



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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THESIS

**THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCANDINAVIAN
SECURITY POLICY SINCE THE CRIMEAN ANNEXATION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. AND NATO POLICY**

by

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June 2020

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SINCE THE CRIMEAN ANNEXATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. AND NATO
POLICY**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines how Sweden and Finland have changed their security policies in the Baltic region after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and analyzes what this policy means for the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although Sweden and Finland are not full members of NATO, since 1994, when they became Partners for Peace in cooperation with NATO, Sweden and Finland have drawn closer to the alliance and, since 2014, have engaged in a posture that is far closer to a collective defense. The two neutral Nordics have increased cooperation with the organization and other member countries that border the Baltic Sea. They have become surrogate NATO allies, but they are not *de jure* engaged under Article V of the Washington treaty.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD	Anti-access/Area Denial
C2	Command and Control
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
EFP	Enhanced Forward Presence
EII	European Intervention Initiative
EU	European Union
FNC	Framework Nation Concept
HNS	Host Nation Support
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JEF	Joint Expeditionary Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORDEF	Nordic Defense Force
NRF	NATO Response Force
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PII	Partnership Interoperability Initiative
RRU	Rapid Reaction Unit
RSM	Resolute Support Mission
SAM	Surface-to-air Missile
SDU	Scandinavian Defense Union
SFNTG	Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
SNMG	Standing NATO Maritime Group
SNMCMG	Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group
SSBN	Nuclear Ballistic Submarine
UN	United Nations
VJTF	Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
VTC	Video Teleconference
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis examines how Sweden and Finland have changed their security policies in the Baltic region after the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and what this policy means for the U.S. and NATO. Although Sweden and Finland are not full members of NATO, since 1994 they have drawn closer to the alliance in a variety of ways, but especially since 2014 have engaged in a posture which is far closer to collective defense than heretofore. The two neutral Nordics have increased cooperation with the organization and other member countries that border the Baltic Sea. Sweden and Finland became Partners for Peace (PfP) in cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1994. They have become surrogate NATO allies, but are not de jure engaged under Article V of the Washington treaty.¹

Sweden and Finland have bilateral agreements with one another as well as with the United States in cooperation between each country's respective Defense Departments and Ministries. What I have discovered through this research is the significant strategic changes in Baltic defense policies, and how it has increased since the annexation of Crimea and what these changes mean for a U.S. Navy officer who might serve in the Baltic.

The changes in the defense policies of Sweden and Finland may well show the deterrent capabilities that they possess by remaining out of either NATO or Russia's military alliances. Are Sweden and Finland able to remain neutral because of their willingness to negotiate with both sides? Does cooperation between Sweden and Finland create some other deterrent towards Russia, while also keeping Russia in a strategic limbo as to whether Finland and Sweden will join NATO? Although Finland and Sweden are increasing cooperation efforts with one another and with NATO, these two countries make policy decisions differently. Due to both countries' geography, their distances from Russia play a role in decision making. Both countries remain neutral, but cooperate enough to maintain their sovereignty, yet also are able to deter Russia. Because Sweden and Finland

¹ "Partners," NATO, September 25, 2019, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/51288.htm>.

are non-aligned states that have closer values with NATO and not Russia these two countries must consider their policies appropriately in order not to upset the security balance in the Baltic. Finland may have closer aligning policies at times with Russia due to its shared border and Sweden may implement stronger policies to push back Russian attempts to encroach on its sovereignty. Finland and Sweden are both non-aligned countries, but each has to weigh its policy decisions carefully and in different manners.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Sweden and Finland's positions in the Baltic Sea play a strategic role in the freedom of navigation for military and economic resources in and out of the Baltic. The significance of these questions has become particularly relevant after the annexation of Crimea. As Russia continues to grow its military and economic power, it will require a wider range of influence not only through the southern Black Sea region but also in those waters to the west and in the Arctic region, which have always been the geopolitical maritime paths to world power. The proximity of Finland to Russia is a growing strategic concern when looking at which countries will have the greatest influence over the Baltic Sea. Sweden also plays a role in the maritime control of the Baltic Sea and maintains close ties with Finland for cooperative efforts in both countries' defense policies.²

The continued efforts to maintain defense ties among nations have been shown through multinational operations at sea and ashore between Swedish and U.S. military forces, while also including other militaries of the Baltic.³ Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO, which means there is no Article V agreement to come to either country's aid in case of attack. Similar to what happened in Ukraine, Sweden and Finland could be next for Russia, even though they are not former Soviet states as Ukraine and the Baltic state are. Although Sweden and Finland are not full members of NATO, they still cooperate with NATO as PfP and have continued to show interest in cooperating with

² *Final Reports on Deepened Defence Cooperation Between Finland and Sweden* (Sweden and Finland: Finish Defence Forces and the Swedish Armed Forces, 2015), <https://www.government.se/government-policy/defence/defence-cooperation-between-finland-and-sweden/>.

³ Swedish Armed Forces, "Aurora 17," Försvarsmakten, accessed August 22, 2019, <https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/activities/exercises/aurora-17/>.

western nations. There have been additional bilateral agreements among Finland and Sweden and the United States on maintaining good relations, enhancing security cooperation in the region.

The policies Sweden and Finland enact will have a direct effect on the other countries located in the Baltic region, and since many of these countries are members of NATO, these policies will have interacting connections between each party's defense organizations. Norway will play a part in the NATO strategy regarding the Baltic due to its geographical location at the entrance between the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. Norway and Sweden will most likely play a maritime role in the strategy that will be required in the Baltic. Finland, along with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, will make up most of the land forces since they directly border Russia.

Russia is uncomfortable about losing its former buffer states and may make aggressive actions towards Sweden and Finland for enhancing cooperation with NATO and other Western alliances.⁴ Russia has also had concerns with NATO expansion as the former Soviet states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have become members of NATO.⁵ Finland is in an interesting position as it is located next to the Kola Peninsula, which is of strategic importance to Russia as a large number of its nuclear ballistic submarines (SSBNs), part of the nuclear triad, are stationed out of the Kola Peninsula.⁶ A buildup of NATO forces in Finland could be perceived as a threat to Russia's secured second-strike capability by potential land invasion on its Northern border.

Finnish and Swedish policies, cooperation, and their willingness to invest in bilateral and alliance agreements will impact future interactions between countries and alliances in the Baltic Sea region. The Scandinavian defense strategy enacted by the

⁴ Sam Tangredi, *Anti-Access Warfare: Countering Anti-Access and Area-Denial Strategies* (Annapolis, UNITED STATES: Naval Institute Press, 2013), <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=1381905>.

⁵ Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined NATO in 2004. "Member Countries," NATO, accessed December 11, 2019, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm.

⁶ Norwegian Ministry of Defence, "Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy: Unified Effort 2015" (Norwegian Government Security and Service Organisation, 2015), 21, <https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/fd/dokumenter/unified-effort.pdf>.

different defense ministers and departments provides a significant area to study. Depending on how Russia perceives these policies, its defense ministry may be provoked into issuing a response. What that response will be, whether policy-based that becomes active or passive, is not entirely certain, but through further research, an informed estimate may be possible.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Defense policy, economy, and strategy for the Baltic Sea countries forms the core of the content.⁷ I plan to focus on the interactions among Sweden, Finland, the United States within and outside of NATO through bilateral agreements, and the NATO country of Norway.⁸ Much of the language and proposed intent of the documents and articles reviewed indicate increased cooperation among western states and organizations. Not all discussions between states have led to solid defense treaties or military alliances. In a time of crisis, neighboring countries would likely come to another's aid.⁹

⁷ Such policies include: Ministry of Defence, "Sweden's Defence Policy 2016 to 2020" (Ministry of Defence, June 2, 2015), https://www.government.se/49c007/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/sweden_defence_policy_2016_to_2020; Prime Minister's Office, "Government's Defence Report (Statsrådets Försvarpolitiska Redogörelse)," Prime Minister's Office Publications (Lönnberg Print & Promo, February 16, 2017), https://www.defmin.fi/files/3688/J07_2017_Governments_Defence_Report_Eng_PLM_160217.pdf.

⁸ "Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden on Defence Cooperation," July 9, 2018, <https://www.government.se/49fcef/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/2018/mou-finnish-swedish-defence-cooperation-20180625-signerad.pdf>; Department of Defense of the United States of America and Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland, "Statement of Intent between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland," October 7, 2016, https://www.defmin.fi/files/3543/Statement_of_Intent.pdf; Department of Defense United States, Ministry of Defence Republic of Finland, and Ministry of Defence Kingdom of Sweden, *Trilateral Statement of Intent among the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Finland and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden* (Washington, D.C., 2018), <https://www.government.se/press-releases/2018/05/minister-of-defence-peter-hultqvist-signs-trilateral-statement-of-intent/>; Dana White, "Secretary Mattis Hosts Finnish, Swedish, Ministers for Trilateral Meet," U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, May 8, 2018, <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1515657/secretary-mattis-hosts-finnish-swedish-ministers-for-trilateral-meeting/>.

⁹ Through further cooperation in the military and political realms Sweden, Finland, the United States, and other countries in the Baltic have continued dialogue that favors policies of supporting one another in times of crisis. Robert Dalsjö, Michael Jonsson, and Christofer Berglund, "Bursting the Bubble? Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications" (Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, n.d.), 69-71, <https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4651--SE>.

1. SWEDEN

Sweden is located in the central geopolitical location in the Baltic Sea between Finland and Norway. Southern Sweden is across the Baltic Sea from the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which may become an increased security concern for Sweden. Sweden has mainly kept a policy of neutrality for most of its modern history but has begun to realize, due to its central location, the importance of the role it may play in future security issues.¹⁰ The Swedish government was not as concerned with defense spending and the buildup of its military forces prior to 2014 due to its policies of neutrality and the unlikelihood of a potential attack on Sweden.¹¹ Many of the cuts took place at the end of the Cold War, as they did with many other countries throughout Europe. From 1990-2015, military personnel dropped from a wartime strength of 800,000 to around 50,000.¹² With the potential for Russia to increase its focus in the Baltic, Sweden has begun additional military spending and continues to focus on the buildup of its defense as seen in the *2016-2020 Swedish Defence Bill*.¹³ Additional military spending will focus on building up Sweden's defense capabilities through training exercises and better equipment to help the country improve its readiness.¹⁴ Sweden has addressed its security shortfalls and has begun implementing changes to try to move its defense strategy in an appropriate direction to address Russian security issues.

Sweden has taken steps prior to the events of 2014 to deepen its cooperative efforts with NATO and other allied countries by its participation in operations in Afghanistan

¹⁰ Eva Frisell and Emma Sjökvist, "Military Cooperation Around Framework Nations: A European Solution to the Problem of Limited Defence Capabilities," FOI-R—4672—SE (Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, February 2019), 12, <https://www.foi.se/report-summary?reportNo=FOI-R--4672--SE>; Juha Pyykönen and Stefan Forss, *Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region: The Role of the Nordic Countries Together With the U.S. Army – SSI* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2019), 35, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/deterrence-in-the-nordic-baltic-region-the-role-of-the-nordic-countries-together-with-the-u-s-army/>.

¹¹ Frisell and Sjökvist, "Military Cooperation Around Framework Nations: A European Solution to the Problem of Limited Defence Capabilities," 12.

¹² Pyykönen and Forss, *Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region*, 36.

¹³ Ministry of Defence, "Sweden's Defence Policy 2016 to 2020."

¹⁴ Pyykönen and Forss, *Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region*, 37.

since 2001.¹⁵ The current mission in Afghanistan is known as NATO's Resolute Support Mission (RSM), but prior to the turnover of security responsibilities to the Afghan government the mission was under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).¹⁶ Sweden has supported the mission in Afghanistan by providing security forces in advisor roles, medical staff, air cargo loadout personnel, and a support unit to assist in security operations.¹⁷ Sweden has helped in the NATO lead mission of ISAF which primary objective was to prevent the reemergence of terrorist actives in the country of Afghanistan.¹⁸ Sweden is still supporting RSM by providing 29 personnel that provide support in an advisory capacity to Afghan security forces.¹⁹ Sweden has advanced its cooperative efforts for supporting security in different regions of the world which provides valuable experience for implementing its own security policies at home.

Sweden has begun implementing what it believes internally will be a sufficient security policy to counteract Russian advances into the Baltic, but there is a dynamic of cooperation between nations and alliances that should also be considered. Shortly after the annexation of Crimea, Finland and Sweden agreed to a joint action plan in April 2014.²⁰ Since 2014, Sweden and Finland's militaries have increased cooperation through different levels of involvement and participation in both nations' exercises, including Finland's

¹⁵ "Afghanistan (Resolute Support Mission)," Swedish Armed Forces, accessed September 18, 2019, <https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/activities/current-international-missions/afghanistan-resolute-support-mission/>.

¹⁶ Swedish Armed Forces.

¹⁷ Swedish Armed Forces.

¹⁸ "ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014) (Archived)," NATO, accessed December 27, 2019, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm.

¹⁹ "Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures" (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, June 2019), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/20190625_2019-06-RSM-Placemat.pdf.

²⁰ Stefan Lundqvist and J. J. Widen, "Swedish-Finnish Naval Cooperation in the Baltic Sea: Motives, Prospects and Challenges," *Defence Studies* 16, no. 4 (October 1, 2016): 360, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2016.1220805>; Oxford Analytica, "FINLAND/SWEDEN: Military Ties Are Set to Deepen," *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service*, August 3, 2018, 2, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/2082111155?accountid=12702>.

