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CIVIL–MILITARY COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE: AN INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES APPROACH

by

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June 2020

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The purpose of this research is to understand how humanitarians and militaries cooperate during humanitarian civil–military coordination in humanitarian response after the Cold War. The research evaluated the international practices explanation through a longitudinal study from 1991 to 2009, a natural disaster case (Haiti Earthquake, 2010), and a complex emergency case (Battle for Mosul, 2016 to 2017). The international practices approach best explains the cooperative framework facilitated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Service (UN-CMCoord). It emphasizes field-level interaction and consensus-building processes in international relations. This research developed the international practices lifecycle to visualize how local social interaction generated a new practice that became diffused, institutionalized, or faded. Empirically, not only did a cooperative framework emerge, but now cooperation is expected in natural disasters and complex emergencies. Practices primarily emerged to fill gaps in policy. Host nation support, humanitarian leadership, and CMCoord staffing and competence were essential to building trust and facilitating humanitarian civil–military coordination. A key finding was the inconsistent application of the humanitarian principles. With the collapse of humanitarian space, humanitarians and militaries can use this information to better work together in the future.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to understand how humanitarians and militaries cooperate during humanitarian civil–military coordination in humanitarian response after the Cold War. The research evaluated the international practices explanation through a longitudinal study from 1991 to 2009, a natural disaster case (Haiti Earthquake, 2010), and a complex emergency case (Battle for Mosul, 2016 to 2017). The international practices approach best explains the cooperative framework facilitated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Service (UN-CMCoord). It emphasizes field-level interaction and consensus-building processes in international relations. This research developed the international practices lifecycle to visualize how local social interaction generated a new practice that became diffused, institutionalized, or faded. Empirically, not only did a cooperative framework emerge, but now cooperation is expected in natural disasters and complex emergencies. Practices primarily emerged to fill gaps in policy. Host nation support, humanitarian leadership, and CMCoord staffing and competence were essential to building trust and facilitating humanitarian civil–military coordination. A key finding was the inconsistent application of the humanitarian principles. With the collapse of humanitarian space, humanitarians and militaries can use this information to better work together in the future.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CMCoord	Civil-Military Coordination Unit
CF	Coalition Forces
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
ConOp	Concept of Operations
CTS	Iraqi Counter Terrorism Services
DSRSG	United Nations Deputy Special Rep. of the Secretary General
GoI	Government of Iraq
HC	United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	United Nations Humanitarian Country Team
HOC	Humanitarian Operations Center
HuMOCC	Humanitarian-Military Operational Coordination Concept
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
INGO	International non-governmental organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
ISIL	The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MSF	Medicens sans Frontieres
NCCI	NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
RC	United Nations Resident Coordinator
SRSG	United Nations Special Representative to the Secretary General
UN	United Nations
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq

WHO	United Nations World Health Organization

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This research is the manifestation of long-fought battles where I had to explain the strategic importance of humanitarian assistance and the unique form of international cooperation that tries to stay apolitical. The phenomenal evolution of humanitarian civil-military cooperation, both within the United Nations and in militaries throughout the world, walks a delicate line of principled action with an ever-expanding set of diverse actors. I am proud to be part of the mosaic of work, examining how the humanitarian landscape is changing. This endeavor could not have been accomplished without the support of my colleagues in the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) and numerous Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) Officers. I would also like to thank Ambassador John Cloud, who, as the William B. Ruger Chair at the U.S. Naval War College, funded the opportunities that made this research possible.

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Embarking on another doctorate program may have seemed ambitious. Other descriptions included puzzling, overwhelming, useless, and the general question of "Why?" I was naïve in thinking that another doctorate would be easier the second time around and faced many unforeseen challenges along the way. So, to answer the question, I whole-heartedly embrace my belief in life-long learning. This journey expanded both my knowledge and academic career—things that I cherish! I am eternally grateful for the opportunity to receive additional education and to continue serving the Navy and the country.

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I. A NEW ERA OF CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Humanitarian crises prompt responses from a range of global actors, from humanitarians to military forces, each playing a separate role and operating under different rules to address the risks to human life. The interaction between the diametrically opposed military forces and humanitarian actors has ebbed and flowed, leading to divergent expectations of cooperation. What determines how humanitarian and military actors cooperate in humanitarian response? From one perspective, the humanitarian principles championed by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) Movement have dominated the normative foundation of who should participate in humanitarian response—explicitly excluding militaries. Yet states have increasingly called upon their militaries in a variety of ways to provide international assistance. With all actors operating in such close proximity, the need for cooperation within the humanitarian system becomes increasingly apparent. Although counter to the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence and the principle of last resort, humanitarian civil-military coordination has emerged and been institutionalized within the United Nations (UN).

The purpose of this study is to understand how humanitarians and militaries cooperate in humanitarian assistance. It seeks to examine if rational, normative, or international practices approaches best explains how this has become commonplace. This dissertation argues that an international practices approach can best explain humanitarian civil-military coordination during humanitarian assistance.

A. THE RISE OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION

The late 20th and early 21st centuries have seen an acceleration in humanitarian emergencies, both in number and in scale. Beginning with Iraqi Kurds in 1991, famine relief in Somalia in 1992, attempted genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Sudan, Myanmar, and wars in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, many of these crises melded humanitarian disaster with conflict and post-conflict dynamics, and generated the term “complex emergencies.”

Other crises stemmed from natural disasters such as the 1988 Armenian earthquake, 1991 Bangladesh cyclone, 2000 Mozambique floods, 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, 2005 Pakistan earthquake, 2010 Haiti earthquake, 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami, and 2015 Nepal earthquake. With climate change contributing to more complex emergencies and natural disasters, the overstretched international humanitarian system faces serious quandaries in action.[1] Responding to such humanitarian needs can quickly exceed the capacity of states.

In response, humanitarian organizations pressed for changes in the delivery of aid. These organizations range from faith-based and secular non-governmental organizations to government aid and development agencies to international bureaucrats. This pressure led to the creation of an international humanitarian system that stressed cooperation among international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), states, and the relevant agencies of the UN. Defined as "the network of humanitarian organizations and international humanitarian law (IHL) that spans rights, relief, and rescue," members of the international humanitarian system identify themselves by their adherence to the four institutionalized "humanitarian principles."[2] These core norms include humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. First endorsed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1965, the member-states of the UN enshrined them with general assembly resolutions in 1991 and 2004.[3]

Of these four core norms, humanity is the overriding principle that describes the imperative to address suffering wherever it is found. To do this, humanitarian organizations should be impartial by prioritizing assistance solely on need, neutral by not taking sides,

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[1] Dorothea Hilhorst, ed. *Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises: Everyday Politics of Crisis Response*. Routledge Humanitarian Studies. London: Routledge, 2013.

[2] Peter J. Hoffman and Thomas G. Weiss, *Humanitarianism, War, and Politics: Solferino to Syria and Beyond* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).

[3] Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations, A/RES/58/114, United National General Assembly (5 February 2004); Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations, A/RES/46/182, United National General Assembly (19 December 1991); Jean S. Pictet, *Red Cross Principles* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1956).

and independent so as to keep to the other principles.[4] In support of these humanitarian principles, the operational principle of last resort emerged as early as 1995 to intentionally separate armed forces from humanitarian actors.[5] This principle of last resort advises that militaries should only be used when they offer a specific capability not met by civilians, have a unique advantage of capability, timeliness, and availability, and complement (not compete with) civilian capabilities.[6] The enduring question for all in the humanitarian community is how to meet ever-increasing humanitarian needs while acting in accordance with these principles.

Counter-intuitively, all but the first humanitarian norm impedes collective action by *any* humanitarian actors if they are acting instrumentally. At the core, their ability to gain access and function in the field is dependent on other actors" perceptions of their impartiality, neutrality, and independence.[7] The principles establish a clear operational intent that humanitarian needs should be kept apolitical, led by civilians, and that efficient and effective principled aid would be best managed by expertise within the humanitarian community. Humanitarians maintain that their reputation, security, and identity as humanitarian organizations is contingent on this distinction. These core principles act as a shield preventing coordination with groups that have perceived political considerations, either working with government agencies, taking state donor funding, or working with

[4] International Committee of the Red Cross, *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief* (1964), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-1067.pdf.

[5] United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Report of the Task Force on the Use of Military and Civil Defense (M/CD) Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations* (Geneva, Switzerland, 1995).

[6] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *What is Last Resort* (Geneva, 2012), https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Last%20Resort%20Pamphlet%20-%20FINAL%20April%202012.pdf.

[7] Laura Hammond, "The Power of Holding Humanitarianism Hostage and the Myth of Protective Principles," in *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics*, ed. Barnett, Michael and Thomas G. Weiss (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).

militaries. Even the cordial competition between aid organizations for funds and mission growth drives organizations against cooperation.[8]

The principle of last resort explicitly mandates excluding *armed* forces from humanitarian assistance except in unique circumstances. Militaries, as the extension of a states" political power, can never claim to be neutral or impartial. Often as the perpetrators of violence, those who receive assistance may have a hard time distinguishing between the armed forces causing the violence and those possibly there to help. This distinction became even more difficult with humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm—inserting militaries to commit violence with the political aim of protecting civilians and ending the humanitarian crisis.[9] Since its earliest mention of last resort, the criteria for requesting military support has been when the military forces can bring a unique, necessary capability only until the humanitarian community can fill the gap. If requested, the humanitarian community demands that assistance decisions be based solely on need (reaffirming impartiality), under civilian leadership, and with the full respect of the humanitarian principles. Humanitarian organizations that strictly interpret these collective norms would not cooperate—especially with militaries.

Cooperation amongst humanitarian and military forces in humanitarian assistance, however, is now routine and actively promoted. Since 2003, such cooperation is institutionalized in a framework of Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination, UN CMCoord, under the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN

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[8] Ian Smillie and Larry Minear, *The Charity of Nations: Humanitarian Action in a Calculating World* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc., 2004).

[9] Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Katzenstein, Peter J. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss, "R2P: From Idea to Norm—And Action?," *Global Responsibility to Protect 1* 1 (2009).

OHCA).[10] Humanitarians and military forces have cooperated in humanitarian emergencies ranging from natural disasters to battlefield support. UN OCHA adopted specific categories of interaction from the least cooperative, where actors co-exist and use CMCoord officers as an interlocutor, to liaison relationships, to the most cooperative, co-location. This unexpected relationship leads to the research question examined by this dissertation: what determines how humanitarian and military actors cooperate in humanitarian response?

B. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE

The purpose of this research is to understand how humanitarians and military forces have cooperated during humanitarian civil-military coordination in humanitarian response after the Cold War. Theoretically, the study develops Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot's nascent concept of a practices lifecycle. Empirically, it examines the understudied component of civil-military coordination in humanitarian assistance. It advances our knowledge on the various uses of military forces in humanitarian missions and addresses the potential tensions of increased civil-military coordination vis-à-vis the humanitarian principles. As the variety of roles for military actors likely increases, the role of coordination between military and humanitarian actors continues to expand. Improved knowledge of humanitarian civil-military coordination informs policymakers, practitioners, and scholars. Policymakers can update guidance, structures, and procedures based on an increased understanding of coordination activities in the field. This data informs the UN in the staffing and training of CMCoord officers and others in the field. This information also increases all actor's recognition of the role humanitarian principles play in practice. Militaries can improve training with enhanced awareness of the values

[10] *United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Concept Paper*, Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group 60th Meeting (Rome, 2005); United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines)* (Geneva, 2003), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3f13f73b4.pdf. United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord) is different from UN Civil-Military Cooperation (UN CIMIC) which is an official term used to describe a military function within a peacekeeping operation. When this dissertation comments on civil-military cooperation (lower case), it refers to the cooperation occurring within UN OCHA, specifically UN CMCoord.

and priorities of other actors they may engage. Finally, this empirical study in humanitarian civil-military cooperation further tests international practices theory.

C. AN EMPIRICAL GAP IN THE HUMANITARIAN LITERATURE

The new post-Cold War era of unprecedented cooperation in humanitarian civil-military coordination is minimally studied through rigorous empirical and theoretical design. This section briefly explains the empirical gap, and the next section outlines the theoretical explanations for the research question.

While the research on humanitarian civil-military coordination is limited, the literature on other aspects of humanitarian action has breadth and depth. Broadly, scholars typically examine types of events like peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, refugee crises, stabilization operations, post-conflict reconstruction, and development—each defining the relationship between humanitarians and militaries in different ways.[11] Humanitarian civil-military coordination remains understudied in events like natural disasters and protracted crises in particular. While studying a particular event, scholars also tend to narrow their focus to a subset of issues like logistics, protection, technology, medical care/trauma response, gender-based violence, food and nutrition, sanitation, or camp management.[12] Other scholars may emphasize a specific actor, like the ICRC, INGOs, host nation government, civil society, military forces, or a specific UN

[11] Lise Morje Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Peter J. Hoffman and Thomas G. Weiss, *Sword & Salve: Confronting New Wars and Humanitarian Crises* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. , 2006); Betts, Alexander and Phil Orchard, ed. *Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed Books, 2014).

[12] Aruna Apte, "Humanitarian Logistics: A New Field of Research and Action," *Foundations and Trends in Technology, Information, and Operations Management* 3, 1 (2010); Willy Shih and Margaret Pierson, *Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief: What Can We Learn from Commercial Supply Chains?*, Harvard Business School (Boston, MA, 2014); Patrick Meier, *Digital Humanitarians: How Big Data is Changing the Face of Humanitarian Response* (London: Routledge, 2015); Alex de Waal, *Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine* (Cambridge: Polity, 2018).

organization.[13] Throughout the literature in these broad categories, the role of humanitarian civil-military coordination through UN CMCoord has rarely been examined.

The minimal humanitarian civil-military coordination literature includes UN-sponsored reviews, humanitarian policy organization's evaluations, and government, military, or think tank reports.[14] These reports examine cases to review the issues, capture lessons learned, identify trends and challenges, and make recommendations—almost universally to expand coordination capacity through a trained workforce.[15] Some sectoral reviews, particularly logistics, technology, or medical care/trauma response, also comment on the usefulness of their intersection with humanitarian civil-military coordination.[16] Occasional INGO publications reflect on the civil-military debate relative to the humanitarian principles and degree of engagement in the field.[17] Vincenzo Bollettino's survey into the humanitarian perceptions of civil-military coordination after Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 is one empirical study.[18] Finally, a first of its kind study occurred after the Battle for Mosul, evaluating how INGOs in Iraq working with UN CMCoord incorporated

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[13] Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell, *Shaping the Humanitarian World* (London: Routledge, 2009); Ginty, Roger Mac and Jenny H. Peterson, ed. *The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action.* London: Routledge, 2016; Monika Krause, *The Good Project: Humanitarian Relief NGOs and the Fragmentation of Reason* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014); James F. Miskel, "Observations on the Role of the Military in Disaster Relief," *U.S. Naval War College Press* 49, 1 (Winter 1996).

[14] This empirical literature informs the data collection of this research in the upcoming chapters.

[15] Sharon Wiharta et al., *The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute-SIPRI (Solna, Sweden, 2008); Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom, and Stuart Gordon, *Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil-military Coordination: A Review of the Literature* Humanitarian Policy Group (London, 2012).

[16] Hosanna Fox et al., *Emergency Trauma Response to the Mosul Offensive, 2016–2017: A Review of Issues and Challenges*, Humanitarian Outcomes commissioned by Médecins Sans Frontières (2018); Shih and Pierson, *Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief: What Can We Learn from Commercial Supply Chains*; Meier, *Digital Humanitarians: How Big Data is Changing the Face of Humanitarian Response*.

[17] Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, *SCHR Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations* (Geneva, 2010), https://www.alnap.org/help-library/schr-position-paper-on-humanitarian-military-relations.

[18] Vincenzo Bollettino, *Civil-Military Engagement: An Empirical Account of Humanitarian Perceptions of Civil-Military Coordination During the Response to Typhoon Haiyan*, Society for Disaster Management and Public Health (2015).

the humanitarian principles into practice and the preservation of humanitarian identity in conflict settings.[19] While limited, this literature is used extensively as data to support this research.

D. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS

Explaining the puzzle of how and why a cooperative framework for humanitarian civil-military coordination emerged requires stepping back to examine potential theoretical explanations for how actors behave in humanitarian assistance. I begin with more general theories of change in international structures, where most research assumes that actors either act rationally or normatively in line with structural constraints and fixed interests—constraints and interests that are material or ideational, respectively.[20] This literature can explain part of what has unfolded in the field of humanitarian assistance since 1991. This section introduces these explanations, and Chapter II will provide a more detailed review of the literature.

1. Rationalist Explanations as the Conventional Wisdom

Purely rationalist accounts suggest that states engage in humanitarianism politically to achieve security gains. States decide whether to cooperate in humanitarian action based on interest calculus. The conventional wisdom in the humanitarian literature argues that state support of humanitarian assistance is politicized, securitized, militarized, or instrumentalized.[21] Participation in a humanitarian civil-military coordination system is another way the perception of political influence may enter humanitarian response.

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[19] HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq* (Geneva, 2017), https://www.nrc.no/resources/reports/principled-humanitarian-assistance-of-echo-partners-in-iraq/.

[20] Kenneth Waltz, *Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

[21] Hoffman and Weiss, *Humanitarianism, War, and Politics: Solferino to Syria and Beyond*; Donini, Antonio, ed. *The Golden Fleece: Manipulation and Independence in Humanitarian Action*. Boulder, CO: Kumarian Press, 2012; Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, *Humanitarian Politics*, The Foreign Policy Association (New York, Fall 1995); Metcalfe, Haysom, and Gordon, *Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil-ilitary Coordination: A Review of the Literature*

Rationalism is good at explaining two divergent outcomes based on calculations of power and self-interest. On the one hand, rational egoism accounts for those cases where states chose to act ad hoc or bilaterally rather than collectively, despite suboptimal individual and humanitarian outcomes.[22] With this explanation, actors are primarily incentivized neither to cooperate nor to coordinate in humanitarian action based on their individual interests. Powerful states use humanitarianism and the supporting institutionalization in international organizations as a tool to achieve a relative gain or preserve existing arrangements—particularly the Western powers.[23] Despite robust international organizations, coordination mechanisms, and frequent multilateral cooperation, actors may still choose to act in an ad hoc fashion, bilaterally, or donate based on interests instead of need. The Nepal earthquake of 2015 exemplifies this non-cooperation when one of the major contributing countries, China, chose to conduct their humanitarian response bilaterally rather than cooperatively. [24] INGOs and UN agencies may also choose non-cooperation when it is perceived to be advancing their respective organizational interests.[25] The rational egoist perspective leads to the proposition that the relative power of donor states is expected to determine the relationship between military and humanitarian actors in humanitarian assistance interested in a particular situation and over time. In this view, humanitarian civil-military coordination would be determined by powerful member-states" ad hoc preferences in their self-interests.

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[22] Ben Ramalingam and Michael Barnett, *The Humanitarian's Dilemma: collective action or inaction in international relief?*, Overseas Development Institute (London, 2010).

[23] John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19, 3 (Winter 1994–1995); Hoffman and Weiss, *Humanitarianism, War, and Politics: Solferino to Syria and Beyond*.

[24] Matthew Southerland, *The Chinese Military's Role in Overseas Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Contributions and Concerns*, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2019), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20Staff%20Report_The%20Chinese%20Military%E2%80%99s%20Role%20in%20Overseas%20Humanitarian%20Assistance%20and%20Disaster%20Relief_7.11.19.pdf.

[25] Ramalingam and Barnett, *The Humanitarian's Dilemma: collective action or inaction in international relief?*

An alternative rational institutionalist explanation builds on cooperation theory in pursuit of absolute gains.[26] Humanitarianism is perceived as a collective good within interdependent systems. As a result, it is in states" collective self-interest to cooperate and delegate humanitarian response to an international institution. Powerful states create institutions that increase their net benefits from cooperating and institutional efficiency of humanitarian aid delivery.[27] It explains how the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Council used their material resources to ensure that the United Nations created an international regime to reduce the transactions costs of delivering humanitarian assistance and increase the technical efficiency of multilateral aid delivery, as was seen in UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 in 1991.[28] Within this rational institutionalist approach, states, UN agencies, and INGOs likewise chose to cooperate to achieve effectiveness and efficiency and avoid duplication of scarce resources. The central proposition flowing from the rational institutionalist perspective is that the relationship between militaries and humanitarians is based on rational actions of actors with common interests to increase the technical efficiency of assistance through the creation and maintenance of institutions, thereby creating the most benefits for the fewest costs. In this view, member-states" preference for technical efficiency would determine humanitarian civil-military coordination.

Neither rationalist explanation can account for the normative values at the core of humanitarianism that are embedded in the international humanitarian system and humanitarian civil-military coordination. While states are important actors, calculated self-interest cannot solely explain their actions. The values of the international humanitarian system also do not reflect state power preferences. These norms constrain states" pursuit

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[26] Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[27] Hoffman and Weiss, *Sword & Salve: Confronting New Wars and Humanitarian Crises.*

[28] References include official communiques on behalf of these countries to the United Nations Secretary General advocating in support of UNGAR 46/182.

of their self-interest, are potentially inefficient from a cost-benefit perspective, and impede alternative actors from helping within the humanitarian space.

2. Humanitarianism Exemplifies the Normative Explanation

Constructivism is a better explanation of how ideational constraints became enshrined in the international system. As social constructions, norms shape identity and how actors comprehend the world and therefore redefine interests.[29] This, in turn, affects behavior and outcomes.[30] Humanitarians, through their principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence, aspire to be apolitical and argue that humanitarianism should transcend politics.[31] The humanitarian identity derives from the degree of adherence to these humanitarian principles in action.[32] The constructivist approach gives increased agency to non-governmental actors and UN agencies in shaping the international regime and the guidance, structures, and procedures set therein.[33]

The adoption of norms is commonly explained as a norm lifecycle starting when a norm-entrepreneur champions a new idea. This process describes the stages of norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalization.[34] Internalization is achieved when international norms are institutionalized or bureaucratized. Finnemore and Sikkink use the creation of international humanitarian norms as a key example of how norms can shape

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[29] Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (1994).

[30] Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention."; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1989).

[31] Michael Barnett, "Evolution without Progress: Humanitarianism in a World of Hurt," *International Organization* 63 (2009); David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002); Antonio Donini, Larry Minear, and Peter Walker, "The Future of Humanitarian Action: Mapping the Implications of Iraq and Other Recent Crises," *Disasters* 28, no. 2 (2004).

[32] Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein, ed. *Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

[33] Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

[34] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. No. 4 (Autumn 1998).

actors and structures.[35] In this case, Henry Dunant acted as a norm-entrepreneur, championing the care of wounded soldiers on the battlefield until his ideas were internalized by states and institutionalized into international law and an international organization, the ICRC.

The norms can come from a variety of different actors, including non-governmental organizations or from within the UN bureaucracy. As an example of a non-governmental actor approach, the ICRC influenced the member states of the UN General Assembly to embrace its definition of the humanitarian norms of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence in 1991 and 2004.[36] Humanitarian identity within the international humanitarian system is considered dependent on adherence to these norms. As an example of the international organization, or top-down globalist approach, the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) of UN humanitarian agencies, the ICRC, and INGO consortia, had sufficient agency to enshrine the principle of last resort on its own in 1995.[37] The institutionalization of these norms into policy reflects the final stage of internalization. With this explanation, the relationship between militaries and humanitarians would be defined by the humanitarian principles and the principle of last resort. As seen in the literature review, these normative constraints are both critical principles for operations and key to the humanitarian identity. The normative proposition would derive that once institutionalized, the humanitarian norms of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, and last resort determine the manner in which militaries and humanitarians behave in delivering humanitarian assistance. The relationship and the operational guides governing it should reproduce and reinforce the humanitarian social structure. In this view, the processes for humanitarian civil-military coordination would be the result of institutionalized norms advocated by UN agencies, UN CMCoord, the ICRC, and INGOs.

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[35] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change."

[36] *The NGO Challenge for International Relations Theory*, ed. William E. DeMars, Dennis Dijkzeul (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2015).

[37] Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

While constructivism explains the increased agency of non-state actors, normative constraints, and identity of humanitarians, it fails to account fully for why some of these norms also face contradictions between each other, are challenged in the field and exclude additional actors like militaries.[38] Another critique is referred to as the institutionalization-implementation gap where ideas may be accepted and even codified, but little is done in implementation and enforcement. In this gap, norms face additional obstacles to become practice.[39]

3. Moving Beyond Rationality and Norms

The rational and normative explanations do not sufficiently answer how militaries and humanitarians have come to cooperate. The rationalist explanations describe institutionalization as a means of powerful states to codify existing arrangements or as a way to cooperate to achieve effectiveness and efficiency. The normative approach describes institutionalization as the internationally documented acceptance of an idea. Neither approach, individually nor working in conjunction, provide enough guidance to perform the required tasks during a crisis. In humanitarian assistance, responding to the day-to-day, life-and-death needs of hundreds of thousands of people in unique circumstances require negotiation and on-the-spot decision making. As the local actors collectively agree that coordinating in humanitarian response yields a better outcome, figuring out how to coordinate is not best answered by higher headquarters with self-interested motives or by restraining activities in an attempt to uphold norms above all else. As such, I propose an alternative approach that gives local actors more agency and better explains how militaries and humanitarians have come to cooperate.

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[38] Metcalfe, Haysom, and Gordon, *Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil-military Coordination: A Review of the Literature* ; Sarah Collinson, *Constructive deconstruction: Making sense of the international humanitarian system*, Humanitarian Policy Group (London, 2016).

[39] Betts and Orchard, ed., Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice; Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Katherine Sikkink, ed. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

E. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES APPROACH

Situating itself in the "practice turn" in international relations, this dissertation argues that viewing humanitarian assistance as a set of practices best accounts for the evolution of the system of humanitarian assistance delivery today. It investigates whether actors" behavior in humanitarian assistance is the product of *practices* that both socialize and allow for actor innovation. Vincent Pouliot explains that in "everything that people do, in world politics as in any other social field, there is always a practical substrate that does not derive from conscious deliberation or thoughtful reflection—instrumental, rule-based, communicative, or otherwise."[40] Instead of interests or ideas shaping practices, Pouliot reverses the causal arrow showing how practices shape the world.[41] Cooperation is not just a political negotiation at the highest levels, but localized social processes that are generative forces unto themselves.[42] In this view, "government officials and their respective networks, as well as non-state representatives, pursue what *communities of practice* first bring to collective consciousness and attention."[43] More succinctly, "practices constitute strategic interaction and bargaining."[44] In contrast to structural normative approaches, practices emerge out of an agent's interaction with social structures and actual conditions in the field. Therefore, there is room for dynamism in the practices model as agents do not merely conform and reproduce social or material structures, they engage with them in the conditions in which they find themselves. This interaction between agents and the field leaves room for actors to alter and displace norms, not merely

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[40] Vincent Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 12.

[41] Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*.

[42] Vincent Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 10.

[43] Emanuel Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, 2 (2008): 200.

[44] Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, "International Practices," *International Theory* 3, 1 (2011): 1.

reproduce and reinforce them in their everyday actions.[45] In this view, the humanitarian principles "only become real through the way in which service providers interpret them and use them in their everyday practice."[46] It is the sustained enactment of such innovative activity that leads to the development of a new practice. The central proposition derived from the international practices approach is the relationship between militaries and humanitarians will be negotiated as they interact in the field. In this view, humanitarian civil-military coordination would be the result of localized social processes between UN agencies, UN CMCoord, the ICRC, INGOs, and military forces.

International practices theory expects that the evolution of the international humanitarian system will take the form of a practice lifecycle, in which a practice is first generated, diffused, institutionalized, and may fade.[47] The community of practice propagates newly generated practices and diffuses them into new field conditions. The new practice dominates and is institutionalized in part because it offers a "balance or temporary consensus" that is acceptable to "dominant coalitions and government networks," and can serve as a "rallying point for stable coalitions," rather than for purely instrumental, efficiency or normative reasons.[48] Humanitarian practices then are expected to be renegotiated based on the different background knowledge and expertise of the humanitarian and military actors as they interact and learn from one another in aid delivery. This genesis of the practices may diverge from formal norms, guidance, structure, or procedures.

1. Practices Shape Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination

This dissertation argues that cooperation between militaries and humanitarians, formally titled UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord), is the result

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[45] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice, Preceded with Three Studies in Kabylian Ethnology* (Paris: Seuil, 2000).

[46] Hilhorst, ed., Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises: Everyday politics of crisis response, 8.

[47] Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices."

[48] Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 203.

of a locally negotiated practices as the UN CMCoord, humanitarians, and militaries interact in the field. The social structure of the international humanitarian system has evolved as aid practitioners interacted in crises whose complexity and scale seemed only to increase. Before the 1991 General Assembly Resolution 46/182, actors were mostly independent and isolationist. If organizations were willing to coordinate, it was primarily ad hoc. With the resolution 1991, a co-existence method of engagement relied on the initial coordination mechanisms of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs.[49] This led to a method of engaging with the centralized structure for coordination and co-existing with other actors in the field. Militaries were minimally engaged as humanitarian actors, so co-existence applied to them as well with clear distinctions of humanitarian space. In the same period, the concept of using military forces as a last resort diffused in the 1990s.[50] Militaries and humanitarians began interacting more during a series of events in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As a result, the UN agents in the field created ad hoc humanitarian-military coordination functions. In 2003, guidance formally institutionalized the role of humanitarian civil-military coordination (UN CMCoord).[51] This widened the spectrum of engagement from co-existence to liaison exchanges and broader still to the co-location of actors.[52]

Humanitarian civil-military coordination evolved to include functions of combined planning, information sharing, developing context-specific guidance, negotiating access,

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[49] The first coordination structures, the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) and United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams were established in 1991 and 1993 respectively.

[50] United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Guiding and Operating Principles for the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations* (Geneva, 1995), https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_files/iasc_1995_report_on_use_of_civil-military_and_civil_defense_assets_and_annex_guiding_principles.pdf.

[51] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines)*.

[52] *United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Concept Paper*.

dividing tasks, and deconfliction.[53] Practitioners gained experience, drew lessons, and generated additional structures and procedures to manage their interactions. Within this context, implementing the humanitarian principles in the field faced operational challenges. Even with continuous reinforcement, the principles were interpreted, balanced, weighed, and operationalized—all ways of describing the practical challenges of applying principles in practice.[54] After 2005, humanitarian civil-military coordination and the other functions have been continually renegotiated. Today, humanitarian civil-military coordination is now part of the background knowledge that aid practitioners bring to the field in new crises. I contend that the cooperative relationship between humanitarians and militaries is the result of field-level practices that have diffused and been institutionalized. This institutionalization does not reflect top-down direction or ideas but instead captures structures and procedures negotiated in the field better explained by the international practices approach.

F. PLAN OF THE STUDY

By adopting an international practices theory approach to explain the emergence of civil-military cooperation in humanitarian assistance, this research seeks to improve upon earlier work on international practices theory in international relations scholarship. The first two chapters will develop the analytical approach used in this research. Chapter II develops more fully the alternative explanations used in the dissertation, particularly the international practices approach and the research design. The research design includes a longitudinal study and two case studies to examine this question. Chapter III evaluates the changing relationship between civilian humanitarian organizations and militaries over time from 1991 to 2009. Chapters IV and V, respectively, examine how well the international practices approach explains humanitarian civil-military interactions during the 2010 Haiti earthquake and 2016 to 2017 Battle for Mosul. Chapter VI assesses the overall findings

[53] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 2.0* (Geneva, 2018), https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/[E-Version]%20UNCMCoord%20Field%20Handbook%202.0%20%282018%29.pdf.

[54] HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

and discusses the implications for the future study of civilian-military coordination in humanitarian assistance as well as areas for further research.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The purpose of this study is to understand how humanitarians and militaries cooperate in humanitarian assistance. In particular, to facilitate this cooperation the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) formalized the mechanism of Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) in 2003.[55] As the nexus point for the interaction between humanitarians and militaries, this research examines the activities of CMCoord officers with military forces, UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). It explores if a rational, normative, or international practices approach best explains how this cooperative framework emerged.

This chapter includes a literature review of the international relations scholarship providing the theoretical background necessary to examine the question and a detailed description of the research design. An in-depth review explains how the rational, normative, and practices approaches would each answer the research question. This is followed by the qualitative research design describing the methodology, data collection, and data analysis used for this study.

A. RATIONALISM

A rationalist explanation focuses on distributions of power and interests amongst all the actors.[56] A fundamental assumption underpins rationalist theory in that "instrumental rationality provides the crucial link between the environment and actor behavior."[57] For a rationalist international relations scholar, the primary agents in the international order are states who either work non-cooperatively or cooperatively to

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[55] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines)*.

[56] Waltz, *Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis.*

[57] Peter Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner "International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 679.

achieve an interest-based outcome. The choice regarding strategies of non-cooperation or cooperation stems from their associated costs and benefits and the ability to achieve the actor's core interest. Outcomes are measured according to interests realized. Rational explanations of humanitarian assistance can result in either an ad hoc or bilateral humanitarian response (rational egoism, or realism) or creating and participating in international organizations where coordination results in burden-sharing and technical efficiency (rational institutionalism). A direct way for a state to act in its own interest is through its political actions, military support, or donations. These rationalist explanations to non-cooperative/cooperative behavior, though focused on states, also apply to other actors such as UN agencies and INGOs who can also act with the same rationally calculated, interest-driven, outcome-focused motivation. This section provides a theoretical background to the rationalist egoist and rational institutionalist explanations and the implications of coordination within these explanations.

1. Rational Egoism as Adhocracy in Humanitarian Response

Rational egoism explains that humanitarian actors would determine cooperation in an ad hoc manner that maximizes power and self-interest. In the unstable and uncertain anarchic environment, actors prefer guarding self-interests even if it yields a suboptimal overall outcome.[58] If providing humanitarian assistance is determined in one's interests—the relationships on the ground between states, UN agencies, and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) would then be determined by the relative influence of the providers. This leaves aid open to instrumentalization by those with the power. The rational egoist perspective leads to the proposition that the relative power of donor states is expected to determine the relationship between military and humanitarian actors in humanitarian assistance interested in a particular situation and over time. A state or organization's cooperation or non-cooperation would be ad hoc based on the calculation of interests.

[58] Ramalingam and Barnett, *The Humanitarian's Dilemma: collective action or inaction in international relief*; Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).

a. Rational Egoism

States instrumentalize humanitarian action in a variety of ways. A direct way for a state to act in its own interests is through its own development agencies or donations to implementing partners like INGOs.[59] Powerful donor states contributing the most funding to international institutions and INGOs should have the most influence over their behavior, policies, and decision making.[60] Humanitarian assistance is being instrumentalized when given in support of the state's interests. Antonio Donini defines instrumentalization as "the use of humanitarian action or rhetoric as a tool to pursue political, security, military, development, economic, or other non-humanitarian goals."[61] The goals often overlap, making them difficult to differentiate, but these examples describe instrumentalized state actions. Politically, aid is used to win friends, earn or maintain a reputation, increase economic partnership, or at times, act as a substitute for effective political or military action.[62] Humanitarian activities can also be related to security interests like the counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, or counter-drug operations.[63] Economic assistance or development aid can be provided to increase trade or mitigate migration.[64] The needs of recipient states may cross many of these categories, making it difficult to parse the many ways aid is instrumentalized. Placing additional conditions on aid instrumentalizes it

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[59] Joanna Macrae et al., *Uncertain Power: The Changing Role of Official Donors in Humanitarian Action*, Humanitarian Policy Group Report 12 (London, 2002).

[60] Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions." Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, *Humanitarianism Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread* (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2011), 91.

[61] Donini, ed., The Golden Fleece: Manipulation and Independence in Humanitarian Action, 2.

[62] Smillie and Minear, *The Charity of Nations: Humanitarian Action in a Calculating World*.

[63] Metcalfe, Haysom, and Gordon, *Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil-military Coordination: A Review of the Literature*

[64] Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*.

further.[65] State power expressed through instrumentalization, manipulation, and contingencies on donorship and assistance provide evidence in support of this proposition.

With states as the primary agent in realist international relations theories, humanitarian interaction is shaped by their rationally calculated interests shown through their ad hoc policies and funding. States can determine whose suffering matters, whose need matters, chose to give money bilaterally instead of multilaterally, earmark funds for preferential projects/countries, and introduce their own mechanisms for performance and accountability.[66] States, in this view, tend to prefer an ad hoc response—giving them the flexibility to cooperate or not as they see fit. The consequences of inaction determine if the response is required, and participation in coordination is decided case-by-case. Adaptivity and flexibility mask adhocracy—particularly in new or complex events.[67] States often interpret "humanitarianism as a political phenomenon deeply connected to security."[68] As a result, the relationship of militaries and humanitarians in the field would reflect the state's political and security interests. Bilateral action, ad hoc involvement, politicization, and militarization of humanitarian assistance for security interests are all viewed as evidence supporting this proposition.

Realists often consider intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and INGOs insignificant when compared to the relative power of states.[69] International organizations and INGOs have a tenuous relationship with states based on their need for political support and funding. Intergovernmental organizations, like the UN, are led by states and reflect a world order constructed by those most powerful. The growth of departments and agencies

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65 Daniela Nascimento, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Humanitarian Challenges and Dilemmas in Crisis Settings," *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (2015), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/One%20step%20forward%2C%20two%20steps%20back.pdf.

66 Thomas G. Weiss, *Humanitarian Business* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).

67 Nicola Reindorp and Peter Wiles, *Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience*, Overseas Development Institute (London, 2001), 12.

68 Hoffman and Weiss, *Humanitarianism, War, and Politics: Solferino to Syria and Beyond*, xxii.

69 Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions."; *The NGO Challenge for International Relations Theory*.

derives from state endorsement, and funds can be withheld if agencies act counter to state prerogatives. As such, international organizations are merely another mechanism of state power and interests. Also, the UN agencies themselves may choose not to cooperate with other UN agencies if doing so is perceived to be in their best interests, usually defined as protecting funding and turf.[70] Evidence of UN agencies executing powerful state preferences or failing to cooperate for their own self-interest supports this proposition.

International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) operate differently, but their need for funding can also yield a realist logic of action. Their funding can be from states, private enterprise, philanthropies, or individual donors. This can lead to asymmetric power differences between donors and recipients. The need for funds also creates a competitive atmosphere amongst INGOs as they jockey for political influence, employees, prestige, and market share.[71] David Rieff comments that "competition for donor funds can determine an NGOs entire rationale for action."[72] The result is INGO resistance to regulation or professionalization and an ardent resistance to being *coordinated*.[73] The self-interested motives or competition between INGOs that results in non-cooperation is also taken as evidence of this proposition.

