explaining how leaders are influenced in both their personal characteristics and leadership decisions. Cardoso, while advancing his personal agenda by signing the NPT and making efforts to align security interest with the United States, gained substantial success in devising economic policies that appeared to have aided in giving him the autonomy required to find new ways to align Brazil with the United States. Additionally, given the new opportunity to leave the country and build upon Brazil's foreign policy relations with other leaders such as Clinton, his personal characteristic of being a quasi-intellectual appeared to have gained notable interest and perhaps helped the increasing military security relations through arms transfers from 1995 to 2000.

3. GEORGE W. BUSH (2001–2008)

"The conservative former oilman and the trade unionist indeed formed an odd couple. But they got on well. The chemistry between the two presidents was immediate, according to Rubens Barbosa, who as Brazil's ambassador to Washington was present."¹⁶⁶ At the beginning of Bush's presidency, in a meeting with Cardoso, an understanding of obstacles to overcome were discussed. Those obstacles lay mostly in Brazil's exclusion from the FTAA established during the Clinton administration.¹⁶⁷ Rhetoric shared between both of them appears to have emphasized a foundational approach that Bush would then establish throughout his presidency to converge interests of both countries. That rhetoric, stated by both presidents as Bush said "The President [Cardoso] and I have made a decision that we'll work closely to iron out any differences that may exist."¹⁶⁸ Cardoso followed up by responding that "That's true. I do agree with the President. I believe that—we have, of course, from time to time some difference. That's normal between nations. Yesterday

¹⁶⁶ Reid, *Brazil*, 256.

¹⁶⁷ Bandeira, "Brazil as a Regional Power," 23–24.

¹⁶⁸ Bandeira, 24.

the Presidents said, American—to be American first. Well, I would say the same, to be Brazil first. That’s normal. But then let’s see how to cooperate.”¹⁶⁹

Talks between Bush and Lula de Silva in 2007, at Camp David, resulted in increased efforts by both sides to improve collaboration on international peace and security.¹⁷⁰ The talks cemented both country’s inclusion toward aiding both Haiti and the Dominican Republic as well as others. Involvement by both countries was done under the authority of the United Nations, which both countries involvement along with others to create the official UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). This involvement, especially for Brazil, ultimately improved the tactics and techniques that gave them the ability to not only work together in future peace keeping operations, but individually become more proficient across the spectrum of military operations.¹⁷¹

While critics of the MINSTAH mission have reported the use of excessive force by Brazil against the Haitian government opposition, it appears the goal had been accomplished by 2010, which marked a very important joint effort taken by two of the hemisphere’s largest military forces.¹⁷² Noted by Antonio Barbosa at the 2009 G20 Sao Paulo meeting, it appears that Presidents Lula and Bush were at odds over their approach to the 2008 post-financial crisis. The United States was content with emphasizing nationalization while Brazil insisted on increased globalization. While economic collaboration was not achieved, a critical military cooperation agreement was, the first of which that had been signed since 1975.¹⁷³

Another key figure in establishing and maintaining relations between both countries during the Bush administration was Thomas Shannon. Shannon led efforts in Latin

¹⁶⁹ Bandeira, 24.

¹⁷⁰ Rubens Antonio Barbosa, *The Washington Dissensus: A Privileged Observer’s Perspective on US-Brazil Relations* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2014), 215.

¹⁷¹ Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga, “MINUSTAH and the Security Environment in Haiti: Brazil and South American Cooperation in the Field,” *International Peacekeeping* 17, no. 5 (2010): 711–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2010.516979>.

¹⁷² Braga, 715–17.

¹⁷³ Barbosa, *The Washington Dissensus*, 218–19.

America and was known as having an exceptionally high-leveled interest in working with Brazil that resulted in the development of important relationships that otherwise had been left in frustration and miscommunication during previous presidencies.¹⁷⁴ Those important relationships appeared to have extended into security cooperation as the Security Assistance Monitor shows that aid provided from 2000 to 2010 was given on a more consistent manner than from 2010–2016.¹⁷⁵

Unfortunately, arms transfers from United States to Brazil, according to SIPRI, went from 111 million in 2001 to zero by 2009.¹⁷⁶ Additionally, SIPRI shows that Brazilian military spending based on GDP in the 2000s was reduced by half a percent from the ‘90s.¹⁷⁷ This limited military relation might have come as a result of the United States engaging in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) after the 9/11 attacks in which Brazil’s policy, while supportive, resulted in minor actual support.

For Bush, all three factors noted above—legacy, autonomy to influence foreign policy, and personality—do not appear to fit the mold. As noted most previously, the effects of 9/11 appear to overcome the majority of foreign policy decisions the Bush administration proposed and any decisions on foreign policy appeared to have been overwhelmingly in favor of the war on terrorism. Therefore, it almost appears that Bush was left with the lack of autonomy in foreign policy decisions that had to do with anything other than dealing with the war on terror. As a result, any rhetoric shared between nations was simply lip service with no tangential backing.

a. *Lula da Silva (2003–2010)*

On decisions made by both Cardoso and Lula da Silva, noted earlier by Power and Cason, was how President Cardoso as well as Lula not only understood the changing economic and political dynamics of the ‘90s but emphasized the importance of face to face

¹⁷⁴ Reid, *Brazil*, 257.

¹⁷⁵ Coletta, “Then and Now.”

¹⁷⁶ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2001–2009.”

¹⁷⁷ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Military Expenditure by Country as Percentage.”

meetings with world leaders as the priority for advancing Brazil's domestic well-being.¹⁷⁸ Cason and Power also remarked that critics of Lula over his excessive travel coined his plane as "AeroLula" because of how much he flew out of the country.¹⁷⁹ Other interesting remarks on how each president approached foreign policy rested in their respective backgrounds. Cardoso's interest with developed countries came as result of his formal education and intellectual background while Lula's interest in developing countries and future investment came as a result of a business background.¹⁸⁰

The most startling example of a changing structure in presidential influence over foreign policy was simply in how much travel—noted as a significant event given that official power transfer is achieved when presidents travel abroad—both Cardoso and Lula took in comparison to leaders before them.¹⁸¹ Information presented by Cason and Power acknowledge that previous President Ernesto Geisel—who led the military regime—left the country only ten times, then followed by Sarney and Collor, who only left "7 to 8 times annually."¹⁸² For Presidents Cardoso and Lula, traveling occurred ten times the amount of prior presidents as Cason and Power mention that "Cardoso left Brazil 92 times in his eight years" while Lula surpassed him, leaving the country "60 times in only four years."¹⁸³ Included in their work is a figure (Figure 5) showing all the absences taken by Brazilian presidents which again may indicate new opportunities toward advancing interest in security cooperation.

¹⁷⁸ Cason and Power, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," 125.

¹⁷⁹ Cason and Power, 122.

¹⁸⁰ Cason and Power, 122.

¹⁸¹ Cason and Power, 122.

¹⁸² Cason and Power, 122.

¹⁸³ Cason and Power, 122.




FIGURE 1. *Absences from Brazil by Presidents, 1974–2006*

Notes: Two of Figueiredo's absences were for medical treatment in the US. Data for Lula are updated to the end of his first term in office on December 31 2006.
Source: Compiled by authors from www.presidencia.gov.br/info_historicas/galeria_pres.

Figure 5. Absences Taken by Brazilian Presidents¹⁸⁴

Author Steen Fryba Christensen noted Brazil's foreign policy in reaction to how Lula regarded American foreign policy which was interpreted as being overly intrusive and noncompatible with Brazil's growing interest to establish a new world order that accommodated Brazil as a partner rather than as another South American country being supported by the Western hegemon.¹⁸⁵ President Lula, along with his Secretary General of Foreign Affairs Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, believed that Brazil could be the leader among a more unified and strengthened South America.¹⁸⁶ For Guimarães specifically, he came to believe in only two options: "to either create a united South America that would serve its peoples or to face political subordination to U.S. hegemony and the social chaos and economic backwardness that would ensue."¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ Source: Cason and Power, 123.

¹⁸⁵ Steen Fryba Christensen, "Brazil's Foreign Policy Priorities," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2013): 271, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.775785>.

¹⁸⁶ Christensen, 274.

¹⁸⁷ Christensen, 274–75.

Another outcome of Lula's foreign policy directly relating to regional peace keeping operations in Haiti, explained by Christensen, was how the United States welcomed Brazil's leadership in stabilizing Haiti which ultimately fell in line with Brazilian policy to prove that they were a regional leader in security.¹⁸⁸ Despite a welcoming attitude by the United States in Brazil's efforts in Haiti, a growing economy coupled with newly defined Defense Strategy in 2008 appeared to juxtapose previous attempts at recognizing a partner in Brazil and creating new means of ensuring that dominance regionally remained with the United States. Exemplifying the struggle to remain a dominant force was how the United States reactivated the Fourth Fleet Command which, as noted by Christensen, "was seen by many in Brazil as a response by the USA to Brazil's proposal."¹⁸⁹

While Bush and Lula's presidencies overlapped, domestic and international concerns appeared to have been of most importance. For Bush it was the attacks of 9/11 that moved any chances to strengthen foreign policy with Brazil toward focusing on the Global War on Terror. For Lula, a booming Chinese economy became a focal point for Brazilian growth. While Lula saw options to diversify Brazil's economy as exemplified by China becoming Brazil's top economic exporter by 2009, the U.S. housing crash of 2008 in the United States appeared to significantly inhibit military relations with Brazil. The inhibiting of relations is also exemplified by arms transfers falling to zero by 2009.

4. Barack Obama (2009–2016)

Recognizing Brazil's soft-power investment into their domestic economy, President Obama constructed the most influential circumstances for meeting Brazilian leadership in 2011.¹⁹⁰ "When Obama visited in 2011 he brought about fifty CEOs from

¹⁸⁸ Christensen, 278.

¹⁸⁹ Christensen, 278.

¹⁹⁰ White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Joint Communique by President Obama and President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil," The White House - President Barack Obama, 2015, 1, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/30/joint-communique-president-barack-obama-and-president-dilma-rousseff>.

top American businesses and met several hundred Brazilian business leaders.”¹⁹¹ A year following this meeting, President Rousseff traveled to Washington and again followed-up on similar discussions relating to shared interest of economic prosperity centered around globalization as energy. Additionally, this meeting by Rousseff resulted in a newly established defense cooperation dialogue within both the United States Department of Defense as well as the Defense Ministry of Brazil.¹⁹² Other notable remarks came from Obama who made assurances to supporting Brazil joining the UN Security Council which while it has not been achieved, still appears to have levels of optimism vice no support from U.S. leadership that would severely limit any future accommodation of Brazil into the council.