Ruska military exercise and Sweden's exercise Aurora.²¹ Since 2014, both countries have worked to create Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group to conduct maritime surveillance and protection operations in the Baltic Sea.²² Continuing cooperation between these two countries will help send a message of deterrence to Russia.

2. FINLAND

Finland has to consider many external issues when determining its security policy because of its geopolitical location. Since Finland is located next to Russia and shares approximately an 800-mile border, Finland's main focus would be on its land forces vice its naval forces.²³ Finland's geographical location next to Russia gives a good picture as to why there are concerns with having a strong land force in the event of a land grab by Russia.²⁴ The Gulf of Finland matters as this body of water is Russia's access point to the Baltic Sea from the large naval port in St. Petersburg, so Finland also has to be cognizant of potential attacks from the sea.²⁵ Due to Sweden's larger role in the maritime realm, further cooperation should be done with the combined Naval Task Group. Finland also has to be concerned with the Kola Peninsula in the north, as this is of strategic importance to the Russian Federation.²⁶

²¹ Charly Saloniuss-Pasternak and Henri Vanhanen, "Finland's Defence Cooperation: The 'No a Priori Limits' Approach with Sweden Should Be a Model for Other Cooperation Efforts," *Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, no. 23 (December 2018): 2, https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/comment23_finland_defence_cooperation2.pdf; Oxford Analytica, "FINLAND/SWEDEN," 2.

²² Mikko Villikori, "Finnish - Swedish Naval Co-Operation Baltic Rim Economies," *Baltic Rim Economics* 2, no. 2524 (May 2019), <https://sites.utu.fi/bre/finnish-swedish-naval-co-operation/>.

²³ Kristin Archick, "The Nordic Countries and U.S. Relations," August 26, 2019, 1, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10740>.

²⁴ Finland discusses its land defense strategy for a potential attack or crisis: "Government's Defence Report (Statsrådets Försvarspolitiska Redogörelse)," 21, 34.

²⁵ A current example is the Russian Navy Day parade and Ocean Shield 2019 which is a Russian naval exercise in the Baltic Sea that incorporates many of the ships from St. Petersburg. Roger McDermott, "Russia Rehearses Multi-Platform Warfare in the Baltic Sea," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 16, no. 113 (August 6, 2019), <https://jamestown.org/program/russia-rehearses-multi-platform-warfare-in-the-baltic-sea/>.

²⁶ Prime Minister's Office, "Government's Defence Report (Statsrådets Försvarspolitiska Redogörelse)," 8; Pyykönen and Forss, *Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region*, 25.

These factors and several others have an impact on Finland's defense.²⁷ The 32,000 Russians that live within Finland's borders as of 2018 may create an internal security concern.²⁸ Russia may take actions similar to what happened in Ukraine, moving to "protect" the interests of Russian nationals in Finland.²⁹ Cyber-attacks and psychological operations (PSYOP) impacting Finnish critical infrastructure, institutions, and citizens are all potential threats that have been recognized by the Finnish government.³⁰

Similar to other countries in Europe, Finland has gone through a period of military downsizing, but with the current security concerns posed by Russia, the government has returned to a buildup. Finnish Defense report shows that it has assessed its defense forces as currently at an adequate level, but much of the equipment will be phased out during the next decade.³¹ New equipment is in the process of being procured for each branch of its military. With an ever-changing strategic environment, the Finnish government will not only need the most up-to-date equipment but will require further cooperation with other nations and alliances.

Until Finland joins NATO it will remain militarily non-aligned.³² There are political reasons why Finland has stayed militarily non-aligned since it borders Russia. If Finland joins NATO, it would most likely be considered a threat to Russia. Finland and Sweden have both been warned by Russian leadership that they should not join NATO least actions be taken against them.³³

²⁷ Prime Minister's Office, "Government's Defence Report (Statsrådets Försvarpolitiska Redogörelse)," 10.

²⁸ Statistics Finland, "Appendix Figure 2. Largest Dual Nationality Groups Permanently Resident in Finland by Their Second Nationality in 2018," September 13, 2019, http://www.stat.fi/til/kans/2018/kans_2018_2019-09-13_kuv_002_en.html; Pyykönen and Forss, *Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region*, 26.

²⁹ Pyykönen and Forss, *Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region*, 26.

³⁰ Prime Minister's Office, "Government's Defence Report (Statsrådets Försvarpolitiska Redogörelse)," 9.

³¹ Prime Minister's Office, 12.

³² Prime Minister's Office, 14.

³³ Pyykönen and Forss, *Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region*, 26.

Finland and Sweden have increased cooperation through bilateral agreements, but cooperation with member countries of NATO should also be taken into consideration. Due to the border that Finland and Russia share, it is understandable why the Finnish government would take careful consideration before joining any military alliance. Russia's aggressive posture has caused the Finnish Government to state "the use or threat of military force against Finland cannot be ruled out and that it will prepare itself for threats accordingly."³⁴ The government understands the neighboring threat but remains cautious in terms of alliances. Finland continues to build its bilateral cooperation with notable defense partners like Sweden and the United States.³⁵

Finland has taken part in different military security and crisis operations in cooperation with NATO and other allied countries to include Implementation Force (IFOR), Stabilization Force (SFOR), Kosovo Force (KFOR), ISAF, and RSM.³⁶ Finland has taken part in a variety of operations in cooperation with NATO and continues to do so by being part of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and contributing 67 personnel to support RSM advisory missions in Afghanistan.³⁷ Through further Finnish cooperation with NATO as a PfP and by Finland participating in most of the alliances operations its commitment to providing security in the region is visible.

3. NATO

In this declining security situation, the United States and NATO have given reassurance that they are committed to defending their allies, particularly the Baltic States and Poland, which face challenges to their security and sovereignty.³⁸ These challenges

³⁴ Pyykönen and Forss, 25.

³⁵ Pyykönen and Forss, 27. The European Union (EU) was also included as a notable partner of Finland, but further research into this area may go beyond the scope of this study.

³⁶ Ministry of Defence, "Ministry of Defence of Finland - Nato," accessed February 23, 2020, https://www.defmin.fi/en/tasks_and_activities/defence_policy/nato; NATO, "NATO/IFOR Homepage," Operation Joint Endeavour, accessed December 27, 2019, <https://www.nato.int/ifor/ifor.htm>; NATO, "Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina," SFOR, accessed May 2, 2020, <https://www.nato.int/sfor/index.htm>; NATO, "KFOR," History, accessed April 23, 2020, <https://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor/about-us/history>.

³⁷ Ministry of Defence, "Ministry of Defence of Finland - Nato"; NATO, "Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures."

³⁸ Pyykönen and Forss, *Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region*, 2.

will have to be met by a constructive deterrent, which is outlined by addressing five of these challenges in Michael Rühle's *NATO Defense College Policy Brief No.15*.³⁹ The five challenges are as follows: terminology, over-generalization, the unclear role of military means, twisting the image of your opponent, and the de-politicization of the debate.⁴⁰ These five challenges are issues that should be addressed for deterrence to be an effective tool for NATO, to use against Russia.

These five challenges should be broken up into two parts. The first two, terminology and over-generalization, play into one another which is why they are discussed together. The last three challenges also show connections among them.

The correct use of the first challenge, terminology, should help lessen the confusion that comes from dealing in military operations in a joint environment. The use of correct terminology also plays into the second challenge to prevent over-generalization and correctly identify the level of force Russia may be using against its target. There are differences between cyber and kinetic attacks not only in the realm in which they are conducted but also in the severity of the damage that they inflict. For example, a cyber-attack towards a country's nuclear energy infrastructure could be more severe than a land assault or artillery strike on a military target.

In the third challenge, the unclear role of military means, just because NATO understands the capabilities of Russia does not mean that it understands the Russian strategy of where it would strike. By understanding Russian interests a more effective deterrent should be possible to implement. The third challenge also plays into the fourth, twisting the image of your opponent, because NATO must be under the assumption they are dealing with a rational actor for deterrence to be effective.⁴¹ If the image of the adversary is twisted and no rationale can be determined behind its motives then deterrence will fail. The fifth challenge, the de-politicization of the debate, also plays into three and

³⁹ Michael Rühle, "Deterring Hybrid Threats: The Need for a More Rational Debate" (NATO Defense College, July 2019), <http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1335>.

⁴⁰ Rühle, "Deterring Hybrid Threats: The Need for a More Rational Debate," 2–3.

⁴¹ Rühle, 3. It is also important to note that the deterrence model created by NATO is not just a model of what NATO would do against itself, but what would be an effective deterrent against Russia. What would Russia do to deter itself?

four by looking into Russian capabilities and interests to understand what is possible to deter and what cannot. A cost-benefit analysis needs to be made on the priorities of both parties involved to see what is possible to stop and whether the cost of stopping is actually worth the resources necessary. Not all hybrid threats can be deterred and some losses will be taken, but if measures are put in place to make acceptable losses more likely in the event one happens that could allow for a stronger strategy.

Since the Warsaw Summit in 2016 the members of NATO have implemented an enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltic states and Poland.⁴² The eFP is divided into four battle groups that are led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States with a combined troop strength of almost 4800 personnel.⁴³ There are 20 different countries that are providing forces to strengthen the collective defense deterrent that NATO provides its member states.⁴⁴ Since forces were deployed in 2017 there has been a continuous multinational presence in all four countries ready to conduct military operations with host nations defense forces.⁴⁵ If Russia were to attack any of the Baltic states or Poland it will likely trigger an Article V discussion among the members of NATO.

A key issue that challenges NATO is having all of its members being able to coordinate and work together as a single unit. This key challenge is a great task for any organization to take on, but especially so for an organization that includes the world's top military powers. NATO has four priorities, speed of decision making, command and control, force readiness, and enablement.⁴⁶ The NATO Political-Military Process requires consensus among its members before moving on to the next step of a plan which has an

⁴² "Warsaw Summit Communiqué - Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016," NATO, July 9, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm; "Warsaw Summit Key Decisions" (Warsaw: NATO, February 2017), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_02/20170206_1702-factsheet-warsaw-summit-key-en.pdf; "NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence" (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, July 2019), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/20190627_1906-factsheet_efp_en.pdf.

⁴³ "NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence."

⁴⁴ NATO.

⁴⁵ "Warsaw Summit Communiqué - Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016."

⁴⁶ "Naval FAO Power Point Presentation," Power Point (NATO EUCOM, n.d.), accessed September 14, 2019.

effect on the speed of decision making, but is an important part of the process to ensure all members are aligned with the mission of the alliance.⁴⁷ NATO is working to streamline requirements and permission to have a faster response time. One example is NATO's goal to accelerate border crossing procedure to five days for routine evolutions and faster times for crisis situations.⁴⁸ The enhancement of the cohesive force of NATO will help improve decision making and timelines in the event hostilities are taken against ally nations.

NATO still maintains its requirements to Article V for the collective defense of all its members even if some challenges remain with the deterrent aspect of the organization. Challenges will always have to be overcome, but through the cooperation of NATO members there will most likely be enough capabilities shared between one another to be an effective deterrent or a formidable force if needed to take action.

4. NORWAY

Norway is in a unique position both geographically and politically concerning its Nordic neighbors.⁴⁹ Norway does not have direct interaction with Russia through the Baltic but does have concerns about incidents occurring in the High North that could potentially develop in future conflicts.⁵⁰ Norway has responsibilities to address for its own country as well as responsibilities to NATO. Norway believes its main focus is limited to maritime operations concerning surveillance and identification of potential adversaries and their assets.⁵¹ Some of the main priorities that the Norwegian defense plan focuses on are its national defense, the collective defense under its agreement with NATO, international crisis management, and the concept of total defense.⁵² Norway plays an active role in its

⁴⁷ Col. Pete Goldfein, "U.S. Military Delegation to the NATO Military Committee," Power Point (NATO EUCOM, n.d.), Slide 10, accessed September 14, 2019.

⁴⁸ NATO, "Naval FAO Power Point Presentation."

⁴⁹ Nordic countries include Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland according to: Archick, "The Nordic Countries and U.S. Relations," 1.

⁵⁰ Although the Arctic region, High North, is a growing topic of concern for competition, the study of this region and its evolving issues will not be possible to cover in this research due to the depth of study. The Arctic is of importance not only militarily, but also economically and maybe an area suited for future research.

⁵¹ Pyykönen and Forss, *Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region*, 19.

⁵² Pyykönen and Forss, 20.

cooperation with NATO through Host Nation Support (HNS) by storing U.S. Military equipment and conducting winter warfare training with the Marine Corps since 2017.⁵³ Norway continues cooperation efforts between its NATO partners, whom it would have to rely upon in case of hostilities enacted by Russia.

An important part of the Norwegian Defense plan is the aspect in which it views the world and has an impact on its security. There are a few issues that Norway considers in its defense policy: the multipolar world that it lives in, Russia trying to regain its great power status, and finally non-conventional threats.⁵⁴ Norway's concern for a multipolar world is the potential for the United States to stray from its engagement in Europe as the political and economic importance of Asia increases. The "deep peace" of Europe has now been challenged by Russia after it annexed Crimea and caused tensions to rise in the region.⁵⁵ The other concern is on non-conventional threats related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, and cyber-attacks.⁵⁶

Norway has several areas to consider in its national defense policy to ensure it protects its borders as well as maintaining its requirements in the collective defense of its fellow allies within NATO and its Nordic neighbors. Although Norway is not located in the Baltic it most likely will continue to play an important role as the gatekeeper between NATO and Russia, whether it is through the High North, the Baltic, or both areas simultaneously. The continued security threat that Russia poses throughout Europe supports the importance of maintaining a strong Norway at an acceptable state of readiness.