Pulling together the self-interested actions of states, UN agencies, and INGOs, this rational egoist/non-cooperative approach argues that the relationship between militaries and humanitarians is based on the rationalistic actions of actors to achieve their power or material ends. Broadly speaking, the incorporation of militaries in humanitarian action in an ad hoc or bilateral fashion determined by the interests of the state in each case. With

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[70] Ramalingam and Barnett, *The Humanitarian's Dilemma: collective action or inaction in international relief?*

[71] Smillie and Minear, *The Charity of Nations: Humanitarian Action in a Calculating World*; Collinson, *Constructive deconstruction: Making sense of the international humanitarian system*.

[72] David Rieff, "The Humanitarian Trap," *World Policy Journal* 12, 4 (Winter 1995/1996); Fiona Terry, *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

[73] Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000); Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa* (London: African Rights and The International African Institute, 1997); Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*.

respect to civil-military coordination, the non-cooperative rationalist explanation would expect that militaries, as tools of states, would act in the state's interests, and UN agencies and INGO preferences would be marginalized. This approach expects that cooperation is difficult and ad hoc unless states view it in their interest.

b. Alternative Realist Explanation

An alternative realist explanation of humanitarian assistance rests on the distribution of power and public goods theory. It argues that the most powerful state in the system, the hegemon, or group of powerful states, will create and maintain institutions, such as international regimes, to reduce the costs of gaining other states" compliance with its wishes.[74] The powerful states are willing to pay the costs of providing these regimes that serve their interests and are more cost-effective than using coercion. Powerful states, in this view, create humanitarian assistance institutions that increase their power and prestige.[75] Power is central to this explanation, as a lead nation or group of like-minded states can use their preponderance of power to drive the rules, agreements, and institutions of an international regime.[76] These structures of power also encourage other actors to obey the established regime. In the international humanitarian system, certain states, particularly the United States and western countries, in this view, would act to achieve an international humanitarian system to their liking and even influence the decision whether or not to act in particular crises.[77] As Larry Minear and Thomas Weiss stated, "in fact, it is logistically and politically unlikely that a major international humanitarian operation would be undertaken without strong American participation and encouragement."[78] Without

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[74] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998).

[75] Hoffman and Weiss, *Sword & Salve: Confronting New Wars and Humanitarian Crises*.

[76] Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes," in *Change in the International System*, ed. Holsti, Ole R., Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander George (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980).

[77] Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*.

[78] Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, *Humanitarian Politics*, ed. Association, Foreign Policy, vol. 304, Headline Series, (Ithaca, NY, Fall 1995), 64.

hegemonic endorsement, states may choose non-participation or non-cooperation. Overall, this hegemonic influence in favor of cooperation would also extend to setting the rules for how militaries are utilized in humanitarian action. The actions of powerful states to establish and shape the humanitarian assistance regime in accordance with their interests would also be evidence supporting this proposition.

2. Rational Institutionalism to Maximize Efficiency in Humanitarian Response

The rational institutionalist explanation of humanitarian collective action builds on cooperation theory in pursuit of absolute, not just relative gains.[79] In this view, all actors are assumed to have interests in achieving their common humanitarian goals in addition to egoistic interests in increasing their power and influence. They, therefore, have incentives to build institutions that reduce the costs of achieving their common humanitarian aims and increase their benefits over the long-term. Unlike in realist theories, actors" mutual interests can lead to cooperation and achieve the most optimal outcome—collectively delivering more humanitarian assistance at less individual cost. Actors who desire the optimal outcome will communicate extensively to avoid the inefficiency of operating independently. The central proposition flowing from the rational institutionalist perspective is that the relationship between militaries and humanitarians is based on rational actions of actors with common interests to increase the technical efficiency of assistance through the creation and maintenance of institutions, thereby creating the most benefits for the fewest costs. A state or organization's cooperation would be based on the interest in increasing efficiency.

To facilitate international cooperation, actors will choose to form an international regime. This is usually defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors" expectations converge in a given area of international relations."[80] In this view, the international humanitarian system is

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[79] Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*.

[80] Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, 57.

interpreted as an international regime—establishing norms, standard operating procedures, and decision-making processes to optimize the delivery of humanitarian assistance with maximum efficiency. Rational institutionalists highlight the functionalism of international institutions and view them mainly as technical environments, rather than normative ones.[81] As such, UN humanitarian agencies like the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) would aim to reduce transaction costs by sharing information and creating processes, so actors do not have to relearn an ad hoc process each time. Alterations to the humanitarian regime should primarily stem from the common desire to improve the regime's technical rationality, in other words, increasing its ability to increase the benefits of cooperative and effective humanitarian response and reducing its costs.[82] In this view, UN CMCoord focuses on the technical efficiency of using military forces to optimize the delivery of aid. States" efforts to create and alter institutions to improve technical rationality and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance is evidence of this proposition.

In the pursuit of absolute gains, all states would choose to execute their humanitarian interests through their participation in international organizations—thereby sharing the burdens of leadership, cost, and developing an international cadre of experts and responders. While they may bargain with each to achieve relative gains in terms of who pays for or supplies what, they are also motivated to achieve the collective outcome of delivering humanitarian response most efficiently and effectively possible. As a cost-benefit analysis, states would be interested in getting more value through increased effectiveness and efficiency of their investments in humanitarian assistance.[83] States would decide on the inclusion of military forces and their relationship to humanitarians

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[81] Steven Weber, "Origins of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development." *International Organization* 48, no. 1 (1994): 1–38. http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/2706913., p. 5.

[82] W. Richard Scott and John W. Meyer, eds., *Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983); W. Richard Scott, *Organizations: Rational, Natural and Open Systems*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1987); and W. Richard Scott, "Unpacking Institutional Arguments: The new institutionalism in organizational analysis. Walter W. Powell and PJ DiMaggio." (1991): 164–182.

[83] Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," *International Organization* 36, 2 (Spring 1982).

through a cost-benefit analysis emphasizing "bang for the buck." The rational institutionalist explanation would be supported if research reveals that the primary intent of states, UN coordinators, and other donors in creating and altering the humanitarian assistance coordination system is technical efficiency—including the various uses of militaries. Research would reveal efficiencies sought in costs and benefits. Reducing costs addresses the inefficient use of resources and effort and ineffectiveness in aid delivery. Increasing benefits takes the form of improved timeliness and more effective and efficient use of resources and effort.

3. Do Rational Interests Offer the Best Explanations?

These rationalist explanations, both the realist ad hoc/bilateral action and rational institutionalist cooperative burden-sharing for efficiency, are frequently made in the humanitarian literature.[84] While the non-cooperative, ad hoc approach gives flexibility, the cooperative burden-sharing approach addresses the increasing costs of adhocracy with a more systemic framework for coordination. States provide the majority of the authority, political negotiation, legitimacy, and funding—all things most actors depend on. In both rationalist explanations, the interests of the state determine how militaries are incorporated in humanitarian response. Yet the overall notion behind humanitarian action revolves around a sense of "oughtness"—that the dignity of peoples should be respected, whether soldier or civilian. One common critique of the rationalist perspective is that it does not recognize this normatively restrictive nature of international humanitarian law, the various UN agencies" mandates, or the guidance and coordination structures they have established. These structures constrain states" pursuit of self-interest and may introduce inefficiencies into the system. Rationalism also does not account for the agency of the UN or INGOs in operations or the policy formulation process. The meaning of humanitarian activity is primarily shaped by these organizations and not states—giving them agency which is

[84] Hoffman and Weiss, *Humanitarianism, War, and Politics: Solferino to Syria and Beyond*; Donini, ed., The Golden Fleece: Manipulation and Independence in Humanitarian Action; Linda Polman, *The Crisis Caravan: What's Wrong With Humanitarian Aid?* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010); Michael Barnett, "Humanitarianism Transformed," *Perspectives on Politics* 3, 4 (December 2005); Ramalingam and Barnett, *The Humanitarian's Dilemma: collective action or inaction in international relief?*

dismissed in the rationalist explanation. As such, the alternative normative perspective has gained much traction within the literature.

B. NORMATIVE EXPLANATIONS

The norms-based explanation is also popular for humanitarianism based on its commitment to norms, foundation story, and influence of ICRC and INGOs in the international humanitarian system. Based on constructivist thinking, this approach counters the exogenous, material, and static notion of interests and argues that ideational forces can shape international relations and organizations.[85] Problematizing interests makes room for the advocacy of socially-constructed norms based on a logic of appropriateness that would then change actor interests and identities over time.[86] Unlike in the rationalist perspective, structure and agency are mutually constitutive between the actors making room for interests to be dynamic instead of static.[87] As a result, the process of advocating norms, ideas, and values can have a causal role in world politics as well as give agency to the actors that promote them.[88] Within humanitarianism, the normative proposition would derive that once institutionalized, the norms of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, and last resort determine the manner in which militaries and humanitarians behave in delivering humanitarian assistance. The relationship and the operational guides governing it should reproduce and reinforce the humanitarian social structure. An organization or state's cooperation or non-cooperation would be based on their respective interpretation of normative behavior. This section will cover the normative aspects of humanitarianism and the implications of coordination within this explanation.

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[85] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992).

[86] Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention."; March and Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics.*

[87] Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Review: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50, 2 (1998): 328.

[88] March and Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics*.

1. Humanitarian Action Defined by Norms

"Principled" humanitarian action, either cooperative or non-cooperative, derives from normative values. Defined as the "standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity," the norms institutionalized in the humanitarian assistance system include the ICRC principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence, as well as the principle of last resort for the use of military forces.[89] They are called the industry standard, the Maginot Line, and the core values that seek to guide practices.[90] The self and collective identity of humanitarian actors within this system is based on moral and ethical adherence to these ideas.[91] These norms then shape interests, behavior, and outcomes. A brief definition of each informs the findings of the research:

> **Humanity:** "The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavors in its international and national capacity, to *prevent and alleviate suffering* wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to *protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being*. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation, and lasting peace amongst all peoples."[92] [emphasis added]
>
> **Impartiality:** "It makes *no discrimination* as to the nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the urgent cases of distress."[93] [emphasis added]

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89 Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 891.

90 Hugo Slim, *Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the Morality of Aid in War and Disaster* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Barnett, "Humanitarianism Transformed."

91 Andrea Schneiker, *Humanitarian NGOs, (In)Security and Identity: Epistemic Communities and Security Governance*, Global Security in a Changing World Series, (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2015); Michael Barnett, "Evolution without Progress? Humanitarianism in a World of Hurt," *International Organization* 63, 4 (2009).

92 International Committee of the Red Cross, *The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement* (Geneva, 1986).

93 International Committee of the Red Cross, *The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement*.

Neutrality: "In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement *may not take sides* in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature."[94] [emphasis added]

Independence: "The Movement is independent. The National Societies, while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their *autonomy* so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the principles of the Movement."[95] [emphasis added]

Principle of Last Resort: The appropriate use of military and civil defense assets in humanitarian emergency operations occurs when the following three criteria are met:

> "a specific capability or asset requirement that cannot be met with available civilian assets has been identified; and foreign military and civil defense assets would help meet the requirement and provide unique advantages in terms of capability, availability, and timeliness; and foreign military and civil defense assets would complement civilian capabilities."[96]

In this view, actors" statements and actions, as well as their self-proclaimed identities, would be in adherence to these norms. As a result, militaries, as an instrument of the state, are not perceived as impartial or neutral.[97] Therefore, in "principled" humanitarian action, humanitarians would seek minimal cooperation only under the conditions of last resort or non-cooperation to maintain a distinction from military forces. The primacy of norms over technical efficiency or power considerations supports this normative proposition.

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[94] International Committee of the Red Cross, *The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement*.

[95] International Committee of the Red Cross, *The Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement*.

[96] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines) Rev. 1.1* (Geneva, November 2007), https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/OSLO%20Guidelines%20Rev%201.1%20-%20Nov%2007_0.pdf; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines)* (Geneva, 2006), https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/01.%20MCDA%20Guidelines%20March%2003%20Rev1%20Jan06_0.pdf.

[97] Pamela Aall, Daniel Miltenberger, and Thomas G. Weiss, *Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000).

2. Humanitarianism in the Norm Lifecycle

Norms arise and shape behavior in the international arena through a norm lifecycle. Humanitarianism is the empirical example used to show how the norm lifecycle can shape world politics.[98] On an incremental trajectory, institutional change occurs through the stages of norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalization.[99] Figure 1 shows the initial norm lifecycle with the additional implementation stage discussed below.



Figure 1. Norm Lifecycle and the Additional Stage of Implementation.[100]

A norm emerges when a norm entrepreneur builds new notions of what is appropriate behavior motivated by altruism, empathy, and ideational commitment. In the genesis story of the international humanitarian system, Henry Dunant acted as a norm entrepreneur, convincing states that wounded soldiers should be permitted adequate medical care and thereby redefined their interests based on this idea.[101] These ideas then gain advocates and cascade. After a tipping point, they are internalized through institutionalization—becoming the new norm. Dunant's advocacy led to institutionalized

[98] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change."

[99] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change."

[100] Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 896.

[101] Henry Dunant, *A Memory of Solferino* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1963).

humanitarian norms in the Geneva Conventions in 1864 and the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863.[102]

Other constructivist scholars extended this norm lifecycle from internalization to add implementation, as seen in Figure 1.[103] Through implementation, internationally institutionalized norms are primarily reinforced through domestic laws. The human rights, development, and refugee literatures have investigated this extension of the norm lifecycle, but it has not permeated the humanitarian literature.[104]

Norms emerge in the norm lifecycle in two key ways: top-down or bottom-up. First, a top-down international organization, or globalist, explanation attributes normative emergence to the top-down advocacy of the authoritative agency within international organizations.[105] In this view, as the UN agencies and programs become increasingly bureaucratized, they would develop their own capacity to shape expected behavior.[106] For example, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) first enshrined the principle of last resort in 1995, defining when and how it was appropriate to use military forces in humanitarian assistance.[107] In this top-down explanation, the ideational initiatives of the UN work in concert with the agency of INGOs who can socialize norms to gain acceptance

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[102] International Committee of the Red Cross, *The Geneva Convention For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field* (Geneva, 12 August 1949), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3694.html; Georges Willemin and Roger Heacock, *International Organization and the Evolution of World Society: Volume 2 The International Committee of the Red Cross* (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984).

[103] Betts and Orchard, ed., Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice.

[104] Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, ed., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Betts and Orchard, ed., Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice; Broome, Andre and Leonard Seabrooke, ed. *Seeing Like an International Organization*. London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2014.

[105] Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*.

[106] Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*.

[107] United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Guiding and Operating Principles for the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations*.

while also advocating internalization within international organizations and states.[108] In this view, the functions of CMCoord and the relationship between humanitarians and militaries would be dictated by the IASC or UN OCHA implementing norms-based guidance on their own authority.

Norm emergence can also be bottom-up from transnational civil society. This non-governmental actor approach gives agency to the ICRC and INGOs and for generating and promoting the acceptance of new norms.[109] INGOs, as norm entrepreneurs and champions, would provide input into the international humanitarian system and policy process about what needs are on the ground and how they are best met through their normative perspective.[110] The over 11,000 NGOs registered with the UN deliver the majority of the assistance.[111] It is important to note that while this research refers to INGOs collectively, they are not a monolithic group in any sense. They vary in size, scope, budget, mission, values, and interpretation of the humanitarian principles, and large INGOS dominate the perceptions.[112] This research will broadly speak to INGOs as a collective when distinguishing them from the UN or state entities but will also highlight individual INGOs in specific cases and their respective perspectives. In this bottom-up view of norm emergence, the ICRC and INGOs would work collectively to dictate their normative prerogatives to OCHA for how to work with CMCoord officers and military forces. Internalized ideas of how and when it is appropriate to work with military forces that have emerged from civil society, INGOs, or the ICRC support this proposition.

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[108] *The NGO Challenge for International Relations Theory*.

[109] *The NGO Challenge for International Relations Theory*.

[110] Weiss, *Humanitarian Business*; Melissa Labonte, *Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons from the responsibility to protect* (London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2013).

[111] "Integrated Civil Society Organizations System," ed. Branch, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Non-Governmental Organization (2019). https://esango.un.org/civilsociety/login.do.

[112] Krause, *The Good Project: Humanitarian Relief NGOs and the Fragmentation of Reason*.

3. Categorizing Humanitarian Norms

The literature provides two useful ways to categorize norms: ethical distinction and range of formality. Hugo Slim categorized norms by adapting the ethical distinctions between absolute, obligatory, and aspirational norms to humanitarianism.[113] In his strict interpretation, absolute principles are "exceptionless" like humanity and impartiality. Obligatory principles have a similar stature but could have reasonable exceptions like neutrality or independence. Aspirational principles represent the ideal to be sought. Slim recognizes that operating with more than one principle, like the humanitarian principles, inevitably puts the principles in tension with each other at times.[114] This ethical categorization informs debates within the humanitarian community about the relevancy and practicality of how to operate in accordance with the principles. For example, should they be treated equally or prioritized with moral common sense?[115] While Slim categorized the principles as absolute and obligatory, other scholars and practitioners among the INGO community have a wide range of interpretations of the principles—relegating them to be more aspirational.[116]

Norms can also be categorizing based on their range of formality in the international system. Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard and parse these as treaty norms, policy norms, and principle norms.[117] The legalization of norms through international treaties marks the highest level of formality, internalization, legitimacy, and observable commitment of the

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[113] Slim, *Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the Morality of Aid in War and Disaster*; James F. Childress, "Norms," in *A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics*, ed. Macquarrie, John and James F. Childress (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1967).

[114] Slim, *Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the Morality of Aid in War and Disaster*, 43.

[115] Slim, *Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the Morality of Aid in War and Disaster*, 43.

[116] Larissa Fast, "Humanitarian Debate: Law, Policy, Action—Unpacking the Principle of Humanity: Tensions and Implications," *International Review of the Red Cross* 97, no. 897/8 (Spring/Summer 2015), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/irc_97_1-2_bookmark-compressed.pdf.

[117] Betts and Orchard, ed., Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice.

part of states.[118] International humanitarian law (IHL), otherwise known as the law of armed conflict (LOAC) or the Geneva Conventions, is distinguished by reaching this level of formality. Policy norms, while not formalized into law, typically evolve from international organization processes, often with input from state and non-states actors, officially documenting norms. They denote "shared expectations for all relevant actors within a community about what constitutes appropriate behavior, which is encapsulated in…policy."[119] Principle norms also denote a standard of appropriate behavior, albeit the least formalized. They emerge when formalizing norms is not desired or possible and include a larger collection of non-state actors discussing the meaning of what appropriate behavior looks like. Principle norms, like UN resolutions, indicate a process of institutionalization and general acceptance in international fora, but with less agreement and willingness to enforce. The different categorizations are essential to understanding when, and which types of norms shape coordination choices.

4. Role of the State/Military in the Normative Explanation

Although constructivist literature focuses on a variety of non-state actors, states—through the people in them—also promote specific values and act accordingly. States can be norm entrepreneurs themselves, approve and abide by international humanitarian law, and endorse normative humanitarian policy and actions through international institutions. Just because a state is acting within the system should not be automatically interpreted as a rational intent and can reflect an ideational commitment to norms—even if they contribute military forces to the action.

Militaries, as the state's instrument of force, would also have a more nuanced role in the normative explanation of the humanitarian response. Primarily recognized as the perpetrators of violence, many humanitarians perceive that military forces inherently clash

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[118] Beth A. Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[119] Susan Park and Antje Vetterlein, "Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and the World Bank," in *Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and the World Bank*, ed. Park, Susan and Antje Vetterlein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4.

with humanitarians in counter-cultural friction that plays out in the field.[120] Nonetheless, it is upon militaries to contribute to upholding international humanitarian law. Moreover, while militaries cannot claim to be impartial, neutral, or independent, they bring extensive manpower who are called to serve, readily deployable, and highly organized.[121] In keeping with the principle of humanity, saving lives and alleviating suffering, militaries could be seen as "humanitarian actors" in certain circumstances. Likewise, militaries, just like the state, are made up of individuals who hold compassionate values. Thomas Weiss and Cindy Collins commented that "stereotypes of military personnel do not readily lend themselves to a humanitarian imaging; but there are soldiers who have a personal commitment to helping and who volunteer for duty that allows them to express their individual humanitarian impulse."[122] The intent of this brief section is to dispel the myth that states, if they employ military forces in humanitarian operations, are operating only under rational, interest- or security-based motives. In this view, if states deploy their militaries in support of a humanitarian imperative, the normative explanations would be supported.

5. Are Norms the Best Explanation?

The normative explanation provides a popular explanation for how humanitarians and militaries work together in humanitarian response—primarily emphasizing those who choose not to cooperate based on humanitarian's emphasis on distinction. The primacy of appropriate behavior, shown through adherence to the humanitarian principles, would largely deter humanitarians from cooperation—or only to cooperate under the terms of last resort. While constructivism explains the increased agency of non-state actors, normative constraints, and identity of humanitarians, it falls short in explaining cooperation with actors like the military that do not share the same values. Constructivism also relies too much on appropriateness—robbing humanitarians of their agency and diminishing their

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120 Aall, Miltenberger, and Weiss, *Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations.*

121 Waal, *Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine*, 124.

122 Weiss and Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention*, 43.

decision-making space.[123] Humanitarian norms also face contradictions between themselves and are challenged during operationalization in the field.[124] The emphasis on appropriateness weakens this as an explanation for humanitarian organization's decisions to cooperate with militaries.[125]

Agency within constructivism is mainly at the systemic level where internalization and institutionalization occur in the norm lifecycle. Even with the transnational civil society bottom-up explanation, individual agency and mid-level agency is only considered as a causal variable in norm change in international organizations.[126] This explanation minimizes practical input from field-level activities. Another key critique is called the institutionalization-implementation gap.[127] In this gap, humanitarian ideas may be accepted and even codified, but little is done in implementation and enforcement—in other words, norms face the additional hurdle to become practice.[128] The fundamental question at the heart of this research is that civil-military coordination, a cooperative practice, occurs despite the norms intended to exclude militaries. To better answer this question, an alternative explanation is proposed.

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[123] Ole J. Sending, "Constitution, Choice, and Change: Problems with the "Logic of Appropriateness" and Its Uses in Constructivist Theory," *European Journal of International Relations* 8, 4 (2002); Leonard Seabrooke and Eleni Tsingou, *Revolving Doors and Linked Ecologies in the World Economy: Policy Locations and the Practice of International Financial Reform*, University of Warwick, CSGR Working Paper 260/09 (Warwick, 2009).

[124] Metcalfe, Haysom, and Gordon, *Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil-military Coordination: A Review of the Literature* ; Collinson, *Constructive Deconstruction: Making Sense of the International Humanitarian System.*

[125] Seabrooke and Tsingou, *Revolving Doors and Linked Ecologies in the World Economy: Policy Locations and the Practice of International Financial Reform*.

[126] John Karlsrud, *Norm Change in International Relations: Linked Ecologies in UN Peacekeeping Operations* (London: Routledge, 2016).

[127] Betts and Orchard, ed., Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice.

[128] Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, ed., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change.

C. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES EXPLANATION

International practices theory posits that localized social processes—or practices—are generative forces unto themselves in the international system.[129] This "practice turn" in international relations scholarship addresses an operational gap where high-level interests, institutionalized norms, or existing policies do not sufficiently explain actor behavior in humanitarian or other international venues. Instead, "bundles of individual and collective practices woven together produce specific outcomes."[130] These practices are a causal mechanism shaping world politics.[131] Cooperation is, therefore, the result of local actor engagement within communities of practice.[132] The central proposition derived from the international practices approach is the relationship between militaries and humanitarians will be negotiated as they interact in the field. This section defines practices in general, practices in humanitarian coordination, and the nascent practices lifecycle.

1. International Practices Theory

Scholars draw upon international practices theory to explain multilateral engagement that requires broad consensus from disparate actors. Primarily explored in multilateral diplomacy, practices theory has also been examined in related activities like international negotiations, conflict resolution, and multilateral field-level operations like

[129] Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy*, 10.

[130] Jeremie Cornut, "The Practice Turn in International Relations Theory," in *The International Studies Encyclopedia* ed. Denemark, Robert A. and Renee Marlin-Bennett (Oxford Reference Online: Blackwell Publishing, 2015).

[131] Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*.

[132] Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation."

UN peacekeeping and UN policing.[133] In particular, John Karlsrud examined the local agency of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in UN peacekeeping operations to balance the competing norms of sovereignty and human rights and humanitarian principles.[134] He found that the SRSG drew from their background knowledge and expertise of others to negotiate a balanced consensus in country and create agreed-upon practices.

Practices combine the individual knowledge of practitioners, the material context they operate in, and the social structures constituted through their practical interaction.[135] Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot define practices as "socially meaningful patterns of action, which is being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world."[136] In this view, humanitarian assistance would be a set of practices related to saving lives and alleviating suffering.

Practices emerge out of the need to repeat actions in a commonly understood manner. Ann Swidler stated:

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[133] Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices."; Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*; Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, "Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya," *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 4 (2014); Andrew Cooper and Jeremie Cornut, "The Changing Practices of Frontline Diplomacy: New Directions for Inquiry," *Review of International Studies* 45, no. 2 (2019); Lou Pingeot, "Protecting or Policing Civilians? United Nations Peace Operations and Global Order Enforcement" (PhD McGill University, 2019); Karlsrud, *Norm Change in International Relations: Linked Ecologies in UN Peacekeeping Operations*.

[134] Karlsrud, *Norm Change in International Relations: Linked Ecologies in UN Peacekeeping Operations*.

[135] What constitutes practices in the literature is continually debated. Most of the debate is around the narrowness or breadth of the definition as well as what is understood in the mind of the individual and what is external like shared understandings of symbols or communications. Kratochwil, Cornut, and Bueger and Gadinger provide good insights into these debates. Friedrich Kratochwil, "Making Sense of "International Practices"," in *International Practices*, ed. Adler, Emanuel and Vincent Pouliot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Cornut, "The Practice Turn in International Relations Theory."; Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger, "The Play of International Practice," *International Studies Quarterly* 59 (2015); Andreas Reckwitz, "Toward a Theory of Social Practice. A Development in Culturalist Theorizing," *European Journal of Social Theory* 5, no. 2 (2002).

[136] Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices," 4.

> the crucial thing about social practices—and the feature that differentiates them from most habits—is that they are the *infrastructure of repeated interactional patterns*. They remain stable not only because habit ingrains standard ways of doing things, but because the *need to engage one another forces people to return to common structures.*[137] [emphasis added]

The practical need to engage drives humanitarian responders to create local structures. The practices approach addresses the dichotomy between structure and agency in international relations theory. As Adler and Pouliot describe, "suspended between structure and agency, practices are simultaneously enacted (agency) and inserted within a social context or political order (structure)."[138] These mutually constructed patterns of operations subsequently produce broader structural effects. Per this theoretical explanation, the cooperative relationship between militaries and humanitarians is the outcome of local practices that have been increasingly formalized.

The practical knowledge of actors plays a significant role in practices. Pouliot differentiates this by describing two types of knowledge: representational knowledge and practical knowledge.[139] With representational knowledge, knowledge precedes practice; it is conscious, explicit, acquired through formal schemes, and reasoned. With representational knowledge, a person may "know that" or "in situation X, you should do Y" based on instrumental or normative reasons. Counter to this and supporting practices theory is practical knowledge—to "know how" or that "in situation X, Y follows.'[140] It is tacit, experiential, implicit, and intuitive. Through this lens, how the humanitarian system operates would not be driven by states or headquarters regardless of their motivations, but by the improvised practices of actors with practical knowledge in the field interacting within the operating environment to achieve humanitarian ends.

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[137] Ann Swidler, "What Anchors Cultural Practices," in *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory*, ed. Schatzki, Theodore R., Karin Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny (New York: Routledge, 2001), 11.

[138] Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices," 16.

[139] Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*, 29.

[140] Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*.

Practices are developed in the field—the social configuration and context where actors interact.[141] In both complex emergencies and natural disasters, the international community is responding on the ground in a social context at the tactical/operational level. Since each event entails unique circumstances in a different environment, practices theory would account for the variability in action as actors apply practical knowledge to the new context.

2. Practices in Humanitarian Coordination

In this view, humanitarian civil-military coordination is a set of practices related to how militaries and humanitarians cooperate during humanitarian assistance. The CMCoord officers, humanitarians, and military members apply their practical knowledge to the new social context. This informs the interaction amongst other actors to create proficient, repeatable engagements. Evidence of applied practical knowledge of the individual actors—through anecdotes of personal experience by CMCoord officers or others—supports the practices explanation. Also, civil-military coordination procedures that result from the repeated engagement of CMCoord officers, military forces, and INGO representatives at the local field level provide additional evidence in support of the practices approach.

Practices build repeatable patterns through discourse or practical interaction in a "community of practice."[142] In a group, learning occurs through interaction—building collective consciousness and the competent patterns of action. According to Adler, "as boundaries of communities of practice are determined by people's knowledge and identity and by the discourse associated with a specific practice, communities of practice, unlike networks, are not necessarily "congruent with the reified structures of institutional affiliations, divisions, and boundaries.'"[143] Without a formal structure, members of the

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[141] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice, Preceded with Three Studies in Kabylian Ethnology*.

[142] Etienne Wenger, *Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[143] Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 200.

humanitarian assistance community of practice include the UN agencies, UN CMCoord, the ICRC, INGOs, NGOs, and possibly some member-states and donors. Belonging to this community of practice is contingent on both knowledge and participation within the group. According to Adler, the:

> knowledge domain [of a practice] endows practitioners with a sense of *joint enterprise*, which 'brings the community together through the collective development of a shared practice" and is constantly being renegotiated by its members. People function as a community through relationships of *mutual engagement* that bind 'members together into a social entity." Shared practices, in turn, are sustained by a *repertoire of communal resources*, such as routines, sensibilities, and discourse.[144] [emphasis added]

In this view, the adopted shared practices would be the result of collective engagement in a mutual process and perpetuated through routines and patterns. Shared practices that have "routines, sensibilities, and discourse" are evidence of this approach.[145]

The "humanitarian assistance community of practice" would be characterized by the commitment to respect human life and taking action to preserve it. The collective knowledge is linked to what Adler calls a "structure of disciplined subjectivity" or self-recognition of core values constituting the community's institutions.[146] The core values are the humanitarian principles, the principle of last resort, and international humanitarian law, which are applied in their practices in the field. The community member's "disciplined subjectivity" expressed in practices spreads through the engagement of non-members so that they will recognize and revere the "disciplined subjectivity" of humanitarianism but *not necessarily changing their other values.*[147] To the humanitarian community, the non-members would include governmental representatives, militaries, other armed groups,

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[144] Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 199.

[145] Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 199.

[146] Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 206.

[147] Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation."

private sector, contracted services, and the civil society they are all intended to serve. From the practices perspective, the international humanitarian system is better identified as a humanitarian assistance community of practice because it is in the practice of delivering aid, not the idea of it, that best describes the system. Throughout the dissertation, I refer to this broader humanitarian assistance community of practice in the familiar vernacular as the "international humanitarian system" or "humanitarian community." I specifically use "community of practice" to identify the actors focused on humanitarian civil-military coordination.

The civil-military "community of practice" is comprised of humanitarian civil-military actors. Repeated engagements between humanitarians and militaries form a separate community of practice that focuses specifically on humanitarian civil-military coordination. This joint enterprise would include those military forces and humanitarians in the field forced to return to common structures for repeated interaction.[148] Through discourse, the "structure of disciplined subjectivity" would interpret the humanitarian principles, the principle of last resort, and international humanitarian law in mutually agreed-upon ways to work together.[149] In this view, UN CMCoord officers, with their practical knowledge and competency, aid the generation of localized social processes to create socially meaningful patterns of action, or shared practices, with the local humanitarian community and military forces. This group of actors constitutes a "humanitarian civil-military coordination community of practice." In this research, any references to the "community of practice" identifies this group exclusively. Evidence of shared civil-military practices, collectively developed and constantly renegotiated by the humanitarian civil-military community of practice supports the practices proposition.

By explaining world politics through the lens of "bundles of individual and collective practices woven together," the cooperative framework for humanitarians and

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[148] Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 199.

[149] Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 206.

militaries is seen as the outcome of practices, not principles.[150] Although humanitarian scholars have not directly tested the international practices theory, the tension between principled and pragmatic approaches to response has been written about for decades.[151] Aligned with this approach, Dorothea Hilhorst and Bram Jansen stated: "humanitarian principles are seen as socially negotiated and acquiring meaning in practice."[152] The practices approach operationalizes the humanitarian principles into the practices of delivering assistance humanely, impartially, neutrally, and independently while unarmed. Viewing the principles as universal or ahistorical does not accurately account for the compromises renegotiated as context changes, warfare changes, technology changes, and what is deemed appropriate behavior changes.[153] Rather than being absolute, obligatory, or aspirational according to the norms literature, the principles are taken in context—compromised, applied, adapted, and interpreted. The varied interpretation of the humanitarian principles by local actors doing civil-military coordination supports the practices approach.

Finally, the practice of humanitarian assistance does not exist in a vacuum but is part of a broader "constellation of practices" in which militaries and humanitarians relate in different ways.[154] These activities include peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, stabilization operations, post-conflict reconstruction, nation-building, and

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[150] Cornut, "The Practice Turn in International Relations Theory."

[151] Larry Minear, *The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas & Discoveries* (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, Inc., 2002); Nicholas Leader, *The Politics of Principle: The Principles of Humanitarian Action in Practice*, Overseas Development Institute Humanitarian Policy Group (London, 2000), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/311.pdf; Larry Minear, "The Theory and Practice of Neutrality: Some Thoughts on the Tensions," *International Review of the Red Cross* 833 (1999), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jpsx.htm.

[152] Dorothea Hilhorst and Bram J. Jansen, "Humanitarian Space as Arena," in *Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises: Everyday Politics of Crisis Response*, ed. Hilhorst, Dorothea (London: Routledge, 2013), 190.

[153] Leader, *The Politics of Principle: The Principles of Humanitarian Action in Practice*.

[154] Etienne Wenger, *Communities of Practice: Learning as a Social System* (1998), https://thesystemsthinker.com/communities-of-practice-learning-as-a-social-system/.

development.[155] The "structure of disciplined subjectivity" is different for each type of activity, but interactions in separate events affect the "disciplined subjectivity" of the humanitarian principles in humanitarian assistance.[156] Debates regarding the humanitarian principles in other activities show that practices may be adjusted based on the interaction of local actors in the broader constellation of practices.

In sum, practices are a series of repeated patterns based on the background knowledge, the social context in the field, and the interaction of actors.[157] In humanitarian response, humanitarian civil-military coordination can be considered the outcome of a bundle of practices.[158] The community of practice would include CMCoord officers, military forces, the ICRC, and INGO representatives who form a joint enterprise in the field to mutually constitute an infrastructure of proficient, repeatable engagements. As a result, the cooperative relationship between militaries and humanitarians is the result of practices in the field.

3. Practices Lifecycle

To understand how practices shape subsequent behavior, Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot proposed a cycle of practices similar to the norm lifecycle. The practice lifecycle includes generation, diffusion, institutionalization, and fade as seen graphically depicted in Figure 2.[159]

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[155] Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*; Hoffman and Weiss, *Sword & Salve: Confronting New Wars and Humanitarian Crises*; Betts and Orchard, ed., Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice; Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*.

[156] Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 206.

[157] Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices."

[158] Cornut, "The Practice Turn in International Relations Theory."

[159] Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices."



Figure 2. International Practices Lifecycle

First, the generation of new practices stems from organized and meaningful patterns of action informed by an individual's practical knowledge. Diffusion occurs as these practices then become the intersubjective knowledge of practitioners and expanded in use. The community of practice is essential in the diffusion of practices to both members and non-members. Institutionalization marks the point where this intersubjective knowledge becomes established social structures.[160] Fade describes a point where a practice loses relevancy and declines in use. The practices lifecycle adds a temporal aspect to this explanation. It has not been developed theoretically beyond this initial inception. This lifecycle can be used not only to examine specific decisions in world politics but also to trace changes over time.

4. Practices Do Not Exclude Other Explanations

As practices are mutually constructed, the international practices theory does not exclude the possibility for rational or normative explanations of behavior. Instead, formative interactions can be due to either rational or normative reasons, or both.[161] Jérémie Cornut summarizes that "practice theory challenges rationalism and constructivism, but this does not mean that it denies that individuals make rational calculations, or that social norms constrain their behavior."[162] As Ted Hopf clarifies, "even while an agent is reflecting upon what action will yield the most benefits or correspond to

[160] Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices."

[161] Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices," 25.

[162] Cornut, "The Practice Turn in International Relations Theory," 11.

her normative commitments, she is doing so against a taken-for-granted background of habit that has already constrained her imaginable outcomes."[163] Though while practices theory does not exclude other explanations, it provides a distinct, separate explanation for what shapes world politics as previously described.

Adler and Pouliot's broad definition of practices also draws criticism from other practices scholars.[164] Erik Ringmar noted there "is no definition of practices that can command broad assent and yet retain sufficient explanatory power."[165] Morten Andersen and Iver Neumann comment on the vagueness of practices—that "when studying the social world, practices can easily come to mean everything and thus nothing at the same time."[166] While valid criticism and contemporarily debated, I have chosen to use the most frequently applied comprehensive scholarly definition in international practices theory. I argue this definition and the corresponding practices lifecycle are the primary explanations for the emergence of a cooperative framework between humanitarians and militaries in humanitarian response.

D. RESEARCH PLAN

The dissertation evaluates the validity of the practices approach for understanding civil-military coordination in humanitarian response through a two-part empirical approach: first, a longitudinal study of the evolution of the international humanitarian system and civil-military coordination since 1991 and, second, two distinct case studies of instances of humanitarian assistance to evaluate whether the emergence and

163 Ted Hopf, "The Logic of Habit in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 4 (2010): 547.

164 Bueger and Gadinger, "The Play of International Practice."; Morten Skumsrud Andersen and Ivar Neumann, "Practices as Models: A Methodology with an Illustration Concerning Wampum Diplomacy," *Millennium* 40, no. 3 (2012).

165 Erik Ringmar, "The Search for Dialogue as a Hindrance to Understanding: Practices as Inter-paradigmatic Research Program," *International Theory* 6, no. 1 (2014).

166 Andersen and Neumann, "Practices as Models: A Methodology with an Illustration Concerning Wampum Diplomacy," 468.

institutionalization of practices leading to civil-military cooperation better explain the provision of humanitarian assistance than power, material interests, or norms alone.

1. Longitudinal Analysis

A longitudinal study examines the evolution of the relationship between humanitarians and militaries from 1991 to 2009. This narrative discusses the establishment of the international humanitarian system with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182, the establishment of UN-CMCoord in 2005, and the development of humanitarian civil-military coordination in its earliest machinations through to the time period of the case studies.