Michael Shifter wrote in his work titled *Obama and Latin America: New Beginnings, Old Frictions* that changing relations between the United States and Latin America and especially with Brazil were developing as President Obama took presidency.¹⁹³ He noted that “Obama’s likeability contrasted sharply with his predecessor’s, significantly enhancing the favorable image of the United States.”¹⁹⁴ Shifter goes on to present data from the Pew Research Center stating that “in Brazil last year confidence in Obama was 76 percent, a dramatic increase from the 17 percent that Bush registered in 2008.”¹⁹⁵

Obama’s presidential term, albeit starting on a high note compared to Bush as presented above and the noted attempts to forge bilateral trade and investment, perhaps was limited by the larger scope of U.S. security interest in the Middle East. Obama supported India to gain permanent membership on the UNSC as U.S. interest in gaining well-supported allies as perhaps a buffer to China were noted. Conversely, Brazil has no

¹⁹¹ Reid, *Brazil*, 258.

¹⁹² “Joint Statement by President Barack Obama and President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil,” The White House - President Barack Obama, June 30, 2015, 3, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/19/joint-statement-president-rousseff-and-president-obama>.

¹⁹³ Michael Shifter, “Obama and Latin America: New Beginnings, Old Frictions,” *Current History* 109, no. 724 (2010): 67–73.

¹⁹⁴ Shifter, 68.

¹⁹⁵ Shifter, 68.

real option to lend itself a buffer to the United States from major global enemies like Russia or China, making it difficult to substantiate greater immediate support to the UNSC that Brazil desires.¹⁹⁶ Additionally, noted in Rousseff's section below, was the scandal that appeared to have a large impact on any palpable negotiations that might have come as result of the increasing interaction between the two leaders. Obama's focus also appeared to have remained on the economic rebound that his presidency inherited which also might have perhaps required a lot of his attention.

A change in relations toward Latin American appears to stem from domestic change insisted by Obama as his campaign slogan read "change we can believe in" a large emphasis on the change that lay in the domestic economy as he took office a year after the housing crash. Additionally, the American people appeared to be growing tired with U.S. action in the Middle East. For those two areas mentioned it appeared a legacy of "change," noted personally by Obama while also being the first elected African American President of the United States, extended into his foreign policy. Specifically, relations with Brazil appeared to get off to a great start as arms transfers grew incredibly 5 years after he took office. Efforts taken to improve bilateral trade agreements and U.S. investment into Brazil also appeared to be on par as Obama facilitated meetings with big businesses of both countries in official visits.

a. Rousseff (2011–2016)

An intelligence scandal involving the U.S. National Security Administration, President Rousseff's personal communications as well as leading oil company Petrobras became a decisive obstruction to smooth relations developing between Obama and Rousseff.¹⁹⁷ This scandal became so large that a visit to Washington by Rousseff in 2013 had to be cancelled and future relations established, those that occurred in 2012, appeared

¹⁹⁶ Mares and Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power*, 95.

¹⁹⁷ Reid, *Brazil*, 259.

to have found themselves derailed.¹⁹⁸ According to SIPRI, arms transfers from the United States to Brazil from 2009 to 2016, went from zero in 2009 to as high as 111 million in 2012, a time when relations and dialogue appeared to really be taking off, to then and finishing at 31 million in 2016.¹⁹⁹ President Rousseff also made another formal visit to Washington in 2015 in which security agreements, cemented around the newly formed General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which according to a write-up on the meeting and the importance of GSOMIA in that it “will allow for a greater flow of information, goods, services, and technologies to advance the security of both countries.”²⁰⁰

The Iran nuclear program became a contentious security interest of the United States through the Bush as well as Obama term which resulted in a divergence of understanding between the two countries. While Cardoso signed the last NPT ensuring only uranium enrichment for energy, Lula debated U.S. nuclear supremacy and the sanctioning of Iran, or as Brazil’s grievance appeared to be the limitations the United States placed on developing countries. Rousseff was noted for making attempts to absolve the friction by terminating support for Iran and ultimately re-align Brazil and U.S. security interest but after the NSA incident Rousseff believed the United States only wanted to strengthen their relations to have a window into Brazilian regional hegemony. Rousseff insisted that the United States take the developing relations with Brazil as that of having a relation with another global power.

Rousseff presidency appeared to have a good deal of autonomy and opportunity to change relations with the United States, especially as 2009 arms transfers were at zero. A big setback appeared to be the NSA scandal in which arms transfers went from zero in

¹⁹⁸ Reid, 259. The instance of the NSA spying on Rousseff and Petrobras was discovered when an NSA contractor, Edward Snowden, had leaked classified NSA information which involved detailed information on the NSA spying on American citizens but also included the Brazil “file” of information. Edward Snowden had been fired since the incident but has also fled to country. Last known reports are that he had sought sanctuary in Russia.

¹⁹⁹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2009–2016.”

²⁰⁰ White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Joint Communique by President Obama and President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil,” 7.

2009 to 111 million in 2012, but after the scandal and by the end of Rousseff's term in 2016 arms transfers shrunk down to 31 million. Conversely, Obama also appeared to have a majority of focus domestically, as noted earlier, on rebuilding the economy after the 2008 housing crash as well as curtailing U.S. troop involvement in the Middle East amongst other areas. In other words, despite the NSA scandal it appears overall that military security relations were converging.

C. CONCLUSION

After delving into each presidential term an analysis and conclusion will encompass each decade to show notable trends in how leaders' decisions in foreign policy indicate change in military relations. Again, the use of SIPRI arms transfers from the United States to Brazil are used as the litmus test against the factors of leadership. Also, along with arms transfers, notable interactions between presidents are weighed for implications of their relation to displaying a change in relations as met by arms transfers.

Scaling back and reviewing the first decade of the 1990s it appeared both countries leaders were given or had accomplished a great deal of autonomy to expand their influence of foreign policy to strengthen military relations. The United States being freed of the bipolar entanglement with Russia with the ending of the Cold War had allowed President Bush and his predecessor Clinton to change the landscape of trade agreements throughout the Western Hemisphere. Despite trade relation, while not entirely aligned with Brazil, as the failed development of the FTAA had not been met by Brazil with open arms, SIPRI arms transfers throughout the 1990s had increased.²⁰¹ Additionally, both Franco and Cardoso signed Nonnuclear proliferation treaty agreements that aligned well with SIPRI arms trade data indicating perhaps the growing convergence in security relations between both presidents.²⁰² Also, rhetoric as well as information shared on the similarities in personal characteristics between Clinton and Cardoso, both being deep intellectuals, also implicate the noted insistence of Cardoso to sign the NPT agreement, which although was

²⁰¹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 1990–2001."

²⁰² Burges and Chagas Bastos, "The Importance of Presidential Leadership," 283.

not advocated by his administration, brought security interest of Brazil closer to those of the United States.

The 2000s ushered in a whole new host of overwhelming concerns for the Bush administration. As rhetoric was just gaining momentum between Bush and Silva the terrorist attack of 9/11 had appeared to be directing the majority of United States interest to the Middle East. SIPRI arms transfers would also show a compelling story of the United States preoccupation with the GWOT as arms transfers went from 111 million in 2001 to zero by 2009.²⁰³ Some semblance of increasing relations with Silva's presidency appeared to remain consistently autonomous over its influence in foreign affairs as Cason and Powers showed that even higher levels of travel occurred for Silva than presidents before.²⁰⁴

The 2010s appeared to have renewed military relations as an increase in both arms transfers and notable rhetoric between presidents occurred. Even Brazilians had taken a greater liking to Obama vice Bush as mentioned by the Pew research survey. Also, SIPRI shows arms transfers going from zero in 2009 to as high as 111 million in 2012. Unfortunately, the noted NSA scandal in 2014 was not taken very lightly by Rousseff as state visits were cancelled as well as a significant drop in arms transfers from 111 million in 2012 to 31 million by 2016. Additionally, it also appeared President Obama had lost some autonomy in foreign policy as the American people pressed hard for U.S. troop disengagement from the Middle East.

Military relations in the 1990s appeared to be greater than those in the 2000s. Factors, such as legacies and personal characteristics, may have played the most prominent role in leader's decisions of foreign policy and may have influenced leadership decisions and their impact on change in military relations. The autonomy created for both countries as noted by the ending Cold War and economic growth through liberalization also facilitated more engagement between both countries. The 2000s showed more semblance of views toward autonomy, but in the opposite view, as the United States preoccupation

²⁰³ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2001–2009."

²⁰⁴ Cason and Power, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," 123.

with GWOT limited growing relations between the two countries. The 2010s again revived perspectives of personal legacies as Obama was rebuilding the United States economically and Rousseff appeared to be equally engaged in diversifying foreign investment after China became Brazil's leading country for exports in 2009. Obama and Rousseff's state visits also brought major exchanges for both trade and advancing on military relations. Arms transfers appeared mildly effected by the noted scandal but overall relations between both countries were much better than the previous decade.

It is difficult to devote one factor of leadership as the sole indicator of changing military security relations. A combination of legacies, autonomy to influence foreign policy, and personal characteristics appears to complement each other as indicators of how those factors influence foreign policy of leadership that effects military security relations. The time noted in this chapter was almost three decades, with varying levels of convergence and divergence, all of which appeared to align well when balancing those factors noted with arms transfers as well as at times even rhetoric shared.

IV. HOW DOES BRAZILIAN INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE OPERATIONS THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AMERICAN STATES INDICATE A CHANGE IN MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES?

This chapter reviews the peace operations conducted by both the United States and Brazil and how those operation have evolved over the last three decades. More specifically, Brazil and United States engagement in peace operations –under the umbrella of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Organization for American States (OAS)—to combat humanitarian crises and threats toward democratic stability. Specifically, this chapter analyzes how each operation has presented patterns or trends in motivations that indicate changes in military security relations that may result in converging or diverging. Patterns of international and domestic circumstances appear to be key factors in how each country converges or diverges within the USNC and the OAS from decade to decade. In other words, the patterns of mutual engagement in these institutions appear to be related to the economic development of Brazil as well as the foreign policy of executive leadership of both countries.

This chapter first provides an overview of the UNSC and OAS, followed by analyses of the 1995's civil war in Angola, 1999 East Timor crises, 2004 Haiti humanitarian crisis, and the 2013 Lebanon civil war. These crises exemplify the patterns of divergence and convergence that implicate a change in military security relations.

A. BACKGROUND ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

The United Nations Security Council was created toward in 1945 at the end of World War II.²⁰⁵ This development was set in place around the four winning nations of the war plus one—the United States, the USSR, Britain, France, and China as the plus one—with six other members joining by vote in a revolving two year membership. Since

²⁰⁵ Dimitris Bourantonis, *The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform* (London: Routledge, 2005), 16.

then the number of those voted into a two-year terms has increased to 10 making 15 total members at any given time on the security council.²⁰⁶ The rules for membership are noted by author Dimitris Bourantonis in his work *The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform*: “the UN charter set two basic criteria to be applied in the election of non-permanent members, namely, ‘contribution of the members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to other purposes of the organization’ and ‘equitable geographical distribution’ (Article 23).”²⁰⁷ A large aspect of those who hold permanent memberships is their ability to veto decisions made by the other six non-permanent members emphasizing the significance of holding permanent membership.