⁵³ Archick, "The Nordic Countries and U.S. Relations."

⁵⁴ "Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy: Unified Effort 2015," 13. There was also an issue of militant Islamism that was addressed in the Norwegian Security and Defence Policy, but it was left out of this study as it does not seem to play a large role in considering Norway's defence against Russia.

⁵⁵ Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 13.

⁵⁶ The non-conventional threats could be included within the realm of hybrid or non-linear warfare. It is also important to point out that the geographical distance does not allow the same standoff capability and decision times are becoming shorter with hypersonic weapons and cyberattacks that can be done almost instantaneously from around the world. Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 13.

5. CONCLUSION

The policies and documents that have been written about the defense strategies in the Baltic region have shown movement towards continued cooperation between Scandinavian states to help deter Russia. The increased cooperation is movement in a positive direction for Sweden and Finland to join NATO, but discussion continues on each country maintaining its neutrality from any military alliances. In the past neutrality has played a role in dictating Sweden and Finland's policies, but with the current tension that has risen from Russia's actions, there may be changes on the horizon.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Sweden, Finland, and NATO are using visible language that indicates an increased security posture among western countries. Through further analysis, I hope to find how the neutrality that Finland and Sweden propose in their documents is perceived by other countries around them, specifically Russia, and to what extent that would refrain from conflict due to their language of cooperation with NATO and the United States.

One hypothesis is that Finland and Sweden will maintain their neutral positions and not officially align with NATO.⁵⁷ Sweden and Finland were both neutral countries during the Cold War, World War II, and other conflicts going back to the early 1800s. Both countries have engaged in different conflicts throughout history, but never to the point of becoming entangled in wars. The extent of their neutrality and cooperation with other states has allowed both countries to gain resources and advance politically and militarily without having to abide by the restrictions of being part of a large alliance. There are both risks and advantages to what Sweden and Finland are doing, where may result in them having to choose whether or not to join the bigger alliance.

In the event of conflict escalation in the Baltic, several nations would be forced to get involved depending on how a future conflict develops. A conflict could be contained within the Baltic and only involve the Nordic countries, but with different agreements and

⁵⁷ Pyykönen and Forss, *Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region*, 17. Neither Finland or Sweden have been occupied by a foreign state, but their reasoning for remaining neutral during the Cold War and most likely again now is due to external forces for Finland and internal forces for Sweden.

treaties in place, it would likely grow much larger in scale. Another possibility is that through further bilateral and trilateral cooperation among Sweden, Finland, and the United States, the United States is brought into the conflict.⁵⁸ The involvement of multiple countries in an all-out war between Russia and NATO would not be a favorable outcome, as deterrence would have failed.

A second hypothesis is that cooperation will increase among Finland, Sweden, and Russia as long as there are agreements that the two Nordic countries remain neutral. By Finland and Sweden continuing an open dialogue about joining NATO, both domestically and internationally, they may maintain some leverage when dealing with Russia. This Nordic leverage may incentivize Russia to try to negotiate with them instead of conducting low- to high-level operations against Sweden or Finland. Similar events of semi-cooperation and neutrality took place during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and Finland had the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which was most likely forced upon Finland to prevent it from joining NATO while also staying out of the USSR.⁵⁹ Although cooperation between Finland and Sweden with Russia may not be as favorable for NATO, it would be favorable to those Nordic countries in keeping their neutrality and sovereignty.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

A single case study will compare today's aspects of the policies being implemented in the Baltic with what transpired during the Cold War. With the return to great power competition, the most recent and comparable example would be the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States does not fit perfectly into the model necessary to resemble Sweden or Finland, but the organizational structures in NATO are as applicable today as

⁵⁸ There is potential for a few other options to play out if the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were taken in some sort of land grab by Russia in conjunction with the taking of Finland. This land grab would cause NATO to become involved and come to the aid of its NATO allies and probably Finland and Sweden as they would likely be involved. Finland and Sweden are also members of the European Union (EU) which has its security mechanisms similar to NATO and would trigger a response to Russian hostilities. However, the type of response and the extent of that response by fellow EU members is not likely to be of much significance to stop Russian advances. Much of the security dependence of European countries falls back to NATO and the EU mostly focuses on economic functions.

⁵⁹ Pyykönen and Forss, *Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region*, 17.

they were during the Cold War. Through examining the dynamic of Sweden and Finland during the Cold War, the policies they employ today can be better understood. Several different areas could be examined, but the Cold War era appears to give the closest relatable explanations as to why the policies are being implemented in the Baltic in the manner that they currently are.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is organized by five chapters, beginning with the introduction of the relevant issues of Finland, Sweden, NATO, and the circumstances involving them in the Baltic, with Russia, post-annexation of Crimea.

The second chapter will address the current militarily non-aligned countries of Sweden and Finland. In this chapter, I examine Swedish and Finnish defense policies within the region and the cooperation that has been shared between both nations.

In the third chapter, I examine the role that NATO plays with Norway and the United States. The reason for choosing Norway is that it is also a Nordic state with ties to Sweden and Finland, while also having responsibilities to NATO. The United States plays a role in cooperation through bilateral and trilateral agreements between these countries outside of NATO. An analysis of NATO's, Norway's, and the United States' policy's should help to give a better understanding of the dynamic that is taking place in the Baltic region.

In the fourth chapter, I make a comparison to the events that took place during the Cold War by examining the Nordic Policies for security defense in the Baltic. Looking at these Cold War policies and comparing them to the policies of today produce a better understanding of the decisions made. This singular case study seems the most relevant to the events that are taking place in today's era of great power competition as the Cold War is the best fit in recent history.

In the fifth and final chapter, I conclude why and how the defense policies of the states involved in the Baltic have changed in the manner that they have. Whether non-military alignment and neutrality played a factor in Nordic security policies regarding

Russia or if deepened cooperation efforts with surrounding western countries have played a role in deterring Russia. If these two factors have played a role then how much? Will the level of deterrence that worked during the Cold War be as effective in today's world or is something more required now?

Each chapter builds from the overlying issues of defense policy which is introduced in chapter one and gives an overview of the research. Chapter two looks at the region focus of Finland and Sweden, which is expanded in chapter three to a global multinational perspective with NATO. Chapter four provides continuity between policies during the beginning of the Cold War and the contemporary era. Finally, chapter five draw concludes with why security policies within the Baltic have been developed in the manner that they have.

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II. SWEDISH AND FINNISH DEFENSE POLICY SINCE THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA

This chapter examines contemporary Sweden's and Finland's foreign and security policy towards Russia before and after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This event caused alarm and a shift towards a renewed forward defense against Russian aggression in northern Europe and heightened security cooperation in their association with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This chapter will also discuss each country's security policies and defense strategies and how they have evolved since 2014, considering the continued war in the Donbas region.⁶⁰ Although Sweden and Finland are not included under Article X and Article V of NATO but members of the Partnership for Peace, they both still maintain close cooperative efforts with NATO as well as with other European Union (EU) security and defense organizations. This post-2014 increase in cooperation between Sweden and Finland is important to discuss in this study. Both countries are furthering cooperation with the United States, NATO-allied countries, and NATO as a whole in a consequential manner. Have Sweden and Finland done enough to increase each country's defense capabilities to fend off an attack made by Russia? If a single country was attacked by the full force of the Russian military, it would most likely not be able to defend itself effectively. All the same, collective defense efforts have been developed and given the reemergence of new defense spending and technology, it would appear that chances of survival for Sweden and Finland have improved compared to pre-annexation of Crimean times.

A. SWEDEN

From the end of the wars in the early 1800s, Sweden has had a non-aligned military agreement primarily to prevent itself from becoming entwined with other countries' affairs and potentially being dragged into another war. Sweden is centrally located in the Baltic between great powers in the East and West, which has made it challenging to remain

⁶⁰ Steven Pifer, "Five Years after Crimea's Illegal Annexation, the Issue Is No Closer to Resolution," *Brookings* (blog), March 18, 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/18/five-years-after-crimeas-illegal-annexation-the-issue-is-no-closer-to-resolution/>.

military non-aligned from organizations such as NATO, since its foundation in 1949. Sweden does cooperate through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in security building as well as in aspects of operations and especially in education and training with NATO.⁶¹ Sweden has additional bilateral agreements with the United States and its neighbor Finland in support of its defense and security in the Baltic.⁶² Although Sweden and Finland are currently independent sovereign countries, they have historical ties that go back hundreds of years. During the 17th century, when Sweden was a strong power its influence ran through the Baltic as the leading power and within the leading powers of Europe.⁶³ During this period, Sweden included the Finnish population that now makes up the country of Finland. Sweden not only played a part in the Thirty Years War, but also played a role in several conflicts in Europe over the next hundred years, slowly losing more territory until Russian troops invaded Finland in 1808, leading to its separation from Sweden.⁶⁴ Finland was not entirely dissolved into the Russian Empire and was allowed to rule itself internally, but was still controlled by the Russian Tsar.⁶⁵

Sweden successfully remained non-aligned/neutral through both World Wars and during the Cold War as marked in past historical events.⁶⁶ Although Sweden remained outwardly neutral, it still worked with the West at varying capacities during the Cold War in the event the Soviet Union did decide to invade Swedish territory.⁶⁷ After the fall of the

⁶¹ “Partners.”

⁶² United States, Republic of Finland, and Kingdom of Sweden, *Trilateral Statement of Intent among the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Finland and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden*; Regeringskansliet Sweden and Ministry of Defence Finland, “Sweden and Finland Signed a Memorandum of Understanding” (Finland, July 9, 2018), <https://www.government.se/press-releases/2018/07/sweden-and-finland-signed-a-memorandum-of-understanding/>; *Final Reports on Deepened Defence Cooperation Between Finland and Sweden*.

⁶³ Stewart P. Oakley, *War and Peace in the Baltic, 1560-1790* (London, United Kingdom: Routledge, 1993), 50, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=240481>.

⁶⁴ Oakley, 161.

⁶⁵ Oakley, 162.

⁶⁶ Eva Frisell and Emma Sjökvist, “Military Cooperation Around Framework Nations: A European Solution to the Problem of Limited Defence Capabilities,” FOI-R--4672--SE (Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, February 2019), 12, <https://www.foi.se/report-summary?reportNo=FOI-R--4672--SE>.

⁶⁷ Robert Dalsjö, *Life-Line Lost: The Rise and Fall of 'Neutral' Sweden's Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West* (Santerus Academic Press Sweden, 2006).

Soviet Union, there was a significant drop in Sweden's military defense from the 1990s to mid-2010s, as its personnel strength went down from its wartime numbers of 800,000 down to 50,000.⁶⁸ Russia was no longer seen as a threat to Sweden or any other country at this time as it was trying to recover from its collapse in the 1990s. One significant change that happened in 1999 was the election of the current President Vladimir Putin. President Putin has aimed to return Russia and its military to its former glory during the height of the Soviet Union and has pulled from historical figures of importance from Russia's past.⁶⁹ Although the early 2000s were not a reason for concern, the wars in Georgia (2008) and now Ukraine (2014) have given further reasons for alarm for the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea.⁷⁰ These wars with a Russian antagonist create a unique situation for Sweden as it is not a full member of NATO. As Russia has been able to conduct military operations and impose its will onto other countries without full kinetic force being used against it by other western nations, there is concern that Russia may turn west and try to gain further influence in the Baltic.

Sweden has made significant efforts to support Western countries in the years leading up to the annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine and has continued to support operations that provide for the security of Europe. Sweden is not the only country that has concerns about Russian interference in the Baltic, but all the other surround nations are members of NATO and would have the other members come to their aid under Article V if they were to be attacked by Russian aggression.⁷¹ Sweden has participated in several

⁶⁸ Juha Pyykönen and Stefan Forss, *Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region: The Role of the Nordic Countries Together With the U.S. Army – SSI* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2019), 36, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/deterrence-in-the-nordic-baltic-region-the-role-of-the-nordic-countries-together-with-the-u-s-army/>.

⁶⁹ Clifford G. Gaddy and Fiona Hill, "Putin and the Uses of History in Russia," *Brookings* (blog), November 30, 1AD, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/putin-and-the-uses-of-history-in-russia/>.

⁷⁰ Ariel Cohen, "The Russo-Georgian War's Lesson: Russia Will Strike Again," *Atlantic Council* (blog), August 10, 2018, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-russo-georgian-war-s-lesson-russia-will-strike-again/>; John Biersack and Shannon O'Lear, "The Geopolitics of Russia's Annexation of Crimea: Narratives, Identity, Silences, and Energy," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 55, no. 3 (May 4, 2014): 247–69, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2014.985241>.

⁷¹ "Collective Defence - Article 5," NATO, accessed February 14, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm. Finland, like Sweden, is the other country that is not a member of NATO and is not protected by collective defense under Article V.

NATO-led operations in support of European security. Such military operations included the 1995 NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo from 1999 to 2013, and in Afghanistan as part of the international security assistance force (ISAF) and the follow on resolute support mission (RSM).⁷² Sweden has been involved in these and many other international security missions that have been supported by the United Nations (UN). Sweden has also assisted with the United States' mission in Iraq to resist the buildup of Islamic State fighters in the region.⁷³

Sweden has taken part in several military operations, but since the annexation of Crimea, it has begun increasing the number of military exercises it takes part in and organizes in the Baltic. Such exercises include the Swedish-organized AURORA 2017; BALTOPS, an annual exercise led by the United States; RAMSTEIN ALLOY, which incorporates Article V scenarios; and the Swedish-led exercise NORTHERN WIND 2019.⁷⁴ These Swedish-led exercises matter because they responded to Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014. AURORA 17 tested the Swedish military's ability to defend the country against an attack on the homeland with the support of surrounding NATO nations including the U.S. and Norway as well as its non-NATO neighbor Finland.⁷⁵

Although Sweden is separated from Russia by the Baltic Sea, military threats remain. These threats include the naval port of St. Petersburg, the Kaliningrad exclave, and

⁷² "Relations with Sweden," NATO, accessed December 11, 2019, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52535.htm; Swedish Armed Forces, "Kosovo (KFOR)," Försvarsmakten, accessed February 14, 2020, <https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/activities/current-international-missions2/kosovo-kfor/>; "ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014) (Archived)"; NATO, "Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures"; Swedish Armed Forces, "Current International Missions," Försvarsmakten, accessed February 14, 2020, <https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/activities/current-international-missions2/>.