2. Case Studies

Two cases facilitate the assessment of the relationship between the role of militaries and humanitarians. The longitudinal analysis in Chapter III provides the historical foundation carried forward in analyzing the two cases. The first case is the Haiti earthquake on January 12th, 2010, and the second case is the Battle for Mosul to remove the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from Mosul, Iraq, from October 2016 to July 2017.

This research uses qualitative case studies to investigate the usefulness of international practices theory in political science. Scholars frequently use case studies to examine humanitarian crises. For this research, a case, or "an instance of a class of events," is an event that includes both humanitarian and military actors working together amidst a humanitarian emergency.[167] The two cases selected examine the humanitarian crises arising from a natural disaster, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and a complex emergency, the Battle for Mosul, in order to evaluate the alternative explanations as to why civil-military relations took the form they did. In both, the event overwhelmed host nation capacity resulting in mobilization of the international humanitarian system, including UN agencies, ICRC, INGOs, and foreign military forces. This placed humanitarians and militaries in

[167] Alexander; Bennett George, Andrew, *Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 17.

close proximity, allowing for the examination of whether rational, normative, or practice explanations can account most fully for their behavior.

The two cases offer very different "field" conditions and relevant sets of norms. I adopt the term "field" both theoretically (referring to social context) and geographically (referring to operational or tactical space of engagement) to describe the locality of action for the actors.[168] In both of these cases, a key state most interested in humanitarian assistance was also the most powerful one with important non-humanitarian interests: the United States. Its participation makes both of these "hard" cases for a normative or practices approach to explain. Instead, U.S. power and material interests should matter most in explaining how humanitarians and militaries behaved during these crises. In Haiti, the specter of a repeat of the 1994 Haitian refugee crisis generated a security imperative that, in a rational calculus, ought to trump humanitarian ones. Similarly, in Iraq, the United States has a strategic imperative to defeat ISIS and shore up the Iraqi state. Its presence and behavior, therefore, allow for a robust test of normative and practice approaches.

3. Methodology

The rational, normative, and practices explanations draw from an element of international socialization that then propels the policy proposal/idea/practice from inception to international institutionalization. While examining all potential explanations, I theoretically develop the practices lifecycle to conduct this research. I adopt the generation, diffusion, institutionalization, and fade terminology to explore further the international practices explanation in humanitarian assistance in a way that does not exclude evidence of the alternative explanations. This lifecycle framework shows changes that could be explained by any of the propositions. I use the practices lifecycle to organize the findings in the empirical chapters, in combination with process tracing.

The two case studies use process tracing to explain the outcome—the relationship between militaries and humanitarians in humanitarian response. Process tracing is defined

[168] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice, Preceded with Three Studies in Kabylian Ethnology*.

as "the use of evidence from within a case to make inferences about causal explanations of that case."[169] Further refined, Van Evera describes it as "the cause-effect link that connects independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the investigator looks for observable evidence of each step."[170] I examine the two case studies using a process-tracing methodology in four smaller steps, or phases, in order to assess the evidence as independently as possible in both cases.[171] All four phases viewed together enable the evaluation of whether norm or practice lifecycles or rationality appear to be operating.

The four phases include *status quo ante*, event dynamics, post-event organizational lesson drawing, and post-crisis institutions. The *status quo ante* phase covers the institutions that predate the cases. This first phase investigates which values, guidance, structures, and procedures are in place prior to the event that determines when, how, and which actors participate in civil-military coordination. The second event dynamics phase covers the action that occurs during the key event. This phase outlines activities during an event investigating the roles, influences, decisions, and motivations of the various actors as well as whether they adhere to the policies and principles in place at the time. The third phase, post-event organizational lessons-drawing, evaluates the actors" respective lesson-drawing processes in the wake of the event, comparing the lessons drawn by each set of actors. The fourth phase, post-crisis institutions, mimics the first phase in allowing us to examine what values, guidance, structures, and procedures are put in place after to the event that is to dictate how humanitarians and militaries interact in future humanitarian assistance operations. This final phase incorporates a more in-depth evaluation of an actor's logic of action to assess the validity of the alternative explanations. By using the four-phased

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169 Bennett, Andrew and Jeffrey T. Checkel, ed. *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

170 Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods For Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 64.

171 Alexander George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Advances in Information Processing in Organizations," (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985); Andrew Bennett, "Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards," ed. Brady, Henry E. and David Collier (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).

structure to evaluate the cases, this research can trace how the humanitarian principles and the principle of last resort have been applied in the field and how they have affected humanitarian civil-military coordination and broader humanitarian social structures over time.[172]

4. Data Collection

The data for this research consist of primary source document analysis, secondary source case reviews, and semi-structured interviews.[173] The primary sources of documents include official statements and policy reports on humanitarian coordination from states, UN agencies, ICRC, and INGOs participating in the cases. This consists of, but is not limited to, significant policy documents, UN meeting minutes, key actor pre-, during and post-crisis reports, post-event working group minutes, final collective after-action recommendation reports, and post-event policy documents that reflect institutionalized changes. Initially, the UN and INGO key actors are identified as those who played a role in the event and post-crisis reviews. All attempts have been made to collect military lessons learned from each of the militaries that supported a particular event. Secondary sources of case study analyses by think tanks, independent research, policy analysis organizations, and academic literature augment these data.

Semi-structured interviews provide the third source of data regarding humanitarian civil-military coordination. Interviews provided theoretical and empirical insights from humanitarian scholars, historical perspectives in support of the longitudinal analysis, and practitioner perspectives from the two cases—triangulating knowledge from primary documents and secondary case studies to validate data and fill analytical gaps. Practitioner interviewees included members of UN OCHA/CMCoord, the ICRC, and INGO representatives, with particular knowledge in humanitarian civil-military coordination that participated in the cases, and officials from countries that provided militaries to the cases

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[172] Vincent Pouliot, "Practice Tracing," in *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, ed. Bennett, Andrew and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[173] John W. Creswell and Cheryl N. Poth, *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, 4 ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2018).

selected—particularly the U.S. To gain a broader perspective of U.S. interests, interviewees included members of the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The majority of practitioners interviewed were high ranking officials working at the political-military-humanitarian nexus with a board perspective of the intersection of activities and motives. Almost all practitioners were at the tactical or operational level in the field during the event. I interviewed approximately fifty people, including fifteen to twenty for each case and a variety of humanitarian scholars. While not exhaustive, I interviewed a representative sample until interviews reached a point of saturation and no longer provided sufficient new data or insights.[174] The interview script, provided Appendix A, included a series of questions that follow an interviewee's organizational involvement before, during, and after the event to address lesson-drawing and behavioral changes observed. Specific questions were asked regarding the organizational perspective of the role of UN CMCoord, humanitarian principles and principle of last resort, and activities participated in during the event. Combined, these three sources of data provided in-depth information to evaluate the cooperative framework that has emerged in humanitarian civil-military coordination from 1991 through to the present.

5. Data Analysis

To evaluate the data collected, the interaction between militaries and humanitarians is measured through four key indicators of values and policy guidance, structure, and procedures.[175] These indicators are evaluated at the moment in time within the practices lifecycle of generation, diffusion, institutionalization, and fade.[176] Within the empirical chapters, periodic snapshots are used to display change over time by comparing one event to another within the practices lifecycle. To assist in showing the changes from figure to

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[174] Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*, 85; Pouliot, "Practice Tracing."

[175] Betts and Orchard, ed., Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice.

[176] Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices."

figure, the previous markings stay in black, and changes are represented in red. In part, such institutional changes will reflect a change in indicators, but they do not explain *why* such change occurs. To assess alternative explanations, I also consider how and to what extent rationalist and normative dimensions of coordinated actions are present. This will be done through a process of inferring whether the behavior was shaped by relative gains, technical efficiency, norms, or practices—focusing on the activities in the field. Figure 3 shows a blank chart of the indicators in the practices lifecycle used throughout the research. See Appendix B for a detailed description of each indicator within the lifecycle.

Indicators in Practices Lifecycle

Indicator	Practices Lifecycle			
	Generation	Diffusion	Institutionalization	Fade
Value-set				
Humanity				
Impartiality				
Neutrality				
Independence				
Last Resort				
Policy (Guidance)				
Universal published guidance				
Context-specific guidance				
Policy (Structure)				
Coordinator				
Cross-Actor Coordination Mechanism				
Coordination method				
Policy (Procedures)				
Dialogue and information exchange				
(Only in Chapter 5)				
Protections of Civilians				
Negotiating Access				
Deconfliction				
Task division amongst actors				

Figure 3. Indicators in Practices Lifecycle

The value-set indicator includes the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, and last resort, as previously defined. These are measured by the consideration given to these principles in the development of field-level practices that led

to humanitarian civil-military coordination. Policy (Guidance) includes both universal published guidance and context-specific guidance. Universal published guidance contains guidelines and handbooks issued by UN OCHA headquarters to inform actor behavior and expectations in the field during either a natural disaster and complex emergency. Context-specific guidance is developed locally and applies the universal guidance within a specific country. Policy (Structure) includes an identified field-level coordinator, a cross-actor coordination mechanism, and a coordination method. In civil-military coordination, a cross-actor coordination mechanism might include a center or cell where humanitarian and military actors converge.

The coordination method is defined by the CMCoord role or location between humanitarian and military forces: co-existence, liaison, or co-location. The coordination method terminology I have adopted, similar to the UN's CMCoord strategy, operates on a spectrum of engagement from co-existence to cooperation. Appendix C includes a chart showing the coordination method in contrast to the UN CMCoord strategy, mission of the military, liaison approaches, and humanitarian-civil-military platforms for reference.[177] On one end of this spectrum is a co-existence method—where humanitarians and militaries co-exist in separate geographic space and communicate only through the CMCoord interlocutor.[178] Per the existing UN guidance, this is still the preferred practice in conflict situations.[179] The middle of the engagement spectrum calls upon CMCoord officers to work with liaisons from humanitarian and military forces. Finally, the other end of the spectrum describes cooperation up to and including co-location of UN CMCoord officers within the humanitarian community and in reasonable geographic space to a military

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[177] *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Guide for the Military 2.0*, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Geneva, 2017), https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Guide%20for%20the%20Military%20v2.pdf.

[178] Metcalfe, Haysom, and Gordon, *Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil-military Coordination: A Review of the Literature*

[179] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 2.0.*

operations center. This is typically used in peacetime disaster response.[180] The CMCoord officer choice of a co-existence, liaison, or co-location coordination method has implications for the humanitarian civil-military coordination procedures.

The Policy (Procedures) indicator contains the primary CMCoord responsibilities of dialogue and information exchange as well as task division. In the last case, the Battle for Mosul, the dialogue task expanded to include the protection of civilians, negotiating access, and deconfliction. These additional procedures are included only in the analysis in Chapter V.

This research has taken limitations and validity of data into account. This research design intends to draw lessons of broader relevance to other coordination situations rather than to provide a minute or up-to-date chronology of events in the case studies.[181] Within the archival research, one key limitation is the willingness to share lessons learned, and of those shared, there is limited data on civil-military coordination itself. For the interviews, participants may answer with bias or answers that may reflect a personal perspective rather than an organizational perspective. Additionally, participants may not be forthcoming in areas that reflect negatively on their organization, and this is dependent on participants answering openly and honestly. I have taken reasonable measures to address this bias through the volume of interviews and by not asking guiding questions. The data was validated with corroborating evidence through triangulation, generation of thick descriptions, and seeking participant feedback.[182] The data analysis, therefore, provides a meaningful understanding of how militaries and humanitarians work together in humanitarian response.

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[180] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 2.0*.

[181] Antonio Donini, *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda*, Institute for International Studies, Brown University (Providence, RI, 1996), 4.

[182] Creswell and Poth, *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, 260.

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter explained the expected behaviors that would come from the rational, normative, and practices approach to answer the question about how humanitarians and militaries cooperate in humanitarian assistance. The research design includes a longitudinal study and two case studies to examine this question. By combining primary source documents, secondary case studies, and semi-structured interviews, data is presented to explore the alternative explanations. Although conventional wisdom cites rational and normative explanations, I argue international practices provide a better explanation for how militaries and humanitarians coordinate in humanitarian response, which is investigated in the following chapters. Adler and Pouliot argue that "one of the key epistemological consequences of taking international practices seriously is precisely to bring those scholarly debates "down" to the ground of world politics in order to empirically scrutinize the processes whereby certain competent performances produce effects of world political nature."[183] This research seeks to improve upon earlier work on international practices in international relations scholarship and theoretically develop the international practices lifecycle.

[183] Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices," 6.

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III. PRACTICES IN HUMANITARIAN CIVIL–MILITARY COORDINATION 1991–2009

> "Coordination" is one of the most overused and least understood terms in international parlance today. Those providing financial and moral support for humanitarian activities are increasingly insistent that coordination be improved, and duplication, waste, and competition be avoided.[184]

After the 1991 Kurdish humanitarian response, a UN report characterized "coordination" as an undefined axiom. Activities in the field showed a wide variety of actors operating independently time and again. Based on decades of this type of ad hoc response, practitioners, policy-makers, and scholars pinned hopes on the solution of "coordination." [185] With recurring interaction, the logical progression was generating practices to support coordination since the "need to engage one another forces people to return to common structures."[186] The 1991 United Nations General Assembly Resolution (UNGAR) 42/186, "Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations," meant to strengthen overall response by creating the international humanitarian system and the initial mechanisms to bring together humanitarian organizations.[187] Through a longitudinal analysis, this chapter shows that since the start of the international humanitarian system in 1991, international practices theory increasingly explains how humanitarians and militaries have come to cooperate in humanitarian assistance.

A few essential humanitarian developments occurred before UNGAR 46/182. First, dating back to 1863, international humanitarian law (IHL) established the humanitarian

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184 "United Nations Coordination of the International Humanitarian Response to the Gulf Crisis, 1990 – 92," Geneva: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, June 1992, p.2.

185 Donini, *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda*.

186 Swidler, "What Anchors Cultural Practices," 11.

187 Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations.

treatment of soldiers and civilians in conflict.[188] Also, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) adopted the humanitarian principles in 1965 and set the standards for humanitarian action.[189] Based on this history, humanitarian values and identity were well established within the UN agencies, ICRC, and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). Second, these INGOs began organizing into representative consortia that facilitated nascent coordination between themselves and worked to influence policy and practice. Practices were generated but rarely diffused and not systematically documented.[190] Third, the initial attempt at coordination was the creation of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO) in 1971.[191] At the time, the UN focused on coordinating only disaster response because the Cold War paralyzed the UN apparatus in conflict contexts—even in responding to humanitarian needs.[192] The massive Mexico earthquake of 1985 and the Armenian earthquake of 1988 laid bare the shortcomings of UNDRO. Before 1991, five other resolutions called for strengthening the capacity of the UN to coordinate the humanitarian response, but none of them created the institutional structures necessary to accomplish this. Finally, humanitarian civil-military coordination during this time was not necessary. During the Cold War, humanitarian response and action were primarily demilitarized.[193] These collective factors meant that the contemporary international humanitarian system did not form until 1991.

This dissertation argues that an international practices approach best explains the generation, diffusion, institutionalization, and fading of different sets of behavior—or practices—in civil-military coordination during humanitarian assistance. This chapter uses

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188 International Committee of the Red Cross, *The Geneva Convention For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field*. IHL was updated in 1949 with Additional Protocols 1 and 2 added in 1977.

189 Pictet, *Red Cross Principles.*

190 International Council of Voluntary Agencies, *A Basic NGO Coordination Guide* (Geneva, 2013), https://www.icvanetwork.org/icva-ngo-coordination-guide-2013.

191 Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*.

192 François Grünewald, *From UNDRO to the Transformative Agenda: 40 years of challenges for the coordination of humanitarian action*, Groupe URD (2012).

193 Barnett and Weiss, *Humanitarianism Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread*.

a longitudinal analysis of the international humanitarian system from 1991 to 2009, utilizing the value-set, policy guidance, structure, and procedure indicators along the practices lifecycle as a framework for tracking the changes in this system. It is divided into periodized sections of 1991, 1992 to 1997, 1998 to 2004, and 2005 to 2009. Within each time period, information is presented chronologically. While interests and norms apply, particularly in the earlier periods, practices theory increasingly explains the milestones and subsequent organizational development of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Civil-Military Coordination officer (CMCoord). Each period ends with a summary of the indicators in the practices lifecycle and considers the rational and normative alternative explanations. This chapter theoretically applies both the international practices theory through a longitudinal framework and the categorization of developments through the practices lifecycle.

A. 1991: ESTABLISHMENT OF HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION

1. UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182

UN General Assembly Resolution (UNGAR) 46/182 was in direct response to the changing post-Cold-War global dynamics, the increase of ad hoc "cross-mandate" UN operations, and the weaknesses of the existing UNDRO. The United Nations proclaims its passage as the official beginning of humanitarian coordination.[194] Although the establishment of the system does not give much initial support to the practices argument, the humanitarian foundation provided is essential to understanding the remainder of this longitudinal examination of how militaries and humanitarian organizations come to work together.

"Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations" reflected years of advocacy but was not welcomed by all.[195] A year prior, UNGAR 45/587 announced the reconceptualization of a "New International Humanitarian

[194] Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations.

[195] Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations.

Order," and certain countries, particularly those from the European Council, Nordic countries, Australia, and Canada, argued for a new high-level coordinator or "humanitarian czar."[196] Efforts to strengthen the system were also supported by UN agencies and INGOs so long as it did not undermine them and upheld their humanitarian values. Opposing member-states like Japan, China, and some developing states expressed concerns about sovereignty, expanding bureaucracy, and that UNDRO did not need a new mandate. UNDRO itself, facing a massive restructuring or extinction, also opposed this. They particularly noted that if the insufficiency of funds were the primary constraint on their effectiveness, the additional high-level bureaucracy would not solve the problems of coordination.[197] The UN Secretary-General was inundated with input regarding the two primary options: create a new bureaucracy or strengthen UNDRO. In the end, he recommended the high-level coordinator position, a new bureaucracy, a strong mandate, appropriate instructions to other agencies, and independent funding.

After tense negotiations, the General Assembly passed resolution 42/186, or "Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations," on December 19, 1991. The resolution begins with an endorsement of three of the ICRC humanitarian principles: humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. This reinforced the normative values set forth by ICRC and reiterated in the humanitarian identity of INGOs and the UN agencies themselves. The institutionalization of these three principles into policy represents the strength of the normative identity intended for the new department.

The final section of 46/182 addresses the significant changes in coordination, cooperation, and leadership. The resolution added a high-level official, specifically, a secretariat-level Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency

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[196] New International Humanitarian Order, A/45/587, United Nations General Assembly (24 October 1990). Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*. Information summarized from a series of letters to the UN Secretary General and meeting notes, Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) reports and recommendations, and UNDRO letters and reports.

[197] Bryan Larner, *Letter to UN Secretary-General*, UNDRO (30 August 1991).

Response Coordinator (ERC).[198] Working for the ERC would be a newly formed Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) with the mandate to coordinate humanitarian response. This office combined UNDRO with currently assigned ad hoc representatives for major and complex emergencies. The resolution also created the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), led by the ERC, to coordinate all UN humanitarian agencies, ICRC, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), International Organization for Migration (IOM), and other INGOs. The INGO consortia were standing invitees to the IASC. Based on the demilitarization of response during the Cold War, resolution 46/182 did not address states" militaries as part of the humanitarian response.

The passage of resolution 46/182 in 1991 provides a baseline for the value-set, policy guidance, structures, and procedure indicators in Figure 4.

[198] Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations.



Figure 4. Indicators in Practices Lifecycle 1991

Given institutionalization within the resolution, I consider this the high-water mark of the intention that practices embody the three humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality. Independence remained an ICRC principle diffused among INGOs but was not in the UN or institutionalized in 46/182. The slight progress on the indicator for the principle of last resort represents the practiced distinction from militaries at the time. The shading on independence and last resort represent a degree of subjectivity

in the assessment. The resolution did not include operational guidance, structures, or procedures for humanitarian civil-military coordination.

2. Rational and Normative Explanations

The rational institutionalist and normative approaches provide reasonable explanations for the establishment of the international humanitarian system and the status of indicators in Figure 4. The high-level political negotiations show how intentions shifted from those reflecting rational egoism to those reflecting rational institutionalist principles since the primary intent of 46/182 was improving efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian response through coordination. The resolution itself did not specifically address humanitarian civil-military coordination but provided a normative foundation for the personnel within the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). The inclusion of the three humanitarian principles and INGO representation on the Inter-Agency Standing Committee also indicated significant normative advocacy from the humanitarian community—from both inside and outside the UN. Since the resolution attempted to resolve ad hoc behaviors, there were no "socially meaningful patterns of action" on which to build, showing the weakness of the practices explanation at this point.[199] The system was created to start a framework for coordination practices.

B. 1992 TO 1997

After the passage of UNGAR 46/182, the international practices approach gets its initial purchase in explaining changes that occur during this phase vis-à-vis civil-military coordination. The minimal structure to the international humanitarian system at the time consisted of ICRC/IFRC/INGO collaboration in consortia organizations, international humanitarian law, and an undefined commitment to the humanitarian principles. The UN humanitarian agencies were primarily characterized as competitive and non-cooperative.[200] The lack of policy guidance, structure, or procedures, particularly in civil-

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[199] Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices," 4.

[200] Gordenker, Leon and Thomas G. Weiss, ed. *Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

military coordination, permits the examination of which actors are involved in the development of practices and why. With a dearth of headquarters expertise and the adoption of a consensus approach, the IASC and DHA had to rely on individuals with direct expertise and knowledge working together. According to the practices view, "government officials and their respective networks, as well as non-state representatives, pursue what *communities of practice* first bring to collective consciousness and attention."[201] Early developments in the DHA reflect a process of bringing together experts to build the system from scratch. This section expands on the initial coordination policy guidance and structure as well as the debates around the principles at the time.

1. Early Policy Guidance

Early policy guidance was shaped by the background experience of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) staff and the consensus-based process used by the community of practice. The background experience brought into the DHA did not fit the broad new mission. Under the new mandate, "DHA operates in the grey zone where security, political, and humanitarian concerns converge."[202] This was a challenging notion from the start because establishing apolitical humanitarian practices that span the range from natural disasters to complex emergencies was not something DHA had the expertise in nor sufficient manpower or authority to manage.[203] The majority of DHA staff came from UNDRO, giving DHA significant experience in disaster response and less in complex emergencies.[204] As a result, initial policy guidance and structures drew from the experiences they had—particularly in disaster response.

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[201] Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 200.

[202] United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines)* (Geneva, May 1994).

[203] Minear and Weiss, *Humanitarian Politics*.

[204] Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*.

In 1992, the DHA convened a "Standing Coordinating Group"—the first organized *community of practice* focused on the use of military assets in humanitarian assistance. Designed to create the civil-military policies by consensus, their first project was to develop guidance on the "Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) in Disaster Relief." The project included 14 member-state representatives and 17 organizations to include ICRC, IFRC, UN agencies, regional intergovernmental organizations, INGOs, and academic institutions.[205] They started their work in the context of humanitarian crises like the Kurds in 1991, Somalia in 1993, and Bosnia from 1992 to 1995. During these events, humanitarians and militaries were interacting in new ways. At that time, DHA administrators initially believed that countries would deploy foreign military assets for humanitarian assistance under a UN flag like a peacekeeping-type mission.[206] This mechanism never occurred, but the initial guidance was drafted under this assumption until the mid-1990s. Working collectively, this group has continued to develop the universal published CMCoord guidance to date.

In 1994, DHA published the *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief*, commonly known as the *Oslo Guidelines*. This document formerly introduced the concept of the "humanitarian gap"—the difference between the assessed needs of an affected state and the capabilities of the international humanitarian community.[207] Under natural disaster circumstances, military forces were considered complementary and an appropriate resource to fill the gap. The document did not include a reference to the humanitarian principles or last resort. In addition to the initial *Oslo Guidelines*, the IASC endorsed second is the *Guiding and Operating Principles for the Use*

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[205] Ingrid Nordstrom-Ho, "International Disaster Relief Assistance—What Role for the Military?" (Blue Helmet Forum, Austria, Vienna, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, September 2011); United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines)*.

[206] Gordenker and Weiss, ed., Soldiers, Peacekeepers and Disasters. "Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O2," August 2018.

[207] United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines)*.

of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations in 1995.[208] This included four of the humanitarian principles and the first mention of the operating principle of last resort.[209] Combined, these documents provided the foundation for humanitarian civil-military coordination in natural disasters.

2. Eroding Principles with Humanitarian Interventions

The new concept of humanitarian intervention highlighted the contradictions within the operational practices of remaining humane, impartial, neutral, independent, and unarmed in the delivery of assistance. Within the constellation of practices around humanitarian operations, humanitarian intervention or "military humanitarianism," introduced a new role for the militaries perpetrating violence in the name of humanitarianism.[210] This was separate from the humanitarian civil-military coordination that DHA was responsible for, but this new concept expanded the ways humanitarians and militaries interacted, thereby altering perceptions on both sides—particularly affecting the perception of the humanitarian principles. A humanitarian intervention called upon foreign militaries performing military operations to exert political pressure in the name of stopping humanitarian atrocities, but humanitarians in the field were still trying to manage the related humanitarian crises by operating under humanitarian principles. While called "humanitarian," there was nothing impartial or neutral about the role of militaries in this type of activity.

With UNGAR 46/182 as the high-water mark of the humanitarian principles, lessons from Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda immediately opened debates about whether the principles were fading in practice. Military support of humanitarian aid in Somalia taught assisting countries, particularly the United States, that humanitarian assistance was not

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[208] United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Guiding and Operating Principles for the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations*.

[209] United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Guiding and Operating Principles for the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Support of Humanitarian Operations*.

[210] Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell, "Military Humanitarianism," *Survival* XXXIII, 5 (September/October 1991).

worth the cost of U.S. soldiers" lives.[211] In fact, the violent unpredictability caused most INGOs to also withdraw from Somalia as well-meaning even the principle of humanity was not enough to outweigh the risks of assisting.[212] In Bosnia, NATO states conducted a humanitarian intervention to protect Bosnian victims from intrastate violence. By operationalizing impartiality and neutrality, humanitarians segregated affected people into "humanitarian space," mostly camps, unintentionally increasing the vulnerability of certain populations.[213] Bosnia also forced humanitarians to address the "well-fed dead" conundrum—commenting that humanitarians can provide food one day, but if people were not safe and protected, where was the successful outcome?[214] Ensuring safety is not a humanitarian principle—but how useful are the others without it? Moreover, what role can, and should military forces play in this when also prosecuting an enemy? After the backlash from the humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, "the conventional wisdom in policy circles is now to refrain from robust involvement by the military in humanitarian crises."[215] The delivery of assistance in insecure environments posed quandaries for both militaries and humanitarians.

Practicing in accordance with the principles faced even more criticism after the Somalia and Bosnia lessons informed the Rwandan response. States mostly stood by during the 1994 Rwandan genocide—abandoning the primary principle of humanity by not acting at all. Later in Rwanda, by practicing neutrality, humanitarian organizations were criticized for their failure to act on atrocities happening within the camps.[216] Heavily critiqued,

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[211] Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, *Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

[212] Médecins Sans Frontières, *Somalia 1991–1993: Civil War, Famine Alert and UN "Military Humanitarian" Intervention 1991–1993* (2013).

[213] Weiss and Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention*.

[214] *Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics*, ed. Weiss, Thomas G.; Barnett, Michael (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

[215] Thomas G. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), 3.

[216] Terry, *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action*.

Walker and Maxwell represented many with the commentary: "Long viewed as the key to humanitarian work, neutrality had almost become a dirty word in the aftermath of the Balkans wars and the Rwanda genocide. How could humanitarian actors pretend to be neutral in the face of such evil?"[217] While in the humanitarian intervention context, the events of Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda exposed the flaws of practicing in accordance with the principles. As a result, I note the initially fading of the humanitarian principles in practice during this period.

3. Early Structures

Early practices in response to the UNGAR 46/182 mandate revolved around nascent coordination structures and staffing. DHA established the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) structure for broader coordination, but humanitarian civil-military coordination lagged. The UNDAC, set up in 1993, included on-site assessment teams physically located at the On-site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC).[218] This started the model of field-level coordination centers, but only addressed civil-military coordination peripherally without dedicated staff. The field-level need to coordinate military and civil defense assets percolated up from these centers into DHA headquarters.

The unsupported humanitarian-military interactions in the field lead to the creation of the DHA Military and Civil Defense Support Unit (MCDU) in 1996. This unit acted as a focal point in DHA headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, for member-state governments, militaries, and civil defense institutions to have a point of access if interested in providing logistics and security support to humanitarian agencies.[219] The small MCDU staff worked to develop both natural disaster and complex emergency expertise within DHA but did not have a deployable capability.

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[217] Walker and Maxwell, *Shaping the Humanitarian World*, 137.

[218] Cahill, Kevin M., ed. *History and Hope: The International Humanitarian Reader*. Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press, 2013.

[219] Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Intervening in Humanitarian Crises*, 14.

Outside of the UN, the first attempts at bridging the gap between humanitarians and militaries in the field were by militaries. The U.S. military introduced a civil-military operations center (CMOC), which offered a venue for militaries to brief INGOs on practical matters like security issues and land mines.[220] Generally speaking, INGOs were reticent to participate in military operations centers in an effort to guard their impartiality and neutrality. If they had a preference to collaborate, it was with the UN or amongst themselves, not with political actors. That being said, some ad hoc coordination occurred at the CMOC during Somalia and Rwanda, indicating that practical matters in the field started to breach the normative resistance of upholding the principles.[221] Overall, there was no consensus within the community of practice about where or how best to generate practices in support of humanitarian civil-military coordination.

4. Status of Research Indicators: 1992–1997

The time from 1991 to 1997 is characterized by the establishment of the international humanitarian system and formation of the initial structures and guidance. The significant developments in the value-set, policy guidance, structures, and procedures are reflected in red in the practices lifecycle shown in Figure 5.

[220] Aall, Miltenberger, and Weiss, *Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations*.

[221] Aall, Miltenberger, and Weiss, *Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations*.



Figure 5. Indicators in Practices Lifecycle 1997

Three of the five principles are institutionalized, and two have been included in lower-level guidance. Except for humanity, there is an open question on whether the principles are starting to fade which may allow for new practices to emerge. There is initial universal guidance about disaster relief with the *Oslo Guidelines* and *Guiding Principles*, but nothing published with respect to the complex emergencies. Other than the established Military and Civil Defense Support Unit (MCDU) at headquarters, there are no UN civil-

military coordination structures nor procedures in the field at this time. These indicators track not just the progression through institutionalization on the practices lifecycle, but the importance of recognizing that some practices fade.

5. Rational and Normative Explanations

All approaches have explanatory power during this period. While counter to the intent of 46/182, the system is still largely ad hoc for most of the indicators, which explains why humanitarian response during this time was inconsistent. This is evidence of rational egoism. Based on the consensus approach to developing the system, rational institutionalist, normative, and practice approaches all have some explanatory power. Rational institutionalism explains the invention of coordination structures to increase efficiency. The involvement of the ICRC and INGOs shows a normative influence in the consensus decision-making. The international practices approach explains the "Standing Coordinating Group" community of practice, and the consensus-based processes ensure that no single actor or group of actors can dominate the guidance with their rational or normative agendas. Guidance is formed only through social interaction with everyone's concurrence. This shows that while the rational and normative approaches still explain some of what has occurred, international practices theory had also started its explanatory power.

C. 1998 TO 2004

The time period from 1998 to 2004 is characterized by reform, challenges to the humanitarian principles, moderate thickening of the institutions, and the birth of UN CMCoord. In a mixture of natural disasters and complex emergencies, coordination transitioned from centralized at headquarters to decentralized in the field. As a result, the practices literature begins to have increased explanatory power. This period starts by addressing the shortfalls of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA).

1. The Birth of OCHA

The lack of practices and continued ad hoc coordination failed to meet the intent of resolution 46/182 for strengthened humanitarian coordination. DHA MCDU focused on

implementing the *Oslo Guidelines* and strategically fulfilling requests for assets from MCDU headquarters in Geneva. During an event, this level of coordination matched military A to provide X, military B to provide Y, and military C to provide Z but did not include field-level coordination.[222] The notion that militaries would provide forces under a UN flag for humanitarian assistance had disappeared. MCDU was weak and not operational in the field, making it difficult to compete with the more battle-hardened agencies of the UN system.[223] Like its UNDRO predecessor, DHA faced obstacles like the "lack of authority and clout, resistance from UN agencies, and uncertain funding," as well as "frail credibility by fluctuating performance."[224] DHA also faced the "ferocious independence of INGOs."[225] Events were still largely coordinated ad hoc or with the assignment of lead operational UN agency that was not DHA.[226] This continued "adhocracy" prompted calls for more UN reform.[227]

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's reform program in 1998 renamed DHA as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).[228] OCHA's revised mandate included policy development, advocacy of humanitarian issues, and coordination in response–particularly streamlining operations to support field coordination.[229] To give the new office more gravitas, the Secretary-General appointed renowned international

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222 "Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O1," March 2018.

223 Donini, *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda*; Reindorp and Wiles, *Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience.*

224 Reindorp and Wiles, *Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience.*

225 Hoffman and Weiss, *Sword & Salve: Confronting New Wars and Humanitarian Crises*, 124.

226 Thomas G. Weiss and Cindy Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention: World Politics and Dilemmas of Help*, 1st ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 152.

227 Donini, *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda*. Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*. Hoffman and Weiss, *Sword & Salve: Confronting New Wars and Humanitarian Crises.*

228 Joanna Macrae and Nicola Reindorp, *The New Humanitarianisms: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action*, Humanitarian Policy Group Report 11 (London, 2002).

229 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O1.

diplomat Sergio Vieira de Mello as the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC).[230] His prestige was intended to get more respect and cooperation from the larger, operational UN agencies who continued to operate autonomously.[231] This reform enabled coordination practices to overcome bureaucratic resistance inside the UN.

2. The Initial Practices

The generation of humanitarian civil-military coordination practices came during large-scale natural disaster response. Field level coordination transformed based on the lessons of Hurricane Mitch applied to the 2000 floods in Mozambique. In 1998, international militaries responded to Hurricane Mitch in Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. During this event, MCDU managed a centralized request for assets process in Geneva headquarters with minimal coordination processes in the field.[232] As a result, military forces from Argentina, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States provided ad hoc support.[233] They each conducted their own operation resulting in commonly acknowledged inefficiencies.[234] This marked the start of a routine grouping of states interested in providing military assistance and making it more efficient. These field-level needs drove OCHA's coordination mandate into the field.

The first practices of civil-military coordination occurred when OCHA coordinated a multinational response to floods in Mozambique in 2000. The OCHA United Nations

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230 Aall, Miltenberger, and Weiss, *Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations*; Daniel Byman et al., *Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operation*, RAND (Arlington, VA, 2000).

231 Weiss and Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention: World Politics and Dilemmas of Help*, 152. "Interview with UN OCHA Official O4," February 2018.

232 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Humanitarian Coordination Lessons Learned* (New York, November 1998).

233 United Nations Office for the Coordiantion of Humanitarian Affairs, *OCHA Situation Report No. 14 Central America Hurricane/Tropical Storm Mitch* (16 November 1998), https://reliefweb.int/report/belize/central-america-hurricanetropical-storm-mitch-ocha-situation-report-no-14.

234 Wiharta et al., *The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response*, 62.

Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team co-located with national authorities and established an On-Site Operation Coordination Center (OSOCC) for humanitarian coordination.[235] The UNDAC team in the OSOCC worked with the United States" civil-military operations center (CMOC) that coordinated the military forces from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, South Africa, Malawi, Portugal, and the Netherlands.[236] The discourse between the OSOCC and CMOC generated a new practice of civil-military coordination by people in the field. There were an ad hoc coordinator assignment and ad-hoc cross-actor coordination mechanism where procedures for information exchange and task division were all formed on-site between the two centers. Even with the new practices, the strategic and tactical requests for the airlift support still had to be coordinated through the OCHA MCDU in Geneva.[237] To OCHA—this new local coordination mechanism, without an official name at the time, became the "textbook example."[238] Overall, the adoption of a co-location coordination method in this highly permissive and non-competitive environment paved the way for a series of new cooperative practices to emerge. I argue this is the starting place where the practices literature begins to have increased explanatory power in defining the relationship between humanitarians and militaries.

3. Fading Humanitarian Principles within the Constellation of Practices

Humanitarian activities within the broader constellation of practices continued to contradict the operational practices of remaining humane, impartial, neutral, independent, and unarmed in the delivery of assistance. Even after Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, humanitarian intervention persisted as a means to curtail atrocities like in the 1999 Kosovo

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[235] Wiharta et al., *The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response*.

[236] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *OCHA Situation Report No. 13 Mozambique Floods* (3 March 2000), https://reliefweb.int/report/mozambique/mozambique-floods-ocha-situation-report-no-13.

[237] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *OCHA Situation Report No. 13 Mozambique Floods*.

[238] Nordstrom-Ho, "Short International Disaster Relief Assistance—What Role for the Military?"

war. Humanitarian intervention was widely considered paradoxical in terminology by humanitarians—the ultimate compromise of neutrality and impartiality for the sake of humanity.[239]

Within the constellation of practices, militaries also began another new role, which challenged humanitarian's impartiality, neutrality, independence, and last resort even more. After the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, militaries took on the roles of development, stabilization, reconstruction, and nation-building, once again altering the relationship between military forces and humanitarians.[240] INGOs who wanted to work in these countries found it near impossible to work independently of the occupying forces, which politicized aid and compromised practices aligned with the humanitarian principles even further. According to Barnett, "these ambitious efforts expand the reach of aid workers to help more people in need—but they also mean that humanitarianism cannot help but become part of politics and governance, and even coincide with the grand strategies of powerful states."[241] Questions about the impartiality and neutrality of INGOs in Afghanistan and Iraq led to concerns about donor influence over INGO operations.[242] By trying to help more people in the name of humanity, INGOs faced difficult dilemmas in how to execute practices in accordance with the humanitarian principles. This dilemma carried over into other humanitarian operations.

The operational principles of remaining humane, impartial, neutral, independent, and unarmed were further complicated with the UN's effort to expand coordination. In the name of coordination, new UN terminology reflected merged UN activities like "integration," "multi-dimensional," or "comprehensive." The intent was to combine humanitarian activities with UN peacekeeping, stabilization, development, or assistance

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[239] Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); David G. Chandler, "The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda," *Human Rights Quarterly* 23, 3 (August 2001).

[240] Hoffman and Weiss, *Sword & Salve: Confronting New Wars and Humanitarian Crises.*

[241] Barnett and Weiss, *Humanitarianism Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread,* 4.