According to Bourantonis, the end of the Cold War signified a change in UNSC involvement of the United States because the Cold War had created a bipolar standoff between the United States and USSR. He continues that the Post-Cold War change resulted in freedom given to the United States allowing more openness toward UNSC involvement. significant change in that the involvement of great powers (Allied Powers—Britain, United States, France, USSR plus China and Axis Powers—Germany and Japan) pre and post-Cold War within the UNSC had occurred. Additionally, restructuring of global powers as the Cold War continued saw the rise in both Germany and Japan along with a host of African nations while Britain and France’s influence eroded.²⁰⁸ Post-Cold-War cooperation within the UNSC, as noted by Bourantonis, was even achieved between the United States and Russia as well as China as he notes their involvement in “the Iran-Iraq war, and the crisis over Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cambodia and Namibia.”²⁰⁹ He continues by offering that the most notable joint effort by these countries was in the Gulf War since it was “the first time since the Korean War (1950–3), the Security Council was able to

²⁰⁶ Nadia Sarwar, “Expansion of the United Nations Security Council,” *Strategic Studies* 31, no. 3 (Autumn 2011): 258, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48527660>.

²⁰⁷ Bourantonis, *The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform*, 4.

²⁰⁸ Bourantonis, 7.

²⁰⁹ Bourantonis, 28–29.

invoke Chapter VII to undertake military action against a state it deemed to be an aggressor.”²¹⁰

Additionally, noted by Derek Reveron, the United Nations Agenda was established in 1992 clarifying the UN members direction toward peace operations. He notes from that, the agenda made encouraged those involved in UN peace initiatives “to stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war.”²¹¹ Bourantonis also holds that in the twenty-first century, Russia as well China hold their seat on the UNSC as result of “population and territorial size.”²¹²

More research recently conducted by Lisa Hultman who focused on the causes that have evoked greater interest in peace operations by the UNSC, from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s and not country specific, resulted in showing that conflict involving innocent civilian deaths had in fact resulted in more UN engagement by and large.²¹³ She noted that events such as Rwanda and Bosnia, where innocent civilian casualties were high, had consequently brought the UNSC to enact a larger number of mandates for civilian protection.²¹⁴ These mandates enacted by the UNSC for greater civilian protection appear to have ultimately led to new opportunities for countries to practice efforts in global security outreach and advance military security relations. As seen in Figure 6, from 2008 to 2017, UNSC involvement in peace operations by all countries combined is significant portion of the all combined efforts in peace operations. The figure displays not only the

²¹⁰ Bourantonis, 29.

²¹¹ Reveron, *Exporting Security*, 44.

²¹² Bourantonis, *The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform*, 7.

²¹³ Lisa Hultman, “UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap Talk or Norm Implementation?,” *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 1 (2013): 70, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312461662>.

²¹⁴ Hultman, 66.

authority of the organization but the legitimacy and precedence it holds over regional and ad hoc coalition operations.²¹⁵




Figure 6. Peace Operations from 2008–2017 by Organization Provided by SIPRI²¹⁶

Additionally, Figure 6 shows not only an importance of the UNSC peace operations but also the significance of the amount of regional peace operations conducted. Discussed next is a brief overview of the OAS and its relevance as regional institution to indicating change in military security relations between both the United States and Brazil.

²¹⁵ “Data and Trends for Multilateral Peace Operations,” Peace Operations and Conflict Management, June 18, 2018, <https://www.sipri.org/research/conflict-peace-and-security/peace-operations-and-conflict-management/data-and-trends-multilateral-peace-operations>.

²¹⁶ Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

B. BACKGROUND ON THE OAS

The development of the Organization of American States began shortly after the United Nations Security Council was created in 1948.²¹⁷ During the period discussed in this review, the agenda and purpose for the OAS as noted by Mônica Herz in *The Organization of American States (OAS) Global Governance Away from the Media*, Routledge Global Institutions is that “the security agenda of the organization has expanded significantly to include transnational criminality, post-conflict peace building and a human security dimension.”²¹⁸ Like the UNSC, development and growing reform occurred in two stages which were pre and post-Cold War.²¹⁹ As an adaptation to the changing world order, the OAS development mirrored the same guidelines as the United Nations and both institution were heavily forged during the cold war. One difference between the creation of the two is that roots grown pre-World War II by Franklin Delanor Roosevelt’s ‘Good Neighbor Policy,’ a non-interventionist mandate, along with the initial drafting of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA) in Rio de Janerio post World War II that established the collective security arrangement in the region.²²⁰ This treaty encompassed the same system of the United Nations imposing the requirement for a collective agreement between all parties before the use of force is considered, as well as treating conflict involving one state therefor involving all states in peace settlement. Finally a few years later, the official draft of the OAS would be signed with the addition of “principles contained in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, namely that the regional organizations should play a part in the peaceful settlement of disputes and that their role in peace enforcement is subordinated to the UN Security Council.”²²¹ Shown in Figure 7 is a snapshot of the OAS peace missions conducted from 1990 to the present.

²¹⁷ Mônica Herz, *The Organization of American States (OAS): Global Governance Away from the Media* (London: Routledge, 2011), 5.

²¹⁸ Herz, 72.

²¹⁹ Herz, 6.

²²⁰ Herz, 11.

²²¹ Herz, 30.




Figure 7. OAS Peace Missions from 1990 to Present²²²

Monica Herz notes the similarity in creation between the OAS and United Nations during the Cold War in that “It was necessary to adapt the inter-American system to this new international reality, in particular to the institutional format generated by the United Nations.”²²³ She continues over the relation to the Cold War by saying “In fact the Cold War framed international relations during most of the time of the existence of the OAS, and the manner in which the dispute between the two superpowers and the two social

²²² “OAS Political Missions Map,” OAS Peace Fund, accessed February 23, 2020, <https://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/PeaceMissions/PoliticalMissionsMap.html>.

²²³ Source: Herz, *The Organization of American States (OAS)*, 6.

systems which they represented took shape in the Americas market the history of the OAS.”²²⁴

C. A U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON PEACE OPERATIONS

As background for understanding how the United States carries out peace operations the use of the United States Joint Force Publication *Peace Operations* is referenced. This document lays out the different types of peace operations conducted by the United States. Those operations include: Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO), Peace Building (PB), Peace Making (PM), and Conflict Prevention (CP).²²⁵ The document also gives a brief description of each such as PKO being used for long-term political stability, PEO being the use of force or threat of force to provide immediate protection to those succumbing from humanitarian atrocities, PB being conducted after high-intensity battles are over and form into a long-term process for stability, PM emphasizing diplomacy to end kinetic exchanges, and CP to diffuse both inter and intra state discord and limit its escalation into kinetic exchanges.²²⁶

Delving deeper into peace operations, noted by the U.S. military directive, that U.S. military involvement largely encompasses most efforts within PKO and PEO while the others remain in the sphere of state department representative initiatives.²²⁷ Noted examples of PKO include “as vehicle patrols in sensitive areas, local negotiations between rival forces, and special investigations.”²²⁸ For PEO, examples include “the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of personnel conducting HA, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute.”²²⁹ Given the military involvement within these specific uses of peace operations as noted by the U.S.

²²⁴ Herz, 6.

²²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Peace Operations*, Joint Publication 3-07.3 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012), VIII, <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=739225>.

²²⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, ix.

²²⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-7.

²²⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-2.

²²⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-8.

military publication, events discussed going further will reside within the areas defined above.

D. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNSC

The United States has been the lead contributor to peace operations through the United Nations since its conception in 1945.²³⁰ However, Stewart Patrick in *Return to Realism? The United States and Global Peace Operations since 9/11*, notes “Since the end of the cold war, the United States has adopted an ambivalent, selective and often inconsistent position toward UN peace operations.”²³¹ Specifically, actions by the United States carried out in partnership with the United Nations, that “the United States has generally limited its own participation in UN-led peace operations to materiel and logistical support, preferring to engage its troops only in operations run by NATO or by an ad hoc, US-led coalition of the willing, particularly as part of the US-directed ‘war on terrorism.’”²³²

Ramesh Thakur shows similar views on U.S. involvement with the United Nations, specifically throughout the 1990s in indirect support, but also offers a noticeable change in the way the United States approached new ways to integrate themselves into the organization. Thakur notes that Bush Sr. had facilitated a widening perspective of U.S. operations within the organization in that

on 12 September [1992] where Bush announced that the USA was prepared to introduce a peacekeeping curriculum in U.S. military schools; to train combat, engineering, and logistical units for international peace-keeping duties; and to open U.S. military bases for multinational training and field exercises.²³³

²³⁰ Stewart Patrick, “A Return to Realism? The United States and Global Peace Operations since 9/11,” *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 1 (2008): 134, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310701879977>.

²³¹ Patrick, 134.

²³² Patrick, 134.

²³³ Ramesh Thakur, *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 52, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316819104>.

Thakur also emphasized the tension between U.S. policymakers in deciding on further engagement of the United States with the UN and those who were not in favor. Noting that those in favor of more participation expressed views toward the evolving post-Cold War global design of international security and peace initiatives that are now a responsibility of the United States to work alongside the United Nations. Those not in favor noted how U.S. military involvement would decapitate much needed skills and requirements to maintain the highly effective force the United States had developed as result of increased lethality brought on by Cold War fears.²³⁴ It appears given the unipolarity the United States enjoyed during the 1990s, remaining viable and relevant to global security, required participation in global security initiatives.

While new opportunities of U.S. involvement in peace operations appeared to present themselves throughout the 1990s, growing political skepticism also grew, as author Ramesh Thakur notes that skepticism came as a result of failed efforts by UN led initiatives in Bosnia.²³⁵ Additionally, an early strategy within the Clinton administration was to intertwine U.S. interest alongside efforts led by the United Nations, obstacles followed on the battlefield by allowing U.S. troops to operate as a subordinate to UN commanders would ultimately lead to U.S. disengagement from direct support to the organization.²³⁶ This strategy is exemplified in the Bosnia crisis, viewed as a failure in UN led peace operations, that resulted in major U.S. casualties—18 army rangers—and ultimately leading the United States to lay major blame to the organization of which a consequent divergence in efforts as the United States began directing operations by U.S. commanders alongside the UN commanders.²³⁷

E. BRAZIL AND THE UNSC

Understanding why Brazil involves itself in peace operations under the UNSC's authority appears to evolve around gaining legitimacy as a country capable of leading

²³⁴ Thakur, 52.

²³⁵ Thakur, 56–57.

²³⁶ Thakur, 56.