⁷³ Swedish Armed Forces, "Iraq," Försvarsmakten, accessed February 14, 2020, <https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/activities/current-international-missions2/iraq/>. The United States involvement in Iraq has been more controversial as it was not sanctioned by the UN security council in 2004 leading some countries to question their involvement and remaining removed from supporting the invasion altogether.

⁷⁴ Forces, "Aurora 17"; NATO, "Key NATO and Allied Multinational Exercises in 2019," February 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_02/1902-factsheet_exercises_en.pdf; NATO, "NATO Allies Participate in Swedish Exercise Northern Wind," SHAPE, accessed February 14, 2020, <https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2019/nato-allies-participate-in-swedish-exercise-northern-wind>.

⁷⁵ Forces, "Aurora 17."

in the event of an invasion from the Kola peninsula to the North through Finland and Norway. There have been a variety of military threats from Russia during the Cold War that ranged from the strategic level of conflict down to the regional level of the Baltic, but due to further aggressive actions and challenging Swedish sovereignty, there is a growing reason for Sweden to ensure its security amongst its neighboring nations of the Baltic. Such incursions by Russian aircraft and naval vessels to enter Swedish airspace and territorial waters are a challenge to Swedish sovereignty.⁷⁶ Russia has even gone to lengths to simulate nuclear strikes against Sweden as part of its military exercises and providing warnings to Sweden if it did chose to join NATO.⁷⁷ Sweden is not alone in the number of aggressive actions taken against its country in the Baltic by the Russian military; aggressive actions have been performed against neighboring countries like Finland and NATO member nations such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.⁷⁸ Due to these increased interactions with the Russian military that were similar to interactions with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Sweden has had to readdress its defense strategy to posture against a resurgent Russia in the Baltic.

At the end of the Cold War, with the fall of the Soviet Union and the balance of power shifted to the West, there was a time when wars and conflicts between major powers were no longer likely. The only security concerns to be expected were terrorist attacks and natural disasters. Due to this mindset, there were large cuts to Swedish military readiness as some 70 percent of military bases were closed and military spending percentage per

⁷⁶ Lizzie Dearden, "Full List of Incidents Involving Russian Military and Nato since March," The Independent, November 10, 2014, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/full-list-of-incidents-involving-russian-military-and-nato-since-march-2014-9851309.html>; Niklas Pollard and Alistair Scrutton, "Sweden Says Credible Reports of Foreign Submarine in Its Waters," *Reuters*, October 19, 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sweden-deployment-idUSKCN0I80T320141019>.

⁷⁷ *Secretary General's Annual Report 2015*, accessed February 19, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_127529.htm; Zachary Boren, "Russia Warns Sweden of Military Action If It Joins Nato," The Independent, June 19, 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-warns-sweden-it-will-face-military-action-if-it-joins-nato-10331397.html>.

⁷⁸ Dearden, "Full List of Incidents Involving Russian Military and Nato since March."

gross domestic product decreased over time.⁷⁹ The decrease from wartime strength that had taken up much of the time and effort of the Swedish government seemed rational without a great power threat for it to be used against. With only minor conflicts in Europe and its surrounding periphery, a military that took on the form of a security force to take care of regional conflicts was likely all that was needed. However, the Swedish Ministry of Defense and members of the Swedish government have seen reasons why an increase in military capabilities is warranted to defend the country and provide support to its fellow Nordic countries in times of disaster or attack.⁸⁰

Sweden still plays a large role in contributing security and support as an “enhanced opportunities partner” after the 2014 Wales Summit that launched the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII) which is more or less a mechanism to square the circle of this non-Article V status.⁸¹ Sweden works closely with its neighbor Finland in supporting NATO as an enhanced opportunity partner in addition to bilateral agreements.⁸² In addition to Sweden’s role in partnership with NATO, Sweden is also a member of the EU for not only economic benefit and inclusion, but also for European security.⁸³

Although Sweden’s interests in joining the EU were more for economic reasons over security, the security of Europe still is important to Sweden because the security of its surrounding region has a direct impact on Swedish security. Although the EU is not

⁷⁹ Nora Vanaga, Toms Rostoks, and Toms Rostoks, *Deterring Russia in Europe : Defence Strategies for Neighbouring States* (Routledge, 2018), 95, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351250641>; “Military Expenditure (% of GDP) - Sweden, United States | Data,” accessed February 19, 2020, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2018&locations=SE-U.S.&start=1988&view=chart>.

⁸⁰ “Sweden’s Defence Policy 2016 to 2020” (Ministry of Defence, June 2, 2015), 1-2, https://www.government.se/49c007/globalassets/government/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/sweden_defence_policy_2016_to_2020; Regeringen och Regeringskansliet, “The Swedish Defence Commission Presents Its White Book on Sweden’s Security Policy and the Development of Its Military Defence,” Text, Regeringskansliet, May 14, 2019, 2, <https://www.government.se/articles/2019/05/the-swedish-defence-commission-presents-its-white-book-on-swedens-security-policy-and-the-development-of-its-military-defence/>. Sweden also is a member of the EU and has stated its support to those member countries that are faced with a disaster or attack.

⁸¹ “Partnership Interoperability Initiative,” NATO, accessed February 20, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132726.htm.

⁸² Sweden and Finland, “Sweden and Finland Signed a Memorandum of Understanding.”

⁸³ European Union, “Sweden,” European Union, July 5, 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/sweden_en.

necessarily in the primary field of focusing on defense and security in the European region, it still plays a part in the supranational organization, especially when a majority of the members of the EU are also members of NATO. Sweden is in a unique position as being a member of the EU and not a member of NATO, but still has close ties with NATO. This puts Sweden in a unique position to further cooperation between NATO and the EU in the mutual defense of Europe through less redundant means of resources and information sharing.

Sweden also takes part in Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFECO) along with the other four Nordic countries—Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland—to consolidate resources and continue to share information for the cooperative defense of the Nordic-Baltic region.⁸⁴ The agreement in 2009 was not the first time that the Nordic nations came together to deepen ties, but since the founding of the Nordic Council after World War II, each of these countries has provided support to one another.⁸⁵ Cooperative efforts in the past have mainly focused on supporting UN-sanctioned missions. In more recent times with aggressive actions posed by Russia, defensive efforts have developed to provide security within and around the local region.⁸⁶ Sweden has taken steps to deepen cooperative efforts with its fellow Nordic countries through additional sharing of information resources at both the political and military levels.

Sweden has not only expanded its defense capabilities through internal advances in military technology and spending, but it has also branched out to cooperate with other countries to try to help maintain security in the Baltic. NATO, the EU, and NORDEFECO can help deter war as well as the lower-level, gray-zone conflicts that are currently much more visible. Additional bilateral agreements with countries like the United States are also

⁸⁴ Ann-Sofie Dahl and Pauli Järvenpää, eds., *Northern Security and Global Politics : Nordic-Baltic Strategic Influence in a Post-Unipolar World* (Routledge, 2013), 129, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203725344>.

⁸⁵ “NORDEFECO: Nordic Defence Cooperation Annual Report 2019,” Annual Report (Sweden: Ministry of Defense, January 2020), 18, <https://www.nordefco.org/Files/Nordefco%20Annual%20Report%202019%20Webb.pdf>.

⁸⁶ “The Basics about NORDEFECO - Nordefco,” accessed February 22, 2020, <https://www.nordefco.org/the-basics-about-nordefco>; “NORDEFECO: Nordic Defence Cooperation Annual Report 2019,” 20-22.

of significance since the transatlantic link and U.S. ties with Europe have been vital since the end of World War II.⁸⁷ Sweden has made significant advances in its defense capabilities since the end of the Cold War and its post-peace decline in military spending and mobilization reductions. Sweden, along with other Western countries have woken up to the defense concerns that have arisen in the East. In order for them to be successful in keeping an effective deterrent and fighting force viable in the future continued cooperation and at all levels will be necessary.

B. FINLAND

Finland also has an important geopolitical position among the Nordic countries and the Baltic Sea Region. Finland shares the longest land border of 830 miles with Russia and has historically been squeezed between Sweden and Russia over the different military and political affairs throughout Finnish history.⁸⁸ Finland, like Sweden, is a close partner with NATO but is not protected under Article V of collective defense.⁸⁹ Finland is also a member of the EU and NORDEFCO with additional bilateral agreements with Sweden and the United States.⁹⁰ Sweden actively participates in several different exercises and operations in cooperation with NATO and its surrounding neighbors in the Baltic.⁹¹ Besides its increased cooperation with neighboring countries, Finland has taken steps at home to advance its defense capabilities to make it a harder target for Russian interference in its daily affairs and sovereignty.

⁸⁷ Ministry of Defence, “Minister of Defence Peter Hultqvist Signed U.S.-Swedish Statement of Intent,” Text, Regeringskansliet, June 8, 2016, <https://www.government.se/articles/2016/06/minister-of-defence-peter-hultqvist-signed/>.

⁸⁸ Teri Schultz, “Long History and Long Border with Russia Make Finland the Perfect ‘Hybrid’ Hub,” *Atlantic Council* (blog), November 17, 2017, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/long-history-and-long-border-with-russia-make-finland-the-perfect-hybrid-hub/>.

⁸⁹ “Relations with Finland,” NATO, accessed February 22, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49594.htm.

⁹⁰ European Union, “Finland,” European Union, July 5, 2016, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/finland_en; Sweden and Finland, “Sweden and Finland Signed a Memorandum of Understanding”; Department of Defense of the United States of America and Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland, “Statement of Intent between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland.”

⁹¹ Salenius-Pasternak and Vanhanen, “Finland’s Defence Cooperation: The ‘No a Priori Limits’ Approach with Sweden Should Be a Model for Other Cooperation Efforts.”

Due to the historical impact that Russia has made on Finland by its incorporation into the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 19th century and having to fight for Finnish independence from the Bolsheviks in 1918, there is an uneasiness about Russia's foreign and military policies.⁹² Finland has responded to Russian aggression in Ukraine by addressing the Finnish defense policy to its sovereignty through its 2017 Government's Defence Report.⁹³ Finland has addressed several factors that could impact the security of its country including conflicts over multiple domains of warfare and the potential for conflict in the Baltic Sea to cut Finland off from other Western states.⁹⁴ Finland understands that due to the large land border that is shared with Russia, a conflict could easily arise over a long front that would be difficult to control for a comparatively smaller force. Although there are continued efforts for cooperation with neighboring countries like Sweden and the Baltic states, Finland is still working to maintain and increase its military capabilities for if and when a military conflict could arise.

Finland has noted areas to enhance its land defense to address the potential incidents that could take place along its long shared border with Russia. Finland has addressed these concerns by improving existing armored personnel carriers and purchasing Leopard 2A6 tanks for use along its border.⁹⁵ Additionally, the use of rapid reaction units (RRU) will be a focus for the Finnish Defence Forces to respond to any incidents along its border with Russia that could potentially escalate.⁹⁶ The current wartime strength of Finland is approximately 230,000; additional forces from the Border Guard, which will fall under the Defence Forces in a time of crisis, will bring the total strength up to 280,000 troops.⁹⁷ The Border Guard helps by ensuring the integrity of its external borders and defending those

⁹² Stephanie Pezard et al., "European Relations with Russia: Threat Perceptions, Responses, and Strategies in the Wake of the Ukrainian Crisis," Product Page (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2017), 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1579.html.

⁹³ Prime Minister's Office, "Government's Defence Report (Statsrådets Försvarspolitiska Redogörelse)."

⁹⁴ Prime Minister's Office, 10.

⁹⁵ Prime Minister's Office, 22.

⁹⁶ Prime Minister's Office, 19–21.

⁹⁷ Prime Minister's Office, 21.

borders if necessary.⁹⁸ This number of troops is a strong defense force for the Finnish, but coming up against the full might of the Russian military that could likely deploy some 300,000 troops in a wartime scenario and the additional amount of reserves available gives Russia the greater personnel force.⁹⁹

Since Russia has greater military forces to challenge Finland, the Finnish military will need a flexible joint response that includes its naval and air forces to provide support to land forces and potentially deny access to the Baltic Sea. Finland would use coastal and anti-ship missiles as well as sea mines to protect its sea lines of communication and maintain its control of the maritime realm through the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea.¹⁰⁰ Naval mine warfare is a definite option for the Finnish navy to implement in the defense of its country and to control the sea lanes to deny access to the Baltic for the fleet in St. Petersburg, Russia. Due to Finland's geographic location, if it were to lose its control of the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea, it would be very challenging to receive economic and logistical support to continue its war efforts.