[242] Macrae et al., *Uncertain Power: The Changing Role of Official Donors in Humanitarian Action.*

missions. Problematically, activities like peacekeeping defined neutrality and impartiality differently in their own respective context.[243] The drive to increase coordination further pulled humanitarians away from their apolitical values.

In the midst of these events, INGOs likewise began to proliferate, collaborate, professionalize, and compete—all affecting their willingness to co-create practices in the field. There was a growing assumption that the more coordination was institutionalized and professionalized, the more politicized and instrumentalized it became—resulting in an international humanitarian system that was…less humanitarian.[244] Competition between INGOs also led to resistance against coordination.[245] For example, "a well-funded NGO may not necessarily complement coordinated action in the field" because they do not need to coordinate for effective response.[246] By intentionally minimizing this practical interaction, there was selective development of shared practices.[247] At the same time, the broader failures in the constellation of practices, like Bosnia and Rwanda, led humanitarian organizations to increase collaborative efforts to professionalize standards and share lessons to improve quality.[248] The community of practice grew in this convoluted context leading to both cooperative and non-cooperative behavior and increased inconsistencies. Humanitarian organizations held firm to the principle of humanity but started showing divergence interpreting the other principles. While impartiality, neutrality, and last resort were institutionalized, evidence during this time showed varying practices in the field.

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[243] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 2.0*.

[244] Barnett, "Humanitarianism Transformed."

[245] Smillie and Minear, *The Charity of Nations: Humanitarian Action in a Calculating World*, 9.

[246] Weiss and Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention*, 47.

[247] Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 199.

[248] In 1997, the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) formed and the Sphere Movement created the first Sphere Handbook for professionalized standards by sector.

4. New Guidelines and a New Title

The new universal published guidance defined the Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord) role within OCHA. Once again, the "Standing Coordinating Group" community of practice drafted the *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies*, or *MCDA Guidelines*, drawing from existing context-specific guidance, a consensus-based inclusive process, and practices in the field. From 2000 to 2003, developing the *MCDA Guidelines* coincided with the conflicts in Afghanistan and an increased number of multi-dimensional operations with peacekeeping forces in Africa.[249] Practices embedded in the already approved ad hoc context-specific guidance were incorporated into the *MCDA Guidelines.*[250] Also necessary during this time was the first *Non-binding Guidelines on the Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys*. These guidelines show how ad hoc localized context-specific guidance informed the universal published guidance.

OCHA MCDU facilitated a consensus-based approach to develop the non-binding *MCDA Guidelines.* The joint enterprise took years to reach consensus, but the process mitigated the likelihood that one set of actors would dominate the process and the product. This "Standing Coordinating Group" included practitioners who had used the *Oslo Guidelines* from 51 delegations of member-states, UN agencies, ICRC, INGOs, and other regional and international organizations.[251] UN agencies and INGOs strongly advocated for the continued inclusion of the three humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality. Some INGOs and a few member-states successfully championed the

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[249] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines)*.

[250] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O1. These included the UN Secretary-General's *Guidance on the Use of Military Aircraft in Afghanistan* in November 2001 and the *Guidelines on Relationships with Military Forces in Afghanistan for UNAMA Area Co-ordinators and Other UN Personnel* in September 2002.

[251] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O1.

institutionalization of the principle of last resort. In the *Oslo Guidelines*, military assets were "complementary to civilian assets," but the delegates collectively chose to strengthen this language to last resort to fortify the principles further. After three years, the final endorsement of the *MCDA Guidelines* by the IASC was expedited to get them out before the conflict in Iraq started.[252]

The *MCDA Guidelines* included the first naming of the civil-military practice that came from the Mozambique floods and other field experiences: United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord). It was defined as:

> The essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals. Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.[253]

The definition itself includes rational institutionalist, normative, and practice-based rhetoric. The definition of CMCoord has not changed since 2003. At this time, the majority of CMCoord experts remained within the small staff at MDCU in Geneva headquarters, and they would surge as necessary to events around the world.

Soon after posting the MDCA Guidelines, the ad hoc context-specific General Guidance for Interaction Between United Nations Personnel and Military Actors in the Context of the Crisis in Iraq was published. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) in Iraq distributed this as practical guidance to all UN personnel in their interaction with military forces. It reiterated operating with militaries as a last resort, only approved by the Humanitarian Coordinator, and when the military met the unique capability and timeliness

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252 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O1.

253 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines)*, 5.

factors not offered by humanitarians.[254] This context-specific guidance also addressed the coordination method of "liaison arrangements" with the military operations center established by the militaries of the United States and Kuwait—shifting the accepted engagement during a complex emergency. Shown in Appendix C, the coordination methods range on a spectrum from co-existence in complex emergencies to liaisons to co-location during natural disasters. This shows a movement away from the co-existence coordination method in complex emergencies toward liaisons—but also explicitly banned a co-location method. Foreign militaries were present as belligerent forces, and local humanitarian guidance reiterated the MCDA Guidelines and values of the humanitarians.

Building from this guidance, UN General Assembly once again called for the strengthening of the coordination by passing UNGAR 58/114 in 2004.[255] Based on the concerns of instrumentalization of assistance, resolution 58/224 officially added the ICRC humanitarian principle of independence, signaling to all humanitarian actors that through independence they can operate more in line with the other principles. This resolution also reiterated that humanitarian assistance should conform with international humanitarian law, the humanitarian principles, the Oslo Guidelines, and the new MCDA Guidelines—reaffirming the institutionalization of the universal published guidance at the time. Overall, this collection of guidelines shows the establishment of CMCoord and an institutional thickening of humanitarian principles even while activities in the field jeopardized them.

This time period closes with the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper. Known as the IASC Reference Paper, this guidance gave a little more in-depth shared knowledge on civil-military relations for those in the field who might develop country-specific

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[254] United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, *General Guidance for Interaction Between United Nations Personnel and Military and Other Representatives of the Belligerent Parties in the Context of the Crisis in Iraq* (9 April 2003), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Civil-Military%20Guidance%20090403.pdf.

[255] Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Humanitarian Assistance of the United Nations.

operational guidelines.[256] The Emergency Response Coordinator, John Holmes, introduced the document in this context:

> Norms have been developed throughout the course of history to define the optimal relationship between civilians and soldiers, based on the cardinal distinction between combatants and non-combatants. In practice, however, strategic, operational, and tactical challenges continue to pose questions including: when and how, if ever, should humanitarian actors coordinate with the military in fulfilling humanitarian objectives?
>
> In today's reality, aid workers and soldiers at times have little choice but to re-explore their relationship and improvise best ways possible for some degree of potential interaction, while simultaneously responding to the emergency at hand.[257] [emphasis added]

The paper acknowledged that the practitioners were improvising in the field—participating in shared discourse, drawing on tacit knowledge, and forming routines around the world. The new civil-military practices were not defined by states or UN agency headquarters, but rather by the practical sense of local actors determining what could be accomplished in each situation.[258] The existing guidance, even with this addition, did not fill the gaps in guidance by giving enough detail for this lower level discourse.

5. Status of Research Indicators: 1998–2004

The significant developments during the 1998 to 2004 timeframe are reflected in red in the practices lifecycle presented in Figure 6.

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[256] Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper* (Geneva, 2004).

[257] Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper* 3.

[258] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice, Preceded with Three Studies in Kabylian Ethnology*, 261.



Figure 6. Indicators in Practices Lifecycle 2004

The four institutionalized humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence are under even more pressure in the field. Independence was institutionalized with resolution 58/224, and the principle of last resort was institutionalized in the *MCDA Guidelines*. Other than humanity, the challenges to the other principles force actors to reassess the degree to which they may be fading. The *Oslo*

Guidelines and *MCDA Guidelines* institutionalized the universal published guidance for both natural disasters and complex emergencies, respectively. Local context-specific guidance was being generated on an ad hoc basis. Per the *MCDA Guidelines*, CMCoord has been institutionalized based on practices generated in Mozambique and other events. Procedurally, the practice of requests for assistance was shifting from headquarters to local actors as local actors begin to develop the procedures for dialogue, information exchange, and task division. By comparing indicators longitudinally, changes are clearly shown through the practices lifecycle.

As seen in the definition of CMCoord, the focus of OCHA shifted from responding to requests for assets to dialogue and interaction. The 1990s represented a small number of routine actors and a process of centralizing requests for assistance in headquarters where MCDU would work with the few states providing assistance. In the 2000s, the field became increasingly crowded, especially with more states providing forces and more INGOs in the field. OCHA began to decentralize the request process from UN headquarters to the field and change its priority to dialogue. As seen with the Mozambique and Iraq cases, a natural disaster and complex emergency, respectively, the emphasis on field-level dialogue and context-specific guidance is increasingly formed by local actors and their interactions. The interpretation of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, and last resort were starting to take shape locally—setting the stage for practices to increasingly explain the relationship among the humanitarians and militaries.

6. Rational and Normative Explanations

The period marks the transition from "adhocracy" to the institutionalization of the CMCoord function.[259] This time period had countless examples of rational self-interested behavior and independent operations from states, UN agencies, and INGOs. When states provided military forces for humanitarian assistance, the reasons included a rationalist

[259] Donini, *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda*. Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa*. Hoffman and Weiss, *Sword & Salve: Confronting New Wars and Humanitarian Crises.*

currying favor with neighbors or testing of military capabilities.[260] It also reflected a normative call to "do something."[261] From a CMCoord perspective, international humanitarian response could now identify the handful of states that would regularly provide military assets and nascent networks began to form.

The normative approach explains the updated OCHA mandate and institutionalization of independence and last resort. In addition to the policy and coordination, OCHA representatives both self-identified and advocated for the humanitarian norms and principled humanitarian action. This reform was a strong values-based endorsement of humanitarianism brought on from within the UN itself, which was later embedded in the new guidance of the period.

While rational and normative approaches can explain individual actor behavior in humanitarian civil-military coordination, international practices theory better explains the relationship between the two disparate sets of actors. As civil-military coordination got more field-oriented, field-level interaction and experience informed higher-level guidance. Also, the intentional consensus-based processes for agreeing upon policies minimized either rational or normative explanations as the two are tempered by realities on the ground and the need to set rules that appeal to all parties.

D. 2005 TO 2009

The period between 2005 and 2009 can be described by the major changes to humanitarian coordination. The lessons from the Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami were reflected in the creation of the clusters approach, IASC endorsement of the *Concept for CMCoord*, and the necessary revisions of the *Oslo Guidelines* and *MCDA Guidelines*. The principles continued to face pressure not just from operations, but from further integrating humanitarian operations with development, peacekeeping, or reconstruction activities. The practices approach gains even more traction in explaining the developments of this period.

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260 Wiharta et al., *The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response*.

261 Wiharta et al., *The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response*.

1. First CMCoord Test in the Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami 2004

The Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami was a test for new CMCoord practices. Takeaways did not yield extensive new practices but rather showed substantial holes in the expertise, guidance, structure, and procedures. Nevertheless, this large-scale, rapid-onset natural disaster was a significant milestone for the international humanitarian system and CMCoord.

On December 26, 2004, a 9.15 magnitude earthquake occurred off the western coast of Indonesia, which sent a tsunami east, west, and north into the Indian Ocean. In total, there were over 225,000 reported fatalities and missing people, and nearly 1.2 million displaced people in over 17 countries.[262] Countless actors mobilized in the region to fill the humanitarian gap, including UN humanitarian agencies, ICRC, and hundreds of INGOs.[263] Military forces from 35 different countries provided 75 helicopters, 41 ships, 43 airplanes, and over 30,000 troops—mostly from Australia, Singapore, Japan, and the United States.[264] Providing the majority of this assistance, the U.S. established Combined Support Force 536 (CSF 536)/Operation Unified Assistance in Utapao, Thailand, and a local CMOC that liaised with UN CMCoord and INGOs.[265]

The new practice of deploying multiple CMCoord officers to the field created a considerable variance in CMCoord practices. The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) Report commented that "the field deployment of a specialized cadre of civil-military

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[262] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Annual Report 2005* (New York, 2006).

[263] Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), *Joint Evaluation of the International Response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami: Synthesis Report* (London, 2006), https://reliefweb.int/report/world/joint-evaluation-international-response-indian-ocean-tsunami-synthesis-report.

[264] Nordstrom-Ho, "Short International Disaster Relief Assistance—What Role for the Military?".

[265] Bruce A. Elleman, *Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia* (Newport, RI: Newport Paper #28, 2007).

advisors to rapid onset emergencies is rare. The tsunami changed all of this."[266] Different coordination mechanisms stood up in the various countries and between the UN agencies—highlighting both duplication and gaps within the system as a whole. The use of the CMCoord officers depended on the Humanitarian Coordinator in the respective states—some garnering more trust than others.[267] Up to sixteen CMCoord officers were mobilized, including almost everyone in the MCDU headquarters as well as recently trained, surge capacity personnel from standby member-state rosters.[268] CMCoord officers were co-located with the UNDAC sites or absorbed in the UN Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC).[269]

There was a broad consensus that CMCoord structure and procedures were either duplicative or ineffective.[270] The CMCoord position was new, comparatively small, and lacking in technical support.[271] If procedures were generated at all, they were formed differently at the various locations and not able to articulate the when, where, and how many military forces were needed. According to one CMCoord officer, "the military requested this information, and we were trying to get it from the various offices/humanitarian hubs set up all over the place, and it didn't work."[272] Dialogue, information sharing, and task division were impossible without an organized assessment of humanitarian needs.

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[266] Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), *Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-affected Countries: Civil Military Aspects of International Response* (London, 2006), 26.

[267] Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), *Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-affected Countries: Civil Military Aspects of International Response*

[268] Nordstrom-Ho, "Short International Disaster Relief Assistance—What Role for the Military?".

[269] Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), *Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-affected Countries: Civil Military Aspects of International Response*

[270] Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), *Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-affected Countries: Civil Military Aspects of International Response*

[271] Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), *Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-affected Countries: Civil Military Aspects of International Response*

[272] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O1.

The policy guidance was also insufficient in this event. Universal guidance included the Oslo Guidelines and MCDA Guidelines, but neither covered the "mixed" environment where a catastrophic natural disaster occurred in the middle of a complex emergency.[273] Also, the existing guidelines failed to offer practical advice; they were "pitched" at a more principled and policy level that was of little value to those on the ground."[274] As a result, the activities of the deployed CMCoord personnel were negotiated based on interactions in the field at each of the respective locations.

The humanitarian principles were not directly addressed during the event. While the military forces were there to save lives and alleviate suffering, there was a subtly noted question amongst humanitarians whether their true commitment was to the humanitarian principles alone.[275] Even amongst INGOs, the humanitarian principles were barely mentioned as a concern during operational or lessons learned reports. The large gaps identified during this event caused significant humanitarian reforms.

2. Second CMCoord Test After Major Reforms—Pakistan Earthquake 2005

The institutionalized humanitarian reforms after the Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami were soon put to the test in the Pakistan Earthquake of 2005. From 2003 to 2005, the independent *Humanitarian Response Review* took into account the tsunami lessons and proposed a standardized humanitarian architecture known as the cluster approach in Appendix D. Moving away from ad hoc lead agency, the humanitarian response would now be organized by "clusters," or sectors like health, protection, nutrition or logistics.[276]

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[273] Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), *Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-affected Countries: Civil Military Aspects of International Response*

[274] Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), *Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-affected Countries: Civil Military Aspects of International Response* 9.

[275] Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), *Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-affected Countries: Evaluation Findings Indonesia* (London, 2006).

[276] United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator & Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, *Humanitarian Response Review* (New York, 2005), https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_files/Humanitarian%20Response%20Review%202005.pdf.

Each cluster had an assigned agency as the global cluster lead. To reduce duplication, cross-sector services like CMCoord and UN Joint Logistics Center would be pooled together in a Humanitarian Common Services sector.[277] The review did not include the capacities of militaries in humanitarian response.

The new practice of deploying multiple CMCoord officers led to changes in OCHA headquarters and operational expectations. First, the OCHA Military and Civil Defense Unit (MCDU) was renamed the Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) to represent the shift from the 1990s strategic request for assets to the early 2000s field-level bridge between the military and humanitarian actors. Also, the community of practice "Standing Coordinating Group" with representatives from interested member-states, UN agencies, ICRC, IFRC, INGOs, regional intergovernmental organizations, and academic institutions was renamed the "Consultative Group on the Use of Military and Defence Assets.'[278] Based on the necessity of institutionalizing field experiences, the IASC Working Group endorsed the *Concept for CMCoord* in March 2005. This concept paper detailed the CMCoord tasks, when it would be appropriate the deploy a CMCoord Officer, what kind of technical support they would receive in the field, the various coordination methods and structures.[279] This concept paper indicated an additional level of institutional thickening for CMCoord practices.

The Pakistan earthquake in October 2005 was the first test of the cluster approach and a more structured CMCoord—both characterized as an improvement over the tsunami response. Based on the now institutionalized practices of CMCoord, CMCS deployed seven UN CMCoord officers in four locations during this event.[280] As liaisons, the

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[277] United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator & Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, *Humanitarian Response Review.*

[278] Nordstrom-Ho, "Short International Disaster Relief Assistance—What Role for the Military?"; United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines).*

[279] *United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Concept Paper.*

[280] Nordstrom-Ho, "Short International Disaster Relief Assistance—What Role for the Military?".

community of practice began to form. Routinized procedures for dialogue, sharing information, and division of tasks were generated and starting to diffuse. The humanitarian community also learned that even though the 1994 *Oslo Guidelines* existed, there was a "general lack of awareness" for what the guidelines said or that they existed at all.[281] The next challenge for CMCoord officers would be to fulfill the OCHA mandate of advocating for humanitarian issues by making local actors aware of existing policies. This event began to standardize the diffusing practices of the more formalized role of CMCoord officers.

3. Incorporating Practices into Universal Published Guidance

New practices and organizational relationships necessitated the community of practice to come together and update the *Oslo Guidelines* and *MCDA Guidelines*. The "Consultative Group on the Use of Military and Defence Assets" tasked CMCS to convene a series of drafting and review committees to update the universal published guidance. Once again, the drafting process for *Oslo Guidelines* worked to achieve consensus amongst 180 experts from 45 member-states and 25 humanitarian organizations.[282] Originally published in 2006, the *Oslo Guidelines* required an immediate revision in 2007. The revision added the word "foreign" to military assets to distinguish OCHA's focus from countries that were increasingly using domestic militaries for disaster relief. Also, the 2006 *Oslo Guidelines* initially reflected the 2003 *MCDA Guidelines"* definition of last resort for complex emergencies. The committees found this language too strong and needed to be adapted to the natural disaster environment. According to a UN CMCoord official, "After codifying 'last resort'—actors complained this term does not work, it is confusing."[283] An extraordinary session of the "Consultative Group" softened it to be more like the original 1994 *Oslo Guidelines,* which defined military and defense assets as complementary to

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[281] Wiharta et al., *The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response*.

[282] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines) Rev. 1.1*.

[283] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O1.

existing relief mechanisms.[284] Through a similar process, the *MCDA Guidelines* were revised in 2006.[285] Finally, to augment this high-level guidance, CMCS published the first *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook* in 2008, which included procedures for coordination, planning, information sharing, and division of tasks.[286] This was a significant step forward in addressing the usability gap between the universal published guidance and operations in the field.

4. Fading Humanitarian Principles in the Constellation of Practices

While acting in accordance with the humanitarian principles was repeatedly reaffirmed in CMCoord guidance, the escalating trend toward humanitarian intervention, more "integrated" coordination approaches, and changing nature of warfare further weakened the prospect of practices following the principles.[287] Humanitarian intervention gained international normative recognition with the Responsibility to Protect norm adopted in 2005.[288] Merging humanitarian activities with development, peacekeeping, and reconstruction further compromised the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence.[289] The nature of warfare had also changed—with a focus on intrastate conflict, asymmetric threats, non-traditional combatants, and counterinsurgency tactics. As a result, the distinction between civilian and combatants was increasingly blurred.[290]

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[284] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines) Rev. 1.1*, 8.

[285] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines)*, 118.

[286] *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook*, (Geneva: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service, 2008).

[287] Stephen Cornish and Marit Glad, *Civil-Military Relations: No Room for Humanitarianism in Comprehensive Approaches*, Den norske Atlanterhavskomite (2008), https://reliefweb.int/report/world/civil-military-relations-no-room-humanitarianism-comprehensive-approaches.

[288] Thakur and Weiss, "R2P: From Idea to Norm—And Action?."

[289] Cedric de Coning, "Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations," *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 5, no. 2 (2005); "Interview with Humanitarian Scholar H1," February 2018.

[290] Hoffman and Weiss, *Sword & Salve: Confronting New Wars and Humanitarian Crises.*

INGOs, in particular, found that "claims of neutrality, impartiality, or independence no longer offer protection from warlords or terrorists."[291] Aid workers were increasingly prone to kidnappings, attacks, casualties, and deaths. According to Fiona Terry, "humanitarian actors have lost their immunity."[292] Concerns with safety and security contributed to the erosion of the normative foundation of humanitarian action.

Operationally, these comprehensive and integrative approaches also affected the role of the CMCoord officers. As this role grew in the broader context, the location of the UN CMCoord officer affected the perception of their commitment to the humanitarian principles—as in they were expected to maintain a distinction from military actors as humanitarian actors. Their location affected the willingness of INGOs to work with them. As examples from the time, CMCoord officers could be co-located with UNDAC's OSOCC like in Mozambique or Pakistan, UNDAC's OSOCC or UN Joint Logistics Center like Indonesia, or with local UN peacekeeping missions like in Lebanon (2006) or Chad/Central African Republic (2009).[293] Whether an accurate representation of their commitment to principles or not, the perception CMCoord officers" humanitarian values became clouded as they associated with the broader constellation of practices. Because of these concerns, practices purely associated with the humanitarian principles continued to fade.

5. Status of Research Indicators: 2005–2009

As seen from the red sections of the bars in Figure 7, many practices have been diffusing and institutionalized during the period from 2005 to 2009. The institutionalization of many of the indicators represents significant movement.

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[291] Kevin M. Cahill, *The Pulse of Humanitarian Assistance*, Fordham University Press and The Center for International Humanitarian Cooperation (New York, 2007).

[292] Fiona Terry, "The International Committee of the Red Cross in Afghanistan: Reasserting the Neutrality of Humanitarian Action," *International Review of the Red Cross*, no. No. 881 (2011), https://www.icrc.org/en/international-review/article/international-committee-red-cross-afghanistan-reasserting-neutrality.

[293] Nordstrom-Ho, "Short International Disaster Relief Assistance—What Role for the Military?".



Figure 7. Indicators in Practices Lifecycle 2009

All value indicators remained institutionalized in 2009. Institutionalized policy guidance repeatedly reinforces the intent to act in accordance with the principles, yet simultaneously practices do not consistently reflect this intent. While humanity was unquestioned, the integration of humanitarian activities with other contexts reflects an increased degree of fading the principles of impartiality, neutrality, independence, and last

resort in practice. Four key documents constituted full institutionalization in universal published guidance: the 2007 *Oslo Guidelines*, 2006 *MCDA Guidelines, IASC Reference Paper* of 2004, and the *Non-Binding Guidelines for the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys*. The practice of context-specific guidance was slowly diffusing, but yet not common practice in natural disasters or complex emergencies. The CMCoord structure was institutionalized. Various cross-actor coordination mechanisms were mixed—some institutionalized like the cluster approach and other coordination center concepts were diffusing with various names. The coordination methods of co-existence, liaison, and co-location were institutionalized and used. Finally, the CMCoord officer procedures for dialogue, information sharing, and task division were introduced in the *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook of 2008*, but the vague descriptions did not constitute the institutionalization of these practices. The practices lifecycle framework, therefore, helps us to understand how coordination emerges over time during this period.

6. Rational and Normative Explanations

Both the rational and normative approaches continue to hold some explanatory power for how humanitarians and militaries worked together during this period. As exemplified in the Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami, states continue to send militaries for a variety of reasons. Even though it was a mixed natural disaster/complex emergency, most around the world treated it as a catastrophic natural disaster prompting calls to "do something.'[294] This normative explanation is supported by global generosity that included government aid, military forces, philanthropy, and INGO action with private donations. And yet, responding to the size and scope also led to reputational self-interest in geopolitical competition. Unlike the small number of supporting states in the 1990s, international humanitarian assistance in the 2000s had emerged as an extension of interstate geopolitics. Called "competitive compassion," this event started a new trend of international responsibility—that being a responsible international actor in an increasingly

[294] Elleman, *Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia*.

multipolar world meant you are willing to contribute to humanitarian assistance.[295] As such, this shows both normative and rationalist motives for states" participating in the delivery of aid.

The rationalist approach also explains some INGO behavior as well as their willingness to coordinate.[296] The International Council of Voluntary Agencies noted the correlation that increased funding "resulted in less than usual need/desire to coordinate."[297] Competition for funds and talent also affected coordination. INGOs favored coordinating when it became in their interests to do so, like gaining access, sharing the burdens, or re-directing their limited funds back toward their own priorities.

The normative approach explains the guidance but does not explain actions very well. UN agencies, INGOs, the ICRC, and some member-states strongly advocated for the humanitarian principles when updating the *Oslo Guidelines* and *MCDA Guidelines*. That being said, intentionally broadening bureaucratic coordination between development, peacekeeping, or reconstruction convoluted practices based on impartiality, neutrality, independence, and last resort—which counters the expected normative explanation of principled humanitarian interaction.[298] As a result, the normative explanation has little weight explaining civil-military coordination.

Neither the rational nor normative approaches provide a good explanation for how humanitarians and militaries have come to coordinate. None of the groups of actors are monolithic, so the best way to explain their relationships is through their repeated interactions. This was shown in the consensus-based processes of developing universal published guidance and growing relationships in the field. This is best explained by

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[295] Christopher Jasparro and Jonathan Thomas, "Transnational Geopolitical Competition and Natural Disasters," in *The Indian Ocean Tsunami: The Global Response to a Natural Disaster*, ed. Karan, Pradyumma P. and Shanmugam P. Subbiah (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2011).

[296] Bill Canny, *A Review of NGO Coordination in Aceh Post Earthquake/Tsunami*, International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) (2005).

[297] Canny, *A Review of NGO Coordination in Aceh Post Earthquake/Tsunami*.

[298] Coning, "Civil-Military Coordination and UN Peacebuilding Operations."

international practices theory combining practical background knowledge and experience with interaction amongst other humanitarian actors to create proficient, repeatable engagements. By co-creating these common structures, humanitarians and militaries have built the framework for the community of practice.[299]

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter started with a 1991 quote that "'coordination" is one of the most overused and least understood terms in international parlance today."[300] The developments in the international humanitarian system between 1991 and 2009 show repeated efforts to define what coordination does and means. Humanitarian civil-military coordination was first characterized by failed adhocracy, followed by managing the request for assets from headquarters, and then moved into the field with coordination structures and dedicated CMCoord officers. I have argued through this longitudinal study that international practices theory best explains this evolution of civil-military coordination. Old, principle-based practices faded as new coordination practices emerged. The evidence is presented through the value-sets, policy guidance, structure, and procedures showing the theoretical usefulness of the practices lifecycle in explaining these phenomena in a temporal context. The data support Vincent Pouliot's premise that "social phenomena cannot be explained without paying attention to the actual doings that give them shape."[301] In this research, the actual doings of CMCoord officers in the field give shape to humanitarian civil-military coordination.

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[299] Swidler, "What Anchors Cultural Practices," 11.

[300] "United Nations Coordination of the International Humanitarian Response to the Gulf Crisis, 1990–92," Geneva: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, June 1992, p.2.

[301] Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy*, 50.

IV. THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE

The 2010 Haiti earthquake provides an in-depth case study to examine the international practices explanation for how humanitarian and military actors cooperate in a natural disaster. After the devastating earthquake, the government of Haiti invited United Nations (UN) agencies and foreign military support to assist with the humanitarian crisis. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) expanded, twenty-six countries provided military forces, and the United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) stood up immediately.[302] Military assets contributed personnel and equipment, logistics, airlift, health care, and even leadership and coordination that augmented the humanitarian community.[303] Building from the chronological development of humanitarian civil-military coordination in Chapter III, the Haiti earthquake case shows how the field level engagement led to a system of humanitarian civil-military coordination that is best understood using the practices lifecycle.

An international practices argument shapes the organization of this chapter. It starts with Haiti's background and the 2010 Haiti earthquake information. Next, the key indicators in the practices lifecycle give a framework for the argument. The findings start with institutionalized practices, so gaps can be identified, which is followed by practices that are diffused or generated to fill those gaps. Then I examine if the practices during the response were in accordance with the humanitarian principles and principle of last resort to illustrate a degree of fading practices. To further support the practices argument, I provide evidence that generated and diffused practices later become further diffused and institutionalized supporting the practices theory itself and the usability of the practices lifecycle. A brief section addresses the alternative rational and normative explanations to the research question and why the practices approach better explains humanitarian civil-

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302 Abhijit Bhattacharjee and Roberta Lossio, *Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake*, Evaluation and Studies Section of Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Geneva, 2011); Resolution 1944 (2010), S/RES/1944 (2010), United National Security Council Resolution S/RES/1944 (2010) (14 October 2010).

303 *Coordination to Save Lives: History and Emerging Challenges*, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Policy Development and Studies Branch (Geneva, 2012).

military coordination during the Haiti earthquake. Finally, a summary of findings pulls together the earlier findings into the coherent key takeaways from this chapter.

A. INTRODUCTION TO THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE

1. Haiti Background

Since its independence in 1804, Haiti has struggled with establishing political unity, its attempts at democratization punctuated by periods of revolt and dictatorship.[304] This extended political instability has contributed to a low-level political economy equilibrium: the country remains poor and underdeveloped and beset by high levels of corruption and patrimonialism. The country was occupied by U.S. troops from 1915 to 1934, in part a result of its high levels of indebtedness to American banks.[305] Haiti's fluctuations between authoritarianism and democracy continued after the U.S. occupation until a longer period of dictatorship was established by Jean-Claude Duvalier from 1971 to 1986.

After President Duvalier's political coalition broke down and he fled the country, the United Nations assisted the country holding democratic elections, resulting in the victory of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990.[306] But Aristide was soon overthrown in a military coup in 1991—leading to civil violence and a mass migration of Haitians to the United States. Aristide regained the Presidency in 1994 with UN political support and U.S. military support.[307] René Préval was elected in 1996, and then Aristide was re-elected in 2000. Yet, notwithstanding the gains in democracy, Haiti's political economy stayed essentially the same. Aristide's tenure, for example, was plagued by allegations of corruption, embezzlement, narco-trafficking, and money laundering.[308]

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[304] Laurent Dubois, *Haiti: the Aftershocks of History* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012).

[305] Philippe Girard, *Haiti: The Tumultuous History—From Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken Nation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

[306] Electoral Assistance to Haiti, A/RES/45/2, United National General Assembly (10 October 1990); Resolution 940, United National Security Council Resolution A/RES/940 (1994) (31 July 1994).

[307] Resolution 940.

[308] Girard, *Haiti: The Tumultuous History—From Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken Nation*.

After another military coup took over in 2004, restoring democracy became a priority both domestically and internationally. In response to the military coup, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was set up to reconstitute the police, restore law, protect human rights, demobilize the rebel groups, and monitor the elections of a new government.[309] After this, Haiti had no standing military forces and MINUSTAH provided local security and stability. The size of the operation was just under 10,000, including 6,700 military troops, 1,620 police officers, 500 international civilians, and 1,000 local civilians. The following election returned René Préval to the Presidency from 2006 to 2011. MINUSTAH, commanded by Major General Peixoto from the Army of Brazil, was still active when the earthquake occurred in January 2010.

2. The 2010 Earthquake

A 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck Haiti at 4:53 P.M. on January 12, 2010. With the epicenter 25 kilometers southwest of Port-au-Prince, the earthquake destroyed the capital's airport, port, roads, electrical infrastructure, and communications.[310] Buildings like hospitals, schools, government facilities, homes, and businesses were flattened as a result of the below standard building codes. Of the country's 10 million population at the time, over 220,000 people were killed, approximately 300,000 injured, and 1 million internally displaced. Debris from fallen buildings blocked the streets and hampered all types of rescue and relief efforts.

In addition to its devastating effect on the population, the earthquake essentially incapacitated the Haitian government. Right before the earthquake, President René Préval was about to enter his personal residence with his wife, took a step back, and watched the home crumble before him.[311] The event also demolished the Presidential Palace and 14 of

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[309] Resolution 1542 (2004), S/RES/1542 (2004), United National General Assembly Resolution S/RES/1542 (2004) (30 April 2004).

[310] Girard, *Haiti: The Tumultuous History—From Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken Nation*.

[311] Marc Lacey, "U.S. Troops Patrol Haiti, Filling a Void," *New York Times* (New York), January 19, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/world/americas/20haiti.html.

16 government ministries.[312] Préval's priorities were to reconstitute the government, remove debris from the roads, and take care of the dead.[313] Numerous government officials perished, including both politicians and technocrats who were still working at the end of the workday. Those who survived contended with the death and destruction left behind. In this uncertainty, getting people in the Haitian government to make decisions was a significant challenge.[314] The only open space available to re-establish temporary workplaces was at the airport. As a result, the Haitian government, UN agencies, foreign militaries, and countless INGOs set up makeshift offices in that centralized location. Of note, the co-location of so many responders facilitated coordination.

The earthquake equally affected United Nations organizations. UN buildings were also damaged, killing the UN Special Representative to Haiti (head of mission), deputy head of mission, and the police commissioner.[315] The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), as well as the remaining UN personnel present, lost family, friends, and colleagues as well as homes and workspaces. The UN mission also lost 102 personnel.[316] The Acting MINUSTAH Commander (General Peixoto being out of town), began coordination efforts while his wife was missing in the rubble of UN buildings.[317] MINUSTAH also set up at the airport.

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312 Emma Vialpando, *Stability Operations in Haiti 2010: A Case Study*, U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (Carlisle, PA, 2016).

313 David R. DiOrio, *Operation Unified Response—Haiti Earthquake 2010*, Joint Forces Staff College (2010).

314 "Interview with Senior Official from the United States Office of the Secretary of Defense D2," February 2018.

315 Arturo C. Sotomayor, *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: Civil-Military Relations and the United Nations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).

316 P.K. Keen et al., "Relationships Matter: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in Haiti," *Military Review* (2010), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20100630_art004.pdf; United Nations, *In Memoriam—In remembrance of those members of the UN Family who lost their lives in the earthquake in Haiti, 12 January 2010* (2010), https://www.un.org/en/memorial/haiti/.

317 "Interview with Commander Joint Task Force - Haiti C1," December 2019.

The member states of the UN were gravely concerned about the Haiti earthquake. The response itself was covered under existing mandates for the respective humanitarian organizations and MINUSTAH's mandate of security and stability remained the same. However, to assist the humanitarian efforts, the Security Council did unanimously pass resolutions adding 3,500 peacekeepers and 680 police to the MINUSTAH forces.[318] MINUSTAH was also tasked with collaborating with the UN Country Team and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)—but what this meant exactly was not clearly dictated.[319] This forced those in the field to negotiate their respective roles and responsibilities.

Finally, the massive inclusion of external actors that materialized in response to President Préval's appeal for international assistance created significant leadership and coordination challenges. In addition to other bilateral support, twenty-six countries provided military assets making this the largest international military effort in support of disaster relief to date.[320] This included field hospitals and hospital ships, air and sea transportation for logistical support, heavy equipment, and troops that could help MINUSTAH.[321] The U.S., Canada, and the Dominican Republic offered the most support.[322] The U.S. military provided over one billion dollars in assistance, including 22,000 military troops and 33 ships. In less than 24 hours, the U.S. established Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-Haiti)—naming it Operation Unified Response (OUR). Canada provided

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[318] Resolution 1927 (2010), S/RES/1927 (2010), United National Security Council Resolution S/RES.1927 (2010) (4 June 2010).

[319] Resolution 1927 (2010); Resolution 1944 (2010).

[320] Bhattacharjee and Lossio, *Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake*.

[321] Debarati Guha-Sapir et al., *Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake Final Report*, United States Agency for International Development (Washington, D.C., 2011), https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacr222.pdf.

[322] United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti: Achievements, Challenges and Lessons To Be Learned* (Geneva, 2010), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/B2987B3C2B0CB071852577600069D837-Full_Report.pdf.

over 2,000 troops with two ships, helicopters, and ground support.[323] The Dominican Republic, less affected, provided first responders as well as construction equipment, mobile clinics, humanitarian supplies and acted as a humanitarian staging area on the area.[324] The U.S. provided the preponderance of military support.

Beyond the economic and military support, an estimated 3,000 to 10,000 INGOs were working in Haiti as well.[325] The larger INGOs already had development experts on the ground but were now inundated with humanitarian experts too. In addition, countless new organizations were introduced that lacked the experience, skills, or tools to manage in a complex and crowded environment, and they relied on the UN structures and other experienced practitioners.[326] Overall, the weakened host nation infrastructure was insufficient to handle the influx of personnel, equipment, and supplies. Several interviewees who were present for the earthquake itself commented that the first few days after the earthquake were spent sorting out who remained within one's own organization, connecting with who remained of other organizations, and trying to find a place to work and a means of transportation and communication.[327]

B. PRACTICES LIFECYCLE IN THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE

Using international practices theory, the Haiti earthquake provides a natural disaster case study to explore what determines how humanitarians and militaries work together in humanitarian assistance. Even with UN presence, assets from twenty-six

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[323] National Defence and the Canadian Forces, *Operation Hestia* (2010), https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/recently-completed/operation-hestia.html.

[324] Rhoda Margesson and Maureen Taft-Morales, *Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response*, Congressional Research Service (2010), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41023.pdf.

[325] Madeline Kristoff and Liz Panarelli, *Haiti: A Republic of NGOs?*, United States Institute of Peace (Washington, D.C., 2010).

[326] Guha-Sapir et al., *Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake Final Report*.

[327] Vialpando, *Stability Operations in Haiti 2010: A Case Study*. All interviewees who were there when the earthquake occurred made similar comments to this effect.

militaries, and thousands of INGOs, conducting humanitarian response posed a field-level quagmire.[328] I argue that what shaped this relationship between militaries and humanitarians is not the top-down rationalist interests or humanitarian norms, it was the people on the ground who had experience in their respective fields and interacted collectively to build socially meaningful routines. Some of these practices built off of the institutionalized UN humanitarian architectures, some practices diffused as the community shared new practices from other locations, and some new practices were generated in the moment to manage the new challenge. Other practices aligned with the values faded. The practice indicators give a framework for analyzing the argument. Figure 8 represents the status of the indicators in the practices lifecycle in 2010 following the Haiti earthquake.