²³⁷ Thakur, 55–57.

missions in efforts to gain permanent membership. (Notable efforts to gain permanent membership are also discussed in the next section.) Categorizing all Latin America countries' involvement in UNSC peace operations, and not specifically Brazil, has been acknowledged by Arturo Sotomayer. In his work *Latin America's Experience with Peace Support Operations from:* Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security Routledge, he contends that

Although states' motivations to participate in UN peace operations vary substantially from case to case, we can identify three general reasons why Latin American states participate in peacekeeping: 1 (1) democratization and impetus for military reform, (2) international prestige and status, and (3) evolving regional norms about intervention.²³⁸

While Brazil has made a transition to democracy within the time period discussed, reviewing the above motivations, it appears Brazil would most fit into the field of using UN peace operations to gain international prestige and status as chapters before have repeatedly noted. Although, as Brazil has always been determined to respect the sovereignty of other nations, tendencies to engage in peace operations also are perhaps hindered by long establish norms within their society that emphasize sovereign rights. Regional, as well as international norms of protecting human rights also appears to present a way around Brazil's respect for sovereignty in cooperating with regional partners to conduct peace operations.

More criticism for Brazilian led Peace Operations, notes author João Paulo S. Alsina Júnior in his article *Grand Strategy and Peace Operations: the Brazilian Case* has been discussed despite a ten year period in which Brazil, while leading MINUSTAH, had not recorded one death.²³⁹ That criticism, such as Brazil not endeavoring any real dangerous missions as well as the fallacy of legitimacy gained through the use of peace operations, comes as a result of the limited level of threats sustained in Peace Operations

²³⁸ Arturo C. Sotomayer, "Latin America's Experience with Peace Support Operations," in *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security*, ed. David R. Mares and Arie M. Kacowicz (London: Routledge, 2015), 326.

²³⁹ Joao Paulo S. Alsina Jr., "Grand Strategy and Peace Operations: The Brazilian Case," *Revista Brasileira de Politica* 60, no. 2 (2017): 4, <https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201700204>.

conducted by Brazil.²⁴⁰ João emphasizes the growing complexity of the security environment as well as increased hazards that will challenged Brazilian led efforts. In other words, as environments that require new peace initiatives increase in level of danger it appears Brazil's involvement will become more and more under international scrutiny. For the United States, accomplishing Peace Operation has always brought on intense scrutiny from high-level commanders in that the belief of conducting such operations limits the effectiveness of military forces used in large scale wars.²⁴¹

Short-term peace operations carried out by Brazil appear to have long-term goals. For example, the peace operation held in Haiti in 2010, where the UN Security Council (UNSC) asked for Brazil's involvement, did so with the long-term goal of showing both the United States as well as the UNSC that they have the capacity to be a formal member of the security council. Additionally, successful completion of the mission and skills developed by aiding in the restoration of Haiti's civil society were then brought back to Brazil for use domestically. As noted by Author Marcelo Valenca and Gustavo Carvalho in their work *Soft Power, Hard Power Aspirations: the Shifting Role of Power in Brazilian Foreign Policy* that,

Although Brazil deployed more troops than any other country in UNEF, UNAVEM III, and UNMISSET, Haiti was the first time the UNSC appointed it to command a peace operation, and Brazilian policymakers have considered it an opportunity to show that, due to its different approach to peacekeeping, Brazil is able to handle peace-keeping and international security tasks of greater magnitude and difficulty.²⁴²

The authors capture the importance of Brazil engaging in these operations as not only the opportunity to gain global legitimacy but also change the views of the United States military leaders in showing a greater capability in their ally to the south.

²⁴⁰ Alsina, 4.

²⁴¹ John T. Fishel, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night," *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 4, no. 3 (Winter 1995): 390–93.

²⁴² Marcelo M. Valença and Gustavo Carvalho, "Soft Power, Hard Aspirations: The Shifting Role of Power in Brazilian Foreign Policy," *Brazilian Political Science Review* 8, no. 3 (2014): 83, <https://doi.org/10.1590/1981-38212014000100021>.

Brazil, as a debated emerging power on many grounds both economically and militarily,²⁴³ still poses a security (unity of effort) challenge to the United States in finding the best way to accommodate Brazil's greater integration into the international security environment specifically within pre-established international institutions like the UNSC. Motivations for using peace operations as a means to buy into membership on the UNSC also appear to coincide with Brazil's international strategic economic goals of slowly maturing their country. Author Thierry Tardy notes on those motivations which are "...largely about projecting power, hard and soft."²⁴⁴ As for peace operations being another use of soft-power development, chosen so hastily by Brazil, noted from Tardy is that "Through peacekeeping and peacebuilding, states can both buttress narrowly defined interests and push their normative agendas at a relatively low cost."²⁴⁵ The post-Cold War era saw emerging economies in India as well as Brazil by the early 2000s leading their agenda again toward discussions of change in permanent membership within the UNSC. The low cost for enhancing Brazilian legitimacy among global powers through peace operations appears to be an incentive for Brazil.

1. Deeper Review of Brazil and the UNSC

At the turn of the 21st century, Brazil had gone from ranking 44th of UN contributors to 13th by 2010 with involvement from over 2000 personnel.²⁴⁶ A depiction of growing Brazilian involvement in UN operations is shown in Figure 8. This statistic mightily emphasizes the two ways that Brazil and the United States can improve hemispheric relations. First, Brazil's ability to contribute greater efforts toward regional security alleviates the United States from using resources that can be otherwise used in areas pertinent to U.S. National Security, interest such as peace and stability of the middle

²⁴³ Christopher Darnton, "The Rise of Brazil: Concepts and Comparisons," in *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security*, ed. David R. Mares and Arie M. Kacowicz (London: Routledge, 2015), 201, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315867908>.

²⁴⁴ Thierry Tardy, "Peace Operations: The Fragile Consensus," in *SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, ed. Bates Gill (Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2011), 97.

²⁴⁵ Tardy, 97–98.

²⁴⁶ Tardy, 103.

east. Secondly, Brazil being the south-south leader of regional stability develops the legitimacy needed not only to gain official membership to the USNC but also as a more attractive partner for trade and investment by the United States.

Brazilian Involvement	Mission	Host Country	Military Personnel	Police Personnel	Civilian Personnel
1957-1967	UNEF	Egypt	6,300 infantry	0	0
1960	ONUC	Congo	179 (pilots/ support personnel)	0	0
1962	UNSF	West New Guinea	2 observers	0	0
1965-1966	DOMREP	Dominican Republic	1 observer	0	0
1965-1966	UNIPOM	India/Pakistan	10 observers	0	0
1989-1991	UNAVEM I	Angola	16 observers 1 medical unit	0	0
1989-1992	ONUCA	Central America	34 observers	0	0
1997-1999	UNSCOM	Iraq	N/A	N/A	N/A
1991-1995	ONUSAL	El Salvador	63 observers	16 observers	5
1991-1995	UNAVEM II	Angola	63 observers 14 medical personnel	39 observers	4
1993-1994	ONUMOZ	Mozambique	170 paratroopers 48 observers	66 observers	16
1993-1994	UNOMUR	Ruanda/Uganda	10 observers 3 medical personnel	0	0
	UNOMIL	Liberia	3 observers	0	0
1992-1995	UNPROFOR	Former Yugoslavia	90 observers	23 observers	0
1993	UNTAC	Cambodia	0	0	19
1995-1997	UNAVEM III	Angola	4,174 (infantry, engineers, medical personnel, observers and officers)	48 observers	0
1995-1996	UNCRO	Croatia	2 observers	1 observer	0
1995	UNPREDEP	Macedonia	5 observers	0	0
1996-1998	UNTAES	East Slavonia	9 observers	2 observers	0
1997-1998	MONUA	Angola	20 observers 15 medical personnel	39 observers	0
1996-1999	UNMOP	Croatia	5 observers	0	0
1995	UNFICYP	Cyprus	20 observers	0	0
1994-1995	MINUGUA	Guatemala	39 observers	37 observers	0
1994	UNOMSA	South Africa	0	0	12
1999	UNAMET	Timor Leste	5 observers	16 observers	N/A
1999-today	INTERFET, UNTAET, UNMISSET	Timor Leste	120 personnel (average per year)	N/A	N/A
2004-today	MINUSTAH	Haiti	1,500 personnel (average per 6 months)	N/A	N/A

Figure 8. A Chronological Order of Brazilian Involvement in UNSC Peace Missions²⁴⁷

²⁴⁷ Source: Valença and Carvalho, “Soft Power, Hard Aspirations,” 82.

Surprisingly, the appearance of further convergence between the United States and Brazil through peace operations has come from the pragmatic learning experiences Brazil has accumulated since increasing involvement in peace operations. Experiences in Haiti in 2010 exemplify how pragmatism has diverted previously held emphasis on sovereignty and consent when confronted with large swaths of criminal activities encountered during that required more conflict management.²⁴⁸ Recognition over the successful peace operations held in Haiti also opened other opportunities for Brazil.

As a result of limited resources in aid from the United States to civil conflict in Lebanon in 2011 the UN called for others to provide support. Answering that call was Brazil, largely as a result of the recognition in success of operations in Haiti, who for the first time utilized a naval asset for UN operations—Brazilian frigate *União* (F45)—by integrating into the United Nations Maritime Task Force (MTF).²⁴⁹ While Brazil and the United States did not necessarily get to collectively work together in this effort, it appears that Brazil provided relief by replacing the United States as a global actor in peace operations allowing the United States to remain focused on Middle East peace operations.

2. Brazil's Effort to Become an Official Member of the UNSC

While Brazil has always sought to gain permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council, when asked to act upon its governing mandates, it has done so with careful consideration of not violating the sovereignty of countries. In recent years, adding even more contention over decisions made by the UN and noted in opening by Harold Trinkunas and David Mares, is how Brazil has made a valiant attempts to re-write a much debated UN principle of “responsibility to protect” with their view called “responsibility while protecting.”²⁵⁰ Again, the change offered by Brazil seeks to improve

²⁴⁸ Tardy, “Peace Operations,” 106.

²⁴⁹ Braga, “MINUSTAH and the Security Environment in Haiti,” 10.

²⁵⁰ Oliver Stuenkel and Marcos Tourinho, “Regulating Intervention: Brazil and the Responsibility to Protect,” *Conflict, Security & Development* 14, no. 4 (2014): 381, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2014.930593>; Thorsten Benner, *Brazil as a Norm Entrepreneur: The “Responsibility While Protecting” Initiative* (Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, 2013), 1–10, https://www.gppi.net/media/Benner_2013_Working-Paper_Brazil-RWP.pdf; Mares and Trinkunas, *Aspirational Power*, 103.

transparency in decisions made unilaterally or through internationally consenting institutions while also giving new options in how to intervene through various ways of peace operations in crisis response. It also appears, due to the historical human rights offenses carried out by a military led Brazilian government, domestic support to engage in peace operations might be a more viable option to give the military a purpose.