However, in the event of a conflict with Russia, Finland will most likely not be alone due to its cooperative efforts with members of NATO, the EU, and its neighbor Sweden, with which it has deepened cooperative efforts. Finland takes part in the annual U.S.-led, NATO exercise of BALTOPS as well as having taken part in Article V scenarios during RAMSTEIN ALLOY.¹⁰¹ Sweden took part in 92 exercises and training events in 2019 and is scheduled to take part in another 71 exercises in 2020.¹⁰² Not only has Finland taken part in several international exercises, but it has also shown itself capable of hosting

⁹⁸ The Finnish Border Guard, "Our Strategy," Raja 100, accessed February 24, 2020, https://www.raja.fi/the_border_guard/our_strategy.

⁹⁹ Johan Norberg, "Vostok-2018: about the Russian military's brain, not its muscles," FOI Memo 6470, RUFS Briefing No. 43 (Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, September 2018), 2, <https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI%20MEMO%206470>.

¹⁰⁰ Prime Minister's Office, "Government's Defence Report (Statsrådets Försvarspolitiska Redogörelse)," 23.

¹⁰¹ "Key NATO and Allied Multinational Exercises in 2019."

¹⁰² "Ministry of Defence of Finland - Finland's Participation in International Training and Exercises," accessed February 24, 2020, https://www.defmin.fi/en/administrative_branch/finland_s_participation_in_international_training_and_exercises.

exercises to advance its cooperative efforts to further integrate with other nations as it did during exercise NORTHERN COASTS 2018.¹⁰³ Finland's cooperative efforts with NATO-aligned countries during Article V related exercises show that Finland is willing to get involved if a crises were to arise and by doing so believes that other countries would come to its aid as well.

In addition to its partnership with NATO, Finland is a member of the EU and has shown greater interest in the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) which are focused on deepened defense capabilities for the EU.¹⁰⁴ Although the EU was initially more focused in economic and political cooperation it has evolved into debating matters of defense, even though many countries in Europe still primarily view NATO as the main provider of security for the region. The Lisbon Treaty, which was ratified by the European Council in 2007, gives the EU the ability to use the CSDP as a tool for the "prevention of conflicts and the preservation of international security."¹⁰⁵ Finland has also further engaged within PESCO to remain committed to fellow EU members that have taken part in advancing their collective defense through a variety of projects.¹⁰⁶ Since Finland is a full member of the EU, it will likely look towards deepened cooperation with fellow EU members due to the commitment to come to one another's aid in a time of disaster or crisis.

¹⁰³ "Exercise Northern Coasts 18 Will Be Arranged in Finland between 25 October and 8 November 2018 - Article - The Finnish Navy," accessed February 24, 2020, https://merivoimat.fi/article/-/asset_publisher/northern-coasts-18-harjoitus-jarjestetaan-suomessa-25-10-8-11-2018.

¹⁰⁴ Matti Pesu, "What Non-Alignment?," Briefing Paper (Helsinki, Finland: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, November 16, 2017), 5, <https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/finlands-security-and-defence-policy-stems-from-partnerships>.

¹⁰⁵ "The Treaty of Lisbon," Fact Sheets on the European Union: European Parliament, accessed February 25, 2020, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/5/the-treaty-of-lisbon>; Timo Behr et al., "The Maritime Dimension of CSDP : Geostrategic Maritime Challenges and Their Implications for the European Union.," Study (Brussels: Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, February 5, 2013), 63, <https://op.europa.eu/443/en/publication-detail/-/publication/a761c0ee-0300-45fc-bd96-f1b2dce380c2>. It is important to note that the authors of *The Maritime Dimension of CSDP* that was produced for the EU were either from the Finnish or Swedish Institutes of International Affairs. Not only have Finland and Sweden cooperated more closely in the military and political realms but also in the academic domain.

¹⁰⁶ "PESCO," Member States Driven, accessed February 25, 2020, <https://pesco.europa.eu/>.

In addition to Finnish cooperation at the multinational level through supranational organizations, it has also signed bilateral agreements for defense cooperation. Such bilateral agreements include its closest neighbor in cooperation Sweden.¹⁰⁷ These agreements are not necessarily legally binding defense treaties, as it is stated in the U.S. and Finnish statement of intent, but if a conflict were to arise, Finland would have allies for support. Although Sweden and the U.S. may be two of the stronger and largest bilateral cooperative supporters, Finnish defense still works to cooperate with other countries such as Belgium, Bulgaria, and Germany.¹⁰⁸ Finland has also worked in bilateral capacities with other countries, “such as the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), France’s European Intervention Initiative (EII), and the German Framework Nation Concept (FNC).”¹⁰⁹ Finland may work with its fellow nations in different capacities, but the closest partner of cooperation for defense security in the Baltic Sea Region would have to be Sweden.

C. FINNISH AND SWEDISH DEFENSE COOPERATION

Looking at Swedish and Finnish history and military non-alignment, the attraction between both countries to further defense cooperation becomes more understandable. Since both countries share a historical bond along with having a precarious history with Russia, combining forces makes for a better strategy when military non-alliance with NATO is the current outlook. Even before the annexation of Crimea, Sweden and Finland have worked closely together through different organizations like the EU, NATO, NORDEF, and the UN, but since 2014 onward both countries have worked to deepen cooperative efforts between military branches of service and through logistical support.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden on Defence Cooperation.”

¹⁰⁸ “Minister of Defence Niinistö to Sign Cooperation Agreements during His Working Visits in Europe,” Ministry of Defence, accessed February 25, 2020, https://www.defmin.fi/en/topical/press_releases/2017?9128_m=8569.

¹⁰⁹ Salenius-Pasternak and Vanhanen, “Finland’s Defence Cooperation: The ‘No a Priori Limits’ Approach with Sweden Should Be a Model for Other Cooperation Efforts,” 1.

¹¹⁰ *Final Reports on Deepened Defence Cooperation Between Finland and Sweden*. 2-3.

Such cooperation has resulted in the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG) which is working to find the best ways to combine its mission capabilities to be more effective and economically efficient in the Baltic.¹¹¹ Since both countries are reliant on maritime industry and commerce through the region, the naval cooperative efforts are a strong point to focus on for the defense of the Baltics Sea. Having naval support and cooperation between Sweden and Finland could become vital for Finland in the chance that it loses its control of Finnish sea lanes in and out of the Baltic. If such an event were to happen then Finland could rely upon Sweden to help with its logistical support. Sweden has a major port in Gothenburg which is outside the Baltic Sea and has direct access to the North Sea through the Skagerrak.¹¹² Even if Russia was to deny other countries access to the Baltic Sea through the use of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapons station in the Kaliningrad exclave, there would still be a logistical path for possible support to Finland and/or the Baltic states if needed. Sea lines of communication (SLOC)s have always been and will remain an important part of maintaining control of the Baltic. In conjunction with the SFNTG, the sea surveillance cooperation Finland and Sweden provide the ability to share information between naval forces to have a more complete picture of the maritime area of operations.¹¹³

Similar to the Finnish and Swedish naval cooperation, the air forces of both countries have similar agreements to work towards a common command and control (C2), base operations, and air operations.¹¹⁴ For Army cooperation, the combination of a Finnish-Swedish Brigade Framework is being worked on to better integrate capabilities that both countries can provide for different mission areas.¹¹⁵ To avoid the economic waste that comes with the initial development when Sweden and Finland innovate in separate

¹¹¹ Villikori, "Finnish - Swedish Naval Co-Operation Baltic Rim Economies."

¹¹² Robert Dalsjö, Michael Jonsson, and Christofer Berglund, "Bursting the Bubble? Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications" (Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, n.d.), 63, <https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4651--SE>.

¹¹³ Villikori, "Finnish - Swedish Naval Co-Operation Baltic Rim Economies."

¹¹⁴ "Final Reports on Deepened Defence Cooperation Between Finland and Sweden," 4-5.

¹¹⁵ "Final Reports on Deepened Defence Cooperation Between Finland and Sweden," 5.

stovepipes, an increase in logistical cooperation between these countries will enable them to be more effective operationally, economically, and technically to provide better weapons systems.¹¹⁶ Sweden and Finland are also looking to have a secure communications capability that will allow both countries to share classified information as well as having secure video teleconference (VTC) capabilities and encrypted phone lines at the ministry and military levels.¹¹⁷

The cooperative efforts that Finland and Sweden have displayed through memorandums, statements of intent, and the different operations and exercises that they take part in represent improvements from the declines of the early 2000s. Sweden has improved its capabilities and defense policies by executing exercises like AURORA 2017 to test the abilities of its military and government to respond to an attack by an aggressor. Finland has addressed its needs to maintain the capabilities that it has and enhance the areas in each of the different domains of warfare that have fallen behind the current times. Each country by itself has made improvements upon its defense capabilities at the strategic level through policies and documents signaling its country's changes. At the operational level, Sweden and Finland have joined together to become a more capable deterrent in the Baltic that has flexibility in the manner that it can respond to a potential threat.

Cooperative efforts between Sweden and Finland have become stronger, but it will be a challenge to tell if these combined forces will be enough of a deterrent to its adversaries. Additional collaboration with other Nordic and Baltic countries through the institutions of NORDEFCO, the EU, and NATO will also be beneficial in enhancing Swedish-Finnish defense capabilities and signaling the position of each country and its cooperative efforts. Sweden and Finland both have interests in maintaining their security as well as providing support to its neighbors to help protect their security within the Baltic. Through the cooperation that these two countries have shown, a stable balance of power among traditionally militarily non-aligned states is possible in a resurgent world of great power competition.

¹¹⁶ "Final Reports on Deepened Defence Cooperation Between Finland and Sweden," 5-6.

¹¹⁷ "Final Reports on Deepened Defence Cooperation Between Finland and Sweden," 6 & 10.

III. NORWAY, THE UNITED STATES, AND NATO'S DEFENSE IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION

This chapter analyzes Norway relative to its Scandinavian and Nordic neighbors within the Baltic Sea Region. The United States is examined in the role it has played among the surrounding countries in the Baltic. A final observation of the overall role that NATO has in the Baltic will be discussed as it relates to the Nordic countries and the states surrounding the Baltic Sea. Norway and the United States are members of NATO and cooperate with the countries of Sweden and Finland through multilateral channels of NATO in addition to multilateral cooperation between the Nordic countries and bilateral agreements of understanding with the United States.¹¹⁸ Through the observations at the regional, bilateral through hegemonic means, and supranational levels of organization, the role of the United States and NATO within the Baltic will become understood.

A. NORWAY

The Nordic countries have had interests in solving problems through multilateral means since the end of the Second World War.¹¹⁹ However, Norway and Denmark became members of NATO, while Sweden and Finland have tried to preserve positions of non-alignment during the Cold War. Sweden and Finland have only warmed up to public cooperative efforts with NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union where western power in a unipolar world became the most probable option for the advancement of each respected country. Unlike Sweden and Finland, Norway chose to join NATO and was an original

¹¹⁸ "Relations with Sweden"; "Relations with Finland"; Archick, "The Nordic Countries and U.S. Relations"; Department of Defense of the United States of America and Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland, "Statement of Intent between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland"; Ministry of Defence, "Minister of Defence Peter Hultqvist Signed U.S.-Swedish Statement of Intent."

¹¹⁹ Robert Dalsjö, *Life-Line Lost: The Rise and Fall of 'Neutral' Sweden's Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West* (Santerus Academic Press Sweden, 2006), 147. Although the initial attempts of the Scandinavian defence union (SDU) were not successful in the formation of a neutral organization of states that could remain separate from NATO or the Warsaw Pact, the Scandinavian countries still worked towards cooperative efforts towards the preservation of each state.

signatory of the Washington Treaty in 1949.¹²⁰ Norway was impacted by the Axis powers during WWII and likely saw a military alliance such as NATO beneficial to its survival during the Cold War so that Norway could be protected from the Soviet Union. The United States also stepped up as the predominant western power in Europe after WWII due to support through the Marshall Plan helping to rebuild Europe.

A likely security reason for Norway joining NATO and closely aligning with the West was due to the development of U.S. nuclear weapons and the U.S. use of nuclear weapons to end the war with Japan. The U.S. was ahead of the Soviet Union in nuclear development at the beginning of the Cold War and was the most likely ally to help preserve Norway's sovereignty and security. Due to several advantages with western security and the fear that the Soviet Union could become the next Nazi Germany that would occupy Norway the Norwegians chose to align with NATO and western ideology. Norway's neighbors, Sweden and Finland, could have also joined NATO but because Sweden and Finland had different experiences they did not. The recent event of WWII and how each country was treated during that war made an impact on the decision process of military alignments. Historical relationships from the 17th century up to WWI were also factors that drove the decision for Swedish and Finnish non-alignment with NATO due to past dealings with Russian military and foreign policy. These different experiences that each country had made a distinction on how each would determine its future security policies and alignments.

Norway has taken part in a significant number of exercises and operations to show its support for western security. Although it has aligned with allies in NATO like the United States and others, it still cooperates closely with its Nordic neighbors through such organizations as NORDEFECO.¹²¹ Norway has cooperated closely with NATO since becoming a member in 1949 through different exercises and operations both military and

¹²⁰ "Norway and NATO," Norgesportalen, accessed April 4, 2020, <https://www.norway.no/en/missions/nato/norway-nato/>.

¹²¹ Ministry of Defence, "The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO)," Redaksjonellartikkel, Government.no (regjeringen.no, December 14, 2014), <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/defence/international-operations/nordisk-forsvarssamarbeid---nordefco/id2350954/>.

non-military. Much of the cold weather training that is conducted by NATO is typically held in Norway due to its landscape and geography.¹²² Norway's Arctic climate allows NATO the ability to train for northern conflicts. As Norway was the only northern member of NATO that bordered the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it was an additional defense concern due to having the potential to be a conflict zone in addition to central Europe between East and West Germany. Norway has had deepened connections with NATO along with the United States and continued cooperation to improve security for both countries since the end of WWII.