[328] Bhattacharjee and Lossio, *Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake*.



Figure 8. Indicators of Practices Lifecycle 2010

This section introduces the respective indicators" status within the practices lifecycle, while the full findings provide more detail about institutionalized, diffused, generated, and faded practices. The red color shows the changes from the 2009 Indicators of Practices Lifecycle figure at the end of Chapter III.

Other than the principle of humanity, the longitudinal analysis of Chapter III categorized the value-set indicators as institutionalized but fading due to the varied interpretations of the principles in practice. This trend continued in the Haiti earthquake, as shown in Figure 8. During the Haiti earthquake response, the practice of delivering aid in accordance with the principle of humanity reigned supreme. Although measuring performance by adherence to the principles had been suggested, few organizations addressed the principles at all in operations or reporting.[329] The permissive environment where MINUSTAH had a supporting role and militaries were invited in enabled the primacy of humanity with little consideration given to the other principles. A few humanitarian organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) were cautious, vocal, and focused on delivering efficient response with strict adherence to the principles.[330] Otherwise, most organizations focused on expediting the delivery of aid and services. Per CMCoord in the field, the principle of last resort was not defined organizationally like ICRC or MSF, but day-by-day or task-by-task.[331] As a readily available option within the community of practice, most UN agencies and INGOs adapted their understanding of last resort to fit the circumstances. Not only were practices in accordance with the principles fading, this significant adaptation of principles based on discourse and practical interaction in the field primarily supports the practices-based explanation in general.

Numerous shifts occurred in the policy guidance, structure, and procedures during the Haiti earthquake that were generated, diffused, or institutionalized. For policy guidance, the universally published guidance, *Oslo Guidelines*, remained institutionalized

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329 Ben Ramalingam et al., *Counting What Counts: Performance and Effectiveness in the Humanitarian Sector*, Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) (2009).

330 Benoit Leduc and Loris de Filippi, "Médecins Sans Frontières Teleconference on Haiti Earthquake on January 18, 2010," press release, https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/research/teleconference-haiti-earthquake-january-18-2010.

331 "Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O3," November 2019.

and used as represented in Figure 8.[332] The lack of country-specific guidelines was a glaring deficiency in Haiti, and CMCoord officers diffused this practice by drafting the local guidelines similar to a practice that was generated in other locations.[333] Although not mandated, the CMCoord community of practice shared this early practice—both the process of making the guidelines and the living document itself.[334] Based on the delay in getting coordinated in a sudden-onset disaster and resultant usefulness, country-specific guidelines were determined as a "best practice," which became later institutionalized as reflected in Figure 8.[335]

The most significant new practice generated was the creation of the Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC) in Haiti. Represented in Figure 8, this new structure facilitated the improvement in procedures as well. In addition to the institutionalized clusters system, the new JOTC provided an official cross-actor coordination forum with both CMCoord and MINUSTAH acting as the coordinators. In this case, the JOTC was co-located with the majority of UN humanitarian response agencies, MINUSTAH, and government services operating out of the airport. This cross-actor coordination method was widely accepted in this event—and this acceptance extrapolated to other natural disasters. This co-location cross-actor coordination method is not institutionalized for complex emergencies (represented in the chart in Appendix C), which accounts for the location of this indicator as not fulling institutionalized in Figure 8.[336] This common structure for interaction, the JOTC, provided a forum for localized social practices to emerge as modus operandi. The "socially meaningful patterns of action" of the newly generated "trading

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[332] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O1. That you all for being my family.

[333] Bhattacharjee and Lossio, *Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake*.

[334] Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 199.

[335] Universalia Management Group, *Independent Evaluation of OCHA's Role in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination* (2012), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Evaluation%20Report_OCHA%20CIMCOORD%20-%202012.pdf.

[336] *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Guide for the Military 2.0*.

floor" procedure facilitated dialogue, information sharing, and task division.[337] The collaborative process combined the individual humanitarian's practical background knowledge and experience with the interaction between other humanitarian actors to create proficient, repeatable engagements. As such, the creation of the JOTC and procedures therein is best explained by the practices approach and generated a new structural concept that later became institutionalized as the Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Concept (HuMOCC).[338]

This summary of practices by indicator shows the overall changes to practices during the Haiti earthquake and the usefulness in identifying them along the practices lifecycle. The next section of the chapter is not organized around the indicators, but rather by the presentation of the practices themselves through practices lifecycle. By re-ordering the phases, the data is presented by starting with the institutionalized indicators, followed by practices adopted from diffusion and those generated in the field. To complete the lifecycle analysis, I examine fading practices around the delivery of assistance in accordance with the humanitarian principles and the principle of last resort. To further support the practices lifecycle in the international practices approach, new practices generated during the Haiti earthquake shown to be diffused and institutionalized after the Haiti earthquake.

C. PRACTICES IN THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE

1. Initial Observations

International practices theory best accounts for the productive field-level interactions that determined the relationship between militaries and humanitarians during the Haiti earthquake. The novel scale of the event and unprecedented international response left responders underprepared and overwhelmed. Lessons learned reports and participants

337 Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices," 4.

338 Ronaldo Reario, "The HuMOCC: Typhoon Haiyan, Cyclone Pam and Nepal Earthquake: Observations and Lessons Identified in Humanitarian-Military-Police Coordination and the Use of Foreign Military Assets," *Liaison: A Journal of Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Relief Collaborations* 7 (Fall 2015).

noted that existing structures, guidance, and training were not sufficient to prepare people for responding on this scale.[339] Several commented that every event was unique, and every country had a different type of government, capacity, and culture.[340] This type of environment necessitates those in the field to create socially meaningful processes in order to deliver aid.

The injection of experts across the sectors brought practical knowledge into the response.[341] A piece of the Alder and Pouliot's definition of practices, the "background knowledge" of the many individuals was an important factor, but not the main emphasis of this research and reporting it compromises the anonymity of interviewees. Therefore, I will highlight the collective comments that captured participants' perceptions of how background knowledge contributed to the practices. Most interviewees referred back to prior experiences that they could draw from—how they were the same and how they were different.[342] As senior-level officials in every specialty, all brought extensive expertise in their respective fields—logistics, medical, coordination, and leadership. This background knowledge was essential but had to be applied to the unique environment. As one of the interviewees stated: "There isn't a book that tells you what to do and how to do it… I am making this shit up every day."[343] This comment reflected on the need to apply his knowledge and skillsets to answer unfamiliar problems at hand.

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339 Universalia Management Group, *Independent Evaluation of OCHA's Role in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination*; United Nations Information Service, *Blue Helmet Forum: International Disaster Relief Assistance—What Role for the Military?* (Vienna, 2011); Bhattacharjee and Lossio, *Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake*; Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O3; "Interview with UN OCHA Official O5," May 2018.

340 Interview with Commander Joint Task Force - Haiti C1; Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O2; "Interview with United States State Department Representative in Haiti S1," August 2019.

341 Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*, 29.

342 Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*, 29.

343 "Interview with United States Senior Flag Officer M1," September 2019.

The practice-based explanation combined the background knowledge of individuals with repeated interactional patterns.[344] In order to function, participants provided consistent themes of learning the context, building relationships, and making decisions in the moment. Many interviewees relayed countless anecdotes of creativity, adaptability, and flexibility in the field. Everyone interviewed addressed some element of finding people, working with people, and sorting out how to get the job done. One interviewee reflected on working in highly unpredictable environments like the Haiti earthquake:

> When push comes to shove, it doesn't matter if we're in uniform, whether you're dealing with other servicemembers, or NGOs, or people, the *collective ingenuity* will go fight the casualty in HA/DR. You can put all the other political nonsense aside, when you have to go help people who are at risk, we will collectively get that done.[345] [emphasis added]

This notion of "collective ingenuity" aligns with the localized social processes within the new practices.[346] The combination of experienced practitioners and collective ingenuity was evident in the Haiti earthquake response supporting the practices explanation.

2. Existing Institutionalized Practices

The initial infrastructure of the Haiti response was drawn from the value-sets and policy guidance, structures, and procedures that had already been institutionalized. This section details what institutionalized practices carried over in Haiti, including the *Oslo Guidelines* and basic UN humanitarian architecture. The evidence will show however, that just because certain practices are institutionalized in the sense that they are routinized and expected by the actors involved does not mean the guiding policies address all the needs on the ground.

Institutionalized guidance existed for natural disasters and complex emergencies, but during the immediate response, OCHA did not know which practices applied to Haiti

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344 Swidler, "What Anchors Cultural Practices," 11.

345 Interview with United States Senior Flag Officer M1.

346 Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy*, 10.

based on the MINUSTAH presence. Without this determination, it was unclear to OCHA whether to follow the *Oslo Guidelines* for natural disasters or *MCDA Guidelines* for complex emergencies, which had different expectations of how to work with military forces. Many presumed security would be bad and had the potential to get worse if aid did not arrive fast enough.[347] One CMCoord officer noted, "while there was insecurity, there was no ongoing conflict, no armed conflict, no Haitian military, and no parties to a conflict."[348] Since these elements were missing, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC), John Holmes remotely made the executive decision that it would be considered a natural disaster about a week after the earthquake.[349] The *Oslo Guidelines* took precedence immediately, but this was a long delay in terms of response. This shows that even though institutionalized guidance existed, when an event questionably combines a natural disaster with some type of complex emergency, determining the appropriate guidance can problematic. Without applying forethought to the issue inside Haiti and with a delay in determining which guidance to follow, local coordinators had to mobilize the structures and procedures using their practical sense of what could be done in the field—opening a window of opportunity to generate new practices.

Even with the high degree of structural institutionalization of humanitarian coordinator roles and activated clusters architecture, the UN agencies within Haiti had a slow operational start. The ERC, John Holmes, was critical of the delayed UN response in these challenging circumstances.[350] The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) leading the UN humanitarian response were likewise affected and delayed by the earthquake itself. The membership of the HCT included the

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[347] Interview with United States State Department Representative in Haiti S1.

[348] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O3.

[349] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O1.

[350] Guha-Sapir et al., *Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake Final Report*.

UN humanitarian agencies and large INGOs with ICRC representatives as observers.[351] Overwhelmed, the "HC failed to create a sufficient humanitarian agenda-setting power to allocate tasks to the military," conduct HCT meetings, nor had guidelines for how the UN cluster system should work with MINUSTAH.[352] While the UN established the clusters system immediately, the volume of INGOs quickly overwhelmed the system.

Within this context, the institutionalized UN humanitarian civil-military coordination function took two weeks to get fully organized and staffed. The first UN CMCoord officer arrived on January 13th, the day after the earthquake, and co-located with the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team and MINUSTAH at the airport location.[353] Due to the preponderance of U.S. military forces, CMCoord officers were stationed at a multiplicity of layers, including in Washington, D.C., with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), at U.S. Southern Command military headquarters, and with the UNDAC team in Haiti.[354] Even though CMCoord officers had an institutionalized role and experienced CMCoord officers filled in these positions, the Independent Evaluation of UN OCHA concluded that CMCoord was insufficient in the early stages.[355] The absence of enough CMCoord capacity in the first weeks, particularly in the field to establish and manage local procedures, limited its ability to play a leading role in coordinating the substantial military presence. Ex post facto, OCHA was critiqued for not assigning a permanent CMCoord function in the country before the earthquake. It took two weeks until a team of six CMCoord officers was

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[351] Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Haiti, *Guidelines for Civil-Military Coordination in Haiti* (Haiti, 2011).

[352] François Grünewald, Andrea Binder, and Yvio Georges, *Inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake*, Groupe U.R.D. (2010).

[353] Alan Butterfield, Ronaldo Reario, and Robert Dolan, "The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord) Response to the Haiti Earthquake," *Humanitarian Exchange*, no. 48 (2010). https://www.cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/20101001_UC_The-Haiti-Earthquake-Response.pdf.

[354] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O3.

[355] Universalia Management Group, *Independent Evaluation of OCHA's Role in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination*, 20–21.

assembled—four of which were in Haiti.[356] In the interim, the CMCoord officers managed the dialogue, information sharing, and task division with the manpower present. As a result, very few requests for military assistance came through the CMCoord office.

The key finding is that institutionalization of practices and roles did not provide enough humanitarian civil-military coordination information for the activities needed during the Haiti earthquake. At best, institutionalized guidance provided a foundation and common expectation—something that was incorporated into the background knowledge and practical sense of the responders. The universal guidance did not address what to do when a natural disaster occurs in a complex environment or how to make the determination of which guidance to follow. The absence of a pre-existing CMCoord officer or country-specific guidelines left gaps in the institutionalized policy guidance, structure, and procedures.

Although the broader humanitarian architecture was institutionalized and staffed in-country, understandable delays occurred when they were equally affected by the devastation of the earthquake. Likewise, the CMCoord function was understaffed for two weeks. Most critically, building a common understanding of principles, roles, structures, and tasks only went so far without sufficient staffing to accomplish the institutional functions. In the absence of usable guidance and sufficient personnel, those in the field had to engage with other actors and form the common structures needed.[357] What follows next—the policy guidance, structures, and procedures that were formed in the field—shows how gaps in institutionalization are filled with new practices.

3. Diffusing Practices

Practitioners in Haiti needed to adapt nascent practices from elsewhere or generate them where there was an absence of institutionalized direction. The key practice adapted in Haiti was the creation of country-specific guidelines. Through diffusion, the CMCoord

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[356] Butterfield, Reario, and Dolan, "The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord) Response to the Haiti Earthquake."

[357] Swidler, "What Anchors Cultural Practices," 11.

officers in the field adopted a practice of developing country-specific guidance. The practice had previously emerged in Pakistan and South Sudan and been shared within the community.[358] The practice was threefold: a shared discourse to create proficient, repeatable procedures between actors, the documentation of the consensus, and the periodic re-negotiation and re-publication as circumstances changed.

The Haiti earthquake brought together the Haiti government, UN Country Team, and MINUSTAH with the surging humanitarian clusters, CMCoord, militaries, INGOs, and countless other actors. The UN Security Council increased the size of MINUSTAH and directed it to work more closely with the UN Country Team and OCHA without giving it further direction about what this meant.[359] There was no process established to negotiate the relationships, much less a document that captured some of the thoughts and consensus. Once determined a natural disaster, the UN HCT with UN agencies, major INGOs, and MINUSTAH agreed to adopt the practice of generating country-specific guidelines that applied the *Oslo Guidelines* to the Haiti context.[360]

The collaborative process exemplifies Adler's "joint enterprise" that brought together the community in the collective development of a shared practice.[361] Local CMCoord officers organized this process while also coordinating the disaster response. A CMCoord officer described the importance:

> It was a necessity, but not because a document has to be produced. It's key because stakeholders need to be part of the process—for these key stakeholders it is also a learning process in terms of what everyone can contribute and expect. And they need to understand it so they can explain it to other colleagues. People come and go, especially in an operation like Haiti, so this is the other benefit of having country-specific guidelines. In

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358 Universalia Management Group, *Independent Evaluation of OCHA's Role in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination*.

359 Resolution 1927 (2010); Resolution 1944 (2010).

360 Universalia Management Group, *Independent Evaluation of OCHA's Role in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination*.

361 Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 199.

> Haiti, we thought that this is going to be part of the solution in terms of newcomers having a ready reference document including a clear definition of procedures, of potential issues, and how to deal with them. If you will ask me the greatest benefit of developing country specific guidelines, it is the learning process.[362]

This "learning process" and documentation of localized social procedures among actors strongly supports a practice-based explanation for how humanitarians and militaries worked together in Haiti. This process reinforced Adler and Pouliot's proposition that practices combine agency through the actor's participation and structure through the social context and political environment.[363] It also institutionalized the country-specific practices in order to capture consensus and carry practices forward to new personnel in the field—further diffusing the new practice.

The content of *Guidelines for Civil Military Coordination in Haiti* reflected the discourse and social construction between actors in the field.[364] The purpose is stated as:

> Acknowledging the need for both humanitarian actors and military and police actors to operate effectively within the same environment, the Guidelines aim to: (i) establish agreed *principles and practices* for constructive civil-military relations in Haiti, (ii) avoid duplication of tasks, and (iii) promote and strengthen the coordination of activities.[365] [emphasis added]

The guidelines explicitly state their intent to document both practices and principles. The practices identified were primarily structural and procedural and will be discussed in the next section. The guidelines also reinforced the humanitarian principles and last resort in writing, but refined the definition of last resort to the local context because "the use of generic language adopted from global guidance belies the difficulties of applying these

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362 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O3.

363 Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices," 16.

364 Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices."

365 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Haiti, *Guidelines for Civil-Military Coordination in Haiti*.

criteria on the ground."[366] This adaptation agreed to by the community of practice, shows how even institutionalized principles can change through repeated discourse. Updating the country-specific guidelines followed a similar process of collective development and distribution.[367]

The creation of country-specific guidelines for civil-military coordination in Haiti shows how collective engagement drives practices and how the diffusion of practices occurs in the practices lifecycle. Although no country-specific guidelines existed prior to the Haiti earthquake, the CMCoord officers brought together the dissimilar groups to build a working-consensus through discourse. Having to find commonality between the wide variety of actors weakens the explanatory power of rational and normative approaches and is better explained by international practices theory.

4. Generating Practices

The absence of institutionalized direction also led to the generation of new practices in the field. The combination of 26 militaries and thousands of INGOs requesting support overwhelmed the CMCoord function initially.[368] Once better staffed, CMCoord officers working with militaries and the MINUSTAH staff providing security had to find a way to work together to process the volume of requests. To do this, CMCoord officers generated a new coordination structure called the Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC) and the "trading floor" procedure on January 26, 2010, 14 days after the earthquake.

Before the generation of the Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC) by CMCoord, the U.S. military created the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell (HACC). About ten days into the response, the HACC arose out of frustration between the U.S. JTF-Haiti Commander and MINUSTAH Commander trying to work the response ad hoc. The HACC

366 Victoria Metcalfe and Michelle Berg, *Country-specific Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines*, Humanitarian Policy Group (London, 2012), 2.

367 Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 199.

368 Universalia Management Group, *Independent Evaluation of OCHA's Role in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination*, 20–21.

was like a civil-military operations center, or CMOC, but its staff were advised to intentionally leave the word "military" out of the title.[369] It was designed to allow NGOs, the clusters, and other organizations to ask for assistance in a formal way. Located at the U.S. embassy, the HACC consisted of 30 rapidly deployed civil-affairs personnel.[370] According to the JTF-Haiti Commander, "the hardest part was to get buy-in from was the NGOs, they just did not like having to deal with coming to meetings and structures that they were not very familiar with."[371] While it started giving some structure to the U.S. military support operations for the Haitian population, it mostly worked outside of normal processes to do so and was not located near the INGOs or the UN.[372] The location at the embassy also made it very challenging for most of these potential partners who needed a security clearance to attend meetings.[373] In essence, the HACC did not represent a forum in which the broader community of practice could easily or willingly access—showing that a structure created by a powerful country did not dominate the coordination. The need for a UN civil-military coordination center became apparent.

The scope and scale of the Haiti response necessitated the "infrastructure of repeated interactional patterns" for humanitarian civil-military coordination.[374] Never done before, the UN CMCoord officers and MINUSTAH staff in the field generated the Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC) on January 26 to better facilitate the practice of cross-actor coordination.[375] This was similar to the functional purpose of the HACC, but the JOTC included all militaries and formalized the tasking process under UN civilian

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369 Interview with Commander Joint Task Force - Haiti C1.

370 DiOrio, *Operation Unified Response—Haiti Earthquake 2010*.

371 Interview with Commander Joint Task Force - Haiti C1.

372 Guha-Sapir et al., *Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake Final Report*.

373 Guha-Sapir et al., *Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake Final Report*.

374 Swidler, "What Anchors Cultural Practices," 11.

375 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *OCHA Situation Report No. 14 Haiti Earthquake* (27 January 2010).

leadership. It was co-located centrally at the airport, increasing access for INGOs, the clusters, and most of the foreign military headquarters. Detailing the experience, a CMCoord officer described the need for the JOTC:

> There was so much chaos and duplication going on with regards to the mobilization of assets. For instance, we'd have people say 'we need a helicopter to do a humanitarian assessment" or 'I have a buddy who's a pilot with the U.S. here and we can have their helicopter" while someone else had organized the helicopter so that other organizations could participate. We needed to get some structure into this. We also needed to approach the military forces in a coordinated way so that we would not approach all the different militaries with a zillion requests. The whole idea was to get coherence into this and some predictability as well.[376]

The JOTC addressed the ad hoc assignments and the lack of prioritization that was occurring in the field. As Swidler stated, practices remained stable because the "*need to engage one another forces people to return to common structures*."[377] In the absence of such structures, actors will create them. The JOTC provided the coherence and predictability of a new common structure.

Positioned at the nexus between foreign militaries and the UN humanitarian system, the JOTC facilitated the main CMCoord procedures of dialogue, information sharing, and task division. Figure 9 shows the coordination organizational structure and the various actors who participated in it.

[376] Interview with UN OCHA Official O5.

[377] Swidler, "What Anchors Cultural Practices," 11.



Figure 9. Coordination Organizational Structure.[378]

This figure shows the JOTC, led by the UN (CMCoord and MINUSTAH), as the go-between for the humanitarian community represented by the clusters and the U.S. and other military partners. The large green arrow represents a two-way dialogue for information sharing and coordination (task division) between the clusters and JOTC—this ensured a standardized request process. Before getting to the JOTC, civilian response planners vetted humanitarian requests through the humanitarian architecture first.[379] One CMCoord officer explained:

> We set this up so when a humanitarian organization would request an asset, a truck or a helicopter, first it would be vetted by the respective cluster to see if all civilian alternatives had been explored, if the cluster said ok, it went to an inter-cluster coordination meeting to verify no other cluster

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[378] P.K. Keen, *The. U.S. Military and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response: Perspectives from the Haiti Earthquake Response Presentation* (2019).

[379] Harvard University and NATO, *The Haiti Case Study: Towards a Comprehensive Response to Health System Strengthening in Crisis-affected Fragile States* (Boston, 2012), https://www.preventionweb.net/publications/view/36602.

> would have assets available, then it would be decided that request was ok to go to the military.[380]

After this rigorous vetting within the humanitarian community, requests would come to the JOTC. One evaluation summarized: "this setup ensured that military and police forces received validated and prioritized requests from humanitarian organizations through a single source to provide for efficient and coordinated utilization of military and police assets."[381] The procedure for submitting requests led to a new practice that incorporated an adapted form of the principle of last resort discussed below. Although the principle of last resort was fading, this structure fostered a routinized process that attempted to compliment the principle of last resort.

Once validated requests arrived at the JOTC, CMCoord generated another new procedure of assigning assets to requests: the "trading floor." In addition to dialogue and information exchange at the JOTC, the "trading floor" became the regularized pattern of interaction for task division. Another CMCoord officer described the routine and "trading floor" process they established:

> The JOTC would basically get the certified requests as priorities by the cluster leads. From there we'd meet for the requests, twice a day, once in morning and once in the afternoon, the planning timeframe was 48 hours (sometimes it could be 24 hours if there is available capacity and depending on the urgency of the task and activity). The request is being presented to all the planning officers of all the participating foreign military assets including MINUSTAH. Always, MINUSTAH had to get the first crack at the request. If MINUSTAH says 'yes, we can do it," then MINUSTAH began coordinating with the requesting agency. If MINUSTAH says 'no, we can't do it," then others who are in the room will say, 'who can do this?" They say, 'we can do this," or maybe 'we can both do this because my capacity is not enough but joining forces with you we can do it." That was the kind of 'trading floor" concept that evolved during the operation of the JOTC. Then, they have to report or provide feedback to the JOTC in terms of completion or non-completion and why. That was the process.[382]

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380 Interview with UN OCHA Official O5.

381 Bhattacharjee and Lossio, *Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake*.

382 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O3.

This description of the "trading floor" exemplifies Adler and Pouliot's definition of practices as "socially meaningful patterns of action, which is being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world."[383] It also exemplifies a process that is not power or norm-driven. The detailed processes within the JOTC became a formalized practice in the local *Guidelines for Civil-Military Coordination in Haiti,* affirming JOTC as a new practice.[384]

International practices theory best explains the new humanitarian civil-military coordination practices that emerged during the Haiti earthquake. In the generation phase of the practices lifecycle, CMCoord officers, working with and within the broader community of practice, generated the structure and procedures necessary in the absence of institutionalized guidance or leadership direction. The UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee assessed that:

> the establishment of coordination structures engaging both military and humanitarian actors in a joint decision-making and resource-tasking enterprise was critical to the absorption of extensive military assets into the humanitarian response operation.[385]

The creation of the structural JOTC as a co-located, cross-actor coordination mechanism addressed the ad hoc assignment of assets. The practical interaction on the "trading floor" facilitated task division. UN CMCoord, MINUSTAH, the Humanitarian Country Team and foreign militaries collaborated to create proficient, repeatable engagements that support the practices explanation.

5. Fading Principles?

The practice of conducting humanitarian assistance in accordance with the humanitarian principles has been institutionalized since the inception of the humanitarian

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383 Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices," 4.

384 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Haiti, *Guidelines for Civil-Military Coordination in Haiti*.

385 United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti: Achievements, Challenges and Lessons To Be Learned*, 10.

system in 1991. Yet, the Haiti earthquake capped a decade that significantly challenged these institutionalized humanitarian principles with natural disaster response, stabilization, and reconstruction missions, as reflected in Chapter III. Reflecting on the status of humanitarian principles over time, famous humanitarian scholar Ian Smillie surmised that neutrality, impartiality, and independence were at best "patchy, weak or simply non-existent," suggesting that the principles may be fading in pre-eminence.[386] In 2009, before the earthquake, humanitarian scholars recommended measuring performance by adherence to the principles, but that type of study was not done in the Haiti earthquake.[387]

As a natural disaster where the host nation government created a highly permissive environment, Haiti would have been an ideal event for the normative principles to be placed front and center—and yet for most, they were not. The necessity for rapid response largely superseded consideration of the principles, and few organizations addressed the principles at all in operations or reporting.[388] Portrayed in Figure 8 earlier in this chapter, the trend continued where humanity remained the key focus of actors while impartiality, neutrality, independence, and last resort continued to fade. This section first gives evidence from the couple of organizations that maintained practices upholding the principles followed by the perceptions of most other organizations that altered the principles in practice. Based on the lack of evidence in reports, most of the data included reflects interview input.

Two organizations stand out as deliberately conducting operations with the humanitarian principles in mind: the ICRC and Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF). Their practices reflected an intentionally distant relationship with the responding militaries. As the author and guardian of the humanitarian principles, the Red Cross was restrained and

386 Ian Smillie, "The Emperor's Old Clothes: The Self-Created Siege of Humanitarian Action," in *The Golden Fleece: Manipulation and Independence in Humanitarian Action*, ed. Donini, Antonio (Boulder, CO: Kumarian Press, 2012), 32.

387 Ramalingam et al., *Counting What Counts: Performance and Effectiveness in the Humanitarian Sector*.

388 Numerous INGO reports of activities in Haiti address accomplishments but not the humanitarian principles. INGO reports are available through their respective websites and through reliefweb.

did as much as it could without military assistance.[389] Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) publicly expressed concerns over the militarization of response efforts contrary to the principles.[390] This included major concerns like when U.S. armed forces controlling the airport diverted an inbound MSF aircraft with needed medical supplies or more minor incidents of run-ins with soldiers patrolling the streets.[391] The strongest statement came from the MSF Operations Manager in Haiti, stating:

> First, we just want the aid operation to be efficient. I think we can gain in efficiency; it's needed. Then, it's a more general question about the militarization of humanitarian (aid). You know, the military distributing food, and at the same time having a gun, it's extremely confusing. It's a constraint for us in places like Afghanistan, in Iraq, in all the areas where military staff are doing humanitarian action or at least perform such actions under that name. So this is something that we are concerned with in MSF in general.[392]

Similar thoughts were echoed by another MSF team-member in the field. They remarked:

> These principles are very strong at MSF and they're used, no so much in Haiti, but very much in environments where security is extremely exposed like in Afghanistan, Middle East, Sahal, or Yemen to negotiate the workspace. And obviously, it's not only for the books, they really are being used to negotiate your working space in addition to international humanitarian law, and other very practical or very pragmatic lines of argument to negotiate your workspace, some access on some roads, some access to some hospitals, or some access for people to get to your medical facilities. So, the principles are always there basically.[393]

These organizations broadened the application of principles globally so as to be more consistent with them across the board. They were both principled and sufficiently funded

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389 Interview with Commander Joint Task Force - Haiti C1.

390 Leduc and Filippi, "Médecins Sans Frontières Teleconference on Haiti Earthquake on January 18, 2010."

391 "Interview with Médecins Sans Frontières team member in Haiti I2," June 2018.

392 Leduc and Filippi, "Médecins Sans Frontières Teleconference on Haiti Earthquake on January 18, 2010."

393 Interview with Médecins Sans Frontières team member in Haiti I2.

to practice without additional support. This was a minority perspective during the Haiti response.

The emergent relationship of militaries and humanitarians in Haiti led to practices that largely ignored the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Humanity held strong as the imperative of action. Almost universally, regardless of organization, those interviewed understood the humanitarian principles and their value in complex emergencies, but also agreed that the circumstances of the earthquake left the principles largely inapplicable, unconsidered, or more likely, assumed their actions aligned with the principles in these unique circumstances. The status updates and after-action reports of most organizations did not mention the consideration of principles in operations.[394] One donor noted that little information was available regarding the actual adherence to the principles.[395] Practitioners, policy-makers, donors, and scholars have left this almost completely unexamined.

To achieve humanitarian ends, improvised practices emerged in the field overriding the principles of the community. The instinctual reaction of responders deemphasized the humanitarian principles at first in favor of the interaction needed to create processes. Unlike a slow-onset disaster, the rapid nature and magnitude of the disaster drove actors to push as much aid as possible by any means necessary.[396] This necessity prioritized humanity—specifically in the rescue phase. An interviewee noted, "some [principles] we followed and some we didn't. If we didn't follow them immediately, we did eventually."[397] The immediate chaos of the situation prioritized action over the principles until the structures and procedures could be established that somewhat reinforced the

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[394] This is based on numerous INGO activity reports that do not include commentary regarding the humanitarian principles.

[395] Liv Moberg, *Norwegian Humanitarian Response to Natural Disasters: Case of Haiti Earthquake January 2010*, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Oslo, 2010), https://norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/haiti-review---final-report.pdf.

[396] Shih and Pierson, *Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief: What Can We Learn from Commercial Supply Chains?*

[397] Interview with Senior Official from the United States Office of the Secretary of Defense D2.

principles. Without strict adherence to the value-set, local actors developed their common understandings by repeatedly engaging with each other in the field, supporting the practices explanation.

In addition to the pure sense of urgency, the consideration of principles was also attributed to the unique security situation. President Préval invited in military forces, and the UN Security Council endorsed MINUSTAH's role in the provision of additional security. Without a Haitian military, most humanitarians and militaries rationalized why the principles were not a concern in this unique set of circumstances. A CMCoord officer in Haiti explained the interpretation of humanitarian principles in the Haiti context. The officer stated:

> The humanitarian principles…it was a bit distorted in terms of the exaggeration that some people are trying to imagine, that it will erode humanitarianism. There is no such thing as erosion because they're (military forces) all over the place. They're providing a safe and secure environment. The MINUSTAH military were securing the country even before the earthquake so you cannot question why they are there. Plus, the fact that MINUSTAH's mandate was modified after the earthquake by the UN Security Council and that MINUSTAH's role included supporting humanitarian organizations or humanitarian assistance activities. There is a clear explanation of what MINUSTAH's role is and this has to be explained. Your [referring to INGO] previous experience in another country cannot be force-fitted into this operation, because this is a different operation.[398]

The CMCoord perspective tailored the principles to the environment counter to the universal interpretation of principles expressed by ICRC and MSF. CMCoord justified their understanding in context, and the ICRC and MSF deliberately considered how their actions in Haiti (or anywhere) affected their humanitarian mission everywhere. This CMCoord officer's comment also suggested nested sources of legitimacy for military forces in humanitarian assistance when UN-directed, which is ambivalent regarding last resort. If principles were contemplated amongst the rest of the humanitarian community, and there is little evidence of that, it is reasonable that fellow humanitarian organizations would concur with the UN OCHA interpretation of the principles.

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[398] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O3.

In practice, the CMCoord understanding of the principles enabled more flexibility to work with others in the field. A U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) humanitarian representative commented:

> Policy is to maintain neutrality as much as possible and keep actual and perceived distance from the military as much as possible—any military. And that certainly was reinforced among humanitarian staff. But where the rubber meets the road is when you're in a situation like Haiti, and you are not going to be able to deliver aid without security forces and you don't have any security forces from within the country you can trust, that's when people make compromises a bit on the fly.[399]

The majority of INGOs and UN agencies applied this perspective to the humanitarian principles in a way to accomplish the task. It made possible the local actor engagement that generated the new practices in the field.

The practices literature has strong explanatory power when values are adapted or interpreted in the field. Negotiating the diversity of views shows how discourse builds the socially meaningful patterns of action.[400] I discovered during this research one perspective so counter-intuitive and noteworthy it bore inclusion in this section. The Commander of Joint Task Force-Haiti, General Trombitas, introduced another interpretation of neutrality. He commented that "all NGOs had a personal stake in the game or political slant. Our military could be neutral because we were just there to help."[401] From his perspective, when tasked with humanitarian assistance, military forces could actually be more neutral than other actors based on their temporary presence and singular mission. While this perception may not have played a significant role in Haiti, it is plausible that other military members may come to similar conclusions and interpret the humanitarian principle of neutrality in this fashion during a natural disaster. The unconsidered nature of the humanitarian principles in practice as a whole lends credibility to their status as fading principles.

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399 "Interview with United States Agency for International Development team member G1," July 2018.

400 Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices," 4.

401 "Interview with Commander Joint Task Force - Haiti C2," August 2019.

The perception of last resort also shifted in this permissive environment. Whether coordination with militaries was initially ad hoc or migrated to the more robust CMCoord structure and procedures, the influx of military forces made assets available that diminished consideration for the principle of last resort. UN organizations and INGOs mostly found that even if they did not want to use military assets, they ended up doing it at first because it was the most accessible or practical choice.[402] From the perspective of the military answering the requests, "last resort became a different thing because it was a disaster of such dimension that every resource was needed, and maybe last resort became the first resort or the only resort."[403] Particularly in functions like getting the airport, port, and roads operational—a common theme was that most INGOs did not care who was sorting it out, as long as somebody was.[404] One report noted that on "the issue of coordinating with the military, especially in non-conflict countries like Haiti, the humanitarian community appears to have a *varied interpretation* of the "principle of last resort" for the use of military under the *Oslo Guidelines* (emphasis added)."[405] Straying from its normative foundation, the principle of last resort became intersubjective and re-negotiated in the field such that JOTC was viewed as somewhat norm compliant.

With the UN-endorsed presence of MINUSTAH, non-conflict environment, and deployed foreign military forces to assist in aid delivery, CMCoord had to continually explain how they interpreted the principle of last resort in this context to the community of practice. One CMCoord officer described that the last resort should be independently considered per task per timeframe. Their description is as follows:

> Last resort should be understood in its correct phase and application, whether it's a natural disaster, complex emergency, or refugee response. We have a need, we need to undertake a humanitarian activity for a defined period of time. For example, you need to ship or transport X amount of

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402 Universalia Management Group, *Independent Evaluation of OCHA's Role in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination*.

403 "Interview with United States Senior Flag Officer M3," August 2019.

404 Interview with United States Agency for International Development team member G1.

405 Bhattacharjee and Lossio, *Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake*, 10.

> supplies from point A to point B within the next 7 days, and with everything we know and have, we are convinced that we cannot fulfill that task within civilian or humanitarian capacity because they're just not there. So, that means that given the situation we need to look for a non-civilian alternative and that would be the military or civil defense, an external capacity. It needs to be understood that this capacity is supporting this task to make sure that this humanitarian activity takes place during the required time period. The last resort should be defined on the timeline of that activity. During that activity [in Haiti], the last resort that we had was the military.[406]

As a benefit, this refined definition can be applied to any circumstance. However, determining last resort, as described above, requires personnel and processes to support the routinized case-by-case examination of tasks and resources. Pushing this boundary even further, an OCHA Independent Evaluation reported that in Haiti, some INGO and UN organizations would come to the CMCoord requesting military assets as a first resort, not a last resort.[407] On the other end of the spectrum, this perception of last resort did not address the normative concerns from organizations like the ICRC and MSF, who preferred to keep even greater distinction from military forces. While some humanitarian organizations preferred more utilization of military forces and some less, the majority of actors worked with CMCoord under this interpretation of last resort.

The collective adaption of the humanitarian principles and principle of last resort during the practices in Haiti supports a practices explanation of how militaries and humanitarians worked together. This adaption was neither the most rational choice nor a normative one—but through discourse, shared practices emerged that contextualized the humanitarian principles and principle of last resort. While militarization and neutrality were noted, most conducted their activities without significant consideration of the values in this context. For this reason, I categorized Haiti response activities in adherence with the principles of impartiality, neutrality, independence, and last resort in a greater degree of fade on the practices lifecycle. In this permissive environment, working with the military actors became routinized and institutionalized rather than the exception.

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406 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O3.

407 Universalia Management Group, *Independent Evaluation of OCHA's Role in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination*.

D. FURTHER DIFFUSION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF NEW PRACTICES

International practices theory examines bundles of practices in specific cases, but looking temporally through a practices lifecycle lens also reinforces the fundamental practices premise that localized social processes are generative forces unto themselves.[408] To corroborate the practices lifecycle, this research examined how the practices generated and diffused during the Haiti earthquake were further diffused and institutionalized. This included the diffused practice of country-specific guidelines and generated practice of the Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC).

The practice of drafting local guidelines continued to diffuse and became institutionalized. Based on the success in Haiti, CMCoord officers started working through their networks to draft guidelines all over the world in both natural disasters and complex emergencies.[409] In 2012, country-specific guidelines were named a "best practice" in an Independent OCHA evaluation.[410] As the UN OCHA Civil-Military Coordination Service (CMCS) updated the 2015 and 2018 *UN CMCoord Field Handbooks* with the input of CMCoord officers, the practice finally became institutionalized and reinforced as good practice. These field handbooks are used for training and as practical field-level guidance for CMCoord officers around the world.[411]

The JOTC evolved into an official institution called the Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Concept (HuMOCC) with a co-location coordination method. This concept outlined the proposed cell or center where CMCoord officers act as a

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[408] Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy*, 10.

[409] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O1.

[410] Universalia Management Group, *Independent Evaluation of OCHA's Role in Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination*.