Additionally, capability gaps appear to exist in Brazil's military force as modernization efforts have been a major focal point of their force since the 2000s. Capability gaps, while perhaps a result of moderate economic growth and both domestic and foreign policy decision by the executive powers—through budget cuts global security interest—impede Brazil's ascent into permanent membership of the UNSC. Another perspective could be that over the last 26 years covered, Brazil has come a long ways economically and politically that have translated well into military modernization efforts as well as initiatives of operations within the UNSC. But, the UN initiatives taken by Brazil, while judged by some as arbitrarily chosen or loosely in line with post-colonial and cultural similarities—Africa and regionally located countries like Haiti—have actually been intricately decided upon for different reasons. One reason is that by including progressively more and more over time (as has happened in the time period covered) in parallel to growing both economic and foreign policy influence globally, may result in one day having significant leverage to join as a permanent member. A low level interpretation of permanent members, especially the United States, appears to show that Brazil's military capabilities are less capable and positioned for a large war or peace initiative both unilaterally or multilaterally within the UNSC. Another member, France, has been noted to aid in the nuclear submarine development of Brazil for protection of the blue water shoreline discovery in oil noted previously.²⁵¹ Force sizes of Brazil, while modest in size, are going to require greater levels of technological advances to achieve local development of top of the line military hardware such as first generation fighter planes, nuclear powered submarines, and satellite infrastructure to support complex networked integration of these

²⁵¹ Valença and Carvalho, "Soft Power, Hard Aspirations."

assets.²⁵² Considering Brazil's military in the aggregate despite some gaps in data before 2005, according to Janes has consisted of an army of a 195,000 members (since 2005) to around 240,000 by 2010, Sailors (since 2008) of around 60,000 and remaining consistent while the Airforce (since 2007) show numbers increasing from 50,000 in 07 to 65,000 by 2010.²⁵³

As for defense spending overall, records indicate that from 1990 to 2000 spending as a percentage of GDP had sat close to only two percent with minor fluctuation.²⁵⁴ In the 2000s, a large jump in spending occurred from 2005 to 2010 of around 25% but since then have not been any higher. Military spending as a percentage of the GDP from 2010 to 2016, lower than that of the 1990s, has also stayed close to 1.5 percent throughout.²⁵⁵ From the numbers above it appears military expenditure over the time period covered in this study have dropped. Despite military expenditures dropping, a review in peace operations may bring another concern as increases since the 2010s have been noted.²⁵⁶

F. BRAZIL, THE UNITED STATES, AND UNSC PEACE OPERATIONS

While the size of Brazilian military force has not changed significantly over the time period covered, limited involvement in the UNSC operations appears to be a result of desired foreign policy decisions as well as economic development achieved. Next, a breakdown of UN involvement that encompassed literary notes on both countries as appearing as an outlier or of noteworthy toward the greater understanding of other indicators discussed in previous chapters as well as implications toward the significance of the security institutions themselves.

²⁵² Valença and Carvalho.

²⁵³ "Country Dashboard: Brazil," Jane's, accessed February 21, 2020, Jane's Group.

²⁵⁴ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Military Expenditure by Country as Percentage."

²⁵⁵ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

²⁵⁶ Alsina, "Grand Strategy and Peace Operations," 7.

1. 1990–2000 Observations

a. Gulf War (1990–2000)

While U.S. involvement in the Gulf War had occurred without Brazilian participation, noted here is how U.S. national interest of the importance of the middle east perhaps created a divergence in U.S-Brazil mutual cooperation. The post-Cold War changing world order had led the United States to take on new initiatives in peace operations within the United Nations. Despite Brazil being a primary exporter of arms to Iraq as discussed earlier, the United States not only insisted they stop, but then through national interest developed partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. Military security relations expressed again in arms sales, the U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia doubled from 1990 to 1999 by 1 billion dollars, in Egypt from 1990 to 1994 from 430 million to 1.7 billion, and Jordan from 16 million in 1990 to 248 million by 1998.²⁵⁷

For Brazil, efforts to take part in the Gulf War not only were obfuscated by arms trading dilemmas to the Saddam regime, but also in recognizing the limited capability that their military forces held at this time. Daniel Zirker, in *The Brazil Military and the New World Order* captured the recognition of limitations within Brazilian military force by noting that “Moreover, military officers were pointedly aware of the inferiority of the Brazilian armed forces compared to those even of Iraq.”²⁵⁸ Additionally, on top of the armed forces being met with capability limitations, their influence and place within the newly constructed democracy was still be developed during this time. Emphasis during the early years of democratic consolidation were on budget cuts of the military to acceptable levels for defense of the homeland and not to a grand scale.²⁵⁹

b. Angola (1995)

Noted as the first time Brazil sent a sizable amount of troops for UN peace operations, Angola’s UN initiative termed UNAVEM III was the third mandate released

²⁵⁷ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 1990–2001.”

²⁵⁸ Daniel Zirker, “The Brazilian Military and the New World Order,” *JPMS: Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 24, no. 1 (1996): 40.

²⁵⁹ Alsina, “Grand Strategy and Peace Operations,” 32.

by the UN to use military intervention to achieve peaceful reconciliation of a country crushed by civil war.²⁶⁰ Here, Brazilian military involvement included over 4000 men.²⁶¹ While in this instance, U.S. involvement was not acknowledged the importance of not only how many Brazilian troops were sent, but it was done under the mandate of the UNSC. The importance of the institution, to be relevant and present as a tool for Brazil to commit such a large force to while showing the United States that they have a part to play in global security is important.

c. East Timor (1999)

The conflict in East Timor, included the United States devoting the 31st Marine expeditionary Unit via the USS Belleau Wood for search and rescue as well as logistical and communications support.²⁶² Additionally, Brazilian involvement, while small with only 5 military personnel, was seen as significant given the location and far-reaching connotation that came as result of their participation.²⁶³ In this instance, cited by author W. Alejandro Sánchez Nieto in his work *Brazil's Grand Design for Combining Global South Solidarity and National Interests: A Discussion of Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti and Timor*, stemming from culturally connected overtones and gestures had allowed Brazil to find a way to gain influence over East Timor while defending the country from Indonesia.²⁶⁴ This influence gained by Brazil was vocalized in the country by advocating for Brazil's permanent seat in the USNC²⁶⁵ and appearing to align nicely with a long conspired interest of Brazil.

²⁶⁰ Alsina, 7.

²⁶¹ Valença and Carvalho, "Soft Power, Hard Aspirations," 82.

²⁶² Barbara Salazar Torreon and Barbara Salazar Torreon, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2013*, CRS Report No. R42738 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 20, <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc462082/>.

²⁶³ W. Alejandro Sánchez Nieto, "Brazil's Grand Design for Combining Global South Solidarity and National Interests: A Discussion of Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti and Timor," *Globalizations* 9, no. 1 (2012): 162, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2012.627719>; Sotomayer, "Latin America's Experience with Peace Support Operations," 326.

²⁶⁴ Sánchez Nieto, "Brazil's Grand Design for Combining Global South Solidarity and National Interests," 171–72.

²⁶⁵ Sánchez Nieto, 171.

While the timing of Brazil's involvement, during Franco's term in 1994, shows autonomy to conduct new avenues of foreign policy but given limited GDP growth at that time also aligns with the minimal involvement of only providing five military personnel.²⁶⁶ Nieto emphasized cultural connections that bound Brazil's involvement into the conflict which may have been sought out by Franco among options to expand Brazilian influence into the UNSC in hopes of one day obtaining a permanent seat.²⁶⁷ Ultimately, it appeared that a both economic development and foreign policy decisions had a mild impact on Brazil's involvement but the goal of permanent membership to the UNSC was by this time established and efforts toward achieving that goal were underway.

2. 2000–2010 Observations

a. *Haiti (2004)*

The participation of Brazil in Haiti was noted as a significant by authors João Paulo S. Alsina Júnior a result of Brazil's historical involvement until that time leading up to 2000s as "... contributions tended to focus on Portuguese-speaking countries (Angola, East Timor)."²⁶⁸ Brazil, whose involvement would last until the end of the 2000s involved over 1000 troops who worked endlessly to diffuse civil discourse within the country and neutralize aggressive belligerent's. Additionally, as noted previously in chapter 3, the Brazilian military used the opportunity of Haiti civil war as a way of training to use later as law enforcement domestically. While Brazil was a leader in this UN mandated peace operation, United States initial involvement remained minimal to only protecting the embassy. Shortly after turmoil appeared to have grown the United States committed over 200 military troops in support.

Brazil's involvement in Haiti and leadership is also noted as significant by author Gelson Fonseca Jr. in work *Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy* as he notes that "not only due to the dimension of this engagement in material and human

²⁶⁶ Sotomayer, "Latin America's Experience with Peace Support Operations," 326.

²⁶⁷ Sánchez Nieto, "Brazil's Grand Design for Combining Global South Solidarity and National Interests," 162.

²⁶⁸ Alsina, "Grand Strategy and Peace Operations," 7.

terms, but also because it signals a willingness to more incisively assume a position of command in the solution of regional crises.”²⁶⁹ Brazil appeared to have lifted a burden from the United States from treading a fine line in involvement, which they also had done so in the 1990s that resulted in major backlash among those in Brazil and other regional countries. Additionally, the United States was still engaged in the GWOT and Brazil’s involvement in this mission would also seem to have critically accommodated the U.S. interests of limited involvement while resources were occupied elsewhere.

Understanding both countries’ involvement in Haiti should be done with consideration to the implications of larger forces bringing them together such as economic development and foreign policy. The countries’ involvement in the UNSC is an illustration of joint military collaboration, that in its own existence is more important than had it not occurred at all. Until Haiti 2004, Brazil and the United States had only seen mutual troop involvement in two UN peace operations—UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia and East Timor.²⁷⁰ Although, a major difference in Brazil in 2004 vice most of the 1990s, is the economic well-being that had jumped leaps as noted in Chapter II. Brazil’s economic development, along with greater autonomy in the executive branch’s ability to exercise foreign policy shed light on a larger significance to the Haiti UN peace operation led by Brazil.

3. 2010–2016 Observations

a. Lebanon 2013

The importance of leadership’s autonomy to influence foreign policy is shown by Brazil’s efforts in Lebanon. Noted by Antonio Ruy Almeida Silva in *The Brazilian participation in UNIFIL: raising Brazil’s profile in international peace and security in the Middle East?* in which notes that “In 2003, Lula visited five Middle Eastern countries: Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. With this visit, Lula became

²⁶⁹ Gelson Fonseca Jr., “Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy,” *Global Governance* 17, no. 3 (2011): 391, <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01703007>.