Norway is important for several strategic reasons to NATO and the U.S. to include maritime, land warfare, and nuclear operations that are coordinated with and through the country. Norway has had close ties with the United States through the Cold War and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it has shown additional support through the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) by providing 54 troops to support the ongoing mission in Afghanistan.¹²³ Although this is a coalition force that is involved in the Middle East, the participation by Norwegian military forces shows commitment to not only NATO but also the U.S. as a member country and partner in security cooperation. The U.S. and Norway have partnered in such ways that the U.S. sent 330 Marines to Norway to take part in winter training.¹²⁴ There have been increases in military exercises and requests for more troops to be trained and capacities to be increased for U.S. capabilities in Norway, especially since the annexation of Crimea in 2014.¹²⁵ Norway's role as a northern European NATO country is important to the strategic defense of not only the alliance but also to the U.S. with regards

¹²² "Norway and NATO - 1949," NATO, accessed April 13, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_162353.htm.

¹²³ NATO, "Resolute Support Mission (RSM): Key Facts and Figures"; "ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014) (Archived)." Norwegian forces were also involved in Afghanistan before the name change to RSM when it was still known as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as noted in the 2001-2014 archived link above. Also interesting to note is that like Norway, the other northern European countries like Sweden and Germany that took part in ISAF also operated in neighboring providences with one another in the Northern part of Afghanistan.

¹²⁴ Gwladys Fouche, "Norway to Invite More U.S. Marines, for Longer and Closer to Russia," *Reuters*, June 12, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-us-russia-idUSKBN1J8149>.

¹²⁵ Fouche, "Norway to Invite More U.S. Marines, for Longer and Closer to Russia."

to sea power and nuclear striking capabilities.¹²⁶ Due to the location of Norway it is the first line of defense to Russia in the Arctic Region for maritime and nuclear forces that could directly strike the Baltic. Norway's location outside the Baltic would be a strong base of operations in the case that NATO had to fight its way back into the Baltic, due to the strong maritime culture of the country. Norway would likely be the first to detect Russian fleet movements in the Arctic that could have a direct impact on the Baltic and NATO operations.

Norway, along with Sweden and Denmark surrounds the entrance to the Baltic Sea through the Danish straits. These straits are a significant maritime choke point for northern Europe for economic, political, and military purposes to connect with the rest of the world. Norway spans from the entrance of the Danish straits up to the Arctic and borders Russia, making Norway central to NATO and the U.S. in defense of its allies. Norway is a part of the first line of defense to contain Russian maritime forces from entering into the Atlantic Ocean from the Arctic and the Baltic Sea Region to prevent a disruption in NATO's SLOCs.

Another strategic concern for NATO and allied forces is the nuclear submarines based out of the Kola peninsula, giving Russia a secure second-strike capability in the event of a nuclear exchange between nations.¹²⁷ Although the Russian nuclear submarines are outside the Baltic Sea, they can still impact the defensive security decision making for the states surrounding the Baltic Sea, most of which are members of NATO. Due to the potential nuclear conflict that could arise and the lack of any nuclear-capable states located in the Baltic, it is understandable why these states would want to be covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Although Norway plays some role in cooperating with the U.S. and

¹²⁶ The Arctic Region is another area of growing importance due to climate change with the opening of additional waterways that were once covered with ice. The discussion of the Arctic is beyond the scope of this research endeavor but may be pursued in future works. The exchange of strategic nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia over the Arctic Region is another area of importance to be considered but due to the limit of this thesis, it cannot be covered in detail.

¹²⁷ Steven Miller and Stephen Evera, eds., *Naval Strategy and National Security* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 339.

NATO in supporting the deterrence efforts regarding nuclear forces, it still focuses on conventional means of deterrence since Norway is a non-nuclear state.

Norway provides cooperative support to the members of NATO through land and naval forces, but it is also a member of NORDEFECO and has cooperated with the Nordic states via military and non-military capacities since the end of WWII and the beginning of the Cold War.¹²⁸ Norway in cooperation with the Nordic states has worked militarily and politically in different capacities from the Nordic council after WWII and through other organizations through the years of the Cold War and post-Cold War era that have taken part in multilateral efforts.¹²⁹ Some of the efforts that the Nordic states have taken part in have been supporting UN-sanctioned missions such as during the crisis in the Suez (1956), the Balkans, and a combined Nordic and Polish unit as part of the Implementation Force (IFOR).¹³⁰ More recent events of cooperation during NORDSUP 2008 addressed areas that may require cooperative efforts for defense and helped with the creation of NORDEFECO.¹³¹ NORDEFECO was created the following year in 2009 from the collaborative efforts of previous organizations which brought the collective defense measures under one organization.¹³²

Although Norway is a member of NATO, it still has geographic and historical ties to its Scandinavian and Nordic neighbors for defense and security. Even before the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Norway continued to collaborate with Sweden and Finland to help maintain security in the region. The concern for Russian interference in the sovereignty of the Nordic countries in the 1990s and early 2000s was not likely as the Russian state was working to stabilize itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

¹²⁸ Nordic Defence Cooperation, “The Basics about NORDEFECO - Nordefco,” sec. Nordic Cooperation-History and background.

¹²⁹ Nordic Defence Cooperation, sec. Nordic Cooperation-History and background.

¹³⁰ Nordic Defence Cooperation, sec. Nordic contributions to United Nations operations.

¹³¹ Nordic Defence Cooperation, secs. 2008-Enhanced cooperation-NORDSUP and 2009 NORDEFECO.

¹³² Nordic Defence Cooperation, sec. 2009 NORDEFECO.

The major focus for Norway and its neighbors seems to have been on regional conflicts and a focus of anti-terrorism due to growing conflict in the Middle East that has spread to the lower parts of Europe. Due to the unlikely return to Cold War conditions during the Yeltsin and early Putin years, defense cooperation between the Nordic states should not have been seen as a threat, meaning no counterbalance would have been necessary. However, after the Georgian war in 2008 and the impact of the global recession, some European states saw potential security concerns and began work towards preserving security within the Baltic.¹³³ Norway has been a member of NATO since its formation and will most likely continue in its capacities to deepen military ties with the West to maintain its security, but will also advance its relations with Sweden and Finland to maintain security in the Baltic while Norway continues to strengthen defenses in the North.

B. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States has had interests in European affairs since the early years, despite trying to remain out of the destructive wars that took place on the European continent. It was not until the U.S. became a strong enough power and began to develop interests overseas that it began reaching out and eventually entered into two World Wars that involved military actions in Europe. By the end of WWII, the U.S. was a superpower in competition with the Soviet Union and the Cold War ensued until the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s. After the Cold War, the U.S. was the unchallenged hegemonic power of a unipolar world until a resurgent Russia and a rising China developed after the turn of the century.

The U.S. has remained engaged in European affairs and defense security through organizations such as NATO, which it was a founding member of in 1949, as well as

¹³³ Cohen, "The Russo-Georgian War's Lesson."

through bilateral agreements with other countries such as Sweden and Finland.¹³⁴ The U.S. has shown its support in the Baltic through several military exercises such as the annual BALTOPS that is led by U.S. maritime forces and takes part in other exercises throughout the Baltic.¹³⁵ The U.S. has also taken part in exercises led by NATO partners Sweden and Finland during AURORA 2017 and Northern Coasts 2018, respectively.¹³⁶ The U.S. is also a member of NATO's enhanced forward presence in charge of the Battlegroup station in Poland with 857 of its troops.¹³⁷ The U.S. has taken steps to cooperate within the Baltic in bilateral and multilateral manners that are consistent with maintaining security among the northern European countries.

The United States has had to reassure its allies in Europe that it will continue to be a contributing member of NATO will enact Article V for the collective defense of the other member countries.¹³⁸ The U.S. has been the major military power in the alliance since its foundation with conventional and nuclear forces. The U.S. nuclear umbrella has been paramount to the deterrent capability of the alliance against the Soviet Union and with Russia after the end of the Cold War.¹³⁹ Helping to prevent conflicts from escalating to a nuclear level the collective forces of NATO can focus on the conventional and non-linear

¹³⁴ "United States and NATO - 1949," NATO, accessed April 22, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_162350.htm; Ministry of Defence, "Minister of Defence Peter Hultqvist Signed U.S.-Swedish Statement of Intent"; Department of Defense of the United States of America and Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland, "Statement of Intent between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Finland"; United States, Republic of Finland, and Kingdom of Sweden, *Trilateral Statement of Intent among the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Finland and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden*. The United States has also signed a trilateral statement of intent among the Ministries of Defense to show the cooperative efforts between the three nations.

¹³⁵ NATO, "Key NATO and Allied Multinational Exercises in 2019."

¹³⁶ "U.S. Military Participates in Swedish Armed Forces' Exercise Aurora 2017," United States European Command, accessed February 25, 2020, <https://www.eucom.mil/media-library/pressrelease/36092/u-s-military-participates-in-swedish-armed-forces-exercise-aurora-2017>; Finnish Navy, "Exercise Northern Coasts 18 Will Be Arranged in Finland between 25 October and 8 November 2018 - Article - The Finnish Navy."

¹³⁷ "NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence."

¹³⁸ "Collective Defence - Article 5."

¹³⁹ The United Kingdom and France are also nuclear-capable countries but have a much smaller nuclear arsenal that is typically reserved for the defense of its own country with more limited capabilities and targeting criteria such as only being required to be capable of striking Moscow.

levels of warfare without having to overcompensate for a nuclear attack from Russia. The advantage for cooperative security between the U.S. and members of NATO can be beneficial to each country as long as freeriding is kept to a minimum and strategically important countries come to a consensus with one another on the defense of the organization.

The United States is still engaged in fighting terrorism as it has done since the beginning of the 21st century, but it has been in the process of shifting towards the return to great power competition in a similar manner to which the Cold War was conducted. With the U.S. considering allies in the Eastern hemisphere that have to contend with China there is potential for the U.S. to overextend and become weaker in its commitments to NATO and other European allies, which may continue to be tested by the Russian government. The U.S. has official agreements with members of NATO, but the memorandums of understanding and the statements of intent with Sweden and Finland due not provide a collective defense aspect that the U.S. would come to the aid of either country if it was attacked by an aggressor. Although, through the deepened efforts to further cooperation between the U.S., Swedish, and Finnish defense departments and ministries in the event of an attack on either Nordic country a strong response from the U.S. government seems likely. A response to an attack would be even more likely if U.S. military members were involved in some manner similar to the “enhanced forward presence” of troops located in the Baltic states and Poland.¹⁴⁰ The U.S. has several options to choose from in the diplomatic, military, and other areas of global influence that can impact the cooperative efforts among the Nordic states and could be interpreted as a deepened security strategy for the Baltic by neighboring countries. The U.S. in cooperation with its allies and partners with NATO will have to use good judgment on how that message is interpreted by

¹⁴⁰ NATO, “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence.”

surrounding European countries to prevent or dampen expansionist influences in the Baltic Sea Region.¹⁴¹

The United States has had varying levels of cooperation and engagement with Sweden and Finland during World War II, the Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. These changing degrees of cooperation have evolved from less intrusive and at some points secretive defense discussions into a more open and public dialogue that can be observed and assessed by neighboring nations. Allowing other countries to see the U.S. strategy can be beneficial in deterring aggressive acts by showing that the U.S. and its allies have primacy in the region and that it is not worth the risk of upsetting the balance in place. However, cultural values must be considered for the different parts of the region of Europe, and understanding how the culture and the values of a country are part of the calculus of security decision making is important in making such decisions for the U.S. With these thoughts in mind and considering U.S. relationships with its European allies defense strategies in the region have become more open between the U.S. and NATO partners, Sweden, and Finland.

C. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO was initially founded in 1949 to balance against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact at the start of the Cold War.¹⁴² With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, NATO focused on regional conflicts such as in Kosovo and later in the Middle East after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States.¹⁴³ NATO has made another shift to refocus on a resurgent Russia and a return to competition similar to the Cold War but in the 21st century. NATO has addressed the actions taken by Russia in the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine by conducting the 2014

¹⁴¹ The expansionist influences such as taking territory by the annexation of Crimea or the Eastern part of Ukraine may not be the same in the Baltic Sea Region. There is potential for conventional means of warfare as viewed by Western perspectives, but there is also influence through propaganda or disinformation means that can influence populations and governments in the West to take on perspectives more favorable to an eastern European way of thinking.

¹⁴² “Why Was NATO Founded?,” We are NATO, accessed April 23, 2020, <https://www.nato.int/wearenato/index.html>.

¹⁴³ NATO, “KFOR”; NATO, “ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014) (Archived).”

Wales Summit denouncing the violation of Ukrainian sovereignty.¹⁴⁴ NATO has taken additional steps to protect its allies through enhanced forward presence (eFP) in the Baltic states and Poland after discussion at the Warsaw Summit in 2016.¹⁴⁵ NATO is adaptable to different challenges that it may be forced to face and continues to adapt through multinational cooperation as seen through the battlegroups that have been deployed and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) as part of the NATO Response Force (NRF) that is standing by for deployment in a time of crisis.¹⁴⁶ NATO has several member countries that surround the Baltic Sea that take part in a few cooperative efforts—eFP, VJTF, and NRF—and each of these countries have varying capabilities that can be offered up for the collective defense of NATO.