[411] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service, *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 1.0* (Geneva, 2015), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/CMCoord%20Field%20Handbook%201.0.pdf; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 2.0*.

coordinator of foreign militaries in conjunction with host nations affected by humanitarian crises. This center can be co-located with a host nation's local military-to-military coordination center as in Haiti, where it was co-located with MINUSTAH. This practice appeared in the Philippines during Typhoon Haiyan in November 2013 when twenty-one member states provided foreign military assets.[412] In this instance, co-location with the Armed Forces of the Philippines was found to have many benefits, including improved understanding of host nation priorities, efficient information sharing, deliberate planning, and rapid coordination and planning.[413] The HuMOCC structure and procedures were again used in the Cyclone Pam response in Vanuatu in 2014 and the Nepal earthquake in 2015.[414] According to UN-CMCoord, "a co-location strategy for humanitarian civil-military coordination, where appropriate and feasible, should be adopted."[415] These responses show the diffusion of the HuMOCC practice and the co-location method from Haiti's JOTC.

The institutionalization of the HuMOCC concept is further evidence that field level activities inform higher-level guidance. As noted above, the HuMOCC conceptual framework was institutionalized in the 2015 and 2018 *UN-CMCoord Field Handbooks*, and in the 2017 *UN OCHA Humanitarian Civil-Military Guide for the Military*.[416] However, while it has been institutionalized in field handbooks and guides, the HuMOCC has not been endorsed by the high-level Inter-Agency Standing Committee. While the other policy categories reflect full institutionalization and IASC endorsement, the cross-actor

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412 United Nations Officer for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Philippines: Foreign Military Deployed Assets* (2013), https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-foreign-military-deployed-assets-30-december-2013.

413 Reario, "The HuMOCC: Typhoon Haiyan, Cyclone Pam and Nepal Earthquake: Observations and Lessons Identified in Humanitarian-Military-Police Coordination and the Use of Foreign Military Assets."

414 Reario, "The HuMOCC: Typhoon Haiyan, Cyclone Pam and Nepal Earthquake: Observations and Lessons Identified in Humanitarian-Military-Police Coordination and the Use of Foreign Military Assets."; Josie Flint, *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies: Towards a Predictable Model*, Regional Consultative Group on Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination for Asia and the Pacific (Singapore, 2017).

415 Reario, "The HuMOCC: Typhoon Haiyan, Cyclone Pam and Nepal Earthquake: Observations and Lessons Identified in Humanitarian-Military-Police Coordination and the Use of Foreign Military Assets."

416 *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Guide for the Military 2.0*.

coordination indicator does not cover the full institutionalization threshold for this reason in Figure 8.

Not only were the structure and procedures of the HuMOCC diffused in operations and institutionalized in guidance, but the HuMOCC concept also spread to national planning. It is a particularly popular concept in countries in Asia and the Pacific as they build their own national disaster management capacity and develop structures to work with international aid during a natural disaster. An analysis of the region noted the HuMOCC was "an *emerging practice* in UN Civil-Military Coordination development globally, as well as in Asia and the Pacific, is the development of a platform to facilitate information sharing, task division, and the coordination of operational planning between humanitarian and military actors."[417] (emphasis added) The HuMOCC has been adopted in the domestic planning of Bangladesh and Nepal and adapted into the disaster management structures of Indonesia and Myanmar. This denotes another level of domestic institutionalization that derived initially from the Haiti JOTC.

Further diffusion and institutionalization support the international practices approach. Not only were practices generated and diffused during Haiti, but additional evidence shows that practices developed in the field propagated in a bottom-up manner through the humanitarian civil-military community of practice. Eventually, these "good," "emerging," and "best" practices became codified at higher headquarters, showing that competent, repeated patterns of action at the field level explain the development of the relationship between humanitarians and militaries.

E. RATIONAL AND NORMATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Both rational and normative approaches do offer some selective explanatory power in explaining humanitarian civilian-military coordination in Haiti, but the practices lens better addresses the overall relationship. The rationalist approach best explains states who offered assistance through the lens of their security interests—like regional stability or

[417] Flint, *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies: Towards a Predictable Model*, 81.

Haitian migration. For example, the United States contributed a significant amount to the humanitarian response in Haiti. While several interviewees and reports cited concerns of Haitian migration, those in the field considered that highly unlikely.[418] Besides, providing humanitarian assistance through military assets had also become a sign of international responsibility, and participation reflected state capability and reputation. Countries around the world contributed military forces as far away as Canada, France, and South Korea.[419] From a more normative perspective, the contribution of military forces can also reflect a state's (and the people therein) compassion and desire to help. Just as compelling to the U.S. and the world was that the "catastrophic nature of the earthquake shocked the conscience of the people."[420] Public announcements of condolences came from the U.N. Security Council, President of the United States, and world leaders everywhere.[421] One cannot completely rule out the rationalist or normative explanation for why militaries are sent to Haiti, however, this does little to explain how humanitarians and militaries worked together once militaries were in the field.

The primary normative measure of humanitarian action would be humanitarian organization's adherence to the humanitarian principles. The ICRC and MSF stood firm, but most other humanitarian organizations did not prioritize the principles the same way. As discussed previously, humanity as the imperative maintained its preeminence, but the unique circumstances, in particular the presence of MINUSTAH and lack of domestic security forces, lowered barriers of working with military forces in Haiti. As the most

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418 Margesson and Taft-Morales, *Haiti Earthquake: Crisis and Response*; Joint Center for Operational Analysis/United States Joint Forces Command, *Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE Haiti Earthquake Response* (2010); Interview with United States State Department Representative in Haiti S1.

419 Gary Cecchine et al., *The U.S. Military Response to the 2010 Haiti Earthquake*, RAND Corporation (Washington, D.C., 2013).

420 "Interview with Senior Official from the United States Office of the Secretary of Defense D3," February 2018.

421 United Nations Security Council. "Expressing Deep Sympathy, Condolences to All Bereaved, Security Council Reaffirms Strong Support for Government, People of Haiti." press release, January 18, 2010, https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/expressing-deep-sympathy-condolences-all-bereaved-security-council-reaffirms-strong; White House. "Remarks by the President on Rescue Efforts in Haiti." press release, January 13, 2010, https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/remarks-president-rescue-efforts-haiti.

readily available option within the community of practice, most UN agencies and INGOs adapted their understanding of the principles to fit the circumstances. The lack of consideration for or "varied interpretation" of impartiality, neutrality, independence, and last resort is better explained by the practices than the normative approach.[422] For these reasons, the normative explanation based on these values fails to describe fully the working relationship between militaries and humanitarians.

Rational institutionalism appears as the most plausible alternative explanation, initially, as actors sought maximum efficiency in relief operations. This logically explains why actors wanted to coordinate, but not how operations unfolded. The processes and procedures formed for humanitarian civil-military coordination were the product of the consensus of a wide variety of actors, reflecting neither a single actor's more rational or normative preference. Nor did this yield a maximum efficiency result that a more top-down technically organized effort arguably would have done. As with the development of the humanitarian civil-military community since its start in 1991, the more a process tries to produce a consensus among disparate actors, the more it reflects compromise over efficiency. While efficiency is the goal of all, most are willing to sacrifice some element of efficiency to participate in a coordination framework that works for the many. In this sense, practices theory better explains behavior in the field than rational institutionalism.

F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The Haiti earthquake provided an excellent case to probe the plausibility of international practices theory. In examining practices, some broader findings can be drawn for humanitarian civil-military coordination in natural disasters. A key finding after the Haiti earthquake demonstrated that countries, the UN, and humanitarian organizations have come to expect military support in natural disasters, and the majority of actors were willing to coordinate. The highly permissive environment, non-conflict status, and support of MINUSTAH all contributed to this shift in the relationship between militaries and humanitarians in natural disasters. An OCHA evaluation concluded:

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[422] Bhattacharjee and Lossio, *Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake*, 10.

> An important issue that emerged from the Haiti experience is how the humanitarian community relates to the military in situations of natural disasters in countries not involving open armed conflict. The principle of last resort when it comes to using military assets was influenced strongly by ground realities of complex emergencies in conflict situations. As the Tsunami and Haiti earthquake have shown, mobilization of military assets can be vital for saving lives in these non-conflict situations, and increasingly military of foreign governments are getting involved in humanitarian operations especially following natural disasters. The Policy Development and Studies Branch of OCHA clarified ***best practices*** in civil military relations in the context of Haiti immediately after the earthquake, and this formed the basis of engagement with the military actors. [emphasis added][423]

Counter to the normative foundations of the humanitarian community, after Haiti engaging with military actors in a natural disaster was now considered best practice.

Second, the host nation and INGOs had key roles in determining the practices of humanitarian civil-military coordination on the ground. The government of Haiti created a highly permissive, low-risk environment wherein INGOs evaluated the security situation and ability to deliver relief in that context. As temporary actors, foreign militaries inserted themselves into the frameworks that the host nation, UN, and humanitarian organizations established. This gave the space for CMCoord to work within the community of practice to generate new practices like the country-specific guidelines and JOTC.

Third, humanitarian leadership and staffing in the coordination structure was key to facilitating the practices within humanitarian civil-military coordination. At first, the lack of humanitarian leadership in general and understaffing of the CMCoord function initially led to delayed coordination during the Haiti earthquake contributing to confusion, duplication of efforts, and ad hoc activities. Once leadership and staffing recovered, new practices were quickly established like the generation of country-specific guidelines, the JOTC, and the trading floor to address the gaps.

Fourth, even if universal guidance like the Oslo Guidelines was institutionalized, it did not address the nuances of any particular event. CMCoord in the field had to interpret,

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[423] Bhattacharjee and Lossio, *Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake*, 30.

negotiate, and implement practices applying institutionalized guidance. This relied heavily on the background knowledge and experience of those in the field.

Fifth, each humanitarian organization gave varying levels of consideration to the humanitarian principles and the principle of last resort. Instead of acting on a universal normative standard, those on the ground largely interpreted the principles in light of the context or relied on the CMCoord interpretation. As a result, the local practices were the result of the background knowledge, discourse, and negotiated engagement of those in the field.

The final finding posits that international practices theory has a high level of explanatory power in circumstances where actions reflect the group consensus of a complex assembly of actors. Recalling the earlier participant's comment, nonsense is set aside, and "collective ingenuity" gets the job done.[424] The rational and normative motivations may lead actors into humanitarian response, but when they confront the collage of actors in the field, an explanation that can fully account for their interaction is a better fit. Since most organizations did not want to or have the means to operate entirely independently, they became immersed in a system where they helped to shape the practices. CMCoord officers, working at the nexus of these actors, adapted to the local context and facilitated new practices within the community to achieve the overarching humanitarian purpose.

G. CONCLUSION

The Haiti earthquake case provided an excellent example to test the international practices theory in a natural disaster. The research indicators showed that the humanitarian principles, the principle of last resort, policy guidelines, structures, and procedures were all shaped by the actors on the ground and adjusted to the local environment. By examining the practices closely, the broader key findings derived from the factors that helped or hindered humanitarian civil-military coordination. First and foremost, OCHA, reflecting

[424] Interview with United States Senior Flag Officer M1.

the broader community, expected that militaries will be regular actors in natural disaster response and can appropriately assist in saving lives.[425] Cooperative practices also resulted from host nation support through a highly permissive environment, INGO willingness to cooperate, humanitarian leadership, and appropriate staffing. In this situation, institutionalized guidance was not sufficient, and practices, particularly how to interpret the humanitarian principles and the principle of last resort, were adapted in the context of the earthquake response. While examined in a natural disaster case, these key findings may similarly apply to a complex emergency.

The international practices approach best explained how humanitarian and military actors worked together during the Haiti earthquake. While rational and normative explanations partially explained why militaries are present, they did little to explain their relationships in the field or subsequent changes in policy and structure. The devastation the earthquake caused to the Government of Haiti, the UN mission, and MINUSTAH created a response atmosphere where these domestic actors had to work with outside humanitarian organizations and foreign militaries. At the nexus of interaction was the CMCoord officers facilitating the "joint enterprise" that established practices formed out of "collective ingenuity" of this widely disparate group.[426] This is further evidence of Pouliot's practices-based premise that localized social processes are generative forces unto themselves. By using the practices lifecycle, the data showed how initial response started with institutionalized practices, but gaps in policy and operations created an opportunity to adapt diffused practices from elsewhere or generate new practices in the field. The practices lifecycle demonstrated how practices generated during Haiti were diffused and became institutionalized after the event.[427] The Haiti case provided considerable evidence supporting the practices explanation in answering the research question and developed the practices lifecycle.

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[425] Bhattacharjee and Lossio, *Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake*, 30.

[426] Interview with United States Senior Flag Officer M1; Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation."

[427] Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy*, 10.

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V. BATTLE FOR MOSUL

The Battle for Mosul provides a complex emergency case to examine how international practices theory explains the cooperation between militaries and humanitarians. In 2016, the Iraqi government launched an offensive military operation to reclaim the city of Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and conducted the most intense urban battle since World War II.[428] To help fulfill its legal humanitarian responsibilities to its population, the Government of Iraq invited in both Coalition Forces and humanitarian actors to work with their Iraqi Security Forces and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).[429] The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordinators (CMCoord) acted as the nexus point of interaction, facilitating the humanitarian response during the battle.

Before the battle, three key CMCoord procedural practices evolved in complex emergencies. Within the practices lifecycle, the CMCoord officer's responsibilities grew to include more dialogue and information sharing procedures. Dialogue between humanitarians and militaries now included advocacy for the protection of civilians, negotiating access on behalf of humanitarians, and deconfliction between actors in the field. First, CMCoord officers in dialogue with militaries and non-state armed groups had been tasked to advocate for the protection of civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and international refugee law.[430] Second, CMCoord officers had also taken on the additional dialogue task of negotiating access on behalf of humanitarians in the field.[431] With complex environments, a common

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[428] James Verini, *They Will Have To Die Now: Mosul and the Fall of the Caliphate*; Paul B. Spiegel et al., *The Mosul Trauma Response: A Case Study* Johns Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health (2018).

[429] Letter dated 25 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, United Nations Security Council

[430] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service, *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 1.0*.

[431] "Interview with Josef Reiterer, Civil-Military Coordination Section Chief, UN OCHA," *Liaison: A Journal of Civil-Military Disaster Management and Humanitarian Relief Collaborations* 7 (Fall 2015).

CMCoord focal point helped INGOs gain access to civilians and assess the need for protection. Finally, associated with negotiating access was another new practice called deconfliction.[432] Constantly evolving deconfliction processes were intended to keep actors in the field aware of each other's locations for safety purposes. The 2015 *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook* institutionalized these three new responsibilities but gave little information about how to accomplish these tasks, which then required the generation of new practices.[433]

This chapter examines humanitarian civil-military coordination through the lens of international practices theory and the practices lifecycle. After an explanation of the state and non-state actors in Iraq and the region establishes the context for the battle, the practices lifecycle frames the presentation of findings. This is followed by existing institutionalized practices which show the gaps in response, and then the diffused and generated practices used to fill those gaps. A key takeaway from the Battle for Mosul was the assessment of how practices variably adhered to principles—so the principles are assessed to determine whether they appear to be fading. To further the practices lifecycle argument, the chapter includes an update on the status of Mosul practices. The alternative rational and normative explanations are considered, but the weight of the evidence shows that the international practices explanation better answers how humanitarians and militaries cooperate in humanitarian assistance. Finally, a summary of findings coherently brings together the key findings of the Battle for Mosul.

A. INTRODUCTION TO THE BATTLE FOR MOSUL

1. Background

A brief explanation of the state and non-state actors in Iraq and the region establishes the context to examine how militaries and humanitarians interacted in the Battle

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[432] Jan Egeland, Adele Harmer, and Abby Stoddard, *To Stay and Deliver: Good Practices for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments*, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Geneva, 2011), https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Stay_and_Deliver.pdf.

[433] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service, *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 1.0*.

for Mosul. The map in Figure 10 shows the location of Mosul in northern Iraq and who held control of the territories just before the Battle of Mosul in 2016.



Figure 10. Map of ISIS Territory October 2016[434]

Although in the recognized state of Iraq, Mosul in fall 2016 was held by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Kurds surrounded the city to the north and east and the Government of Iraq (GoI) to the south. ISIS also held territory in the fractured country of Syria to the west. This section provides background information about the conflicts between Iraq, the Kurds, and Syria, followed by a detailed explanation about the growth of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Instability in Iraq gave rise to ISIS. First, a United States-led coalition invaded Iraq in 2003, toppled the Saddam Hussein regime, and installed a provisional democratic

[434] Source: Ishaan Tharoor and Laris Karklis, "The History of Mosul, in Five Maps," *The Washington Post* 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/21/the-history-of-mosul-in-five-maps/.

government.[435] After a period of sectarian violence, coalition forces helped stabilize the country and withdrew from Iraq in 2011. Corresponding with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the UN established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to conduct development and humanitarian assistance.[436] UNAMI is not a peacekeeping force. By 2013, ISIS began capturing territory in Northern Iraq and Syria.[437] To fight the threat, Iraqi President Faud Masam and Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi invited back international assistance to help the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) reclaim the ISIS-occupied land.[438] Politically, 81 international partners, primarily states, created the Global Coalition in 2014 to defeat ISIS. Regarding military support, President Barack Obama established the Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) on October 10, 2014.[439] U.S. and Coalition Forces (CF) from over 70 countries returned to Iraq in support of the government and the ISF.

The spread of ISIS particularly threatened the Kurdish population of Iraq. Located in the northern section of Iraq, the Kurdish ethnic group traces its heritage and geographic claim to this region back for millennia.[440] Grounded in their own sense of nationalism, those in Iraqi Kurdistan formed the Kurdistan Region (KRG) as their government and established their own fighting force named the Peshmerga. Although not recognized as a separate state, the KRG and Peshmerga represented the political and military authority in

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435 Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, Third ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2012).

436 The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, S/RES/1500, United Nations Security Council (August 14, 2003).

437 Cameron Glenn et al., "Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State," ed. Center, Wilson (2019).

438 Letter dated 25 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General.

439 Kathleen J. McInnis, *Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State*, Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C., 2016).

440 Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds: A Modern History* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2016).

the Iraqi Kurdistan region during the Battle for Mosul. In the Kurdish city of Erbil, the humanitarian community established its operational headquarters.[441]

Neighboring Iraq to the west is the state of Syria, which became even more vulnerable to ISIS. In 2011, political protests evolved into the Syrian civil war. This period was defined by the hundreds of different rebel groups that formed, dissolved, shifted alliances, and reformed throughout the country, primarily fighting the Bashar al-Assad regime.[442] The turmoil left geographic space highly contested, making room for the Kurdish, ISIS, Turkey, and rebel groups to take and hold space. The Global Coalition and CJTF-OIR were established to defeat ISIS in both Iraq and Syria.

ISIS began as an offshoot of the terrorist group Al Qaeda in Iraq in 2006.[443] The name has changed and evolved, but the organization was commonly known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and the Arabic acronym Da'esh. This research will use the acronym ISIS. After almost fading away during the U.S. occupation of Iraq, this terrorist group reemerged in response to anti-Sunni sectarian violence in Iraq and attracted foreign terrorist fighters in 2008 to 2009.[444] They were described as jihadists, Islamic militants, and terrorists.[445] By 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi assumed leadership. He grew the insurgent organization into a full-fledged army and started sending operatives into Syria. In the midst of alliances and fractures among rebel groups during the Syrian Civil War, ISIS swept over Syrian and Iraqi territory. In Iraq, they gained control of Fallujah and Ramadi in 2013 despite five of the fifteen Iraqi

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441 United States Agency for International Development, *Iraq-Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1* (Washington, D.C., 2014), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/iraq_ce_fs01_08-11-2014c.pdf.

442 Nikolaos Van Dam, *Destroying a Nation: The Civil War in Syria* (London: I.B.Tauris & Co., 2017).

443 Simon Mabon and Stephen Royle, *The Origins of ISIS* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017).

444 Patrick Cockburn, *The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution* (London: Verso, 2015).

445 Joby Warrick, *Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS* (New York: Anchor Books, 2016).

Army divisions present in Anbar province.[446] The ISF suffered significant casualties and desertions in the face of ISIS military expertise. In January 2014, ISIS took over Raqqa, Syria, and declared the city the capital of the emirate. By summer 2014, ISIS had taken over Mosul, Tikrit, and the Mosul Dam from Iraq and the towns of Sinjar and Zumar from the Kurds as well as the gas fields. At its height in 2014, ISIS controlled more than 100,000 square kilometers of territory across Iraq and Syria.[447] This is what drove Iraq to request international assistance and the formation of the Global Coalition.

The ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi made his first public appearance in the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul to announce the creation of a "caliphate" on June 29, 2014.[448] Unlike other terrorist groups, the declaration of the caliphate made ISIS assume government functions within the ISIS-controlled territory.[449] ISIS relied on profits from seized oil fields and foreign financing to administer the quasi-state and build an army. ISIS used social media attracting foreign terrorist fighters and international financing while spreading its ideology and broadcasting videos of tourists, journalists, and aid workers being beheaded, crucified, or burned alive. As evidence of its strategic success, ISIS held more firepower, funds, and territory than any jihadist organization in history.[450]

ISIS gained a reputation for brutal savagery with no respect for any international norms or laws. Even with the beginning of CJTF-OIR and Coalition Force airstrikes in 2014, ISIS continued terrorist and conventional military attacks, conducted massacres, committed genocide, used chemical weapons, and took and sold slaves amongst the

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446 Cockburn, *The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution*.

447 Warrick, *Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS*.

448 Glenn et al., "Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State."

449 Violeta Vasiliauskiene, "The International Humanitarian Law and the Fight Against ISIS," *Mykolas Romeris University Public Security and Public Policy* (September 2016), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327816575_THE_INTERNATIONAL_HUMANITARIAN_LAW_AND_THE_FIGHT_AGAISNT_ISIS.

450 Jay Sekulow, *Rise of ISIS: A Threat We Can't Ignore* (New York: Howard Books, 2014).

populations they conquered.[451] The group's pro-Islamic/anti-Western message radicalized individuals worldwide and created splinter groups in other countries. ISIS-inspired attacks in Indonesia, France, Belgium, Turkey, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Libya, Sri Lanka, and the United States.[452]

Fighting ISIS brought together an unlikely collage of actors—non-Kurdish and Kurdish, Saudi Arabia and Sunni monarchies, Iranian proxy militias, the Syrian Assad regime, various Syrian opposition groups, the Global Coalition, and Russia.[453] The ISIS takeover of the strategically paramount Mosul Dam in August 2014 caused international distress.[454] After ten days, Iraqi and Peshmerga fighters reclaimed it together. This coordination slowed ISIS" methodical seizure of territory and marked a turning point for ISIS" growth. Throughout 2015, Iraqis and Kurds began taking back Iraqi territory. The Kurds seized Sinjar in November 2015, and the ISF took back Ramadi and Fallujah by summer 2016.[455] Learning from these battles, the ISF experienced the various ways civilians were at risk in the middle of armed conflict with ISIS to include unplanned IDP movements and unmet humanitarian needs.[456]

2. The Battle for Mosul

This section sketches the relevant aspects of the Battle for Mosul that lasted from October 16, 2016, to July 10, 2017. The Government of Iraq (GoI) prioritized the liberation

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[451] Warrick, *Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS*. United Nations Security Council, *Seventh Report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism* (New York, 2017), https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2017/904.

[452] Glenn et al., "Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State."

[453] Cockburn, *The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution*.

[454] White House, "Statement by the President," press release, August 18, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/18/statement-president; "Interview with United States State Department Representative in Iraq S3," February 2020.

[455] Glenn et al., "Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State."

[456] Glenn et al., "Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State."

of the city of Mosul and the protection of its civilians within the city.[457] This required simultaneous planning and coordination of warfighting, humanitarian assistance, internally displaced persons, restoration of services, and reconstruction. The GoI coordinated nine internal Iraqi Ministries and six separate security forces, including the Coalition Forces (CF). The GoI had the support of the UNAMI mission, UN agencies, OCHA humanitarian civil-military coordination (CMCoord), and 90 humanitarian organizations.[458] While the Iraqi government was equally concerned about the military operation and follow-on stabilization components of the battle, this study focused on the humanitarian response. The GoI and UN relationship leadership led to a permissive environment in the Iraqi controlled territory within which humanitarian organizations could operate. Well-staffed for the battle, CMCoord officers performed their routine procedures of information sharing, task division, and dialogue, which included advocating for the protection of civilians, negotiating access on behalf of INGOs, and deconflicting at the Front Line of Troops (FLOT).[459]

On the other side of the battlefield, ISIS did not negotiate with any external actor, including humanitarian organizations. The ISF and Coalition Forces (CF) fought an aggressive enemy that would not follow international humanitarian law during the battle with respect to soldiers or civilians.[460] ISIS had also historically threatened the safety and lives of humanitarians.[461] Neither the UN nor humanitarian organizations had access to the people affected within ISIS territory, and by default, they were not in a position to be neutral. By not negotiating with humanitarians, ISIS had forced the humanitarian community to choose sides.

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457 Robin Wright, "ISIS on the Run," *The New Yorker* (2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/isis-on-the-run.

458 SREO Consulting, *Lessons Learned Study on UN Humanitarian, Civil-Military Coordination and Stabilization Efforts in Mosul* (Consulting, SREO, January 2019).

459 "Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O7," August 2019.

460 Vasiliauskiene, "The International Humanitarian Law and the Fight Against ISIS."

461 Mabon and Royle, *The Origins of ISIS*.

The military forces prosecuted the battle in three phases, defined by geography and time. Figure 11 shows the phases of the battle and the corresponding ISF and ISIS movements.



Figure 11. Battle for Mosul Phases.[462]

In phase one, from October to December 2016, the ISF had reclaimed approximately one-third of the city in east Mosul.[463] The second phase, from January to mid-February 2017, included fully liberating eastern Mosul and flanking western Mosul to cut off the line of communication with outside reinforcements from Syria. President al-Abadi announced the final phase on February 19, 2017, which lasted until he declared victory on July 10, 2017. This final phase encircled and reclaimed the hardened "Old City"

462 Source: Thomas D. Arnold and Nicolas Fiore, "Five Operational Lessons from the Battle for Mosul," *Military Review* (2019). (Original map used with permission from the Institute for the Study of War, 2019; modified by Nicolas Fiore).

463 Arnold and Fiore, "Five Operational Lessons from the Battle for Mosul."

marked in red on the map. The symbolic defeat occurred on June 22, when ISIS blew up the Great Mosque of al-Nuri, where the ISIS leader al-Baghdadi had proclaimed the caliphate three years earlier.

The battle itself was considered one of the most intense, deadliest, fiercest, and largest urban battles since World War II.[464] Due to the unprecedented scale of the event, the myriad of military and police forces involved were inexperienced in conducting large-scale urban military operations and managing the civilian population inside the city.[465] The dense urban environment and high-intensity conflict operation were unlike the natural disasters or slow-burning conflicts humanitarians were more familiar with. In fact, the swiftly changing situation on the ground resembled a rapid-onset natural disaster more than a complex emergency—requiring all actors to be flexible and adapt to the dynamics in the field.[466] The unprecedented nature of this event meant no existing policies could adequately prepare actors for the novel context of this battle.

The protection of civilians and medical care during that battle were the key concerns for the GoI and humanitarians. Experiences from the smaller cities like Tikrit, Ramadi, and Fallujah reclaimed from ISIS taught the GoI the importance of coordination in the face of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Forecasts for the Battle for Mosul estimated the potential for 1.2 to 1.5 million more IDPs.[467] In the end, over one million were displaced as a result of the battle.[468] The trends within Iraq showed that while IDP numbers continued to escalate, returnees were also on a significant upward trend after the

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464 Verini, *They Will Have To Die Now: Mosul and the Fall of the Caliphate*; Spiegel et al., *The Mosul Trauma Response: A Case Study*

465 Arnold and Fiore, "Five Operational Lessons from the Battle for Mosul."

466 "Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6," August 2019.

467 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Humanitarian Response Plan Iraq 2016* (2016), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/iraq/document/2016-iraq-humanitarian-response-plan.

468 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Humanitarian Response Plan Iraq 2018* (2018), https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-2018-humanitarian-response-plan-advance-executive-summary-enar.

cessation of hostilities in other areas. As a whole, the GoI, ISF, Coalition Forces, UN, and humanitarian organizations would have to consider both traffic flows—the initial civilians fleeing from contested parts of the city and the return of civilians while other parts of the city were still contested.

The GoI also had to consider the thousands injured who would require emergency medical treatment during the battle. The Iraqi military did not have the combat medical units, nor did the Coalition Forces agree to provide the capability.[469] The World Health Organization, as the "provider of last resort," and contracted medical organizations filled this essential gap required under international humanitarian law. Both the protection of civilians and facilitation of medical response were key activities of the CMCoord officers during the battle. As a whole, the nine-month, high-intensity urban battle was unprecedented—leaving room for new thought as to how best to facilitate humanitarian assistance.

B. PRACTICES LIFECYCLE OVERVIEW

Applying the international practices approach to the Battle for Mosul complex emergency case study further explains how humanitarians and militaries work together. While the rational and normative approaches may partially describe why the actors were involved, they do not explain well most of what occurred in the field, which had important lasting effects on CMCoord practices. I argue that people on the ground who have tacit knowledge and experience in their respective fields then interact collectively to build socially meaningful routines, further expanding the CMCoord officers" roles.[470] Figure 12 represents the status of the research indicators in the practices lifecycle in 2017 after the battle.

469 Spiegel et al., *The Mosul Trauma Response: A Case Study*

470 Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices."



Figure 12. Indicators in Practices Lifecycle 2017

While it appears that some of the indicator bars have not moved since the Haiti earthquake, additional products, roles, and responsibilities in the respective categories are explained below as increased tasks have been placed on CMCoord officers. This section presents the indicators" status within the practices lifecycle, while the findings will detail the institutionalized, diffused, generated, and faded practices.

The value-set indicators continue the trends in the practices lifecycle established in Chapters III and IV. The International Committee of the Red Cross" (ICRC) humanitarian principles supported humanitarian credibility and access to all sides during the conflict (less pertinent in natural disasters).[471] Nevertheless, fighting ISIS was the first time since the ICRC's establishment, where the ICRC could not engage with all sides of the conflict, leaving humanitarian services only provided on the Iraqi side of the front lines.[472] During the Battle for Mosul, the principle of humanity was given privilege and remained fully institutionalized and unquestioned except ISIS.[473] However, the selective interpretation or borderline irrelevance of impartiality, neutrality, independence, and last resort during the battle were reflected in the practices lifecycle by an increased degree of fading.[474]

Figure 12 also shows the local policy guidance, structures, and procedures developed in this case. Before the Battle for Mosul, there was universally published guidance for complex emergencies, including the *MCDA Guidelines*, *IASC Reference Paper of 2004*, and 2015 *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook*.[475] However, this institutionalized guidance did not account for a complex, high-intensity urban battle against a non-state actor that does not follow internationally recognized laws and norms. It also

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471 Pictet, *Red Cross Principles*.

472 The Lancet, *Examining Humanitarian Principles in Changing Warfare* (2018), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(18)30256-3/fulltext.

473 HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

474 HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

475 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines)*; Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper* ; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service, *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 1.0*.

did not explain how to do the new CMCoord dialogue practices of negotiating access or deconfliction. This lack of specificity contributed to generating guidance based on activities in the field, supporting the practices approach. CMCoord officers only had their background knowledge and the community of practice to draw from to generate the needed policies, structures, and procedures.

For context-specific guidance, the most significant policy generated was the "Humanitarian Concept of Operations (ConOp)" based on collective input negotiated among the actors. Because of the existing universal published guidance and generation of additional local context-specific guidance, the policy guidance indicators reflect full institutionalization.

The novel policy structures in Figure 12 built new practices to augment the existing institutionalized structures. First, the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) utilized the existing institutionalized clusters approach to manage the different sectors of response (Appendix D). As the designated coordinator, OCHA also established a robust team of five highly-qualified and experienced CMCoord officers to do dialogue, information exchange, and task division at the operational and tactical levels. As a practice diffused from natural disasters, the HC created a cross-actor coordination mechanism of the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC). While the HOC is not fully institutionalized in complex emergencies, as indicated in Figure 12, it was so successful during the battle, it was recommended as part of OCHA's standard toolkit.[476] For the cross-actor coordination method, a new practice emerged that was not part of the co-location, liaison, co-existence framework (Appendix C). This new practice went beyond co-location to "embedding" a CMCoord officer at the ISF Joint Operations Center (JOC). The practice has not diffused to date.[477] The coordination method indicator reflects full institutionalization of the existing co-location, liaison, co-existence framework.

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476 SREO Consulting, *Lessons Learned Study on UN Humanitarian, Civil-Military Coordination and Stabilization Efforts in Mosul*.

477 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6.

Figure 12 includes the routine procedural indicators of dialogue, information sharing, and task division and now includes the additional dialogue tasks of negotiating access, advocating for the protection of civilians, and deconfliction. Based on previous field-level activities informing higher-level guidance, negotiating access and protection of civilians were already institutionalized to some degree. First, the practice of negotiating access dates to the 2003 *MCDA Guidelines* and *IASC Reference Paper of 2004*, but none of the existing guidelines before the battle instructed a CMCoord officer how to do it—requiring them to generate new practices or adapt practices from previous assignments.[478] While the protection of civilians is part of the Law of Armed Conflict, it was not previously part of a CMCoord officer's responsibilities. The practice of advocating for the protection of civilians was institutionalized in the 2014 *Guide for the Military* and 2015 *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook*.[479] The practice of deconfliction generated new practices within dialogue and information sharing. The CMCoord officer embedded in the Joint Operations Center developed a deconfliction procedure by sharing information with all actors about the volatile operating environment and the front line of troops (FLOT).[480] The CMCoord procedures of dialogue, information sharing, and task division remain institutionalized, and the additional dialogue responsibilities led to the generation and diffusion of practices for negotiating access, protection of civilians, and deconfliction.

The summary of practices by indicator demonstrates the thickening of practices during the Battle for Mosul and the usefulness in identifying them along the practices lifecycle. While CMCoord had an established coordination role with corresponding guidance during complex emergencies, new practices were needed and developed in the field. The indicators along the practices lifecycle signify a continuation of the trends

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478 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines)*; Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper*

479 Eva Svoboda, *The Interaction Between Humanitarian and Military Actors: Where Do We Go From Here?*, Humanitarian Policy Group (London, April 2014).

480 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6.

discovered in Chapters III and IV regarding the value-set and policy guidance, structures, and procedures.

C. INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES THEORY IN THE BATTLE FOR MOSUL

1. Initial Observations

The Battle for Mosul case study provides an in-depth opportunity to examine the practices-based approach to explain the relationship between militaries and humanitarians. The next section of the chapter is not organized around the indicators, but rather by the presentation of the practices themselves within the practices lifecycle. The data is structured by re-ordering the phases—building on the institutionalized practices, identifying the gaps, and reporting the diffused and generated practices formed to fill the requirements. This is augmented by a rich discussion of fading practices. The practices lifecycle is further substantiated in an additional section showing how practices generated and diffused during the Battle for Mosul are later diffused and institutionalized. The intent is the demonstrate that the events in the field described by the international practices theory fruitfully explains the relationship between militaries and humanitarians.

Understanding the basic humanitarian architecture and personnel is essential to the humanitarian civil-military coordination practices in Iraq. For UN leadership, Lise Grande held the positions of Deputy Special Representative (DSRSG) of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), and other roles.[481] Supporting her as HC at the strategic level was the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), which coordinated UN agencies like OCHA and INGO partners. To facilitate operational coordination, OCHA established a new Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) in Erbil to coordinate the clusters providing the operational response per sector. As a new structure, the HOC will be discussed in greater detail below under diffused practices.

[481] In 2014, the United Nations Secretary General appointed Lise Grande as the Deputy Special Representative (DSRSG) of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)/Resident Coordinator (RC)/Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)/Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Program. It is not uncommon that a single person holds the multiple positions of DSRSG/RC/HC.

Within the HOC, the Coordination and Common Services cluster included UN OCHA and CMCoord, the NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq (NCCI), other INGOs, and private actors.[482] This joint enterprise created the infrastructure of repeated interactional patterns that anchored humanitarian civil-military coordination during the Battle for Mosul.[483]

As soon as the government started preparations for the Battle for Mosul, the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) directed UN-CMCoord to work with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Coalition Forces (CF).[484] UN OCHA set up a CMCoord team of up to six members at its height.[485] The selection of CMCoord officers with practical knowledge in complex emergencies brought in the tacit knowledge of how to do the job, familiarity with practices from other locations, and access to a network of established relationships with UN agencies and INGOs.[486] Staffing six CMCoord officers was perceived as a substantial investment and resource appreciated by the INGOs.[487] They liaised with the ISF operations center/CJTF-OIR CJ9 (Coalition Joint Staff Civil Affairs office), the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) with the UN clusters in Erbil, and in the field. Echoing the expansion of CMCoord tasks, UN OCHA situation reports stated the UN CMCoord framework "facilitates humanitarian access, the protection of civilians, and the security of humanitarian aid workers (i.e., deconfliction)."[488] The CMCoord officers needed methods to maintain dialogue and information exchange with ISF and the Peshmerga, gather and distribute information about recently retaken areas, security, IDP

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[482] Established in 2003, the NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq (NCCI) included 103 INGOs, 69 NNGOs, and seven observers according to the *NCCI Profile* 2019.

[483] Swidler, "What Anchors Cultural Practices," 11.

[484] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6.

[485] SREO Consulting, *Lessons Learned Study on UN Humanitarian, Civil-Military Coordination and Stabilization Efforts in Mosul*.

[486] Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*, 29. Comments reflect the background volunteered by the CMCoord officers interviewed.

[487] "Interview with NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq representative I3," September 2019.

[488] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Iraq: Mosul Humanitarian Response Situation Report #1 (17-19 October 2016)* (October 19, 2016).

flows, and presence of unexploded ordnance, deconflict with ISF and CJTF-OIF, negotiate access for the humanitarians, and advocate for humanitarian activity and principles with security forces.[489] They conducted these activities in order to deliver humanitarian assistance to those within or returning to the city, provide trauma medical care, and facilitate the movement of IDPs into camps. CMCoord planned accordingly, established practices, and was staffed and resourced to manage this significant role during the battle.

2. Existing Institutionalized Practices

The ability to plan for the forthcoming Battle for Mosul built upon the existing UN and humanitarian architecture already established in Iraq. This section details how the standing institutionalized practices for humanitarian civil-military coordination applied in Mosul. Driven by a strong Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), familiar structures like the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and clusters system supported the response. The NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq (NCCI) had been collaborating since 2003, and individual INGOs had established roots. Working together, the GoI and all those mobilized learned smaller scale lessons from their experiences in the earlier liberation battles of Ramadi and Fallujah. While the liberation of Mosul was large scale and would be a collective challenge, the institutionalized architecture provided a basic functional framework. Yet, the data show that institutionalized practices were only a starting place for the complexities of this event.