²⁷⁰ Valença and Carvalho, “Soft Power, Hard Aspirations,” 82; Torreón and Salazar Torreón, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2013*, 15.

the first Brazilian head of state to visit the Middle East since Brazilian Emperor Pedro II's visit to the region in 1871.”²⁷¹ Prior to 2013 engagement by Brazil, both the United States and Brazil partnered for stability and protective actions in the country in 2006 during Lebanese domestic civil discourse.²⁷² Brazil, showing greater capacity at that time to project power abroad appeared to find themselves intertwined in UN peace initiatives in Lebanon that led to its 2013 engagement. Also noted by Silva was the large number of families with ancestral ties between the two countries of Lebanon and Brazil.²⁷³

As Brazil's involvement with the middle east since the 2010s has only recently became more apparent, after reviewing its economic development over the course of the 26 years covered, coupled with new levels of autonomy in executive power, UN peace operations are yet another avenue that Brazil can consistently build upon to exert more influence while also using that time on the world stage to continually “try-out” for a permanent role on the council. A convergence between the United States and Brazil military security relations has great opportunity as Brazil's involvement in the middle east increases. Through lifting the burden of global security through engaging in greater involvement in the middle east will the United States conceivably view Brazil as a larger influence and peer vice traditionally as just the regional leader of the southern western hemisphere. An ever pressing concern of those who believe Brazil's expanding involvement in UN peace operations is merely done only as a low cost attempt to gain permanent membership may be missing the long-term strategic goals Brazil has appeared to develop since the 1990s. Cooperation in UN security council peace operations and its relation to gaining legitimacy or even the possibility of reaching permanent membership also appears to demand a whole host of foundational platitudes and milestones such as those noted of economic development and greater capacity to take on international conflicts beyond its regional territory. It appears that the United States and Brazilian efforts in UN

²⁷¹ Antonio Ruy Almeida Silva, Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga, and Danilo Marcondes, “The Brazilian Participation in UNIFIL: Raising Brazil's Profile in International Peace and Security in the Middle East?,” *Revista Brasileira de Politica* 60, no. 2 (2017): 4, <https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201700211>.

²⁷² Braga, “MINUSTAH and the Security Environment in Haiti,” 6; Torreon and Salazar Torreon, *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2013*, 25.

²⁷³ Silva, Braga, and Marcondes, “The Brazilian Participation in UNIFIL,” 6.

Peace Operations were not as robust as the two countries would have preferred. It now appears that the slow maturing of Brazil's economy and international presence met with possibly the declining international influence of the United States may lead to greater mutual efforts in military security relations as directed by the UNSC.

G. BRAZIL AND UNITED STATES OPERATING WITHIN THE OAS

The United States involvement in the OAS, as noted by Michael Shifter in the Inter-American Dialogue, that since the development in the 1940s until this recent decade the United States has led the funding of the organization while also maintaining headquarters in the United States. Also emphasized by Shifter is the criticism the United States has been dealt with since its inception with regards to how it uses its participation as another means to accomplish the sole interest of the United States. He continues on U.S. involvement in OAS peace operations that “there are many signs that today the U.S. gives less importance to the OAS than it has in recent years.”²⁷⁴ Shifter also took note of important instances in the 1990s of OAS cohesion in tending to disruptions of democracy in countries such as “Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993), and Paraguay (1996)” that the a largest criticism came in the limited efforts used in all cases.²⁷⁵

The United States interaction in the OAS in the 2000s, a similarity to the UN involvement, where limitations were noted to exist as the GWOT had taken a majority of military security focus off to the middle east. For the OAS itself, rhetoric of irrelevance and ineptitude circulated around United States officials but noted development and greater capacity for conducting regional stability was acknowledged as shifter writes that “merely increasing U.S. attention will not remedy the OAS's ills. Other key hemispheric countries—Mexico and Brazil for starters—also need to take the OAS more seriously for the organization to have a chance to fulfill its potential.”²⁷⁶

²⁷⁴ Michael Shifter, “The U.S. and OAS: A Paradoxical Relationship,” Security Assistance Monitor, April 14, 2014, <http://www.securityassistance.org/content/us-and-oas-paradoxical-relationship>.

²⁷⁵ Shifter.

²⁷⁶ Shifter.

Encapsulating Brazilian led efforts toward joining the United States in ways to advance regional security, noted by Gelson Fonseca Jr. in *Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy* are his words emphasizing a historical narrative of Brazil and the United States coming together. He said,

The multilateral focus was a constant in Brazilian diplomacy even before the creation of the UN's predecessor, the League of Nations. To be precise, that focus first appeared in 1889 when Brazil attended a meeting of Western Hemisphere countries in Washington, DC, convened by President Grover Cleveland. The meeting turned out to be the embryo of the Organization of American States (OAS). By participating in this meeting, Brazil implicitly accepted multilateralism as a useful means for advancing its national interests.²⁷⁷

While remarks on the historical importance of both countries taking initiatives toward regional security, for Brazil, noted challenges toward advancing efforts in organization like the OAS remain in two areas according to Fonseca. The first one is recovering from the negative military dictatorship's rule and actions in human rights and its limited international engagement while the other remains in line with economic development and leadership (see chapters 2 & 3). He notes that "The second challenge is more complex and remains today: how can Brazil use the political capital it gained from democratization—and later on, from economic stability—to explore new ways to project the country internationally."²⁷⁸ His interpretation of Brazil overcoming these challenges appears to lead Brazil toward a more inclusive demeanor in not only regional organizations like the OAS, but global security apparatus as well.

Others note challenges in defining the "problem" and corresponding correct way to intervene.²⁷⁹ Instances of lacking regional security initiatives in cases such as Ecuador in 2000 were noted by Jennifer L. McCoy in *International Response to Democratic Crisis in the Americas, 1990–2005* in that efforts to disrupt a military led regime were successful

²⁷⁷ Fonseca, "Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy," 376.

²⁷⁸ Fonseca, 388.

²⁷⁹ Jennifer L. McCoy, "International Response to Democratic Crisis in the Americas, 1990–2005," *Democratization* 13, no. 5 (2006): 756–75, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340601010644>.

but the unconstitutional removal of the Haiti's president had occurred.²⁸⁰ Additionally, noted by McCoy are the obstacles presented by actions taken of the OAS and its effectiveness to intervene as jurisdiction and coordination with global security groups such as the UNSC are required.²⁸¹

H. ANALYSIS

A closure review of the time period covered, it appears that a few specific instances of the United States and Brazil operating within the UNSC clearly identify the argument presented, that through time, notwithstanding international and domestic circumstances that arise as well as actions of executive leadership, that countries involvement in the security institutions noted are indicative of a change in military security relations. The next section provides an analysis of how specific instances of both countries level of involvement exemplify how the institutions show that change.

1. On Involvement with the UNSC

Reviewing instances of involvement within the UNSC, in relation to the progression of time, it also appears that Brazil's long-term decisions of both economic and foreign policy are now beginning able to display its ability to unilaterally decide upon how it intends to use the UNSC to their advantage. The United States involvement, while fairly consistent, appears to bring on much more criticism among members and those aspiring to become members. The first instance lending to the emphasis of both time and the relevance of the UNSC is the United States actions in the Gulf War. Where Brazil was noted for not participating as result of two separate and otherwise nonrelated reasons. The first was that the Saddam regime owed Brazil money for arms received and the other was that Washington insisted that Brazil stay out of the conflict.²⁸² Fast-forward almost 20 years and through not only time—adding noted Brazil economic stability and foreign policy advancement of chapters II & III—but also through the institution itself had Brazil's

²⁸⁰ McCoy.

²⁸¹ McCoy.

²⁸² Crandall, *Hemispheric Giants*, 165.

involvement in Lebanon showed both countries had come together outside of their region in efforts toward global peace. Again, evidenced Brazil's involvement in the Middle East, as the UN reached out to all members for assistance, and Brazil was poised to take on the request as its position both economically and in foreign policy were able to align with U.S. interest in matters of the Middle East. It appears as time continues Brazil will strategically advance themselves using the avenues of global and regional security apparatus to build its legitimacy abroad as well as justifying perhaps an expanding military force both in size and capability.

Additionally, decisions by Brazil in its involvement in both the UNSC as well as the OAS have been taken strategically. The institutions discussed, have been in existence since the 1940s, and while Brazil's military led regime from 1964–1985 had not changed its involvement, the importance of the institutions still remains along with the opportunity for renewed interest. The United States has always held a dominant role, both as funding member as well as involvement, and appears to be susceptible to international circumstances such as those in the Middle East—Gulf War, GWOT, issue with IRAN—as the decisions of its leaders in foreign policy as well as the global economic order are easily dissuaded in avenues leading them away from UNSC mandates that would otherwise not be solely of its own national interest.

2. On Involvement with the OAS

Fortunately, the United States and Brazil will always remain on the OAS as a permanent member unless they so choose to disengage. For the OAS, it appears to be a bit difficult to distinguish a noticeable break out between actions called by both the UNSC as well as the OAS, as the OAS acts as a subordinate to the UNSC. Noted previously, many request for action come from the United States, and while some believe these request only fall in line with its national interest, Brazil's decision to align with those national interest may also indicate the advancement of mutual military security relations.

While not extensively covered, Brazil's lack of involvement and criticism of breaching sovereignty toward the United States in their actions in Haiti in 1993 where almost 20,000 U.S. troops were sent is contrasted by Brazil subsequent involvement in the

country 10 years later. National interest aligning both countries, as shown in the Haiti 2004, of regional stability, in which an aggrandized effort by Brazil appears to show how aligning growing interest in regional stability had also brought both countries closer as the factor of both time in which Brazil's economy has blossomed in the early 2000s as well as foreign policy of its leadership. Additionally, the importance of the OAS as the platform allowing both countries to come together—even if the U.S. presence surmounted to merely a couple hundred troops—does not diminish the importance of how Brazil and the United States involvement in the regional institution can be indicative of a change in military security relations.

I. CONCLUSION

The longstanding institutions of both the UNSC and the OAS appear to increasingly become more relevant for both the United States and Brazil. Additionally, Brazil's involvement in global peace initiatives through these organizations may become more apparent as time progresses and Brazil's domestic economic stability and decisions of foreign policy of its leadership varies in alignment of U.S. interest. Ultimately, strength of the intuitions to remain relevant will provide avenues for both countries to come together.

V. CONCLUSION

Concluding remarks will bring readers back to the stated hypotheses as well as findings and results. While each hypothesis appeared to be relevant as an indicator to change in military security relations between Brazil and the United States the time period covered also played a role. The time period observed began just after the Cold War and carried through the 2001 9/11 attacks as well as the 2008 great recession in the United States. Both international and domestic circumstances, observed over time, appear to have influenced the areas discussed in this thesis. Those areas include the economic development in Brazil, foreign policy decisions by both countries, and the countries' involvement in both UNSC and OAS. Also, it is important to note that each hypothesis discussed should not be considered in a vacuum and that all three hypotheses remain complexly interwoven in significance toward providing implications of how changes in military security relations occurred.

The thesis proposed the following question: What factors explain change in military security relations between the United States and Brazil? To answer the proposed question, three hypotheses were considered and are presented which are as follows:

- Hypothesis one: Economic development of Brazil indicates a change military security relations as displayed in joint operations, treaties, as well as the transfer of material power.
- Hypothesis two: Both countries' executive leadership decisions of foreign policy have led to a change in military security relations.
- Hypothesis three: Both countries' involvement in international and regional security institutions indicate a change in military security relations.