Much of life in the Nordic, Baltic, and northern European countries transpires along the coastlines of each country making the Baltic Sea important to the geopolitical and economic wellbeing of NATO members. Although the maritime realm in the Baltic is mostly free, it can potentially be turned into an environment that has capabilities denied by advisories working in the region. One such threat to NATO members and partners is the Kaliningrad exclave on the border of the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania.¹⁴⁷ There have been concerns that the corridor between Poland and the Baltic states could be closed in the event of a push by Russian forces through Belarus connecting Kaliningrad with the main body of Russia.

The potential threat of A2/AD weapons in the exclave are a concern to neighboring countries surrounding the Baltic Sea as these weapons could place military forces in a denied environment making operations more challenging and raising the potential risk.

¹⁴⁴ “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales,” NATO, accessed April 23, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.

¹⁴⁵ “Warsaw Summit Communiqué - Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016.”

¹⁴⁶ “Warsaw Summit Communiqué - Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016.”

¹⁴⁷ Juha Pyykönen and Stefan Forss, *Deterrence in the Nordic-Baltic Region: The Role of the Nordic Countries Together With the U.S. Army – SSI* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2019), 11, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/deterrence-in-the-nordic-baltic-region-the-role-of-the-nordic-countries-together-with-the-u-s-army/>.

There are a variety of weapons such as the S-400 surface-to-air missile system (SAM), coastal missile defenses like the Bastion-P that uses anti-ship cruise missiles, and Iskander-M ballistic missiles.¹⁴⁸ These weapons systems in conjunction with the manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum could make a conflict in the Baltic Sea for NATO maritime forces a challenge. Cyber-warfare and disinformation used at levels viewed below the kinetic threshold of warfare can be as great a problem as the kinetic weapons that are stationed in Kaliningrad. The use of television like RTV in the Baltic states and the use of bots and trolls to influence political decision making such as in Swedish elections are some cases where Russia has tried to interfere with the sovereignty of countries by manipulation at lower levels of conflict.¹⁴⁹ It is not only at the operational level of warfare that NATO and its allies should consider when conflict arises in regional affairs, but up to the strategic level with all potential options of conflict that should be considered when engaged with Russia.

The different members of NATO have a variety of capabilities that can be offered to assist in the Baltic, but many of the nations that surround the Baltic are more focused on the potential of a land conflict over that of maritime conflict. Much of the wars of Europe have been fought and decided on land with some major naval battles through history but the decisive points of victory were determined on land. The importance of maintaining open sea lanes is for the flow of needed resources and personnel associated with the defense and security of the Baltic and of Europe such as during both world wars. NATO has been working to increase its maritime capabilities not only in the Baltic but in other bodies of water where conflict with the Russian Navy or other forces could arise like the Black Sea or the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea.

The NATO maritime forces are broken up into four groups to allow for flexibility in response to potential maritime threats or crises. Two of these groups contain frigates and

¹⁴⁸ Robert Dalsjö, Michael Jonsson, and Christofer Berglund, "Bursting the Bubble? Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications" (Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, n.d.), 26, <https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4651--SE>.

¹⁴⁹ Johan Fernquist et al., "Bots and the Swedish Election," n.d., 16, <https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20MEMO%206466>.

destroyers that are a part of the standing NATO maritime groups one and two (SNMG) and the other two groups contain mine countermeasure units part of standing NATO mine countermeasure groups one and two (SNMCMG).¹⁵⁰ These maritime forces are comprised of a variety of vessels from countries like Norway, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands to name a few and each group is commanded by a different officer from that member countries naval force.¹⁵¹ These four groups make up the core naval force for NATO as part of the VJTF under the NRF, but additional naval forces can be called up if needed in the event of a crisis.¹⁵²

While not all of these forces are located in the Baltic there are countries like Denmark and Germany that have strong naval capabilities that can support other countries in the Baltic. Some countries like the Baltics states are more inclined to mine and countermine warfare and do not have the capabilities for anti-air warfare or anti-submarine warfare. Although this may appear as a disadvantage for individual countries it can be seen as an advantage for the collective defense of NATO. While the Baltic states handle mine warfare the other naval forces of NATO are free to push resources into the development and training of advancing surface, air, or subsurface capabilities in the warfare environment of the Baltic. Navies have always required a large checkbook to maintain and to stay relevant in an evolving world of warfare. By sharing the cost and the capabilities over a collective group the members of NATO can have a diverse amount of capabilities with specializations and expertise in each country for a cost that is manageable for each member's economy.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ "Allied Maritime Command," Maritime Groups, accessed April 27, 2020, <https://mc.nato.int/missions/maritime-groups>.

¹⁵¹ NATO. For further information on each group, there is a link to each command's page with information on ships and forces that are part of each group.

¹⁵² NATO.

¹⁵³ It is interesting that of the three Scandinavian countries—Norway, Sweden, and Denmark—all three have varying economic and defense alliances. Norway is a member of NATO but is not a member of the EU. Denmark is a member of both NATO and the EU. Then Sweden is a member of the EU, but not of NATO. This was an interesting situation to note which further research would likely reveal further information behind the reason why such alliances worked out in this manner when all three countries are also part of NORDEFCO. This situation would be an interesting topic for future research. Archick, "The Nordic Countries and U.S. Relations."

Norway, the United States, and NATO each have specific interests and concerns when dealing with potential security and defense issues in the Baltic region. Although Norway and the United States are not bordering the Baltic Sea, they both have interests with the organizations and countries that are located within the region. The historical and cultural ties of Scandinavia make defense cooperation a reasonable objective among Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. The shared border that Norway has with Russia and Finland ties in for cooperative efforts farther north that impacts the state of affairs in the Baltic. The United States has interests with the countries of the Baltic and continues to build on its cooperation with Sweden and Finland. Even though Sweden and Finland are not members, NATO remains close as each country is considered part of the Western European ideals and values.

Although each country and the collective organization of NATO as a whole may have different values associated with the security and defense of the Baltic, there is still the overall importance of the security of the collective countries that fall under the western allies. Some countries may feel more threatened than others by aggressive actions posed against them by the Russian military. However, in the cooperative security agreements between nations, there is the strategic ability to make a strong enough force to counter aggressive actions made against member countries and partners depending on the level of integration and shared capabilities between those forces. NATO and other member countries appear to be working towards these cooperative security goals at the diplomatic, information sharing, military, and economic levels. If NATO is to be successful at deterrence to ensure the security of the Baltic then it must continue to move in this direction to have a formidable force ready if that deterrence fails.

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IV. A CASE STUDY OF DEFENSE POLICIES IN SCANDINAVIA DURING THE COLD WAR

This chapter examines the circumstances of Swedish and Finnish defense policies during the Cold War and how they compare to the defense policies that are in place in response to increased instances of Russian aggression since 2014. The relationships among Norway, the United States, and NATO with Sweden and Finland are examined for how neutrality and semi-cooperative efforts were enacted during the Cold War. The relationships among these different countries during the Cold War compared to present times after the annexation of Crimea will show the changes that have taken place in defense policies in the Baltic. Finland and Sweden are caught between two great powers in the East and the West and each country's defense policy decisions will have implications upon how that state is treated by either side. Even though after the Cold War hostilities did not appear likely to resume, the cooperative efforts that Sweden and Finland have shown with NATO and the West may have a bigger impact on each country's defense situation in the Baltic. In a new era of great power competition, there are pressures to join military alliances that can become challenging when caught between rivals that will test a country's neutrality in war and non-alignment in peace.

One such country that has faced challenges to its sovereignty is Sweden. In recent years, Sweden has been more closely aligned to western policies, but that has not always been the case. The interactions between the West and Sweden developed over time from neutral to semi-cooperative efforts during the Cold War. At the end of World War II Sweden initially tried to establish a Scandinavian defense union (SDU) but was ultimately unsuccessful in 1949 as Norway and Denmark joined NATO.¹⁵⁴ Sweden has not officially aligned militarily with another country since the end of the Napoleonic wars, although Sweden did assist its neighbor Finland during the Russo-Finnish Winter War but not under

¹⁵⁴ Robert Dalsjö, *Life-Line Lost: The Rise and Fall of 'Neutral' Sweden's Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West* (Santerus Academic Press Sweden, 2006), 147.

official Swedish capacities.¹⁵⁵ Since Sweden was unable to make a Nordic defense alliance at the end of WWII it was in a position to become militarily non-aligned so as not to get mixed up in a conflict between the USSR and NATO.¹⁵⁶ If an attack was made against Sweden there was thought that aid would come from its neighboring countries to support Sweden in a time of crisis.

Initial relations between the United States and Sweden were non-existent, taking the time and the right people to open lines of communication and cooperation between the two countries.¹⁵⁷ There was likely still mistrust after the war as Sweden had provided iron ore to Germany through the duration of WWII, even though it likely had no other choice.¹⁵⁸ Although relations may not have quickly evolved and further developed soon after the war, by the 1950s and 1960s increased capacities for intelligence sharing on Soviet military assets that were spread throughout the Baltic were being passed along to the United States.¹⁵⁹ Even though Sweden was not directly aligned with the United States it still cooperated at certain levels to help protect the security of Sweden.

Sweden's official foreign policy was neutrality during the Cold War with plans to remain neutral if war broke out between other nations.¹⁶⁰ The political boundaries had changed since the end of WWII with much of Eastern Europe in control of the Soviet Union and the Baltic States under control of the USSR. Due to the shrunken distance between Sweden to Russia, with Finland in between with minimal strategic depth, remaining impartial to either the West or the East seemed to be in the best interest of the survival of

¹⁵⁵ Carl Bergqvist, "Determined By History: Why Sweden and Finland Will Not Be More than NATO Partners," War on the Rocks, July 13, 2016, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/determined-by-history-why-sweden-and-finland-will-not-be-more-than-nato-partners/>.

¹⁵⁶ Dalsjö, *Life-Line Lost: The Rise and Fall of 'Neutral' Sweden's Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West*, 147.

¹⁵⁷ Dalsjö, 157.

¹⁵⁸ Rolf Karlbom, "Sweden's Iron Ore Exports to Germany, 1933–1944," *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 13, no. 1 (January 1965): 65–93, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03585522.1965.10414365>.

¹⁵⁹ Dalsjö, *Life-Line Lost: The Rise and Fall of 'Neutral' Sweden's Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West*, 158.

¹⁶⁰ Mikael Nilsson, "Amber Nine: NATO's Secret Use of a Flight Path over Sweden and the Incorporation of Sweden in NATO's Infrastructure," *Journal of Contemporary History* 44, no. 2 (April 1, 2009): 287, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009408101252>.

Sweden. Sweden could have potentially become the next battleground for WWII along with East and West Germany if Sweden had decided to officially commit to an alignment with the West. To maintain the Swedish outward appearance of neutrality it had to cooperate with Western countries, like the United States, in secret for military purposes.¹⁶¹ The Social Democratic government of Sweden helped prevent Soviet suspicion from rising with its pro-Soviet tendencies that made the country and its people seem to be more left-leaning even while cooperating with Western nations.¹⁶² It would appear that Sweden had two separate dialogues between the East and the West that tried to show neutrality, but was in actuality secretive cooperation.

Sweden was important to the United States and NATO during the Cold War for several different reasons and Sweden cooperated with the West in a variety of ways from intelligence sharing to increase the capacities of Swedish landing strips for American heavy bombers.¹⁶³ Another important part of Swedish cooperation is that Swedish airspace provided a direct route for U.S. and NATO bombers to strike priority targets located in the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁴ Although Sweden agreed to some cooperative efforts with NATO to assist in some logistical capacities it did not fully know the entire plan for a NATO nuclear strike against the Soviet Union since it was not a member. Since Sweden had agreed to cooperate in some areas NATO expected Sweden to allow its aircraft and likely other requirements to fly through Sweden without concern and just allow it to happen.¹⁶⁵

The likely reasoning behind Swedish cooperation with the West is due to the isolation the country was put in after its Scandinavian neighbors, Norway and Denmark

¹⁶¹ Susanne Berger, "The Great Paradox of Swedish Neutrality in the Cold War and Today," War on the Rocks, December 28, 2015, <https://warontherocks.com/2015/12/the-great-paradox-of-swedish-neutrality-in-the-cold-war-and-today/>.

¹⁶² Berger, "The Great Paradox of Swedish Neutrality in the Cold War and Today." The pro-Soviet tendencies of Sweden were most likely not done purposefully to hide the fact that the Swedish government was cooperating with the United States and other NATO countries. It is most likely a coincidence that a left-leaning government was trying to align with Western military defense while trying to seek out the best deal to protect Sweden and its population.

¹⁶³ Nilsson, "Amber Nine," 288.

¹⁶⁴ Nilsson, 289.

¹⁶⁵ Nilsson, 290.

joined NATO instead of forming a neutral SDU which could have protected themselves from a Soviet attack. The occupation of Norway and Denmark during the Second World War is a primary reason why these two countries were much more eager to join a defense alliance like NATO over a neutral weaker alliance like the SDU. Sweden had been able to maintain somewhat of a neutral stance during the war while allowing some slight concessions to Germany and the allies at different times of the war when it was in Sweden's best interest for self-preservation. If the roles had been reversed and Sweden had been occupied by Nazi Germany, violating its neutrality in the war, then Sweden would have likely joined NATO instead of trying to remain neutral. However, these were not the historical events that took place so Sweden is still a close partner with NATO, but has not become a member like Norway and Denmark.