Before the Battle for Mosul, the established institutionalized universally published guidance for complex emergencies included the *MCDA Guidelines*, *IASC Reference Paper of 2004*, and 2015 *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook.*[490] These documents provided a broad framework for practices, including the main tasks of dialogue, information sharing, and

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[489] SREO Consulting, *Lessons Learned Study on UN Humanitarian, Civil-Military Coordination and Stabilization Efforts in Mosul*.

[490] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines)*; Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper* ; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service, *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 1.0*.

task division.[491] The CMCoord guidance did not address the dialogue practices of negotiating access, deconfliction, and advocating for the protection of civilians, or what to do when a side of the conflict does not follow internationally recognized laws and norms. One CMCoord officer commented about how guidance did not prepare the CMCoord officers for an event like this battle:

> Something like Mosul, which is very unique, is certainly not part of any guidance that we had and the structures that we were supposed to set up in other environments. But I guess there will be a more general conversation about the discrepancy between policy and reality in the field. What I'm saying is not just for Mosul, but for any other complex emergency is that CMCoord guidance and policy need to adapt to the realities on the ground. Most of us are deployed to warzones and we don't need militaries and civil defenses, that's the last thing we need, we need coordination structures and engagement with the military and need to protect humanitarian principles and humanitarian space. But that is a discussion that is ongoing in the OCHA CMCoord world and the access world in general.[492]

This comment conveys that gaps in existing guidance do not cover some or even many conflicts. Of note, the remark also reflected how much the CMCoord role had shifted from coordinating military support (as seen in the Haiti earthquake) to principled, structured engagement. In essence, they expressed a desire to standardize and document more useful practices. Not only did the universal guidance need more granularity, but planning for the upcoming battle also drove the demand for more context-specific guidance as well.

The practices approach can explain the collective development of shared practices when existing policy guidance and structures do not give the answers to operating in unique circumstances. While the basic institutionalized humanitarian framework provided a familiar and strong foundation, by recognizing the existing limitations in the planning phase, the humanitarian leadership directed the creation of new practices for the complicated battle to come. Humanitarian civil-military coordination relied upon

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[491] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines)*; Inter-Agency Standing Committee, *Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies: An IASC Reference Paper* ; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service, *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 1.0*.

[492] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O7.

CMCoord practical knowledge to bring in practices from other locations or generate their own.

3. Diffused Practices

In the practices lifecycle, diffusion means agents adopt practices established elsewhere or adapts them from other circumstances to fills gaps, with intersubjective knowledge drawn from the community of practice.[493] The anticipated high pace of the Battle for Mosul required a more responsive operational structure. This led to a practice from natural disaster response called the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) to be adopted. A CMCoord officer stated a "complex emergency tends to be more protracted, tends to take more time, includes negotiations with all parties of the conflict and so forth," and therefore, information can be processed through the normal clusters system.[494] Natural disaster response, in contrast, requires more rapid coordination, often when the clusters are not stood up or new, so an additional coordination center supports time-sensitive coordination amongst the clusters. By adopting this practice from natural disasters, the processes for expedited information sharing began in July 2016 at the newly-established HOC in Erbil.[495] The HOC platform facilitated daily meetings between the clusters, other UN agencies, and NCCI to review priorities, plan operations, and escalate urgent issues to the HC if necessary.[496] One review stated, "to meet the fast and unpredictable context of urban warfare, an area-based coordination forum such as the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) should form part of OCHA's standard toolkit."[497] This shows the diffusion of practices across events by the experts who take their experience and apply it elsewhere.

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493 Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 199.

494 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O7.

495 United States Agency for International Development, *Iraq-Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #1*.

496 SREO Consulting, *Lessons Learned Study on UN Humanitarian, Civil-Military Coordination and Stabilization Efforts in Mosul*.

497 SREO Consulting, *Lessons Learned Study on UN Humanitarian, Civil-Military Coordination and Stabilization Efforts in Mosul*, xiv.

In this case, a disaster response practice was adopted in a complex emergency and was later recognized more broadly, institutionalized, and made routine.

4. Generating Practices

Absent specific guidance or existing practices, the practices lifecycle points to the generation phase—where new practices emerge in the field from the community of practice.[498] The novel circumstances in Mosul provided a setting conducive for the generation of new practices. These included the enlarged role of CMCoord to handle deconfliction, protection of civilians, and negotiating access. The permissive environment (on the Iraqi side), supportive leadership, time for planning, ample and experienced CMCoord staffing, and an unquestionable urgent need led to an openness to new, more expansive, context-specific guidance, structures, and procedures than in previous complex emergencies.

In planning for the battle, CMCoord officers worked with the community of practice to generate four new unpreceded pieces of context-specific guidance. First, with the support of the HC and CMCoord, the ISF created the "IDP Support Plan for the Nineveh Liberation Operation."[499] Built with significant input from the CMCoord officers" background experience, this plan laid out how IDPs were processed from the front line of troops (FLOT) and transferred to muster points, screenings, and camps.[500] Second, the HC tasked CMCoord officers to come up with a humanitarian plan for IDPs in military-style so that ISF would understand it. As a result, CMCoord generated a groundbreaking "Humanitarian Concept of Operations," or "Humanitarian ConOps." with the input of the clusters.[501] These two pieces of guidance, one from ISF and one from the HC/CMCoord,

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498 Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices."

499 *IDP Support For the Nineveh Liberation Operation*, Joint Operations Command Republic of Iraq (October 1, 2016).

500 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6.

501 Ruben Stewart, "Lessons Encountered During the Battle for Mosul," *NZ Army Journal* Fourth Edition (February 2018): 24, http://nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2018/nz_army_journal_4th_ed.pdf.

both included collective inputs and outlined a joint framework in IDP management for all actors. The CMCoord officers also generated "Military Guidance on Evacuation of Civilians" specific for the military audience and daily "Humanitarian Requests for Information," which posted regular updates about the front line of troops, safe access routes, change in status of critical infrastructure, and IDP movements.[502] Connecting the humanitarian and military actors, CMCoord officers applied practical knowledge and brought together inputs to collectively generate new guidance during the Battle for Mosul.

Another revolutionary practice occurred within the coordination method of the structure—embedding a CMCoord officer within the military. As seen in Appendix 5, unlike the standard practice of co-existing in complex emergencies or liaising or co-locating during a natural disaster, embedding a CMCoord officer moved a coordinator from the humanitarian community in the HOC or the field and placed them at the Iraqi Security Forces/Coalition Joint Operations Command (CJOC).[503] Historically, this practice would be considered taboo for reasons of impartiality and neutrality, but having a well-staffed CMCoord function increased the potential points of interaction within the community of practice to coordinate. Although authorized in the "Humanitarian ConOps," many humanitarians questioned this decision.[504] A CMCoord officer explained that:

> People were scared. [They were thinking] if we are working too closely it will affect our neutrality and impartiality, where my point was your conduct was more likely to affect your neutrality and impartiality, not where you're physically located. We should trust our staff to represent the humanitarian concerns in these environments as well.[505] [emphasis added]

Counter to the historical distinction between humanitarians and military forces, this comment reflects a heretofore taboo idea that location does not determine values and therefore promotes humanitarian advocacy within the military operational center. This

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[502] *Military Guidance on Evacuation of Civilians*, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2016); Stewart, "Lessons Encountered During the Battle for Mosul."

[503] Stewart, "Lessons Encountered During the Battle for Mosul."

[504] United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, *Shifting from Worst Case Preparations to Operational Sequencing* (October 1, 2016).

[505] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6.

thinking thus generated the practice of embedding CMCoord with the military as a coordination method. This also highlights the element of trust between the UN humanitarian leadership, CMCoord, and the broader humanitarian community.

Embedding a CMCoord officer with Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces also led to new procedural practices. From within the CJOC, the CMCoord officer performed the newly enlarged dialogue and information sharing procedures. They provided continuous advocacy for humanitarian principles and the protection of civilians, received information that could be shared with the HOC and INGOs, and conducted deconfliction with the "Humanitarian Requests for Information" notices that updated the front line of troops (FLOT) information.[506] With this input from the CMCoord located at the ISF/CJOC, a CMCoord officer in the field noted that the practice of deconfliction "was fairly straightforward because the front line was so clear in everyone's understanding."[507] As a result, concerns among the humanitarians decreased over time as most agreed on the benefits of embedding a CMCoord officer outweighed the risk that they may compromise their humanitarian identity and violate the humanitarian principles.[508] This expansion of procedural practices extended from the operational center to the community of practitioners in the field.

The CMCoord officers in the field liaised tactically amongst the humanitarians and military forces conducting the battle. One CMCoord officer described the process to receive and share information:

> The front line was always moving, so our major focal points for engagement were moving. We spent most of our time in cars driving around to find the different counterparts in different units or divisions, to advocate on protection of civilian issues or request information on civilian movements in line with movements of the military advance. With the information we received from these daily missions, we'd then backbrief the HOC.[509]

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506 Stewart, "Lessons Encountered During the Battle for Mosul."

507 "Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O8," October 2019.

508 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6.

509 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O7.

Having CMCoord officers in the field instead of just at the coordination centers enabled more localized dialogue, near-real-time information sharing, and continuous focused engagement to establish the practices needed within the city limits.

The CMCoord officer's practices for negotiating humanitarian access in the field also required new procedures within the community of practice. With and on behalf of INGOs in the field, CMCoord officers negotiated with ISF and other actors to standardize one access letter across the multitude of checkpoints.[510] Once received, the access letter would be good for one month.[511] Having a monthly time limit was not the most efficient approach according to humanitarians, nor was it the most secure approach according to the military. Yet, the CMCoord officer's ability to work within the community of practice to negotiate an acceptable solution adapted to the highly fluid circumstances. CMCoord also established a hotline to report and resolve access problems.[512] The broadening of the CMCoord dialogue procedure to include negotiating access further expanded the need for localized negotiation and decision-making.

The newly generated humanitarian civil-military coordination practices during the Battle for Mosul show how field-level relationships build socially constructed patterns of action.[513] Neither rationally efficient nor normatively consistent, the negotiated arrangements within this complex emergency illustrate CMCoord consensus-building within the civil-military coordination community of practice. The generated practices also reflect the increased breadth of CMCoord responsibilities, increased interaction points made possible by improved staffing, and the vital role of trust between the intersecting actors. From the "Humanitarian ConOps" to embedding CMCoord in military operations centers to daily field-level interaction, this case study shows how militaries and humanitarians worked more closely together in the field than ever before.

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510 SREO Consulting, *Lessons Learned Study on UN Humanitarian, Civil-Military Coordination and Stabilization Efforts in Mosul*.

511 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O7.

512 SREO Consulting, *Lessons Learned Study on UN Humanitarian, Civil-Military Coordination and Stabilization Efforts in Mosul*.

513 Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices," 4.

5. Fading Principles?

The practices lifecycle leaves open the possibility that practices, even institutionalized practices, may fade. As indicated in Figure 12, humanitarian practices in the Battle for Mosul prioritized the institutionalized principle of humanity while interpreting impartiality, neutrality, independence, and last resort through their organizational preferences. During both planning and operations, the principles were discussed on a daily basis—continuously evaluated and applied pragmatically.[514] Unlike other humanitarian responses, the Mosul response was reliant on and part of the military operation.[515] The unique combination of only working with one side of the conflict, cooperation with the Iraqi government, and presence of non-traditional service providers made for a complex operational context. One report surmised "that the humanitarian principles play a role on the theoretical level is clear. In practice, this is less clear."[516] These coordination practices prompted the humanitarian community to ask itself—are our practices aligned with our principles? In 2009, humanitarian scholars recommended a study to evaluate how INGOs debated and operationalized the humanitarian principles in practice.[517] A first of its kind study was completed during the Battle for Mosul.[518] This research, combined with other reports, showed the humanitarian community how different INGOs interpreted and implemented the principles in the field.

The interpretation of these principles in practice varied based on the risk organizations were willing to accept to deliver assistance and different perceptions of these principles at the strategic (headquarters), operational (Erbil), and tactical (Mosul) level. As one CMCoord officer in the field observed:

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514 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6.

515 Fox et al., *Emergency Trauma Response to the Mosul Offensive, 2016–2017: A Review of Issues and Challenges*.

516 HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*, 9.

517 Ramalingam et al., *Counting What Counts: Performance and Effectiveness in the Humanitarian Sector*.

518 HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

> There was much debating amongst other humanitarians about the principles: a kind of theoretical-ness to the debate. We had strong leadership that said, 'let's go and see, let's go and find out, let's work it out in the field with other actors." There was a void between those operating and those who were discussing it theoretically in Erbil.[519]

Each INGO, particularly those who were more removed from the field, determined for themselves how their adherence to the principles correlated to their perception of security. Those in the field found the debate less theoretical and were driven to pragmatic working relationships.[520] Many relied on their humanitarian status as protection in itself, foregoing measures that harden their appearance in the field.[521] This included using soft-skinned vehicles, not wearing body armor, not using military or police escorts, or not working in camps with a military presence. Operating near the front line of troops in this manner assumed a great deal of risk. Several INGOs chose not to organizationally take the risk of operating on the front lines for security and safety reasons of their personnel.[522] How an organization determined this influenced their interpretation of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, and last resort.

Humanity held preeminent status in the communal discourse. The operative question was—what actions supported humanity more, adhering to all the principles or elevating humanity and diminishing compliance with the other principles?[523] The HC, Humanitarian Country Team, UN clusters, and CMCoord held a position that they would not "let people die in order to maintain distinction from the military," and thereby determined humanity would be privileged over impartiality, neutrality, independence.[524]

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519 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O8.

520 Spiegel et al., *The Mosul Trauma Response: A Case Study*

521 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6.

522 HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

523 Spiegel et al., *The Mosul Trauma Response: A Case Study*

524 Fox et al., *Emergency Trauma Response to the Mosul Offensive, 2016–2017: A Review of Issues and Challenges*.

This local determination between the majority of humanitarian actors gave humanity precedence, contextualized the principles into action, and shaped the majority of response.

Counter to the above consensus, a few organizations held alternative perspectives on the principles based on their respective mandates and operational modalities.[525] Organizations like the ICRC and Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) strictly interpreted the humanitarian principles and criticized UN operations as being in "lockstep with the military operations, leaving little room for independent humanitarian action."[526] Their normative adherence to principles informed both their operations in the field and their willingness to coordinate—particularly a decision not to provide medical assistance in conjunction with the UN World Health Organization (WHO). Only a few organizations interpreted the humanitarian principles in this strict manner.

In the name of humanity, the World Health Organization (WHO) introduced another new practice of partnering with non-traditional medical service providers to fill the gap in medical services for injured within the city of Mosul.[527] As "medical organizations," these organizations were not constrained by the humanitarian principles at all. Collaborating with these non-traditional actors while championing humanity was uncharted territory for the humanitarian community. By openly and collectively accepting the precedence of humanity, the community of practice was faced with if and how to engage these other actors with the "disciplined subjectivity" of humanitarianism.[528]

The subjective implementation of impartiality, neutrality, and independence led to varying practices and interactions with the military. Typically, humanitarians kept their distance from parts of the conflict to maintain the principles as much as possible, but

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525 Fox et al., *Emergency Trauma Response to the Mosul Offensive, 2016–2017: A Review of Issues and Challenges*.

526 Fox et al., *Emergency Trauma Response to the Mosul Offensive, 2016–2017: A Review of Issues and Challenges*.

527 Fox et al., *Emergency Trauma Response to the Mosul Offensive, 2016–2017: A Review of Issues and Challenges*.

528 Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation."

operationally in Mosul, this was not possible with what needed to be achieved.[529] Impartiality prioritized the delivery of assistance based on need, but the greatest need often occurred in the areas with the greatest insecurity. Instead of working to fulfill the greatest needs within the city, most INGOs fulfilled the needs of the people they had access to or the need of the people in areas where they were willing to assume the risk of operating.[530] Many humanitarian actors freely interpreted impartiality.

Neutrality represented an organization's desire not to take sides and rise above political entanglement. Neutrality was not possible because ISIS did not dialogue with the humanitarian actors, and humanitarian assistance was not delivered in ISIS-controlled areas. In the Mosul context, the view on neutrality was less about working with all actors. Instead, it was viewed as the degree to which one "lined up behind the UN and the military operations of the Iraqi government."[531] Neutrality was also wrapped up in an organization's risk aversion and willingness to get closer to the front lines. Maintaining neutrality in the Mosul context justified activities farther away from the front lines, as that would have required more engagement with either CMCoord or security forces directly. The activities of those working closest to the front lines necessitated an interpretation of neutrality that allowed them to gain access and work in the area. In one justification, an INGO argued it could be neutral <u>because</u> CMCoord offered the liaison service with political and military actors—keeping a degree of separation between the actors.[532] Again, these INGO decisions were made organizationally.

Practicing operational independence addressed the degree to which an organization had the ability to practice free of donor mandates or their reliance on other organizations. Many donors pushed their implementing partners to deliver to certain areas.[533] With this

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[529] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O7.

[530] HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

[531] HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

[532] HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

[533] HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

pressure, the larger INGOs pushed back more on donor conditions, but they were generally also more risk-averse.[534] In addition, the INGO reliance on CMCoord to provide regular information and negotiate access provided another example of decreasing operational independence.[535] Outsourcing these practices became institutionally easy for organizations who preferred to use scarce resources on response.[536] According to an NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq (NCCI) representative, "there came a point when we were over-reliant on CMCoord because it had worked well. They had established resources."[537] There was some shared consensus on the use of CMCoord at the expense of operational independence, but what this meant also varied by organization.

The principle of last resort was upended in the high-intensity military battle that created the humanitarian crisis and became displaced by the imperative of humanity. A CMCoord officer in the field explained that "last resort is whatever it takes to save lives—we consider how we can make the situation better and what resources we have."[538] In normal circumstances, humanitarians would conduct assistance and only use outside resources (militaries) as a last resort. In the Battle for Mosul, this dynamic was reversed. The Iraqi Security Forces did not have the resources to fulfill its obligation to the people and invited humanitarian organizations and foreign militaries to assist. The Government of Iraq's humanitarian priority facilitated the civil-military interaction that led to practices relying on CMCoord.

Trusted, routinized dialogue with CMCoord contributed to the diminished consideration of last resort. Experienced and highly competent CMCoord officers built trust between these actors at the nexus of engagement. They used their access to receive information, expertise to interpret the information, and judgment to share the needed

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534 HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

535 Interview with NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq representative I3.

536 HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*, 12.

537 Interview with NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq representative I3.

538 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O8.

information in which all actors could perform their respective roles.[539] A CMCoord officer described their role:

> I'm not transferring information, what I'm doing is translating it into humanitarian implications, that then it can be passed on to humanitarians. And humanitarians don't need to know certain information. Because if they are privy to that information and for whatever reason they're captured or blurt it out, then neutrality and impartiality gets thrown out the window. Part of the key role of a civ-mil officer is acting as a translator and an ambassador—translating the messages from militarese into humanitarian impact and vice versa back into militarese.[540]

The CMCoord officer's routine communications indicated a consistent acknowledgment of the reinterpreted status of last resort, where daily civil-military dialogue practices became expected and professionalized. The practical background knowledge of CMCoord officers was key to competent information exchange, enabling proficient, repeatable engagements based on mutually established trust.[541] In this context, establishing trust in CMCoord amongst the actors in the field facilitated the revised view of last resort and helped apply resources to the overall humanitarian response.

One CMCoord officer proposed an argument against the diminished engagement or principle of last resort during complex emergencies. He stated:

> The general civ-mil policies of OCHA is that if you're involved in conflict you should have less involvement with the military than during a disaster. My argument is that there's more to talk about in high-intensity conflict than in disasters. There's actually more need to engage and more need for frequency of engagement. So rather than lessen your engagement in high-intensity conflict, you actually should be increasing your engagement. If it was a disaster, I wouldn't need to meet them [militaries] as much.[542]

Although counter to the policy of co-existing to maintain distinction and the principle of last resort, there is an inherent logic to the need for increased engagement when the

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[539] "Interview with Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve Representative D3," December 2019.

[540] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6.

[541] Interview with Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve Representative D3.

[542] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6.

environment is more complicated. With the benefits of increased access, information sharing, and deconfliction that resulted from CMCoord interaction during the Battle for Mosul, it is plausible that this argument could change the perception of engagement as a last resort during complex emergencies in the future.

Working with the United Nations, many other INGOs shared the UN's prioritization of humanity over the other principles. This focus on humanity by the practitioners in the field laid the foundation for shared practices agreed upon between the military forces, UN, and INGOs—with CMCoord acting as the translator. However, the varied interpretation of principles suggests that they continued to fade as represented in Figure 12. While deliberated robustly, the civil-military community of practice did not reach mutual consensus beyond the preeminence of humanity. Overall, there is little evidence that the relationship between militaries and humanitarians was based on the normative foundations of the principles, and their fading status supports a field-level practices explanation for their relationship.

D. FURTHER DIFFUSION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF NEW PRACTICES

The further diffusion and institutionalization of practices provide additional evidence in support of the practices lifecycle. This section explains how practices generated and diffused during the battle were perceived or institutionalized. The three additional CMCoord practices, negotiating access, advocating for the protection of civilians, and deconfliction, have been institutionalized in the 2018 *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook*.[543] The "Humanitarian Concept of Operations" has diffused into the natural disaster context. Other practices like the co-location of a CMCoord officer with military forces or that counter to last resort, increased engagement is necessary during complex emergencies have not diffused yet. Overall, OHCA has made a concerted effort to address the gap in universal guidance with updated guidance that incorporates more input from operational CMCoord officers.

[543] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 2.0*.

The new CMCoord dialogue procedures for deconfliction have developed the most since the Battle for Mosul. What began as a function of organizing area security evolved into a process intended to keep others in the field aware of the respective locations of military forces and humanitarians.[544] The practice quickly diffused and became formalized as a Humanitarian Notification System for Deconfliction (HNS4D) in complex emergencies like Syria and Yemen.[545] The 2018 *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook* institutionalized the practice.[546] It is not mandatory for humanitarian actors to participate in this system, and some, to protect their humanitarian work and principles, intentionally choose not to participate. However, the practice is now institutionalized in policy guidance, structure, and procedures.

The groundbreaking "Humanitarian ConOp" was considered an effective part of context-specific guidance during the battle. The 2018 *Recommended Practices for Effective Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets in Natural and Man-Made Disasters* identified building a concept of operations as a recommended practice.[547] However, even though the practice was generated during a complex emergency, the 2018 guidance applies specifically to natural disasters and not complex emergencies. A lessons-learned study stated that "replication [of the conops] should be treated with caution" due to impartiality and neutrality concerns.[548] There is no evidence to date that this practice has diffused in practice in any context.

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[544] Egeland, Harmer, and Stoddard, *To Stay and Deliver: Good Practices for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments.*

[545] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 2.0.*

[546] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 2.0.*

[547] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Recommended Practices for Effective Civil-Military Coordination of Foreign Military Assets in Natural and Man-Made Disasters* (Geneva, 2018), https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/180918%20Recommended%20Practices%20in%20Humanitarian%20Civil-Military%20Coordination%20v1.0.pdf.

[548] SREO Consulting, *Lessons Learned Study on UN Humanitarian, Civil-Military Coordination and Stabilization Efforts in Mosul.*

The revolutionary practice of embedding a CMCoord officer at the military operations center has also not diffused to date. According to the CMCoord officer, who filled that role, while it was very successful, replicating it would have to be driven by the context.[549] However, the benefits realized and recognized within the community of practice could reasonably forecast that this practice of cross-actor coordination may be diffused in the future in comparable circumstances.

One CMCoord officer argued that counter to the principle of last resort, the need for humanitarian civil-military engagement increased during a complex emergency. This same CMCoord officer provided a case study to the 2018 *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook* making a case for increased engagement during complex emergencies.[550] Although not established policy, the inclusion of this case shows how lessons learned from practices in the field are diffused through policy documents, and that last resort can be re-interpreted by the broader community.

Of final note, the insufficiency of existing guidance was a key factor leading to new practices in the Battle for Mosul, and OCHA has since incorporated more practices in the policy guides and handbooks. For comparison, the 2015 *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook* gave 11 real-life examples of CMCoord in the field while the 2018 *UN CMCoord Field Handbook* captured 35 operational experiences in callout boxes with titles like "case study" or "good practice."[551] The 2018 *Handbook* included five callout boxes from Mosul, in particular, describing the front line information exchange, emergency medical teams, dialogue with religious leaders, access, and working with other UN agencies/services. Although from 2010, the 2018 *Handbook* also cited the Haiti earthquake for the country-specific guidelines, Joint Operations Tasking Center, and its strategy of cooperation. These boxes were written by operational CMCoord officers showing how different officers in

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[549] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6.

[550] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 2.0*.

[551] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 2.0*.

different contexts applied the principles and performed the CMCoord function around the world. The inclusion of this material supports the practices theory that field-level activities, particularly Haiti and the Battle for Mosul, are informing higher-level guidance and becoming generative forces unto themselves.[552]

E. RATIONAL AND NORMATIVE EXPLANATIONS

The rational and normative explanations provide some explanatory power to the relationship of military and humanitarians during the Battle for Mosul, but the practices approach better describes the humanitarian civilian-military coordination and its effects. The rationalist approach best accounts for the participation of 81 partners in the Global Coalition and their universal interest of defeating ISIS.[553] Liberating territory, stabilizing Iraq and the region, and stopping international ISIS attacks were key security-oriented priorities.[554] Fighting ISIS could also be explained normatively—that ISIS had committed such atrocities it required global attention and accountability.[555] In addition, to support the humanitarian needs of their people, the Government of Iraq also invited in humanitarian organizations to assist them where they knew they had neither the capability nor expertise to fulfill their requirements under international humanitarian law (IHL). Responding in accordance with IHL can also be both rational and normative—standing by international humanitarian law as an international responsibility or as an essential normative standard to uphold. Rational institutionalism fails to explain the emergent relationships because actions were based on mutual accommodation of respective roles and norms, rather than maximum efficiency. Overall, rationalism explains why Coalition Forces were present, and the rules militaries followed in the country, but it cannot account for how militaries and humanitarians worked together.

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552 Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy*, 10.

553 "Interview with United States Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition S2," March 2020.

554 Interview with United States State Department Representative in Iraq S3.

555 Interview with United States Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition S4, February 2020.

Given the adaption of the humanitarian principles, the normative explanation also falls short. Overall, humanitarian behavior did not consistently conform to the operational principles of impartiality, neutrality, independence, or last resort. In the name of humanity, the UN and many humanitarian organizations consciously diminished or reinterpreted the other principles to fit their organizational objectives.[556] Risk tolerance, a rational motive, played a significant role in how organizations interpreted the principles. Ignoring last resort became the status quo. While the ICRC and MSF again upheld the rigorous interpretation of the principles, they were the exception to the majority of response.[557] With the Iraqi government's humanitarian prioritization and UN leadership support, the barriers to working with the military were lowered from the planning phase throughout the prosecution of the battle. Little evidence supports the normative explanation for the actual conduct of relations between militaries and humanitarians.

The collapsed humanitarian space in Mosul necessitated local-level negotiations that could not be dictated from higher headquarters. The highly fluid environment required a degree of immediate adaptability that those outside the field, even in Erbil, had trouble grasping.[558] As such, the local civil-military community of practice socially negotiated practices between the military forces and humanitarians in real-time. The practices theory provides the best explanation for the humanitarian civil-military coordination that occurred during the Battle for Mosul.

F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The Battle for Mosul is an important case study to examine international practices theory in a complex emergency. The nature of the environment, supportive leadership, planning, and staffing created a set of practices that filled the gap in guidance in humanitarian civil-military coordination. The prioritization of humanitarian action by the

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556 HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

557 Fox et al., *Emergency Trauma Response to the Mosul Offensive, 2016–2017: A Review of Issues and Challenges*.

558 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O8.

Government of Iraq was a critical factor in creating an environment that facilitated cooperation. This host nation support, combined with strong humanitarian leadership by the HC, offered a strategic level of cooperation that permeated to the operational and tactical levels of coordination. The ability to plan also gave actors lead time to stay ahead of the humanitarian situation.[559] In addition, a team of qualified CMCoord officers who drew from background experiences in complex emergencies led to the diffusion and generation of new civil-military coordination practices in Mosul. This included the expansion of newer practices like advocating for the protection of civilians, deconfliction, and negotiating access.

Trust is a key factor in a community of practice. The infrastructure of repeated interactional patterns, or practices, relies on the community's expectation of competent behavior, which is supported by background knowledge and experience.[560] In the Battle for Mosul, trust in the civil-military coordination function, and the CMCoord officers themselves, came from the top-down and bottom-up as well as across actors from military to humanitarian organizations.[561] This trust facilitated coordination in Mosul's very complicated and fluid environment. The combination of these factors led to the new guidance, structures, and procedures that filled the gap in institutionalized guidance.

The core theoretical question of the humanitarian community persists—are they practicing in accordance with their principles? The Battle for Mosul indicates that practice is highly variable—continuing the trend seen since the start of the humanitarian system in 1991.[562] The Mosul NCCI representative argued that "if you open that door and change

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[559] UN News. "After Mosul Victory, Senior UN Officials Detail Iraq's Political and Humanitarian Needs." press release, https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/07/561652-after-mosul-victory-senior-un-officials-detail-iraqs-political-and-humanitarian#.WfY807pFw2w.

[560] Swidler, "What Anchors Cultural Practices," 11.

[561] Interview with NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq representative I3; Interview with Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve Representative D3; Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6.

[562] HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

standards [principles], you have to reconcile the whole standard."[563] There seems little desire to discard the principles—and yet the key questions persist about should humanity hold preeminence? What do the other principles mean if everyone interprets them differently? Are they operational principles, or are they aspirational?[564] The experiences during the Battle for Mosul further complicated these questions instead of answering them. The adaption of principles led to new practices in the field that deviated from strict compliance with the principles.

G. CONCLUSION

The Battle for Mosul case demonstrates that international practices theory has a high level of explanatory power for humanitarian civil-military interactions. The building of consensus for policy guidance, structures, and procedures among groups of disparate actors that took place in the Mosul case is not well explained by rational nor normative approaches. It was through interaction, negotiation, and routinization of meaningful patterns of action that dissimilar groups came together into functional working relationships. CMCoord officers operated at the nexus of this joint enterprise, with the primary purpose of acting as the translator or ambassador between military forces and humanitarians.[565] As such, their local practices become generative forces unto themselves.[566] By examining the practices along the practices lifecycle, the generation, diffusion, and institutionalization of practices do a better job in capturing has how militaries and humanitarians work together. The practical interactions in the field, moreover, are producing broader structural effects in the expansion of CMCoord responsibilities within UN OCHA.

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[563] Interview with NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq representative I3.

[564] Slim, *Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the Morality of Aid in War and Disaster*.

[565] Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 199.

[566] Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy*, 10.

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VI. THE EXPECTATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

> Principled humanitarian action is nothing more than an empty mantra unless it is translated into a meaningful response on the ground.[567]
>
> —Yves Daccord, director-general,
> International Committee of the Red Cross

After three decades, the term "coordination" has moved from "one of the most overused and least understood terms in international parlance" to expected behavior with institutionalized frameworks.[568] Yves Daccord's quotation represents the humanitarian community's efforts to keep humanitarian action meaningful and principled amidst the expansion of coordination with disparate actors. The purpose of this research was to understand how humanitarians and militaries cooperated and coordinated during civil-military coordination in humanitarian response after the Cold War.

Such cooperation would not normally be expected. At their core, humanitarian organizations believe their ability to gain access and function effectively in the field is dependent on adherence to the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Following these principles would be expected to lead humanitarians to only cooperate with military forces as a last resort.[569] Yet, cooperation amongst humanitarian organizations and military forces in humanitarian assistance is now routine and actively promoted. Since 2003, such cooperation was institutionalized in a framework of Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) under the UN Office for the

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[567] Yves Daccord, "Humanitarian Action in a Changing Landscape: Fit for Purpose?," press release, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/editorial/02-04-humanitarian-action-yves-daccord.htm.

[568] "United Nations Coordination of the International Humanitarian Response to the Gulf Crisis, 1990–92," Geneva: United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, June 1992, p.2.

[569] Hammond, "The Power of Holding Humanitarianism Hostage and the Myth of Protective Principles."

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OHCA).[570] Explaining the puzzle of the emergence of this cooperative framework in humanitarian civil-military coordination required stepping back to examine why, theoretically, actors have behaved in these ways in undertaking humanitarian assistance. In this study, I have found that—while rational and normative explanations are often part of the explanations for why individual organizations participate in humanitarian response—international practices theory and the practices lifecycle have strong explanatory power for how the cooperative framework emerged.

Before reviewing this dissertation's findings and their implications, I highlight the trends and comment on UN CMCoord today. Over the thirty-year period covered by this research, several trends emerged that affected the longitudinal study and two case studies as well as the present and future of humanitarian civil-military coordination. Unlike the start of the international humanitarian system in 1991, the increased number and types of actors have broadened the community of responders. This diversification of the humanitarian sector includes governmental representatives, militaries, other armed groups, private sector, contracted services, and the civil society they are all intended to serve. Humanitarian action also has an increase in the amount of financial resources, including more contributions from emerging Arab and Islamic actors.[571] Modern technology has changed the ability to assess needs and deliver assistance—altering everything from communications to logistics to trauma surgery in the field.[572] Humanitarianism has also been increasingly and intentionally combined with political activities like human rights,

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570 *United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Concept Paper*; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines)*.

571 Ed Schenkenberg, *The Jigsaw of the International Humanitarian Response System: Trends and Developments in Organising More Effective Disaster Response*, HERE-Geneva (Geneva, 2015), http://here-geneva.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/IDRL-project-product-2-policy-trends-overview-3-March-2015.pdf.

572 Meier, *Digital Humanitarians: How Big Data Is Changing the Face of Humanitarian Response*; Spiegel et al., *The Mosul Trauma Response: A Case Study*

disaster risk reduction, and development.[573] In addition, actors can no longer assume universal respect for international humanitarian law when operating in conflict settings.[574] The final trend is that humanitarians feel an increased need for protection since 1,200 aid workers were killed over the last decade, while others have been kidnapped or injured in the field.[575] These trends have significantly changed the dynamics of humanitarian civil-military coordination in the field.

At the nexus of humanitarian civil-military coordination is UN CMCoord officers with their expanding list of responsibilities. What started as dialogue, information sharing, and task division grew to include subtasks of advocating for the protection of civilians, negotiating access, and deconfliction.[576] To do this, CMCoord officers need a "strong technical knowledge of the conduct of hostilities if they are to be an effective advocate and engage in a fruitful dialogue with military actors and in order to understand the humanitarian implications of military decisions or policies."[577] INGOs expressed a general desire for more engagement. According to one INGO consortium representative, "most NGOs would want more investment [in CMCoord] and have more influence in how it was utilized."[578] Some even see strengthened CMCoord as a way to improve humanitarian

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[573] Chandler, "The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda."

[574] International Committee on the Red Cross, *International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts* (2019), https://shop.icrc.org/international-humanitarian-law-and-the-challenges-of-contemporary-armed-conflicts-recommitting-to-protection-in-armed-conflict-on-the-70th-anniversary-of-the-geneva-conventions-3122.html; Julia Brooks, *Protecting Humanitarian Action: Key Challenges and Lessons from the Field*, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (Boston, 2016), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/atha_key_challenges_in_the_protection_of_humanitarian_action.pdf.

[575] Beatrice Godefroy, *Protecting the Protectors: Safeguarding Humanitarian and Medical Workers in Conflict Zones*, Center for Civilians in Conflict (2019), https://civiliansinconflict.org/blog/protect-humanitarian-aid-workers/; Brooks, *Protecting Humanitarian Action: Key Challenges and Lessons from the Field*; Humanitarian Outcomes, *The Aid Worker Security Database*, https://aidworkersecurity.org/incidents/report/summary.

[576] "Interview with Josef Reiterer, Civil-Military Coordination Section Chief, UN OCHA."

[577] SREO Consulting, *Lessons Learned Study on UN Humanitarian, Civil-Military Coordination and Stabilization Efforts in Mosul*.

[578] Interview with NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq representative I3.

access and protect aid workers.[579] Contrary to these endorsements, recently, OCHA has decreased its investment in civil-military coordination with donor governments investing more specifically in deconfliction systems. But as one field expert noted, "deconfliction is not the most complicated piece when you are on the ground."[580] Finally, one interviewee noted, "coordination is thankless job no matter who you are or which level—you have soft power and not a lot of resources and everybody expects everything and blames you for everything."[581] As the focal point for the community of practice, UN CMCoord will continue to shift and change. Within the context, this chapter summarizes the findings, the relationship with previous research, limitations and problems with the study as well as implications and recommendations for future research.

A. RECAPITULATION OF FINDINGS

1. Theoretical Findings

This research sought to fill some of the theoretical and empirical gaps that exist within humanitarian scholarship around the relationship of humanitarian and military actors. The international practices approach addresses a gap where relative power, self-interest, or norms do not sufficiently explain actor behavior—it argues, instead, that "bundles of individual and collective practices woven together produce specific outcomes."[582] Practices, as "socially meaningful patterns of action," are the result of repeated local actor interaction, which become generative forces unto themselves in the international system.[583]

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[579] Godefroy, *Protecting the Protectors: Safeguarding Humanitarian and Medical Workers in Conflict Zones.*

[580] Interview with NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq representative I3.

[581] Citation withheld to protect anonymity of the participant.

[582] Cornut, "The Practice Turn in International Relations Theory."

[583] Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices," 4; Pouliot, *International Pecking Orders: The Politics and Practice of Multilateral Diplomacy*.

The first key finding supports the "practice turn" in the international relations scholarship by affirming how practices affect world politics shown through the humanitarian civil-military coordination cases.[584] The longitudinal study in Chapter III showed how the relationship between humanitarians and militaries shifted from political ad hocism and independent norms-based activities to practices generated in the field during the 1991 to 2009 period. Chapters IV and V, respectively, also showed how newly generated and diffused practices filled the gaps in institutionalized policy during the 2010 Haiti earthquake and 2016 to 2017 Battle for Mosul. Despite the normative framework of the humanitarian principles, events on the ground necessitated the humanitarian organizations, military personnel, and CMCoord officers return to common structures.[585] Supporting Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot's definition, data showed how practices emerged from the material context and the social structures constituted through their practical interaction.[586] Respecting the anonymity of participants in the research design, I only found anecdotal evidence of background knowledge, but the seniority of the interviewees indicated a substantial degree of experience and tacit knowledge as the additional component which comprises practices. This key finding directly contributes to the wider body of international practices literature by illustrating the importance of practices in international relations.