Next, for each hypothesis, concluding remarks will re-encapsulate the key findings. Lastly, a few recommendations are provided for policymakers and military leaders that

include the significance of these findings in relation to the Great Power Competition that the United States is embarking on globally.

A. FINDINGS

1. Hypothesis One: Findings and Remarks

Does an increase in economic development of Brazil indicate a change in military security relations with the United States? It appears, as Brazil's GDP has risen over the time period covered, consequently its potential to allocate funding toward its military has also risen. Additionally, its economic development had created a level of stability at home that allowed greater engagement of presidential foreign policy initiatives abroad, as noted in Chapter III, which appear to also show trends of increasing arms transfers from the United States to Brazil. Also, it was not purely Brazil's economic growth that provided implications for a potential expansion in its military as well as engagement with United States; it also appears the way in which Brazil expanded their economy played a role. Expanding their economy, by liberalization as well as opening their markets up to international and regional institutions such as the WTO and Mercosul, allowed Brazil to develop relations beyond borders that previously had not existed.

Furthermore, the Brazilian economic uptick that occurred in the 2000s alongside the United States effort in the GWOT showed a decrease in military security relations, but as the United States bounced back from its major recession it appeared the military security relations also followed. This pattern shows how important economic development is, as Brazil's ability to maintain steady growth over a ten-year period was critical to have the ability to re-engage with the United States once the GWOT and recession had subsided. Sustained economic development by Brazil provided an indication of changing military security relations as shown by how the development in Brazil allowed its military to remain accessible for opportunities to participate with the United States. Adding to this highlighted pattern is that both countries signed on to the GSOMIA in 2010 which has displayed more interaction from where both countries' relations had been in 1990.²⁸³

²⁸³ Wilson Center Brazil Institute, "Brazil-U.S. Defense Cooperation."

While economic development of Brazil has indicated a change in military security relations with the United States, it also appears that its economic development is not the only indication. The other areas of research appear to be intertwined with the importance of Brazilian economic growth and support the hypothesis of indicating change in military security relations. In sum, to succinctly answer the question of how Brazilian economic development indicated change in military security relations with the United States, the method of liberalization in economic development opened the gates toward having an open-ended opportunity for increasing shared mutual military security relations. These relations changed through economic development were also confronted by both countries' balancing international effects. Factoring in time, of both international circumstances as well as economic growth in Brazil, the eventuality of both countries coming together was achieved.

2. Hypothesis Two: Findings and Remarks

In addition to the impact that Brazilian economic growth had in advancing military security relations, the foreign policy decisions by both countries' executive leadership indicated change. The importance of factors of leadership, such as legacies, autonomy to influence foreign policy as a result of both domestic and international circumstances, and personal characteristics of each president all appeared relevant in the time period observed. Additionally, it appears that those factors influenced each presidents' decisions in foreign policy, from 1990 to 2016, indicating changing military security relations through the expansion of arms sales.

Moreover, each president was met with domestic and international circumstances that appeared to weigh heavily on their ability to advance further military relations. Domestic and international circumstances such as the domestic economy of Brazil or the GWOT of the United States both directed each executive office either toward or away from furthering relations. Over the time period covered, increasing or decreasing military security relations appeared to ebb and flow with rhetoric as well as the physical interaction between presidents. This is emphasized in observation at the end of the time period covered

as Obama and Rousseff made many attempts to collaborate both in Washington and in Brazil.

While the factors influenced decisions of foreign policy made by both countries' executive leadership, again the executive decisions made did not occur in a vacuum. Additional forces would compound the effect of leadership decisions in foreign policy. Those forces include sustained economic development by Brazil over the observed time period as well as the ever-changing dynamic of international influences. Those factors also impressed upon both countries' leaders more or less autonomy to remain influential in foreign policy and appears to provide an indication of how military security relations were affected.

3. Hypothesis Three: Findings and Remarks

Both countries' involvement in the United Nations Security Council and the OAS was an indicator of change in military security relations. Besides involvement in the UNSC and OAS, both countries interacted more in leading peace initiatives globally and the interaction itself is an indicator of change as Brazil's ability to project power increases. While both countries' involvement in these institutions increased considerably over time, it appears Brazil's involvement has changed the dynamics of advancing military security relations between both countries the most, as their involvement has expanded to new regions such as the Middle East. This is evidenced by its position in the beginning of the study, having mostly engaged with the United States on regional and international security concerns while unilaterally engaging in other areas that aligned mostly with previous cultural and historical relations.

The major change of Brazil was appearing to align its security interest with the United States occurred when, fast-forwarding 20 years from the beginning to the end of the study, Brazil's frigates sailed for peace efforts in Lebanon at the request of the UNSC. While the United States was occupied elsewhere in the Middle East, it appears Brazil's global security interest as well as advancement in gaining recognition and legitimacy are bringing both countries closer than the divergence that occurred after the 9/11 attacks. For regional security engagement within the OAS, a major change in Brazil's view on security

efforts by the United States in Haiti had occurred from U.S. involvement in 1994 and almost ten years later Brazil's involvement in 2003. A divergence in military security relations appeared to occur in the early 1990s around the United States involvement in the OAS peace mission in Haiti as Brazil warned of violating sovereignty but then years later had finally been in a position to engage themselves. While the security institution had presented itself as another denominator of importance, it also appears that Brazil's engagement in 2004 may have been a culmination of economic stability as well as the autonomy of the executive (Silva) to advance the country's influence in regional stability. This was favored by Washington as the United States involvement in the GWOT was increasing.

In sum, an indication to change in military security relations between both countries' was not only a result of their involvement in the institutions. That involvement also included Brazil's economic development as well as the country's executive leadership decision in foreign policy, that when combined appear to show a change in military security relations. To reiterate, relevance and importance of the institutions themselves, over the time period observed, remained a viable option for both countries to participate. The influence of the other hypotheses discussed also appears to be intertwined within the significance of how both countries' involvement in regional and international security institutions indicated a change in military security relations.

B. BRAZIL, UNITED STATES, AND GREAT POWER COMPETITION

The last Great Power Competition revolved around the Cold War, in which the United States foreign policy and military interest appeared to solely revolve around NATO and containment of the USSR. For Brazil, during that time it was a military led country that remained relatively isolated in its international presence both economically and diplomatically. Post-Cold-War for the United States resulted in establishing renewed global dominance through advancing economic and military governance through trade pacts and coalition-led security initiatives. For Brazil, the ability to participate in both economic establishments, and global security institutions, was highly dependent on economic stability within their domestic economy, noted in Chapter II, as well as

opportunities in greater autonomy of the executive branch to influence foreign policy as noted in Chapter III. As long as the institutions discussed in Chapter IV are viable and relevant, Brazil's increasing involvement and modernization of its military capability will be an avenue for the United States to advance mutual military security relations.

In sum, this thesis found that Brazil's economic stability, diplomatic decisions, and involvement in international and regional security institutions have evolved over the period covered in their importance to alluding a change in military security relations. Acknowledging how these factors may influence GPC in years to come also presents itself as relevant and should be analyzed. Additionally, of all three hypotheses presented, it appears the foreign policy decisions by leadership of Brazil may have a larger impacting role on relations between both countries. Despite economic stability achieved over the time period observed, diplomatic relations between both countries' appear to have followed by increased arms sales, involvement in military exercises, as well as international and regional security efforts. A present-day example of the importance of foreign policy decisions of leaders, is how Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro visited the United States Southern Commander Admiral Craig S. Faller in Miami on March 8, 2020.²⁸⁴ At this visit, both parties agreed to advancing defense technology and improve joint military modernization efforts of both countries.²⁸⁵ Significance here lies not only in the advancement of military security relations, but that this was the first time a Brazilian Head of State has visited U.S. Southern Command.²⁸⁶ Also, it may be in the best interest of the United States to enlist greater cooperation with their south-south partner Brazil, as Brazil's position in this GPC today is much more different—economically, diplomatically, and its involvement in security institutions—than its position during the Cold War.

²⁸⁴ Reuters, "Brazil, U.S. Sign Agreement to Develop Defense Technology," March 8, 2020.

²⁸⁵ Reuters.

²⁸⁶ Reuters.

C. FURTHER RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Future research on how involvement of the United States and Brazil in the UNSC and the OAS display changes in military security relations should be done. Unfortunately, a recommendation given here is to take into account the overall time required to display change in the hypotheses discussed as it appears to be the largest challenge. Even only after a study as long as 26 years is there a display of minor relevance of both countries' involvement in these institutions toward advancing greater military security relations, but in relation to time, small implications of change may be multiplied over the span of 30 to 50 years. Also, variables unforeseen in future research may be how much attention state and non-state actors will demand from both the United States and Brazil as each country answers UNSC and OAS mandates for peace operations.

While the time period observed appears to provide satisfactory examples and data in the areas discussed, more research will help to develop a greater understanding in the dynamics of military security relations. Delving more into Brazilian economic development that may support a larger and increasingly more modernized military force could display future changes in military security relations between both countries. Equally, while both countries' executive leadership decisions in foreign policy are continually ebbing and flowing as a result of domestic and international circumstances, close attention in research over future engagements between these countries could extend implications toward a changing dynamic in military security relations.

Although, certainly concentrating a greater focus on Brazilian economic development as well as decisions in foreign policy by both countries, understanding each country's involvement in international and regional security institutions may be important. Seeing each country's involvement into these institutions can also lend itself to the importance of understanding how they may converge or diverge in military security relations as a result of the areas discussed. Lastly, leadership of both countries should be concerned with how the discussed hypotheses could change over another 26 or more years as it appears the reemergence of Great Power Competition can set another cycle of pre and post-Cold War era relations.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Alsina, Joao Paulo S., Jr. "Grand Strategy and Peace Operations: The Brazilian Case." *Revista Brasileira de Politica* 60, no. 2 (2017). <https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201700204>.
- Bandeira, Luiz Alberto Moniz. "Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations with the United States." *Latin American Perspectives* 33, no. 3 (2006): 12–27. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X06287338>.
- Barbosa, Rubens Antonio. *The Washington Dissensus: A Privileged Observer's Perspective on US-Brazil Relations*. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2014.
- Benner, Thorsten. *Brazil as a Norm Entrepreneur: The "Responsibility While Protecting" Initiative*. Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, 2013. https://www.gppi.net/media/Benner_2013_Working-Paper_Brazil-RWP.pdf.
- Bourantonis, Dimitris. *The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform*. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Braga, Carlos Chagas Vianna. "MINUSTAH and the Security Environment in Haiti: Brazil and South American Cooperation in the Field." *International Peacekeeping* 17, no. 5 (2010): 711–22. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2010.516979>.
- Brainard, Lael, and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz. *Brazil as an Economic Superpower?: Understanding Brazil's Changing Role in the Global Economy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009.
- Brands, Hal. *Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy*. Strategic Studies Institute Monograph. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010.
- Brum Fernandes-Fernandes, Juliana de. "Collor De Mello, Fernando (1949–)." In *Encyclopedia of Political Communication*, edited by Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2008. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412953993>.
- Burges, Sean W., and Fabrício H. Chagas Bastos. "The Importance of Presidential Leadership for Brazilian Foreign Policy." *Policy Studies* 38, no. 3 (2017): 277–90. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2017.1290228>.
- Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. *The Accidental President of Brazil a Memoir*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2007.