Even with the failure of the SDU, Sweden still maintained close relations for cooperative efforts with its Norwegian neighbor during the Cold War. Key connections that were made between Sweden and Norway for intelligence sharing during the Cold War were made back during WWII when Norwegian refugees fled occupied Norway to take refuge in Sweden.¹⁶⁶ Denmark joined a few years later in the intelligence-sharing with Sweden and Norway after an informal meeting in Gothenburg in 1948 between each of the represented countries.¹⁶⁷ Since these three countries were working towards further cooperation in intelligence sharing the Swedish intelligence office that coordinated with Norway and Denmark was only one part of the two departments that collected intelligence for the Swedish government.¹⁶⁸ The cooperative efforts between Sweden and Norway during the beginning of the Cold War were close and if or when the Soviet Union invaded Scandinavia there were expectations that the two countries would combine forces in defense of one another.¹⁶⁹ Much of what was discussed among the Scandinavian countries

¹⁶⁶ Magnus Petersson, "The Scandinavian Triangle: Danish-Norwegian-Swedish Military Intelligence Cooperation and Swedish Security Policy during the First Part of the Cold War," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 4 (August 1, 2006): 612, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390600766015>.

¹⁶⁷ Petersson, "The Scandinavian Triangle: Danish-Norwegian-Swedish Military Intelligence Cooperation and Swedish Security Policy during the First Part of the Cold War," 612.

¹⁶⁸ Petersson, 608-609. Not all of the information has been declassified and released from the initial years of the Cold War so there is still additional information on events that took place that is not yet known.

¹⁶⁹ Petersson, 617.

was kept secret and away from public viewing to protect the Swedish position of neutrality and keep the country from becoming entangled in any future conflicts.

Compared to the events of the Cold War it seems that Sweden has taken a more public stance on the defense of its country after the annexation of Crimea as compared to its cooperative efforts in secrecy during the Cold War. A likely reason for the change in defensive strategy is that after the fall of the Soviet Union, Sweden became increasingly closer to the West as it no longer had to fear military incursions into its country by Russia. Since the United States was the remaining hegemon it was in Sweden's best interests to more closely align towards western ideals and values to better its own country economically. Once Russia came back and rose as a resurgent power there was no going back to the secret cooperative efforts that Sweden once had done during the Cold War because Russia was already aware of Swedish cooperation with the West. Sweden understands that it cannot go back to the old ways of conducting its defense cooperation through secretive means, but must still maintain its position of neutrality and non-alignment by not becoming a member of NATO. Even though Sweden is not a full member of NATO, Sweden will still cooperate closely with NATO to make it a hard target for Russia and preserve Swedish sovereignty.

Although Finland has grown close in cooperation with Sweden through bilateral and multilateral organizations, Finland has always had a strong Russian neighbor looming over each of its moves. Finland's history between Russia and Sweden has made for interesting defense considerations. For most of Finnish history, it was part of Sweden until it was seceded to Russia in 1809 and did not gain its independence until the Bolsheviks revolution in Russia.¹⁷⁰ The Soviet Union tried to regain its control, but only gained moderate territories through the Winter War of 1939–1940.¹⁷¹ Finland did briefly join Nazi Germany to fight the Soviets but never regained lost territories from previous conflicts.¹⁷² Finland has tried to remain neutral in all of its dealings, but its record of going against

¹⁷⁰ Ministry for Foreign Affairs, "Main Outlines of Finnish History," This is Finland, January 9, 2014, <https://finland.fi/life-society/main-outlines-of-finnish-history/>.

¹⁷¹ Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

¹⁷² Bergqvist, "Determined By History."

Russian actions is still echoed throughout history and Russia seems to expect the same stance of defense again from Finland.

The Finnish-Soviet security treaty of 1948, also known as the Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance, put Finland in a sort of hold by the Soviet Union as Finland promised it would not attack the USSR as long as it was not attacked.¹⁷³ There were also understandings within this treaty that if Finland did feel threatened that a neutral country such as itself could look for aid from anyone willing to assist, which at the time would likely have had to be the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁴ Finland likely felt cut off in a defense policy aspect from the west due to its previous alliances and failures of support against the Soviet Union during the Winter War and after supporting the Axis powers during WWII for a short time it was an additional challenge to be accepted by western standards.

Although Finland proclaimed neutrality to protect itself from getting in between a war among NATO and the Warsaw Pact it was economically aligned to the West with its free-market economy.¹⁷⁵ Since Finland was divided economically and militarily it would be viewed as being split between the great power competition of the Cold War and had to drive policies in the best manner that its government could to remain neutral. If neutrality had broken down and conflict had ensued between Finland and the Soviet Union, the Finns would have likely been fighting alone just as they had during the Winter War a few years earlier.¹⁷⁶ It was important for Finland to maintain its neutrality during the Cold War due to past decisions and interactions of alliances. If Finland had made any rapid decisions to join alliances like NATO it would have set off alarms within the Soviet Union. It was also likely improbable that NATO could allow Finland to align militarily with the West so soon after the end of WWII due to previous alliances, but after the first 20 years of the Cold War would have been more likely to consider a closer partnership.

¹⁷³ Klaus Tornudd, "Finnish Neutrality Policy during the Cold War," *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 25, no. 2 (November 28, 2005): 44-45, <https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2005.0044>.

¹⁷⁴ Tornudd, "Finnish Neutrality Policy during the Cold War," 45.

¹⁷⁵ Tornudd, 46-47.

¹⁷⁶ Tornudd, 46.

Finish and Swedish defense policies during the Cold War have some similarities to the defense policies of the current timeframe after the annexation of Crimea. Both countries have refrained from becoming full members of NATO, but each has increased cooperative capacities and capabilities with the organization since the fall of the Soviet Union. Both Sweden and Finland have joined the EU not only for increased economic potential but also for the security of Europe as a collective.¹⁷⁷ The neutrality that both countries once announced during the Cold War as the official stance of each country has evolved into a non-alignment with NATO, but there has been enhanced cooperation that could eventually lead to membership if the right conditions are met. Sweden and Finland, although different in each of its approaches to foreign policy and defense, have strengthened cooperative efforts between one another and the rest of Europe to better the security and stability of the Baltic Sea Region.

¹⁷⁷ European Union, “Finland”; European Union, “Sweden.”

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V. CONCLUSION

Sweden and Finland have had a long history with one another and the surrounding states that precedes the contemporary issue of security policies in the Baltic. Although a great deal has changed in the world since the 17th century and the conflict of the Thirty Years War, some things resonate through time and reappear as a different political, social, and military function. What can be determined through observations of past events and alliances is that non-alignment and neutrality can be used for strategic planning to remain out of large military alliances under the correct conditions. Varying levels of neutrality during times of war and non-alignment during times of peace have allowed Sweden and Finland to remain out of fully joining NATO while still cooperating at increasing levels to gain much of the benefits. Due to specific shifts in the control of power in the world going from bipolar during the Cold War to a unipolar world post-Cold War and now with a return of great power competition there is more visibility of cooperation for Baltic security and defense. Due to the historical events of the past and the experiences that each country endured during war and peace led decisions to cooperate with other countries in certain manners and to implement security policies that are currently in place in the Baltic.

Neutrality has been used by countries like Switzerland and the U.S. throughout history to prevent belligerent powers from intervening in the affairs of the state or when a state would only suffer great losses from involving itself in the foreign affairs and wars of Europe. Neutrality has helped the U.S., when it was a weaker state during the 19th century, to mostly remain out of the great wars of Europe until it was thrust into becoming a great power at the turn of the century. Sweden was at its height of power during the 17th century over much of Europe, but due to loss of territory and other states gaining greater power over Sweden, it finally had to protract into policies of neutrality for the preservation of its sovereignty. Finland, which has traded hands between Sweden and Russia, has also had to pursue a policy of neutrality when it was not strong enough to take on outside forces but when threatened, such as defending against the Bolshevik revolution and during the Winter War with the Soviet Union, it used what force it could muster to fend off its aggressor. Although the Finnish may have tried to remain neutral and join an alliance it still looked

for help from western countries that shared similar values for help during times of conflict and times of peace.

It can be much easier for a country to align with other countries of similar values once attacked by a country on the other end of the polarized spectrum. A bipolar world can make decision making seem simpler because a country has only one of two choices to pick between which side it should fall under. The Cold War made decision making for the East and the West understandable as the East forced control over soviet states through terror and the West gave decisions for free liberal democracy to spread. Sweden and Finland found themselves between these two superpowers during the Cold War and had unique ways of maintaining their sovereignty while not officially aligned with the East or the West in the public domain of influence. Sweden did have regular communication and cooperation efforts with the U.S. since it had stronger western values over ideologies of the East. Finland has similar western values, but because of past incursion with Russia and the Soviet Union, it had to pursue a form of *détente*. By Finland having a level of understanding with the Soviet Union, it could live in peace between the East and the West without being swallowed up by the Soviets as the Baltic States had been. Both Sweden and Finland used varying amounts of neutrality and non-alignment, to work for its benefit to remain out of conflict the best it could while trying to retain its strength so it did not become a weakened European power after engagement in war. These policies of neutrality come from the lessons learned during the decline from power centuries ago which still have an impact on decision making today.

One main difference between Swedish and Finnish defense policy during the Cold War as compared to today is the presentation in the public sphere so that all nations can see Swedish and Finnish cooperative efforts with the West. During the Cold War much of what was done between non-aligned Nordic countries was kept secretive. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the closed doors have opened up into showing the cooperative security strategy Sweden and Finland have been leaning towards. The countries surrounding the Baltic at the end of the Cold War likely never expected Russia to become as great of a threat again, as seen from a western perspective, and felt it would be prudent to try and more closely align to the West for economic and security advancement. After

the end of the Cold War, there were no expectations for larger-scale conflicts to arise once more as they did during the World Wars, but instead only small regional conflicts involving non-state actors or terrorist groups that could be dealt with smaller security forces. The rapid drawdown by most countries' military forces lulled many into a false state of security until Russian forces invaded Ukraine. Once NATO began waking up to the potential threat that Russia was once again becoming, NATO has made modest attempts to build up its strength to be a deterrent to Russia and have a substantial enough force to defend against Russian aggression in the evolving domains of warfare.

Deterrence during the Cold War is not the same deterrence in the contemporary era. There are similarities when looking at power and influence, but it is not a conflict of democracy against communism as it was described during the Cold War. There is still a difference of values between the U.S. and Russia, and the East and the West, and how those values play into economic strength, social and cultural norms, and how people view themselves within each of these two systems. These differences between the two nations have caused growing tension and friction between them which caused a divide in Europe during the Cold War and is shifting back now with additional countries opposing Russian foreign policies and incursions into other sovereign nations. Violations of international law in a system that is not bought into by Russia will only fluster both sides since neither one will understand the other's logic if they can not see past their own. Until the civil-military-political systems can meet at more common ground, interactions between East and West will continue to be a challenge with one another at varying levels of intensified aggression and hostilities.

Russia has taken to commencing hostile acts on its boards where potential insecurity could arise or potential gains to strengthen its security could be made. The Baltic, being one such area, has been and will continue to be a region where Russia has security interests just the same as the other states that surround the Baltic Sea have security concerns. The historical, geopolitical, and values of the Baltic play a role in the security policies chosen by the states in the region. The experiences through history from the transition of Swedish power to a neutrality policy that has become a cooperative engagement strategy is linked to its experiences during WWII and the Cold War. Sweden

looks for deepened cooperation with fellow Nordic countries to make a strong enough deterrent in Northern Europe while being selective with its cooperation with NATO. By staying under NATO's shadow while still seeking defense cooperation through NORDEFCO and the EU it has effectively made a layered defense around itself without joining the antagonist to Russian security policy, NATO. Finland in a similar manner has done what Sweden has aimed for as a security policy that incorporates layered defenses through partnerships, but Finland is on the front line with its shared border with Russia. The geopolitical aspect for Finland would seem that it would have joined NATO like the Baltic States did before Russia became a resurgent power, but it did not. Instead, Finland has been able to stay between East and West with dependent cooperation with NATO while not upsetting the balance with Russia. While the other surrounding Nordic, Baltic, Scandinavian, and Northern European countries are members of NATO and have set articles that define each of their defense requirements and necessary security policies in the region, Sweden and Finland have flexibility in their response to Baltic security.

The reason that understanding Baltic security is important to a naval officer that may serve in this region is that understanding the dynamics between countries and between alliances makes a difference in that naval officer's effectiveness. The capabilities that each country can offer in the defense of the Baltic vary and each state has to consider its domestic policies as they affect the foreign policy and interactions with neighbor states. A naval officer who has a better understanding of the internal workings of countries that surround the Baltic will be more effective at the joint staff level. Focusing purely on the military aspect of cooperation can achieve a minimal effect, but by cooperating with Baltic partners at the diplomatic, information, and economic levels a stronger strategy can be accomplished.

The importance of maritime forces is central to the Baltic since all the countries in the region rely on the Baltic Sea for commerce and military defense. Many nations that are impacted by this region have a strong focus on maritime power such as Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Norway. The other countries of mainland Europe are more concerned with land defense and potential choke points like the Suwalki Gap or the Fulda Gap. There is also the choke point at sea, the Danish Straits, that if shut down could cut off the countries

in the Baltic by maritime means of defense. Understanding these strategic points in the region and the significance to each country that presides over them gives a clearer understanding of decisions among Baltic nations. Through gaining a better understanding of how cooperation and interactions between nations work in the Baltic, a naval officer will be a more effective strategic planner.

Potential areas for further research should include the high north or Arctic region since this area directly impacts Norway and other Nordic countries. Russia's secure second-strike capability, nuclear submarines, also operate in this area and have a direct strategic impact on decision making in the Baltic. The North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea could also be areas of future interest as submarine capabilities and usage increase. The Baltic and northern Europe are an ever-growing area of interest for political, economic, and military ventures which will present further evolution in defense policies over the next decade.

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