International practices theory has a high level of explanatory power in circumstances where cooperative action reflects the group consensus of a complex assembly of actors. Recalling the description from the Haiti case, one participant noted "collective ingenuity" will get the job done.[587] The rational and normative motivations that may lead actors into humanitarian response, but when they confront the collection of actors in the field, an explanation that accounts for their interaction is a better fit. Since

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584 Karlsrud, *Norm Change in International Relations: Linked Ecologies in UN Peacekeeping Operations*; Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*; Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices."

585 Swidler, "What Anchors Cultural Practices," 11.

586 Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices," 4.

587 Interview with United States Senior Flag Officer M1.

most organizations did not want to or have the means to operate entirely independently, they became immersed in a system where they helped to shape the practices. CMCoord officers, working at the nexus of these actors, adapted to the local context and facilitated new practices within the community to achieve the overarching humanitarian purpose.

To examine the causal impact of practices on world politics, I theoretically developed Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot's nascent concept of a practices lifecycle. Again, this process was used to examine whether behavior was shaped by relative gains, technical efficiency, norms, or practices—focusing on the activities in the field. This framework of generation, diffusion, institutionalization, and fade helped to visualize the process of how local social interaction created a new practice, how that practice diffused to other locations, and the point at which it became institutionalized or faded.

My initially proposed order of the indicators was based on the longitudinal analysis in Chapter III—first came the institutionalization of values, then initial policy guidance, with structure and procedures coming much later. However, the Haiti earthquake and Battle for Mosul case studies, Chapters IV and V, revealed a different order of indicators as the practices approach increased in explanatory power with field-level action. The examination of practices during these cases started with the structure (through a coordinator and their cross-actor coordination mechanism and method) and procedures. With this determined, policy guidance and the consideration of the values followed. If a future researcher wanted to adopt this framework of indicators, they might choose to reorder the indicators based on their type of case.

I found the measurement of the lifecycle phases flexible and subjective. Generation of a new practice was the easiest to identify, but it is difficult to quantify what diffusion looked like—repeating it one, five, or twenty times? I did not identify this up front and, in fact, recommend relatively open criteria in the future as practices are adapted to separate contexts in diffusion. I also found institutionalization as a rudimentary measure. First, there are varying levels of institutionalization that the basic framework did not account for—for example, the distinction between a UN General Assembly Resolution, concept adoption through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, or UN OCHA CMCoord guidance approved by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency

Response Coordinator. These distinct tiers have slightly different levels of involvement and balance of the actors involved and different perceptions of legitimacy. Second, certain practices expanded and were reinforced through all tiers of institutionalization. To me, this expansion was not well captured in the basic model and further indicates more robust support that generated practices reach this degree of substantiation in world politics. Finally, measuring fade was a subjective judgment based on repetitive events showing similar practices moving away from the institutionalized principles/practices.

2. Empirical Findings

The theoretical framework was empirically tested through the 1991 to 2009 longitudinal study as well as the Haiti earthquake and Battle for Mosul case studies. Building from the findings presented in each chapter, this compilation of empirical findings ties the data together. These findings include the expectation of cooperation supported by the expansion of CMCoord officer responsibilities, host nation support, and UN humanitarian leadership and staffing. I also found the practices generated in the field filled gaps in policy and showed an inconsistent application of humanitarian principles in action.

I found that not only did a cooperative framework emerge, but now cooperation is expected in both natural disasters and complex emergencies. This manifests differently in the separate types of events and in different contexts. As seen in the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami (2004), Haiti earthquake (2010), and other disasters, more and more countries choose to provide assistance by deploying military forces. Militaries around the world have included humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) into their strategy documents, capability development, and conceptual frameworks, and doctrine.[588] Recipient countries who repeatedly experience natural disasters now have standing bilateral agreements with partner countries, contingency plans, exercises to practice integration, personnel exchanges, and country plans to address how foreign actors interact

[588] Metcalfe, Haysom, and Gordon, *Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil-military Coordination: A Review of the Literature* These countries include, but are not limited to, the United States, Canada, Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, France, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and New Zealand.

with domestic agencies.[589] Particularly in the Asia and Pacific region, UN CMCoord has facilitated these cooperative arrangements.[590] In these developments, humanitarians have expressed concerns that the increase in contingency planning further spreads the expectation that military forces will be deployed for disaster response. [591] Finally, with climate change contributing to the increased frequency and severity of natural disasters, calling upon both domestic and international forces during humanitarian crises continues to trend upwards, contributing to this expectation of cooperation.[592]

As indicated by the expansion of CMCoord responsibilities to include practices advocating for the protection of civilians, negotiating access, and deconfliction, a degree of international cooperation is also expected in complex emergencies. First and foremost, as seen in the Mosul case, coordination typically reinforces international humanitarian law, which is still widely accepted as the appropriate standard of conducting warfare. Like in natural disasters, civilians in conflict situations have a growing expectation that international military forces will help protect their safety and rights.[593] This prospect is further supported by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept in the broader constellation of practices—showing that international support can be expected whether a host nation wants intervention or not.[594] A high degree of cooperation was shown in the Mosul case, where the Government of Iraq invited and participated in coordination

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589 Flint, *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies: Towards a Predictable Model*; Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O2.

590 Flint, *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies: Towards a Predictable Model*; Reario, "The HuMOCC: Typhoon Haiyan, Cyclone Pam and Nepal Earthquake: Observations and Lessons Identified in Humanitarian-Military-Police Coordination and the Use of Foreign Military Assets."

591 Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, *SCHR Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations*; Metcalfe, Haysom, and Gordon, *Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil-military Coordination: A Review of the Literature*

592 Hilhorst, ed., Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises: Everyday politics of crisis response.

593 Humanitarian Policy Group and International Committee of the Red Cross, *The Concept of Protection: Towards a Mutual Understanding* (Geneva, 2012), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/2012/hpg-icrc-roundtable-summary-note-2011-12-12.pdf.

594 Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention."; Thakur and Weiss, "R2P: From Idea to Norm—And Action?."

mechanisms on both the humanitarian and military side. Even where there is not a permissive environment, like Syria or the Lake Chad Basin, humanitarians and militaries are working in ungoverned spaces, and regional CMCoord support continued coordination as close to the field as possible.[595] The collapsed geographic space makes operating without coordination increasingly dangerous. For example, many humanitarians turned to participation in deconfliction mechanisms after the 2015 bombing of a Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, killing 24 patients and 18 staff.[596] As put forward by a CMCoord officer from the Mosul case, counter to the foundational notion that humanitarians and militaries be more separated in complex emergencies, the need for increased and more frequent engagement is even more important in complex emergencies because there is even more to talk about.[597] While the co-location or embedding CMCoord officers in military operations centers might remain controversial, the increased CMCoord responsibilities show the expectation for more humanitarian civil-military coordination in complex emergencies.

In either case, the natural disaster or complex emergency, I found that host nation support created an environment conducive to cooperation and the emergence of practices supporting humanitarian civil-military coordination in the field. While intentionally selecting cases in each category, the highly permissive environment of both showed that government-endorsed coordination frameworks lowered the barriers of resistance to cooperation—diminishing consideration of the humanitarian principles or organizational preferences in the face of great need. These coordination frameworks included military operations centers, UN clusters, humanitarian operations centers, Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC), Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Concept/Cell (HuMOCC), or others that go by different names. By facilitating the delivery of humanitarian response through these mechanisms, more INGOs participated as well as

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595 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination Service *UN-CMCoord Field Handbook Version 2.0*.

596 Médecins Sans Frontières, *In Focus: Kunduz Hospital Attack* (2018), https://www.msf.org/kunduz-hospital-attack.

597 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6.

other providers like governmental aid representatives, other armed groups, private sector, and contracted services—again challenging the normative notion of who could do humanitarian response.

This research also found that practices emerged to fill gaps in policy. In particular, practices drive behavior when the governance structures are weak or slow to respond. First, the existing policies are written to achieve consensus—leaving them intentionally broad to appeal to all constituents and informative in a variety of contexts. In complex circumstances, a recurring theme found that when existing guidelines failed to offer practical advice, they were "'pitched" at a more principled and policy level that was of little value to those on the ground."[598] So even though universal guidance like the *Oslo Guidelines* and *MCDA Guidelines* were institutionalized, they did not address the nuances of any particular event requiring actors in the field to develop practices to fill the gap. Second, while the universal guidance addressed natural disasters and complex emergencies, neither covered the "mixed" environment where a catastrophic natural disaster occurred in the middle of a complex emergency.[599] As a result, responders had to adapt the respective guidelines as they saw fit in the field like in the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami or wait for a determination like in the Haiti earthquake.[600] This gap has not been filled with guidelines—paving the way for practices to continue to adapt in future events. Third, the humanitarian community also learned that even though the *Oslo Guidelines* and *MCDA Guidelines* existed, there was a "general lack of awareness" for what the guidelines said or that they existed at all.[601] This gap leads to improvised practices in the field. The continued role of CMCoord officers remains to promote the existence of

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598 Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), *Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-affected Countries: Civil Military Aspects of International Response* 9.

599 Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), *Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-affected Countries: Civil Military Aspects of International Response*

600 Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O1.

601 Wiharta et al., *The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response*; Bollettino, *Civil-Military Engagement: An Empirical Account of Humanitarian Perceptions of Civil-Military Coordination During the Response to Typhoon Haiyan*; SREO Consulting, *Lessons Learned Study on UN Humanitarian, Civil-Military Coordination and Stabilization Efforts in Mosul*.

these guidelines. While the last decade has seen an increase in field handbooks, recommended practices, and guides for the military, increasing awareness and filling the gaps continue.

In the cases studied, humanitarian leadership and staffing were vital to facilitating the practices within humanitarian civil-military coordination. The Haiti case showed a gap in leadership—as key leaders were killed by the earthquake and remaining leaders were affected by the disaster itself. This slowed the pace of the response. On the other hand, planning for the Battle for Mosul showed involved, assertive humanitarian leadership engaged politically and shaping the military operation itself. Pro-active, politically astute leadership can advocate for the consideration of humanitarian concerns and direct coordination structures. This is a delicate position to manage because the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) often has other political roles like the Deputy Special Representative (DSRSG) of the UN mission, Resident Coordinator (RC), and/or Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Program. It is not uncommon that a single person holds multiple positions—commonly called the DSRSG/RC/HC. Holding both political and apolitical (humanitarian) positions makes it near impossible to separate the two, but the Mosul case showed that the distinction could be successfully conveyed in the field.[602] Beyond just the leadership role, the United Nations" intentional merger of mission activities into integrated or comprehensive missions further convolutes the distinction further down the UN architecture. This was seen in both cases with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). While strong leadership has shown to advocate for humanitarian needs, it is potentially problematic with the merger of political and apolitical functions within the UN operations.

Adequate staffing of experienced CMCoord officers also played a significant role in bridging the gap between actors and facilitating the processes supporting coordination. While local CMCoord officers are networking, gathering and sharing information, and

602 HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*, 16.

participating in meetings—they are also responding to global data calls and communiques via email, phone, and web-based applications.[603] Also, burnout occurs with the pace of the workload increasing turnover. In a major event, a small CMCoord team instead of just one person can divide the workload, offer more coordination and advocacy contact points strategically, operationally, and tactically, and permit twenty-four-hour action. A larger team also brings more tacit knowledge and experiences from other locations—informing the development of local practices. Both pro-active leadership and staffing supported the practices leading to increased coordination.

The final finding was the inconsistent application of humanitarian principles in action. First, the exceptions to this were the standard-bearers, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF), who viewed the humanitarian principles as obligatory and applied them consistently in every circumstance. They upheld the institutionalized principles in practice by treating them as equal and conducting operations closely aligned to the intent of the principles regardless of the type of event. Championing their principled approach, MSF has even noted that "it is striking that little attention has been given to the distinction between natural disasters and armed conflict."[604] Otherwise, the majority of the evidence showed either a lack of consideration for or adapted interpretation of the humanitarian principles and principle of last resort.[605] Routinely operationalized within the broader constellation of practices, an ICRC report noted there are "more and more agencies with competing interpretations of the principles."[606] Almost all others redefined the principles based on organizational preference or local context or viewed the principles as aspirational.

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603 Additional workload commented on by numerous CMCoord officers interviewed.

604 Ed Schenkenberg, *The Challenges of Localised Humanitarian Aid in Armed Conflict*, Médecins Sans Frontières (Frontieres, Medicins sans, 2016), https://www.alnap.org/help-library/the-challenges-of-localised-humanitarian-aid-in-armed-conflict.

605 HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

606 Jeremie Labbe and Pascal Daudin, "Applying the Humanitarian Principles: Reflecting on the experience of the International Committee of the Red Cross," *International Review of the Red Cross*, no. 897/8 (2016): 185.

In conjunction with the other trends, this finding raised the question about what humanitarian identity is and the purpose of the humanitarian principles if they no longer offer the protective shield allowing humanitarians to do their work. The ICRC recently recognized that "the application of the humanitarian principles by humanitarian actors is a constant challenge and does not always guarantee the access, security, and capacity needed to make a significant difference in the lives of people in need."[607] Humanitarian organizations considered the dilemma—does their organization do nothing in the name of the principles or willingly choose to compromise them?[608] In both the Haiti and Mosul cases, practitioners acknowledged compromises. As one report stated, "all actors, including MSF, need to be better prepared for considered compromises. Where compromises are necessary, humanitarian actors need to be ready to make these decisions quickly and with full consideration of the short and long-term consequences."[609] And when finally compromising the principles, as most organizations did in the Mosul case, the operational success, or "victory narrative," justified the compromises made.[610] As the universal normative standard and source of humanitarian identity, I expected the humanitarian principles to have stronger and more standardized influence. The variation of the principles significantly weakened the normative explanation for the research question and contributed to my determination over time that they were fading in practice.

B. RELATIONSHIP WITH PREVIOUS RESEARCH

These findings are broadly in line with those of other international practices scholars. This includes researchers such as Emanuel Adler, Vincent Pouliot, Rebecca

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607 International Committee of the Red Cross, *E-briefing: Principles Guiding Humanitarian Action* (2016), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/e-briefing-principles-guiding-humanitarian-action.

608 HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*, 18.

609 Fox et al., *Emergency Trauma Response to the Mosul Offensive, 2016–2017: A Review of Issues and Challenges*, 43.

610 Fox et al., *Emergency Trauma Response to the Mosul Offensive, 2016–2017: A Review of Issues and Challenges*, 34.

Adler-Nissen, Jérémie Cornut, Lou Pingeot, and John Karlsrud.[611] International practices theory does well at explaining the results of multilateral engagement that requires broad buy-in from disparate actors. It has primarily been tested in multilateral diplomacy, but also in related activities like international negotiations, conflict resolution, and multilateral field-level operations (UN peacekeeping, UN policing). I found the results of examining UN CMCoord in harmony with this other work.

Upon reflection, I see two broad types of international practices tested in the literature. One test examines the inner-workings of high-level political negotiations. In this case, the localized social processes, or practices, are in the engagement of negotiators (diplomats), which create institutionalized agreements. Given that the practices lifecycle is not developed, I estimate the process and agreements can be replicated (or diffused), but the lifecycle is more internal to that particular event, if evident at all. The second application of international practices theory is at the operational or tactical level of multilateral operations—like UN missions or country teams. My research applied the latter, and by exploring the practices over time I found generation by location, diffusion to other locations, and institutionalization in higher-level guidance—thereby validating the practices lifecycle. The practices lifecycle shows the distinction.

Empirically, this research is generally compatible with existing case studies where the primary purpose is to identify trends, lessons, challenges, and dilemmas that emerge.[612] These cases typically highlight field level interactions and identify how they are reconciled. This research may be at odds with those who argue that actions are deeply political leading to rationalist, self-interested behavior by the actors involved.[613] While international practices theory does not rule out rationalist motivation for behavior, it would counter that

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[611] Adler and Pouliot, "International Practices."; Pouliot, *International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy*; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, "Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya."; Cooper and Cornut, "The Changing Practices of Frontline Diplomacy: New Directions for Inquiry."; Pingeot, "Protecting or Policing Civilians? United Nations Peace Operations and Global Order Enforcement."; Karlsrud, *Norm Change in International Relations: Linked Ecologies in UN Peacekeeping Operations*.

[612] Hilhorst, ed., Disaster, Conflict and Society in Crises: Everyday politics of crisis response.

[613] Hoffman and Weiss, *Humanitarianism, War, and Politics: Solferino to Syria and Beyond*.

one actor does not typically dominate field level interactions, and the negotiated processes better explain the ultimate cooperative framework that has emerged.

C. ANTICIPATED CRITIQUES

I can anticipate some critiques based on this research. First, I anticipate a basic theoretical challenge that the practices literature is just rationalism plus normative explanations. The international practices approach does not exclude these motivations for behavior, instead, it offers an alternative explanation that includes the background knowledge of individuals involved, the material context around them, and the local social interactions to explain world politics. When international practices have strong explanatory power, the result of international activity does not reflect the singular rational interests or normative preferences of any particular actor. Instead, actors draw from experience and work toward resolution or working relationships that all can work within. The end result no longer resembles what would be predicted by rational or normative explanations. For example, in the Haiti earthquake the processes of fielding humanitarian requests through the clusters and the Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC) was not the most efficient or normatively compliant solution, but it did create a functional cross-actor coordination mechanism that all actors could participate in.

Another critique derives from the potential discrepancy between a practice being institutionalized and fading simultaneously. I found this problematic in evaluating the fading humanitarian principles (impartiality, neutrality, independence) and the principle of last resort while they continued to be reinforced through institutionalized policy guidance. Empirically, one way to reconcile this is to categorize the principles as aspirational rather than obligatory.[614] Theoretically, reconciling this is more challenging. Can a practice be both institutionalized and fading? In general, the underlying assumption of the practices literature is that new practices would be institutionalized to replace old practices. However, the question remains—what happens in the interim? Or should a researcher investigate the

[614] Slim, *Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the Morality of Aid in War and Disaster*.

two contradictory practices separately—a new one emerging while another is fading? This incongruence detracts from the usefulness of the practices lifecycle.

Other critiques stem from what the research design did not determine: that practices changed norms or became "practical knowledge." In a comparative study, John Karlsrud examined practices as the causal mechanism for explaining norm change in international organizations.[615] I examined the question differently—by characterizing the humanitarian principles as operational, I explained them as "fading practices" rather than "revised norms" or "norm change." Nor did this study provide evidence that institutionalized practices became "practical knowledge" or tacit knowledge in the field. Without examining the individual participants more closely to determine both their background knowledge and familiarity with guidance, this research cannot make such a determination. In fact, case after case has shown that even as recent as the Battle for Mosul, familiarity with UN guidelines remained a challenge in the field.[616] While the increase of CMCoord officers helped to bring this knowledge to the field, the variety and increasing number of participants contributes to the lag of familiarity. This research was not designed to address norm change or practical knowledge.

D. LIMITATIONS AND PROBLEMS ARISING DURING THE RESEARCH

A couple of limitations and problems occurred during this research. As a limitation, researching international phenomena is challenging when event participants scatter to other countries, events, job positions, or employers. Every effort was made to reach those with direct knowledge of humanitarian civil-military coordination from all perspectives. The greatest gap was in the military perspective from other countries. While participating in coalitions, the motives are assumed to be similar to the U.S. military personnel interviewed, but this was not fully verified by a cross representation of other participating military forces in the case studies. However, I determined that without this individual input, the

615 Karlsrud, *Norm Change in International Relations: Linked Ecologies in UN Peacekeeping Operations*.

616 Wiharta et al., *The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response*; Bollettino, *Civil-Military Engagement: An Empirical Account of Humanitarian Perceptions of Civil-Military Coordination During the Response to Typhoon Haiyan*.

collaborative result examined by the practices approach would have been the same, given their willingness to cooperate in the first place.

Another problem can affect the testing of international practices theory: access to participants. While I did not conduct field research nor find it necessary, what was necessary for examining practices was access to participants. To investigate the local social processes in a case, a researcher requires sufficient connections to interview enough individuals involved to represent the multitude of perspectives thoroughly. Tests of international practices theory must have tactical, field-level data and insider perspectives. I accomplished this through interviews. Another way may be through more detailed reports, meeting minutes, or actual participation. This is not the kind of research that can only be done through document analysis of high-level primary documents or secondary analyses. At best, those documents report the results of deliberations but not the negotiations, trade-offs, or respective priorities of actors and how those all shift during an event. My point to future researchers is that unlike rationalist and normative approaches, this theory is best tested with the appropriate level of access to participants in the actual event.

I also found an unanticipated consequence of my case selection. While I was intentional in selecting a natural disaster and complex emergency, I found the host nation leadership's request for assistance in both cases created a highly permissive environment conducive to coordination. While my two case studies appeared as opposites, the permissive environment may have made them more similar than intended. Both events were also somewhat finite in length as opposed to protracted crises where distinction is perceived as more important. In the immediacy of response to these cases, practices on the ground were necessary and explanatory. Contrary to this, the other explanations may be stronger in a protracted complex emergency where normative distinction or rational institutionalism for efficiency may evolve. Future cases should include non-permissive environments and protracted crises.

E. IMPLICATIONS OF THESE FINDINGS

The findings have implications for other scholars and practitioners. As a relatively new approach within international relations scholarship, international practices and the international practices lifecycle may be useful in explaining other multilateral engagement. In particular, explanations for humanitarian civil-military coordination should continue to look beyond the conventional wisdom of rational approaches highlighting political self-interests or efficiency. Since this research found that militaries and humanitarians are both expected in the field during humanitarian response, this implies that civil-military coordination may also be explained by the practices approach in other contexts like an epidemic response, non-permissive environments, and protracted crises.

For those in humanitarian leadership, particularly in the United Nations, this study implies the benefits of increased investment in leadership, staffing, planning, practical guidance, and enhanced training. This is a signal to UN OCHA and donor states to increase, not decrease, their focus on CMCoord based on the expanding breadth of tasks and increased demand for CMCoord officers. Especially if the field continues to include additional actors who are unfamiliar with the humanitarian principles and international guidelines, CMCoord officers bring important background knowledge into the practices that are generated. The Mosul case implied that building trust in this capacity enables other organizations to fulfill their humanitarian objectives. I also note that the type of event, natural disaster or complex emergency, may not be the best way to determine CMCoord liaison approach, as illustrated by the Mosul case.

For military leaders, this research revealed how complicated a future operating environment could be. The collapse of a separate operational humanitarian space means the confluence of actors is overlaid on top of military operations. Military forces also have to consider that international humanitarian law (IHL) is also no longer sacrosanct and mutually protective. In fact, adhering to IHL is exploited by the enemies.[617] The character of war is changing—and while some like to focus on how technology changes this—it

[617] Verini, *They Will Have To Die Now: Mosul and the Fall of the Caliphate*.

might find it more practical to look deeper at the Battle for Mosul to project what the future of war will look like.[618]

If the emerging conclusions of my study are confirmed by other research, and the increasing trend of non-traditional humanitarian assistance providers continues, the broader international humanitarian community would be well served to invest time considering how to interact or include other actors like the private sector or contracted service providers, as well as how to shape the rules that would govern such inclusion. Members of the international humanitarian system need to discuss how the "disciplined subjectivity" of humanitarianism should be shared or enforced.[619]

The interpretation of humanitarian principles and the principle of last resort in the field also has significant implications for humanitarian identity and humanitarian operations. The reports that detail the compromises, interpretations, adaptations of principles in the field point to much-needed conversations in the humanitarian community about the obligatory, aspirational, or operational nuances of the principles.[620] Are new principles needed if most actors are going to interact with military forces? Are new principles needed to address the increasingly insecure environment where humanitarians work? As warfare and the security environment changes, the relevancy of the humanitarian principles remains a fundamental question requiring further examination.[621]

F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The field of civil-military coordination in humanitarian assistance remains understudied. I divide my recommendations for future research into four categories. First, examining humanitarian civil-military coordination through the lens of international

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618 Brian Michael Jenkins, *What the Battles of Mosul and Aleppo Tell Us About Their Countries Futures*, RAND Corporation (2016), https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/11/what-the-battles-of-mosul-and-aleppo-tell-us-about.html.

619 Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 206.

620 Fox et al., *Emergency Trauma Response to the Mosul Offensive, 2016–2017: A Review of Issues and Challenges*; HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

621 The Lancet, *Examining Humanitarian Principles in Changing Warfare*.

practices theory revealed insightful data and filled gaps from the two common theoretical perspectives. Future civil-military practices research should examine the cooperative framework that emerged in non-permissive complex emergency cases. I also recommend international practices theory to anyone investigating the broader post-Cold War preoccupations of the international community, to include peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, stabilization operations, post-conflict reconstruction, and development. In particular, the practices approach should be tested in other multilateral field-level operations like UN peacekeeping, UN policing, integrated or comprehensive missions, multi-mandate organizations, protracted crises, or "mixed" environments with a natural disaster and complex emergency. Finally, I recommend further theoretical development of the international practices lifecycle that add a temporal dimension to the explanation and thereby address the endogenous aspects of change or transformation that occurs through international intervention.[622]

Second, I recommend that additional empirical studies be conducted on humanitarian civil-military coordination. Current empirical humanitarian research is dedicated to review issues, quantify needs, evaluate funding, investigate best practices, highlight dilemmas, capture lessons learned, identify trends and challenges, and make recommendations.[623] Little empirical research focuses on the rationale for humanitarian civil-military coordination in these categories. To improve training and preparedness, future studies should continue Vincenzo Bollettino's study into the humanitarian perceptions of civil-military coordination—particularly investigating the continued lack of familiarity of responders with international guidelines.[624] This may inform a condensed civil-military basic training that increases this familiarity to a broader audience—

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[622] Naazneen Barma, *The Peacebuilding Puzzle: Political Order in Post-Conflict States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[623] Paul Knox Clarke, *The State of the Humanitarian System*, ALNAP (2018), https://www.alnap.org/help-library/the-state-of-the-humanitarian-system-2018-full-report; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Global Humanitarian Overview* (Geneva, 2020), https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/GHO-2020_v9.1.pdf.

[624] Bollettino, *Civil-Military Engagement: An Empirical Account of Humanitarian Perceptions of Civil-Military Coordination During the Response to Typhoon Haiyan.*

particularly just-in-time training for those deployed to a disaster. I would also recommend more research into the host nation's role in humanitarian civil-military coordination as states develop domestic response structures and use domestic armed forces as first responders.[625] In addition, research should investigate the civil society perception of humanitarian civil-military coordination. There is persistent anecdotal evidence that aid recipients are much less discerning about where assistance comes from—civilian or military—so long as aid is received.[626] Investigating aid recipients" perceptions of civil-military coordination would also much inform those working in this field.

This study revealed that military forces would continue to interact with others in the field—humanitarians, non-state armed groups, civilians, private industry, criminal networks, and intergovernmental organizations. I recommend the military research on how human security issues lead to conflict, complicate the warfighting environment, and affect the termination of conflict. The dense urban environment is minimally understood, and Mosul provides a highly relevant contemporary example of modern warfare that requires more further investigation and updated doctrine. I also recommend a condensed humanitarian civil-military just-in-time training for those who might find themselves in the field on short notice.

Finally, I recommend extensive research into how various organizations interpret the humanitarian principles in practice. Without further research into how these principles are applied and used in practice, the humanitarian community cannot have an informed discussion about what the principles mean today and in the future. Are the humanitarian principles obligatory, aspirational, or operational?[627] Ground-breaking research in Mosul examined both the humanitarian principles in practice and the preservation of humanitarian

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625 Flint, *Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination in Emergencies: Towards a Predictable Model*.

626 Wiharta et al., *The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response*, 118.

627 Slim, *Humanitarian Ethics: A Guide to the Morality of Aid in War and Disaster*; Terry, "The International Committee of the Red Cross in Afghanistan: Reasserting the Neutrality of Humanitarian Action."

identity in conflict settings.[628] Many are asking what the implications are for the humanitarian principles considering the collapsed humanitarian space, the changing character of war, deeply complex operational environments, and the latest trends of increased actors, the weakened status of international humanitarian law, and the security of aid workers.[629] Should they change or evolve? Are new ones needed?[630] And, finally, how do you reconcile the principles as both domestic and foreign military forces continue to provide assistance? When many talk of the future of warfare, they often identify how technology is changing warfare—but I contend that the collapsed humanitarian space actually tells us more about what we will see in the future of war. Within one block of the Mosul battle, fighters were fighting, followed by humanitarians providing assistance followed by civil-society and development practitioners restoring services.[631] Humanitarians, in the middle, will continue to have a robust conversation about who they are, what they do, and what rules they follow.

G. AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL REFLECTION

This chapter started with Yves Daccord's quote that "principled humanitarian action is nothing more than an empty mantra unless it is translated into a meaningful response on the ground."[632] From the start of this research, I wanted to explain what occurred on the ground—and whether that reflected humanitarian principles and the principle of last resort. My knowledge of the countless times military forces had been called in to assist humanitarian response immediately challenged this distinction—which therefore led to this research question. After the research, a new question lingers based on Daccord's observation—what is a meaningful response?

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[628] HERE-Geneva, *Principled Humanitarian Assistance of ECHO Partners in Iraq*.

[629] The Lancet, *Examining Humanitarian Principles in Changing Warfare*.

[630] Adele Harmer, Abby Stoddard, and Alexandra Sarazen, *Humanitarian Access in Armed Conflict: A Need for New Principles?*, Humanitarian Outcomes (2018), https://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/sites/default/files/publications/scoping_study-humanitarian_access_and_new_principles.pdf.

[631] Interview with UN OCHA CMCoord Official O6.

[632] Daccord, "Humanitarian Action in a Changing Landscape: Fit for Purpose?."

This quote also echoes the countless times my humanitarian colleagues have emphasized the sanctity of the humanitarian principles. I pursued this research to investigate how they (humanitarians) were different from us (military personnel) and ended up finding significant commonalities. We both serve a calling larger than ourselves, for little material reward, and in some of the worst conditions around the world. I knew the humanitarian imperative existed within myself and many of my military friends. Those involved in humanitarian or development missions found them to be the most rewarding of their careers. And yet knowing that, my humanitarian colleagues saw us as "other'—a concept I now understand, even if I do not fully agree. The final finding about the pragmatic application of principles was the most heart-wrenching for me to report. Although well supported by evidence, I personally had higher expectations of the normative explanation in humanitarian response given its normative foundation and based on my routine interaction with esteemed colleagues in the United Nations, the ICRC, and various INGOs. I am not persuaded that the humanitarian principles are irrelevant, even given the evidence of their disuse. I hope to be part of future conversations about what humanitarian action looks like in the 21st century.

H. CONCLUSION

This research aimed to show that cooperation between militaries and humanitarian organizations, formally titled UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord), is the result of locally negotiated practices as the relevant actors interact in the field. Rational and normative explanations offer only partial explanations for why individual organizations participate in humanitarian response. International practices theory and the practices lifecycle have stronger explanatory power for how the cooperative framework emerged. The key findings of this research imply an increased investment should be made in humanitarian leadership as well as CMCoord staffing, planning, practical guidance, and training. Most significantly, the varied interpretation of humanitarian principles requires a re-examination of what humanitarianism means, who can be a humanitarian, and how this might need to change based on the changing operating environment.

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APPENDIX A. HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION INTERVIEW

[Introduction: This is a semi-structured interview with open response. I will ask some questions about your organization's policies and philosophies in general and follow it up with more detailed information about activities before, during, and after the event. While this research focuses on natural disasters, it is very plausible that other humanitarian activities inform the policies and practice when working in natural disasters. Additionally, security forces can be military, law enforcement, private contractors, etc. At times, I may refer to security forces and others I may refer to civilian-military coordination, please share all of your experiences, but clarify which type of security actor is being referred to. Finally, I use the term "humanitarian governance" to include the organizational structures, policies, and guidance broadly used by the humanitarian community.]

Organizational policies and philosophies

Can you explain your organization's principles with respect to humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR)?

What is your organization's policy on the use of security forces for HA/DR events?

What is your organization's philosophy on humanitarian governance? (structures, policies, guidance)

What is your organization's philosophy of the role of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)?

What is your organization's philosophy of the role of the United Nations Interagency Standing Committee (UN IASC)?

Event Dynamics

[You will be asked a series of questions about a more narrow timeline regarding your organization's role in event X. To do this, I will ask a series of chronological questions to explore what happened before, during, and after the event. Please expand on the organizational policies and philosophies you mentioned above as they apply to this specific event.]

[Brief summary of critical juncture/event]

Before getting specific, can you describe a quick overview of your organization's involvement in the event?

Phase One: Pre-event Procedures and Norms

Prior to the event, what were the primary activities of your organization?

In general, can you describe how much of the organization's activities were natural disaster related and how much were other humanitarian activities?

Of these activities, what shaped your organization's philosophy about civilian-military coordination in general?

What were your organization's principles regarding HA/DR prior to this event?

Did your organization have any official or unofficial procedures for humanitarian operations and/or working with security forces prior to the event?

Phase Two: Event Dynamics

What was your organization's primary motivation for becoming involved in this event?

What were your organization's main activities during the event?

What were your organization's priorities?

What were your organization's additional concerns (administrative requirements like reports, fiscal accountability, security, evaluation, coordination, etc.)?

Can you describe your organization's interaction with civilian-military coordination during the event? (UN OCHA, other)

Can you explain your organization's principles with respect to humanitarian assistance/disaster relief during this event? (humanitarian principles and last resort)

What was your organization's practice of working with the security forces during the event?

Phase Three: Organizational Lesson-drawing

Can you describe your organization's process for collecting lessons from the experiences during the event?

Did experience from the event alter your organization's principles with respect to humanitarian assistance/disaster relief or other humanitarian activities? (humanitarian principles and last resort)

Did actors within or outside of your organization offer recommendations for changes?

Did these changes get documented?

Did these proposed changes get forwarded up a decision chain?

Based on the organizational lessons drawn, how did your organization convey those lessons drawn within the organization?

Did this change affect future policies or operations for your organization?

Did experience from the event alter your organization's philosophy on the need for broader humanitarian governance? (structures, policies, guidance)

Phase Four: Post-event Norms, Procedures, and Governance

[Thank you for describing your organization's principles, policies, and practices. I would like to ask one final set of questions regarding how your organizational lessons drawn were conveyed to the humanitarian community and potentially were incorporated into broader changes in humanitarian governance.]

Based on the organizational lessons drawn, did your organization participate in a larger humanitarian community effort to collectively examine improvements to humanitarian governance based on the recent event?

What was the coordination mechanism your organization participated in to share lessons drawn?

Can you explain your organization's philosophy of collaborating with the humanitarian community?

Did your organization's discussion about principles carry forward to the broader humanitarian community (humanitarian principles and last resort)? How so?

Regarding civilian-military coordination, did your organization recommend any changes to coordinating with security forces during a humanitarian crisis? Were the changes adopted?

Overall, were your organization's preferences incorporated into the humanitarian governance?

Finally, does your organization anticipate increased, decreased, or the same level of civilian-military coordination going forward in both HA/DR and other humanitarian activities?

[Thank you very much for your time. This concludes our interview. If I have any additional questions, I would like to follow up with you. I truly appreciate your time and contribution to this research.]

APPENDIX B. INDICATORS IN PRACTICES LIFECYCLE

This framework describes various values and policies (guidance, structures, procedures) indicators along the practices lifecycle. These indicators provide a framework that captures a moment in time in the cycle. The placement along the lifecycle framework can be used to display change over time by comparing one event to another.

Indicator		**Practices Lifecycle**			
		Generation	**Diffusion**	**Institutionalization**	**Fade**
Value-set	Value (humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, last resort)	New value set emerges	Value dispersed to other locations	Value enshrined in policy and informs habit	Value loses relevancy/replaced by other value
Policy (Guidance)	Universal published guidance (guidelines/ handbook)	No or insufficient guidance—invented on site	Unofficial guidance dispersed to other locations	Guidance published	Existing guidance no longer apply to situation
	Context-specific guidance	No or insufficient guidance—invented on site	Unofficial guidance dispersed to other locations	Guidance published	Existing guidance no longer apply to situation
Policy (Structure)	Coordinator	Ad hoc coordinator assignment	Coordinators identified with relevant experience	Coordinator role established, personnel trained and qualified	Coordinator function replaced or returns to ad hoc assignment
	Cross-Actor Coordination Mechanism (operational, field, sectoral)	Ad hoc cross-actor coordination mechanism formed in the field	Nascent cross-actor coordination mechanism largely replicates framework used in previous events	Official cross-actor coordination mechanism enshrined in guidance	Official cross-actor coordination mechanism replaced
	Coordination method (isolation, co-existence, co-location)	Ad hoc coordination method formed by actors in the field	Informal coordination method adapts framework used in previous events	Coordination method routinized and enshrined in guidance	Coordination method replaced by another method or returns to ad hoc formation in the field
Policy (Procedures)	Dialog and information exchange (planning/ monitor activities/ negotiate access)	No established mechanism—formed on site	Informal mechanism that adopts mechanism used in previous event	Formal mechanism enshrined in guidance	Institutionalized mechanism replaced or returns to ad hoc formation on site

Indicator		Practices Lifecycle			
		Generation	**Diffusion**	**Institutionalization**	**Fade**
	Task division among actors	No established mechanism—formed on site	Informal mechanism that adopts mechanism used in previous event	Formal mechanism enshrined in guidance	Institutionalized mechanism replaced or returns to ad hoc formation on site

APPENDIX C. COORDINATION METHOD COMPARED TO UN-CMCOORD FRAMEWORKS

Policy Structure Indicator

Coordination method	Co-location	Liasion	Co-existence

UN-CMCoord Frameworks

UN-CMCoord Strategy Strategy for Coordination	**Cooperation**			**Co-existence**
Type of Event / Mission of the Military	**Peacetime Nat'l Disaster**	**Peacekeeping**	**Peace Enforcement**	**Combat**
UN-CMCoord Liaison Approaches	**Co-Location** HUM MIL	**Liaison Exchange** HUM LO LO MIL	**Liaison Visits** HUM LO LO MIL	**Interlocutor** HUM UN-CMCOORD MIL
Hum-Civ-Mil Platforms	HuMOCC (Humanitarian-Military Operational Coordination Concept)	UN-CMCoord Cell		
		UN-CMCoord Working Group		
		Civil-Military Advisory Group (CMAG)		
		UN-CMCoord Forum		

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APPENDIX D. UNITED NATIONS CLUSTER APPROACH



Figure 13. United Nations Cluster Approach[633]

633 Humanitarian Response, *What is the Cluster Approach?* (2020), https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach.

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