- Cason, Jeffrey W., and Timothy J. Power. "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making in the Cardoso-Lula Era." *International Political Science Review* 30, no. 2 (2009): 117–40. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512109102432>.
- Christensen, Steen Fryba. "Brazil's Foreign Policy Priorities." *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 2 (2013): 271–86. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.775785>.
- Clinton, William J. "Congratulatory Presidential Letter on Nuclear Nonproliferation Ratification." Confidential, Cable. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, May 26, 1994. Digital National Security Archives.
- Coletta, Emily. "Then and Now: Distribution of U.S. Security Assistance in the 21st Century." *Security Assistance Monitor* (blog), October 23, 2019. <http://www.securityassistance.org/blog/then-and-now-distribution-us-security-assistance-21st-century>.
- Jane's. "Country Dashboard: Brazil." Accessed February 21, 2020. Jane's Group.
- Crandall, Britta H. *Hemispheric Giants: The Misunderstood History of U.S.-Brazilian Relations*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011.
- Darnton, Christopher. "The Rise of Brazil: Concepts and Comparisons." In *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security*, edited by David R. Mares and Arie M. Kacowicz, 197–209. London: Routledge, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315867908>.
- Davis, Sonny B. *A Brotherhood of Arms: Brazil-United States Military Relations, 1945–1977*. Boulder, CO: University Press of Colorado, 1996.
- Thomas E. Skidmore Collection. "Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1931-)." Accessed February 7, 2020. <https://library.brown.edu/collections/skidmore/portraits/fernandoHenriqueCardoso.html>.
- Fishel, John T. "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night." *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 4, no. 3 (Winter 1995): 372–98.
- Fishman, Andrew, and Max G. Manwaring. *Brazil's Security Strategy and Defense Doctrine*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011. <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2125.pdf>.
- Fonseca, Gelson, Jr. "Notes on the Evolution of Brazilian Multilateral Diplomacy." *Global Governance* 17, no. 3 (2011): 375–397. <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01703007>.

- Gregory J. Dyekman. *Security Cooperation: A Key to the Challenges of the 21st Century*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007.
- Herz, Mônica. *The Organization of American States (OAS): Global Governance Away from the Media*. London: Routledge, 2011.
- Hirst, Mônica. *The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations*. New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Hultman, Lisa. "UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap Talk or Norm Implementation?" *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 1 (2013): 59–73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312461662>.
- Jane's Group. "Brazil Market Report: Executive Report," August 22, 2019. Jane's by IHS Markit.
- Jervis, Robert. "Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?" *Security Studies* 22, no. 2 (2013): 153–79. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.786909>.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Peace Operations*. Joint Publication 3-07.3. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012. <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=739225>.
- Kehoe, Genevieve M. *Presidents and Terminal Logic Behavior: Term Limits and Executive Action in the United States, Brazil, and Argentina*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2014.
- Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. <https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691122489/after-hegemony>.
- Lake, David A. "Economic Openness and Great Power Competition: Lessons for China and the United States." *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 11, no. 3 (Autumn 2018): 237–270. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poy010>.
- Lowenthal, Abraham F. *Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s*. 2nd ed. Baltimore: MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990.
- Mares, David R., and Harold Trinkunas. *Aspirational Power: Brazil on the Long Road to Global Influence*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016.
- McCoy, Jennifer L. "International Response to Democratic Crisis in the Americas, 1990–2005." *Democratization* 13, no. 5 (2006): 756–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340601010644>.
- McKenzie, Carol. "UNITAS Atlantic 2015 to Begin in Brazil." Navy News Service, November 13, 2015. https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=91995.

- Middlebrook, Kevin J., and Carlos Rico, eds. *The United States and Latin America in the 1980s: Contending Perspectives on a Decade of Crisis*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986.
- Miskel, James F. “‘Being There’ Matters--But Where? [Military Forward Presence].” *Naval War College Review* 54, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 25–39. <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss3/3/>.
- Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th ed. New York: Knopf, 1972.
- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. “Real GDP Long-Term Forecast - Brazil.” OECD Data. Accessed March 10, 2020. <https://data.oecd.org/gdp/real-gdp-long-term-forecast.htm#indicator-chart>.
- Organization of American States. “OAS Political Missions Map.” OAS Peace Fund. Accessed February 23, 2020. <https://www.oas.org/sap/peacefund/PeaceMissions/PoliticalMissionsMap.html>.
- Patrick, Stewart. “A Return to Realism? The United States and Global Peace Operations since 9/11.” *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 1 (2008): 133–48. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310701879977>.
- Pereira, Carlos, and João Augusto de Castro Neves. *Brazil and China: South-South Partnership or North-South Competition?* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03_brazil_china_pereira.pdf.
- Pereira, Luiz Carlos Bresser. *Economic Crisis and State Reform in Brazil: Toward a New Interpretation of Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996.
- Perruci, Gamaliel. “The North-South Security Dialogue in Brazil’s Technology Policy.” *Armed Forces & Society* 21, no. 3 (1995): 371–94. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9502100304>.
- Pion-Berlin, David, and Harold Trinkunas. “Attention Deficits - Why Politicians Ignore Defense Policy in Latin America.” *Latin American Research Review* 42, no. 3 (2007): 76–100. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4499390>.
- Reid, Michael. *Brazil: The Troubled Rise of a Global Power*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014.
- Reuters. “Brazil, U.S. Sign Agreement to Develop Defense Technology.” March 8, 2020.

- Reveron, Derek S. *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016.
- Roett, Riordan. *The New Brazil*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010.
- Sánchez Nieto, W. Alejandro. "Brazil's Grand Design for Combining Global South Solidarity and National Interests: A Discussion of Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti and Timor." *Globalizations* 9, no. 1 (2012): 161–78. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2012.627719>.
- Sarwar, Nadia. "Expansion of the United Nations Security Council." *Strategic Studies* 31, no. 3 (Autumn 2011): 257–79. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48527660>.
- Shifter, Michael. "Obama and Latin America: New Beginnings, Old Frictions." *Current History* 109, no. 724 (2010): 67–73.
- . "The U.S. and OAS: A Paradoxical Relationship." *Security Assistance Monitor*, April 14, 2014. <http://www.securityassistance.org/content/us-and-oas-paradoxical-relationship>.
- Silva, Antonio Ruy Almeida, Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga, and Danilo Marcondes. "The Brazilian Participation in UNIFIL: Raising Brazil's Profile in International Peace and Security in the Middle East?" *Revista Brasileira de Política* 60, no. 2 (2017). <https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201700211>.
- Smith, Joseph. *Brazil and the United States - Convergence and Divergence*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2010.
- Sotomayer, Arturo C. "Latin America's Experience with Peace Support Operations." In *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security*, edited by David R. Mares and Arie M. Kacowicz, 324–35. London: Routledge, 2015.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. "Data and Trends for Multilateral Peace Operations." *Peace Operations and Conflict Management*, June 18, 2018. <https://www.sipri.org/research/conflict-peace-and-security/peace-operations-and-conflict-management/data-and-trends-multilateral-peace-operations>.
- . "Military Expenditure by Country as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 1988–2018." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2019. <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988–2018%20as%20a%20share%20of%20GDP%20%28pdf%29.pdf>.
- . "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 1990–2001." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Accessed February 21, 2020. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php.

- . “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2001–2009.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Accessed February 21, 2020. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php.
- . “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 2009–2016.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Accessed February 21, 2020. http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php.
- Stuenkel, Oliver, and Marcos Tourinho. “Regulating Intervention: Brazil and the Responsibility to Protect.” *Conflict, Security & Development* 14, no. 4 (2014): 379–402. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2014.930593>.
- Takiff, Michael. *A Complicated Man: The Life of Bill Clinton as Told by Those Who Know Him*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010.
- Tardy, Thierry. “Peace Operations: The Fragile Consensus.” In *SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, edited by Bates Gill, 87–109. Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2011.
- Thakur, Ramesh. *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect*. London: Cambridge University Press, 2006. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316819104>.
- Torreon, Barbara Salazar, and Barbara Salazar Torreon. *Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–2013*. CRS Report No. R42738. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. <https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc462082/>.
- U.S. Congress. House. *U.S. Relations with Brazil: Strategic Partners or Regional Competitors?: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations*, House of Representatives, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., July 26, 2000.
- U.S. Department of State. “Foreign Military Training and DOD Engagement Activities of Interest.” Government. U.S. Department of State: Diplomacy in Action, Accessed February 21, 2020. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/index.htm>.
- U.S. Southern Command. *UNITAS 50: A History of Naval Cooperation*. Miami, FL: U.S. Southern Command, 2009.
- Valença, Marcelo M., and Gustavo Carvalho. “Soft Power, Hard Aspirations: The Shifting Role of Power in Brazilian Foreign Policy.” *Brazilian Political Science Review* 8, no. 3 (2014): 66–94. <https://doi.org/10.1590/1981-38212014000100021>.

- Vigevani, Tullo, and Marcelo Fernandes de Oliveira. "Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era: The Search for Autonomy through Integration." *Latin American Perspectives* 34, no. 5 (2007): 58–80. <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0094582X07306164>.
- Walt, Stephen M. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power." *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985): 3–43. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540>.
- Waltz, Kenneth Neal. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
- White House Office of the Press Secretary. "Joint Communique by President Obama and President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil." The White House - President Barack Obama, 2015. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/30/joint-communique-president-barack-obama-and-president-dilma-rousseff>.
- . "Joint Statement by President Barack Obama and President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil." The White House - President Barack Obama, June 30, 2015. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/19/joint-statement-president-rousseff-and-president-obama>.
- Wilson Center Brazil Institute. "Brazil-U.S. Defense Cooperation." Brazil-U.S. Relations, April 22, 2019. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/brazil-us-defense-cooperation>.
- World Bank. "Data for Brazil, United States." World Bank Data, November 12, 2019. <https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=BR-US>.
- . "GDP (Current US\$) - Brazil," Accessed February 21, 2020. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=BR>.
- . "Military Expenditure (Current USD) - Brazil." World Bank. Accessed October 21, 2019. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?locations=BR>.
- Yeon, Priscilla. *Brazil and the United States: Trade Agendas and Challenges of the Bilateral Relationship*. Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2008. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/brazil-and-the-united-states-trade-agendas-and-challenges-the-bilateral-relationship>.
- Zirker, Daniel. "The Brazilian Military and the New World Order." *JPMS : Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 24, no. 1 (1996): 31.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California